Stylistic Criteria and the Analysis of the Pentateuch

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The problem of criteria in stylistic analysis in the field of Old Testament studies is one that lies at the very heart of our discipline, as now conceived, and the demand for its solution is the most insistent of the many calls upon the attention of the philologically trained scholar. If no solution exists, or if a false solution has been embraced, then much that today passes current among us for scientific and absolute will be found to be nothing more than unverified hypotheses and erroneous inferences.

The crisis with which our study is faced is one that has much in common with those crises which are the lot of all sciences whether occupied with the visible or the mental fabric. It seems as hard for a science to abandon its stock-in-trade as it is for a family to sever itself from those bits and pieces, long since outmoded and useless, but still treasured by virtue of long association. Such separations are always painful and never made without reluctance; but how often it has been true that a science has seemingly lost its life to find it. Thus the Ptolemaic school must go, its place taken by the Copernican; Locke and Leibnitz must yield up the sceptre to Kant; Wolf, the inaugurator and the redoubtable champion of what has been called the Homeric question, must retreat before the unitarians.¹

This last reversal has considerable relevance for our present purpose, for the hypothesis advanced by Wolf impinges at more than one crucial point on that of Wellhausen. In fact to what extent Wellhausen was indebted to Wolf may be seen from the similarity in his methods and conclusions. The title of his main work,² too, was reminiscent of that of Wolf’s famous work Die Prolegomena. It would seem, therefore, not irrelevant to our discussion to enquire into the present state and standing of Wolf’s

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theory,³ the influence of which was once felt in many fields of classical literature, and is even now by no means a spent force in the Old Testament field.

Wolf was a child of the era of the French Revolution, an age of doubt and distrust of all the traditions and beliefs of the past, an age of the vindication of the common man. Even claims of genius were challenged and what had been hitherto regarded as the work of the one master spirit was now designated as the product of the people. Hence Wolf under this influence asserted that the Iliad and the Odyssey, like much else, was not the work of a single author but had arisen in the form of folk-poetry among the people. The idle few had wrested to themselves the fruits of the industry of the many. Homer had either pirated the poetry of the common people or it had been wrongly attributed to him. The argument in which Wolf himself placed supreme faith was that writing was still unknown when the Iliad originated, or at least

³ J. A. Scott, The Unity of Homer, California, 1921. (In the following pages I have made extensive use of this work, first because of the close parallelism between Homeric and Pentateuchal criticism, and, second, because I felt that this book was not likely to be readily available to readers in this country.)
so little known that it could not be employed for literary purposes. It is well-nigh impossible for us in this day of increased knowledge about the Ancient World to believe that anyone could ever have taken this assertion seriously. This stronghold, formerly held to be impregnable, has been left so long without a defence that no one would now consider it worth attacking.

His second reason for rejecting the unity of the Iliad was the size of the poem. There could, so he affirmed, never have been an occasion suitable for the delivery in extenso of a poem of this magnitude. Facts, however, failed to support this statement. Scholars pointed out that the Greeks assembled for several days at a time to listen to the production of a dramatic festival. Some indication of the amount of material presented at one of these festivals is given by the fact that, at the last three days of the City Dionysia in Athens, nine tragedies, three satyric plays, and at least three comedies were presented. The average length of a drama was 1,400 verses. It was thus realized that it was well within the realms of possibility for a Greek audience to spend three consecutive days listening to the entire Iliad and Odyssey. His final argument was that, about the middle of the sixth century B.C., the poems assumed their epic form under Peisistratus, and interpolations were made in the interests of him and of Athens. Scholars in due course showed from internal evidence that this was impossible. Of Wolf’s statement, ‘the united voice of all antiquity consistently assigned to Peisistratus the honour of collecting, arranging and putting into writing the poetry of Homer’, J. A. Scott says, ‘it looks dangerously near intentional deception.’ In fact, as he points out, the testimony of antiquity is against the possibility of interpolation. Herodotus tells that Onomacritus was exiled for interpolating a verse into the poetry of Musaeus, and Scott’s comment is: ‘It is incredible that a public sentiment that exiled a man for interpolating a verse in so insignificant a poem as that of Musaeus should have been indifferent to wholesale additions to the almost sacred poetry of Homer.’ Lycon, a comic actor, was fined the enormous sum of ten talents for interpolating a single line in a comedy, and Scott adds with a little justifiable sarcasm: ‘the theory that men who never wrote a great line of poetry could with scissors and paste create the two greatest poems of the world, shows the fathomless depths of human credulity.’ It would, indeed, be hard to believe that the high level of the Greek artistic sense in literature would have permitted intermeddling with the most cherished of all their possessions, the poetry of Homer.

