Response to Sophia Senyk, ‘The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Today: Universal Values versus Nationalist Doctrines’*

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I am writing in response to the article ‘The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church today: universal values versus nationalist doctrines’ by Sophia Senyk which appeared in Religion, State & Society vol. 30, no. 4, 2002. Professor Senyk teaches at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome. The article is an acrimonious attack upon the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, of which Professor Senyk is or was a member.

Professor Senyk begins her article by quoting a 727-word statement from the 2000 summer session of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Synod. Her first complaint is that the statement’s first point has to do with the formation of a canonical commission to prepare a Directory to establish the norms of clerical garb and insignia. Had Senyk stopped there, many people would have applauded her, particularly since the names of the members of this commission do not inspire any special confidence. Even so, the issue is not as trivial as Senyk would like the readers to believe; to quote Fr Cyril Korolevsky,

Obviously, ‘the cassock does not make the monk’, but the Church is an army and there must be a uniform, although it may be simple. In an assembly of troops, the different regiments should not be confused with each other, and one should not dress regular soldiers as though they were free-lancers ... let us not stupidly sacrifice everything to Roman Catholic and Protestant fashions. (Korolevsky, 2001, p. 55, section 22b)

But then Senyk gets down to her real complaints, which are many. She accuses hierarchs and others of ‘a misplaced nostalgia for the irretrievable past and aspirations after grandeur’. Under this heading, she repudiates any aspiration of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to a serious presence in Kiev and to the name of the Kiev-Halych Metropolis. She asserts of the Greek Catholic Kiev-Halych Metropolis that ‘in 1805 it ceased to exist for the Greek Catholics’. That assertion is open to question on historical grounds. Kyr Yosafat (Bulhak) was the Greek Catholic Kiev-Halych metropolitan of Kiev-Halych, confirmed by the pope early in 1818. Metropolitan Yosafat never resigned his office, nor was he removed; he died on 23 February 1838 (Blazejowskyj, 1990, p. 258). The metropolitans resident in L’viv since 1807 main-


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tained the consciousness that after the repose of Metropolitan Yosafat they were the legitimate Greek Catholic metropolitans of Kiev, but while they did assert this from time to time, the assertions were done quietly, so as to avoid complicating state relations between Austria and Russia. Evidently Senyk does not wish to take this into account.

On 18 February 1908 Pope Pius X, personally and in writing, appointed Metropolitan Andrei (Sheptyts'kyi) administrator of the vacant Greek Catholic eparchies in the Russian Empire — including, of course, the Metropolis of Kiev (Korolevsky, 1993, p. 263). This did not remain a paper title; in this capacity Metropolitan Andrei actually functioned in Kiev and built a church there during the brief period of religious freedom which followed the Russian Revolution. He also appointed an exarch for Kiev, in the person of Kyr Yosyf (Slipyi); this appointment was confirmed by Pope Pius XII (Bociurkiw, 1996, pp. 46–47).

More recently, Pope Paul VI formally recognised the metropolitan as a ‘major archbishop’ (Acta, 1964, p. 214), which is the equivalent of a patriarch for almost all practical purposes.1 This could only have been done in consideration of the metropolitan’s position as the heir of the metropolitans of Kiev-Halych (Ukrainian Greek Catholic metropolitans of lesser rank, such as the metropolitans of Winnipeg and Philadelphia, have no pretensions to be major archbishops).

Most recently, Pope John Paul II has extended the territory of the major archbishop to the whole of Ukraine (with the possible restriction of Transcarpathia) and has blessed the site for the building of the cathedral church in Kiev.

Professor Senyk’s claim of the Greek Catholic Kiev-Halych Metropolia that ‘in 1805 it ceased to exist for the Greek Catholics’ is thus subject to dispute, particularly since she offers no proof or supporting evidence.

Sections 5–8 of the document of the summer 2000 session of the Synod of bishops have to do with the ongoing work of the ‘the Synod of Bishops of the Kiev-Halych Metropolis’. Senyk strongly disapproves of this, to the point of asserting that ‘A Synod of Bishops of a Kiev-Halych Metropolis today is a figment of the imagination’. The Synod of which Senyk so strongly disapproves nevertheless meets and functions regularly, in accordance with Canon 133, Section 2 of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, promulgated by Pope John Paul II in 1990; the hierarchs who are members of this Synod, who take part in its sessions and carry out their tasks, cannot seriously be described as a figment of the imagination.

Senyk is also annoyed by references to patriarchal commissions and the like, and by any use of the patriarchal title. Those familiar with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church over the past four decades know that this church aspires to be a Patriarchate and that many people within the church have become impatient with the shilly-shallying of those in Rome who have set themselves against that aspiration.

Senyk complains that various titles and ranks used within the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church are confusing. No doubt this is true to a degree, but the same can be said of a great many religious bodies, academic bodies, governments and private organisations; with great effort I shall resist the temptation to give some choice examples!

More serious is Senyk’s claim that ‘Pastoral problems are subordinated to claims on titles in the context of a nostalgia for long-lost territories and faithful, or indeed for territories where there was never any Greek Catholic presence of any size’. To what territory or territories does she refer? The only one she mentions is Kiev — and from personal experience (having served in Kiev on several different occasions over a period of years) I can assure anyone that the claim that there are no Greek Catholics
in Kiev is a Soviet mirage. There are at present three Greek Catholic Exarchates in central and eastern Ukraine, because there are Greek Catholic faithful in central and eastern Ukraine, partly as a result of demographic changes during the twentieth century. More to the point, in the twentieth century the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has spread to a huge number of places far beyond Ukraine. It is not ‘nostalgia’, of all things, which moves the bishops to make provision for the church in such places, it is the serious and urgent need to serve the pastoral needs of the faithful. There are thousands of Ukrainian Greek Catholics in Portugal with no pastoral service. Will Senyk accuse the bishops of ‘nostalgia’ because one or more priests have gone to Portugal to serve these faithful? There was never in history a Greek Catholic presence of any size in Portugal – but today there is such a presence, and it is the teaching of the Catholic Church that everything should be done to assist these faithful to retain their proper ecclesial identity.

