The ‘Best Years’ of Stalin’s Church Policy (1942–1948) in the Light of Archival Documents*

DIMITRY POSPIELOVSKY

The general information in this paper has been common knowledge for students of Soviet church–state relations for some time. Its contribution to the field lies in details found in formerly unavailable archival documents which in some cases correct earlier understandings, present documentary proof of what used to be scholarly hypotheses, shed light on some formerly inexplicable twists and turns in Soviet policy, or add logical links between what seemed to be unrelated series of events. Of course archival documents do not necessarily contain the truth. Many of them are reports and notes by Soviet officials who wrote them with self-serving interests in mind. Hence they become an important source of information only in the hands of a scholar knowledgeable in the field who juxtaposes them with the relevant known events.

Stalin and the Metropolitans

A new era in Soviet church–state relations was launched by the famous meeting between Stalin and the three senior hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church on 4 September 1943; but a special relationship of sorts between Metropolitan Sergi, the patriarchal locum tenens, and Stalin began somewhat earlier.

That very cautious and diplomatic bishop, who after four spells in Soviet prisons had learnt to abide very meticulously by Soviet laws, broke the law on the very first day of the German attack, the Sunday of All Russian Saints, 22 June 1941. While Soviet leaders and the media remained silent, the septuagenarian metropolitan was the first one to break the news of the war in a fiery sermon on that day. He declared that in all national historical ordeals the church had always been and would likewise now remain with its people. Symptomatically, he advised the clergy not to be tempted by 'the other side' but to share all trials with the nation fighting for its survival. He ordered his staff to mimeograph his sermon and mail it out to all the surviving parishes in the country and instruct them that it be read from the ambo in all churches. This was against the laws of 1918 and of 1929 which forbade the church to interfere in any affairs of state and society.

The first signs of a changing attitude on the part of the government towards the church were that Sergi was not reprimanded in any way and that there were no

*This paper was originally presented at the Fifth World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES), Warsaw, August 1995.

0963-7494/97/020139-24 © 1997 Keston Institute
attempts to prevent the dissemination of this and all his subsequent patriotic appeals. Moreover, most of them were printed by the state and disseminated on the other side of the front from Soviet aeroplanes. Neither were there any impediments placed in the way of collections of donations for the war effort undertaken immediately by the church on the initiative of Aleksi, the metropolitan of Leningrad. Last but not least, publication of antireligious periodicals stopped within weeks of the German attack. Sergi took advantage of the situation and early in 1942 sent a cable to Stalin reporting that the church was collecting generous donations from its parishioners for the war effort and therefore needed a bank account, which it had not been allowed to have since the decree of 23 January 1918 had deprived it of the status of a legal person. Stalin responded by a friendly telegram thanking the church for its efforts and granting it a bank account number. The permission to open a bank account was an implicit, if only partial, recognition of that status. The other favour of the same year was the lifting of curfew for Easter night, allowing traditional Orthodox midnight processions with lighted candles outside the churches.

Other events of 1942 included an embarrassing interlude for the locum tenens. His most trusted friend, Metropolitan Sergi junior (Voskresensky), whom Sergi had sent as his exarch to the occupied Baltic states and who had chosen to stay in Riga under the German occupation, convened a conference of the Orthodox Baltic bishops on 8 August 1942. An NKVD report pointed out that although the conference had sent a message of greetings to Hitler, the bishops remained faithful to the Moscow locum tenens, but defamed his ‘patriotic antifascist appeals’. The report continued that in response to the Baltic bishops’ action ‘Metropolitan Sergi Stragorodsky and his council of fourteen bishops are about to issue a special appeal ... condemning the Baltic bishops. Secretly assisting this measure which is politically beneficial to our country, the NKVD is taking steps to disseminate ... such documents by having them typographically printed’. As the report was signed by a deputy head of the NKVD, if not Stalin then certainly Beria was aware of it.

Ye. I. Lisavtsev, one of the most prominent Soviet reliгиologists from the Institute of Scientific Atheism, claimed that there had been a secret meeting between Stalin and Metropolitan Sergi in July 1941 and that even on the eve of the 1943 encounter with the three hierarchs Stalin had a private meeting with Sergi. Thus, according to Lisavtsev, the 4 September encounter was neither the first one, nor a total surprise to the bishops, as claimed by most authors, including myself, heretofore. However, no documents confirming Lisavtsev’s claim have so far been found in the archives. Nor is there much logic in that claim. First, when the Germans approached Moscow in November 1941, the metropolitan, no doubt on Stalin’s orders, was evacuated to Ul’yanovsk and was not allowed to return to Moscow until August 1943, although the other surviving metropolitan, Nikolai of Kiev, who had retreated along with the Soviet troops, was permitted to stay the whole while in Moscow. This somewhat contradicts Lisavtsev’s claim that Sergi and Stalin, both being former seminarians, understood each other and remained satisfied with their July meeting. An even more convincing piece of evidence against the earlier Stalin—Sergi encounters is the fact that on 4 September 1943 Stalin had called Karpov to his Kuntsevo dacha where in the presence of Malenkov and Beria he asked him to give full information on Metropolitan Sergi, Aleksi and Nikolai: their age, state of health, authority in the church, attitude to the Soviet regime and so on. Then after general questions about the Russian and other Orthodox churches and their mutual relations, Stalin asked Karpov’s opinion on establishing a liaison body between the church and the state. Karpov proposed the formation of a commission on church affairs under the Supreme
Soviet Presidium, but Stalin retorted that the liaison body should have no preroga­tives of independent decision-making, but only those of keeping the Council of People’s Commissars informed on the church and of passing the latter’s decisions on to the church. Having requested and received Beria’s and Malenkov’s approval of a meeting with church leaders, Stalin told Karpov to telephone Metropolitan Sergi and ask him when would it be convenient for him to meet Stalin. The metropolitan replied: ‘today’. Two hours later the three metropolitans were whisked to the Kremlin where their talks with Stalin lasted 1 hour and 55 minutes.4 Thus the meeting was not a total surprise to the metropolitans (what is surprising is that Sergi did not ask for at least a day to prepare an agenda). Karpov’s account therefore militates against the likelihood of any earlier meetings between Stalin and the metrop­olitan.

Note that, according to Karpov’s record, all three bishops actively participated in the talks, whereas former reports claimed that, as the meeting had been a total surprise to them, only Metropolitan Sergi braced himself and spoke, while the others remained silent.

Stalin began the encounter by praising the patriotic activities of the church and said that numerous letters from front line addressees as well as from the rear ‘approve the position adopted by the church in relation to the state’. Then he invited the metropolitans to say what the church would like the Soviet government to do for it. The most important issue, said Metropolitan Sergi, was to regularise the adminis­tration of the church. For the last 18 years it had consisted merely of a locum tenens, without even a synod since 1935.5 He asked for permission to convene a council of bishops and to elect a patriarch. The other two metropolitans approved. Stalin asked how long it would take to convene the council, what the title of the patriarch would be and whether the church needed any assistance from the state. Sergi replied that the patriarch’s title would be ‘... of Moscow and all Rus’, which he thought was a more appropriate title than ‘... of all Russia’.6 He thought the church would need at least a month to bring all the bishops to Moscow. Stalin agreed with the title, but thought one month was too long, and asked Karpov how soon the bishops could be gathered together ‘using Bolshevik methods’. Karpov replied three or four days if aeroplanes were provided. The date was set for 8 September. Stalin offered a state subsidy, but Sergi categorically refused any subsidies from the state.

The next request by Metropolitan Sergi related to the restoration of theological education. Metropolitan Aleksi remarked that the prerevolutionary model of junior seminaries was inappropriate for the present conditions, as students would be too immature, without stable convictions; he proposed that no students under 18 years of age should be accepted. He added, however, that the establishment of proper semi­naries was a task for the future.

The first aim was to establish elementary pastoral–theological schools. Stalin replied that the format of the educational establishments was an internal matter for the church: ‘The government will have nothing against the establishment of both undergraduate seminaries and graduate academies’, he said, adding that the church ‘may open seminaries in as many dioceses as it needs’.

Sergi also asked for permission to publish a regular monthly church periodical and ‘to grant bishops the legal right to negotiate with local governments on the subject of reopening churches’. The other metropolitans added that there were great local varia­tions in the density of functioning churches and that first of all churches ought to be reopened where there was a particular disproportion between the functioning churches and the size of the population. Stalin promised that there would be no
government obstacles whatsoever to the opening of churches.

Metropolitan Aleksi then raised the question of ‘releasing certain bishops from prisons, camps and internal exile’, while Sergi added that it would be necessary to remove travel and residence restrictions from the released clergy so that the church could appoint them wherever they were needed. Regarding the first question Stalin said: ‘Present us with a list; we shall scrutinise it.’ He instructed Karpov to look into the second issue.

