Can There be a Russian Christian Democracy?

MICHAEL HUGHES

Introduction

A good deal of scholarly attention has recently been given to the impact of religious belief on political attitudes and behaviour in postcommunist Russia. On the pages of this journal Richard Sakwa has traced in considerable detail the emergence and development of the various parties and organisations which over the past few years have presented themselves to the Russian public as the representatives of a coherent 'Christian Democratic' tradition capable of informing the reconstruction of the country's social and political institutions. This renewed interest in the potential significance of religion as an influential factor on Russia's future development should not of course be a matter for surprise. The dramatic collapse of the Soviet state in the early 1990s created a need for a sustained process of institution-building in the successor states; and the manifest failure of Marxist–Leninist ideology which had for decades served, at least at a rhetorical level, as the formal source of legitimacy for the communist ancien régime also created a kind of 'ideological space' which was quickly filled by a large number of doctrines and Weltanschauungen ranging from classical liberalism to neo-Stalinism. Christian Democracy would at first glance seem to have been well-equipped to compete in the new intellectual market-place. The traditional motifs of Western European Christian Democracy, with their emphasis on social and national reconciliation, appear admirably suited for a country like Russia, suffering from a 70-year legacy of savage social division and fragmentation. And, it is almost superfluous to add, any attempt to import into the political arena values grounded on a metaphysical conception of human existence seemed calculated in the early 1990s to meet with a positive response from a population which had suffered for decades at the hands of a government that looked askance at almost any manifestation of spiritual life. Even so, as Sakwa has shown so well in his second article on the subject, the early hopes which accompanied the birth of the various Russian Christian Democratic parties just a few years ago have faded with bewildering speed. The largest and most important of these, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM) headed by Viktor Aksyuchits, moved rapidly to the right, and before long found itself associating with Russian nationalist groups of various kinds. For this reason, the RCDM lost members to other organisations, and the whole Christian Democratic movement fell victim to the kind of squabbling and in-fighting that has been a hallmark of postcommunist politics in Russia. As has so often proved to be the case in Russian history, a commitment to Christian values became intimately associated with a commitment to the territorial integrity of the state,
giving rise to a seemingly paradoxical situation in which support for a universalist ethical philosophy displayed itself through an intense sense of patriotism towards the institutions and values of an individual culture.  

The problems encountered by the various Christian Democratic organisations over the past few years raise an important question, and one that certainly cannot be answered with any ease or certainty: can there be a Russian Christian Democracy? In other words, have the problems faced by the RCDM, and the other groups which publicly pledge themselves to the values of Christian Democracy, simply been a reaction to the difficult circumstances facing all political parties in postcommunist Russia? After all, the process of democratisation is an enormously difficult one, which requires a complex shift in the patterns of behaviour of all those who are involved in it, whether as party leaders or simply as voters. Political fragmentation and division has been the rule in almost all the new democracies of the former Eastern Europe, and may even be a necessary phase in the establishment of new and stable party systems in the region. Conversely, could it be argued that there are distinctive features in the Russian historical experience which mean that Christian Democracy, at least as it exists in Western Europe, can never take root in Russia since there are not the requisite cultural and institutional foundations? This whole question is one of enormous complexity, since it goes to the very heart of the debate about the extent to which contemporary patterns of social and political development are bounded by the inheritance of the past. In order to answer it – or, to be more realistic, in order to identify the most important factors which impact upon it – a good deal of space needs to be given to a discussion of the nature of Christian Democracy, as well as an examination of the specific historical conditions which gave birth to it in the countries of Western Europe.

More or less the only consensus among students of Christian Democracy is that their chosen subject of study is extraordinarily elusive and difficult to analyse. Even those political scientists who choose to focus their attention on the relatively concrete phenomenon of Christian Democratic parties cannot ignore altogether the complexities of the distinctive doctrine or Weltanschauung which these parties seek to articulate. It is of course important to avoid falling victim to the nominalist fallacy identified many years ago by T. D. Weldon, who warned against the danger of assuming that the use of a particular term in political discourse necessarily implies the existence of some corresponding institutional or ideological ‘reality’ possessing a single and cohesive identity. The truth is that the term ‘Christian Democracy’ has been applied to a wide range of doctrines and political parties which seem, at least at first glance, to have little in common with one another. Any attempt to develop an a priori definition would be pointless, at least as a guide to a study of the ‘real world’. A successful discussion has to abandon at the outset the quest for neat conceptual boundaries and unambiguous definitions, and be content instead with a series of partial insights derived from a study of the ideas and historical developments which have helped to forge contemporary Christian Democracy. This is not necessarily to argue that the identity of Christian Democrats in Western Europe during the past few decades has been so fragile as to call into question the notion that there are certain core values and beliefs which can usefully be labelled as ‘Christian Democratic’. During the postwar period, members from the various Christian Democratic parties have cooperated enthusiastically with one another, a cooperation that has been predicated on the assumption that there are certain principles which they hold in common concerning the organisation of social and political life. It will be seen later that there is a pronounced ‘existentialist’ streak in the Christian Democratic view of human
personality which rejects the extreme liberal notion that the individual can exist – or even be conceived of as existing – outside society. The first step in trying to understand Christian Democracy must therefore be to examine the concrete historical developments which led to the creation of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe in the twentieth century.