Senyk next complains that ‘The [Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church] sees itself as the church best qualified, or indeed the only one qualified, to be called a Ukrainian National Church’. Allowing for a bit of hyperbole, and for an attempt to impose a title that no Christian body (to my knowledge) ascribes to itself, Senyk’s claim here is not entirely unjustified. In the religious context of Eastern Europe, this should hardly surprise anybody. It would actually be helpful if Senyk developed a critique of attempts to water down doctrine so as to create an ecclesial community that would embrace all Ukrainians (except, of course, those who do not care for diluted religion!). She hints at this, but does not really make the effort. Instead, she complains of grandiloquent phrases ascribing an all-Ukrainian significance to this or that, which does not in fact have an all-Ukrainian significance. She is not mistaken – I will be happy even to provide her with a bit more ammunition on this point. For example, there is a hymn to the ‘Sacred Heart’, entitled *Like a Deep Resounding Bell*, which has the chorus: ‘To Thy Heart, O My Redeemer, Our entire nation homage pays. The Ukrainian people are Thine forever; These people in Thy heart preserve!’ Assuming (not unreasonably) that about ten per cent of the Ukrainian population are Greek Catholics and another one or two per cent are Roman Catholics, it is still patently absurd to claim that the entire Ukrainian nation pays homage to the ‘Sacred Heart’ and/or that the Ukrainian people belong to the ‘Sacred Heart’ forever. One can easily find Greek Catholics who do not practise or appreciate devotions to the ‘Sacred Heart’. Perhaps one might attempt to excuse the wildly overstated claims of national homage and allegiance to the ‘Sacred Heart’ as hyperbole and poetic licence – but this hymn is not using a figure of speech and the hymn itself is doggerel rather than poetry. I am inclined to suspect that Ukrainian is not the original language of this text, but I am not about to research it! Senyk is welcome to add it to her arsenal without giving me any credit. As I shall discuss below, Senyk has a nose for fascism, so she might with profit to her argument look at additional verses of this deplorable hymn; they can be found in a collection published by the Order of Saint Basil the Great in Prudentopolis, Brazil, in 1930. If Senyk wants them, I shall be happy to provide more examples of the same hymnologic genre, though I do not recommend them for religious use.

It is fashionable in some circles to style the patriarch/major archbishop ‘head of the church’. Senyk writes that ‘“Head” is no one’s title (and I leave it to others to discuss whether it is a proper term to use at all)’. She is almost correct on her first point; the only proper ‘head of the Church’ is the Lord Jesus Christ. On the floor of the Second Vatican Council Patriarch Maximos IV of Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem and All the East suggested that ‘head of the church’ is not an entirely proper term for a hierarch
of any rank (Discours, 1967, pp. 133–34). In the Ukrainian Greek Catholic context, Senyk is correct in observing that ‘head’ has become a code word to hint at other titles. She would have done well to cite Pope John Paul II’s exhortation on the importance of ‘eliminating all duplicity and ambiguity’,

According to Senyk Ukrainian Greek Catholic faithful number about five per cent of the total population of Ukraine. For whatever reason, she has thus halved the probable size of the church. A conservative estimate of Greek Catholics in Ukraine is rather more than five million, and the population of Ukraine altogether is under fifty million. Thus even at a low estimate, the Greek Catholics are over ten per cent of the total Ukrainian population. Senyk’s inaccurate population estimate occurs in the context of her objection to the claim that the Greek Catholic Church has some all-Ukrainian significance, but that claim is based on more than population figures. Western Ukraine (which has a Greek Catholic majority) is certainly an important bastion of Ukrainian national identity and the Greek Catholic Church in turn is probably the most important organised presence of any kind in western Ukraine. The combination has often been described as a ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’. One example from personal experience might be of interest. In January 1991 I travelled to L’viv to participate in the first celebration of Christmas since the Greek Catholic Church had regained St George’s Cathedral. I was astonished to find a great many groups, especially family groups and groups of children, from all over Ukraine, who had come to L’viv especially to experience an authentic Ukrainian celebration of Christmas – and L’viv rose to the occasion magnificently.

The claim of the Greek Catholic Church to be the religious bearer of the Ukrainian national identity is by no means perfect – and one of the flaws is the heavy latinisation and polonisation promoted by the Order of Saint Basil the Great – but that claim is still far from empty. Without the Greek Catholic Church, Ukraine itself and Ukrainian culture would be much poorer.

Senyk writes that

The intertwining of the religious with the political and ethnic ... has become common practice. The bishop of Ivano-Frankivs’k, Sofron Mudryi, wrote as follows in his pastoral letter at Easter 2000 published in the official newspaper of Ivano-Frankivs’k diocese, Nova zoria: ‘This great joy and God’s grace I wish first of all to the president and government of Ukraine, to our local administration, all our clergy and all our faithful of this diocese and of all Ukraine.’

The great joy and divine grace in question are the ineffable beatitude of Christ’s Resurrection from the dead. Is it somehow improper to wish people Paschal joy and divine grace? Surely not. It is the happy duty of Christians to proclaim the Paschal joy and divine grace to the entire world, including all Ukraine. Most Ukrainians are Christians, and are therefore unlikely to take umbrage at expressions of Paschal joy.

Senyk cites an unidentified Greek Catholic priest as having written an article that compared ‘the Saviour’s Way of the Cross with the thorny path of Ukraine towards its freedom’. Ukraine’s independence of course means a great deal to citizens of Ukraine, but for a Christian, especially for a Christian priest, is it in any way commensurate with Christ’s passion and death for the salvation of all human beings?

The answer to this question would depend on what sort of measure one used. How does one measure suffering? In any event, whether the suffering endured for
Ukrainian independence – which was closely intertwined with the suffering endured for fidelity to the Greek Catholic Church – was commensurate with Christ’s passion and death, there is no reason to think that the suffering of the Ukrainians cannot be compared to the suffering of Christ. See Colossians 1:24: ‘Now I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I complete what is lacking in Christ’s afflictions’. (St Paul was not claiming to be the Messiah.) Nor is such a comparison in any way unique to Ukrainians: one wonders if Senyk has read Polish messianic writings, for example, or similar writings of many other ‘ captive nations’.

Senyk is annoyed with another Greek Catholic priest (also unnamed) who, it seems, joined a priest of Patriarch Filaret’s Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate in blessing a commemorative plaque honouring Viacheslav Chornovol [sic] (whom Senyk describes as an avowed atheist) and in celebrating a service for the dead for Mr Chornovil’s repose. I have not seen the plaque, I do not know where it is located and I have no idea what the inscription may be, so I shall not discuss the matter of the plaque. I believe that I met Mr Chornovil once, in the company of a Ukrainian Orthodox priest; on that occasion Mr Chornovil said that he had previously been indifferent to the church but was now drawn towards it (this conversation took place in L’viv in September 1988). The devotion of the ‘Gregorian masses’, actively promoted by the Order of Saint Basil the Great, is based upon the legend that Pope St Gregory succeeded, by celebrating a series of 30 masses, one each day for 30 days, in obtaining the liberation of the deceased Emperor Trajan (who was never a Christian of any kind) from Hell and the salvation of his soul. The claims made for the efficacy of the Gregorian masses will not bear repeating. But a simple prayer-service for the repose of Viacheslav Chornovil cannot be seen as offensive in such a context.

