

Life in Religious Pluralism: the Religious Situation in the Polish–Ukrainian Borderland Area*

DARIUSZ WOJAKOWSKI

The Polish–Ukrainian borderland is a place where three religious denominations meet. The relationships between these different religions have a long history there and they were the basis on which the process of the shaping of national consciousness began and on which Polish–Ukrainian national relations were formed in the second half of the nineteenth century in that area.¹ The coexistence of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches in that borderland already had a very complicated and turbulent history before the rise of the Greek Catholic Church, which included features of both denominations and was itself a result of these interactions. Now, in the 1990s, all three denominations are perhaps playing a more important role in that region than ever before. This paper is based on research done in the region between 1994 and 1996 by Grzegorz Babiński.

Although the contemporary Polish–Ukrainian borderland had an earlier common history, for the last 50 years it has been divided between Poland and Ukraine, and the two parts have functioned in two different socio-economic orders. After a brief introduction it is therefore necessary to describe them separately.

The Polish–Ukrainian Borderland: Territory, Population and History

Territory

Babiński defines a borderland as ‘a more or less given, to some extent historically variable territory where there is social and cultural exchange between two or a larger number of social groups’.² The crucial criterion which defines the territory of the Polish–Ukrainian borderland is the common existence there of Poles and Ukrainians. As a result of compulsory and voluntary migrations after the Second World War and the dispersal of the Ukrainian community in the territory of Poland³ the area of the Polish–Ukrainian borderland has increased. In this study I am using the term ‘Polish–Ukrainian borderland’ to refer strictly to the territory of the historical ethnic borderland, which is to be differentiated from the neighbouring regions which have historically had either Polish or Ukrainian native populations. I have also excluded the regions inhabited by Ukrainian ethnic groups emphasising their cultural autonomy (Lemki, Rusnaki).

Although the result of the migration process was an increase in the Polish–Ukrainian borderland area, the process, together with the assimilation of the Polish and Ukrainian minorities, was a cause of the reduction of the territory that had been

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settled by both the Polish and the Ukrainian populations within the confines of the historical ethnic borderland. The area along the state border with Ukraine from the southern Polish state border to the former border between Galicia and the Polish Kingdom is the contemporary Polish part of the borderland area: that is, the territory of the present Przemyśl voivodeship and the eastern part of the Krosno voivodeship. Further north, the territory has a similar ethnic structure but a quite different history and religious composition. The Polish minority on the Ukrainian side of the borderland lives mainly in the L'viv *oblast'*, where it has resisted the policy of ethnic assimilation. Few Poles live in the neighbouring districts, except the cities of Ternopil' and Ivano-Frankivs'k: they are dispersed and form an insignificant element in the social structure of those districts.⁴

Population

The population of the L'viv district was 2,727,400 in 1989;⁵ that of the Polish side of the borderland was 600,000 in 1991.⁶ The Polish minority on the Ukrainian side and the Ukrainian minority on the Polish side are both small: between 2.5 and 5 per cent. Accurate figures are very difficult to obtain: in Poland they have not been gathered at all, and figures from the former USSR are unreliable. The best estimate available for the Ukrainian minority on the Polish side of the borderland is 20,000–35,000;⁷ that for the Polish minority in the L'viv district is 67,000.⁸ As far as religion is concerned, the Orthodox and Greek Catholics are mainly Ukrainians, while the Roman Catholics are Polish.

History

From the Middle Ages to 1939 the borderland area was always under a single state system: the Duchy of Halych (to 1340), Poland (to 1772), Austria (to 1918) and Poland again (to 1939). The two dominant ethnic groups were always Poles and Ukrainians, but other smaller groups included Jews, Germans and Armenians. There was always a mixture of many religious traditions too. Originally the Orthodox Church was predominant, but with the penetration of the region by Polish culture the position of the Catholic Church (which was, in fact, the state religion of the Kingdom of Poland) became stronger.⁹ From the end of the sixteenth century, after the Union of Brest, there were attempts to replace the Orthodox Church with the Greek Catholic Church. They succeeded in 1693.¹⁰ Since that time this region has been dominated by both the Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic Churches, while the Orthodox Church disappeared – first formally, and later, since the eighteenth century, in reality.¹¹ This is how the religious situation remained up to 1939. The religious reforms which had been carried out at the end of the eighteenth century¹² and the agreement between both Catholic Churches from 1853 formed the basis of the lasting *modus vivendi* between these religious groups. Mixed marriages and religious education of children were made possible, and common religious ceremonies developed.