The Historical Foundations of Christian Democracy in Western Europe

In twentieth-century Europe Christian Democracy has been associated closely, though not exclusively, with Roman Catholicism. The programme of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), which was set up in France towards the end of the Second World War, drew much of its intellectual inspiration from the social teachings of the church, as well as from prominent figures in the world of philosophy, such as Emmanuel Mounier and Etienne Gilson. The confessional basis of the Italian Christian Democratic Party, which dominated the country’s political life until its recent collapse, was even clearer. The case of the Christian Democratic Union in Germany is more complex, not least because the party’s architects made a determined effort in the immediate postwar period to attract Protestant members and voters, in order to destroy in the popular mind the notion that the CDU was the heir of the Zentrum (Centre Party), which had for a century been the natural focus of political loyalty for large numbers of German Catholics. However, while Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe have generally been most successful in Catholic countries, the relationship between the Catholic Church and Christian Democracy has always been a complex one. Although Christian Democratic parties owe a great intellectual debt to the social teaching of the church, as set out in encyclicals such as Rerum novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo anno (1931), their comparative success in Catholic countries has above all been the consequence of the distinctive pattern of political mobilisation which took place in Europe during the nineteenth century.

The French Revolution posed a powerful challenge to the Catholic Church across Europe, since the secular values it embodied threatened the established patterns of status and privilege. In Protestant countries, the impact of the Revolution on religious life was naturally less profound, since the independence of the ecclesiastic authorities vis-à-vis the secular government was already much more constrained. Jean-Marie Mayeur has characterised accurately the change which took place in Catholic countries in the century after 1789:

A la monarchie de droit divin dont la fin était de conduire les hommes vers le salut, se substituait un état fondé sur la souveraineté populaire, indifferent en matière de religion, laïque, sécularisé.

The Catholic Church was no longer part of the established order, but instead confronted a bourgeois political elite that was secular in ethos and inclined to view the church both as a challenge to the power of the state and a threat to its own, newly acquired, status. As the nineteenth century progressed, in countries like France and Italy ‘All political currents, liberals, radical, socialists, republican, democratic, were at one in attempting to safeguard the political community from any return of the Church’s influence.’ The reaction of the church to the challenge of the liberal revolution took a variety of forms, but for the most part consisted of a rejection of the values and institutions of the bourgeois state that had emerged as the greatest threat to its corporate power since the religious upheavals of the sixteenth century. The
best-known example of this was of course the policy of *non expedit* in Italy, when the Vatican banned Catholics from taking any part in the political life of the young Italian state following the growing conflict between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities in the peninsula during the decades after 1848. Nevertheless, although the church hierarchy bitterly resented the emerging liberal order, it was in practice unable to challenge the triumph of the political revolution. As a result, millions of Catholics across Europe found themselves in an extremely difficult position. Although the church to which they belonged discouraged them from participating directly in the political life of their countries, they were increasingly forced to organise themselves politically in order to defend many of their most cherished rights (including the right to educate their children in schools run by the church). The origins of Catholic political parties can therefore be traced back directly to the church–state conflict of the nineteenth century, when thousands of Catholics across Europe began to use the opportunities and freedoms provided by the new liberal governments in order to limit the impact on their lives of the process of secularisation.

The mobilisation of Catholics across Europe in the nineteenth century was of course a good deal more complex than this rather simplified sketch suggests, since the process reflected particular national circumstances and developments. In Prussia, for example, the Catholic population first mobilised in response to the discrimination it suffered at the hands of the Protestant majority. The same pattern prevailed following German unification, when many of the policies introduced during the period of Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf* imposed limits on the Catholic population’s freedom to educate its children in religious schools (while banning the Jesuits from the country altogether). In this case, of course, it was the Catholics’ status as a religious minority that acted as a stimulus for political mobilisation, since the dominant political elite was (rightly or wrongly) identified with the Protestant majority. However, while the exact circumstances varied from country to country, it is important to realise that the mobilisation of the Catholic population across Europe during the nineteenth century took place for the most part against the wishes of the ecclesiastical hierarchy; the church itself did not urge its members to act politically in defence of its interests, but was instead critical of attempts to establish distinct Catholic political parties.