Senyk then takes issue with an article published in Meta in July 2000; in her account of it, the article is ‘a glorification of the writer Leonid Mosendz’. Mosendz was an obscure poet and litterateur of the interwar period; he died in 1947 or 1948. He was associated with Dmytro Dontsov, also a poet and litterateur but active in connection with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, for whom he served as something of an ideologue. This was the 1930s, and the ideas involved are a political Art Deco pastiche, if Senyk’s account is anything to go by:

Idealism, Irrationalism, Christianism [sic] as far as their world-view was concerned; Voluntarism, Activism, Aggressiveness in the spiritual–moral sphere; Occidentalism, Heroism, Neoromanticism in the sphere of culture and creativity … Dontsov saw it as his chief task to awaken in Ukrainians a feeling of Greatness, Nobility and Virility, a feeling of Individualism, which could be acquired, he believed, only by appropriating the Spirit of Europe, the Europe of traditions, of Knighthood, of the Conquistadors, of Religious missions and Dogmatism [All capitals in the original] … . Muscovite Eurasian cultural influences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the specifically somnolent Muscovite–shamanistic Orthodoxy and the socialism–communism of the most recent period, is something imposed on us, in its very essence foreign to our spirituality. If we want to live independently and in creative cooperation with the West, we must break our ties with the East, which has befuddled our soul. The East has constrained us, it has beaten us down, trampled us in its Mongolian mud.

My word. It makes Don Quixote seem well organised. I have never read any of
Dontsov’s writings (and it is highly probable that most of the readers of Religion, State & Society are similarly unfamiliar with Dontsov’s thought), though I have at least heard of him. But if that muddle of ideas is any accurate reflection of what Dontsov and Mosendz were promoting, it is no wonder that their political efforts did not lead to much in the way of solid results. The whole thing could make a good satirical song. But I am not inclined to take it seriously – such mélanges could be found in many writers in the 1930s. If someone has published an article expressing admiration for Mosendz and Dontsov, I would need to read the article before I could possibly form an opinion – but if the extract given by Senyk reflects the full content of the article, I strongly suspect that most readers would not even finish it. Senyk claims that ‘both Mosendz and Dontsov were admirers of Mussolini and Hitler’. I certainly wouldn’t know. I do know, however, that in making such a charge in a serious publication, Senyk has an obligation to provide some proof – which I do not find in the paragraph I have just quoted.

On the strength of this silliness, Senyk then accuses the newspaper of publishing ‘neo-nazi’ views! The ‘thinking’, if one cares to call it that, of the Nazis was and is certainly muddled, but that is by no means peculiar to nazism or fascism, as anyone who reads present-day political speeches might acknowledge. Senyk further asserts that ‘This is not the first article of similar tendency to appear; but the church authorities are apparently not disturbed by its tone’. Again, if Senyk’s summary of the contents of the article is accurate, the article represents a waste of space, which on that account should disturb the church authorities and the publishers.

Perhaps a well-researched discussion of the work of Mosendz and Dontsov might be interesting. On one specific point here, it is possible that Senyk is on to something. I have often noticed in Western Ukraine a strange fascination for ‘Europe’ and being ‘on the European level’ (sic: ‘na Evropeis’komu rivni’ in Ukrainian), while even on the street one can notice that the expression ‘Asiatic’ is often used as a pejorative epithet. I have wondered where this comes from – and I still wonder; but since one can find the same phenomena in Moscow and St Petersburg, it is likelier that Dontsov and Mosendz may have reflected this bigotry rather than created it themselves.

Senyk next discusses ‘russophobia’. She is referring to an entirely too real phenomenon, and I could call her to bear witness that I too have often been the victim of this form of bigotry – it says something about the nature of russophobia that an Irish priest can be a victim to it. On one amazing occasion in Canada, I was peaceably eating my lunch when a notably russophobe priest suddenly said that even my clothes proved that I was a ‘moscophile’. I was wearing a single-barred cross, a Greek anterion (which does not resemble a Slav cassock or podryasnik such as a Russian cleric would wear), and a nondescript pair of socks and sandals. Under the anterion I was wearing shirt, trousers and underwear of standard Canadian style and manufacture. When I asked my assailant kindly to specify what in my clothing identified me as a ‘moscophile’, he declined.

This sort of obscurantism is not confined to any particular ethnic or religious group, however. I remember another person staring at a truly magnificent Greek icon of the Hospitality of Abraham and screaming ‘That’s Roman Catholic!’ When I asked him please to show me one Roman Catholic Church anywhere that displays such an icon, he answered ‘oh, they all have it’.

Russophobia is a religious nuisance, to say the least, because the Order of Saint Basil the Great has succeeded in convincing significant numbers of Ukrainian Greek Catholics that anything at all that represents the authentic Byzantine tradition (which is the proper patrimony of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) is ‘Russian’, and
therefore to be rejected with hatred. I could give numerous examples of this – and so could Professor Senyk, but it seems that she prefers to accuse others.

Senyk adds invented issues to the confusion. She claims, for example, that the term ‘Muscovite’ (‘moskovs’ka’) in Ukrainian has a distinctly derogatory connotation, in contrast to the neutral ‘Russian’ (‘rosiis’ka’). On linguistic grounds alone, this is false. Ukrainian supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate do not in the least hesitate to call it by that name, without at all intending to be derogatory. One may easily hear the word ‘Russian’ used as though it were an obscenity. I shall not discuss here some of the unflattering epithets that certain Russians apply to Ukrainians.

Senyk then objects to the existence of friendly relations between the Greek Catholic Bishop of Ivano-Frankivs’k, Kyr Sofron Mudryi (a member of the Order of Saint Basil the Great) and Filaret Denisenko, who heads the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate, which is not in communion with any of the Eastern Orthodox Local Churches. Her objections are based on the assertion that ‘the Catholic Church recognises the removal of hierarchs from office in the Orthodox Church’: might she provide a reference for that? The Holy See finds it possible to be friendly with Orthodox churches that are not in full communion with one another (such as, for example, the two Malankara Orthodox communities in South India). Moreover, as the Pontifical Council for the Promoting of Christian Unity would be able to inform Professor Senyk, the Holy See is not able to compel Catholic bishops and dioceses in the choice of ecumenical interlocutors.

Ukrainian Greek Catholic ecumenists, with the full support of the patriarch and the Synod, have made strenuous efforts to develop ecumenical relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate for well over a decade. The lack of response has been consistent: the Moscow Patriarchate representatives in Ukraine do not answer letters; they do not return telephone calls; it is impossible to arrange meetings with these representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Moscow Patriarchate conducts a constant barrage of propaganda against the Greek Catholic Church. When Pope John Paul II visited Ukraine in 2001 the behaviour of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate was unspeakable. Filaret (assuredly for his own reasons, but the fact remains the fact) did a great deal to promote and encourage the papal visit. Is it any wonder that Bishop Sofron of Ivano-Frankivs’k prefers to speak with someone who at least appears to be congenial? I hold no brief for Filaret Denisenko, and I have said so repeatedly, both in print and in public gatherings, but I cannot deny the truth: it is impossible to conduct an ecumenical dialogue with a ‘partner’ who constantly and consistently hurl lies and abuse. One can only pray and hope for better days ahead. Meanwhile, Filaret’s church is large enough to make a discussion seem quite sensible.