Two identical lists of clergy are to be found in the archives, one of 28 September, and the other, addressed to Karpov, of 27 October. In a telling preamble to the petition Patriarch Sergi wrote:

I beg you to submit the petition ... to extend amnesty to the following persons whom I should like to restore to work in the church. I am not passing judgment as to the extent of their guilt or innocence, but I am convinced that should the government extend to them its mercy they ... would do their best to prove their loyalty to the state and to make up for their former guilt.

Another interesting detail is that comparing that list of 24 bishops with Metropolitan Manuil’s six-volume catalogue of Russia’s twentieth-century bishops one finds that a good number of those petitioned for by the new patriarch had been liquidated by the NKVD in the period between 1936 and 1941, which was obviously unknown to the church leadership of the time. Of the whole list only one bishop, Nikolai (Mogil­evsky), was in fact released and appointed archbishop (later metropolitan) of Alma-Ata in 1945.7

After raising the question of imprisoned bishops, Metropolitan Aleksi complained that ‘the Leningrad city government’s administrative inspector does not allow’ the diocese to make deductions from its income for the needs of the national church administration in Moscow, and he asked Stalin that the new church by-laws might permit parish rectors to be members of the parish executive, in order to have a say on the budgetary appropriations issue as well as other questions. Stalin replied that he had no objections.9

Metropolitan Nikolai asked for permission to set up a church candle-producing enterprise, because the then current practice of making them manually in the parishes pushed the price of candles too high. In response Stalin ordered Karpov to make sure that bishops received the full right of control over church funds and that no impedi­ments were placed in the way of setting up seminaries, candle factories and other enterprises.10

Stalin handed over the building of the former German embassy to the patriarchate and once again offered the church financial subsidies, either ‘now or at any time in the future’. The metropolitanans declined that offer. However, they apparently accepted Stalin’s offer of supplying the patriarchate with food at government prices, as well as cars for the patriarch immediately and for the leading bishops in the near future. In conclusion all three metropolitanans complained about the unbearably high taxes levied on the church and on clergy incomes. Stalin replied that each individual case ought to be submitted to Karpov and scrutinised by him; and then added that henceforward the state organ for church affairs to which all grievances should be addressed would be the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs (CROCA) under Karpov’s chairmanship. Turning to Karpov he said: ‘Don’t forget, however, that you are not the church’s chief procurator, and in your activities you must emphasise the indepen­dence of the church.’ Then he instructed Molotov to place a report of the meeting in
Izvestiya and accompanied the metropolitans to the door of his office.12

In the past, most authors, including this writer, thought that the main motivation for Stalin's encounter with the metropolitans was the need to have the church on his side in the war, that it was a clear sign of recognition of the failure of communist slogans to raise the nation's war morale and that the appeal to the church was one of the aspects of a resort to national patriotism in order to win the war. If so, why then did it take Stalin so long to arrange the meeting and why was it only after the Stalingrad and Kursk victories, when there was no more doubt as to who would win the war, that he suddenly needed the church? Why did he not respond in kind to the mass reopening of churches in the German-occupied territories as soon as they began in 1941? The documents now available indicate that the real immediate motive for the meeting lay beyond Soviet borders. For some time the Anglican Church had been asking the Soviet government to allow it an official visit to the Russian Church. No doubt the Church of England hoped thereby to strengthen the position of the Russian Church in an atheist state and also, perhaps, to quell the voices of those members of the British public who were uneasy about Soviet–British friendship because of the known facts of Soviet persecution of religion. At the same time, Stalin was bringing pressure to bear on the British to reopen the second front. In preparation for the Stalin–Churchill–Roosevelt Tehran Conference he was hoping to increase that pressure via the Anglican Church which, Stalin correctly hoped, would be impressed, among other things, by witnessing the splendid worship of an allegedly flourishing Orthodox Church.13 Although Molotov suggested a month's delay in inviting the Anglican delegation, Stalin apparently did not agree, and the delegation arrived a week after Sergi's patriarchal enthronement on 12 September. Thus from the very beginning of the unwritten concordat the church was assigned a foreign policy purpose in Stalin's state structure.

In his speech at the 1945 Council (Sobor) which elected Aleksi of Leningrad as the next patriarch upon Sergi's death, Karpov must have raised great hopes among the churchmen: 'I am deeply convinced that the council's decisions will strengthen the church and will prove to be an important point of departure in the subsequent development of church activities aimed at helping the Soviet people to achieve their colossal historical goals.'14 Karpov's first documented church dealings were with Molotov, the foreign affairs commissar (minister after 1946) and the first deputy premier. According to Karpov's notes, at their first session on 13 October 1943 he informed Molotov that Patriarch Sergi was enquiring about the date for the Russian Church's return visit to Britain. In Molotov's opinion there was no reason for an immediate response: 'We should not bow down to them ... they are not fighting well anyhow. It was one thing for them to come here cap in hand, and quite another for us to go there ...'. There was no reason to do so until the British had reopened the Normandy front, Molotov said. As deputy chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars Molotov was also giving Karpov instructions on issues relating to internal church matters and to the CROCA. Thus during the 13 October visit he enquired about the Renovationists. Karpov replied that Stalin had approved his (Karpov's) suggestion of placing no impediments in the way of the final disintegration of that group.15 On the procedural question of reopening of churches Molotov said that was the business of the CROCA, while the legal formalities of opening a church should be the work of the local executive organs. There should be no hurry in the matter. No pleas were to be satisfied immediately. The ones already received by the CROCA should be sent back to the appropriate local government organs for their resolutions on each case. Then, said Molotov,
... the patriarch's opinion should be solicited and reported to the central Soviet government, together with comments and a description of the situation by the CROCA, with its suggestion on where churches should be opened. Subsequently ... the CROCA ought to seek approval from the government, and only then give instructions to local governments. ... There is no way around it, we shall be forced to open a few churches here and there, but we must hold the process back. Final decisions must remain with the [central] government."}

These instructions led to a very cumbersome procedure. A group of at least twenty lay believers had to place an application with the local soviet executive committee. The latter had the right of rejecting the petition, but if it approved it, it would forward the petition with its approval to the CROCA, which again had the right to reject it; but if it approved it, it had to forward it to the republican Council of Ministers, which alone had the right to permit and order the reopening or construction of a church. Scrutinising CROCA reports on the number of petitions I have calculated that the time lapse between the first petition and its final approval was between one and three years and that the rate of satisfactory responses to the original petitions varied on the average between 10 and 20 per cent in the best years, that is between 1943 and 1949. 17

On the issue of cadres for the provincial CROCA offices, Molotov ruled that at least in the areas formerly occupied by the enemy NKGB (MGB) officials should be appointed, but that the hiring should be the responsibility of the local party obkom. As to Karpov himself, who was the head of an NKGB department, Molotov advised him to retain that post while heading the CROCA, as long as his NKGB connection remained generally unknown. The question of who was going to pay the provincial CROCA officials' salaries was left open. In conclusion Molotov instructed Karpov to work with Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, on the question of finding a replacement for Metropolitan Nikolai, who in accordance with his own preference would be staying in Moscow to head the Department of External Church Relations with the title of metropolitan of Krutitsy (the patriarch's suffragan for the Moscow province parishes).18

On 19 May 1944 Molotov called Karpov to his office again and asked why the church reopening process varied so much from province to province. Karpov replied there were great discrepancies in the number of applications: most came from the Moscow, Kalinin, Yaroslavl', Ivanovo and Gor'ky provinces; many fewer from Siberia, the Urals and the (lower) Volga areas. In fact in the period in question 29 churches had been reopened while 54 more were under review. Molotov reminded Karpov of the necessity of reopening two Muslim theological schools in Central Asia, and asked whether that issue should be solved immediately or after the creation of the second council (the Council for Religious Cults, in charge of all other religions).

**Words and Deeds**

It would soon transpire that it was the Molotov strategy of putting as many impediments as possible in the way of the recovery of the church that was adopted, and not the strategy implied by Stalin's promises at the 4 September meeting. The government simply wanted to use the church in foreign affairs and for the domestication of newly annexed territories. The Soviet offensive was in full swing, and reconquered
territories contained thousands of functioning churches which had been reopened under enemy occupation. What was going to be their fate? A list of questions submitted by Agitprop to Zhdanov – some originating from local propaganda officials, others obviously reflecting the concerns and uncertainty of the ‘liberated’ population (collected between December 1943 and May 1944) – concentrated to a considerable degree on the new religious policies. Some asked whether the setting up of the council for the Orthodox Church was connected to the alliance with Britain and the USA. Why had churches been closed and destroyed before the war, but were now being reopened? Which policy was the right one? How should antireligious work be conducted now, if at all, and what advice should be given to priests asking about their rights and duties? Should churches which had been used for secular purposes before the war be returned to that use or left as functioning churches? And a final question reflecting total confusion, or perhaps hope: ‘Will there still be Soviet power after the war or will it be like the United States or Britain?’

Rumours were circulating, according to an Agitprop memorandum, that Metropolitan Nikolai’s appointment to the Committee on Fascist Crimes was a return to the tsarist times ‘when metropolitans ruled with tsars’, that the churches were being reopened under pressure from the allies, that exchanges of greetings between the state and church leaders signified the abandonment by the Soviet government of its prewar religious policies, and that religious studies would be reintroduced into school curricula within a year.