Wolf actually did no more than provide the seed of the Homeric controversy; the planting and the watering were the work of his disciples. He designated the Prolegomena ‘Volume I’, but though he lived another twenty-nine years after its publication ‘Volume II’, which was to contain the promised internal or linguistic proofs of diverse authorship, never saw the light. The positive arguments that have led to the rejection of Wolf’s theory both in its original and ultimate forms, though by now widely familiar, will bear repetition. In the hands of Wolf’s followers the Homeric question suffered a strange reversal. The refusal to recognize Homer’s right to such a quantity of literary wealth became the

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4 John A. Scott, op. cit., p. 44.
5 In fact, not only was writing in common use from the end of the third millennium B.C. onwards but even master copyists were trained from very early times. See W.J. Martin, Dead Sea Scroll of Isaiah, London, 1954, pp. 17 ff.
conviction that no one man could have been responsible for so many absurdities. Wilamowitz, whilst busy abusing 'the fanatics, defenders of unity who admire the divine Homer,' calls the Iliad 'a miserable cento.'

8 Muelder says: 'It is really too bad that the poet of the Odyssey tried his powers on a species of poetry for which he had neither the creative ability nor the powers of expression.'

Thus spake the giants and the earth trembled. All this was passing strange since no writer of ancient Greece had detected a fault in Homer as poetry. What now amazes us is the assumption of infallibility on the part of many of these scholars. Lachmann, with that air of pontifical authority which some of the critics adopted, wrote: ‘Anyone who does not comprehend how Homer sprang from and through small songs will waste his time in studying either what I write or epic poetry itself; for he has not the ability to understand any part of either.’

In one matter only did the critics agree: the composite character of the Iliad and Odyssey; but beyond this there was no unanimity. The doubtful peace that reigned was at best one of indifference, arising from the conviction that what remained was not worth a struggle. Fick’s original Iliad had 1,936 verses, Roberts’ had 2,146, Bethe’s had 1,300. Wilamowitz, on the other hand, regarded two of the books, expelled unequivocally by Fick, Roberts, and Bethe, as undoubtedly genuine and unchanged. Muelder disagreed with all the rest and carved out his own original Iliad. He regarded the parts commonly held to be late as being early, and the so-called early as being late. These five did not agree in regard to one single verse, and every line in Homer has been rejected by at least two of them, the result, in part at least, of the failure to establish at the outset objective criteria. There was no agreement as to standards, no enquiry as to what constituted a valid measuring unit, no heed given to the biblical admonition on the dire consequences of using two different weights. Under such leadership literary appreciation and scholarship were doomed, for Homer ceased to be a poet and became but a theory of Fick, of Roberts and the rest, and his work ceased to be poetry, and became but the figment and the plaything of man’s imaginations. Such a methodology, if one can

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so designate it, had taken its leave of objective research as well as of literary criticism; the ‘good and substantial steps’ were ignored and ‘men through the dizziness of their heads, stepped besides’ with as calamitous consequences as those which befell Bunyan’s Pilgrim.

The argument most favoured was that from diction, and especially the vocabulary of the tenth book of the Iliad, which contained seventeen words not found in any other book of the Iliad, but occurring in the Odyssey. This book, because of these words, was expelled from the Iliad. Scott set out to strengthen this argument by extending a like investigation to all the books of the Iliad, but to his surprise found that each book of the original Iliad had about twice as many Odyssean—that is, words found only in the particular book and in the Odyssey—as the suspected and rejected tenth book.

A further reason put forward as proof of the later date of the Odyssey was the increase of abstract words it contained as compared with the Iliad. Croiset asserted that the Iliad had but thirty-nine whereas the Odyssey had eighty-one. It turned out, however, on investigation that the Iliad has seventy-eight. A point of interest for us in this connection is that it became clear in the course of investigation that there was no justification for dating a word from its first

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appearance. The fact that abstracts are found in the Iliad but their cognate adjectives do not occur, does not prove that the poet of the Iliad was ignorant of these adjectives.

Much at one time was made of the fact that references to storms, snows, and the phenomena of the heavens are much more frequent in the Iliad than in the Odyssey. Later it was shown that there existed a simple explanation: the action of the Odyssey is mostly indoors, that of the Iliad out of doors with the warriors in the field.