The Polish Part of the Borderland

The General Aspects of the Religious Situation

The Position of the Churches before 1989

In the People's Republic of Poland all religious denominations were subject to

legislative, economic and administrative restrictions. The communist authorities were particularly interested in controlling the Roman Catholic Church, which had a large influence on Polish society; but this very influence forced the authorities to tolerate it and make concessions to it. The power-base of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was the large number of believers and extensive social confidence in the Church as an institution.¹³

The Orthodox Church appeared in the region from 1958 with the support of the central authorities, who since the early 1950s had been planning to use the Orthodox Church to eliminate the Greek Catholic Church in that area.¹⁴ However, the situation was ambivalent: while the central authorities were favourable to the Orthodox Church, the local authorities were visibly reluctant to apply pro-Orthodox policies.¹⁵

The position of the Greek Catholic Church was exceptionally difficult. It was treated as illegal by the authorities, although there was no legislative act forbidding the activity of that Church.¹⁶ After 1956 some religious practices in the Greek rite were tolerated (except in south-eastern Poland), but only within the structures of the Roman Catholic Church. Only one Greek-rite parish, in Komańcza, functioned without interruption during communist times.¹⁷ From 1956 Greek-rite masses were said in Przemyśl, Jarosław and Sanok. At that time the Greek Catholic Church did not have its own church organisation: its hierarchy was taken away to the USSR in 1946 and its parish structure was eliminated in 1947.¹⁸

Religious Structure and Church Organisation

The Roman Catholic Church dominates the Polish side of the Polish–Ukrainian borderland. Its social base is the Polish population which constitutes more than 95 per cent of the inhabitants. Baptised Roman Catholics constituted about 99.5 per cent in Przemyśl diocese in 1987,¹⁹ but in the borderland, with its Orthodox and Greek Catholic population, the percentage is smaller.

Przemyśl has been the capital of the archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church since 1992; earlier it was a diocese.²⁰ The northern part of the borderland is the territory of another, very small, diocese with its capital in Lubaczów. The Roman Catholic Church has a complex structure in that whole area with 354 parishes.²¹ Its social activity, especially in village communities, is typical of that Church's activities in rural regions.²²

The size of the Orthodox community has fluctuated, but generally church data have been rather overstated. According to those data there were 13,500 Orthodox believers in the borderland (including Lemko territory) in 1976 and 7100 in 1991.²³ The community always had a diaspora character. Since 1989 the phenomenon of conversions from the Orthodox to the Greek Catholic Church has emerged. At the present time only eight parishes are functioning in the Polish part of the borderland (which belong to the diocese with its capital in Sanok). Only three of them, Sanok, Kalników and Morochów, number more than 200 believers. The number of Orthodox believers in that area may be estimated at fewer than 2000. Conversions to the Greek Catholic Church have visibly weakened the Orthodox Church, but the rate has fallen lately and the present position of that Church will probably be maintained.

During the communist period the Greek Catholic Church functioned within the structures of the Roman Catholic Church. New, separate structures for that Church appeared only in 1989–91. Przemyśl was the capital of the diocese from 1991 to 1995, and the archdiocese is now based there. There are 23 parishes functioning in the borderland.²⁴ Some of them are well organised, with their own churches and a

resident priest (for example Jarosław, Komańcza). Some of the parishes function without a church (Kobylnica, Leszno). Often one priest has to look after several parishes (for example Leszno, Gaje, Chotyńiec and Kobylnica). The parishes are still in the stage of formation.

It is impossible to state with accuracy the number of Greek Catholics today. The generally accepted estimate for the area (including Lemko territory) is about 12,000.²⁵ Some believers are still (though less frequently than in the early 1990s) converting from the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches to the Greek Catholic Church, and the latter is thus still showing a tendency to grow. Some believers describe their religious membership ambiguously, expressing many ties with their former denomination.