Senyk criticises the Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishops who have stated that they are not competent to judge the claims of the three competing Orthodox judicatories in Ukraine. Does Professor Senyk seriously propose that Catholic bishops should sit in judgment on such a matter? On what conceivable basis? Eastern Orthodox canon law is a difficult field of study (in former days, incidentally, the Moscow Patriarchate often presented Metropolitan Filaret Denisenko as a leading expert on it). There is no reason at all to believe that any Greek Catholic bishop on the Ukrainian Synod is an expert in this field. Yet on what other basis could such a judgment be given? It certainly could not be based on Eastern Catholic canon law, because that law does not bind the Eastern Orthodox. What jurisdiction do the Greek Catholics have – even what jurisdiction does the pope have – to sit in judgment on people who are not and never have been the subjects of the Catholic Church, and who have not asked the
Catholic Church to adjudicate their disputes? The Second Vatican Council clearly recognises that Orthodox canon law is valid and binding for the Orthodox (Unitatis, 1964, para. 16). The best that the Catholic Church can do towards the healing of the jurisdictional divisions of Eastern Orthodoxy in Ukraine is to pray for that healing, and whilst awaiting the healing grace of God, refrain from exacerbating the situation by playing favourites, let alone doing anything that could give the false impression that the Catholic Church considers itself competent to judge the matter.

Senyk quotes a letter from yet another obscure Ukrainian personality: Tymish Omel’chenko, who is said to have been ‘head of the Ukrainian National Union (Ukrains’ke Natsional’ne Ob’iednannia)’ in Berlin in 1942. I shall not trouble to discuss this letter, because Senyk herself states that ‘the letter [should not] be taken as a correct assessment of Sheptyts’kyi’s views, or indeed as necessarily indicating that Omel’chenko had been in touch with Sheptyts’kyi previously’. This is quite so, and raises at once the question of the relevance of such a letter, from a figure who was of scant importance 61 years ago and is of no importance now. Senyk asserts that the letter illustrates ‘the confusion of national and religious issues, of seeing the church through national spectacles’. This is a recurring theme in Senyk’s article; she does not approve of the connection between the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian nationalism. That is her privilege, but she has only to come forth boldly and say so, and state her reasons, whatever they may be. For my part, I discern in Professor Senyk’s article an incomplete understanding of the nature of church and society in Eastern Europe, and an attempt to impose a quite foreign paradigm of church-state relationships.7 Senyk would do well to read what her senior colleague at the Pontifical Oriental Institute, Archimandrite Robert Taft, has written: for the Eastern Christian

\[\text{That his religion, his worship, should be inextricably bound up with his history and the life of his people, that he should worship God in a language that is the fruit of his own culture which preserved not only the faith but also the sense of national unity of his forefathers during dark days of oppression – this is what matters. (Taft, 1963, p. 13)}\]

Nobody can require Professor Senyk to agree. But she might at least express her dissent without resorting to accusations of neo-nazism.

Senyk then quotes the former Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishop of Argentina, Kyr Andrii (Sapeliak), who is now retired and living in Ukraine and has written a recent book to which Professor Senyk, predictably, takes exception. Bishop Andrii probably resigned in 1994; he is now well over 80. He has never served as a diocesan bishop in Ukraine.

Senyk complains that ‘The nationalist mentality ... regards all Roman Catholics in Ukraine as Poles’. As it happens, a high percentage of Roman Catholics in contemporary Ukraine are ethnic Poles. There are also other Roman Catholics present in Ukraine: some are German, some are Hungarian, some are Slovak and so on, but the percentage of Roman Catholics in Ukraine who are ethnic Ukrainians is not impressive. In this connection, Senyk also complains that the Greek Catholic hierarchs and publications are ‘major proponents of an ideology which can lead only to ethno-religious conflicts’, and that ‘from the Christian viewpoint’ this attitude ‘amounts to a denial that the one God is Father of all, and [it] is a repudiation of the blood Christ shed, which broke down the walls of separation: in his kingdom there is no longer Jew or Greek’.

This is surely a sweeping accusation. The connection between patriotism and
religion is, again, strong in most of Eastern Europe. This is not new, but it is simply false to claim that the Greek Catholic Church, in Ukraine or anywhere else, denies that the one God is Father of all, and repudiates the Blood of Christ! Among the martyrs beatified by Pope John Paul II in 2001 at the express request of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Synod is Hieromartyr Leonti (Leonid Fedorov), an ethnic Russian and the first Russian Greek Catholic exarch. It was not easy to obtain this beatification; had it not been for the strenuous efforts of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic hierarchy it would not have taken place. Senyk is aware of this beatification, but she does not see fit to mention it.

Senyk asserts that ‘People are still alive who can testify that Ukrainian-speaking peasants were killed and their homes set on fire simply because they belonged to the Roman Catholic Church.’ That may be true, though such cases are not known to me. It is certainly true that in Catholic Poland after the Second World War the Greek Catholic Church was severely persecuted. There are people alive today who can testify to the terrible details of that persecution. Senyk knows this, but does not mention it.  

In a bizarre aside, Professor Senyk writes that

It is as if the Catholic Church in Ireland were to give blanket approval to all the actions and all the members of the IRA and took to blessing the banners and meeting rooms of Sinn Fein. There is a difference, however. If the Catholic Church in Ireland were to do this kind of thing, mass media all over the world would report on it. Has Senyk ever set foot in Ireland? Does she speak so much as half-a-dozen words of Irish? Is she even remotely competent to discuss the relationship between the Catholic Church in Ireland and Irish nationalism? I have known Senyk for the better part of twenty years, and if she has any connection with my home country, she has never seen fit to mention it to me, nor shown any interest whatever in Irish affairs.

For reasons that she does not explain, the L’viv Theological Academy (now the Ukrainian Catholic University) also arouses Senyk’s displeasure. One might have expected her to rejoice at the presence of such a remarkable institute of higher learning, equipped with an outstanding faculty, the more so since the work of the Academy/ University is supervised by the Pontifical Oriental Institute where Senyk is a professor; but no. When the matter of the L’viv Academy/University is on the agenda at faculty meetings of the Pontifical Oriental Institute, there may be some lively discussion!

