

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Today: Universal Values versus Nationalist Doctrines

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In the summer of 2000 the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) held its biennial meeting, upon the conclusion of which it issued the following statement of its decisions.¹

To the glory of the holy, consubstantial and lifegiving Trinity, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. *Amen.*

To the most reverend bishops, reverend fathers, venerable men and women religious, and faithful of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

By the grace of God and the blessing of the Roman Apostolic See + Liubomyr, Auxiliary Bishop of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, by the authority delegated to me I proclaim and make public the resolutions of the Synod of Bishops of the Particular [*Pomisna* – equivalent to ‘Local’ used of Orthodox Churches] Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church which took place in Buchach, Ternopil’ *oblast*’, in the monastery of the Holy Cross of the Basilian Fathers from 16 to 20 July 2000.

The Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church resolves:

- (1) To create a canonical commission to prepare a Directory of the UGCC, which will establish the norms of clerical garb and honorific insignia, composed of the following members: Bishop Roman Danylak, Fr Mikhailo Dymyd, and Fr Oleh Kaskiv.
- (2) To divide the territory of the Major Archbishopric into the following dioceses: the archdiocese of L’viv; and the dioceses of Stryi, Sambyr-Drohobych, Sokil, Ternopil’-Zboriv, Buchach, Ivano-Frankivs’k and Kolomyia-Chernivtsi.
- (3) To adopt *ad experimentum* the Particular Law of the UGCC and to instruct the Major Archbishop to decide about the time and manner of its publication.
- (4) To add to the Particular Law of the UGCC this canon: ‘On the territory of a diocese all the parishes are to be under the jurisdiction only of the local bishop’.
- (5) To confirm the activity of the Metropolitan Synod of the Kiev-Halych Metropolis of the UGCC on the territory of Ukraine, which exists accord-

ing to Canon 133 of the CCEC [Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches].

(6) To confirm the official name of this Synod as the ‘Synod of Bishops of the Kiev-Halych Metropolis of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church’.

(7) To instruct the Synod of Bishops of the Kiev-Halych Metropolis of the UGCC to meet at least twice a year or more often, if according to the Metropolitan there is urgent need of this or if one-third of the bishops of the Metropolis demand this.

(8) To instruct the Synod of Bishops of the Kiev-Halych Metropolis of the UGCC to prepare before the next Synod of Bishops of the UGCC, on the basis of the CCEC, Particular Law, and the traditions of the UGCC, an exposition about its rights and obligations, for approval by the Synod of Bishops of the UGCC.

(9) To hold the Third Session of the Patriarchal Council of the UGCC in the summer of 2002 and to approve as a working theme the slogan ‘Jesus Christ – the source of the regeneration of the Ukrainian nation’.

(10) With the intention of completing the ecumenical conception [*ekumenichna kontsepsiia*] of the UGCC and of reacting in a timely manner to changes taking place in the ecumenical process, to instruct the Major Archbishop to create an interdiocesan study group.

(11) To use all means to support existing Catholic educational institutions and to strive to create new ones in order to raise Christian education and morality.

(12) The hierarchy, clergy and laity of the UGCC are to support in every way the diffusion of information about our Church in the mass media and through other lawful means.

(13) To instruct the Major Archbishop to create a fund for the support of priests who work in caring for our faithful in countries where we have no bishops.

(14) To instruct the Patriarchal Catechetical Commission to hold regional meetings in 2001 with those responsible for catechetical affairs in order to study and carry out the Catechetical Directory of the UGCC and to prepare for the Patriarchal Council in 2002.

(15) To instruct the Patriarchal Commission on Youth Affairs to organise work with the aim of holding a world meeting of UGCC youth in the summer of 2002.

These decisions of the Synod of Bishops of the UGCC, which took place from 16 to 21 July 2000 in Buchach, Ternopil’ *oblast*’, in the monastery of the Holy Cross of the Basilian Fathers, extracted from the Protocols of Sessions 1–5, have been approved by the bishops of the Synod of Bishops of the UGCC in 2000.

Participants in the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

Titles

After the solemn invocation of the Holy Trinity and the rest of the rather bombastic opening, the hierarchy sees fit to place as its first resolution an item about clothes and honorifics. Surely these are the last things which should occupy pastors of a church beset by as many problems as the UGCC. A preoccupation with trivia is not confined to the question of clerical dress alone. Anyone not intimate with the aspirations of the

UGCC hierarchy will be bewildered at the variety of titles used: Major Archbishopric, Major Archbishop, Kiev-Halych Metropolis, Metropolitan, Patriarchal Commission, Head of the UGCC. The variety reflects an ideological agenda. Officially, this church is called the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church; the province in Ukraine is headed by a major archbishop (at that time Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky (Liubachivskyi) (d. 14 December 2000)), and is hence a Major Archbishopric, as a look at the official directory of the Catholic Church, the annual *Annuario Pontificio*, under the heading 'Arcivescovati Maggiori, Lviv' will confirm. Any synod of bishops of this province is properly called the 'Synod of Bishops of the Major Archbishopric of L'viv'. This title does not satisfy prelates and others with a misplaced nostalgia for the irretrievable past and aspirations after grandeur. There was at one time a Uniate Kiev-Halych Metropolis, but in 1805 it ceased to exist for the Greek Catholics. (The term 'Greek Catholic' was introduced by Empress Maria Theresa in the 1770s for use in the Austrian Empire; at earlier periods in the Russian Empire the term everyone used was 'Uniate'). A Synod of Bishops of a Kiev-Halych Metropolis today is a figment of the imagination, as is the metropolitan mentioned in section 7, and the 'Patriarchal Commissions': there can be nothing 'patriarchal' without a patriarch. The secret hope is evidently that the Holy See will not protest against the misapplication of titles and will thereby seem to approve tacitly the existence of a 'Kiev-Halych Metropolis' and a Patriarchate. Liubomyr Husar (Huzar) is consistently called auxiliary bishop of the 'head' of the UGCC. 'Head' is no one's title (and I leave it to others to discuss whether it is a proper term to use at all). The *Annuario Pontificio* calls him auxiliary bishop of the major archbishop of L'viv of the Ukrainians. As the text of the Synod's statement shows, the title 'major archbishop' does not satisfy the hierarchy; the title 'patriarch', however, approved by no higher instance, cannot be used officially, although it is used extensively unofficially. The vague term 'head' is therefore used to cover up a claim to titles the 'head' does not in fact possess.