Interdenominational Relationships

There are some troublespots in interdenominational relationships on the Polish side of the borderland. The two main issues are church property and religious conversions. Relations between the Orthodox and Roman Catholics often depend on concrete situations in local communities and the characters of the priests. Most frequently these denominations keep apart, although sometimes they cooperate at the local community level (for example in Kalników).

The Orthodox and the Greek Catholic Churches have the same social base: the Ukrainian minority. This is the reason for the above-mentioned conversions from one Church to another. These have led to suspicion between these Churches (mainly amongst the clergy), but there has been no open conflict. It seems that relations between the two Catholic Churches are better, although here too there sometimes appears to be some animosity.

Religiosity

The feature which differs most sharply in the two parts of the Polish–Ukrainian borderland is the religiosity of the inhabitants. On the Polish side it is influenced by traditions of religiosity in Polish society in general, the main features of which are a ‘close connection [of religious practices] with church organisation and a relatively high willingness to submit to its control’ and ‘knowledge of the dogmatic principles of the catechism’.²⁶

The first feature may be defined as the ‘institutionalisation’ of religious practices. According to Józef Majka the highest level of institutionalisation of religiosity is to be found in former Galicia (which includes the Polish–Ukrainian borderland).²⁷ Data gathered in the 1980s confirm this opinion. According to research done in 1984²⁸ Przemyśl diocese (together with Tarnów diocese) had the highest percentage of *dominicanes* (Catholics who participate in Sunday mass) in Poland (75 per cent), but the lowest percentage of participants who take communion (*communicantes*). The first figure indicates the level of institutionalisation of religiosity, while the second indicates the profundity of that religiosity.

The Polish–Ukrainian borderland is a rural region, and the type of religiosity that prevails there is that which is typical of rural regions generally. Its features are described by Józef Styk.²⁹ They include: a high percentage of men amongst the practising believers; formalism and traditionalism in religious practices; the domination of collective practices; and a poverty of theoretical religious knowledge. It is also defined as ‘closed’³⁰ or ‘folk’³¹ religiosity. In fact, folk religiosity was character-

istic for the whole of Polish society until the 1980s³² and it took a radical form in country regions. Nowadays in Poland selective religiosity is beginning to predominate.³³ This consists in ‘the completely or partly conscious selection of the values passed on by the Church.’³⁴ The social and historical circumstances of the borderland, however, lead one to presume that this region will be unaffected by this transformation of religiosity.

On the basis of research we may conclude that ‘folk’ religiosity is characteristic both for the Roman Catholics and for the other religious groups in this region. The Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches report systematic religious practice, and observations of attendance at Sunday masses and liturgies show that, while not as high as in the Roman Catholic Church, this is much higher than the 10–15 per cent which is regarded as normal for diaspora parishes.³⁵ Furthermore, all respondents, regardless of their religious affiliation, when describing their own and other religious denominations point to differences in church organisation (the head of the Orthodox Church is the patriarch of Constantinople and the head of the Catholic Church is the pope) and in ritual practices (the different calendars, the language of the liturgy, the time of celebration of the mass), which shows that the institutional and ritual (or practical) dimensions of their religion are especially important for believers of all religions in the borderland. The religiosity of all inhabitants of the Polish side of the borderland thus has an institutional character; religious knowledge is less important for them than ritual practices.

Local Communities

The different religious groups come together in the multireligious local communities, where religious pluralism is experienced every day in direct social relationships. Because the Greek Catholics and Orthodox are dispersed in the borderland area there are few villages where they function as a separate group. Except in Mokre, in all villages Roman Catholics are in the majority. In the Polish part of the borderland most multireligious local communities are, in fact, bireligious ones (except, again, Mokre, where half the population are Orthodox, one third Greek Catholic and the rest Roman Catholic). They consist either of Roman Catholics and Orthodox (and a very small number of Greek Catholics) (Kalników, Morochów), or of Roman and Greek Catholics (Gaje, Komańcza, Chotyniec). Some of these villages have long-lasting traditions of ethnic–religious pluralism which date back to the eighteenth century (for example, Kalników, Morochów³⁶); others became bireligious communities only after the Second World War (Gaje, Chotyniec).