In her section on ‘Burdens from the Past’ Senyk does concede that the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church in the USSR after the Second World War made it ‘clearly a victim’. She does not mention the arrest and imprisonment of the entire hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, nor the arrest and imprisonment of horrendous numbers of clergy, monastics and faithful. Instead, she has the astonishing effrontery to claim that the Servant of God Metropolitan Andrei (Sheptyts’kyi) wanted to do the same thing in reverse! Senyk attempts to substantiate this claim with a quote from a memorandum that Metropolitan Andrei wrote to the Austrian government on 15 August 1914. However, the memorandum demonstrates that Metropolitan Andrei had nothing of the sort in mind: Kyr Andrei specifies that Austrian policy towards the Orthodox should be ‘without touching doctrine and the sphere of dogmas’. The measures that Metropolitan Andrei recommends to the Austrian Emperor appear normal in the development of Eastern Orthodox responses to a change in the allegiance of a particular territory.
The first such measure is the separating of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine from the Synod in St Petersburg. Since the Synod in Saint Petersburg was nothing more nor less than a civil-service committee of state officials, to wit, bishops, whose president was the tsar himself ... the real controller of the synod was the lay procurator, who was a minister of the crown ... the church [of Russia] was a government department, like the treasury or the armed forces (Attwater, 1937, pp. 76–77)

and acknowledged the tsar of Russia as Supreme Ruler and Judge, nobody could possibly have expected that any other country would permit this Synod to exercise authority in territory not part of the tsar's domain. Moreover, this Synod was an utterly uncanonical structure, which functioned only by the authority of the tsar, and Metropolitan Andrei was well aware of this. By the same token, when Poland regained civil independence after the First World War, the Polish government immediately and urgently sought to detach the Orthodox in Poland from any dependence on the Church of Russia, and therefore in 1924 obtained autocephaly for the Orthodox Church in Poland, granted by the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople.

The second measure is the prohibiting of the liturgical commemoration of the tsar of Russia and the prescribing of liturgical commemoration of the Austrian Emperor. This again is normal; the Byzantine liturgy prescribes a liturgical commemoration of the Christian Sovereign in whose domains the Local Church functions. Thus, at the Orthodox church in Oxford one may hear the commemoration of the Queen of England; at the Monastery church in Chevetogne, Belgium, one may hear the commemoration of the King of the Belgians, and so on. Orthodox - and Catholic - clergy holding public services in the Austrian Empire prayed for the emperor.

Metropolitan Andrei's third proposed measure is that the Russian Synod should not be replicated in Austrian territory. He adds that some Orthodox hierarchs who were Great Russians by birth, or who were unwilling to accept Austrian rule, might have to be removed (he does not suggest, please note, that such bishops should be murdered or imprisoned) and replaced by other hierarchs. Since the Synod in St Petersburg was accustomed to move bishops around like pawns on a chessboard no one would have found this unfamiliar.

Nowhere in these proposals made by Metropolitan Andrei in August 1914 is there any hint of a suggestion of a forced 'religious conversion' from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. Kyr Andrei was well aware of the pattern of changes in Orthodox church structures to match changes in civil allegiance: thus the Church of Greece became autocephalous in 1833 (Roberson, 1999, p. 87), the Church of Bulgaria in 1870, the Church of Serbia in 1879 (Roberson, 1999, p. 69), and so on, and the process continued through the twentieth century and at the time of writing there are more such movements in Macedonia (Roberson, 1999, pp. 130–32), Montenegro, Ukraine and elsewhere. None of this has any particular connection with religious persecution, nor does it resemble the forced aggregation of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1945 and 1946.

In making these outrageous suggestions about Metropolitan Andrei, Senyk also ignores the context. Austria was a Catholic power, and therefore Christian; the Soviet Union was neither. Austria was accustomed not merely to tolerate Orthodoxy, but to support the Orthodox Church in Austrian dominions. Thus in 1873, by an agreement with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, Austria obtained autocephaly for
the Orthodox Christians in Austria, centred around the metropolitan of Chernivtsi, in Bukovyna (Attwater, 1937, p. 106). In 1878, by a formal concordat with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Austria obtained autonomous status for the Orthodox Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Attwater, 1937, p. 106). Not only that, the Austrian emperor, even at the cost of unpleasantness with the tsar of Russia, permitted the establishment and continuing functioning of the Russian Orthodox Old Ritualist hierarchy centred at Bila Krynitsya, also in Bukovyna (Mel'nikov, 1999, pp. 182–234). Metropolitan Andrei knew all this. Had he or anyone else tried to suggest a policy of religious persecution of Orthodox Christians in Austrian territory, the emperor would have dismissed it out of hand.

Furthermore, far from persecuting Orthodox Christians, Metropolitan Andrei went out of his way to be supportive of the Orthodox when he had opportunities to do so. In February 1919 he welcomed the Russian Orthodox bishops Yevlogi of Zhytomir and Aleksi of Vladimir into his own home in L'viv (Korolevsky, 1993, pp. 235–37), because they were refugees and had nowhere to go. When Bishop Yevlogi later became the head of the Russian Orthodox Churches in Western Europe, Metropolitan Andrei arranged for the Stauropegion Press in L’viv to print liturgical books for him.

Most notably of all, on 20 July 1938 Metropolitan Andrei wrote a trenchant pastoral letter protesting most vehemently against Polish persecution of the Eastern Orthodox parishes in Volyn, in Kholm, in Pidlassia and Polessia. This is not the behaviour of a man seeking to persecute Eastern Orthodox Christians.

I regret the necessity of discussing the complicity of the Moscow Patriarchate in the persecution of the Greek Catholic Church, but Professor Senyk leaves me no choice when she asks rhetorically what is the difference between this project proposed by Sheptyts’kyi and that carried out in 1946, but by the other side? Does the [Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church] have a moral right to accuse the Moscow Patriarchate of profiting from the actions of the Soviet authorities, when the [Ukrainian Greek Catholic] metropolitan on his own initiative produced a similar plan to destroy the Orthodox Church in Ukraine?

As I have just shown, Metropolitan Andrei did nothing of the kind. What is the difference, as Professor Senyk asks? Or, to put it another way, what is the evidence that the Moscow Patriarchate collaborated actively with a theomachian government to persecute and destroy the Greek Catholic Church?

On 10 April 1945, Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov received Patriarch Aleksi I of Moscow and Metropolitan Nikolai of Krutitsy (the ‘number two’ man in the Patriarchate) for a meeting that also included Georgi Karpov, chairman of the ‘Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church’ – in other words, the Soviet government’s watchdog on the Moscow Patriarchate. The following day, the Soviet government arrested Metropolitan Yosyf (Slipyi), Bishop Mykola (Charnets’kyi), Bishop Mykyta (Budka), Bishop Hryhorii (Khomyshyn) of Stanislaviv and his auxiliary Bishop Ivan (Liatyshevs’kyi). Does Senyk believe that the timing was purely coincidental?

That was only the beginning. On 20 April 1945 – just ten days after the arrest of the Greek Catholic hierarchs – the Moscow Patriarchate elected Mikhailo Oksiuk to be Bishop of L’viv and Ternopil’ (no such diocese had ever previously existed in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, nor were there a significant number of parishes whom this bishop might serve – except, of course, the Greek Catholic parishes that the Moscow Patriarchate expected to be aggregated to it in short order).
Rushed hastily through monastic tonsure and elevation to the rank of archimandrite, the new ‘bishop of L’viv and Ternopil’ was consecrated in Moscow two days later with the monastic name of Makari. He arrived in L’viv on 27 April 1945 and began distributing a letter from Patriarch Alexi of Moscow ‘To the Pastors and Faithful of the Greek Catholic Church, Residents of the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR’. The letter is undated, but according to Karpov the text was agreed on 19 March, more than three weeks before the arrest of the Greek Catholic hierarchs. This letter rehearses the customary charges of Nazism against Metropolitan Andrei, his associates, and even the Vatican, and urges the Greek Catholics to break with Rome and join the Moscow Patriarchate: ‘Pray you, brothers ... break your ties with the Vatican, which leads you into darkness and spiritual destruction by its religious heresies ... Make haste, return into the arms of your true Mother, the Russian Orthodox Church.’25 One doubts that Professor Senyk could produce an authenticated document26 from Metropolitan Andrei in similar terms, urging the Orthodox faithful to abandon their shepherds and become Catholics.

