THE POETIC PAUL

On Creating New Realities for Righteousness in Romans

David Southall

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The Whitley Lecture was first established in 1949, in honour of W.T. Whitley (1861-1947), the Baptist minister and historian. Following a pastorate in Bridlington, during which he also taught at Rawdon College in Yorkshire, in 1891 Whitley became the first Principal of the Baptist College of Victoria in Melbourne in Australia. The college was later renamed Whitley College in his honour.

Whitley was a key figure in the formation of the Baptist Historical Society in 1908. He edited its journal, which soon gained an international reputation for the quality of its contents – a reputation it still enjoys over a century later as the Baptist Quarterly. His History of British Baptists (1923) remains an important source of information and comment for contemporary historians. Altogether he made an important contribution to Baptist life and self understanding in Britain and Australia, providing a model of how a pastor-scholar might enrich the life and faith of others.

The establishment of the annual lecture in his name was intended to encourage research and writing by Baptist scholars, and to enable the results of this work to be published, and this continues as its aim today. The giving of grants, advice and other forms of support by the Lectureship Committee serves the same purpose. The British Baptist Colleges, the Baptist Union of Great Britain, BMS World Mission, the Baptist Ministers Fellowship and the Baptist Historical Society are represented on the committee. These organisations also provide financial support for its work.

This year the committee is delighted that David Southall has agreed to be our Whitley Lecturer. David is a Baptist Minister who has served in Baptist churches in Saltley, Birmingham and South Croydon. He is married to Alison and has three children. David gained his doctorate in 2007, following a period of study at Spurgeon's College, where he continues to be an Associate Research Fellow.
David is now a Healthcare Chaplain at Worcestershire Royal Hospital where, amongst other things, he continues to research and write on metaphor and narrative and their usefulness to patient care. He is always happy to dialogue on these and many other issues and can be reached on David.Southall@worcsacute.nhs.uk.

In The Poetic Paul, David takes a fresh look at Paul's understanding of sin and righteousness in Romans. His New Testament research, combined with his experience as a minister and healthcare chaplain, bears fruit in this thoughtful and pastorally sensitive publication. Paul's personification of Righteousness and Sin and his rich use of metaphor provide fertile ground for exploring his theology. Anyone interested in the relevance of the Gospel today and contemporary debates around Justification and Universalism will find his message helpful and stimulating.

Further printed copies are available from the Baptist Union of Great Britain.

Peter Shepherd
Secretary, Whitley Lectureship Management Committee
INTRODUCTION

The writings of the Apostle Paul are replete with metaphor, narrative and personifications. The aim of this paper is to present, in outline, the results of a thought experiment in which we let Paul's use of language exert its full influence on the thematic δικαιοσύνη of Romans. The results will provide a new way of reading some Pauline texts and present a model in which the Apostle uses the term Righteousness, when it is personified, as an equivalent term for Christ himself.

I want to achieve my aim by considering three areas. Firstly, I will propose a mechanism for what is happening in passages in which righteousness is personified within metaphoric and narratorial settings. I will do so by drawing on literary theorists in order to examine the operational mechanisms of the three poetic tropes. Secondly, I want to give a brief outline of how the interplay of metaphor, narrative and personification impinges on the interpretation of righteousness in certain passages in Romans. Finally, I want to suggest, in a preliminary way, the cash value of these findings for some aspects of Pauline theology. In essence, the modest aim of this paper is to present in nuce my entire thesis.

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1 David J. Southall, Rediscovering Righteousness in Romans: Personified Δικαιοσύνη within Metaphoric and Narratorial Settings (WUNT 240; Mohr Siebeck, 2008).
METAPHOR NARRATIVE AND PERSONIFICATION

Metaphor

In outlining my approach to metaphor I must first begin with recourse to one of the trope's principal theoreticians: Paul Ricoeur.² Ricoeur sets himself against the rhetorical tradition in which metaphor is viewed as ornamental and substitutionary.³ For him metaphor is a semantic impertinence, a violation of language codes, which is productive of new information and imaginative new meaning.⁴

To say that metaphor is not drawn from anywhere is to recognise it for what it is: namely, a momentary creation of language, a semantic innovation which does not have a status in the language as something already established whether as a designation or as a connotation.⁵

For Ricoeur, therefore, metaphor as substitution 'is a sterile operation'; whilst his view of the trope gives rise to a 'veritable creation of meaning'.⁶

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³ For an example of metaphor as an 'abuse of language' which 'insinuates wrong ideas' see John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (2 vols.; ed. A. C. Fraser; Oxford: Clarendon, 1894), 146-47. Paul Avis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol and Myth in Religion and Theology (London: Routledge, 1999), 93 helpfully notes the generalisation that some, like the classical writers, held an ornamental or substitutionary view of metaphor, whilst the Romantics, literary critics and philosophers of science suggest an incremental or constitutive view. Since Aristotle the argument has revolved around 'whether metaphor is merely ornamental to already existing thoughts or words, or actually creative and constitutive of thoughts and words.'

⁴ Ricoeur, 'Hermeneutics', 79-80.

⁵ Ricoeur, 'Metaphor', 174. (Emphasis added.)

⁶ Ricoeur, 'Hermeneutics', 79.
It is not possible to deal in depth with Ricoeur’s view of metaphor. However, certain assertions emerge which are important for my project and are listed below:

- Metaphor has more than an emotional value; it engenders *new information*.

- Metaphor says something new about reality and conveys *cognitive truth*.