In general, the Catholic parties which formed during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, including the *Zentrum* in Germany, were far from democratic in outlook. There were, however, some exceptions. In 1848, certain groups of Catholics in both France and Germany showed themselves to be enthusiastic proponents of the cause of radical political change. Already in 1830 the journal *L’Avenir*, founded in Paris by Lacordaire and Lamennais, had combined a commitment to Catholic values with a call for universal suffrage and the establishment of free trade unions. Eighteen years after the establishment of *L’Avenir*, Lacordaire set up another journal, *L’Ere Nouvelle*, which also sought to combine Catholicism with a commitment to democracy and radical social reform. However, it was only really in the last decades of the nineteenth century that large groups of Catholics across Europe finally proclaimed publicly their commitment to the principles of liberalism and democracy, and became convinced that it was possible to combine their religious faith with a commitment to the dominant political values. The establishment of the influential *Sillon* by Marc Sangnier in France during the 1890s illustrated the extent to which Catholic laymen had come to accept the values of the Republic; Sangnier himself spoke of his wish to show that it was possible to be ‘chrétien sans peur et républicain sans équivoque’, thereby putting an end to a century of tension between the church and the state. However, the Catholic hierarchy still lagged behind lay Catholics in
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coming to terms with the era of liberalism and democracy, although the publication of *Rerum novarum* in 1891 by Pope Leo XIII showed that it was gradually accepting the dramatic social and political changes of the previous decades. The hierarchy’s commitment to a variety of social Catholicism did not extend to a wholehearted support for the liberal democratic order which was firmly established across the western half of Europe. It was not in fact until 1919 that the church finally gave permission for the establishment of a Catholic political party, when Don Sturzo in Italy was given permission to set up the Popular Party. The foundation of the Popular Party proved to be an important moment in the development of Christian Democracy in Western Europe. While its appearance was welcomed by the church, great efforts were made to establish in the mind of the general population that the party was not simply a mouthpiece for the Catholic Church, but rather an independent organisation seeking to promote a range of policies that were inspired by the Christian values of its members. The principle was followed over the following years, as similar parties were formed in a number of other countries across Europe. Christian Democracy in Western Europe was therefore not a ‘child’ of the Catholic Church; indeed, it is fair to say that the church as an institution was usually reluctant to endorse moves which could be interpreted as signifying its entry into the political arena. The development of Christian Democracy was instead largely driven by Catholic laymen anxious to defend their faith and values against incursion by the secular authorities and keen to assist in the development of social and economic policies that reflected their own values.

The Catholic Church and Christian Democratic Political Philosophy

It was noted earlier that the social teachings of the Catholic Church as they developed from the late nineteenth century onwards exercised an important influence on the development of Christian Democratic doctrine, even though the exact boundary between social Catholicism and Christian Democracy was a vexed one. One writer even suggests that ‘Le problème essentiel de la DC est de traduire en termes politiques la philosophie sociale de l’église.’ This inevitably raises an important question about the relationship between the church and the major Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe during the past hundred years: to what extent have the principles articulated by these parties reflected the values and ideas of the ecclesiastical hierarchy? Although it has been seen that Christian Democratic parties emerged as a major political force largely through the efforts of lay Catholics mobilising to defend and promote their own goals and values, the significance of this historical legacy of quasi-independence would naturally be reduced should Christian Democratic doctrine have proved in practice to be little more than the mechanical application to social and political life of principles set down by the Vatican.

The publication of the papal encyclical *Rerum novarum* in 1891 marked a sea-change in the attitudes of the church hierarchy towards social and political questions, since the encyclical represented a determined effort to respond to the challenge posed by the twin changes of democratisation and industrialisation. Leo XIII was concerned at the triumph of liberal values across Europe during the course of the previous century, in both the economic and the political spheres, since they promoted a hyper-individualism that fragmented society and left millions of workers ‘isolated and helpless, betrayed to the inhumanity of employers and the unbridled greed of competitors’.