On 24 June 1945 the Moscow Patriarchate’s Bishop Makari of L’viv and Ternopil’ issued a pastoral letter to the Greek Catholics of Galicia, urging them to become Russian Orthodox. The Russian Orthodox metropolitan of Kiev and exarch of Ukraine, Ioann (Sokolov), issued his own pastoral letter, condemning the Vatican as pro-fascist and urging the Greek Catholics to forsake the Catholic Church and join the Moscow Patriarchate.

On 3 October 1945 Fr Havryil Kostel’nyk – then still a Greek Catholic priest – wrote to Patriarch Alexi of Moscow, recommending that two of his associates (Fr Antonii Pel’vets’kyi and Fr Mikhailo Mel’nyk) be made Russian Orthodox bishops of Stanislaviv and Drohobych. Kostel’nyk was planning for a ‘church council’ to meet in January 1946. He also urged the patriarch of Moscow to permit celibate Greek Catholic priests to marry upon their entrance into the Moscow Patriarchate;27 such a lenient policy would make it impossible for such priests to return to the Catholic Church at a later date.

On 7 December 1945 Patriarch Alexi wrote to Karpov. To his credit, Alexi rejected the proposal to allow the celibate priests to marry, because this was uncanonical, and expressed opposition to an attempt to convene a ‘church council’. On both points, the Soviet government decided against the patriarch’s view; the celibate priests were tacitly allowed to marry,28 and an imitation ‘church council’ was held.

On 12 February 1946 Patriarch Alexi of Moscow sent this telegram to the Initiatory Group (Initsiiatyvna hrupa) (Kostel’nyk and his associates) preparing the mock-synod:

As the future council draws near, I send God’s blessing to you and all the members of the Initiatory Group. I wish you God’s assistance in all the remaining work before the council. May the Lord bless the working29 Council of the Greek Catholic Church and give us the joy of unity. With love in Christ, Aleksi, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’.30

Then came the consecration to the episcopate of Antonii Pel’vets’kyi and Mikhailo Mel’nyk, the two leading members of the Initiatory Group, who were unmarried and therefore eligible for the episcopate. Since the whole point of these two consecrations was to provide bishops to give some sort of cover to the glaring reality that all the Greek Catholic hierarchs were in prison,31 the methods used were quite unusual.

The Moscow Patriarchate follows a well-set pattern for electing and consecrating
bishops: when a diocese is vacant, for whatever reason, the Holy Synod elects the candidate whom it considers to be suitable. This election, with the date of the meeting of the Holy Synod at which the election took place, is always announced in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. Following the election the actual consecration takes place; this also is always announced in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, but in the unique case of Pel’vets’kyi and Mel’nyk, there are irregularities. There is no proof at all that either one of them was ever elected by the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Moscow. The proceedings of the pseudo-council read as follows:

It is clear to everyone that such a Council could not take place without the participation of bishops, bishops who would come from amongst the clergy [taking part in the council]. Sensing our necessity in his paternal heart, and deeply understanding this need, Patriarch Aleksi of Moscow and All Rus’ himself solved the matter of an episcopate for the new branch in the vineyard of Christ’s Church and therefore set the dates of 24 and 25 February 1946 for the consecrations of Fr Antonii Pel’vets’kyi and Fr Dr Mikhailo Mel’nyk, the first to be Bishop of Stanislaviv and the second for the former Peremyshl’ diocese, now the Sambir-Drohobych diocese.

This raises more questions than it resolves. The Moscow Patriarchate is scrupulous about episcopal elections and consecrations, especially since the multiple Renovationist schisms of the 1920s. If the patriarch, by way of exception, authorised these two consecrations, then by necessity there must be a written record. No one has ever produced such a document. Moreover, neither of the two dioceses in question had any connection with the Moscow Patriarchate. The diocese of Stanislaviv was created in 1885 by Pope Leo XIII and Emperor Franz Josef; it was always Catholic. The diocese of Peremyshl’ seems to have been founded in 906, and had never belonged to the Moscow Patriarchate.

In addition, it is utterly uncanonical to consecrate a bishop for a diocese that already has a bishop. Bishop Hryhorii (Khomyszyn) of Stanislaviv was in prison in February 1946, but had not yet been charged with any criminal offence and was therefore still the lawful bishop of Stanislaviv. Bishop Yosafat (Kotsylovs’kyi) of Peremyshl’ was not even imprisoned at the time of these consecrations; he was still functioning as bishop of Peremshyl’.

Again according to the council proceedings, during the service of the consecration of Mikhailo Mel’nyk as ‘Bishop of Sambir and Drohobych’, Kostel’nyk spoke and said that nobody had elected these two men to the episcopate; they had elected themselves. It is difficult to conceive of a more damning admission.

Thus these two consecrations are completely indefensible. They were also not revealed to the participants in the pseudo-council until after the vote was taken to ‘annul the Union of Brest’. Until that moment, the two bishops participated in the pseudo-council as simple priests, and were presented in the capacity of priests to the assembly, since they were part of the presidium.

Professor Bociurkiw has also reported documentation to show that the expenses of the pseudo-council were paid by Metropolitan Ioann (Sokolov) of Kiev, Moscow patriarchal exarch in Ukraine. Since he was paying the bills, it is perhaps natural that Metropolitan Ioann attended the pseudo-council, even though it was supposedly a Church Council of the Greek Catholic Church, with which Metropolitan Ioann had no connection.

The pseudo-council convened on 8 March 1946. All the members of the presidium and the two priest-secretaries had secretly joined the Moscow Patriarchate two weeks
earlier, which rather weakens the claim that this was a Council of the Greek Catholic Church. Later that morning representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate arrived: Bishop Makari of the Russian Orthodox diocese of L’viv, Bishop Nestor (Sidoryuk) of the newly-created Russian Orthodox diocese of Mukachevo (in Transcarpathia) and Mitred Archpriest Konstantin Ruzhitsky, chancellor of Moscow’s Ukrainian Exarchate. This at a so-called Greek Catholic Church Council being conducted exclusively by Moscow Patriarchate clergy in the absence of any Greek Catholic bishop or any representative of any Greek Catholic bishop.

The crucial ‘vote’ was taken later the same day, by a show of hands. Evidently the organisers were not about to trust a secret ballot.

