

Patterns of Religious Change in Postsoviet Russia: Major Trends from 1998 to 2003

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Introduction

The last decade of the twentieth century was a period of turbulent transition in the religious life of postsoviet Russia. For 70 years until the late 1980s 'militant atheism' had been an integral part of official ideology and state policy in the USSR. It is hardly surprising, then, that by time Gorbachev started his policy of political liberalisation only one in 10 Russians was raised in the tradition of the Orthodox Church and three out of four did not believe in God (Greely, 1994, p. 253). Two events in Russia can be seen as symbolising the beginning and the end of this transitional epoch of the so-called 'religious revival'. In 1988 a religious festival, the Millennium of the Baptism of Rus', was officially declared a national festival and was sponsored by what was still technically a communist (and atheist) state, although this was hardly believable for most Russians. Yet only 11 years later, in December 1999, after the unexpected resignation of President Yel'tsin, Vladimir Putin went to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Aleksii II, to ask for his blessing to serve as the temporary leader of the country until the next proper presidential elections took place. By then this was seen by the majority of Russia's population as a perfectly natural move on the part of a political leader.

For social scientists the breakup of the USSR provided a unique opportunity to analyse whether a long period of enforced secularisation will destroy religion, or leave it so enfeebled that it has little resiliency once the weight of oppression is lifted, or whether on the contrary religion will revive, and if so in what form. Referring mainly to the results of sociological surveys and public opinion polls, I shall attempt to outline the recent developments in the Russian religious landscape.

Territories as diverse in their geographical conditions and ethno-cultural traditions as for example, Bulgaria, Norway and Iran were incorporated into the common political and administrative system of Russian Empire and, subsequently, the USSR. Both states were hosts to virtually all world religions. Postsoviet Russia is a vast multiethnic and multicultural area and just as diverse religiously.

According to the 1897 census, of the Russian Empire's 125 million residents 72.0 per cent were Orthodox Christians, 9.2 per cent Catholics, 3.0 per cent Protestants (at that time primarily Lutherans), 11.1 per cent Muslims, 4.2 per cent Jews and 0.4 per cent Buddhists (Obshchi, 1905). Soviet censuses after the Second World War never asked about personal religious convictions and consequently there are no reliable data on the religious composition of the Soviet Union at the time of its disintegration. Various expert estimates, however, indicate that the religious diversity of the USSR was as great as that

Table 1. Religious composition of the population of the Russian Empire, the former USSR and postsoviet Russia (percentage of total population)

	Russian Empire (1897)	USSR (1991)	Russia (late 1990s)
Population (millions)	125.6	270.0	149.0
Orthodox	72.0	22.8	33–40 (50–60 million)
Catholics*	9.2	5.5	0.2 (300,000)
Protestants	3.0	3.0	0.7 (1 million)
Muslims	11.1	18.5	10–13 (15–20 million)
Buddhists	0.4	0.4	0.7 (1 million)
Jews	4.2	0.2	0.7 (1 million)
Nonbelievers	—	about 50	about 50

Sources of data: Russian Empire: *Obshchi*, 1905; USSR and postsoviet Russia: *Religioznyye*, 1996; *Religiya*, 1997.

* Figure includes both Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics.

of the Russian Empire before 1917 (Table 1). There were a number of important changes in religious demography during the period from 1897 to 1991, however. First, the number of agnostics increased significantly. Second, the proportion of Orthodox Christians decreased. To a certain extent, this was a result of the fact that in 1917 the Orthodox Church was deprived of its established position and lost many 'Orthodox' who were simply formally affiliated with this only state church. More important, however, was the fact that in the 1920s and 1930s communist antireligious policies were aimed particularly at the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of prerevolutionary monarchic Russia. Third, there was growth in the Islamic population. In both the Russian Empire and the USSR Islam was the traditional religion of certain ethnic groups, who always had higher rates of demographic growth. At the same time Soviet policy was generally more tolerant towards Islam than towards the Russian Orthodox Church. Fourth, there was a decline in the proportion of Catholics, which was chiefly the result of territorial changes: Poland, a major enclave of Catholic population in the Russian Empire, became an independent state in 1918. Fifth, there was a dramatic decline in Judaism. This was the result of the Holocaust (the majority of Jews in the USSR lived in the western parts of the country, which were occupied by the Nazis), augmented by large-scale emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and the USA in the 1970s.

In the Russian Federation today two religions – Orthodox Christianity and Islam – are dominant and can be regarded as indigenous, since they both took root even before the emergence of the Russian state as a politically integrated unit.

Orthodoxy

In 1917 there were about 77,800 parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the Russian Empire; by 1941 only 3100 were still functioning in the entire USSR, with none at all in 25 *oblasti* of the Russian Federation (Pospelovsky, 1995). After the onset of Gorbachev's policy of political liberalisation the ROC began to grow rapidly. In 1988 it had somewhat under 7000 parishes, 21 monasteries and 5 theological schools; its clergy comprised 74 bishops, 6700 priests and 723 deacons. Today, on the territory of the former USSR, the Moscow Patriarchate has about 23,350 parishes, 559 monasteries, and over 60




Figure 1. Religions in Russia.

theological educational institutions of various kinds; its clergy comprises 156 bishops and 19,500 priests and deacons (Russkaya, 2003). Various sociological surveys and expert estimates indicate that 50–60 million Russian citizens identify themselves as Orthodox Christians (Religioznyye, 1996). In other words Orthodoxy is the religion of 33–40 per cent of the total population (Table1) or of between two thirds and three quarters of all believers in postsoviet Russia (Figure 1). It is important to note that the ROC today has a significant impact on a larger proportion of Russian citizens than those who actually consider themselves as members of this church. A national survey in 2002, for instance, revealed that the ROC enjoyed the confidence of 62 per cent of the country’s total population and in this respect was well ahead of the government, the mass media and the trade unions (Tables 2 and 3).