He was at the same time perturbed by the appeal of the ‘false remedy’ of socialism to large sections of the working class, who were attracted by its promise
to use collective action to transform the material foundations of society. *Rerum novarum* therefore set down a conception of private property rights which exercised enormous influence over the development of Christian Democratic movements and parties in the decades that followed. Leo argued that the right to hold private property was ‘a right which man receives from nature.’ At the same time, though, while such rights were rooted in natural law, ownership had to be exercised in a way that showed sensitivity to the social character of property. The exact boundary between the social and private character of property was not in fact well developed in *Rerum novarum*, but the principle was clear: the poverty and deprivation suffered by millions of workers was an evil that needed to be avoided by appropriate behaviour on the part of those who were the stewards of divine providence. Nevertheless, as Leo XIII tacitly acknowledged in his encyclical, the duty to behave charitably was not always followed, with the result that political (state) action could on occasions be needed to address the social problems of industrial society.

In *Rerum novarum* Leo explicitly recognised that the state authorities had both a right and a duty to intervene to offer protection to those who ‘have nothing of their own with which to defend themselves’. At the same time, while it acknowledged that action by the government could be appropriate to protect ‘the lives and well-being of the unpropertied classes’ , the whole spirit of *Rerum novarum* was to seek alternative solutions to social problems – in part reflecting the Catholic hierarchy’s suspicion of the liberal state. Leo declared firmly that ‘the state has no authority to swallow up either the individual or the family’ and placed great emphasis instead on the role of private associations, ranging from trade unions to charities, in protecting individuals against the worse excesses of exploitation and poverty. This emphasis on the value of pluralism – that is on the need to inculcate and encourage the development of a myriad of different organisations and groups within civil society – has, like the emphasis on the social character of private property, become a defining principle of Western European Christian Democracy during the twentieth century. Leo’s defence of such a pluralist response to the problems posed by industrial society, in preference to a more *étatist* solution, may have a number of explanations. He was certainly perturbed by the possible accumulation and abuse of state power which he feared was inherent in the collectivist ethos of socialism. He may also have believed that the church would be able to extend its influence (or, to use a vexed term, ‘hegemony’) more effectively over the institutions of civil society than over the bourgeois state. Whatever the exact reasons behind Leo’s thinking, the ideas expressed in his 1891 encyclical were destined to have considerable impact on the nascent Christian Democratic parties that finally began to emerge in the wake of the First World War, when the church finally followed through the logic of *Rerum novarum* and accepted that the cause of social reform could not be neatly divorced from the question of political action.

Later encyclicals such as *Quadragesimo anno* refined and advanced the Catholic Church’s stance towards a whole range of social and political questions, which in turn influenced the ideas and values that have been articulated by the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe over the past 50 years. However, the political philosophy of parties like the German CDU and the French MRP, which were established in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, has also to a great extent been influenced by the thinking of writers and theorists from outside the ecclesiastical hierarchy, such as Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain. Although many of these thinkers were themselves profoundly influenced by Catholic values, their ideas played an important role in helping European Christian Democracy to
develop a distinctive Weltanschauung which, though influenced by the social teachings of the church, also possessed its own clear-cut identity. Writers like Maritain and Etienne Gilson were greatly influenced by Thomist philosophy, and it is hardly surprising that their treatment of social and political life was informed by a conviction that active involvement in the community provided the individual with an opportunity to pursue "la lumière de la raison." The task of the individual was not to endure the travails of earthly life, but rather to treat it as a source of enrichment which offered numerous opportunities for spiritual development.

It has been said on numerous occasions that the Christian Democratic 'ideal of the good society is "personalist."' The problem is, of course, that the concept of 'personalism' is itself as ambiguous and vexed as the concept of 'Christian Democracy'. It is perhaps most closely associated with the names of the French philosophers Emmanuel Mounier and Gabriel Marcel; the former, in particular, exercised a significant influence on those involved in the formation of the MRP in France in 1944, even though he paradoxically spent a good deal of his life bitterly criticising the beliefs and actions of those who declared their commitment to the principles of Christian Democracy. It has already been seen that the pronounced existentialist timbre which is the hallmark of both men's writings creates numerous problems of analysis. At the heart of a good deal of personalist philosophy, at least as it has appeared in the writings of prominent Christian Democrats and the programmes of their parties, lies a rejection of the liberal antinomy between the individual and society. The abstract individual is contrasted unfavourably with the existing person enmeshed in a complex network of social and political relationships that provides the most effective setting for personal development. Etienne Gilson, who was himself closely involved in the French MRP in the years after 1945, expressed this conviction with particular force in a celebrated pamphlet on the subject entitled Notre Démocratie:

Si les personnes humaines forment des peuples, c'est parce qu'aucune d'elles, seule et sans le secours des autres, ne saurait atteindre toute la perfection dont elle est capable.