- Metaphor operates at the *level of the sentence* and not of the word; it validates the intrinsic *polysemy* of words.

- Metaphor is *untranslatable* and *irreducible* to ‘literal’ paraphrase.

Ricoeur draws on Aristotle and states:

Why do poets write tragedies, elaborate fables, use ‘unusual’ words such as metaphors? Because tragedy itself is connected to a more fundamental human project, that of *imitating* human actions in a poetic way ... tragedy is destined to express human reality, to express the tragedy of life. But on the other hand *mimesis* does not mean the duplication of reality; *mimesis* is not a copy: *mimesis* is *poiesis*, that is, construction, creation ... an imitation of human actions which make them appear better, higher, more noble than they are in reality.

As such he is able to maintain his view of metaphor as a creative imitation of reality; in other words metaphor has a *mimetic function*.

Ricoeur also notes that metaphors are not isolated events; rather ‘there are often clusters or networks of metaphors underlying either a

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7 ibid.
8 ibid.
10 Ricoeur, ‘Hermeneutics’, 78.
11 ibid., 179-80.
12 ibid., 180.
poem as a whole or an entire work' and one metaphor calls for another. He notes this in the Hebrew tradition where God is called King, Father, Husband, Shepherd and so forth and states:

These ‘root’ metaphors have a particular capability to engender an unlimited number of potential interpretations at a more conceptual level. Thus they both gather and diffuse. They gather subordinate metaphors and diffuse new streams of thought.

Colin E. Gunton draws on Ricoeur’s work and applies it to Biblical Studies. Like Ricoeur, metaphors for Gunton are not literary adornments but robust, primary, inescapable and essential features of human language. For Gunton, they play an untranslatable and irreducible part in the creative construction of new perceptions of reality: ‘no advance in knowledge of the world is possible without changes in the meaning of words, that is to say, by means of the development of metaphors.’

He says:

to construe life as a play or a dream is not only to organise or interpret life in different ways, but also to give plays and dreams a significance that they might not otherwise have had. That is to say, metaphor can have a revelatory formula.

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14 ibid.
16 On proponents ‘for’ and ‘against’ the view that a metaphor can be translated or paraphrased see Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 353-54.
17 Gunton, Actuality, 30. Like Ricoeur he too draws on the work of Black, Models and Metaphor and also Clive S. Lewis, ‘Bluspels and Flalansferes’, in The Importance of Language (ed. M. Black; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963). (See the good summary of the Ricoeur in Thiselton, New Horizons, 352-54 who shows that Ricoeur is not ‘breaking new ground when he argues that metaphor made new connections through the use of creative imagination.’).
There is much more that could be said about metaphor, with regard to the fixing of reference, its untranslatability; and its ability to act as a metaphor system at a conceptual level. However, for the time being I seem to be on safe ground in saying that metaphor is powerful and not ornamental; that it is semantically innovative; and that it gives us new ways of creatively constructing reality.

**Narrative**

However, metaphor is not the only literary device operative within certain passages in Romans. Much could be said about the rise of interest in narratorial elements within biblical studies and Pauline writings. And it would be remiss not to mention the foundational work in this area by Richard B. Hays and Douglas A. Campbell, as well as others. Fundamentally, they point to the fact that a narrative is constructed of *actants* and a *plot* enacted in time.

However, here I must deal only with the mechanism of narrative; and again I draw on the work of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur's work on narrative is complex; but for my purposes he identifies an important point; namely that *narrative* operates in a similar manner to metaphor; that is

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20 Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ*, 82-95 (92-101). Hays is not far from Ricoeur here and specifically mentions him earlier in his work (24-25 [23-24]).

to say it has a *semantically innovative* role.

Despite the complexity of Ricoeur’s work he puts forward his main ideas on narrative with clarity and succinctness. His main contention revolves around the *creative power of narratives* in generating *possible* ways of understanding and viewing the world. So he states:

> The meaning of a text lies not behind the text but in front of it. The meaning is not something hidden but something disclosed. What gives rise to understanding is that which points towards a *possible* world, by means of the non-ostensive references of the text. Texts speak of *possible* worlds and of *possible* ways of orientating oneself in these worlds.

For Ricoeur, therefore, narrative constructs the world of the possible.

Again more could be said of his notions of *plenitude* and *plot* - and the way in which he utilises Aristotle to show a mimetic function of narrative. But perhaps all this might be summed up in his statement:

> I see in the plots we invent the privileged means by which we *re-configure* our confused unformed and at the limit mute temporal experience.

In Aristotle’s terms: the literary work as a whole (and its constituent parts - *mythos* and *mimesis*) are all involved in this creative construction. So ‘narrative has a mimetic function’. Crucially, therefore, narratives offer ‘a model of perceiving things differently, a paradigm of new vision’. ‘[Narrative] is not an instance of *reproductive imagination* [i.e. a copy of the original] but of *productive*...

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23 Ricoeur, ‘Metaphor’, 177. (Emphasis added.)


26 ibid.
imagination'; it refers to reality not in order to copy it but to prescribe a new reading.\textsuperscript{27}

Ricoeur concludes that 'narrative systems have a cognitive value: they make reality appear in such and such a way'.\textsuperscript{28} Thus when the reader is seized by the refigured world, the narrative-effects, according to Ricoeur, become \textit{revelatory and transformative}: 'The effects of fiction, effects of revelation and transformation, are essentially the effects of reading\textsuperscript{29} in which \textit{mimesis} (and hence both \textit{mythos} and \textit{poiesis}) is 'the Greek term for disclosure of a world'.\textsuperscript{30}

This all too brief sketch of Ricoeur's work highlights the fact that narrative can be conceived of as a mode of \textit{semantic innovation}, operating within the realm of the productive imagination; prescribing new readings and constructing possible worlds. This is clearly a 'strong' conception of narrative and bears a family likeness to that of metaphor above.