On the second day, Metropolitan Ioann (Sokolov) of Kiev, Moscow Patriarchate exarch in Ukraine, appeared at this pseudo-council; Kostel’nyk thereupon withdrew as chairman in favour of Metropolitan Ioann. Speaking in Russian, the metropolitan read out a formal message from Patriarch Aleksi — obviously prepared in advance for the occasion — officially accepting the now-former Greek Catholics into the Moscow Patriarchate. This reading was acclaimed by the traditional chant of ‘Many Years’, and the moment can be seen and heard on the cinema film of the pseudo-council. Professor Senyk would do well to view that film carefully. Metropolitan Ioann of the Moscow Patriarchate does not appear to be entirely paternal, the poor priests look terrified, and the ‘Many Years’ sounds much less enthusiastic than a funeral dirge.

The July-August 1946 issue of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* published an ‘interview’ with Kostel’nyk, in which Kostel’nyk is stated as having affirmed that there were no arrests of Greek Catholic clergy either before or after the pseudo-council. This statement, of course, is an obvious lie.

One could continue *ad nauseam*, but the above-presented facts are surely enough to make it clear that the Moscow Patriarchate collaborated in a criminal, blasphemous, mendacious and unspeakably wicked charade, and that there is no evidence at all to justify the accusation that Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi would have done anything of the kind.

There is a hypothetical defence for the Moscow Patriarchate. The Patriarchate was very much the junior partner in this stygian sham and all the major decisions were taken by the Soviet government. Soviet pressure was certainly brought to bear on the Patriarchate. As I have already mentioned, Patriarch Aleksi I did not want to grant permission to priests to contract marriages, and did not want this pseudo-council to take place. Nor is there any evidence that either the Holy Synod or the patriarch gave prior approval to the episcopal consecrations of Pel’vets’kyi and Mel’nyk. However, that hypothetical defence is unsustainable, because it is now (April 2003) well over a dozen years since the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the Moscow Patriarchate continues to maintain that the 1946 pseudo-council was real, valid and canonical. 40 There has been ample opportunity over the past dozen years for Patriarch Aleksi II to disavow the persecution of the Greek Catholic Church. He has conspicuously failed to do so. To the contrary, Aleksi II and the other authorities of the Moscow Patriarchate continue to complain that ‘their’ dioceses in western Ukraine have been damaged by the restoration of the Greek Catholic Church.

Senyk nevertheless writes as if the Ukrainian Greek Catholics considered themselves to be the exclusive religious victims of communism ‘and they did not even undergo the worst, massive arrests and killings of the 1920s and 1930s’. The Greek Catholic Church was in fact only too familiar with the persecution, massive arrests, killings and artificially induced famines of the 1920s and 1930s. In those years the Russian Greek Catholic Exarchate (under Metropolitan Andrei’s juris-
diction) was wiped out. Exarch Leonti (Leonid Fedorov)41 was beatified as a martyr by Pope John Paul II in 2001. Greek Catholic parishes in Soviet Ukraine during the interwar period were all destroyed. Moreover, in Patriarch Alexii II’s latest anti-Catholic pronouncement, in an interview published in Italy, he accuses the Vatican of collaboration in the Khrushchev persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church (1959–64) and asserts that this was ‘the worst persecution of the twentieth century’.42 Evidently, then, Patriarch Alexii II of Moscow considers 1959–64 to have been worse, in religious terms, than the 1920s and 1930s, so Senyk’s argument loses much of whatever force it might have had.

In attacking the Greek Catholic Church Professor Senyk has produced a piece of tendentious writing. In particular, her accusations of neo-nazism and quasi-fascism could have been lifted from Soviet antireligious tracts. Her attack on Metropolitan Andrei is especially hurtful. Based as it is on no evidence at all, it causes the informed reader to wonder seriously what can have motivated Senyk to write and publish it. If she really wants the Greek Catholics to forget the persecutions and move on, she has chosen an unlikely way to encourage such a development.

Notes

1 ‘Quae de Patriarchis sunt dicta, valent etiam, ad normam iuris, de Archiepiscopis maioribus, qui universae cuidam Ecclesiae particulari seu ritui praesunt’ (Orientalium Ecclesiastum (Second Vatican Council, 21 November 1964), para. 10.

2 There is a very small neo-pagan group styling itself the ‘Native Ukrainian National Faith’ (Ridna Ukrain’s’ka Natsional’na Vira, often abbreviated to RUNVira). This group explicitly repudiates Christianity.

3 The Roman Catholic Churches of Poland and Lithuania and of course the Russian Orthodox Church are all national churches – others could easily be added to the list.

4 Ukrainian original and English translation in Schudlo, 1959, p. 840.


6 I thank Kyr Nicholas (Samra), bishop of Gerassa, who brought this phrase to my attention.

7 Those interested in my own views on this very complex and difficult question may read my sermon ‘What does this mean?’ preached in Irish in Christ Church Cathedral, Dublin on 21 January 2000 and published in English translation in Eastern Churches Journal, 7, 1, pp. 125–34.

8 See Iwanusiw, 1987, for a detailed and thoroughly illustrated history of what happened to Greek Catholic parishes in Poland after the Second World War.

9 For my part, I have spent significant amounts of time in Ukraine, I speak Ukrainian, and I believe I could offer a useful presentation on the relationship between Ukrainian nationalism and the Ukrainian churches. However, nemo debet esse iudex in propria causa.

10 To offer only one example, the rector, Fr Borys Gudziak, who honours me with his friendship, holds a doctorate in Byzantine Studies earned from Harvard.

11 With the single exception of Blessed Teodor (Romzha), bishop of Mukachevo-Uzhhorod. The Soviet government did not trouble to arrest him; they simply murdered him without any judicial process at all.

12 Servant of God (Servus Dei) is an official title granted by the Vatican as the first major step in a canonisation process.

13 The German original and a Ukrainian translation by Dr Peter Isajiw were published as a booklet excerpt from the journal Bohoslovia (32, 1968) under the title (in English) Archbishop-Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky’s Memorandum of August 15 1914 to the
Central Powers (Rome, 1968). Senyk does not mention this edition, though she can scarcely be unaware of it.  

Cracraft, 1971, gives a thorough analysis of the 'Holy Governing Synod', which was set up after Peter I abolished the Patriarchate.  

Kraini Sud'ya, as found in the oath of office required of all ecclesiastics appointed to the Synod. See Cracraft, 1971, p. 162.  

Senyk translates this phrase as 'prohibiting prayers for the tsar'. She knows better. We are all free to pray for whomever we please, but a public liturgical commemoration of the sovereign is another matter.  

Roberson, 1999, p. 77. Actually the Bulgarian Church became autonomous in 1870 and de facto autocephalous in 1872.  