The real test of the unity of the two poems is now realized to lie in such things as the hidden digamma, the use of abstract nouns, patronymics, aeolic forms, formation of the perfect, hiatus, case-endings, and such unconscious indications of the poet’s land and age. By resolutely refraining from making even the minutest changes in the text, as, for instance, those cacophonous combinations which were for long the despair of Homeric editors, the

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Greeks unwittingly testified to their own absolute integrity in text transmission and incidentally preserved the evidence for the lost digamma. Those proofs, once held to prove beyond dispute diverse authorship, have now broken down because of the lack of factual foundation; they rested on inconsequent reasoning and false statistics.

The Application of the Documentary Analysis to the Old Testament

It now remains for us to discuss briefly the general nature of Pentateuchal criticism. It should be kept clearly in mind that the purpose of the following pages is not to refute the views of individual critics or of certain schools of criticism. When reference is made to a scholar’s work it is done so as to provide the view or theory with a ‘habitation and a name’. It is not implied that the theory in question originated with the scholar named or that it was exclusively his. We are not concerned with personal opinions but with a principle and a methodology. The subjective nature of the whole procedure has raised and must continue to raise the gravest doubts. It is notoriously easy to mistake what is in reality a subjective pattern for an objective one. Most people, for instance, firmly believe that there is a configuration on the surface of the moon in the semblance of a man’s face; but some sailors, on the other hand, see the shape of a woman’s head in profile. Kant went as far as to hold that reason did not derive the general laws from nature but prescribed them, so reversing the common view on the relation of human knowledge to nature. The stylistic patterns that some have come to believe exist in the Pentateuch have doubtless assumed in their minds a reality that is indistinguishable from objective existence. No practical purpose at the moment could be served by an exhaustive examination of the details. All that is here attempted is to show the very doubtful character of one or two of the points in the network which have provided the basis, starting-points and termini, for the imaginary lines that constitute the patterns.

Wellhausen, like Wolf; seems to have failed to provide us with criteria and principles essential to the confirmation and rationalization of his hypothesis as to the composite character of the

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Pentateuch. Hence we are compelled to seek outside his writings ‘for information concerning the nature of the linguistic evidence justifying his treatment of the documents. We need not
here dwell on the insufficiency of the presence of theological inconsistencies or disparity in the presentation of theological views as evidence for the diverse authorship of a work. A moment’s reflection on, say, the works of Milton, where Christian and pagan philosophies jostle with one another, should make clear the ‘captious nature of such a procedure. Nothing less than linguistic divergences capable of being tested by external criteria could lend support to a hypothesis so contrary to reality as evidenced by the works of innumerable authors.

The scholar who realized to the full the necessity of presenting established criteria, and of transforming what was no more than an unfounded speculation into a scientific method and raising it from the level of subjective and intuitive treatment to the status of objective research, was S. R. Driver, one of the best Hebrew scholars of his day. In his analysis of Genesis he tries to present in a fairly comprehensive manner the list of criteria which he himself believed to possess validity and which, if applied to the text, would produce results similar to those which he had obtained. His frequent use of the word criteria shows how acutely aware he was of their supreme importance, and how alive he was to the inadequate nature of any technique in which they did not occupy a central place. By his action he attempted to bring down to earth what had hitherto dwelt in the clouds. Thus he provided us with the means of scrutinizing his criteria and of drawing our own conclusions as to their degree of trustworthiness. As will be seen later, it is and must remain an open question whether the divisions provided the criteria or whether the criteria supplied the divisions. What is certain is that other arbitrary divisions of Genesis could and have been made on the basis of a different set of criteria.

Driver gave us for the so-called P document thirty-four characteristics. It is clear, however, from a later statement that he intended them to be considered as criteria. Thirty-three of these are what might be called lexicographical criteria and are thus identical in kind and at most differ only in degree. We are accordingly able to consider them as a group, and to test their validity in the light of the findings of modern literary appreciation. In the first place they would be rejected by the literary critic because they stand in contradiction of two factors mentioned in all definitions of style. To take one of these definitions: ‘Style, the formal aspect of the art of communication, is the exercise of personal choice among the possibilities offered by the medium of expression with the aim of effective communication.’ The two factors are individuality, that is, the uniqueness of personality, and choice, that is, the action of a free agent. These two forbid us to state in any given case what are or what are not the limits of an author’s resources. Critics now speak of that mental activity which precedes creative thinking as the ‘well’. What the processes are that take place during it and how they come to yield up their results is something that they frankly confess is too mysterious to lend itself to investigation. Not only can an author not predict what may arise in the mind of another but even his own forms are unpredictable.