Whereas in the Russian Empire and (to a lesser extent) in the USSR the ROC was a predominantly national church, after the breakup of the USSR it has become a truly

Table 2. Evolution of public confidence in the Russian Orthodox Church, 1994–2002 (percentage of respondents)

	1994	1998	2002
Trust or rather trust (<i>trust entirely</i>)	55 (24)	52 (18)	62 (28)
Mistrust or rather mistrust	21	32	23

Source of data: ‘Omnibus’ sociological surveys carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) (unpublished)

Table 3. Public confidence in various state, political and public institutions in Russia, 1998–2002 (percentage of those who ‘trust or rather trust’/‘mistrust or rather mistrust’)

Do you trust:	1998: trust/mistrust	2002: trust/mistrust
President of Russia	No comparable data	81/15
Church	52/32	62/23
Russian Army	46/44	52/43
Government	11/77	50/47
Mass Media	37/58	32/64
Trade Unions	18/60	28/52
Police	19/75	23/74
Parliament	15/65	No comparable data
Political Parties	7/76	No comparable data

Source of data: ‘Omnibus’ sociological surveys carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) (unpublished)

international organisation. The church’s centre remains in Moscow, but today more than half the parishes and clergy of the ROC are no longer in Russia itself, but in other former republics of the USSR. In three such republics – Ukraine, Belarus’ and Moldova – the ROC (or its branches subordinated to Moscow) is the largest religious organisation. In addition, 10 dioceses and almost 300 parishes of the ROC are located outside the borders of the former Soviet Union (Table 4).

The new geopolitical realities since the break-up of the USSR have brought about fundamental changes in the administrative-territorial structure of the ROC. While still under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate the parishes and dioceses of the ROC in various former republics of the USSR have been granted different types of legal status, which reflect various degrees of self-administration and independence from Moscow. Three main factors have influenced the kind of status achieved: the internal political situation in the given state; the character of the relationship between the new national political elite and the political authorities in Moscow; and the level of social impact of the ROC in the given state.

There are basically three variants of adaptation of the ROC to the new political conditions in which it finds itself.

The first can be defined as a gradual autonomisation. In Ukraine (1990), Moldova (1992), Latvia (1992) and Estonia (1992) the structures of the ROC were granted the status of autonomous churches. These churches are independent from Moscow as far as their internal affairs and daily life are concerned. With the exception of Estonia, the social impact of the ROC is considerable in all these states. At the same time, these are the states where the new political leaderships since the early 1990s have pursued a policy of keeping at a distance from Moscow. In conditions of growing nationalistic (and, sometimes, anti-Russian) sentiments, providing the structures of the ROC with the maximum autonomy was, perhaps, the only way of keeping the Orthodox parishes and dioceses in these republics as a part of the Moscow Patriarchate.

The second variant of adaptation is a rather formal change of administrative status and the maintenance of unity with Moscow. This is the case in Belarus’ and Kazakhstan, where the social authority of the ROC is also significant. Yet in contrast to the states

Table 4. The Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) in the Russian Federation and abroad

Countries	Status of the Russian Orthodox Church and number of its dioceses/bishops	Number of parishes	Number of monasteries	Number of clergy: priests and deacons	Educational institutions*
Total	Moscow Patriarchate: 135 dioceses/157 bishops	about 23,350	553	about 19,550	61
Russian Federation (2003)	70 dioceses/80 bishops	about 10,600	334	about 8400	33
Ukraine (2002)	Since 1990, autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate: 35 dioceses/40 bishops	9515	131	7995	14
Belarus' (2003)	Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church: 10 dioceses/10 bishops	1277	22	1205	5
Moldova (including the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdnistria) (2002)	Since 1992, autonomous Orthodox Church in Moldova: 4 dioceses/4 bishops	More than 1100	36	About 1000	5
Lithuania (2000)	1 diocese/1 bishop	40	2	37	0
Latvia (2003)	Since 1992, autonomous Orthodox Church in Latvia: 1 diocese/1 bishop	118	2	about 100	1
Estonia (2003)	Since 1992, autonomous Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church: 1 diocese/1 bishop	32	1	about 50	0

Table 4. (continued)

Countries	Status of the Russian Orthodox Church and number of its dioceses/bishops	Number of parishes	Number of monasteries	Number of clergy: priests and deacons	Educational institutions*
Georgia	[Since the fifth century the autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church has been equal in status to the Russian Orthodox Church]	0	0	0	0
Armenia (2003)	Part of the Diocese of Maikop (Russia) 1 diocese/1 bishop	2	0	no data	0
Azerbaijan + Dagestan (Russia) + Chechnya (Russia) (2003)		6 + 12 + 7	0	20 + 17 + 3	0
Kazakhstan (2003)	Since 2003, Metropolitan District of the Russian Orthodox Church: 3 dioceses/3 bishops	222	8	340	1
Uzbekistan + Turkmenistan + Kyrgyzstan + Tajikistan (2003)	1 diocese/1 bishop	105	5	133	1
United Kingdom (2002)	1 diocese/3 bishops	22	0	32	0
France + Italy + Switzerland + Spain + Portugal (2003)	1 diocese/1 bishop	7 + 16 + 4 + 3 + 2	4 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 0	21 + 10 + 2 + 3 + 0	0
Austria + Hungary (2002)	1 diocese/1 bishop	2 + 8	0	1 + 2	0