The memorandum expressed concern over signs of a genuine religious revival in the country and noted that it was kindling antisoviet feelings: for instance, in a recent women’s religious procession in Penza province participants were shouting: ‘Down with the collective and state farms! Back to private land ownership!’ The memorandum instructed cadres that whatever the patriotic contribution of the clergy may have been during the war

the party and Soviet power have not altered their principled attitude to religion and the church ... especially since the clergy has been making attempts to enhance church influence among the masses ... by preaching that the motherland and the church, Orthodoxy and patriotism are inseparable ... that a nation is strong only as long as it keeps its faith.

The memorandum then explained that in conditions of war it was necessary to come to an accommodation with the church because of ‘its political weight owing to its influence upon the masses ... still having tens of millions of faithful’. Party workers should therefore educate the believers ‘in the true scientific world view’, and draw them away from the church; but ‘crude attacks on religion and the church are particularly intolerable as long as the war lasts ...’. Party workers should explain to the population that the exchanges of greetings between Stalin and the hierarchs occur not because the latter are church officials, but because they are Soviet citizens helping the war effort. As for Soviet religious policies, they will be conducted in accordance with the constitution. (One might ask why the constitution was ignored in the 1930s.)

The memorandum admitted a certain disarray among local party officials who were either taking a completely passive attitude to religion or overreacting by resorting again ‘to crude administrative repression’: for example, by refusing to register a priest, suddenly closing a church, or tearing pectoral crosses from schoolchildren’s necks. The memorandum stressed that

The fundamental duty of local party and state officials ... is to mobilise,
consolidate and move all human resources onto the destruction of the enemy. In these conditions it would be politically wrong to continue antireligious propaganda of the old type. Lectures on such themes as 'religion – the enemy of socialism' ... would now harm the cause of national consolidation, creating conditions of confrontation between the believers and the atheists. This would undermine the power of the nation to fight the enemy.19

The memorandum left no doubt that the current mild religious policies were meant for wartime only and would last only as long as the church could be used by the state as an important political tool. The price paid to the church for its service would be merely toleration and a minimal reopening of churches here and there, as is evident from Karpov's draft notes for a report to Molotov dated 21 August 1945 which include the following statistics: '5770 applications for the opening of churches have been received in 1944–5. Approved 414 cases, rejected 3850, 1506 are under review. There remain 16,795 closed churches in the Union, of which 2953 are not being used for any purpose.'20

There are no further reports on the contents of other visits by Karpov to Molotov, but his undated 1946 memorandum for discussion with Molotov indicated that the visits must have taken place at least once a year. The 1946 memorandum mentioned relations with the Balkan Orthodox Churches: very good with the Romanian Patriarchate but, surprisingly, strained with the Bulgarian and Serbian Churches. In Karpov's opinion the problem was that the ruling metropolitans, Iosif in Serbia and Stefan in Bulgaria, ignored their governments' ministers in charge of relations with the church. Tito and Dimitrov should be contacted on the matter, wrote Karpov. Regarding a petition from the Orthodox archbishop of Lithuania to reopen a seminary in Vilnius, Karpov noted that the CROCA had no objections, but that the Lithuanian government vetoed the proposal. Karpov favoured the approval of Patriarch Aleksi's petition to give subsidies of $30,000 each to the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch, but not to the patriarch of Alexandria, because he had recently complained to Aleksi about persecution of the Orthodox Church in Serbia. In conclusion Karpov asked Molotov how to respond to the invitation he had received from Metropolitan Aleksi, the locum tenens, to take part in a meal in commemoration of the recently deceased Patriarch Sergi. Molotov advised him to attend it and to make a speech. This detail indicated that the initiative for the subsequent 'tradition' of CROCA officials participating in church solemnities came from the church leadership, rather than from the CROCA and the Soviet government as had previously been thought.

These documents provide interesting illustrations of detailed attention paid to church affairs by the second most powerful man in Stalin's Soviet state.21 The other high officials mentioned in Karpov's notes as having given him audience are Voroshilov and Kosygin, both at the time deputy prime ministers of the USSR. (Kosygin simultaneously served as the prime minister of the Russian Republic.) Both treated the church primarily in the foreign policy context. The patriarchate offered to include 20-minute liturgical excerpts in Moscow Radio's external service broadcasts on Sundays. Kosygin considered they should be broadcast only on the days of great religious feasts, not every Sunday, but added that the issue ought to be cleared with Zhdanov (the party's ideological boss). With Voroshilov, such issues were discussed in the context of a foreign currency budget for the patriarchate's work abroad. In an audience on 16 January 1947 Voroshilov insisted on the widest possible use of the
church in foreign affairs, especially in the struggle against the Roman Catholic Church, which according to Voroshilov was ‘much stronger than Hitler’; he thought the Russian church should recruit the Anglican, Lutheran and ‘evangelical’ churches into a common bloc of struggle against Roman Catholicism. Other foreign policy proposals by the CROCA noted immediately after the Kosygin audience included an invitation to the autocephalous Ukrainian bishops in Canada, Teodorovich and Adam, to visit the USSR, and a subsequent delegation to Canada with a subsidy of $4000–5000 to the Ukrainian church there. Apparently nothing came of that project.

The ‘Final Solution’ of the Greek–Catholic Issue

The main role prepared for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine was the absorption of the Uniate or Ukrainian Catholic Church, planned by the Soviet authorities for liquidation even before the war ended. The first visible move was the publication of the article ‘S krestom ili nozhom?’ (‘With the Cross or with a Knife?’) on 8 April 1945 in the Western Ukrainian editions only of Ukrainian newspapers, as well as in all newspapers published solely in Western Ukraine.22

The article described with a fair degree of accuracy the story of the enforcement of the Union on the Ukrainians and Belorussians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Polish rulers who wanted to use it as a means of denationalising and polonising the Ruthenians;23 but then, switching to the twentieth century, the article turned into a vicious and false indictment of the whole Uniate Church and all its leaders as agents of the Vatican and the Nazis destroying the Ukrainian nation. The great leader of the twentieth-century Ukrainian Uniates Metropolitan Sheptyts’ky was presented as a power-greedy opportunist who had at first supported the Nazis but had then begun to switch sides when he saw that the tide of war was turning against them. The article admitted that at the last Uniate Council shortly before his death Sheptyts’ky had condemned the Banderist terrorists and called on his clergy to be loyal to the Soviet regime. Surprisingly, the article also attacked the prominent pro-Orthodox theologian and Uniate priest Havrylo Kostel’nyk, the future head of the Action Group (‘Initsiativnaya gruppa’) for the reunification of the Uniates with the Orthodox Church, as a Nazi collaborator who had ‘sent his two sons to fight in Hitler’s gangs’. In contrast to its treatment of the Vatican and the Uniates the article had only praise for the Orthodox and for those members of the Uniate clergy who had converted to the Orthodox Church and had actively promoted the return to Orthodoxy of the Uniates in the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. The article cited numerous cases of alleged active collaboration with the Nazis by Uniate clergy, contrasting this with the ‘patriotic behaviour ... of the vast majority of the Ukrainian and Russian Orthodox clergy’. The article did not as yet directly suggest abolition of the Uniate Church, but protested against the freedom enjoyed by the Uniate clergy despite their blatant hostility to the Soviet regime, and appealed to the Uniate clergy to follow the example of the Orthodox and support the ‘national’ cause.24

This article must have been published in order to test whether the atmosphere permitted the liquidation of the Uniate Church. Soon after it appeared Khrushchev wrote to Stalin: ‘While in Moscow I informed you about the work completed to demoralise the Uniate Church and to make the Uniate clergy join the Orthodox Church. ... An “action group” has been formed from the ranks of the Uniate clergy.’ Attached to his letter were two letters from the Action Group: one addressed to the Ukrainian Council of People’s Commissars and the other to the Uniate clergy. Khrushchev emphasised that ‘all the documents have been written entirely by the
clericals; our people have not touched them’. Both letters condemned the Union as from its very inception a Polish plot to liquidate the Ruthenians on Polish territory. It was only thanks to the Russian partition of Poland that ‘the Union in Galicia under Austrian control freed itself from the Polish yoke and revived our nation’. Thus according to both appeals Russia had saved the Galician people from disappearance. The character of the Union did not change, however, as in the Carpathian area under Hungarian control it remained an agent of magyarisation. The letter to the Ukrainian government admitted that the Galician clergy feared the Bolsheviks as revolutionary atheists, but then it thanked Stalin for his benevolent attitude and gave assurances of the authors’ full confidence in Soviet power. It concluded with the information that the signatories had formed an Action Group for the reunification of the Uniate Church with the Orthodox Church, asked the government to legitimise them and their activities, and significantly pointed out that in order to prepare people for the conversion they would like to publish certain necessary booklets which had been written and prepared for publication in pre-war Poland, ‘and altogether to carry out the work in such a way as to cause as little struggle and tensions as possible ...’.