Internal Pluralism

The coexistence of two religious groups in one local community forms the basis for social bonds and relationships. Family bonds have a special influence on the existence of the bireligious communities inasmuch as the men connected by bonds with both religious groups shape the intermediate sphere between those groups: the sphere of the men is internally pluralistic and it is mainly the men who participate in two religious and ethnic traditions and often have double religious identity. Official mixed marriages form a small percentage of the total number of marriages because there are some canonical and social barriers against them. However, they still occur in these communities and the sphere of internal pluralism is thereby extended. In marriages which are formally non-mixed, moreover, both spouses often preserve two

religious traditions. The form of compromise between these traditions depends on a common decision.

Internal pluralism is a feature of people who have converted from their religion for reasons other than marriage. The main such reason would be the impossibility of practising their own religion, and connected with that situation, the process of assimilation (there are Greek Catholics who have practised in the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches since the 1950s) and, conversely, the desire to return to the religion of their fathers (conversions in the other direction). The internal pluralism of such people manifests itself in the fact that they attend the services of two religious denominations and/or through family connections.

Religious Tolerance

A wide spectrum of attitudes towards other religious groups is observed, from a feeling of affinity and tolerance to aversion or even hostility. The sources of these attitudes are different.

In the case of negative attitudes the main factors are: the overlapping of religious divisions with ethnic ones and the presence of ethnic stereotypes in attitudes towards religious groups; and the phenomenon of collective conversions.

The main source of religious tolerance is religious pluralism in a local community. Coexistence within the framework of one community makes different religions identifiable and familiar. Cooperation between members of different religious groups in a local community can occur on several levels. There is a prevalent phenomenon of neighbourly help functioning across religious divisions in the borderland. It is very common for those living in one village to make plans for its development using the common institutions – a school, a local council. Where such a base exists, conflicts between religious groups in a village community are only sporadic. Tolerant attitudes are also apparent when the inhabitants of a given village show that as far as they are concerned the local faiths are closely related. Such feelings arise out of the institutional nature of the local religiosity: the structural connections between the Roman and Greek Catholic denominations and the similarity of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic rites are salient, while dogmatic and legal differences are not obvious. Feelings of religious difference are weak and limited to an aversion towards mixed marriages in one's own family.

Traditional Cooperation among the Various Religious Groups

As noted above, cooperation amongst the religious groups within the framework of a local community is one of the factors indicating religious tolerance. Of significant importance here are contacts on the specifically religious level.

Religious cooperation often takes place in the school. The teaching of religion and ceremonies and processions on the occasion of religious holidays are often organised for the two main local religious communities together (for example in Kalników, Komańcza, Mokre). Sometimes the whole community participates in masses celebrated by two rites together (for example in Chotyniec). Agricultural workers will often take a day off when the other religion has a holiday. Families of mixed religion commonly celebrate two sets of religious holidays, a custom which strengthens religious pluralism.³⁷ The custom of visiting neighbours at the time of their holidays is common.

The Ukrainian Part of the Borderland

The General Aspects of the Religious Situation

The Position of the Churches before 1991

The communist system existed longer in Ukraine than in Poland, and it was more hostile towards religion, with officially-organised atheistic agitation, restrictions on church activity and persecution of clergy. The ideological aim of encouraging religion to disappear meant that even the legally-existing religions in Ukraine had a weak structure and a shortage of clergy.

The authorities nevertheless favoured the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian borderland:³⁸ as on the Polish side, it was seen as a counterbalance to the Greek Catholic Church and was therefore treated by the communists better than in the other parts of Ukraine.³⁹

From 1946 the Greek Catholic Church was illegal: it existed underground and was subject to persecution. Only with the onset of Gorbachev's *perestroika* did the Church emerge from the catacombs and begin slowly to regenerate itself. The existence of an underground structure was one reason for the survival of the Church.⁴⁰ Moreover, some of those worshipping in Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches still secretly identified themselves as Greek Catholics.⁴¹

The Roman Catholic Church functioned legally but was very weak, with a dozen or so parishes in the whole of western Ukraine.⁴² The communist authorities were suspicious of it as the 'Polish Church'.