These are trivia, but they reveal something about the sense of priorities among the UGC hierarchy. Pastoral problems are subordinated to claims on titles in the context of a nostalgia for long-lost territories and faithful, or indeed for territories where there was never any Greek Catholic presence of any size.²

The Nation

The UGCC sees itself as the church best qualified, or indeed the only one qualified, to be called a Ukrainian National Church. Immediately after the Synod the UGCC held a jubilee pilgrimage to the Marian shrine of Zarvanytsia, famed for its miraculous icon. Official appeals to the UGC faithful to participate, signed by the Synod of Bishops and published in the UGCC press, describe it in such phrases as 'the national all-church pilgrimage to Zarvanytsia', 'all Ukraine is preparing for it', 'the all-Ukrainian celebration of the Great Jubilee'.³ Statistically, UGCC faithful number about 5 per cent of the total population of Ukraine. That figure alone should suggest some modesty in public appeals. There are other reasons too why grandiloquent phrases about all Ukraine preparing for a pilgrimage should be avoided. A pilgrimage should be a religious event; its sole purpose ought to be to strengthen the faith and deepen the Christian life of its participants. National demagoguery should have no place at such an event. The UGCC saw fit, however, to invite the president of Ukraine and other political figures – all equally indifferent religiously – and to advertise their participation as an attraction of the pilgrimage. The president's speech

was to be the culminating event of the two-day pilgrimage. Other attractions of the pilgrimage were to be three marches (*pokhid*, a secular term, since *professia* is Latin and *khresnyi khid* is Orthodox – just one example of the dilemma facing a church occupying the middle ground between two traditions), all to the accompaniment of brass bands, one of them with the relics of martyrs, and for one of which participants were asked to don folk costumes; there was also to be a contest of choirs.

The intertwining of the religious with the political and ethnic illustrated by the Zarvanytsia pilgrimage has become common practice. The bishop of Ivano-Frankivs'k, Sofron Mudryi, wrote as follows in his pastoral letter at Easter 2000 published in the official newspaper of Ivano-Frankivs'k diocese, *Nova zoria*: 'This great joy and God's grace I wish first of all to the president and government of Ukraine, to our local administration, all our clergy and all our faithful of this diocese and of all Ukraine.'⁴ (Note: Sofron Mudryi is not himself a citizen of Ukraine.) A bishop sets the tone for his clergy, and Mudryi's tone is indeed faithfully echoed by the priests of his diocese. One of these priests described for the readers of the same newspaper a religious commemoration of the tenth anniversary of Ukraine's first democratic elections. The pastor compared 'the Saviour's Way of the Cross with the thorny path of Ukraine towards its freedom'.⁵ Ukraine's independence of course means a great deal to citizens of Ukraine, but for a Christian, especially for a Christian priest, is it in any way commensurate with Christ's passion and death for the salvation of all human beings? One more illustrative event comes from the same page of the same newspaper: another priest of the same diocese, together with a priest of Patriarch Filaret's Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP) blessed a commemorative plaque to the politician Viacheslav Chornovol, an avowed atheist, and celebrated a service for the dead on his behalf.⁶ Chornovol's atheism had not however prevented him from actively supporting Filaret and promoting acts of violence against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) presided over by Metropolitan Volodymyr.

A Church on the Right

When the national and religious are so entwined, the national dons the mantle of the sacred. Examples of nationalistic ideology taking the place of the Christian faith and Gospel teachings are rife in official UGCC publications and public statements – not to mention articles by Greek Catholics writing in the secular press. For example, an issue of *Meta* for July 2000 carries a long article with the title 'Catholic spirit and ethics as a means of educating the nation'. The title may seem innocuous; the contents, however, are another matter. The article is a glorification of the writer Leonid Mosendz, a close collaborator with Dmytro Dontsov, who now has a street in L'viv named after him. Dontsov was active in several political parties from about 1918. In 1922 he was one of the founders of the Ukrainian Party of National Work (*Ukrains'ka partiia natsional'noi roboty*) and is considered to be the chief ideologue of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsional-istiv*, on which more below), although he was never formally a member of it. Both Mosendz and Dontsov were admirers of Mussolini and Hitler. Mosendz, the author tells us, was one of a new generation of Ukrainians – 'militant, principled, determined, disciplined, with an iron will and a strong character ...'.

The doctrine of their periodical [1922–39; to 1932 *Literaturno-naukovii visnyk*, thereafter simply *Visnyk*] was founded on the following principles:

Idealism, Irrationalism, Christianity [*sic*] as far as their world-view was concerned; Voluntarism, Activism, Aggressiveness in the spiritual–moral sphere; Occidentalism, Heroism, Neoromanticism in the sphere of culture and creativity ... Dontsov saw it as his chief task to awaken in Ukrainians a feeling of Greatness, Nobility and Virility, a feeling of Individualism, which could be acquired, he believed, only by appropriating the Spirit of Europe, the Europe of traditions, of the Middle Ages, of Knighthood, of the Conquistadors, of Religious missions and Dogmatism [All capitals in the original]. ... Muscovite Eurasian cultural influences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the specifically somnolent Muscovite-shamanistic Orthodoxy and the socialism–communism of the most recent period, is something imposed on us, in its very essence foreign to our spirituality. If we want to live independently and in creative cooperation with the West, we must break our ties with the East, which has befuddled our soul. The East has constrained us, it has beaten us down, trampled us in its Mongolian mud.⁷

That such views are held and expressed by some individuals is not surprising; neonazism is a problem which is not confined to Ukraine alone. What *is* surprising is the publication of an article of this kind in an official church newspaper. The fact that a diocesan Catholic newspaper should publish such material and, moreover, present it as illustrating the ‘living stimulation of the Catholic spirit’ (from the article’s subtitle) should not be allowed to pass without protest. This is not the first article of similar tendency to appear; but the church authorities are apparently not disturbed by its tone.