Second, these criteria ignore the necessity of distinguishing the different kinds of prose. Some would distinguish three categories: (a) descriptive prose, which is devoted to the description of objects in space; (b) narrative prose, which deals with the narration of events in time; and (c) expository prose, that is the exposition of ideas in order. It is no longer sufficient to count the number of times a given word may occur. Its occurrence is to a large extent conditioned by the

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12 John L. Lowes, The Road to Xanadu, 1927.
nature of the prose demanded. Today literary critics have little time for enumeration, they prefer to weigh.

Third, there is the recognition of the right of every author to avail himself of the literary device known as elegant variation. This ubiquitous literary phenomenon probably owes its existence on the one hand to the mind’s abhorrence of monotony, and on the other to its delight in variety and change; and in the mind of the genius these conditions exist in an enhanced degree. It is a corollary of free choice and by its nature unpredictable. As it is implied in our definition of style it need not further detain us here.

There is, over and above, the now universally admitted fact that it is extremely rare to meet absolute synonyms in a language.

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There are near synonyms, but it is often impossible to define with any degree of certainty either the area of inclusion common to both or the area of exclusion.

The invalidity of such criteria has long been recognized by classical scholars, and no one would now think of attaching any significance to, say, the fact that beans are mentioned in the Iliad but not in the Odyssey; that the Iliad is rich in words for wounds and wounding, whereas such words are rare in, or absent from, the Odyssey; that the words for grasshopper, crane, eel, maggots, snow, sparrow, and donkey occur only in the Iliad, palm-tree only in the Odyssey. In fact the Iliad uses 1,500 words none of which occurs in the Odyssey. Or again, no deductions of any kind could be made from the fact that in the works of Shakespeare the word ‘pious’ is found only in Hamlet and subsequent plays. Even inconsistencies may occur in one and the same author; Virgil in a single book makes the wooden horse of fir in one passage, of maplewood in another, and of oak in yet another.

Again, style must of necessity be influenced by the subject matter to be communicated, and the object of communication. Dante enjoining versatility in one and the same author, put it thus: ‘Next we ought to possess a discernment as to those things which suggest themselves to us as fit to be uttered, so as to decide whether they ought to be sung in the way of tragedy, comedy, or elegy. By tragedy we bring in (sic) the higher style, by comedy the lower style, by elegy we understand the style of the wretched. If our subject appears fit to be sung in the tragic style, we must then assume the illustrious vernacular language, and consequently we must bind up a canzone. If, however, it appears fit to be sung in the comic style, sometimes the middle and sometimes the lowly vernacular should be used; and the discernment to be exercised in this case we reserve for treatment in the fourth book. But if our subject appears fit to be sung in the elegaic style, we must adopt the lowly vernacular alone.’

Style may, and often will, vary according as the aim is conviction or persuasion; the ultimate aim is invariably effective communication. The element of art in style arises from the blending of choice and communication, the activity and the aim.

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Personal choice is limited in prose only by the factors of usage and meaning, that is, the conventions which govern the sense in which single words are to be understood, and the idea-content of the words. Style or rhetoric in the wide sense has been described as the gap or discrepancy between an external criterion of adequate expression of a number of ideas and the actual expression selected by the author. Added to all this is the impossibility of describing with any degree of accuracy the limits of the semantic field of many words.