The society that he, along with the MRP, wanted to see develop in France was one where there was 'une libre collaboration de personnes obéissant aux ordres de la raison at de l'amour qu'elle éclaire'.

However, while Gilson, like other prominent theorists of Christian Democracy, went to considerable lengths to critique extreme individualism, he remained at the same time bitterly critical of any form of collectivism that threatened to engulf the individual person. Indeed, there was a pronounced Kantian tone in his assertion that 'La personne humaine est une fin, l'Etat n'est là que pour lui permettre d'atteindre le plein développement dont elle est capable.' His support for the kind of pluralist and diversified society which was praised so warmly by Leo XIII in Rerum novarum reflected a belief that it alone could provide a setting in which the individual could remain free while simultaneously transcending the confines of his own individuality in order to develop a fuller sense of identity which acknowledged the reality of his own social nature:

De sa naissance à sa mort, chaque homme est engagé dans une pluralité de structures sociales naturelles hors desquelles il ne saurait vivre ni atteindre son complète développement.

For Gilson a democracy that was purely political and failed to address social and
economic questions was a deeply flawed democracy which led to the fragmentation of society and made it more difficult for each person to develop to their full capacity. Gilson's pamphlet has been cited here at length not simply because its author exercised considerable influence on the development of the doctrine of French Christian Democracy, but rather because his ideas were characteristic of the ideas which determined the development of Western European Christian Democracy as a whole in the postwar era. Michael Fogarty has shown at length that personalist ideas, when stripped of some of their more complex philosophical foundations, informed the programmes of almost all the major Christian Democratic parties which appeared in Western Europe during the years after 1945. The exact texture of the 'personalist foundations' of the various programmes naturally varied from country to country. However, the belief that public policy ought to be informed by an attempt to identify and implement policies capable of promoting social harmony and solidarity, while simultaneously protecting the rights of the individual person, has been one of the dominant themes of Christian Democracy in postwar Europe. The reason why the doctrine and programme of the Western European Christian Democratic parties have often seemed so strange to British eyes, in particular, is precisely that they have been designed to overcome – or rather dismiss as unreal – the collectivist–individualist dualism that has been the hallmark of most political thinking in Britain since 1945. Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe have of course themselves often been divided over the particular policies they wish to promote in the postwar period. However, they have all shared a commitment to preventing the state from encroaching into spheres of social activity that are considered to be the proper domain of the individual or the private association, while at the same time supporting the use of state power to limit social fragmentation and division. The 'non-ideological' character of Christian Democratic parties in postwar Western Europe has been something of an illusion and has not, as is often believed, simply reflected their evolution into 'catch-all' parties dedicated to propounding policies that will maximise popular support and ensure electoral success. Although the leadership of parties like the German CDU and, until recently, the Italian CDI have over the years shown themselves to be shrewd tacticians capable of creating electoral platforms calculated to appeal to large sections of the population, the philosophical traditions of the various parties have continued to influence their political behaviour. The Christian Democratic tradition in Western Europe has been to promote policies not because of their 'ideological correctness' but rather according to their ability to promote the Christian Democratic vision of the good society. In the 'real world' of democratic politics considerations of electoral appeal have of course played an important role in influencing the behaviour of Western European Christian Democratic parties. However, this political realism has itself been a defining feature of a political tradition that is sceptical of the potential for achieving complete social transformation and renewal, and recognises that although the state can have an important influence on social life it can never transform it.

**The Historical and Philosophical Foundations for a Russian Christian Democracy**

It has so far been argued that while Christian Democracy in Western Europe has always been closely associated with Catholicism the relationship between Christian Democratic parties and the Catholic Church was historically more tangential and less direct than sometimes imagined. Catholics became politically active in the nineteenth
century largely at their own volition rather than in response to encouragement from the ecclesiastical hierarchy. As a result, while the relationship between church and party has certainly been close in some countries during the twentieth century, most notably in Italy, it would be a mistake to presume that Christian Democracy itself developed simply as an extension of the church into the political realm. Similarly, it has been seen that although Catholic social teaching has influenced the programmes of many Christian Democrat parties, they have also responded to the ideas of lay thinkers and writers. The fact that the CDU in Germany attracts support from both Catholics and Protestants, albeit disproportionately from the former, shows clearly that Christian Democracy cannot be seen simply as a Catholic phenomenon. So too does the existence of Protestant confessional parties in countries like Sweden and Norway, which declare their commitment to both Christian and democratic values. 30

The conclusion therefore must be that no particular confessional basis is required for the existence of Christian Democracy, even though it remains true that the patterns of political mobilisation which took place in Europe following the political and industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century promoted the development of confessional parties more strongly in Catholic than in Protestant countries.