Russophobia

Early in May 2000 Ihor Bilozir, a Ukrainian popular singer, was celebrating his birthday with friends in a café in L’viv; at another table a group of people was singing Russian popular songs. A fight ensued, and the Ukrainian singer was killed. At the end of May a demonstration was held in L’viv to commemorate him. This was described in the daily newspaper *Den*, distributed throughout Ukraine in Ukrainian- and Russian-language editions, on 10 June 2000. People held signs reading ‘Bring back capital punishment for the killers of I.B.’; ‘If the court does not condemn, the people will punish by death!’ Signs were painted on buildings: ‘Down with Russian culture!’; ‘Death to the *katsapy!* [a derogatory term for Russians]’. The demonstration was organised by the Social-Nationalist Party (*Sotsial-natsionalistychna partiia*), which shortly before had invited the founder of the French National Front Party, Jean-Marie le Pen, to L’viv.⁸ In the wake of the demonstration the café where the singer was killed and another café were demolished and other acts of vandalism perpetrated.

Among the many thousands at the demonstration were a number of Greek Catholic priests and bishops. The UGCC not only did not condemn the violence and hatred, but by the presence of its clergy seemed to condone it. Throughout the past decade the UGCC has missed opportunities to preach forgiveness and reconciliation; on the contrary, its publications have regularly carried material promoting mistrust and intolerance. *Nova zoria* may well hold first place here. A July 2000 issue carried a letter under the heading ‘Alarm! A church is being destroyed!’⁹ Some phrases from it: ‘Cynically, out in the open, in the light of day (even the communists destroyed

churches by night) people who call themselves Orthodox are destroying a church'; 'this atheistic action'; 'vandalism by these new messengers of the Devil'; 'let us stop these servants of Lucifer'; 'the Orthodox in their atheistic-diabolic acts of vandalism ...'. What were the facts of the case? As the letter itself states, the parishioners of a village church, evidently formerly Greek Catholic, now Orthodox, had decided to renovate their church by giving it an outer wall of bricks, with some alterations to the sacristy in the process. The accusation of 'destruction' thus had no substance to it; but even if it had had, the tone of the letter would have been nothing but inflammatory, and all the more so since the editor of *Nova zoria*, Ihor Pelekhatyi, a priest, added his own comments in the same vein. *Nova zoria*, incidentally, advertises itself as an 'all-Ukrainian Christian newspaper'. 'All' apparently does not extend to including among Ukrainians citizens of Ukraine who belong to another confession or who use another language.

One category of citizens which *Nova zoria* excludes is the entire membership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, the largest Christian church in Ukraine, consistently labelling it 'Muscovite' ('*moskovs'ka*', a term which in Ukrainian has a distinctly derogatory connotation, in contrast to the neutral 'Russian' ('*rosiis'ka*'). Instead of attempting to heal old wounds and seek reconciliation *Nova zoria* and other UGCC publications write abusively about the UOC-MP, with calumnies and insinuations instilling in their readers hatred not only of a church, but of a very large portion of the population of Ukraine. The membership of the UOC-MP is described as Russian, working for the interests of Russia.¹⁰ In Ukraine outside Galicia the people either speak Russian or have no aversion to others who speak Russian. That the members of the UOC-MP are Ukrainians, citizens of Ukraine, whatever language they may prefer to speak, and that the UOC-MP's ties with the Moscow Patriarchate are minimal, does not seem to be relevant.

In April 2000 *Nova zoria* carried an article entitled 'With a stone hidden in one's pocket?',¹¹ written by the paper's priest-editor. He strives to convince his readers about the 'desire of the Moscow Patriarchate, in the wake of official Kremlin policy, to obtain hegemony in the world. The only serious obstacle to the Moscow Patriarchate in this will be the UGCC.' Similar material appears regularly in the paper. In May 2000 it carried an article by Sofron Dmyterko, former bishop of Ivano-Frankivs'k, bitterly criticising the commemoration of martyrs at the ceremony presided over by Pope John Paul II at the Colosseum on 7 May. His article was followed directly by a commentary on the same theme by the editor. Besides fully approving the bishop's criticisms and adding others of his own – the complaint being that the UGCC was slighted, while Russian Orthodox martyrs were commemorated – the editor writes:

The drawing-up of lists of new martyrs is on the conscience of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity. Hopelessly striving to engage the ROC in ecumenism, Council members have somehow failed to see that they are thus intentionally placing unity in danger in the bosom of the Catholic Church itself.¹²

Rome need not worry about this veiled threat. As long as the UGCC continues to receive material help from Rome, there is no danger that it will trouble unity within the Catholic Church. Meanwhile, although the UGCC likes to complain that its martyrs are overlooked – the martyrs of the church, as the UGCC is fond of repeating, which has suffered the most (one wonders how this is measured) – it has yet to prepare even one serious, documented publication about any one of these martyrs.

Friends

In the context of nationalistic Russophobia the friendly attitude of the UGCC towards Patriarch Filaret's UOC-KP and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) becomes understandable. Both the UOC-KP and the UAOC have broken away from the UOC-MP on nationalist grounds, justifying their schisms by claiming that they are creating a 'Ukrainian' church in contrast to the 'Muscovite' UOC-MP. They join the UGCC in heaping abuse on the UOC-MP because it prays for Patriarch Aleksii and uses Church Slavonic in the liturgy.

An issue of *Nova zoria* of July 2000 carries a photograph of the Greek-Catholic bishop Sofron Mudryi celebrating a prayer service together with Filaret.¹³ Filaret is not in communion with any Orthodox Church, considered a schismatic by all. Surely Mudryi, as a Catholic bishop, should know that the Catholic Church recognises the removal of hierarchs from office in the Orthodox Church, and consequently has no relations with Filaret either. The UAOC is similarly regarded by all Orthodox Churches as in schism. Moreover, at a meeting between representatives of the UGCC and the UOC-MP, sponsored in Vienna by Pro Oriente in the summer of 1998, the two delegations signed an agreement to respect the canonical decisions of each other's church.¹⁴ The Vienna delegation was headed on the UGCC side by Liubomyr Husar. The same Liubomyr Husar presided over the Synod of Bishops which in July 2000 adopted the 'ecumenical concept' (*ekumenichna kontsepsiia*) of the UGCC,¹⁵ the contents of which hardly reflect the spirit of the Vienna agreement. Let us take for example paragraph 32, in which the UGCC bishops declare that because of the 'undefined state' of Orthodoxy in Ukraine they cannot judge the claims of the three Orthodox churches. So much for accepting the canonical decisions of the Orthodox Church. The same text was announced in the newspaper of Ivano-Frankiv'sk diocese, *Nova zoria*; there an accompanying article is full of warm words for 'Patriarch' Filaret, which contrast sharply with the tone of the article next to it, about 'Muscovite Orthodoxy'. Both articles are unsigned; they probably come from the pen of the editor.