The appeal to the Uniate clergy is almost identical to the above, except for a severe criticism of the Uniate Church, which has become an isolated and static body having ‘separated itself by a Chinese wall from our Orthodox brothers’. It pointed out that even before the war Rome and Poland had doomed the Uniate Church to liquidation by on the one hand insisting on clergy celibacy, and on the other establishing within the Polish Roman Catholic Church an Eastern rite for proselytising among the Orthodox and not allowing the Uniate bishops to join the pro-Orthodox movement. The appeal ended, however, with an ominous warning: ‘The government will recognise only the orders of the Action Group and will not recognise any other administrative authority in the Greek-Catholic Church.’ Both letters are dated 28 May 1945, so it is clear that the authors took it for granted that the government would legitimise them and approve the text of their appeal to the clergy. In his letter to Stalin Khrushchev wrote that he had given permission to print special inserts to Ukrainian newspapers for Western Ukraine only. He suggested that the Action Group’s appeal be published in one such insert. Stalin apparently approved the whole enterprise, because a few days later the Ukrainian government officially confirmed the legitimacy of the Action Group and gave it the ‘go ahead’.25

Let us now look at some figures. According to a Ukrainian CROCA report there were 2290 Uniate parishes in Ukraine in 1945 served by 1294 priests on its lists, of whom 859, that is 66 per cent, had joined the Orthodox Church by January 1946. Why is there such a discrepancy between the number of parishes and the number of clergy, when according to official Uniate sources there had been close to 2200 Uniate priests there in 1943? Some may have fled westwards with the Soviet advance, but there must also have been new ordinations in the subsequent two years. If we give the Soviet authorities the benefit of the doubt, the real number of Uniate priests must have been not lower than 2000, and this means that well over 700 priests must have been in Soviet jails and camps by the end of that year. Hence the claim by the Ukrainian CROCA that a majority of the Uniate clergy was in favour of joining the Orthodox Church sounds rather hollow: 859 is barely 43 per cent of 2000.26

An attached letter to the patriarch by Fr Kostel’nyk, the chairman of the Uniate Action Group for reunification with the Orthodox Church, dated 3 October, very cautiously confirms the persecution. Assuring the patriarch of his own sincere devotion to Orthodoxy, Kostel’nyk wrote that hardly fifty Uniate priests had joined the Orthodox Church out of conviction. The others were joining because they saw no
alternative. ‘This does not mean that they are all dedicated papists. Simply, being aware of the Soviet government’s policy, they believe that the Orthodox Church too has no future under that regime.’ ‘Our people,’ wrote Kostel’nyk, ‘having lived under foreign yokes since the fourteenth century, ... have learnt to submit to compulsion only externally while suppressing a hate response, reacting in a particular way when the right moment comes’; and he predicted that at the first opportunity at least a part of those converts would return to the Uniate Church, the strongest incentive being the current ‘martyrdom of the Greek-Catholic Church, for our public interprets the current arrests of bishops and priests as persecution of the Greek-Catholic Church’. In order to prevent an eventual reversion of this kind, Kostel’nyk proposed the following measures. Firstly, to allow the celibate priests to marry before their acceptance into the Orthodox Church. This would preclude their return to the Uniate Church. Secondly, that bishops for Galicia should be chosen from the ranks of the local, formerly Uniate, celibate clergy. They alone would be able to convince their flock that the conversion was an organic act and not one imposed by foreigners. Thirdly, at least in the cities, a majority of priests should be chosen from among those who would have joined the Orthodox Church by conviction rather than by compulsion. Only bishops of local birth would be able to distinguish between those categories. In conclusion he noted that in the nineteenth-century conversions of Belorussians and Ukrainians to Orthodoxy the leaders of the reunification were Uniate bishops and the process was slower. Now, he wrote, everything was being done in too much haste. We may remember that in their appeal to the Ukrainian Soviet government Kostel’nyk’s Action Group asked for permission to publish literature preparing the Uniates for conversion to Orthodoxy. That permission, apparently, was not granted. Uniates simply woke up one day as ‘Orthodox’ and had to accept the fact. And in the long run Kostel’nyk’s prophecy came true.

In contrast, in his letter to Karpov of 7 December 1945 the patriarch mentioned no persecutions. Optimistically he reported that the Action Group had succeeded in reunifying over 800 Uniate priests with Orthodoxy by 3 December, ‘and the flock follow their pastors’. According to the patriarch Kostel’nyk planned in the near future to convocate diocesan conferences at which a general return to the Orthodox Church would take place. The patriarch emphasised that such conferences (which had not even been mentioned in Kostel’nyk’s letter) would assure the participants that the reunification was their own decision, not some violent act by Moscow. Moreover, if general reunification occurred via those conferences there would be no more need for a local council. The Ukrainian Orthodox Exarchate should make it clear that Uniate parishes could join the Orthodox Church without reference to the intermediary Action Group, by applying directly to the exarchate (in Kiev). All Uniate clergy would be accepted in their current rank. Celibates would have to remain celibates, and all local Uniate traditions and rituals could be retained, except, of course, the filioque. Naturally, prayers for the pope would be replaced by those for the Orthodox episcopate, Latin-Catholic feasts which had no parallel in the Orthodox Church would be dropped, and the Paschal cycle must be celebrated according to Orthodox rules.27

The next document is a telegram from the L’vov Council (Sobor), which took place from 8 to 10 March 1946. It reported the decision of 202 delegates to rejoin the Orthodox Church. Two days later the Action Group sent a telegram to Stalin on behalf of 216 (sic!) council delegates thanking him for the reunification of the whole Ukrainian nation. Other cables were sent to Patriarchs Aleksi and Maximos of Constantinople, to Metropolitan-Exarch Ioann of Kiev, and to Khrushchev. The archives
also contain an unremarkable speech by the Ukrainian exarch at the closure of the council. What was not mentioned was the canonical irregularity of a council without bishops of the given religion. True, Pel'vets'ky and Mel'nyk of the Action Group had been consecrated bishops shortly before the council, but they were Orthodox bishops presiding over a council of clergy who were still Uniate.28

After the council Kostel'nyk wrote an address to the Canadian Ukrainians on behalf of the council, assuring them that the reunification with Orthodoxy was an organic process, having begun with the return to Orthodoxy of the Uniates in the USA at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries, and continuing in Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia) between the wars and among the Polish Lemkos in the 1920s. As to the Uniate Church, he emphasised that its fate had been sealed in a concordat between the Vatican and the Polish government in 1925, according to which Uniate dioceses were to be headed by regular Polish Latin bishops. Under the auspices of that agreement the Polish government refused to allow Uniate clergy to take care of those Orthodox Ukrainians and Belorussians whose churches were being closed by force by the Polish state in its general persecution of the Orthodox Church in the 1930s.29

There were still Uniates to be dealt with in Carpathian Ruthenia. Its eastern part was annexed to Ukraine from Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. A good many Carpatho-Ruthenians had returned to the Orthodox Church in the early part of this century, and so before the war there was an Orthodox diocese there under the Serbian Patriarchate. In the above-mentioned session with Karpov Kosygin suggested that in the absence of any response from the Serbian Patriarchate to an enquiry from the Moscow Patriarchate,30 a Russian Orthodox bishop should be appointed to Mukachevo, who should then get busy transferring the local Uniates to the Orthodox Church.31

If the internal secret reports of P. V. Lintur, a special plenipotentiary for religious cults in Carpatho-Ukraine, are to be believed, the Soviet authorities still had no unified policy on the Uniate Church there as late as the spring of 1946. According to him, after the victorious end of the war Uniates there were joining the Orthodox Church en masse; but for some reason the local communist authorities and even the procuracy were supporting the Uniates. He cited cases where whole villages voted to join the Orthodox Church but the procuracy and the local communist party organisation returned the ecclesiastical properties to the Uniates. Sumptuous Uniate clergy residences and huge estates remained untouched; but as soon as an estate passed into Orthodox hands with the conversion of the community, the properties would be confiscated and distributed to so-called ‘heroes of the antifascist struggle’.32

Soon, however, instead of leaving the process to its own inertia, the Soviet authorities began to use intimidation and force to put an end to the Uniate Church there as well. Subsequent reports began to indicate little success by the local Orthodox clergy in their attempts to convert Uniate priests by conviction: only fourteen Uniate priests joined the Orthodox Church. Numerous Uniate churches, including the main Uzhgorod diocesan cathedral, were taken away from the Uniates by the Soviet authorities in 1947 and handed over to the Orthodox. Apparently such acts meant that propaganda by the Uniate bishop Romzha that the Orthodox were NKVD agents began falling on fertile soil. The CROCA agent advised that pressure be increased on the Uniate Church, and that all churches that had once been Orthodox should then be confiscated from the Uniates, the Uniate seminary closed, tax benefits withdrawn from the income of the Uniate Church, the church’s most valuable properties nationalised, and a massive campaign launched in the Soviet media to unmask the pro-
fascist activity of the Uniate Church.