So if, as Ricoeur suggests, narrative functions to produce new information, then we might justifiably expect the narratorial elements within the Apostle's writings to produce a degree of semantic innovation at the level of the sentence or word. In view of this, it seems reasonable to suggest that there is the possibility that righteousness will undergo semantic innovation in narratorial settings in the same way that it might within metaphor rich texts.

\textbf{METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE IN CONCERT}

In comparing the mechanisms of metaphor and narrative above, it also needs to be recognised that they operate in similar ways to produce new information. In fact these two modes of language often operate \textit{in concert}.

Again, Ricoeur notes both metaphor and narrative operate at the level of the same basic unit, the sentence; maximal in the case of

\textsuperscript{27} ibid., 292-93.
\textsuperscript{28} ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ricoeur, \textit{Time and Narrative}, 3:101.
\textsuperscript{30} Ricoeur, 'Metaphor', 180.
metaphor and minimal in the case of discourse or narrative. Thus they may be regarded as 'similar processes which are merely applied to two different strategic levels of discourse, the level of the work and that of the word'. In addition, in the discussions above metaphor and narrative have both been seen as being productive of imagination - constructing a world of the possible. Furthermore, I have noted that, by developing Aristotle, Ricoeur has shown that metaphor and narrative have a mimetic function; in other words they are devices of semantic innovation; the former by 'extending the polysemic characteristic of natural languages', the latter by 'the invention of plots'.

In *Time and Narrative* Ricoeur formalises the interweaving which has been implicit in some of his earlier works and, in articulating the link between metaphor and narrative, states:

> Although metaphor has traditionally belonged to the theory of 'tropes' (or figures of discourse) and narrative to the theory of literary 'genres', the meaning-effects produced by each of them belong to the same basic phenomenon of semantic innovation. ... With metaphor, the innovation lies in the producing of a new semantic pertinence by means of an impertinent attribution. ... With narrative, the semantic innovation lies in the inventing of another work of synthesis - a plot. ... It is this synthesis of the heterogeneous that brings narrative close to metaphor. In both cases, the new thing - the as yet unsaid, the unwritten - springs up in language. Here a living metaphor, that is, a new pertinence in the predication, there a feigned plot, that is, a new congruence in the organization of events.

*What unfolds, then, is one vast poetic sphere that includes metaphorical utterances and narrative discourse.*

The *in concert* functioning of the modes will prove important later where I will firstly show that personified Righteousness occurs within metaphorical and narratival frameworks; and secondly show how such

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31 Ricoeur 'Metaphor', 166-67. In this sense 'metaphors are works in miniature'.
32 ibid., 171.
34 Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 1:ix. (Emphasis added.)
35 ibid., xi.
frameworks enable δικαιοσύνη to undergo semantic innovation in which it becomes an equivalent term for Christ. However, I am not quite finished with modes of expression which are generative of such innovation, and turn my attention to one final trope used by Paul, namely personification.

PERSONIFICATION

It is fair to say that, unlike metaphor and narrative, personification has not received major treatment within Pauline studies despite its prominence. In fact the major debate in biblical studies has been the one in which hypostatisation has been set in opposition to personification. Let us take the notion of wisdom in the Hebrew Scriptures as an example of the trajectory of past discussions.

So, on the one hand Bousett and Helmer Ringgren exemplify hypostatisation by their comments on Prov 8:22-31 where wisdom says: 'The Lord created me [wisdom] at the beginnings of his work. Ages ago I was set up.' Hence, Ringgren says: 'Wisdom is here not an abstraction or a purely poetic personification but a concrete being, self-existent beside God.' And Bousset defined these Jewish 'hypostases' as 'intermediate entities (Mitteldinge), something in between personalities and abstract beings'.

In opposition to this view Dunn and Hurtado exemplify the personification approach when they state:

Wisdom passages are simply ways of describing Yahweh's wise creation and purpose ... Within Jewish monotheism and Hebraic literary idiom Wisdom never really becomes more than a personification - a personification not so much of a divine attribute but rather of a function of Yahweh, a way of speaking about God himself, of expressing God's

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actively involved with his world. 38

Interestingly the same debate has revolved around Sedek (righteousness) in the Hebrew Scriptures: is this an intermediary being or a personification. 39

I have argued elsewhere for a deficiency in the hypostatisation view, based on an false understanding of language amongst other things. 40 But Dunn’s personification position seems little more than suggesting that personification is an ornamental literary device. Is this adequate? I suggest not.