Germany (2002)	1 diocese/2 bishops	44	0	45	0
Belgium (2002)	1 diocese/2 bishops	7	2	5	0
Netherlands (2002)	1 diocese/bishop's position is vacant	4	2	5	0
USA (2002)	Patriarchal parishes in the USA: no dioceses/1 bishop	31	1	42	0
Canada (2002)	Patriarchal parishes in Canada: no dioceses/1 bishop	24	0	5	0
Argentina + Chile + Brazil + Colombia + Panama + Peru + Costa Rica + Ecuador (2002)	1 diocese/1 bishop	20	0	about 10	0
China (2000)	Since 1957, autonomous Orthodox Church in China: no dioceses/bishops	2	0	2	0
Japan (2000)	Since 1970, autonomous Orthodox Church in Japan: 3 dioceses/3 bishops	70	1	18	1
Countries with individual parishes or monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church (2002)	Australia (3), Bulgaria (1), The Czech Republic (2), Denmark (2), Egypt (2), Finland (4), Greece (1 monastery), Iceland (1), Iran (1), Ireland (1), Israel (3 + 5 monasteries), Japan (1), Lebanon (1), Morocco (1), Mexico (1), Mongolia (1), Norway (3), South Africa (1), Sweden (5), Thailand (1), Tunisia (2), Serbia (1), Syria (1), Vietnam (1)				

Table 4. (continued)

Countries	Status of the Russian Orthodox Church and number of its dioceses/bishops	Number of parishes	Number of monasteries	Number of clergy: priests and deacons	Educational institutions*
Countries with permanent official representations of the Moscow Patriarchate:	Germany (Düsseldorf), Switzerland (Geneva), Syria (Damascus), USA (New York), Belgium (Brussels), Thailand (Bangkok)				

Principal sources of data: (1) the official website of the Russian Orthodox Church: www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru; (2) Mitrokhin and Timofeyeva (1997); (3) Statistical data from the Secretariat for Interorthodox Relations and Foreign Institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church (*Sekretariat po mezhravoslavnyam svyazyam i zarubezhnyam organizatsiyam Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi*) at the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate (unpublished); (4) the official website of the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church: www.church.by; (5) the official website of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate: www.orthodox.org.ua; (6) the official website of the Orthodox Church in Moldova: www.mitropolia.md; (7) Tserkvi (2002).

* 'Educational institutions' includes theological academies, theological seminaries, theological schools and Orthodox universities.

mentioned above both Belarus' and Kazakhstan have always kept close political relations with Russia. There was therefore no need for any essential changes in the relations of dioceses of the ROC with the Moscow headquarters. Both the Belarusian Exarchate of the ROC and the recently established Metropolitan District of the ROC in Kazakhstan serve simply as a convenient vehicle for church administration but make no claim to increasing independence from Moscow.

The third variant involves simply keeping the *status quo*. This applies to those countries where Orthodox Christians form only small religious minorities: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania and the states of former Soviet Central Asia. The social and political impact of the ROC in these countries is small, and change in the status of the ROC has not therefore been an important issue. At the same time as fulfilling their religious functions, the parishes of the ROC serve also as important ethnic-cultural centres that consolidate the Orthodox Slavic population living in these states.

Islam

The second largest religion in the Russian Federation is Islam; there are more Muslims living in Russia than in Saudi Arabia, Islam's country of origin. The main Islamic areas are the Northern Caucasus, the Volga Basin, the Southern Urals (Kurgan, Chelyabinsk and Orenburg *oblasti*) and Western Siberia (especially Tyumen' *oblast'*) (Figure 1). There is also a substantial Islamic community in Moscow city and Moscow *oblast'*: according to various estimates between 600,000 and 1.2 million (Malashenko, 1998). Today there are over 3400 officially state-registered Islamic religious communities in Russia (excluding Chechnya and Ingushetia, for which data are not available), but neither the exact number of *de facto* functioning mosques nor that of actual Islamic believers is known. The commonly accepted estimate of the actual number of mosques in Russia is about 7000 (Malashenko, 1999). Evaluating the number of Islamic believers is complicated by the fact that the term 'Muslim' is frequently used in an ethnic rather than a religious sense and therefore encompasses not only practising believers but all the members of ethnicities of traditionally Islamic religious background: Tatars, Bashkirs and the culturally and linguistically various peoples of the Caucasus. Estimates range therefore between 12 and 20 million Muslims (Halbach, 1996). There is no doubt, however, that the proportion of Islamic ethnic groups in the population of the Russian Federation is increasing. Whereas in 1937 'ethnic Muslims' made up 5.9 per cent of Russia's total population, in 1994 the proportion was as high as 8 per cent (Malashenko, 1998). Demographic forecasts for the coming decades agree that the Muslim component will continue to grow as the ethnically Russian component decreases (Halbach, 1996).

In seven out of 89 administrative provinces of Russia ethnic Muslims are in a majority. These are: the republics of Bashkortostan (2.5 million ethnic Muslims, or about 60 per cent of the total population, 401 registered mosques in 2002), Tatarstan (2 million (about 55 per cent), 951 registered mosques), Dagestan (2 million (about 95 per cent), 580 registered mosques), Chechnya and Ingushetia (1 million (about 95 per cent), no data on the number of registered mosques), Kabardino-Balkaria (0.7 million (about 85 per cent), 98 registered mosques) and Karachayevo-Cherkessia (0.4 million (about 90 per cent), 102 registered mosques) (Narody, 1994; Ministry, 2003).

Any analysis of Islam in postsoviet Russia requires careful consideration of strong ethnic-cultural and regional differentiation. The Islamic population of Russia consists of almost 40 ethnic groups, who speak different languages and have various cultures and traditions. Some of them live in compact areas and some are dispersed all across Russia. According to the 2002 census the largest of these ethnic groups are: Tatars (5,558,000),

Bashkirs (1,674,000), Chechens (1,361,000), Avars (757,000), Azerbaijanis (621,000), Kabards (520,000) and Dargins (510,000) (Narody, 1994).