This report found full approval in Moscow, including the suggestion of the Orthodox bishop of Mukachevo, Nestor, to establish an Orthodox missionary brotherhood specialising in returning the Uniates to Orthodoxy. Karpov suggested the publication of a mass-circulation brochure on the subject of the Greek-Catholic Church during the Second World War. Karpov proposed that all 47 Uniate monks should be concentrated in a single monastery, and the other three closed; that the Uniate seminary with its 40 students should be closed and replaced with an Orthodox pastoral school with 50 students; that Roman clergy should be forbidden to minister to the Uniates and vice versa; and that all missionary visits by Uniate clergy without special permission from the CROCA official in each particular case should be banned. In contrast, the Orthodox clergy should be allowed freely to organise visits and lectures to Uniate clergy and laity, to locate Orthodox sympathisers among the Uniate clergy and laity and activate them, and eventually to establish an Orthodox seminary.33 It may be noted that no such rights and activities were allowed to the Orthodox clergy or laity in the historically Orthodox parts of the Soviet state.

On 27 October 1947 the Uniate Bishop Romzha, while returning from the consecration of a village church in a horse-drawn trap, was crushed to death by a Soviet armoured vehicle. On 28 August 1949 the liquidation of the Uniate Church was officially announced at an episcopal celebration of the Assumption in Mukachevo.34 There still remained the Uniate Church in Slovakia, predominantly in the western part of Carpathian Ruthenia, so-called Pryashevs’ka Rus’, where some 20 per cent of the population belonged to the Orthodox Church of Carpatho-Ruthenia under the Serbian Patriarchate. There had been two other Orthodox dioceses in Czechoslovakia: the Czechoslovak Orthodox Church consisting of Czech converts to Orthodoxy and led by a Bishop Gorazd directly under the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and a Russian emigre diocese led by Archbishop Sergi, under the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Russian Exarchate of Paris. Bishop Gorazd was executed by the Nazis in 1942 and his diocese disbanded after he was found to have been hiding Czech communist partisans who had killed Heydrich, the Nazi Gauleiter of Prague. In 1946 the Moscow Patriarchate consolidated all these groups into its Exarchate of Czechoslovakia. After the liquidation of the Uniate Church in the Prešov diocese in 1950 and its merging with the Orthodox Church the latter was granted autocephaly in 1951.35

Thus the Moscow Patriarchate was used for the purpose of bringing Orthodox churches beyond Soviet borders under its direct control or at least into its sphere of influence. One of its first objectives was to bring back under its jurisdiction those parts of the Orthodox diaspora which had their origins either in the Russian Church itself or in that church’s missionary activities before the Bolshevik revolution. These included the missionary churches in Japan and China, the missionary Metropolitanate of America, and the two Russian emigre church administrations, one under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople headed by Metropolitan Yevlogi in Paris, and the other the so-called Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, better known as the ‘Karlovtsian’ church after the Serbian city in which it had been located from 1921 to 1943. Finally there were the autocephalous and autonomous Orthodox Churches of Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, which had appeared when those areas gained political independence after the Bolshevik victory in Russia. The separate existence of the Latvian and Estonian Orthodox Churches, as well as of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, reestablished under the German occupation, ended with the reoccupation of those territories by the Soviet
Army, although by the autumn of 1944 at least 94 autocephalous parishes were trying to resist incorporation into the Moscow Patriarchate, motivating their stand by their desire to have services in Ukrainian. They were informed, however, that the Moscow Patriarchate did not oppose the use of Ukrainian in church services. The last report on the autocephalists in the archives (September 1944) mentions the arrest by the NKGB of the three main autocephalist leaders in Dnepropetrovsk and the seizing of a cache of antisovent materials.36

Under pressure from the nationalistic interwar Polish government the Orthodox Church of Poland had broken with the Moscow Patriarchate and received autocephaly in 1924 from the Ecumenical Patriarchate uncanonically, that is without first securing a canonical release from the mother church. It received a charter of autocephaly from the Moscow Patriarchate in 1948.37

In the areas outside the control of the Soviet government, however, the Moscow Patriarchate’s efforts were much less successful. In the Russian diaspora it persuaded only a small minority of parishes and clergy in North America and Western Europe to break away from the mainline diaspora church structures. In Japan the local Orthodox Missionary Archdiocese had been transferred to the Russian Orthodox Metropolia in the USA. As to China, Patriarch Alexis obviously wanted to nativise the so-called Peking Orthodox Mission on the Japanese model, by recalling the last Russian emigre bishop from there in 1955 and appointing the first native Chinese bishop (consecrated five years earlier) as the head of the autonomous Chinese Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate.38 After the departure of almost all Russian emigres from Manchuria and China, however, the fledgling Chinese Orthodox Church appears to have been too weak to survive Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’; and very little has been heard of it since.

All attempts by the Moscow Patriarchate to bring the Orthodox Church of Finland back under its wing failed despite the considerable postwar Soviet political influence in Finland.

The Church in Postwar External Politics

There was a glaring discrepancy between Stalin’s promises to the metropolitans and the much more restrained and restraining position of Molotov and Kosygin; yet it would be naive to conclude that Stalin was friendlier to the church than his lieutenants and that the subsequent restraining and repressive church policies were carried out without Stalin’s knowledge. Had that been the case, the patriarch would have addressed himself to Stalin over his subordinates’ heads. For instance, he could have complained at least about the bureaucratic clumsiness, undue slowness and frequent refusals on the issue of reopening churches in the audience which he and Metropolitan Nikolai were granted by Stalin on 10 April 1945. The absence of grievances presented by the church leadership to Stalin is a clear indicator that all policies were closely coordinated with Stalin and that the patriarch was aware of the fact that Stalin had no intention of fulfilling all his promises of 4 September 1943. Through Karpov’s eyes Stalin was closely watching the life of the church, as is apparent from Karpov’s regular secret reports sent straight to Stalin, Molotov and Beria of church attendance across the country, especially at Easter.39

The audience granted by Stalin to the patriarch on 10 April 1945 surely dealt with foreign policy. It was no coincidence that both had their foreign ministers at the meeting: Molotov and Metropolitan Nikolai of Krutitsy who had become the head of
the External Church Relations department of the patriarchate. I shall allow myself a quotation from one of my earlier publications which remains valid until any documents modifying it are found:

On May 28 Patriarch Aleksi departed on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, no doubt on Stalin's approval or even instigation during the recent meeting. This was the first ever pilgrimage of a Russian Patriarch to the Holy Land, and it was at least as much political as religious. The purpose was obviously to impress the non-communist world that the Russian Church was genuine and free, i.e. that the Soviet State had changed for the better. ...

On the way back from the Holy Land the Patriarch visited Egypt and the Patriarch of Alexandria. There an emigre Russian parish joined the Moscow Patriarchate. From Egypt he proceeded to Beirut, where he met the Patriarch of Antioch. ... Throughout the visit he was received by heads of states and other political and religious dignitaries.

But Metropolitan Nikolai did not return with the Patriarch. He made an official visit to Great Britain (a return visit to the Anglican Church), where he gave a speech at the University of London on fascism as the greatest foe of humanity, Christianity and civilisation. At a reception in York, the host, the Archbishop of York, dancing to the latest tune from Moscow, attacked the Vatican as a common enemy of the Orthodox and Anglican Churches, and claimed that theologically the latter two Churches were almost identical to each other. ... Metropolitan Nikolai was received by King George VI at Buckingham Palace. He also officiated and preached at the local Russian Orthodox Church which had just joined the Moscow Patriarchate following its patron, Metropolitan Evlogii [Yevlogi] of Paris and Western Europe. 40

Ecumenism and Peace Campaigns

Here I do not intend to repeat what has already been written by such scholars as William Fletcher on the foreign propaganda use of the Moscow Patriarchate by the Soviet government. 41 My purpose is to present some archival documents confirming that which has hitherto been deduced by scholars from circumstantial evidence. These documents also provide additional details. Thus secret 1946 reports of the so-called 'White TASS' available only to Soviet leaders and the more trusted Soviet media personnel indicate considerable interest in and concern with the nascent World Council of Churches (at the time often termed the Ecumenical Council or Ecumenical Movement).