An initial attempt at defining personification includes the idea that it is a figure of speech endowing non-human objects, abstractions, or creatures, with life and human characteristics. 41 Personification was much debated within the rhetorical tradition, where most often it was called prosopopeia with perhaps Quintilian being its most able exponent. 42 The history of personification became closely allied with the rise of allegory, especially in the Middle Ages as seen in the

40 Southall, Rediscovering Righteousness, Chapter 3.
Psychomachia of Prudentius and Langland’s Piers Plowman.\(^{43}\) However, for several reasons (including the theory that personification replaced mythical figuration when rational attitudes superseded the primitive imagination) personification (like metaphor) has been viewed as an ornamental, puerile and intellectually unsophisticated figure of speech.\(^{44}\)

Recently, however, James Paxson has sought to rehabilitate personification in an attempt to show that it is "one of several tropes that are uniquely and deceptively powerful in the creation of literature. Personification is the prime poetic mark of theoretical self-awareness and maturity, a signal not of the failure of the literary imagination but of its success and fulfilment."\(^{45}\) It is a "complex artistic tool for revealing and advertizing the problems and limits inherent in narration in particular ... and verbal creation in general,"\(^{46}\) "a violation of grammatical rules which suggests the animation of a noun that is abstract."\(^{47}\)

So Paxson has a strong view of personification; like metaphor and narrative, personification is creative and revelatory, working at the level of the imagination as a semantically innovative figure of speech.

Paxson also attempts to devise an inclusive and extensive taxonomy of personification. His categorisations include:

- **Substantialisation**: the figural translation of any non-corporeal quantity into a physical, corporeal one.\(^{48}\)

- **Anthropomorphism**: the figural translation of any non-human

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\(^{44}\) For those who hold such views see James J. Paxson, *The Poetics of Personification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 12-34.

\(^{45}\) ibid., 175.

\(^{46}\) ibid., i.

\(^{47}\) ibid., 30.

\(^{48}\) ibid., 42.
quantity into a character that has human form.\textsuperscript{49}

- \textit{Personification (prosopopeia)}: the figural translation of any non-human language quantity into a sentient human capable of thought and language, possessing voice and face.\textsuperscript{50}

It can be seen above that, for Paxson, not all personifications are the same and his taxonomy seeks to provide some methodological rigour in their appraisal. For example he suggests that the personification of Wisdom in Wis 7, and the abstractions Virgil places in the underworld in Book 6 of the \textit{Aeneid} ('Grief', 'Care' and 'Pale Disease' etc.) are 'elemental personifications' because 'they are utterly mute and produce no physical actions'.\textsuperscript{51} They are, therefore, \textit{substantialisations} with the figural operator being \textit{anthropomorphism}; true personification is \textit{prosopopeia} where the personified entity speaks. However, were he to have developed the case with regard to Wisdom (although not part of his remit), he would no doubt have given the taxonomic label personification to the character of Wisdom which is given voice in Sir 24 or Prov 8.\textsuperscript{52}

Whilst Paxson's taxonomy seems rather overplayed, it does alert us to the range of personifications which we may encounter with regard to personified righteousness. In a similar way to J. Hillis Miller, I eschew somewhat the fine taxonomic distinctions above and suggest that any type of narratorial character invention, whether speaking or mute, is entitled to be called personification.\textsuperscript{53} Nevertheless, Paxson's recognition of different elements within the personificatory mode is to be welcomed; for example in the passages I have investigated in Romans, I have shown that Δικαιοσύνη takes on the mute

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{49} ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} ibid. (Emphasis added.)
\textsuperscript{51} ibid., 44. For Paxson's comments on Wisdom see 36-7. In citing Virgil he draws on \textit{Aeneid} VI, 273-81.
\textsuperscript{52} Paxson does not have the personification of Wisdom within his purview here so he does not pursue it any further. For data on Wisdom in Jewish writings see below.
\textsuperscript{53} J. Hillis Miller, \textit{Versions of Pygmalion} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 5. 'Prospopoeia is the ascription to entities that are not really alive first of a name, then of a face, and finally in a return to language, of a voice'.
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substantialised roles of slave-master and athlete (in Rom 6:18 and 9:30);54 I have also made the case for a strong personification - or prosopopeia - when Righteousness speaks in Rom 10:6.55

Paxson affirms the view that personification, like metaphor, is sufficiently complex and important to warrant the type of treatment which he has given; and if perhaps not fully agreeing with him that personification is the master trope of poetic discourse, I align myself with his robust conception of personification in producing semantic innovation.56 In this way, Paxon's position belies Dunn's weak conception of personification; a Hebraic idiom which is merely a vivid way of speaking about God.57 Such an ornamental view of personification seems inadequate in the light of the strong theory of personification proposed above. This is not to say that some personifications are not local rhetorical ornament; clearly some are and they have little significance in producing semantic innovation,58 but others should be treated as strong tropes which can create new possibilities.

For my purpose here, however, Paxon's position provides a way forward with regard to an understanding of righteousness in Paul's writing. His assertion that personification is constitutive of all narration is an important point in the discussion of personification's relationship with metaphor and narrative.59 This allows for the view that personification is best seen as a character invention within metaphoric and narratorial matrices. In suggesting this I am able to steer between

54 Southall, Rediscovering Righteousness, Chapter 6 & 7.
55 ibid. Chapter 10.
57 See 3.3.3.
59 Paxson, Poetics, 169. Here he agrees with J. Hillis Miller, 'Narrative', in Critical Terms for Literary Study (eds. F. Lentricchia and T. McLaughlin; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 66-79. See also J. Hillis Miller, Versions of Pygmalion, 220-21. 'Personification is not just any trope having the potential to generate a narrative. Personification is the inaugural trope of narration and without it there is no storytelling'.
the Scylla of viewing personified righteousness as a hypostasis (which I consider untenable) and the Charibdis of seeing righteousness as an ornamental personification (which I consider inadequate).