As far as degree of religiosity is concerned, the Muslims of the Volga Basin in the Central European part of Russia (Tatars and Bashkirs) are much more worldly than those in the Northern Caucasus, especially those in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, where Islamic prescriptions and rules are obeyed more strictly. It was in Chechnya and Dagestan where as early as the beginning of the 1990s several attempts were made to restore the system of *sharia* law (Halbach, 1996; Islam v Rossii, 1996). The issue of the incorporation of some elements of *sharia* into secular legislation has also been seriously debated in the republic of Ingushetia (Novoye, 2000).

The forms of Islamic religious practice in Russia also differ strongly from place to place. The majority of Russia's Muslims are Sunnis, but the Tatars and Azerbaijanis living in the North Caucasus are Shiites. Whereas most Sunnis follow the Hanafi school, the Chechens, Ingush and Avars are the adherents of the Shafi school. Alongside 'official Islam', mystical Sufism (represented by the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya religious orders) is widespread in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia. Remnants of preislamic tribal beliefs and the norms of customary law – the so-called 'adat' – have a big influence on Islamic practices among the Adygei ethno-linguistic family (the Adygei, Kabard and Cherkess peoples) (Islam v Rossii, 1996).

The differences within Russia's Muslim community are evident not only when one compares two big macro-cultural Islamic regions, the North Caucasus and the Volga-Ural area. They are also present within single geographical areas. In the Caucasus, adherence to Islam is more superficial among the Adygei in Western Caucasus than among the Chechens or the various peoples living in Dagestan. In the religious culture of the Adygei Islam coexists peacefully with elements of Christianity and with the remnants of various pagan practices and beliefs. Hence Islam is perceived here as a matter of lifestyle and cultural tradition. In Chechnya and Dagestan, by contrast, Islam is much more of a politico-religious phenomenon, and its social and political impact is especially evident there.

It was in Dagestan that the radical-conservative Wahhabi movement, advocating a return to an original 'pure Islam', made its first appearance in Russia in the early 1990s, subsequently spreading fast in other Islamic regions of the North Caucasus.

There are various reasons for the recent emergence and spread of the Wahhabi movement in the Russian Caucasus. First, as a result of 70 years of communist antireligious policy the Islamic regions of Russia have to a large extent lost their own specific historically rooted religious traditions. The absence of cultural immunity and the crisis of identity in postsoviet society created favourable conditions for the spread of new 'imported' Islamic movements and ideas. Second, the dynamic rise of Wahhabism is characteristic of areas experiencing high unemployment and economic decline. This is the case in Russia's Islamic regions in the Northern Caucasus, where the ideas of restoring equality and social justice propagated by Wahhabi leaders have become popular, particularly among the younger generation of Russian Muslims. Third, the increasing activity of foreign Islamic missionaries is backed by financial support from the Wahhabi movement abroad, mainly from Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Razhbandinov, 1998).

The mountainous republic of Dagestan in the Caucasus is a peculiar case of ethno-cultural diversity combined with a variety of local Islamic religious practices, which demonstrated an amazing persistence even under communist rule. As a result Dagestan, along with neighbouring Chechnya, has assumed a leading position in the process of Islamic revival in the Russian North Caucasus (Gammer, 1995; Islam v Rossii, 1996). Of

Table 5. Personal belief and religious identity in Russia (1998, percentage of respondents)

Are you a religious person?		What is your religion?	
Yes	45.1	Russian Orthodox	52.5
		'Christian' (without further definition)	5.1
		Muslim	2.4
		Various other religions	1.1
		Total:	61.1
No	38.3	I am not a believer	32.8
Difficult to answer	16.6	Difficult to answer	6.2

Source of data: Mchedlov (1998).

all Russian administrative units Dagestan has the densest Islamic 'religious infrastructure': about 1000 legally registered mosques for a total population of 2.1 million. The Dagestani town of Buinaksk is widely recognised as the main Islamic educational and theological centre for the entire North Caucasus. In the Russian Federation it is only in Dagestan that the Islamic religion has been taught as an ordinary subject in state schools since 1992 (Halbach, 1996). Nevertheless, despite these strong Islamic traditions, the idea of 'Islamic unity' has neither become the basis for the creation of a new postsoviet identity for Dagestan's ethnically diverse population nor prevented latent and even open ethno-religious conflicts in this republic. The majority of the population of Dagestan comprises eight ethnicities – Avars, Dargins, Kumuks, Lezgins, Laks, Tabasarans, Chechens and Azerbaijanis – each numbering 100,000 to 600,000. There are historical tensions amongst these ethnic clans and competition for representation in republican and local administrations. These interethnic tensions have caused Dagestani Islam to split into several administrative structures ('muftiates' or 'qadiates') that coexist on the same territory and play an essential role in the process of political mobilisation within the various ethnic groups.

The example of the numerous splits and intra-Islamic tensions in Dagestan reflects the general contemporary situation within the Islamic community of Russia. The repeatedly declared aspiration for the unification of all Russian Muslims is still overwhelmed by disintegrative tendencies based not on religious but rather on ethnic tensions and the political ambitions of various Islamic leaders. Consequently, there is at the moment no single Islamic religious organisation or leader that can claim to speak on behalf of a majority of Russia's Muslims.

Religious Revival in Postsoviet Russia: Stereotypes and Realities

Along with the other former republics of the USSR Russia has experienced a period of so-called 'religious revival' after the lifting of restrictions on religious activities at the end of the 1980s. However, different groups of people – social activists, religious leaders, sociologists and scholars of religion, people in the mass media – interpret the term 'religious revival' in quite different ways.