A report of 4 March carried the information that the General Secretary of the Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches had declared that the WCC would study the religious situation in Russia and that the committee had adopted a resolution calling for an end to forced repatriation of refugees. The aim of the WCC, according to TASS, 'is to form a unified front of Protestant and Orthodox churches', and it pointed out that all three of the Russian Orthodox diaspora churches as well as the Ecumenical Patriarchate were participating in the movement. 42

Preceding the TASS report by some 40 days was a memorandum on the WCC from Patriarch Aleksi to Karpov (23 January) in which he expressed his view that although the late Patriarch Sergi had refused to participate in the ecumenical move-
ment before the war the time was now ripe to get involved and use it for the good of the Russian Orthodox Church. 'The Anglican Church believes that without the participation of the whole Orthodox Church the aims of the movement will remain unattainable', the patriarch stated, stressing that by the Orthodox Church the Anglicans meant primarily the Russian Orthodox Church, without which the fate of the movement, they said, would be tragic. His plan was 'to take advantage of the weakness of the Anglican Church and of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's loss of authority in the Orthodox world' in order 'to raise the authority of the Russian church'. Using this momentum 'the Moscow Patriarchate must gather the whole Orthodox diaspora, including the churches of Poland and Finland', under its omophorion. It is necessary '... to take into our hands the initiative of forming a single Slavonic or Balkan Orthodox movement which would speak with a single voice in defence of Orthodoxy at ecumenical conferences ...'.

The patriarch thus seized on the WCC as a means of gaining international support and the prominence necessary to survive in the hostile communist world. To convince Karpov of the usefulness of the Russian church's participation in the WCC he had to dress it in terms advantageous to the Soviet authorities. He wrote, for example, that pressure could be brought to bear via friendly Anglicans to expel all the Russian emigre churches and theologians from the ecumenical movement. Similarly, with Russian prodding, the Anglicans could bring pressure to bear on the London exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to convince him to revoke the charters of autocephaly granted to the Polish Orthodox Church and of autonomy to the Finnish Orthodox Church. Should the Moscow Patriarchate fail to achieve these aims the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the WCC would be that of an observer. In case of success, the church should enter the movement as a full member, on the condition, however, that Orthodox doctrines would not be a subject of deliberation. 'The first act of the Russian church as a member would be to call a World Assembly of Peace,' wrote Aleksi. 'Religion and the United Nations have the same aim: to achieve peaceful life and welfare for the people.'

Apparently in response to an undated letter from Dr Geoffrey Fisher, the archbishop of Canterbury, to Metropolitan Nikolai begging the Russian church to enter the WCC, on 18 June 1946 the patriarch sent two priests to Western Europe on a two-month fact-finding mission. The archives contain a memorandum by one of these priests, Grigori Razumovsky, on his return from Geneva. It is a strange and interesting mixture of political intrigue and genuine theological and missionary concerns. The Moscow Patriarchate ought to subordinate to its sphere of influence all Slavonic patriarchates, as well as the Antiochan, Georgian and Jacobite Churches, thus taking the place of the Second Rome (Constantinople). Moving on to missionary concerns Razumovsky compliments the WCC for undertaking missions to Jews and pagans, and asks a rhetorical question: Should not the Russian Church concern itself with the christianisation of Japanese prisoners of war, so that they will return home as enlightened Christian missionaries? He suggests that the Russian clergy in Manchuria, fluent in Japanese, should be used for the purpose. In the same key Razumovsky has words of praise for the bishop of Chichester's address of forgiveness to the German Roman Catholics; and he criticises the Russian church's hostility towards the Roman Catholics: 'Our differences are our grief', he writes, and suggests that the Orthodox Church should begin its reconciliation with the Roman Catholic Church by extending friendship to the Roman Catholics of the Baltic republics and of Carpathian Ruthenia. The conditions of entry to the WCC suggested by Razumovsky do not differ from Patriarch Aleksi's: the same exclusion
of emigre clergy and theologians, and particularly of all ‘products of the St Serge Paris Theological Institute’. Should these conditions not be fulfilled the church would not even consider joining the WCC. In conclusion, Razumovsky repeats that the Russian Orthodox Church must become the centre and leader of the whole Orthodox oikoumene. This is expected of it by all local Orthodox churches, as well as Copts and Jacobites, he claims. ‘It must unify in its bosom all Orthodox churches.’

Patriarch Aleksi, dwelling on the theme of making the Moscow Patriarchate the world centre of Orthodoxy, in a letter to Karpov of 13 January 1947 proposes to convocate a pan-Orthodox Council (Sobor) in Moscow in October of the same year to discuss the Roman Catholic and the ecumenical issues and to devise a common Orthodox policy on both subjects. He uses this proposal to press for the return of all the buildings of the Trinity–St Sergius Monastery and at least one church in Moscow to the Russian Orthodox Church. Such a pan-Orthodox assembly finally met in 1948 on occasion of the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the Russian church; but it fell far short of the Moscow Patriarchate’s expectations. Constantinople reminded Moscow that convoking pan-Orthodox consultations and councils was the sole prerogative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. No Greek patriarch came to the autocephaly celebration. Such a grandiose celebration of the event was in itself a slight to Constantinople: Russian autocephaly came about in 1448 in the form of a break with Constantinople in consequence of the latter’s submission to the papacy at the Council of Florence. Thus the celebration was a reminder to the Orthodox churches of Constantinople’s theological unreliability and weakness, and of the Orthodox steadfastness of the Russians. The Greek clergy who did come agreed to participate only in liturgical celebrations, not in the theological conference, which therefore became not an inter-Orthodox forum but a politicised meeting of churches with communist governments. The fact that the WCC had failed to meet the Moscow Patriarchate’s conditions – the emigres were not expelled – was at least one of the causes of its entry being delayed until 1961. The failure with the WCC and of the 1948 celebrations, as well as the Moscow Patriarchate’s failure to entice the Orthodox diaspora churches into its jurisdiction, undoubtedly dealt a blow to the church’s importance in Stalin’s eyes as a factor in his international politics, although Metropolitan Nikolai did his best to prove his and his church’s usefulness to Soviet foreign policies by multiple speeches at world peace congresses condemning the Americans as aggressors in Korea and levelling against them fantastic accusations such as that they had carried out bacteriological experiments on Korean women and children and organised mass incinerations of the Korean population. Neither he nor Stalin believed these accusations and Stalin may have been sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate that they were so grotesque as to be almost harmless. In short, instead of playing the role of a world religious leader, which if successful would have forced the Soviet authorities to treat the church with as much respect as Stalin did in 1943, it became merely a secondary tool of Soviet foreign policy; useful, but not so vital as to force the Soviet government to modify its internal policies towards the church. What is more, the Cold War was now firmly established, and Stalin was practising increasing isolationism – foreign policy itself, and particularly its propaganda aspect, were becoming matters of secondary importance to him.

It was therefore no coincidence that 1948 saw the last opening of a new seminary (Saratov). Thereafter all pleas to open seminaries were rejected. Antireligious propaganda was considerably enhanced and before the end of 1949 a net decline in the number of operating churches set in. Needless to say, Razumovsky’s proposal of
Christian mission among Japanese prisoners of war fell on totally deaf ears: the last thing the communist regime wanted was to spread the Gospel message, albeit among the Japanese!

The Role of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs and Soviet Internal Religious Policies

The scope of activities allowed the church on the internal front was of course incomparably narrower than on the international scene. As the war was drawing to its end an Agitprop conference under the chairmanship of Shcherbakov on 31 March 1944 criticised the laxity of antireligious work, and particularly that of the press in Ukraine which, according to Aleksandrov, gave too much prominence to the clergy. The conference resolved to reactivate the ideological offensive in accordance with 'the works of Lenin and Stalin'.

Subsequent CROCA documents, particularly reports from regional offices and Karpov's so-called 'instructional letters', bear ample witness to the role of that organisation as a watchdog and supreme authority over the church, a role wholly inconsistent with Stalin's 'warnings' to Karpov during the 1943 encounter not to think of himself as 'chief procurator'. In his exchanges with regional officials Karpov formulated the functions of the CROCA as 'the preservation of normal relations between the church and the state and their improvement for the good of the Motherland'. Already in 1944 Karpov was taking a negative view of large numbers of children attending church services and was criticising the 'demonstrative' wearing of pectoral crosses. He suggested that such practices should be countered by explanatory work, but warned this was not a function of CROCA officials. He was constantly warning against any overt involvement of CROCA officials in internal church matters as undermining the appearance of the church as free and independent. Bishops should be used as a screen between the CROCA and the church, always camouflaging CROCA orders as originating from the church administration. In 1927 Tuchkov, the OGPU official in charge of church affairs in the prewar period, had made similar requirements of Metropolitan Kirill (Smirnov) as a condition for his acceptance by the Soviet government as patriarch. Kirill had refused to play the game and had gone back to prison, where he perished around 1941.

There are many complaints by CROCA officials about the churches' engagement in charity. Karpov categorically forbade any direct charitable activity by the churches, although collections made in churches for the war effort (and apparently for the postwar reconstruction) were acceptable as long as they were handed over to the appropriate Soviet foundations and not passed on directly to the recipients. Already in 1944 there appear reports of closure of individual churches in the formerly occupied territories and their 'return' to their prewar users: factories, clubs, collective farm enterprises and so on. Local CROCA officials approving such acts refer to a CROCA 'instruction for its plenipotentiaries' permitting such acts if the churches in question were reopened under enemy occupation. In some cases, in return for a church building confiscated from a parish, the latter was handed a civilian house or a plot of land and materials to build one. This practice was to become quite widespread in the later years of renewed religious repression, and the reason behind such a seemingly absurd policy was clearly to minimise the aesthetic attraction of the church.