It is now clear that we can dismiss the notion that Christian Democracy cannot take root in Russia simply because the country lacks the appropriate Catholic heritage. Even so, in order to understand the possible foundations for a successful Russian Christian Democracy it is once again necessary to focus on questions of both history and doctrine, concentrating this time on the historical role and influence of the Orthodox Church on Russian social and political life. It is self-evident that the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Russian state has across the centuries been quite different from the one which has traditionally existed between the Catholic Church and the secular authorities in the countries of Western Europe. Although it is impossible to characterise the complex texture of this relationship within the confines of a comparatively short article, it is hardly controversial to suggest that the institutional autonomy of the Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the Russian state has always been limited, even if historians might disagree both about the extent of this autonomy and the degree to which it has varied over time. The absence of a Western European-style feudal period in Russian history, with its complex tapestry of competing temporal and ecclesiastical powers, helped to establish the conditions for the development of an ‘omnipotent state’ which resisted the evolution of an independent civil society. This conception of the Russian state as the driving force in the development of Russian society has of course been subjected to numerous critiques over the centuries, not least from the Slavophile publicists of the nineteenth century who argued in article after article that the state could not act as the creator of authoritative values for Russian society. 31 However, even the Slavophiles were only able to defend the Orthodox Church by arguing that its true worth was to be found not in its ‘external’ institutional form but rather in its ability to create a spiritual unity (sobornost’) among believers. In reality the Russian state has for centuries played a vital role in influencing the development of the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution. The controversies between the ‘Possessors’ and ‘Non-possessors’ in the fifteenth century, along with the battle between Nikon and Avvakum in the seventeenth century, were resolved (if that is the right word) only by the involvement of the secular authorities. 32 The Petrine reforms of the early eighteenth century did not establish the subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Russian state, but simply advanced and systematised a pattern that had been evident for centuries. The Russian Orthodox Church has never enjoyed the corporate status that the Catholic
Church once possessed in the countries of Western Europe.

The direction of the argument should by now be clear. In countries like France and Italy the conflict between the church and the state in the nineteenth century played an important role in mobilising Catholics politically and encouraged the formation of organised parties and groups. In Russia, as in most of the Protestant countries of Western Europe, the foundations for such a development were not present, since the conflict between the religious and secular authorities had been 'resolved' at a much earlier stage. Nor, of course, did there take place in Russia during the nineteenth century the kind of bourgeois liberal revolution that occurred in the West. As a result, even had Orthodox believers wanted to mobilise in defence of their church, there were simply not the opportunities to do so, at least before 1905 when the constraints on political activity were reduced somewhat. It is not surprising that the first real Christian Democratic Party to appear in the tsarist empire emerged in Lithuania in the wake of the events of 1905-6, when Catholics sought to use the new political freedoms to mobilise in defence of greater freedom to practice their religion. In Russia itself there simply could not take place the development of a system of confessional politics which in the western half of Europe eventually gave birth to the organisational structures within which contemporary Christian Democracy was forged.

The situation of the Orthodox Church during the Soviet period of Russian history is of course too well-known to require further elaboration here. Suffice it to say that while the establishment of militant atheism as a component part of the official ideology created the potential for huge conflict between state and believers, the oppressive nature of the regime limited the immediate political consequences of this tension: it was not possible for believers to mobilise in defence of the Orthodox (or any other) Church for fear of the consequences. Nor, of course, was it possible for those in the ecclesiastical hierarchy to adopt the same line taken by the Catholic hierarchy in Europe during the nineteenth century towards the militantly secular and ant clerical elites that came to power in countries like France and Italy; it would hardly have been practical for any religious leader in Soviet Russia publicly to advise his congregation to adopt a policy of *non expedit* and refuse to participate in the ritual affirmations of Soviet power! The political mobilisation of Catholics in nineteenth-century Europe may have taken place in large part as a reaction to the threat to their values and interests posed by the emergence of a new secular elite; however, a necessary condition for this mobilisation to be successful was, of course, that this new elite was committed to a liberal set of beliefs that prevented it from crushing its critics. The Soviet government never displayed similar scruples.