The next issue of *Nova zoria* contains an article by the editor entitled 'Krylos apocalypse' (*Krylos'kyi apokalipsys*) (Krylos is near ancient Halych in Ivano-Frankiv'sk diocese). The author writes with astonishment that Bishop Mudryi's great friend Filaret (there exist 'constructive, not to say amicable, relations' between them), has announced that he intends to build, or rather rebuild, a grandiose cathedral in the area, where 'there are only Greek Catholic communities'. The editor is shocked, but proposes a way of patching up the rift and returning to 'amicable relations'. Why not build a church jointly, giving it the old title of the Dormition, 'but consecrating it also as the Church of the Unity of Ukrainian Christianity'? The rapprochement between the UGCC on the one hand and the UOC-KP on the other appears to be motivated by nationalist rather than religious reasons. If the latter were of prime importance, surely the natural partner for the UGCC in collaboration in schools and other combined efforts would be the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine. Rather, the basis for all the UGCC's 'ecumenical' activity is an appeal to national tradition conceived as a narrow, illiberal form of populist nationalism. The masses are presented with a vision of national unity by means of religious unification.

Phyletism

That the threat quoted earlier about the danger to unity within the bosom of the Catholic Church and the suggestion about a 'Church of the Unity of Ukrainian

Christianity' could be made in an official UGCC organ are only two of the many warning signals that for a great many Ukrainian Greek Catholics their church is important to them only insofar as it is Ukrainian, not insofar as it is Catholic.

In an August 2000 issue of the newspaper of the Sambir-Drohobych diocese, *Zyva voda*, appeared an article under the title 'The Union – prehistory and consequences'.¹⁶ Union with Rome is presented as good because it supposedly preserved Ukrainian culture from Polish and Russian encroachments better than Orthodoxy. Many Greek Catholics who write about the union of their church with Rome take this same apologetic approach, but apparently do not see that in doing so they are agreeing with Orthodox polemicists, who maintain that the Uniate Church arose and exists solely for temporal motives, not for religious ones. The author of this article writes in conclusion about contacts between the UGCC, the UOC-KP and the UAOC (the UOC-MP for the author is a 'Russian church', with which the UGCC cannot have anything in common) and ends thus: 'In the long run we can believe in a probable and possible union, in the future, of all our ritually identical churches in one "Soborna Ukrainian National Church".' *Soborna* here means, as Ukrainians generally understand the word, 'united, all-Ukrainian'.

No bishop or anyone else in a prominent position in the UGCC has so far spoken of the problem that political parties and movements of the extreme right, which in themselves are small, are using the UGCC as their mouthpiece. No important figure in the UGCC is prepared to declare loudly and publicly, *in Ukraine and for a Ukrainian public* (what they declare in the West has little bearing on church life in Ukraine), that his faith stands for values infinitely superior to national culture or the nation-state. To state this clearly and unequivocally would take courage. Many ordinary believers would accept such a statement and perhaps even welcome it. Many activists, however, and much of the press and other media, as well as political organisations and individual politicians who are favourable to the UGCC, perceive it primarily as an institution for the preservation of national identity. For a bishop to state the contrary means losing political influence and inviting attacks as being anti-Ukrainian. The perception of the church primarily as a national institution is, moreover, one that many bishops and other church leaders themselves share; the declarations of many hierarchs associate church, nation and state so closely as to make them indivisible. I shall return in the conclusion to this article to some recent examples. The problem is already deep-rooted. For many decades the UGCC has been presented to its members not primarily as a place to know Jesus Christ the Saviour of all, but as the one institution capable of preserving and developing Ukrainian culture and all things Ukrainian. This view of the UGCC has entered deeply into the mentality of its members. The educated class of people who consider themselves Greek Catholics are largely indifferent to religious teachings and practices; they adhere to the UGCC primarily because they see this church as a bulwark of nationalism. It would take long, patient and concerted efforts by many pastors to reeducate the faithful to a better understanding of Christianity.

Recently a third volume of a publication concerning Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi of L'viv (1900–44) came out, under the aegis of three institutions (the Office of the Postulator of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyc'kyj (*Postuliatsiia mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'kogo*) in L'viv, the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in L'viv, and the Greek-Catholic L'viv Theological Academy) and with an editorial staff of eight, including Bishop Mikhaïlo Hrynchshyn of Western Europe. The volume has the subtitle 'The church and the social question', but it deals not so much with social questions as with political. In its selection of materials it well

illustrates the contemporary confusion between nationalistic sentiment and membership of the UGCC. I will quote from only one letter, written by Tymish Omel'chenko, head of the Ukrainian National Union (*Ukrains'ke Natsional'ne Ob'iednannia*) to Andrei Sheptyts'kyi from Berlin in April 1942. I must add at once that this volume does not give Sheptyts'kyi's reply, as indeed it does not give his reply to most of the other letters published. Nor should the letter be taken as a correct assessment of Sheptyts'kyi's views, or indeed as necessarily indicating that Omel'chenko had been in touch with Sheptyts'kyi previously.

In Your Excellency's behaviour is mirrored the tradition of the Ukrainian Church of Volodymyr the Great, which always faithfully served the freedom, honour and glory of the Ukrainian nation, forming with it one inseparable whole. From this unity it follows that one nation, possessing one soul, must have only one national church. This view of the Ukrainian Church is reflected in Your Excellency's letters to Ukrainian Orthodox bishops and to Ukrainian Orthodox believers among intellectuals. ... The first goal of our strategy is decisive support, with all our national forces and means, for the bloody German struggle against Moscow. ...¹⁷

Believe it or not, this letter appears in a section called 'Holiness of life: opposition to the German occupation forces' (*'Sviatist' zhyttia: opir nimets'kii okupatsiinii vladi'*). The point of quoting from this letter is not in order to shed light on anyone's views about the Nazis (perhaps least of all Sheptyts'kyi's) but to illustrate the recurring problematic phenomenon among Greek Catholics, both in the 1940s (as the letter shows) and today (as its publication in a section on 'holiness' shows), of the confusion of national and religious issues, of seeing the church through national spectacles. The letter revolves round the two ideas of a national church and support for the attack against Russia, and as far as I can see provides nothing of relevance for a discussion either of holiness of life or of resistance to German occupation – quite the contrary.