My contention is evidenced by the fact that early in the classical rhetorical tradition one of the key distinctives of personification was that it was a trope of character invention. So the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* presents personifications as figures which have ‘the power to make present’ and ‘to lend speech to mute things’. This method of character invention is also found in Greek drama and philosophical discourse where ‘at the openings of Plato’s dialogues or the plays of Euripides is the oft found rubric - *prosopa* - meaning *dramatis personae*; the creation of any kind of dramatic character in mimetic form’. For Quintilian, the notion of *prosopopeia* was a fertile means of discursive invention, and in relating it to juridical discourse, he says:

*By prosopopeia* I mean fictitious speeches supposed to be uttered, such as an advocate puts into the mouth of his client ... then the judge seems to hear the voice and feelings of the unhappy victims ... even though they never uttered a word.

This character invention is nicely summed up by Bloomfield in a general definition: ‘Personification is the process of animating inanimate objects or abstract notions ... and also the *animate figure thereby created*’. Signs of such character invention include the use of verbs which are normally used only of living entities and the use of

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nouns as names of living beings.⁶⁴

PERSONIFICATION AND NARRATIVE

If the above notion of personification is adopted, then ‘personification as character invention’ suggests that the trope is related to narrative discourse. If narratives, as I have suggested, are discerned by means of a particular form - plot and actants - then personified figures take their place within the discourse unit as the latter; i.e. they play the part of the actors within the story.

To substantiate this I must return briefly to the work of James Paxson for whom the ‘personification figure is made up of the ‘personifier’ and the ‘personified’.⁶⁵ The ‘personifier’ conforms to a standardized narrative actant: ‘(s)he is a mobile and active human being endowed with speech, and representative of a specific psychological, physiological and ideological constitution’.⁶⁶ The ‘personified’ is found among a range of abstractions, inanimates and creatures and is figurally translated into the ‘personifier’.⁶⁷ The resultant personified figure is thus a compound entity.

However, it is at this point that we must recognise the non-referential nature of the actant within the narrative; that is to say that the personified character is just that - a personification and not a person.⁶⁸ This does not mean that there is no referentiality; a simple narrative (or intimation of a narrative) may well fit within or resonate with larger narratives in which reference is intimated or fixed.⁶⁹ However, the non-referential nature of the personification avoids the error of falsely attributing hypostatization to what is in fact a literary device. We are neither allowing the actant to be ontologically privileged, nor treating

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⁶⁴ ibid.
⁶⁵ Heim, ‘Personification of Jerusalem’, 135 notes Paxson’s dependence on ‘the common "Saussurian" linguistic distinction between "signifier" and "signified"’ which ‘also applies to personifications’.
⁶⁶ Paxson, Poetics, 40.
⁶⁷ ibid.
⁶⁸ Caird, Language, 137.
⁶⁹ See Southall, Rediscovering Righteousness, Chapter 3 for a discussion on narrative dynamics in Paul.
it as an allegorical cipher in which the code must be cracked to discern its 'true' identity; nor are we adopting a weak view of personification as merely poetic. Rather, because the narrative dynamic mode can act to produce semantic innovation we need not resort to such techniques.

The Importance of Metaphor and Narrative for Personified Righteousness in Romans

We have travelled some distance in our exploration of theoretical models which discuss the functioning of metaphor, narrative and personification. It is now time to pull these strands together and assess their impact for a reading of righteousness in Romans. At this point I must say that I will only be able to present the briefest overview of this, without the exegetical detail, but hopefully the ideas below will give a flavour of the trajectory and fruit of this approach.\[^{70}\] I will begin with Romans 6, where Righteousness is clearly personified as slave master, move on to Romans 9 where δικαιοσύνη takes his part as an athlete in a footrace, and end with Romans 10:6 where the Righteousness entity finally speaks with his own voice. I will suggest that, in each of these cases, personified Righteousness, acting out a role within a strongly metaphoric and narratorial context, actually becomes Paul's equivalent term for Christ himself.

Personification and Narrative in Romans 6

Having outlined the operative mechanisms of metaphor, narrative and personification above, let us a take a cursory look at one of the passages in which personified 'righteousness' plays its part within strongly metaphoric and narratorial settings and consider Romans 6. It is generally agreed that, in Rom 6:15-23, Righteousness and Sin are personified.\[^{71}\] In the text they have become slave masters exercising their lordship over humanity. Elsewhere I have shown exegetically that

\[^{70}\] The exegetical details are published in Southall, Rediscovering Righteousness and footnotes in the text will direct the reader to the full exegetical discussion.

\[^{71}\] Brendan Byrne, Romans (Sacra Pagina 6; Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1996), 200. No commentator dissents from this view, although the priority which is given to the slavery motif differs.
this occurs within a narrative context in which δικαιοσύνη and ἁμαρτία are actants. It is also clear that the story in Rom 6:15-23 parallels (or at least occupies the same world as) the narrative of Adam and Christ (Rom 5:12-21). Now an ontologically committed reading of the passage would result in 'Sin' and 'Righteousness' becoming real entities holding sway over humanity. Another reading might attempt to compare the two actants in Rom 6:15-23 to Adam and Christ of Rom 5:12-21 in order to produce an allegorical reading of sorts; yet neither of these views has won support within Biblical scholarship. In my opinion the very fact that Righteousness and Sin are incorporated within a narrative as dramatis personae actually opens up the possibility of the transformation of the terms. Furthermore, the fact that this mini-narrative is in proximity to larger narratives which revolve around the story of Christ informs the investigation. The point here is that, without resorting to hypostatization or mere personification, δικαιοσύνη takes its place as a character within a narrative framework; a factor which alerts the reader to its possible semantic transformation. It seems now that the character of Righteousness functions in the same way as Christ in the previous passage, and Paul begins to set up a Christ/Righteousness equivalence.