In June 1891 Andrei, then still a simple monk, accompanied Bishop Felix Julian Xavier Jourdan de la Passadière on a visit to the Old Ritualist monastery in Bila Krynitsia. Soon after becoming a metropolitan, Kyr Andrei arranged an Old Ritualist chapel in L'viv, beautifully appointed. Remaining in touch with the Old Ritualists in Bila Krynitsia, Metropolitan Andrei also visited Moscow in 1907 and met Bishop Innokenti (Usov) of the Old Ritualists. There were other contacts. See Korolevsky, 1993. Metropolitan Andrei also requested and received from Pope Pius X Vatican recognition for the ordinations of the Old Ritualist hierarchy centred at Bila Krynitsia. See Staroobryadchestvo: opyt entsiklopedicheskogo slovarya (Moscow, Tserkov', 1996), p. 278.  

Not long before, Bishop Aleksi had been Metropolitan Andrei's gaoler and Bishop Yevlogi had done his best, during Metropolitan Andrei's enforced absence from L'viv, to strive to alienate Greek Catholics from their church - even to the point of misappropriating Metropolitan Andrei's own hierarchical vestments. Yevlogi had the good grace to apologise. (Information courtesy of Archbishop Alexis van der Mensbrughe.)  

These include the service to 'All Saints Glorified in the Russian Land', published in Paris with the imprimatur of Metropolitan Yevlogi but printed by the Stauropegion Institute in L'viv in 1930.  

For the text see Korolevsky, 1933, pp. 504-7.  

For much, though not all, of the following information on the Moscow Patriarchate's involvement in the 'reunion' of the Greek Catholic Church with the Moscow Patriarchate in 1945-46, I rely on Bociurkiw, 1996. I am grateful to Professor Bociurkiw for his research on the matter. I would be helpful for someone with access to the archives that Bociurkiw cites to publish a complete compendium of the documents in question, in such a way that the authenticity of the publication is clear.  

Slipyi spent the following 18 years in prison. Charnets'kyi spent 12 years in prison, and died in L'viv in 1959 as a direct result of physical abuse and torture in prison. Budka died in a prison infirmary in Karaganda on 1 October 1949. Khomyshyn died in prison. (According to Bociurkiw he died on 28 December 1945, but this is problematic, since on 1 March 1946 he was formally charged with treason and collaboration with the Nazis. Other sources state that he died in prison on 17 January 1947.) Liatyshes'kyi spent 10 years in prison; he died on 27 November 1957.  

In April 1941 the Moscow Patriarchate ordained Archimandrite Panteleimon (Rudyk) titular 'bishop of L'viv', but not as a residential diocesan ordinary. In any case he was never able to take up any post in L'viv because of the Second World War and its aftermath; he eventually became the Moscow Patriarchate's archbishop of Edmonton, Canada.  

'Pastyryam i veruyushchim greko-katolicheskoi tserkvi, prozhivayushchim v zapadnykh oblastyakh Ukrainskoi SSR', in the collected works of Patriarch Aleksi Slova, rechi, poslaniya, obrashcheniya, doklady, stat'i, vol. I (Moscow, 1948), pp. 121–23. The English translation of the above-quoted passage comes from Pospielovsky, 1984, vol. 2, p. 308. There is some mystery about the publication of this letter of Patriarch Aleksi I. Bociurkiw reports that he did not find it in the collection of the patriarch's writings, and others have said the same, although I have seen it there myself. This raises the possibility that (as sometimes occurs with Soviet publications) there were two slightly different editions of the
volume in question. The letter also appears in Documentation catholique, XLIII, 1946, pp. 59–61.

26 If Senyk doubts the authenticity of the pastoral letter attributed to Patriarch Aleksi I she has only to produce an authentic letter from Patriarch Aleksi II disavowing it.

27 Fr Havryil Kostel’nyk had for some years been the leader of those who opposed attempts to introduce mandatory celibacy of the clergy in the Stanislaviv and Peremyshl’ dioceses, so this request was not surprising.

28 One would like to know whether these marriages were simply done in the Soviet registry office or whether they were actually solemnised in church.

29 In his speech quoting from the telegram Pel’vets’kyi used the Ukrainian word ‘trudiaschyi’, literally ‘toiling’ – a typical Soviet propaganda word.

30 Text in the proceedings of the pseudo-council (Diiania, 1946, p. 62); my translation from the Ukrainian. The original would almost certainly have been in Russian, however. A Russian text appears in the Moscow Patriarchate’s book to mark the 35th anniversary of the pseudo-council L’vovsky Tserkovny Sobor (Moscow, Moscow Patriarchate, 1982), p. 74. Here the expression used is ‘trudolyubivy Sobor’, ‘the work-loving Council’, which is such a cliché as to be ludicrous.

31 No ‘Church Council’ can be held in the absence of bishops of the church in question, and indeed two-thirds of the episcopate of that church must be present in order for the council to be quorate.

32 Bociurkiw, 1996, p. 155, asserts that on 19 February the Holy Synod in Moscow elected Pel’vets’kyi and Mel’nyk and that on 20 February a patriarchal decree determined that they were to be consecrated in Kiev on 24 and 25 February. However, Bociurkiw bases this assertion purely on an obituary of Pel’vets’kyi published 11 years later in Pravoslavnyi visnyk; nobody has ever produced either proof of such an election or the text of such a patriarchal decree, let alone a protocol number and signature.

33 Diiania, 1946, pp. 26–27. The same claim, in substantially the same language, is repeated in the Moscow Patriarchate’s book to mark the 35th anniversary of the pseudo-council: L’vovsky Tserkovny Sobor (Moscow, Moscow Patriarchate, 1982), p. 74; The Lvov Church Council (Moscow, Moscow Patriarchate, 1983), p. 50 and L’vivs’kyi Tserkovnyi Sobor (Moscow, Moscow Patriarchate, 1984), p. 47.

34 Unless one chooses to accept the earliest suggested date for Bishop Hryhorii’s death. In that event, Bishop Ivan (Liatyshevs’kyi), who was also imprisoned but had not yet been charged, was the legitimate bishop of Stanislaviv at the time of the consecration of Antonii Pel’vets’kyi.

35 Charges against the imprisoned hierarchs were not announced until 1 March 1946.

36 Diiania, 1946, p. 31 includes a statement attributed to Mikhailo Mel’nyk claiming that Bishop Yosafat of Peremyshl’ was imprisoned at the time of the consecration of Antonii Pel’vets’kyi.

37 Charges against the imprisoned hierarchs were not announced until 1 March 1946.

38 Church historians and canon lawyers reserve some unflattering technical terms for people who attempt to elect themselves to the episcopate.


40 On 14 March 2003, as I was writing this article, Patriarch Aleksi II gave an interview to the Kyiv Telegraph in which he insisted that the Moscow Patriarchate ‘does not accept any statements that cast doubt on the canonicity of the L’viv Sobor in 1946 and its results,
which liquidated the union [of the Greek Catholic Church with the Holy See] and adopted the union with the [Russian] Orthodox Church'.

41 After a long imprisonment on Solovki and elsewhere Hieromartyr Leonti died on 7 March 1935 in Vyatka. Even his grave has been desecrated so that his relics cannot be found.

42 English-language version of l'Espresso online, 24 March 2003.

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