The view that the UGCC is a nationalist institution exclusively for Ukrainians has been stated by no one more clearly than by the retired UGCC bishop of Argentina, Andrii Sapeliak, who is now one of the many UGCC repatriates in Ukraine. I quote one paragraph from his concluding remarks in his recent book:

In order to unite the entire Ukrainian nation in one monolithic Ukrainian state and to fulfil the calling of the Particular [*Pomisna*] Ukrainian Church, it is imperative that the three branches of Kievan Orthodoxy unite: the Greek-Catholic Church [i.e. the UGCC], the Orthodox Church of the Kievan Patriarchate [UOC-KP] and the Autocephalous Orthodox Church [UAOC] in one Kiev-Halych Patriarchate. The 'Ukrainian Orthodox Church', which is under the Moscow Patriarchate, cannot be taken into consideration, because as a church it is not Kievan, but only exists on the territory of the Ukrainian state. It ought to care for Orthodox Russians who belong to the Moscow Patriarchate, but live outside their church territory.¹⁸

One cannot help noting that the author talks of a national Ukrainian church without any mention of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine, with which, after all, the UGCC is already united. The nationalist mentality regards all members of the UOC-MP as Russians or as Ukrainian turncoats, and regards all Roman Catholics in Ukraine as Poles.

Ukraine today, like every country in Europe, is multiethnic and multiconfessional. UGCC hierarchs and official publications, which should be teaching the brotherhood of all people in Jesus Christ, have turned out instead to be major proponents of an ideology which can lead only to ethno-religious conflicts. By their statements they give official church support for the use of religion as the basis for an ethnically and culturally exclusive nationalism. Ukrainians who in daily life use the Russian language and Ukrainian citizens of Russian or Polish or other descent are being branded by UGCC leaders as outside the pale of Ukrainian society. Even from a civil, secular viewpoint this attitude is tragic: it tends to create a feeling of alienation among those rejected. It is even more tragic from the Christian viewpoint. It amounts to a denial that the one God is Father of all, and it is a repudiation of the blood Christ shed, which broke down the walls of separation: in his kingdom there is no longer Jew or Greek.

The UGCC leadership apparently supposes that the whole of Galician society is behind it; and it also seeks to expand its sphere of influence in other areas of Ukraine. It not only encourages practical nonbelievers to use the UGCC for clearly nonreligious purposes, but itself propagates the UGCC for such purposes. In August 1999 in a UGCC church in the centre of L'viv the rightist Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv* (OUN)) had its banners blessed and was placed under the special protection of the Mother of God.¹⁹ The military arm of the OUN, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrains'ka povstans'ka armiia* (UIA)), was engaged in guerrilla warfare in western Ukraine in the 1940s and 1950s. While some of its members were no doubt idealistic freedom fighters, the UIA also has on its records numerous massacres of civilian population and burnings, just as Nazi and communist military formations do. People are still alive who can testify that Ukrainian-speaking peasants were killed and their homes set on fire simply because they belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. Today the UGCC gives its unconditional approval to the erection of monuments, which it blesses, and to commemorations of the UIA fallen, as if the entire organisation and all its members were irreproachable. It is as if the Catholic Church in Ireland were to give blanket approval to all the actions and all the members of the IRA and took to blessing the banners and meeting rooms of Sinn Fein. There is a difference, however. If the Catholic Church in Ireland were to do this kind of thing, mass media all over the world would report on it. The UGCC can act in this way in the knowledge that no one outside Ukraine will hear about it.

Education

The document of the Synod of Bishops quoted at the beginning of this article praises existing educational institutions and calls for new ones (item 11).

In November 1998 the L'viv Theological Academy held highly publicised festivities to celebrate its accreditation by the Vatican's Congregation for Catholic Education. The Academy did not see fit to print the letter of accreditation, so I had to search it out elsewhere.²⁰ In substance, the letter, dated 30 October 1998, in response to a request for accreditation and for affiliation with the Pontifical Oriental Institute (PIO), allows the PIO to 'guarantee academic help in organising the first theological cycle ... the Institute is to examine the programme, teachers and educational structures' of the Academy. The Congregation permits and accredits such a cycle for an experimental period of five years, 'the whole time with academic assistance from the PIO', after which time accreditation will be reviewed. In all the L'viv festivities

and press releases there was no hint that the accreditation was only experimental.

The L'viv Theological Academy, aimed at the laity, and intended to lead to the establishment of a Catholic university, is not, in spite of all the attention and funds concentrated on it, the most important educational institution in the UGCC. Bishops, at least, ought to realise that the education of future priests is a priority for their church. Unfortunately, either the bishops do not realise this, or they take education to be synonymous with indoctrination. A thorough and capable examination of textbooks, educational programmes and qualifications of teachers in the UGCC seminaries would be revealing. The manuals used can be found in many bookshops in Western Ukraine. What passes for Ukrainian church history is indoctrination with dangerous myths which flatter the national ego by disparaging everyone else (Poles, Muscovites, Roman Catholics, Orthodox).

Burdens from the Past

Galicia was occupied by Soviet troops during the Second World War and united to the Ukrainian SSR. In 1946 Stalin moved to destroy the strongest focus of resistance to the Soviet regime, the UGCC. At a staged church council in L'viv the UGCC supposedly decided to liquidate itself, joining the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This entire action was prepared and carried out by the communist authorities, but the Russian Orthodox Church complied, accepting what it knew to be a declaration which went against the will of most of the council participants. The ROC hoped that with time these Galicians would become convinced Orthodox. The 1946 L'viv council is a painful memory both to Greek Catholics and to Orthodox, and has made any reconciliation between the UGCC and the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate much more difficult than it would have been in any case.