All this is not to argue that there cannot be such a thing as Russian Christian Democracy. It is, rather, to suggest that the historical conditions which have existed in Russia over the centuries mean that the wellsprings and organisational foundations of a Russian Christian Democratic movement must necessarily be different from the ones that exist in Western Europe. One of the most important questions that needs to be asked therefore concerns the possible sources of intellectual inspiration for Russian Christian Democracy. It was seen earlier that in Western Europe Christian Democratic thought has drawn on an eclectic set of ideas ranging from Catholic social doctrine to personalist philosophy. Russian Christian Democracy could of course draw on the same sources, though it would then undoubtedly face the charge of being an 'ideological import'. More realistically, it could seek to distil the essential features of Christian Democratic thought, as it exists in the West, and seek to locate them within the context of a Russian intellectual tradition. This is certainly the
course that has been favoured by the various Christian Democratic parties and move­ments that have appeared in recent years, including Aksyuchits’s RCDM. However, identifying and articulating a Russian Christian Democratic tradition is fraught with dangers and difficulties. It is in the first place difficult enough to identify even in the West European context what is meant by Christian Democracy; reinterpreting and grounding these principles in a very different intellectual and cultural context poses even greater difficulties. In the second place, attempting to articulate a set of distinctive Russian Christian Democratic principles poses a danger that is well known to anyone who has even a basic knowledge of the Russian intellectual tradition. For many hundreds of years there has been within that tradition a tendency to conflate belief in Russia’s identity as a Christian nation with a belief in Russia’s status as a great power.34 This is not of course to argue that there is a necessary relationship between the two. Nevertheless, one of the great challenges facing any Christian Democratic organisation in Russia is to ensure that a genuine patriotism and commitment to the country’s intellectual and spiritual heritage does not degenerate into something more sinister.

The Orthodox Church, it has often been argued, lacks the strong tradition of social and pastoral work characteristic of the Catholic and Protestant churches. Florovsky went so far as to argue that ‘there was no important movement of social Christianity in modern Russia’, while Meyendorff has suggested that one of the defining features of Orthodoxy has always been its ‘one-sided dedication to liturgical contemplation of eternal truths, and its forgetfulness of the concrete needs of human society’.35 It is of course possible to take issue with these characterisations. Russian monasteries served for centuries as a major source of charity for the poor and sick. By the end of the nineteenth century the Orthodox Church had become, at least in some parts of Russia, extremely active in charitable and missionary work, establishing for itself a social role of considerable importance. Nevertheless, the notion that Orthodoxy has traditionally placed greater emphasis on ‘mysticism’ and a detachment from ‘historical realities’ than the major western churches clearly contains an element of truth, even though the exact texture of this attitude towards the temporal world is hard to categorise with any precision. The possible reasons for this detachment are of course manifold. In the Russian context, it could perhaps be argued that the historical character of the relationship between state and church encouraged the development of a profound dualism in the social and political thought of the Orthodox Church, in which the problems and issues of the world were deemed to be the proper concern of the secular authorities.36 Alternatively, the argument could be turned on its head, by suggesting that the ‘mystical’ quality of Orthodoxy encouraged a retreat from the world which helped to create the conditions for the expansion of the state and the retreat of one of the major institutions of civil society – the Church – to an essentially passive social and political role. Whatever the exact truth, it is clear that the Orthodox Church in Russia has not, at least hitherto, developed to the same extent as the Catholic Church a tradition of theorising about social and political life. It is therefore not surprising that when the various Christian Democratic parties which have emerged in Russia over the past few years have tried to identify an intellectual heritage on which they can build it is to lay writers like Semen Frank and Sergei Bulgakov that they have turned much of their attention. During its early days the RCDM explicitly rejected a ‘Manichaean approach to public service’ and vigorously condemned the ‘renunciation of “politics”’. The Declaration issued by the party’s Constituent Assembly noted instead that ‘if we are now going to turn away from the world... we are going to suffer an even more terrible tragedy’.37 In other words, if
Christian Democracy, by its very nature, represents an affirmation of the world and a celebration of human freedom, it appears to sit somewhat awkwardly with the Orthodox Church’s traditional quietist stance towards social and political questions.