CROCA complaints about bishops were of two kinds. First, they complained that some bishops were afraid to make any decisions by themselves: even in cases of
clergy appointments some bishops, like Kirill Pospelov of Tashkent, would send the candidate to the CROCA plenipotentiary, who would respond that such decisions belonged to the bishop, not to him. Secondly, they complained about the ‘antisoviet’ bishops and priests who criticised Marxist atheistic ideology in their sermons and preached that the Soviet government, being militantly atheistic in its philosophy, would always remain in confrontational relations with the church. Into this category fell, for example, Luka Voino-Yasenetsky, the famous surgeon and archbishop, and Bishop Aleksi of Yaroslavl’. Priests continued to complain about unbearably high taxes, which they would not be able to pay if their parishioners did not give them the necessary funds. The Omsk CROCA plenipotentiary reported antisoviet statements by several local priests prompted by crushing taxes. In September 1944, in addition to a monthly income tax of 2400 roubles, each priest was ordered to pay an additional 57,000 roubles by 15 December. ‘As long as the Soviet regime exists’, one priest is quoted as saying, ‘religion will always be persecuted … [Now it] is strangling the church through back-breaking taxes.’ Strangulation by taxation did not spare even such notables as the patriarchate’s head of external church relations, Metropolitan Nikolai, described by the CROCA as a patriot who as early as 1941, when in retreat from Ukraine with the Red Army, appealed to the population of Ukraine to struggle against the Nazis. In a 1948 letter to Shvernik, the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Metropolitan Nikolai reported that the salary he received as the head of the Moscow provincial diocese was taxed at the same rate as that of any Soviet employee (13 per cent), while the 50,000-rouble annual salary for his pastoral work was taxed, in accordance with Article 19, on the whole sum, although he donated 30,000 of that salary every year to the war orphans’ fund. Thus, of the remaining 20,000 he was forced to pay 19,000 in taxes; in other words he was being penalised for charity.

Even in these ‘best of times’ for the church in the postwar era it continued to be treated as a sort of plague-bearing organism that ought to be isolated in a ghetto in order to keep Soviet society safe from religious contamination. There are two characteristic comments by Karpov to this effect. In March 1944 a 23-year-old grand-nephew of Ostrovsky, the famous Russian playwright, paid him a visit proposing to form a Union of Christian Youth. He told Karpov that most young people thought that the Soviet government had allowed the election of the patriarch only because Aleksi had so vigorously collected donations for the war effort and that the new seminaries were a trap where the students were secret Komsomol agents. Moreover, there were Christian youth movements everywhere in the West, even in Nazi Germany; it would be expected in the West that such a movement should exist in Russia too. Thus a patriotic Christian youth movement in Russia would dispel suspicions regarding the revived church and its schools at home and increase credence for the church abroad, as well as helping to bring up young people as responsible patriots and good Christians. In the same month he was visited by a 52-year-old engineer who asked for permission to establish a philosophical society. As Karpov remarked, both proposals were ‘naturally’ rejected; he described both visitors as seemingly psychotic. The logic here is simple: according to Marx, man’s consciousness is determined by the environment; both persons have received an atheistically-based higher education in an atheistic environment; yet they believe in God. They are therefore abnormal. A case illustrative of the same mentality occurred in the early 1950s. Patriarch Aleksi wrote to the rector of Kazan’ University asking him to donate to the library of the Moscow Theological Academy any duplicates of theological works in their library, which had absorbed the library of the prerevolutionary
Kazan’ theological academy and seminary. Instead of responding directly to the letter, the rector wrote to Karpov that the university library was prepared to satisfy the patriarch’s request on the condition that no representatives of the theological school or of the patriarchate were present at the transaction. The university would deal only with the CROCA. On another occasion, an offer by the patriarchate to give public concerts by church choirs, with 50 per cent of the income from ticket sales going to funds for war invalids, was rejected by Kosygin in principle. Kosygin agreed with Karpov that unused churches should not be utilised as workshops or warehouses. Immediately following the Kosygin audience a note on other CROCA proposals included giving the church a limited legal person status, enabling it to acquire vehicles and workshops to produce church utensils and to rent, build and purchase houses — but not churches.

In an audience with Voroshilov Karpov reported that the reborn theological academies had introduced several philosophy disciplines into their curricula. The issue was raised because the decree of 23 January 1918 banned the teaching of any subjects in theological schools that did not directly relate to the professional functions of the future pastors. Voroshilov’s response is not recorded. However, he agreed with Karpov that the church’s plea for the return of saints’ relics from museums should be ignored. Both decided on behalf of the church that reverence of relics should be discouraged as superstition. Two issues remained unresolved: the CROCA’s proposal to discontinue any church donations to the war effort since the war had ended; and its suggestion that the state should provide building materials for the restoration of even those historically and architecturally valuable churches which were in church use. Among other problems listed by the CROCA was the frequent appointment by provincial governments of old, semi-literate invalids as local CROCA officials. The CROCA proposed that their appointment could be left with the provincial government but the choice of personnel ought to be coordinated with the central CROCA.

A major scandal occurred in 1946. A proposal by the Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan to give donations to war orphans through the MOPR state charity organisation was accepted by the latter and the local branch of MOPR publicly thanked the Alma-Ata diocese for its generosity. In a report to Malenkov the chairman of the MOPR Central Committee described the donations as an ‘act of provocation on the part of the church’. A member of the MOPR presidium was sent to Alma-Ata. All church donations were stopped and the chairwoman of the Alma-Ata MOPR chapter, Ivanova, lost her job.

There were frequent reports of acts of violence against churches and believers. According to reports from the Kiev provincial CROCA it was quite common for local collective farm chairmen to lead bunches of hooligans in attacks on churches holding services. In one case a military officer intervened and threw the assailants out of the church. Some provocateurs raised panic by shouting ‘Fire!’ during the Easter vigil in a rural church in Ivanovo province when the church, with room for 300 people, was packed with over 1000. In the subsequent stampede two women and one 13-year-old girl were crushed to death and 20,000 roubles stolen from the church treasury.

Hostility towards the church and fear of any contacts with it characterised the generation which had come of age at the height of the activities of the League of the Militant Godless. They perceived the relaxation of official religious policy as only a temporary respite, and the return to a policy of militant atheism and of new assault on religion under Khrushchev came to them naturally, as a restoration of normality. That
generation had to depart from active life and the communist system had to end in complete bankruptcy before the general public could register a change of heart towards religion and the church.

Notes and References

1 Deputy Commissar for Internal Affairs P. D. Kobulov, 1–2 October 1942. Rossiisky tsentr khrenaniya i issledovaniya dokumentov noveishei istorii (RTsKhIDNI), f.5/17, op. 6, d. 93, 1.28, film 1360.

2 His paper on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Fr Alexander Schmemann Memorial Conference organised by the ‘Memorial’ Society, St Petersburg, May 1993.

3 Karpov was a major-general of the NKVD, apparently in charge of the department overseeing the church at least since 1941. According to documents, as head of the Pskov province NKVD in 1937–38 Karpov ‘had brutally violated socialist legality, carried out mass arrests of innocent citizens, used perverted methods of investigation, and falsified defendants’ depositions ... in 1941 Karpov was recalled to the central NKVD offices in Moscow ...’. ‘O vypolnenii poruchenii TsK KPSS’, Izvestiya TsK KPSS, no. 11, 1989, p. 52.

4 Karpov’s report on the meeting, Gosudarstvenny Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), fond 6991c, op. 1a, delo 1, list 1.

5 ibid. The Synod ceased to exist by virtue of the arrest of most of its members.

6 Russia connotes an imperial concept, irrespectively of religion. Rus’ is the historical common name and origin for all three East Slavonic Orthodox nations.

7 GARF, f.6991c, op.1c, d.5, 1.1. None of the names figures in Regel’son’s list of bishops who had broken with Metropolitan Sergi; but judging by Manuil’s biographies of bishops all the listed bishops were men of great moral integrity and most were outstanding spiritual leaders. See: M. Manuil, Die russischen orthodoxen Bischofe: Bio-Bibliographie (edited by Martin George, M. Agurskij and F. von Lilienfeld) (Oikonomia, Erlangen, 1979–86) vols. I–V passim and vol. V, pp. 192–94; Lev Regel’son, Tragediya russkoi tserkvi (YMCA-Press, Paris, 1977), pp. 559–608.

8 This was the individual who replaced the Cult Commissions (‘Komissii po kul’tam’) which according to M. Odintsov were abolished in April 1938. See his ‘Khozhdeniye po mukam’, Nauka i religiya (Moscow), no. 7, April 1990, p. 57.

9 It is important to remember this, as that right would be removed from the clergy by the amendments to the by-laws imposed on the church in 1961.

10 This is another point worth remembering, in view of the refusal by Karpov’s Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church to permit any further opening of theological seminaries after 1948 and the removal of clergy control over the material resources of parishes and dioceses in 1961.