In this action the UGCC was clearly a victim. Unfortunately and unevangelically, it has exploited its role of victim to the point of being blind to the fact that its own actions have not always been above reproach. Indeed, it can be asked, 'Had the shoe been on the other foot, how would the UGCC have acted?'

This is not an idle question. The volume already cited concerning Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi contains a memorandum written by him on 15 August 1914, shortly after the outbreak of the First World War. Austrian victory seemed assured, and the metropolitan addressed his note (written in German) to the Austrian government, to propose how things in that part of Ukraine which was then in the Russian Empire (by far the larger part of Ukraine) should be organised 'as soon as the victorious Austrian army enters the territory of Russian Ukraine'. Religious matters, as could be expected, receive the most attention; I quote at length, but not from this rather poor translation into Ukrainian (not labelled as a translation), which obscures and in places deforms the original meaning.²¹ In this letter, where Sheptyts'kyi writes of the 'Ukrainian Church' he is referring to the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian part of the Russian Empire; the metropolitan of Halych is himself.

[Church] organisation should follow the same goal: to separate as thoroughly as possible the Ukrainian Church from the Russian. ... Without touching doctrine and the sphere of dogmas, it is necessary to enact a whole series of church decrees (for instance: separating the church from the synod in St Petersburg, prohibiting prayers for the tsar, prescribing prayers for the [Austrian] emperor, etc.). ... All these decrees, however, must come from church rather than civil or military authorities,

so as to break with the Russian system. It would be inopportune to create a new synod (like that in St Petersburg). Prayers for the tsar are to be forbidden; prayers for the [Austrian] emperor are to be prescribed, etc. The metropolitan of Halych ('and all Ukraine') could decree everything that corresponds to and is lawful according to the principles of the Eastern Church and the traditions of the Metropolis [of Halych]. If my provisions (which could be confirmed by the military authorities) are obeyed – and they will be – then a central ecclesiastical authority in Ukraine will be created, and the [Orthodox] Church, as a unified organism, will be completely separated from the Russian. ... A certain number of bishops, that is, those who are Russians by birth, as well as those who do not agree to submit, can be removed at once and be replaced by others, who are pro-Ukrainian and pro-Austrian. The eastern patriarchs, when they apply to the government for money, will confirm all these decrees and measures. Rome also will approve them. ... In this way the unity of the Ukrainian Church will be preserved or introduced in practice, while its separation from the Russian Church will be decisive and thorough. The canonical foundations for this tactic are acceptable from the Catholic point of view and from the Eastern Orthodox they are legal, logical and natural.

If in moral theology the intent to do a deed counts the same as doing it, what is the difference between this project proposed by Sheptyts'kyi and that carried out in 1946, but by the other side? Does the UGCC have a moral right to accuse the Moscow Patriarchate of profiting from the actions of the Soviet authorities, when the UGCC metropolitan on his own initiative produced a similar plan to destroy the Orthodox Church in Ukraine? What he writes is hardly different from what the three leaders of the Initiative Group of the Greek Catholic Church for Reunion with the Orthodox Church wrote in 1945: 'When the entire Ukrainian nation has been united in one state body, then its church likewise must unite into one church – its own native church, independent of a foreign yoke.'²²

As we have seen, today's UGCC bishops write in the same vein. Do they have any moral right to blame those who used the same arguments to destroy the UGCC? It is time for the UGCC to drop pathos-filled references to its being a persecuted victim, never persecuting others. UGCC faithful were not the only persons to suffer for their religious beliefs under communism, and they did not even undergo the worst, massive arrests and killings of the 1920s and 1930s. In any case, the victim is now dangerously close to becoming a persecutor if given only half a chance.

Conclusion

The material on which this article is based dates from before 2001. We should ask whether two important events of that year, the succession of Liubomyr Husar as major archbishop in January and the visit to Ukraine of Pope John Paul II in June, had any effect on the situation. Subsequent developments show no changes, but rather an intensification of the situation already prevailing.

Among the persons the pope beatified on 27 June 2001 in L'viv was Mykola Konrad (d. 1941), a priest and professor of philosophy at the L'viv Theological Academy. The circumstances of his death are by no means clear.²³ Besides teaching, Konrad also wrote for the L'viv diocesan newspaper *Meta*, and some of his articles were published by that newspaper separately as booklets. One of these is entitled

'Nationalism and Catholicism'.²⁴ The author criticises the philosophy of Nietzsche and the views on nationalism of Dontsov (see above) from a Catholic viewpoint. His own views on nationalism, however, while echoed by many political activists in Ukraine today, would hardly seem to make him a candidate for beatification. Let me quote a few passages. 'A nation is a natural grouping. International groupings can be useful only for carrying out some special tasks, but they cannot include the whole of life and create a framework for it.' (pp. 8–9). 'Nationalism and contemporary Catholicism are close to each other in their idealism and activism.' (p. 28). 'A few victims among Christian pilgrims at the hands of Seljuk armed bands, and all Europe arose at the call of Peter of Amiens. Such was then the life force of the Catholic spirit. Nationalism and Catholicism are powerful allies in the struggle against liberalism and socialism. ... The sword and the cross – this is the hope of the nations for a better tomorrow.' (p. 29) 'Actually, the nation can be and should be placed above everything earthly and secular, as the highest secondary goal of human life here on earth, to which must be subjected those private goods which are connected directly with this world.' (p. 31)

The author also makes positive comments about Hitler, Mussolini and their collaborators. I do not know whether the beatification of Konrad was prepared without an examination of his life and writings, or whether these were examined and found satisfactory. In any case, no one in the UGCC appears disturbed about venerating a person with views such as his.

There are other examples of the propagation of extreme right-wing views in and by the church.