Driver’s remaining criterion is given as number 27. It reads: ‘As those acquainted with Hebrew will be aware, there are in Hebrew two forms of the pronoun of the 1st person singular, ‘ani and ‘anoki which are not by all writers used indiscriminately: P now uses ‘ani nearly 130 times (‘anoki only once, Gn. xxiii. 4; comp. in Ezekiel ‘ani 138 times, ‘anoki once, xxxvi. 38). In the rest of the Hexateuch ‘anoki is preferred to ‘ani and in the discourses of Deuteronomy it is used almost exclusively.’ In Genesis the personal pronoun occurs only nine times in passages assigned by Driver to P. Why a particular form of a personal pronoun should be associated with P when in one document of considerable size it is found in only nine passages, whereas J and E use it on numerous occasions, would seem to savour a little of arbitrariness in the enlistment of characteristics. In one of the P passages the form is strangely enough the long one, proof one would have thought of its existence in P’s vocabulary. Nowhere does there seem to be a discussion of what actually constituted the nature of the difference between ‘ani and ‘anoki. Most Semitic philologists would now agree that in the longer form there is incorporated a deictic element (deixis is a morphological device used in languages as a substitute for the manual gesture in indicating the nearness or farness of things). From a study of the use of the two forms in Genesis it would seem clear that they were used with some discrimination. The consciousness of the deictic character of ‘anoki is shown by the fact that it is found only five times with hinne, itself in origin a deictic particle (originally it had the meaning ‘here’, but in time lost this character and later often plays merely the part of our colon in introducing direct speech). It is never found with the compound hin’ne (a compound of hinne

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and ‘ani). It is hard to see what reason could be given for P’s predilection for the shorter form. Modern philological methods would not be content to let the matter rest here. As Marouzeau, contrasting modern and ancient methods, says: ‘They are content to note the facts where we look for the explanation, they draw attention to the processes where we discern in them the mechanism and the effect.’

To take once more an analogy from classical scholarship: who today would think of using the five different forms for the Greek infinitive ‘to be’ (ἐναι, ἐμεναι, ἐμεν, ἐμεν, ἐμεν) as a criterion for the analysis of a work in Greek? Even before the philological volte-face which has taken place within living memory, and before these and many other philological facts bringing in their train fundamental changes, there hung over the criteria as a whole an inerasable question mark. Did the documents furnish the criteria, or did the criteria beget the documents? Is there not really here the absence of a starting-point, and hence is it undesignedly nothing more than an argument in a circle? There is, too, the disconcerting fact that, with a

15 Marouzeau, Traité de Stylistique Appliquée au Latin, 1935, p. xix. (Ils se contentent de noter des faits là où nous en cherchons l’explication, de recommander des procédés alors que nous en observons le mécanisme et l’effet”).
sufficiently fertile imagination and the necessary audacity, an entirely different set of criteria might be drawn up resulting in a new set of documents.

It was not from verbal characteristics, whether as peculiarities of diction or of form, but from matter as well that the inferences were made. One example, perhaps, will suffice: the two accounts of the Flood. In introductions to the Old Testament and in commentaries on Genesis this is given a prominent place, indicating the importance attached to its evidence for the composite character of the book. What is usually said about diction or style should, in the light of what we said above, carry little conviction. On closer investigation it becomes clear that the pivot upon which everything turns is a single word, the word *sh'nayim* (two). It is an accepted canon in criticism that we seek the source of a textual difficulty not in the first instance in the text itself; but in the knowledge at the disposal of the scholar. There were several ways in which one might have circumvented the difficulty. It might have been assumed that we have here a scribal error in the form of haplography, that is, the writing of a letter or word once when it should be written twice. In this case the word in question is *sh'nayim*. If we added the omitted word to the one already in our text we would then have a phrase identical with that in verse nine of chapter seven. Such doublets in Hebrew are used to express distribution, much as we use ‘each’ in English, or to denote the successive nature of the action, as the doublet does in such a passage as Genesis xxxii. 17: ‘And he gave into the hands of his servants one herd after another separately’. Or again, *sh'nayim* might have been used to indicate an indefinite number as it is used in 1 Kings xvii. 12, where though the English translates ‘two sticks’ the meaning is beyond doubt ‘a few sticks’, a usage analogous to that of ‘*paar*’ in German. There is, moreover, a third possibility: the sentence may be using a singular, sometimes called a generic singular, for the plural, a usage not uncommon in Semitic. *Sh'nayim* would then be a collective, and the passage would have to be translated ‘and from all living, from all flesh thou shalt bring pairs into the ark’. It is difficult to think of any other means of expressing ‘pairs’ in classical Hebrew.