There is no doubt that religion has become an influential social force and religious institutions today are a significant component of Russian civil society. Yet the questions of the religious identity and religious participation of the population require careful analysis. The relationship between personal belief, religious identity and actual

Table 6. Evolution of religious orientations and religious practice in Russia, 1985–2002 (percentage of the total population, according to the results of public opinion polls)

	1985	1989	1991	1996	1998	2002
Nonbelievers	75	66	61	43	38	33
Believers	25	33	32	48	45	57
Don't know		1	7	9	17	10
Attend church at least once a month			5	7	9	8
Receive eucharist at least once a month			2	4	3	2
Baptised		65			76	77
Religion and faith						
– are very important to me						8
– are not important at all						32

Sources of data: 1985: Greely (1994); 1989–2003: sociological surveys carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) (partly published in Obshchestvennoye, 2002) and by the Russian Independent Institute for Social and National Issues (*Rossiiskiy nezavisimyy institut sotsial'nykh i natsional'nykh problem*) (summer–autumn 1995, unpublished).

religious practice is complicated and controversial. In fact, religious self-identification frequently reflects neither a personal belief system nor a regular religious practice. Religion is often perceived as part of the traditional cultural environment or as an ethnic style of life: 'I am Russian, and therefore Orthodox' or 'I am Tatar, and therefore Muslim'. The results of social surveys thus always look paradoxical, because they indicate a higher total of respondents identifying themselves as Orthodox, Muslims, Buddhists and so on than the total of those who answer 'yes' to the general question 'Do you believe in God?' or 'Are you a religious person?' (Table 5; Mchedlov, 1998).

Surveys show a continuing rise in personal religiosity in Russia. By the mid-1990s about 50 per cent of Russian citizens were declaring themselves religious; before Gorbachev's policy of political liberalisation the figure was 25 per cent (Greely, 1994). Although not as rapidly as in the early 1990s, growth continues: 57 per cent of respondents identified themselves as 'believers' in a survey carried out in 2002 (Table 6).

Table 7. Belief in God: past and present (percentage of the total population, according to the results of comparable public opinion polls)

	Russia, 1991 ^a	Russia, 1991 ^b	Russia, 1998 ^c
I have never believed in God	50	45	37
I once believed but don't now	3	4	3
I did not believe but do now	22	21	24
I have always believed in God	25	28	36

Source of data: ^aGreely (1994); ^{b,c}Dubin (1999).




Figure 2. Religious organisations in administrative regions of Russia (1 January 2003).

In three sociological investigations carried out by various researchers in 1991 and 1998 (Table 7) between 21 and 24 per cent of respondents said that they did not believe in God in Soviet times but do so now. In other words, no fewer than one fifth of all Russians (or one third of former atheists) have abandoned atheism for theism since the collapse of communism. This proportion is higher than in any other formerly communist Eastern European country (Greely, 1994, p. 257).

Indices of religiosity show correlations with the ethnic background of respondents. They are higher in the case of Islamic ethnic groups. For instance, even in relatively 'agnostic' Tatarstan 67 per cent of urban and 86 per cent of rural Tatars identify themselves as faithful Muslims (compared with 34 per cent and 43 per cent in 1989) (Musina, 1997). The highest proportions of believers are among the Islamic ethnic groups in the Northern Caucasus: Chechens (97 per cent), Ingush (95 per cent), Karachai (88 per cent) (Kritsky, 1997).

Among the Slavic population, the level of religiosity differs from one geographic area to another. A higher percentage of believers is characteristic of the Southern European part of Russia – an area of old settlements with a relatively low proportion of recent immigrants and a relatively high rural population. By contrast, territories of more recent settlement with a predominantly urban and industrial population (Siberia, the Far East, the Northern European part of the country) show a lower level of religiosity. Surveys show that almost 80 per cent of respondents in Voronezh *oblast'* (about 500 km south-west of Moscow) and 76 per cent in Stavropol' (the most southerly of the administrative regions of European Russia) answer 'yes' to the question 'Do you believe in God?', but only 28 per cent do so in industrial Petrozavodsk, the capital of the republic of Karelia in the north of Russia. In Moscow the percentage of believers more or less corresponds with the average for Russia as a whole: 50.1 per cent (comprising 39.7 per cent Orthodox, 6.2 per cent 'simply Christian', 1.8 per cent Muslim, 1.4 per cent Catholic, 0.6 per cent Buddhist,

Table 8. Regularity of religious practice in Russia among those who identify themselves as 'Orthodox', 1991–1998 (percentage of all 'Orthodox')

Attend church services 1991/1998		Receive eucharist 1991/1998	
Monthly and more frequently	13.2/13.8	Monthly and more frequently	6.9/4.7
Several times a year	39.0/33.2	Several times a year	14.2/10.9
Less than once a year	9.1/15.0	Less than once a year	16.2/10.4
Never	35.7/36.8	Never	59.5/65.9
Difficult to answer	1.5/1.1	Difficult to answer	3.2/3.1

Source of data: sociological surveys carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) in 1991 and in October 1998 (partly published in Dubin, 1999).

0.2 per cent Jews and 0.2 per cent Protestants) (Rossiya, 1997; INTAS/Prometee/VTsIOM, 1996).

These geographical differences in the degree of religiosity correspond with different densities of 'religious infrastructure' – the total number of all local religious organisations per one million local population. Figure 2 shows a high concentration of religious organisations in the Central and Southern European parts of the country. By contrast, there is an obvious lack of religious infrastructure in the vast territories to the east of the Urals. The apparent exceptions of the Taimyr, Koryak and Chukotka autonomous regions and Magadan *oblast'* are simply a reflection of their very small population: the insignificant absolute number of religious organisations thus appears large as a relative number per one million people.

Whereas ethnic and geographical differences are evident, surveys show that differences in levels of religiosity among the various age groups are tending to decline (Mchedlov, 1998). So are those amongst groups with different educational levels. For instance, in 1991 only 16 per cent of respondents with a university degree said that they were religious in comparison with 58 per cent among those who did not have college-level education. In 1998 the corresponding numbers were 46 per cent and 58 per cent respectively (Dubin, 1999).