Religious Structure and Church Organisation

Since the time of *perestroika* the Catholic Church has been able to develop, with an increase in the number of believers, churches and property. As far as the Orthodox Church is concerned there have been many conversions to the Greek Catholic Church and some symptoms of a crisis have emerged. There are no data about the number of believers in the three main Churches, but the proportion belonging to the Greek Catholic, Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches respectively is 12:7:1. The Ukrainian part of the borderland is thus more diverse than the Polish part and the domination of one Church is not so obvious. There is some territorial differential in the religious structure on the Ukrainian side. The Orthodox Church has little influence in the west near the state border with Poland (Mostys'ka, Sambir), where the Greek Catholic and the Roman Catholic Churches have a significant and dominant place in the social structure. In the other territories the proportions between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches are more equal. Roman Catholics are concentrated in the west of the region, in L'viv and in the vicinity of Drohobych.

The Greek Catholic Church is the biggest denomination in the L'viv district, with 1238 parishes in 1993.⁴³ The archdiocese has been based in L'viv since 1991,⁴⁴ the processes of winning back church possessions and developing seminaries had begun a year earlier.⁴⁵ Like the other Churches the Greek Catholic Church has a problem with low numbers of clerical personnel.

In 1993 the Orthodox Church had 730 parish communities in the borderland.⁴⁶ Two years earlier there had been 660.⁴⁷ The Church was thus able to develop itself organisationally even while many of its believers were converting to the Greek Catholic Church. However, as early as 1990 the structures of the Orthodox Church divided. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) appeared and soon began

to predominate over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC(MP)) in the L'viv district. In 1993 the UAOC (including the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC(KP)), the third faction of the Orthodox Church) had 608 parish communities,⁴⁸ while the UOC(MP) had 122.⁴⁹ The division of the Orthodox Church is a symptom of the crises of that Church in Ukraine. In 1996 the UAOC, which had been the strongest Orthodox Church in the borderland, also split. It is very probable that the situation of the Orthodox Church will become even more chaotic soon.

In 1993 the Roman Catholic Church had 102 parishes in the L'viv district.⁵⁰ While the social base of the Greek Catholic Church is the Ukrainian population, and that of the Orthodox Church the Ukrainian population and also the Russian minority, that of the Roman Catholic Church was originally the Polish minority. That situation may be changing, however.

Although the Roman Catholic Church has problems with the number of priests (in 1994 40 priests working in 102 parishes, 29 of whom did not have Ukrainian citizenship⁵¹), it is gaining members among the Ukrainian population. It is not easy to explain this phenomenon. One reason may be that before 1988 the Roman Catholic Church was, for Ukrainians, the only legal place of contact with Catholicism, and they have turned to it rather than to the Greek Catholic Church.⁵² It is possible that the Roman Catholic Church will lose its uniquely Polish character in the near future and this may cause its further and faster development.⁵³

Interdenominational Relations

Interdenominational relations are more complicated and more likely to cause conflict in the Ukrainian part of the borderland than in the Polish part. As in the Polish part, the causes of tensions are church property and competition in acquiring members.

The question of property is the main reason for tensions between the Greek Catholic Church and the UAOC,⁵⁴ and it is sometimes an issue in Greek Catholic–Roman Catholic relations.⁵⁵ It was mainly in the early 1990s that local religious conflicts arose as a result of these tensions, and sometimes they took a violent course.

Competition in acquiring members is an issue throughout Ukraine and is connected with the phenomenon of religious revival and the missionary activities of the main Churches and also the Protestants.⁵⁶ This competition has a negative influence on relations between the Catholic Churches in the borderland.⁵⁷ There is no open conflict, but it is difficult to say how the Greek Catholic hierarchy will respond to the introduction of Roman Catholic services in the Ukrainian language, if this happens.

Religiosity

The development of church organisations indicates the revival of religiosity which has occurred in Ukraine during recent years. Statistical research⁵⁸ show that this revival is strongest in western Ukraine, where the borderland lies. The effects of the years of enforced atheism are still evident, however. If, as we have seen, the main features of religiosity on the Polish side are 'institutionalisation' and 'knowledge of the catechism' then the main feature of religiosity on the Ukrainian side is the lack of any religious knowledge at all. This is of course the heritage of the communist system. The teaching of religion was impossible then, and at present it is not on an especially high level because there is still a lack of competent people to do it. The

indices of religiosity are mainly declarations of faith and religious activity. The latter is at a lower level on the Ukrainian side of the borderland than on the Polish side, but cultural specificity should be taken into account because in the Oriental tradition predominating in Ukraine participation in the Sunday liturgy or mass is not considered obligatory as is participation in the Sunday mass in the Roman Catholic Church. This factor also explains why the religious activity of the Roman Catholics is higher than that of the others in the Ukrainian part of the borderland.