**Personification and Metaphor in Romans 6**

If personification is linked to narrative, is it also related to metaphor? Again I answer in the affirmative with the help of Ricoeur who says:

Personification, in turning an inanimate, non-sentient, abstract, or ideal entity into a living and feeling being, into a person, reminds us of the metaphorical transfer from the inanimate to the animate. It is true that personification does not take place only through metaphor but also by metonymy and synecdoche. But what distinguishes personification by means of metaphor and metaphor properly speaking, except the extension of the verbal unity?

Thus in the same way that personification and narrative are closely

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73 Ricoeur, *Rule*, 67. (Emphasis Added.)
linked, so the trope and metaphor exhibit similar tendencies.

The similarity between the tropes prompts us to ask a further question: How does personification function in a metaphor system? Metaphor systems (or root metaphors) as delineated above are devices which organise a whole network of metaphors and frame an entire discourse.74 Ricoeur rightly suggests that the Kingdom of God and God as Father are root metaphors; indeed the presence of metaphor systems is widespread and includes that of slavery and athletics - root metaphors which have proven pivotal to my final construal of Righteousness. In this sense the metaphor systems organise the background, or if I may extend a 'theatrical' metaphor, they set the stage on which the actors in the dramatic work enact the story.

Again let us return briefly to Romans 6 with Righteousness and Sin as actants - slave masters over humanity - enacting their part within the plot of the mini-narrative of Rom 6:15-23 and of Paul's larger narrative of Christ. This is correct as far as it goes; yet narrative is not the only device operative within the passage. It has been well recognised that the metaphor system of slavery is an important organising metaphor in Pauline Christianity.75 In fact it is a metaphor system which functions to set further parameters within which the actants of Rom 6 may function; that is to say that the root metaphor offers containment to the mini-narrative; a mini-story which now finds itself placed within both a metaphor system and a larger narrative.76 So if being a 'slave of Christ' (Rom 1:1) is an important root metaphor in Paul’s thought world, and if by extension the metaphor system of slavery can be appropriately applied to believers in terms of personified Righteousness (as in Rom 6), then might not the identity of the personified entity have a metaphoric referential after all? That is to say, that as Personified Righteousness becomes a character invention within a metaphoric matrix of slavery and a narratorial plot revolving around two realms of existence (mirroring Adam and Christ), then ὄντακτος ὑπνη itself becomes Paul’s equivalent term for the person of Christ; and it is the

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74 Paul Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics', 94.
76 On 'containment' see Paxson, Poetics, 39.
presence of these three creative tropes which push Righteousness in this direction.

In sum, I have already outlined a theoretical position in which metaphor and narrative work in concert and which is generative of semantic innovation: new information via a fusion of terms. Here I have extended this to include the functioning of the trope of personification within such modes of expression as a trope of character invention. So the narrative dynamic framework allows for the personified character inventions to enact a specific story via a specific plot. The framework also acknowledges, and indeed requires, that the specific narrative itself is explicated by other larger narratives. Furthermore, metaphor systems give the specific narrative added direction in that they set the stage on which the personified actants play their part; containing the specific narrative within an organising system and doing so with a level of referentiality. It is this functioning of personification within metaphoric and narrative realms which alleviates the need to resort to ontologically committed positions (e.g. hypostases). It also means that there is no cipher to be cracked because of the aforementioned qualities of these devices, especially their indirectness and untranslatable nature. Rather, metaphor and narrative in concert pave the way for the transformation of personification. In fact, it seems to me that when Paul uses Righteousness in this way in Romans 6, he is using it as a functional equivalence for Christ - a point which I have established exegetically in full in another place. 77

Romans 9:30-33 and 10

Likewise, I could give the same brief overview for Rom 9:30-33. Here the agonistic (athletic) metaphor system looms large in the shape of a footrace. Gentiles are not pursuing personified Righteousness and yet attain him. In this subverted race, personified Righteousness is being pursued as the quarry or lead athlete; just as righteousness once pursued Israel in Isaiah 51. The narrative circles around Israel’s failure. Who have Gentiles attained? Personified Righteousness, namely Christ. Who

77 Southall, Rediscovering Righteousness, Chapter 6.
has Israel failed to attain? Personified Righteousness-by-the-Law, namely Christ.78

The same too could be said of Rom 10:1-4. Here the phrase ‘the righteousness of God’ occurs. The metaphor is weaker now - the agon is still not far away as zeal and telos attest. The narrative is still constrained by the failure of Israel in the face of Christ. But δικαιοσύνη is personified now and verbs are used of it which are used of living entities. It is an entity to which Israel refused to submit and which she did not acknowledge(10:3). How so? Surely of all people Israel should know the sedeq of God - his saving, vindicating power exercised on their behalf. Yes, of course, unless this personified δικαιοσύνη is Christ himself.79

At Rom 10:5-8 we have the supreme example of personified Righteousness functioning as an equivalent to Christ.80 Here he speaks - a personification which Paxson would rightly call prosopopeia. The narrative is the story of Christ in ascent and descent. It centres on the story of a protagonist, God’s ‘Son’, Christ Jesus, who enters the oppressed state of humanity in obedience to his Father’s wishes, assumes its enslaved nature, and then dies. However, he is raised to new life by the divine, life-giving Spirit, and exalted to the Father's right hand, where he now reigns, judges and intercedes. And the metaphor - well it is that of the prohibited and illusory quest. Well known in religious psychology, the Hebrew Scriptures and the Epic of Gilgamesh.