The *locus classicus* was to be found, not in Genesis, but in Exodus vi. 3: ‘I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as God Almighty, but by my name the LORD I did not make myself known to them’ (R.S.V.). It is on the basis of the accepted translation of this verse, that the theory of the composite character of the Pentateuch has been most confidently defended. On examination, it becomes apparent that the argument depends, in this instance again, on a single word and that a mere particle, the negative *lo*. Probably never in the whole history of exegesis, whether classical or biblical, has so much been made to depend on a single word. There was something strangely paradoxical about this attitude to a tiny word on the part of men who were ready to believe that otherwise the text had suffered extensive admixture. In the interpretation of the text at the outset a recognized and generally accepted canon of exegesis seemed to have been neglected, namely that a passage should be interpreted in the light, not only of the local context, but also of the remote, for, to be fair to any statement, the, mediate as well as the im-

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16 Gn. vi. 14ff., and Gn. vii. 1ff.
17 Gn. vi. 20.
mediate must be taken into consideration. When it became clear that the translation conflicted with the tenor and sometimes the text of what had gone before, the first suspicion should have fallen on the accuracy of the translation. If the reliability of this could have been established beyond doubt, then the troublesome little negative might have been removed as an irreptitious adjunct and added to the not immodest collection of delenda. Such a procedure would have been no more unethical than that taken, seemingly without a scruple of conscience, in other instances. There was, however, no need to do violence to the text as it stands: a simple solution would have been to read it not as the negative but as the emphatic particle. This would have involved merely replacing the vowel o by u, as has been done in at least one other place in the Old Testament (2 Samuel xviii. 12). Why this particle should have been treated as if it were sacrosanct must be one of the most extraordinary examples of inverted scrupulosity.

The commonly accepted translation of this verse is used to support the view that the tetragrammaton YHWH as a title of God was first revealed to Moses. Hence earlier passages in which this name occurs must have originated from a hand different from the one which wrote those in which it is absent. This enables a division to be effected between those passages which use Elohim and those which use Jehovah. This is admittedly elementary division, but it is the establishment of the principle that counts, and here is sufficient to prove the composite character of the documents. The use of the various names for God first gave Astruc the idea of dividing up the Pentateuch on this basis, and until the present day Pentateuchal criticism still uses the occurrence of the different divine names as evidence of different documents. The removal of this verse would deprive Pentateuchal criticism of its one piece of indisputably objective evidence, for varieties in style can be classed only as subjective.

It might have been possible, of course, to have denied the implications by drawing attention to the full sense of the Hebrew word for ‘name’. The field of meaning of this word covers not only that of ‘name’, that is, a verbal deputy, a label for a thing, but also denotes the attributes of the thing named. It may stand

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for reputation, character, honour, name and fame. Hence the reference would not be so much to nomenclature as to the nature of the reality for which the name stood. To bring out the full meaning in English one would then have to use some such phrase as ‘glorious name’.

There is, however, another possible translation which would eliminate all conflict with the remote context. The phrase, ‘but ‘by my name the LORD I did not make myself known to them’ could be taken in Hebrew as an elliptical interrogative. The translation of the whole verse would then run: ‘I suffered myself to appear (Niph’al) to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as El-Shaddai, for did I not let myself be known to them by my name YHWH?’ Hebrew possesses an interrogative particle but on a number of occasions it is as here omitted: a good example is in Genesis xviii. 12. It is possible that in the spoken language the intonation was usually sufficient to indicate a question, as is still the case in living Semitic languages. Intonation has been described as the subjective stratum in languages in contrast to words, the objective stratum. Writing can never be a full, but only to a greater or less degree a partial representation of the spoken word. No ancient script attempted to indicate intonation, and even at the present day with all our typographical aids no completely satisfactory system has been

19 For a brief list of examples see Paul Joüon, Grammaire de l’Hébreu Biblique, Rome, 1923, p. 495.
devised. It should not be a cause for surprise that, in the transference of speech to writing, such meagre aids as there were should on occasion, possibly because unexpressed in speech, be omitted altogether. Commentators have not always reckoned with this possibility. For instance, in Job xxiii. 17, ‘For have I not been cut off on account of the darkness?’ which is a parallel case to the one under discussion, Bick quite unashamedly deletes the negative.

No objection could be taken to this translation of Exodus vi. 3, in the light of Semitic usage, even if it had only the context to commend it. There is, however, strong support forthcoming from the grammatical structure of the following sentence. This is introduced by the words ‘and also’. Now in Hebrew common syntactical practice demands that where ‘and also’ is preceded by a negative it also introduces a negative clause and vice-versa,

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otherwise we would be faced with a non sequitur. In this instance the clause after ‘and also’ is positive, hence one would expect to find the preceding clause a positive one. The translation of the clause as an interrogative would thus remove any illogicality. A perfectly good reason can be given for the use of an interrogative form here: it is a well-known method of giving a phrase an asseverative character. A translation of ‘and also’ in this context by ‘but’ would be highly unsatisfactory if not altogether inadmissible on the ground that the next clause again is introduced by ‘and also’. This makes it extremely hard to avoid drawing the conclusion that we are here dealing with a series of positive statements, the first couched for the sake of emphasis in an interrogative form, and the two subsequent ones introduced by ‘and also’ to bring them into logical co-ordination.