Local Communities

Research on the Ukrainian part of the borderland is in its initial stages and few general conclusions can yet be drawn. However, some basic differences in religiosity are already apparent.

If on the Polish side bireligious communities are rare, on the Ukrainian side such communities are typical (Greek Catholic/Orthodox or Roman Catholic/Greek Catholic), and there are also trireligious communities. In the Ukrainian part of the borderland area the intermediate sphere between religious groups, consisting of men and women connected with more than one religion, is larger than in the Polish part. The number of strictly ‘catacomb’ Greek Catholics was relatively sparse in Soviet times, if we compare it with the number of members of that denomination today.⁵⁹ Thus we may assume that earlier most of them used to identify themselves with the Orthodox Church or the Roman Catholic Church. On the Ukrainian side, mixed marriages have never had to face the obstacles which appear on the Polish side. The prewar custom whereby a husband and wife will keep to their different religious denominations and bring up their children in the religion of the parent of the same sex is still preserved in Ukraine.⁶⁰

It seems, however, that the sphere between the religious groups may to a large extent be characterised not by pluralism but by religious indifference. Of course religious indifference cannot be ascribed to the entire population of the Ukrainian part of the borderland; but the religiously indifferent element in local communities has been picked out by respondents as socially important.

Although there is plenty of evidence of religious tolerance in the Ukrainian part of the borderland area, there have also been violent religious conflicts. These are often about specific local issues, such as the desire to remove an unpopular priest or the ambition by a local group to capture the village church. In such conflicts, nominally religious, it is likely that religion as such plays only an instrumental role. This explanation is still a hypothesis, however, and needs verification through further research.

The other specific feature of coexistence of religious groups on the Ukrainian side of the borderland is the absence of cooperation between them on the strictly religious level. Thus while there may be cooperation between religious groups within the framework of the village community, which may even extend to help in building a particular church, typically there will be no common religious ceremonies.

Conclusions

The religious situations in the two parts of the historical Polish–Ukrainian borderland are similar in that each has a mixture of the same religious denominations. However, interaction between those denominations and the religiosity of the inhabitants are different in the two parts.

In the Polish part of the borderland satisfactory interdenominational relationships, the significant role of religion in social and family life and the existence of a sphere of reciprocal connections and cooperation between local religious groups are factors which indicate that the present religious situation is stable and is likely to remain so. In the Ukrainian part of the borderland, however, antipathy and even hostility between the Churches, religious indifference and the resulting lack of cooperation on the religious level are the main factors indicating that the religious situation is unstable. That situation is to some degree the heritage of communist times. At the microsocal level, however, we can observe such phenomena as the existence of a sphere of internal pluralism and the existence of family and local bonds connecting the members of different religious groups. These may form the basis for lasting and positive religious relationships.