By contrast, gender remains a significant differentiating factor. Today about 68 per cent of women in Russia say they are religious, but only 46 per cent of men (Stark, 2002). These differences appear to be almost as high as in Soviet times. In answer to the question 'Were your parents religious?' 56 per cent said their mothers were, but only 33 per cent said their fathers were (VTsIOM, 1998).

Finally, there are evident differences in religiosity among various social and professional groups. In Russia today the most 'godless' seem to be industrial workers and freelance intellectuals; more religious are peasants, qualified technicians (engineers), office workers and pensioners; the highest proportions of believers are among students, businessmen, soldiers and housewives (Novy kurs, 1996, p. 98).

The indices of religiosity based on the criterion of self-identification (the proportion of those who identify themselves as belonging to a particular religion, or who simply say that they are religious) are much higher than the number of actually practising believers (those who regularly attend church services and who fulfil other religious rituals and prescriptions) (Table 6) (Greely, 1994; Varzanova, 1997). For example, of those who say that they are 'Orthodox' no more than 15 per cent attend church services monthly or more frequently (Table 8). Even among the relatively strict Muslims of the Northern Caucasus

Table 9. Religious belief and religious practice in postcommunist countries (1998, percentage of respondents)

	I consider myself a very religious person	I have no doubt about the existence of God	I attend church at least once a week	Personal prayer: every day
Eastern Germany	2.1	8.3	3.1	5.1
Russia	3.4	23.6	3.6	12.3
Ukraine	3.8	23.0	14.0	19.3
Slovenia	5.1	21.9	20.3	14.2
Czech Republic	6.2	13.7	8.9	9.0
Belarus'	6.3	35.4	11.3	21.4
Lithuania	6.4	28.6	10.4	18.1
Slovakia	10.4	35.7	32.7	29.2
Romania	11.6	61.9	25.1	53.4
Poland	19.5	55.0	53.3	37.2
Hungary	22.6	27.4	13.6	20.9
Croatia	33.3	51.5	25.0	30.1

Sources of data: Tomka (1998); sociological surveys carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Belarusian National Academy of Sciences in August–September 1998 (unpublished) and by the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) in October 1998 (unpublished).

the rates of regular fulfilment of various religious rites are low: Ingush 28 per cent, Avars 34 per cent, Chechens 36 per cent, Dargins 43 per cent (Kritsky, 1997). Hence despite the above-mentioned self-declared conversion to religion of one in five Russians, the indices of regularity of religious practice in Russia are among the lowest in comparison with the other formerly communist countries of Europe (Table 9). Moreover, Russians confirm the superficial character of their religiosity, with only 3.4 per cent defining themselves as 'very religious' (Table 9) and only 8 per cent saying that 'religion and faith are very important to me' (Table 6). In fact, the vast majority of 'Orthodox believers' in Russia participate only either in one-time ceremonies (baptising their children, church weddings or funerals) or in the major religious festivals such as Easter or Christmas.

Table 10. Attitudes toward the influence of the church on society at the time of the collapse of communism (percentage of the total population, according to the results of comparable public opinion polls, 1991)

	Russia	USA	Poland	Ireland	GDR
I have a great deal of confidence in the church	75	40	75	46	21
The church has too much power	7	23	37	40	46

Source of Data: Greely (1994).

We can see, then, that the variety of approaches to measuring religiosity in postsoviet Russia (77 per cent are baptised, between 45 and 60 per cent (depending on the exact formulation of the question) claim to be believers, 8 per cent attend church services monthly or more frequently) allow for endless speculation on the subject. Most expert estimates agree, however, that between 10 and 15 per cent of those who define themselves as religious persons (or, in other words, between 5 and 8 per cent of the total Russian population) can be said to be regularly practising believers (Novy kurs, 1996).

The early 1990s in Russia were marked by a dramatic decline of public confidence in the institutions of state power and political associations and, at the same time, by the growing popularity of religious organisations, with the Russian Orthodox Church in first place. According to a comparative international public opinion poll carried out simultaneously in 21 countries in 1991 the ROC enjoyed the support of 75 per cent of Russia's population (Greely, 1994). In other words, at this peak of 'religious boom' the percentage of those who placed confidence in the ROC as a social institution was 2.3 times higher than the percentage of those who defined themselves as 'believers' (Table 6). At that time in Russia the level of people's trust in religious organisations was probably one of the highest in the world (Table 10). Later on, the strengthening of the formal positions of religious organisations within the postsoviet state was accompanied by more critical attitudes to their activity. Yet during the 1990s more than half the population declared their trust in the ROC (Table 2) and by the end of the 1990s popular confidence in the ROC was greater than in various state institutions, the mass media, trade unions or political parties (Table 3).

The stable (or even increasing) popularity of the ROC in Russia should not be interpreted as involving a growth of clerical influence in the political sphere. Only a small proportion of Russians support the idea of the participation of the ROC or clergy in political activities. In a national survey in 1998 only 9 per cent of respondents were of the view that clergy should take part in electoral campaigns (Dubin, 1999). It seems also that there are no objective premises for the development of influential political parties with a religious background, since various sociological investigations do not reflect any essential differences in political orientation between believers and nonbelievers (Kublitskaya, 1997; Dubin, 1999).

The issue of the actual (or latent) influence of the Orthodox Church on Russian society is however much broader than the question of its direct political involvement. For example, on the one hand only about a quarter of the total population today believes that the current social and political impact of the churches and religious organisations in Russia is substantial (Table 11); but on the other hand almost half the respondents were of the view that if President Putin invited the pope to Russia but the Orthodox Church were opposed to this, the president should cancel the invitation (Table 12).

Between 1990 and 2003 the total number of religious communities in Russia increased from 6600 to 21,000 (Ministry, 2003). This figure includes individual places of regular worship (Orthodox and Catholic parishes, Protestant congregations, Islamic mosques, Jewish synagogues and so on), administrative centres of religious organisations, monasteries, religious missions, religious brotherhoods and theological educational institutions. It includes, however, only those religious organisations that are registered as legal entities by the Russian Ministry of Justice. The procedure of registration enables a religious organisation to obtain official status, which is associated with the certain privileges, but it is technically not required by law. Many religious communities in Russia therefore function without state registration (as is the case with thousands of mosques, for instance) and they are not included in the above official statistics.