The March 2002 issue of the monthly publication of the UGCC Stryi diocese, *Arka*, carries an article which is an example of the fact that expressions of nationalistic ideology are to be found not only in the secular, but also in the Greek Catholic press. Under the rubric '*Dukhovnist*' ('Spirituality') the paper carries an article by Oksana Saiko entitled 'Bringing back the spirit of Dontsov'.²⁵ After 11 years of Ukrainian independence, says the author, Dontsov's works are finally being published, a sign that 'the nation is slowly maturing, preparing to accept Dontsov's ideas and to be formed under their influence'. She cites a passage from Dontsov which illustrates his extreme integral nationalist ideas: 'We are not just a provincial nation. The breadth of will was alive in our ancestors, in the idea of colonising the Left Bank [Ukraine east of the Dnieper River], in the idea of becoming masters of the Black Sea, and in the struggle against the North [i.e. Russia]. Similar tasks again confront us.' Saiko draws her conclusions: 'When you read Dontsov, you feel how today our nation cannot do without his spirit, his enthusiasm, his call. ... We must have a Ukrainian nation without any Muscovite strata. We must have a nation in Dontsov's spirit.' As noted above, this article appears under the heading 'Spirituality'.

While in Kiev, Pope John Paul II blessed the site where the UGCC plans to build a 'patriarchal cathedral'. Later the UGCC announced its plans to move its administrative centre from L'viv to the new site. This is a costly undertaking and Cardinal Husar has written a letter to Greek Catholic faithful asking them to contribute towards it.²⁶ The cardinal begins with a brief historical narrative which supposedly justifies the move. Its accuracy may be judged by his analysis of the Union of Brest (1596), when a part of the Metropolis of Kiev entered into union with the Roman Catholic Church: 'In Ukraine two churches arose: one united with the successor of the Apostle Peter and one which, as a result of outside influences, did not join that unity. Besides this difference, the two parts of the Kievan root practically do not

differ.’ So, we learn, there were no ‘outside influences’ urging union with Rome, but only urging against it. As for there being no differences between Greek Catholics and Orthodox, we must conclude that, if the cardinal really believes what he writes, he is ignorant of the teachings and practices of the Orthodox Church. Further on he writes about ‘returning the [administrative] centre of our church to the capital, Kiev, the place of its birth, from which it was expelled due to cruel circumstances ... the Ukrainian Catholic Church, after existing for 200 years far from Kiev ...’. Any reader short on Ukrainian church history will be led to believe that up to 200 years ago the UGCC had its centre in Kiev; in fact, it never had. The cardinal goes on to express the hope that although at present many churches have their centres in Kiev, one day ‘the Head of the one Ukrainian Church will take his seat in the cathedral of St Sophia, the symbol of our unity’.

Husar’s letter needs to be read in the context of many of his other statements and of those of other UGCC bishops, as reported in the Ukrainian media. The move to Kiev lacks sound pastoral justification since the Greek Catholic presence there is minimal. The motive for the move is expressed in the document I quote at the beginning of this article: to assert a position which the UGCC never possessed, in the hope of gaining confessional dominance with the assistance of nationalist-minded politicians. For this reason the UGCC continues to publicise itself in Ukraine as the most ‘Ukrainian’ of confessions; hence the reference in Husar’s letter to ‘outside influences’, which Ukrainian readers will understand as ‘influences hostile to the Ukrainian nation’. Can this kind of stance lead to reconciliation or ecumenical dialogue?

This is not simply my personal impression. The same issue of *Arka* from which I quote above publishes the views of ‘interested persons’ about the move, considered essential, of the UGCC administrative centre to Kiev. Let me quote two comments.²⁷ Deacon Yurii Savkuk, press secretary of the head of the UGCC:

The goal of returning [!] the administration of the UGCC to Kiev is the unity of the church. It’s a question not only of uniting all Greek Catholic communities around a church centre in Kiev, but of the unity of the entire Kievan Church, which today is divided.

(For an understanding of what is meant by ‘the Kievan Church’ in such statements, see my earlier comments on the book by Sapeliak.) Myroslav Marynovych, vice-rector of the L’viv Theological Academy:

In spite of being met with prejudices or nonacceptance, we should consider ourselves a full-fledged member of the Kievan Church. We are not going there without any rights, after all; only in being united with the Greek Catholic Church can the Orthodox Church attain the fullness of Kievan piety.

Involuntarily, one recalls Dontsov’s phrase about colonising the Left Bank which Saiko quotes in the same issue of the newspaper, since this new centre of the UGCC will indeed be on the left bank in Kiev.

In Western Ukraine, where the UGCC is strong, violations of religious freedom are frequent. I will give examples in only one area, religious instruction, introduced under the name of ‘Christian ethics’ in state schools. The resolutions of the Ivano-Frankivsk diocesan council, held on 15–16 January 2002 and published in the diocesan newspaper, contain a number of problematic proposals.²⁸ One runs as follows: ‘The diocesan administration is to request the *oblast*’ educational adminis-

tration that teachers who are not qualified professionally or who are indifferent with regard to religion shall not be admitted to teaching the course “Christian ethics”.’ In defending this course, the UGCC asserts that it is ‘nonconfessional’. Moreover, according to the Ukrainian Constitution the church is separate from the state, so asking state officials to check the religious views of teachers in state schools is unconstitutional.

Another proposal reads: ‘Every parish is to conduct a register of young people present at the Sunday liturgy in church’. In Chortkiv, Ternopil’ *oblast*’, a largely Greek Catholic town, there is a small Roman Catholic community. The parents of schoolchildren are unhappy with the course ‘Christian ethics’, as well as with pressure on their children to participate in Greek Catholic prayers and religious services. By law, neither is obligatory; a parent may write to the headteacher asking that a child be excused the ‘Christian ethics’ class: but as one mother explained to me this would set the town against her, and her daughter would suffer in school.²⁹

The UGCC claims the title of Kiev, it labels its initiatives ‘all-Ukrainian’; it seeks a position of power in Ukraine. Its leaders and its publications, far from contributing to harmony and reconciliation among the various ethnic and religious groups in Ukraine, sow hatred and intolerance. Instead of helping to create a truly democratic society, with equal rights for all citizens, whatever their ethnic background or their faith, the UGCC hierarchy allows its organs to propagate quasi-fascist ideology and its hierarchs and clergy to support quasi-fascist formations.

The future looks bleak. I have been concentrating on statements by church leaders and articles published in the official church press. It may be objected that the views I have been criticising are not shared by the mass of believers. With this I quite agree. As in every situation, however, the mass of the people do not determine the course of the institution – rather the reverse. The mass of the people will tend to absorb the views and attitudes proffered them by their leaders. In *Nova zoria* I do not find letters to the editor protesting against the newspaper’s tone. The people are silent; and in any case, the church press is not about to print dissident voices.