Notes and References

- ¹ This is a typical feature of the ethnic borderlands in East Central Europe. See Gregorz Babiński, 'Religia i nacjonalizm w Środkowej i Wschodniej Europie', in Irena Borowik and Andrzej Szyjewski (eds), *Religie i Kościoły w społeczeństwach postkomunistycznych* (Nomos, Kraków, 1993).
- ² Gregorz Babiński, 'Pogranicze etniczne, pogranicze kulturowe, peryferie', *Pogranicze* (Wydawnictwo Filii UW, Białystok), vol. 4, 1994, p. 6.
- ³ This problem is described in Krystyna Kersten, 'Ludzie na drogach: O przesiedleniach ludności w Polsce 1939–1948', *Res Publica* (Warsaw), no. 4, 1987; Eugeniusz Misiło, *Akcja 'Wisła'* (Warsaw, 1993).
- ⁴ Statistical data show that the Polish minority in Tarnopil and Ivano-Frankivsk's *oblasti* is about 25,000, or one per cent. See: Władysław Gill and Norbert Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989–1993* (Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 1994), pp. 80, 118; Piotr Eberhardt, *Przemiany narodowościowe na Ukrainie XX wieku* (Oboż, Warsaw, 1994), pp. 258–59.
- ⁵ Eberhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 258–59.
- ⁶ Marian Malikowski and Kazimierz Z. Sowa, *Szanse i bariery rozwoju 'Ściany wschodniej' Polski* (Wydawnictwo WSP, Rzeszów, 1995), table 1; *Rocznik archidiecezji przemyskiej* (Przemyśl, 1994).
- ⁷ The figure of 35,000 includes all persons of Ukrainian origin even if they never identify themselves as Ukrainians. According to the bulletin *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce: Informator 1994* (Warsaw, 1995) the number of Ukrainians in Przemyśl voivodeship is 5000–10,000 (p. 22).
- ⁸ Dariusz Wojakowski, 'Polacy na Ukrainie Zachodniej: Zagadnienia wybrane', *Przegląd Polonijny* (Nomos, Kraków), no. 4, 1996, p. 56.
- ⁹ On these changes in the religious situation see Artur Paszko, 'Społeczno-polityczne położenie Cerkwi Prawosławnej w państwie polsko-litewskim w XIV i XV wieku', *Nomos* (Nomos, Kraków), no. 16, 1996, pp. 6–31.
- ¹⁰ Elżbieta Piwowar, 'Pierwszy synod unicki eparchii przemyskiej (1693)', in Stanisław Stępień (ed.), *Polska-Ukraina: Tysiąc lat sąsiedztwa* (P-WIS, Przemyśl, 1990), pp. 157–58.
- ¹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 165–66.
- ¹² August Fenczak, 'Z dziejów inicjatyw polskich na rzecz urugulowania stosunków między obrządkami Kościoła Katolickiego', in Stępień (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 174, 179.
- ¹³ Irena Borowik, 'Religijność społeczeństw postkomunistycznych – katalog pytań i paradoksów', in Borowik and Szyjewski, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
- ¹⁴ Kazimierz Urban, *Kościół Prawosławny w Polsce 1945–1970* (Nomos, Kraków, 1996), pp. 163–65, 314–15.
- ¹⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 165, 312–13.
- ¹⁶ Paweł Pelc, 'Położenie prawne Kościoła Greckokatolickiego w Polsce w latach

1945–1989’, *Więź* (Warsaw), no. 7, 1992, p. 121.

¹⁷ For a description of the restrictions applied to that parish see Zbigniew Wojewoda, *Zarys historii Kościoła Greckokatolickiego w Polsce w latach 1944–1989* (Nomos, Kraków, 1994), pp. 40–41.

¹⁸ Pelc, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–8.

¹⁹ *Kościół Katolicki w Polsce 1918–1990* (Wydawnictwo GUS, Warsaw, 1991), p. 52.

²⁰ *Rocznik archidiecezji przemyskiej* (Przemysł, 1994).

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 522; Jan Kozłowski, Janusz Langer and Tadeusz Zagajewski, *Atlas wyznań w Polsce* (Krajowa Agencja Wydawnictwa, Kraków, 1989), p. 84.

²² In Przemysł voivodeship 61 per cent of the population lives in villages, in Krosno voivodeship 64 per cent. The percentage for the whole of Poland is 38. See Malikowski and Sowa, *op. cit.*, table 4.

²³ Kazimierz Urban, *Mniejszości religijne w Polsce 1945–1991* (Nomos, Kraków, 1994), pp. 137, 243–44.

²⁴ *Skhematyzm Peremis'koi Yeparkhii vizantiis'ko-ukrains'koho obriadu* (Przemysł, 1994).

²⁵ Wojewoda, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

²⁶ Józef Majka, ‘Jaki jest katolicyzm polski?’, in Franciszek Adamski (ed.), *Socjologia religii* (Wydawnictwo Apostolstwa Modlitwy, Kraków, 1984), pp. 266, 274.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 271.

²⁸ *Kościół Katolicki w Polsce 1918–1990* (Warsaw, 1991), p. 172.

²⁹ Józef Styk, ‘Światopogląd i religia a tożsamość społeczno-kulturowa mieszkańców wsi’, in Jan Turowski, *Socjologia wsi i rolnictwa* (Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin, 1995), pp. 229–30.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 230; Zbigniew Narecki, ‘Środowisko wiejskie a religijność katolików’, in Władysław Piwowarski (ed.), *Religijność ludowa: Ciągłość i zmiana* (Wrocław, 1983), p. 191.