This increase in the number of religious organisations was accompanied by changing

proportions amongst communities of various religions, churches and denominations (Table 13), by shifts in the religious geography of the country, and by increasing diversity in the Russian 'religious landscape' (Krindatch, 1996).

Perhaps the most striking recent changes on the Russian religious map are associated with an increasing presence of various Protestant denominations and churches in the vast territories to the east of the Ural Mountains, in Siberia and the Far East (Figure 1). As mentioned earlier, in Soviet times these territories traditionally had a population with a relatively high proportion of unbelievers and an obvious lack of religious infrastructure (Figure 2) in comparison with the European part of the country. Since the end of communism and the lifting of restrictions on the activities of religious organisations, Protestant missionary churches have consequently especially targeted these 'godless' areas of Russia. Protestant denominations in Russia pay much greater attention to systematic missionary activity than does the Russian Orthodox Church. In March 2002 four major Protestant religious organisations (Table 14) – the Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists of Russia (*Rossiiskiy Soyuz Yevangel'skikh Khristian-Baptistov*), the Pentecostal

Table 11. How do you estimate the current social and political impact of the churches and religious organisations* in Russia? (percentage of respondents)

	1991	2003
Substantial	6	27
Insignificant	46	41

Sources of data: 1991: Dubin (1999); 2003: 'Omnibus' sociological surveys 2003-EX-01 carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM).

*The survey question did not specify any particular denomination or denominations.

Table 12. If President Putin invited the pope to visit Russia but the Russian Orthodox Church were opposed to this, what should be the final decision of the president? (2001, percentage of respondents)

He must insist on the pope's visit	32
He must cancel his invitation	45

Source of data: sociological survey 2001-EX-7 carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM).

Table 13. Religious communities* in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (1 January 1991) and in the Russian Federation (1 January 2003) Above: the absolute number; below (in italics and brackets): the percentage this represents of the total number of religious communities

	Russia 1 January 1991	Russia 1 January 2003	Percentage change between 1991 and 2003 (1991 = 100%)
Total number of all religious communities	6650	20,922	315
	<i>(100.0)</i>	<i>(100.0)</i>	
Orthodox Churches	3772	11,439	303
including:	<i>(56.7)</i>	<i>(54.7)</i>	
– Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate	3442	11,012	320
	<i>(51.8)</i>	<i>(52.6)</i>	
– Old Believers	265	274	103
	<i>(4.0)</i>	<i>(1.3)</i>	
Roman Catholic Church	34	258	759
	<i>(0.5)</i>	<i>(1.2)</i>	
Protestant Churches and Denominations	1853	4760	257
including:	<i>(27.9)</i>	<i>(22.8)</i>	
– Baptist and Evangelical Christian	991	1,601	162
	<i>(14.9)</i>	<i>(7.6)</i>	
– Pentecostal and Charismatic	300	1,502	501
	<i>(4.5)</i>	<i>(7.2)</i>	
– Adventist	185	624	337
	<i>(2.8)</i>	<i>(3.0)</i>	
– Lutheran	177	203	115
	<i>(2.7)</i>	<i>(1.0)</i>	
– Presbyterian	1	133	13,300
	<i>(0.0)</i>	<i>(0.6)</i>	
– Methodist	2	100	5000
	<i>(0.0)</i>	<i>(0.5)</i>	
– New Apostolic Church	0	72	n/a
	<i>(0.0)</i>	<i>(0.3)</i>	
– Churches of Christ	0	23	n/a
	<i>(0.0)</i>	<i>(0.1)</i>	
Islam	914	3445	377
	<i>(13.7)</i>	<i>(16.5)</i>	
Judaism	34	262	771
	<i>(0.5)</i>	<i>(1.3)</i>	
Buddhism	16	213	1331
	<i>(0.2)</i>	<i>(1.0)</i>	
Other Religious Organisations	27	545	2018
including:	<i>(0.4)</i>	<i>(2.6)</i>	
– International Society for Krishna Consciousness	9	96	1600
	<i>(0.1)</i>	<i>(0.4)</i>	
– Baha'i World Faith	1	19	1900
	<i>(0.0)</i>	<i>(0.1)</i>	
– Jehovah's Witnesses	92	406	441
	<i>(1.4)</i>	<i>(1.9)</i>	
– Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons)	0	46	n/a
	<i>(0.0)</i>	<i>(0.2)</i>	

Sources of data: 1991: annual report of the Council for Religious Affairs attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR (*Sovet po delam religii pri sovete ministrov SSSR*) (unpublished); 2003: statistics of state registration of religious organisations compiled by the Department for the Affairs of Public and Religious Organisations of the Ministry of Justice of Russia (*Departament po delam obshchestvennykh i religioznykh organizatsii Ministerstva Yustitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*) (unpublished).

* 'Religious communities' include places of regular public worship, administrative centres of religious organisations, monasteries, religious brotherhoods and theological educational institutions.

Table 14. The largest Protestant churches in Russia

	Total number of <i>de facto</i> existing congregations (registered and unregistered)	Estimated membership
Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists of Russia	1400	280,000
Pentecostal Union of Evangelical Chris- tians in Russia	1400	300,000
Russian Union of Christians of Evangeli- cal Faith (Pentecostal)	1250	180–200,000
West Russian Union of Christians – Sev- enth-Day Adventists	1000	120,000

Source of data: personal consultations with the leaders of Protestant churches.