Only now, in Roman, Christ himself speaks and prohibiting going up into heaven (for he himself has come down) or descending into the abyss (for he himself has been raised). Rather is the recognition of the nearness of Christ. Barth’s genius is to see this:

Who is speaking here? Obviously not a ‘personified’ idea, but the very man of whom Moses has written that he will live as the kelal of the Law, namely, as righteousness before God, the divine justification for everyone who believes in Him. Since He is the meaning, the authority, the fulfiller and the way to fulfilment of the Law, He is Himself the righteousness before God, the divine justification that everyone is to

78 Southall, Rediscovering Righteousness, Chapter 8.
79 ibid., Chapter 9.
80 ibid., Chapter 10.
receive and can receive through faith. Whoever reads Moses has no alternative but to hear the living voice coming from the subject of his prophecy, from this one fulfiller of the Law calling him to Himself.\(^8^1\)

In each case the Christ/Righteousness equivalence occurs due to the functioning of personification within a metaphoric and narratorial matrix. Thus, when δικαιοσύνη is personified, it will act out its role which in less metaphoric and narratorially construed passages would be played by Christ himself.

Does this occur elsewhere in Romans? I believe so although not in all places. And I think that the Corinthian correspondence gives and aetiology for such a linking of Christ and Personified Righteousness; and Philippians gives its continuation. But to give examples of this would take us from the aim of the paper.

**Some Implications for Pauline Studies**

However, perhaps there are more apposite questions to ask. If Paul uses poetic language in this way and if personified Righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) is, at times, equivalent to Christ then what are the implications for Pauline studies. There are four preliminary points which would be worthy of further study.

*A renewed understanding of the Importance of the Poetic Nature of Pauline Language.*

In my view Richard Hays rightly says that ‘Paul, the missionary preacher, is at least as much a poet as a theologian’\(^8^2\) Indeed I have welcomed those who have recognised the sparkling nature of Paul’s metaphoric and connotative language, along with the narrative substructure which undergirds it. I believe that my thesis continues to support this position.

However, in my view the trope of personification has remained in the background within Pauline Studies and has often been viewed as a

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mere rhetorical device. My work gainsays this position and suggests that the trope is a tool of semantic innovation which operates in a similar way to metaphoric discourse. Furthermore, I have shown that personification has proven to be enlightening for the interpretation of righteousness terminology in Paul.

Could this not also impact on other aspects of Paul’s theology? I think so. For example, there are clearly places where Paul personifies Sin, Law, Death and a number of other conceptual terms. It seems to me that an examination of these personified entities in line with the approach of my project (i.e. the functioning of personification within metaphoric and narratorial matrices) may prove instructive. That is not to say that in these cases we will also find personified entities functioning as equivalents to physical entities; but they may give an insight into Paul’s thinking which has been absent or minimised because of their neglect. Given that there has been much recent work with regard to Paul’s view of the Law, might not an investigation of personified Torah add something to the current state of the debate? Furthermore, might not the traditional investigation of Wisdom in Paul be enhanced by the procedures which I have adopted?

_A renewed understanding of the Apocalyptic Nature of Paul’s Gospel and his Relationship with Judaism._

In recent years, and particularly under the New Perspective paradigm, Paul’s continuity with Judaism has been prioritised. Certainly with regard to ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣÙΝ this has been a good thing, allowing the Hebraic, relational force of the term to be heard. However, like most theses, this one too has overplayed its hand in order to substantiate its case; in some ways it had to in order to counter the strength of the traditional view of righteousness as status and gift.\(^3\) Nevertheless, the net result of the New Perspective’s interpretation of righteousness has led to a downgrading of the notes of discontinuity within Paul’s gospel.

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In my thesis as a whole I have welcomed the work of Douglas Campbell, amongst others, who has attempted to re-establish the apocalyptic (and somewhat discontinuous) framework of Paul’s message by recourse to the narrative of Christ in ascent and descent. I think that my work follows this trajectory, and I affirm both the continuity and discontinuity of Paul’s theology. Thus the continuity is demonstrated because Paul, like his predecessors, recognises the Hebraic nature of righteousness terminology as God’s salvific, covenantal, vindicatory activity. However, this does not stop the Apostle from developing δικαιοσύνη in the light of his gospel, and personified Righteousness becomes a term to describe the One who effected the salvation of humanity and the vindication of God: Christ himself. In my view, to stress continuity at the expense of discontinuity misses the thrust of Paul’s gospel proclamation; and fails to hear the dialectic of the continuous and the discontinuous within an apocalyptic framework. Therefore, an investigation of the conversation between continuity/discontinuity, without polemic, may produce results which have implications for Pauline interpretation.

A renewed understanding of the Political Implications of Paul’s Gospel.