There exists no serious forum in Ukraine itself for a discussion of these issues. Anything approaching criticism of the UGCC is taken exceedingly ill. After the publication of her article in Germany the author quoted in footnote 10 has found it impossible to publish in Ukraine anything further on church topics, being blocked directly or indirectly by church officials at all levels.

The Catholic Church in Poland and the Orthodox Church in Russia, to name but Ukraine’s neighbours, are closely scrutinised at home and abroad, and critical comment does not spare the statements and actions of their hierarchies. The UGCC hierarchy feels safe on account of general ignorance both of the Ukrainian language and of the religious, social and political situation in Ukraine. Its leaders, who come from the West, are careful to use a different vocabulary when talking to their western counterparts from that which they use inside Ukraine today.

Notes and References

- ¹ See the UGCC bulletin of religious information *Ahentsiia relihiinoi informatsii (ARI)*, nos. 6–7, 2000, pp. 4–5.
- ² For further examples and other aspects of the problem discussed here see S. Senyk, ‘A victim to nationalism: the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in its own words’, *Het christelijk Oosten*, nos. 3–4, 1999, pp. 167–87.
- ³ *Meta* (the official newspaper of L’viv diocese), July 2000, p. 1.

- ⁴ *Nova zoria* (the official newspaper of Ivano-Frankivs'k diocese), 26 April 2000, p. 1.
- ⁵ *Nova zoria*, 5 April 2000, p. 2.
- ⁶ *loc. cit.*
- ⁷ 'Katolyts'ki dukh i etyka yak chynnyky vykhovannia natsii', *Meta*, July 2000, pp. 5, 7.
- ⁸ See *Russkaya mysl'*, 22–28 June 2000, p. 8.
- ⁹ 'Tryvoha! Zynschuiut' khram', *Nova zoria*, 7 June 2000, p. 2.
- ¹⁰ For examples see Natalja Kotschan, 'Die griechisch-katholische Kirche in der Ukraine heute: ideologische Hindernisse für den Dialog mit der Orthodoxie', *Ost–West: Europäische Perspektive*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2000, pp. 135–44.
- ¹¹ 'Z kamenem za pazukhoiu?', *Nova zoria*, 12 April 2000, p. 2.
- ¹² *Nova zoria*, 24 May 2000, p. 1.
- ¹³ *Nova zoria*, July 2000, p. 1.
- ¹⁴ See *Service Orthodoxe de Presse*, no. 231 (September–October 1998), p. 11; on the status of Filaret, deposed in 1992 and excommunicated in 1997, and of his church in the Orthodox world, see the explanation by Georges Tsetsis, *ibid.*, no. 235 (February 1999), pp. 17–18.
- ¹⁵ *Meta*, August–September 2000, pp. 4–5.
- ¹⁶ 'Uniiia – peredistoriia ta naslidky', *Zyva voda*, August 2000, p. 8.
- ¹⁷ A. Kravchuk (ed.), *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: zhyttia i diial'nist'*, vol. II: *Tserkva i suspil'ni pitannia*, part 2 (Vydavnytstvo ottsv Vasiliiian 'Misioner', L'viv, 1999), p. 973. Sheptyts'kyi's letters to the Orthodox mentioned in this quotation were directed to members of the UAOC in the territories occupied by the Germans in the Second World War. Although they are frequently cited as evidence of the UGCC's ecumenism, they were only an invitation to the UAOC to join the Union with Rome. Because they are mistaken for an ecumenical initiative, they have frequently been reprinted in UGCC publications, as in *ibid.*, vol. 1 (L'viv, 1995), pp. 400–1, 406–11.
- ¹⁸ Andrii Sapeliak, *Kyivs'ka tserkva na slov'ians'komu skhodi* (Vydavnytstvo ottsv Vasiliiian 'Misioner', L'viv, 1999), p. 227.
- ¹⁹ See the Roman Catholic *Biuletyn' tserkovno-relihiinoi informatsii*, no. 9, 1999, p. 28.
- ²⁰ *Patriiarkhat* (a monthly published in the USA by the Ukrainian Patriarchal Organization), no. 32, January 1999, p. 4.
- ²¹ Kravchuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 611–12; another translation, from a Russian translation of the German original, is in V. Yu. Malanchuk *et al.* (eds), *Pravda pro uniiu: dokumenty i materialy* (Kameniar, L'viv, 1968), pp. 139–40. The original German text was published in Theophil Hornykiewicz, *Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe*, vol. I (Ferdinand Berger und Söhne, Horn, Austria, 1966), pp. 8–11.
- ²² *Diiannia soboru Hreko-Katolyts'koi Tserkvy u L'vovi 8–10 bereznia 1946* (Prezydiia soboru, L'viv, 1946), p. 18.
- ²³ See Augustyn Babiak, *Les nouveaux martyrs ukrainiens du XXe siècle* (Editiones Universitatis Catholicae Ucrainorum S. Clementis Papae, Rome), vol. 81 (2001), p. 325, who first says that Konrad's death occurred 'quand les bolchéviques se sont retirés de Galicie', then that Konrad was stopped and killed by an 'agent du NKVD'.
- ²⁴ Mykola Konrad, *Natsionalizm i katolytsyzm (vidbytka z chas. Meta)* (L'viv, 1934); it may be consulted in the Stefanyk National Library, L'viv. The translations are mine.
- ²⁵ Oksana Saiko, 'Povernuty Dontsovs'kyi dukh', *Arka* (founder and publisher Julian Gbur (Yuliiian Hbur, bishop of Stryi)), March 2002, p. 7.
- ²⁶ This letter has been published widely in the Greek Catholic press. I am translating from the text published in *Sivach/Sower*, the official publication of the Ukrainian Catholic diocese in Stamford, Connecticut, 10 February 2002, pp. 1, 11.
- ²⁷ *Arka*, March 2002, p. 1.
- ²⁸ 'Propozytsii soboru', *Nova zoria*, 13 February 2002, p. 4. These proposals are published with a statement that they have been blessed and confirmed by Bishop Sofron Mudryi.
- ²⁹ I collected this information in January 2002.