Table 15. Attitudes toward church-state relationships and toward the principle of equality of religions and churches (percentage of respondents to a national public opinion poll, 1997)

	Young people (18–26)	Adults (40–60)
Support of traditional religions and churches and restrictions on activities of ‘new’ and ‘nontraditional’ religions/churches	23.2	28.2
Full equality of all religions and churches	40.0	40.8

Source of data: Mchedlov (1998).

Table 16. Do you agree that ‘western’ culture has a negative impact on the situation in Russia? (percentage of respondents)

	1996	2002
Agree or rather agree	48	67
Disagree or rather disagree	36	29
Don’t know	16	6

Source of data: Obshchestvennoye (2002), p. 160.

Table 17. To what extent does the ‘western’ model of society suit Russia? (2000, percentage of respondents)

This is a universal model of society, which can be fully applied in Russia	4
This model of society can be adjusted to the conditions in Russia	15
It is unlikely that the ‘western’ model of society can be developed in Russia	30
The ‘western’ model is not suitable for Russia and it contradicts the style of life of the Russian people	37
Don’t know	13

Source of data: Obshchestvennoye (2002), p. 159.

Table 18. Is it important for Russia to 'join' world culture and to adopt the lifestyle of the majority of developed countries? (2000, percentage of respondents)

Yes, it is important	38
No, it is not important	31
We should not strive for that at all	20
Don't know	11

Source of data: Obshchestvennoye (2002), p. 160.

Table 19. How do you feel about the idea 'Russia for Russians only'? (percentage of respondents)

	1998	2002
I support it entirely	15	17
It would be good to achieve this, but within certain limits	31	38
I feel negative: this is real fascism	32	28
I don't care or I have never thought about it	15	10
Don't know	7	7

Source of data: Obshchestvennoye (2002), p. 128.

Union of Evangelical Christians in Russia (*Soyuz Khristian Very Yevangel'skoi Pyatidesyatnikov v Rossii*), the Russian Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) (*Rossiisky Ob'yedinenny Soyuz Khristian Very Yevangel'skoi*) and the West Russian Union of Christians – Seventh-Day Adventists (*Zapadno-Rossiisky Soyuz Khristian Adventistov Sed'mogo Dnya*) – formed a Consultative Council of the Leaders of Protestant Churches (*Konsul'tativny sovet glav protestantskikh tserkvei*) with the purpose of coordinating their work. The long-term goals of this Council include the formulation of a 'common Protestant social doctrine' (V Rossii, 2002). Evidently one may predict continuing growth of the Protestant component in the Russian religious landscape.

The increase of religious diversity in Russia is due to the appearance and rapid development of various new religious organisations which were not present in Soviet times and many of which are the product of foreign missionary initiatives. Most foreign religious missions working permanently in or visiting Russia have come from the USA, South Korea and Germany. Among those new religious organisations that are growing particularly dynamically and are widespread geographically are the Presbyterian Church (133 officially registered communities), the Methodist Church (100 registered communities), the New Apostolic Church (72 registered communities), the Hare Krishna movement (96 registered communities) and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (46 registered communities) (Religiya, 1997; Ministry, 2003).

The territorial distribution of the new religious organisations is frequently inversely proportional to the geography of those religions and churches that are considered 'traditional' for Russia. In the other words, the newcomers seek to fill the religious

'vacuum' in the areas of weak development of the religious infrastructure of traditional religions and churches (Krindatch, 1996).

By the mid-1990s the public attitude towards so-called nontraditional religions and foreign missionaries was becoming increasingly negative. Although in a national survey carried out in 1997 96 per cent of respondents agreed with the general principle of freedom of personal choice of belief, only 40 per cent supported the full legal equality of all religions and churches (VTsIOM, 1998). Moreover, a quarter of the population are in favour of direct restrictions on the activity of nontraditional religious organisations in Russia (Table 15).

In order to explain these changes in public attitudes one should take into consideration the general antiwestern sentiments that have become characteristic of an ever-growing segment of Russian society. Whereas in 1996 48 per cent of Russians were of the view that '“western” culture has a negative impact on the situation in Russia' by 2002 the percentage had increased to 67 (Table 16). In a 2000 survey, to the question 'To what extent does the “western” model of society suit Russia?', fewer than one fifth of respondents believed that it could be either fully or partly applied to Russia's conditions and traditions. Over two thirds of respondents were either simply sceptical about the possibility of applying western society models in Russia or even said they were in contradiction with the traditional style of life in Russia (Table 17). Amazingly, just 15 years after the demolition of the Iron Curtain the idea of cultural separation from the other parts of the world appears to be attractive for at least half the Russian population. For instance, in a survey in 2000 over half the respondents to the question 'Is it important for Russia to “join” world culture and adopt the lifestyle of the majority of developed countries?' said either that 'it is not important' or 'we should not strive for that at all' (Table 18).

Meanwhile a rise in xenophobic sentiments has become obvious since the late 1990s. According to public opinion polls, during the period 1998–2002 the proportion of those who entirely or partly supported the slogan 'Russia for Russians only' increased from 46 to 55 per cent, while the proportion of those opposing it fell from 32 to 28 per cent (Table 19).

In the light of these changes in public sentiment it is not surprising that recently we have been seeing an increasingly negative perception of all faiths other than Orthodoxy (and not only of 'nontraditional' faiths, as used to be the case a few years ago). Half the respondents in a public opinion survey in Moscow in March 2002 were of the view that Islam is a religion that is hostile to Orthodoxy, while in an all-Russian survey in September 2002 51 per cent of respondents supported the actions of the state authorities against Roman Catholic clergy working in Russia (Obschestvennoye, 2002, p. 148).

The above-outlined aspects of the phenomenon of religious revival and its specific patterns in various regions of the country, combined with ongoing changes in the sphere of interreligious and church-state relations, allow us to speak both about the continuing creation of a new 'religious space' in Russia and about the further dynamic evolution of the religious segment of Russia's civil society.

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