³¹ Władysław Piwowarski, ‘Wprowadzenie’, in Piwowarski (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 9–11.

³² *ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

³³ Irena Borowik, ‘Miejsce Kościoła i religii w nowej sytuacji Polski’, *Nomos* (Kraków), no. 1, 1992, p. 161; Władysław Piwowarski, ‘Przemiany religijności polskiej – stan obecny i perspektywy’, *Więź* (Warsaw), no. 10, 1992, pp. 32–33.

³⁴ Janusz Mariański, *Religijność w procesie przemian* (Warsaw, 1991), p. 127.

³⁵ Urban, *Kościół Prawosławny ...*, p. 134. We should also note that since members of the Greek Catholic Church are not obliged to attend mass in the Greek rite and often live closer to a Roman Catholic Church these figures are lower than they might otherwise have been.

³⁶ Zdzisław Budzyński, *Ludność pograniczna polsko-ruskiego w II połowie XVIII wieku* (Wydawnictwo WSP, Przemysł-Rzeszów, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 181, 249.

³⁷ See Janusz Mariański, *Kierunki badań polskiej socjologii religii w latach osiemdziesiątych* (Warsaw, 1990), p. 62.

³⁸ Wojewoda, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–26.

³⁹ Tadeusz A. Olszański, *Historia Ukrainy XX wieku* (Volumen, Warsaw, 1994), p. 219.

⁴⁰ Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, ‘Ukraiński Kościół Katolicki w ZSRR za Gorbaczowa’, *Więź*, no. 11/12, 1991, pp. 150–71.

⁴¹ Paweł M. Bendyk, ‘Nie jesteśmy katolikami drugiej kategorii’, *Więź*, no. 11/12, 1991, p. 172.

⁴² Adam Hlebowicz, ‘Geografia wyznaniowa i konflikty międzykonfesyjne na Ukrainie AD 1991’, *Więź*, no. 11/12, 1991, pp. 146–47.

⁴³ Ivan Hreczko, ‘Odrodzenie tradycyjnych wyznań chrześcijańskich na Ukrainie’, *Nomos*, no. 7/8, 1994, p. 246.

⁴⁴ ‘Kalendarium odrodzenia narodowego na Ukrainie 1985–1991’, *Więź*, no. 11/12, 1991, p. 35.

⁴⁵ Bociurkiw, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

⁴⁶ Hreczko, ‘Odrodzenie ...’, pp. 245–46.

- ⁴⁷ Hlebowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–45.
- ⁴⁸ Of that number about 500 belonged to the UAOC. In 1991 out of the total number of 660 Orthodox parishes 430 belonged to the UAOC. See Hlebowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–45.
- ⁴⁹ Hreczko, ‘Odrodzenie ...’, pp. 245–46.
- ⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p. 246.
- ⁵¹ *loc. cit.*
- ⁵² Ivan Hreczko, ‘Stosunki wyznaniowe na Ukrainie zachodniej po upadku komunizmu’, in Borowik and Szyjewski (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 61–62.
- ⁵³ The question of introducing the Ukrainian language to the liturgy is seen by priests as one of the most important challenges facing the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine.
- ⁵⁴ Hreczko, ‘Stosunki ...’, p. 61.
- ⁵⁵ Some churches, for example in L’viv and Boryslav, which were founded by the Roman Catholics before the Second World War have been given by the Ukrainian authorities to the Greek Catholics.
- ⁵⁶ Serhiej Zdioruk, ‘Narodowe interesy Ukrainy w sferze religijno-narodowego systemu świata’, *Nomos*, no. 7/8, 1994, p. 197.
- ⁵⁷ See the interview with Bishop Rafał Kiernicki in Andrzej J. Madera, *Na bocznych drogach Europy: Polacy na Ukrainie* (Spotkania, Rzeszów, 1994), p. 67.
- ⁵⁸ E. Sinicyń, ‘Współczesna społeczno-polityczna sytuacja na Ukrainie i jej wpływ na poziom religijności oraz dynamikę orientacji wyznaniowych’, in Borowik and Szyjewski (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 159.
- ⁵⁹ Bendyk, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
- ⁶⁰ See Wojakowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–60.