It may seem strange that a superstructure of the intricacy and dimensions of Pentateuchal criticism should have for its first and main foundation a single passage, or to be exact, actually only a particle in the passage. It is not, however, unique in the annals of scholarship. A theory of Bethe’s with very similar antecedents came to grief. In his Dichtung und Sage he had propounded at considerable length the theory that the account of the goddess Athene’s intervention to prevent Achilles from attacking the king was a later addition. He based his assumption, the discussion of which occupies most of the volume, on a single verbal form which, as was later shown, he had misunderstood and mistranslated.20

Failure to take into full account the peculiarities of Hebrew idiom and stylistic devices have led to a misunderstanding and in some cases a misreading of the text. A case in point is rhetorical amplification. This usually takes the form of progression from the general idea to the subordinate terms. It is found again and again on the pages of Genesis. This literary device is, of course, not peculiar to Hebrew: it is to be met with in the writings of Lessing and of Carlyle. It has on more than one occasion been ignored by critics, who then proceeded to explain the passage as two different accounts. Again, there are certain fundamental principles that must be observed by everyone who ventures to translate from one linguistic medium to another. One such principle is that one form may have several functions. In

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Semitic, verbal forms are not primarily concerned with time sequence, but describe the nature of the action; they are what are called tense-aspects. In translating the greatest care must be

20 See Scott, op. cit., p. 147.
taken in choosing often from several possibilities the equivalent tense that best reproduces the sense of the passage taken as a whole. For the Hebrew perfective tense-aspect or the consecutive imperfective such equivalents as past habitual, past imperfect, or pluperfect will come in question. For instance, the verb (a consecutive imperfective) in Genesis xxxv. 15 must be translated by a pluperfect, as the mediate context and the nature of the tense-aspect demand. The meaning is, ‘for he (Jacob) had called (the name of the place Bethel)’, not ‘and he called’. This erroneous translation is the basis for the assumption that this passage is a second account of Bethel.

A misconception still widely disseminated is that the verification of sources in a document would necessarily indicate different hands. Such a deduction would no longer be tolerated in literary criticism in general. The remarkable work of John Livingston Lowes on Coleridge shows how untenable such a conclusion would be. In his investigation of the antecedents of that extraordinary work of literary art, The Ancient Mariner, he brought to light from Coleridge’s own note-books some of the raw materials that went, probably unconsciously, into its composition. Most critics would probably agree that Lowes has made out an irrefutable case, not based on subjective premisses but on extant documentary evidence; but no one would be foolhardy enough to attempt a division of the poem using as a basis the sources indicated by Lowes. The action of creative genius that can take what to most men would be worthless dust and make of it a body with a living soul is an impenetrable mystery, and no amount of dust will explain it. To resolve man into his constituent chemicals is not to explain man. Sources might be said to be inorganic but under the spell of genius they are transmuted, vitalized, and ‘become organic. The inanimate in the mind of the genius assumes that quality which we indicate by the non-revealing terms, animate or vital. In the mind of the creative genius there takes place a mysterious process by which the facts result, not in a synthesis, but in an amalgam. There is added a new ingredient, a new

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quality that transmutes the whole into the gold of genius. As to the nature of the mental activity, and as to how the process is conditioned, no one today would hazard a guess. It would appear, therefore, nothing less than presumption for anyone to forget his limitations to such an extent as to set bounds to the versatility and ingenuity of an external mind, and to say what could and what could not have come up from what Lowes calls the ‘well’.

It behoves all scholars in this rigid scientific age to sit close to the facts and to eschew inferences that lack completely any objective substantiation. We deal, not with what was not written, not with some mythical torso, but with what actually lies before us. A literature exists which bears in all its parts the stamp of a standard Hebrew and a grand style. Where did the influence, whose effect can be seen in almost every nook and cranny of the Old Testament, originate? Its informing force is as unmistakable as the influence of Luther on German, or the Authorized Version on English literature. Only a literary work could have had such a sustained effect and have impregnated with simple grandeur a literature so extended in time and scope. We have long since realized that we do not owe the preservation of a literature to some imperishable material such as stone or copper, but to that intangible quality we call style. Much less is a document preserved by the insertion of a framework of pious phrase and religious claims. It is not the ‘Thus saith the Lord’ that lends to the document immortality. This could have been supplied by any renegade priest or false prophet. It is what follows the ‘Thus

saith the Lord’ that carries within itself the seeds of life. The hypothetical torso postulated by men like Wellhausen as having at one time independent existence would not of itself have survived a single generation.