11 A brief report did indeed appear there on 5 September stating that Stalin had received the named metropolitanians the previous day and that it had been decided at the meeting to convocate a church council (sobor).


14 In 1962 the deposed Karpov would be attacked for that speech on the grounds that he had been advocating an active role for the church in alliance with the state in constructing the new Soviet society. See Odintsov’s compilation of GARF documents (F.6991, op.1, d.2039, 11.241–42): ‘Pis’ma i dialogi vremen “khrushchevskoi ottepeli”’, Otechestvennaya istoriya, no. 5, September–October 1994, p. 80.

15 According to Anatoli Levitin that process was aided by the NKGB, which after 1943 completely isolated all the remaining renovationist bishops from each other and from their leader, Metropolitan Aleksandr Vvedensky, by preventing the latter’s letters and telegrams
from reaching his addressees and vice versa. This led all his peripheral clergy to return to the Moscow Patriarchate via repentance, and by 1945 Vvedensky remained the only serving renovationist bishop, with a single church in Moscow (St Pimen) at his disposal. Anatoliy Levitin, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi tserkovnoi smuty* (3 vols) (Institut Glaube in der 2 Welt, Küsnacht, Switzerland, 1978), vol. 3, pp. 396–400.


17 In some cases the fulfilment rate of the petitions was as low as seven per cent – for example in Ryazan’ province, where 150 petitions were received, but only ten approved by the end of 1944, although the total number of closed churches was 765, of which 117 were not being used for any purpose. In at least one case, that of Astrakhan’ province, the local CROCA chief was severely reprimanded for having approved 85 per cent of petitions. But even final approval did not mean the immediate fulfilment of a request. Thus Karpov reprimanded local CROCA officials for ignoring approvals for church reopenings by the central CROCA. See GARF, f.6991s, op.1a, d.7, 11.35–37. For overall assessment and statistics on church applications and responses, see *doc. cit.*, d.6, 11.1–35; dd. 8–10, passim.


20 GARF, *cit.*, 11.32 and 38.

21 *ibid.*, 11.50–54.

22 The author of the article was Yaroslav Galan, writing under the pseudonym V. Rosovych. See: Litvin, the CPU Agitprop department secretary reporting to G. Aleksandrov, 19 April 1945, in RTsKhIDNI, f.17, op.125, d.313, 11.17–26. This report summarises reactions to the article. Masses of people queued up for it; copies that were stuck on notice boards were often torn down by angry mobs. The comments of West Ukrainian scholars (‘academicians’) cited in the report mostly criticised the article for its unfairness towards Sheptyts’ky. Professor Krypyakevych pointed out that Sheptyts’ky had opposed Vatican policies and spoke of the necessity to unite with the Orthodox Church in order to be one with the rest of Ukraine. Academician Shkurat added that Sheptyts’ky was consistent in his actions in that direction: he was moving further and further ‘from the Uniate Church, from the Vatican and in the direction of Kiev. The whole Uniate clergy opposed that movement and called him a “madman”.’ Allegedly, Kostel’nyk publicly called Sheptyts’ky a psychotic in one of his sermons. However, a Dr Derhach disagreed and stated that Kostel’nyk had stated that as soon as the war ended he would ‘declare war on Slipyi and work for the reunification with the Orthodox Church’. The cited scholars condemned Slipyi as an agent of the Vatican and a Nazi collaborator. Pointing at the inaccuracies in the article, Academician Kollessa stressed that even as early as 1920 the Polish government and the Roman Catholic Church distrusted Sheptyts’ky, keeping him under detention outside L’vov. Rome was dissatisfied with Sheptyts’ky – this must have been already in the 1940s – and the pope allegedly ‘blessed Slipyi to be the metropolitan even while the “mentally ill” Sheptyts’ky was still alive’. He stressed that Kostel’nyk had been Sheptyts’ky’s close collaborator in promoting the Orthodox cause before 1939. The war allegedly prevented the realisation of their hopes.

23 The Soviet data are from GARF, *cit.*, 11.107–28. The Uniate source is Osyp Zinkevych and Rev. Taras Lonchyna (eds.), *Martyrologiya ukraïns’kykh tserkov, tom II: Ukrain’s’ka...*
Stalin’s Church Policy (1942–1948) 161

Katolyts’ka Tserkva (Smoloskyp, Toronto, 1985), pp. 56–57. The list of clergy and parishes there is given by diocese, including the Peremyshl’ (Przemysl) diocese of which at least one half (including the city of Przemysl) remained in Poland. Comparing the total figure of parishes in that list with the CROCA figure for Soviet territory alone and then juxtaposing it with the number of clergy given in the Uniate source, I achieved a figure of at least 2180 priests in Soviet Ukraine (not counting Carpathian Rus’) in 1943 for 2290 parishes.

27 GARF, cit., op.1c, d.32, 11.71–72.
28 GARF, cit., 11.131–86.
29 L’viv (L’vov), 9 October 1946, ibid., 11.203–7.
30 GARF, cit., d.1, 11.33–42.

According to a CROCA report, the one million-strong population of Soviet Carpatho-Ukraine consisted in 1946 of 62 per cent Uniates, 17 per cent Orthodox, 12 per cent Jews, 6 per cent Roman Catholics and 2 per cent Hungarian Reformed. By 1947 there were 75 Uniate parishes served by 252 priests and 175 Orthodox parishes served by 135 priests. The report pointed out that the mass return of the Carpatho-Ruthenians to Orthodoxy had begun in 1920 and that two years later 140 parishes had come over to Orthodoxy, but that then an agreement was reached between the Vatican and the Czechoslovak government according to which all church buildings constructed by the Uniates had to be restored to them, even if the whole village had converted to Orthodoxy. Consequently the Orthodox lost most of their churches and had to build new ones. By the 1930s they had 104 mostly newly-built churches with 140,000 faithful and 200 monastics. GARF, cit., d.32, 11.34–64.

32 Report of May 1946, GARF, cit., d.32, 11.34–44.
33 It should be noted that no Orthodox seminary was in fact established there under Soviet control.
36 GARF, cit., d.10, 11.19–49. Leaf 20 contains a letter from the autocephalists to Khrushchev asking for permission to retain their church in Soviet Ukraine. Curiously 14 of the reported autocephalist parishes were in the Dnepropetrovsk diocese, which while under German occupation to the best of our knowledge contained only ten autocephalist as against 318 autonomist (Moscow Patriarchate) parishes. See D. Pospielovsky, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Crestwood, New York, 1984), vol. 1, p. 242.
37 These reported that about 120,000 people attended the Easter 1944 vigil in the 30 functioning churches of Moscow and that 148,000 attended in the 90 churches of the Moscow province. In most cases 80 per cent of the worshippers were women, but some 20 per cent were under 25 years of age; in some churches young people constituted up to 50 per cent, ‘considerably more than in 1943’. GARF 6991c, op.l, d.2, 1.64.
April 1946, GARF, cit., d.1c, 1.142.

GARF, cit., 11.27–30.


GARF 6991c., op.2, d.65, 11.1–3.


RTsKhIDNI, f.5/17, film 1387, d.221, 11.4–7.

For example, Instruktivnoye pis’mo dlya ispolkomov gorodskikh i raionnykh sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya otnositel’no otkrytiya tserkvei (Instructional Letter for the Executive Committees of City and District Councils of Workers’ Deputies on the Opening of Churches), undated, but probably 1944, GARF cit., d.8, 11.11–17a.

When Tuchkov explained that as patriarch Kirill would have to retire clerics on orders from the government, Kirill replied that if he were to do so he would inform the victim that it was the government that had ordered his sacking. To Tuchkov’s demand that such removals should be presented as independent decisions by the hierarchy, Kirill replied: ‘You are not a cannon, and I am not a projectile to wreck the church with.’ Pospelovsky, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 106.

For example, in the Kursk diocese. GARF, f.6991s, op.2, d.60, 11.35–36.

Various reports, GARF, cit., d.6, 11.28–101; d.8, 11.1–96; d.9, 11.1–201; d.10, 11.16–80.

Apparantly his case was resolved, because there are no further complaints from the metropolitan after Shvernik forwarded the letter to Kosygin and then to Zverev, the minister of finance. GARF, cit., op.7, d.91, 11.11–15 and 25–26.

GARF, cit., op.1, d.5, 11.13–19.

GARF, cit., op.2, d.177, 11.131–32.

These points would later be confirmed in a letter from Karpov to Patriarch Alexi in 1945. See Pospelovskiy, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 399.

GARF, cit., 11.43–48. In fact, to the end of the existence of the USSR provincial CROCA officials remained on the budgets of the provincial governments.

RTsKhIDNI, microfilm roll 1438, d.421, 1.9. MOPR stands for Mezhdunarodnaya organizatsiya pomoshchi bortsam revolyutsii (International Organisation for Aid to the Revolutionary Fighters).

GARF, cit., op.1c, d.9 (1944), 11.75–77 and 10.