There has been a recent upsurge of interest in the political aspects of Paul’s gospel, especially with regard the interface between the Paul’s message and the Roman Empire. N.T. Wright has worked towards what he calls a ‘multi-dimensional fresh reading of Paul’ in which he wants to recognise that the worship of Caesar (the Imperial Cult) was not only the fastest growing religion in parts of the empire but also the means of Roman domination.84

The emperor’s far off presence was made ubiquitous by the standard means of statues and coins, reflecting his image throughout the domains; he was the great benefactor, through whom the great blessings

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of justice and peace . . . were showered outward to the grateful populace - who in turn worshipped him, honoured him, and paid him taxes.\(^{85}\)

Importantly he notes certain parallels between terms used in Caesar’s proclamation and in Paul’s gospel. For example, the accession of the emperor was hailed as *euaggelion*; and Caesar was the *kyrios* - the lord of the world.\(^{86}\) Perhaps more importantly the Roman goddess *Iustitia* (an Augustan innovation) was closely linked with the imperial regime.\(^{87}\)

Wright notes the significance of the above factors and suggests that an aspect of the Apostle’s thinking involved confronting and opposing Caesar and the Empire. According to Wright this is not primarily because of a Pauline anti-Imperial stance but because Paul opposed paganism in all its forms: Caesar was claiming divine worship and status which belonged only to the one God.\(^{88}\) Thus, for example, when Paul proclaims that Jesus Christ is Lord, the message of Jesus as the true King of Israel and the true Lord of the world could not fail to be heard as a political and religious challenge to the lordship of Caesar - an upstaging of the story of Rome itself.

I agree with Wright that it is highly probable that Paul’s utilisation of δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ in Romans represents the Apostle’s confrontation with the Roman Empire. Thus, on coming to Rome, which prided itself on being the capital of Justice, Paul’s declaration that ‘the gospel of King Jesus reveals God’s δικαιοσύνη must also be read as a deliberate laying down of a challenge to imperial pretensions’.\(^{89}\) Justice will not be found, therefore, in the *euaggelion* of Caesar but in the good news of Jesus Christ; and in place of Rome’s proclamation of the Roman goddess - personified (and divinised) *Iustitia* - stands Paul’s proclamation of personified δικαιοσύνη: Christ himself.

In my view, therefore, my thesis not only supports Wright’s multi-

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\(^{86}\) Wright, ‘Paul and Caesar’, 176.

\(^{87}\) ibid., 171.

\(^{88}\) Wright, ‘Paul’s Gospel’, 164.

\(^{89}\) ibid.
dimensional reading but takes it a little further. It suggests that personified δικαιοσύνη was an important element in Paul’s subversion of Caesar’s message, in which a narratorial character invention, Righteousness, stands in opposition to the mythological Justice. Such an avenue of research might be usefully applied to other Pauline letters.

The Nature of Justification.

Perhaps the most important implication from my Christ/Righteousness equivalence revolves around the nature of justification.

In my thesis I have concentrated solely on the noun δικαιοσύνη to the exclusion of the verbal forms. I have done so out of necessity because my interest lay primarily in the function of the personification of abstract nouns. However, the Christ/Righteousness equivalence which I have posited might help to inform the way in which Paul conceptualises the verbal forms δικαίω and cognates. That is to say that my project may well have ramifications for our understanding of what Paul meant by justification.

It goes without saying that the topic of justification is vast, but one initial suggestion seems immediately to arise from my work: If at times Paul uses δικαιοσύνη to connote Christ, then he might use the verbal form (δικαίω) to express participation or incorporation in Christ. Thus when the Apostle describes believers as being ‘justified’, he thinks not only (or even primarily) of the juridical verdict in their favour, but of the personified δικαιοσύνη in whom they participate (by the Spirit) because of his faithfulness (ἐ πίστεως). In this way justification and participation do not belong to divergent theological spheres but ‘belong together because [Paul] understands salvation to mean our participation in Christ’s justification’.  

This, of course, is not a new suggestion. For example, Richard B. Hays argued the case that a participatory soteriology is the logical position to adopt in the light of his reading of the faithfulness of Christ in Galatians; and Schweitzer, Deissmann, Wrede, and, more recently


90 Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ, 213 (251).
91 ibid., xxix. (2nd Edition only.)
E.P. Sanders, have put forward similar positions. I merely suggest that my conclusions support the participationist view, and further research on this may prove fruitful.

The above four points are no more than preliminary markers of avenues for further exploration. However, each has as its starting point the conclusion of this thesis: that the Apostle Paul uses poetic language in a powerful way, personifying δικαιοσύνη and allowing this character invention to play its role as the prime actor in the drama of salvation; the role which in less metaphoric and narratorial pericopes is played by Christ himself.

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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY


David Southall is married to Alison and has three children, Suzy, Ashley and Charlie. After flunking his first degree at Durham University following the death of his mother, David became a Mental Health Nurse, working eventually in the red light area of Birmingham as a Community Psychiatric Nurse/Drug Counsellor. He was called into ministry and trained at Spurgeon’s College from 1998-2000 where he gained an MTh. He has spent time in ministry in Saltley, Birmingham and South Croydon Baptist Church. In 2004 he embarked on a period of full-time PhD study after being awarded a Baptist Union Scholarship and successfully gained his doctorate in 2007. His thesis has since been published in the WUNT series under the title *Rediscovering Righteousness in Paul: Personified Dikaiosun within Metaphoric and Narratorial Settings* (Mohr Siebeck, 2008). David had a change in direction in 2009 and entered Healthcare Chaplaincy at Worcestershire Royal Hospital, Worcester. He continues to write and research, particularly in the areas of metaphor, narrative and personification and their usefulness within healthcare.

Here David takes a fresh look at Paul’s understanding of sin and righteousness in Romans. His New Testament research, combined with his experience as a minister and healthcare chaplain, bears fruit in this thoughtful and pastorally sensitive publication. Paul’s personification of Righteousness and Sin and his rich use of metaphor provide fertile ground for exploring his theology. Anyone interested in the relevance of the Gospel today and contemporary debates around Justification and Universalism will find his message helpful and stimulating.

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