No one has ever seriously drawn attention to any defects in the style of; say, Genesis, or questioned its literary quality. Style in Genesis possesses that ability, associated with all good style, of remaining inconspicuous, but its importance for effective communication is not thereby in the least diminished. Those who have been well qualified to judge, such as Milton, Coleridge, or Kierkegaard, have paid their tribute either directly or indirectly to the superlative quality of the prose of Genesis. It would pass with flying colours Coleridge’s test of a work of genius: ‘it is

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not the poem that we read with the greatest pleasure, but that to which we return with the greatest pleasure that possesses true literary power’. Again its literary quality might be tested by asking: of the possible alternatives has the author selected the best, and so provided us with an ideal and irreplaceable verbal deputy?

Even Wellhausen, convinced as he was of the fragmentary nature of the document, is struck by the unity and articulation of the document and the little evidence there is of the process of amalgamation. On the other hand, he can on other occasions abandon himself to unrestrained speculation. We are seldom in a position to put his subjective reasoning to any rational test, but there is one specimen in existence. He ventured on one occasion, not only to surmise that a clause had been omitted, but to supply the missing words: ‘Es war alles trockene Wueste.’ (All was a dry waste.) One wonders whether these words could be translated into Hebrew without doing violence to both the sense and the style of Genesis.

Genesis possesses all the characteristics of a homogeneous work: articulation, the unwitting use of forms and syntactical patterns which indicate the linguistic and geographical milieu of the writer, the function of particles, and in particular the definite article passing through the stages from demonstrative to definitive, as well as here the fluid state of grammatical gender. The writer of Genesis was a man of such pre-eminent literary gifts, as almost to suggest a facility and preoccupation with models in another literary medium. He has all the characteristics of genius: variety and diversity, multiplicity of alternatives, wide range of colours, a full gamut of notes exploited with masterly skill. No man now would dream of deducing from diversity of style diversity of authorship; diversity is part of the very texture of genius. It is not in the uniformity of diction or style but in the uniformity of quality that unity is discerned. It is easier to believe in a single genius than to believe that there existed a group of men possessing such preeminent gifts, so self-effacing, who could have produced such a work. Genius is rare, Greece produced only one Homer, Italy one Dante, England one Shakespeare. We do not know for certain of any document possessing literary worth having been produced by a group. The case of the composite authorship of the Authorized Version is no analogy—here the warp, the Hebrew text, was provided, and there

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remained but the interweaving of the weft. The patterns and moulds were to be found in the substratum provided by Tyndale.

There would seem to exist no valid objection to accepting Genesis as a literary unit, the work of a single author. When Kurt Sethe, a man in the twentieth century but not of it, one of the greatest authorities on Ancient Egypt, sought to find someone to father the greatest of all contributions to the progress of civilization, the North Semitic script, he mentions Moses as a possible candidate. And as we too ask ourselves a similar question as to the origin of Genesis we scan the historical horizon in vain for a man of breadth of experience and mental stature commensurate with a work of this literary quality apart from the Moses presented to us in the Pentateuch.

Old Testament scholars might be well advised to seek a methodology based on an objective approach to their problems. The older methods, far from leading them into the promised land, have left them in a wilderness singularly devoid of landmarks, and in which only the presence of the Baconian-Shakespeareans relieves the sense of loneliness. Modern philological methods and linguistics might provide a good foundation for constructive work. Results might be less brilliant and less sensational than those of the early days of stylistic analysis, and speculation would have to be severely curtailed. Nevertheless, in the long run the results should become permanent contributions to our store of worthwhile knowledge. It is perhaps hard for those nurtured in a subjective methodology to appreciate the attitude of scholars with an objective approach. The seeming dogmatism of the latter arises from the fact that in the nature of the case they can admit no exception to the rule that objective data alone can produce verifiable results. A discipline that dispenses with the need for verification or from which verification is excluded is as little to be trusted as a vehicle with defective steering and no brakes.

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