The search for a coherent Christian Democratic tradition of theorising about social and political life is still of course at a comparatively early stage in Russia. The greatest attention has perhaps understandably been given to writers of Russia’s ‘silver age’, including the contributors to the celebrated 1909 Vekhi symposium, whose ideas were forged in reaction to the atheistic materialism of the Russian intelligentsia which provided such fertile ground for the growth of revolutionary ideas in Russia in the half-century before 1917. It is, however, worth making the point that there are earlier thinkers in history whose ideas could be of value in the search for new principles to guide the formation of a Russian Christian Democracy. The social and political thought of the Moscow Slavophiles still does not attract a great deal of attention in Russia, perhaps because it is too often identified as combining an unhealthy nationalism with an unrealistic utopianism. In reality, though, both Russian and western scholars have been too inclined to emphasise the banal elements in Slavophilism while failing to give sufficient attention to some of its more valuable insights. Yuri Samarin’s ideas about the communal foundations of human personality were, as Zenkovsky has shown, remarkably well developed and extremely insightful. The existential elements which characterised much of the philosophical thinking of Aleksei Khomyakov and Ivan Kireyevsky similarly revealed an acute awareness that human personality can obtain its fullest potential only within a society informed by a strong sense of its own spiritual identity and mission. And, as is well known, several members of the Slavophile circle were themselves directly involved in the development of the Great Reforms which took place in Russian society during the 1860s, a participation which forced them to reflect in a very immediate and personal way on the problem of devising practical policies and initiatives capable of improving the social and moral condition of human society. Nevertheless, the great flaw in Moscow Slavophilism was its failure to develop a coherent doctrine capable of distinguishing clearly between the spiritual foundations of human society and the actual conditions of human existence. It was for this reason that Florovsky once accused some members of the Slavophile circle of flying from the constraints and realities of history, preferring to believe instead that human society, at least when informed by the correct Orthodox principles, could exhibit an almost pre-lapsarian harmony and order. Perhaps more worryingly, it was also this aspect of Slavophile thought that proved most vulnerable to degeneration into a form of crude chauvinism in the hands of later thinkers. Russia’s spiritual potential could all too easily be presented as evidence of the country’s exalted significance vis-à-vis the civilisations of the West.

Although the Slavophiles failed to develop an adequate social and political philosophy, their ideas exercised considerable influence on a later generation of Russian thinkers who addressed many of the same issues in a more coherent and elaborate manner. The appeal of Semen Frank’s writings to a modern audience rests, in large part, on their author’s attempt to establish the foundations for a coherent ‘Christian politics’ which acknowledges that there are ‘eternal unshakeable principles of human life which emanate from the very essence of man and society’, while at the same time accepting the ‘reality of the superficial, outer stratum of social being’ – a distinction which was too often blurred in Slavophile thought. Frank argued that the ‘ontological essence’ of human existence was rooted in ‘the primordial harmony of universally human life’; in other words, he suggested that there was an ‘inner sphere’ of human society in which each individual realised his rootedness in being – a unity which
Frank designated by use of the term *sobornost* (a term which had previously been used by the Slavophile writer Aleksei Khomyakov to refer to the union of believers within the church, rather than to the character of Russian society as a whole). At the same time, Frank insisted that the individual’s awareness of his own autonomy and identity could not be ignored or discounted, but had to be recognised as a vital aspect of human existence. This acknowledgement of the ‘outer strata’ of life, which Frank designated by the term *obschestvennost’*, provided his writings about society with a concrete and ‘realistic’ character which was absent in Slavophile thought. The sphere of *obschestvennost’* possessed, in Frank’s work, a character that was not unlike the character of civil society in Hegel’s writings on politics. It allowed for, and even welcomed, human diversity (or pluralism), recognising the totalitarian menace inherent in monistic theories of human society that insisted on the primacy of one particular organising principle. Frank’s searing critique of all utopian thought that sought to achieve the transformation of human existence by ‘external’ means was rooted in his insistence that the two spheres of society could not be conflated with one another. Any attempt to do so would lead inevitably to ‘the unchaining and triumph of the powers of evil, to the kingdom of hell on earth’.

The value of Frank’s intellectual legacy for Russian Christian Democrats should now be clear: it acknowledges the reality of the ‘empirical world’ of human society, while at the same time refusing to accept that this finite world represents the only setting for human existence. Politics cannot simply be ignored or discounted, since it can have a real impact on the spiritual health of both individuals and society; at the same time, the human condition cannot be resolved through purely political means. The task of the Christian politician is therefore to understand the close relationship between *sobornost’* and *obschestvennost’*, while at the same time acknowledging their fundamental difference.

Frank was not of course the only Russian writer who addressed the vexed issue of the relationship between the individual and society. Sergei Bulgakov, who also contributed to the *Vekhi* symposium, repeatedly reacted against ‘any tendency to submerge the individual and his absolute value in the concept of an illusory “we”’. At the same time, he too welcomed the Russian Orthodox doctrine of ‘*sobornost’*’ as a satisfactory solution of the dilemma presented by the principles of the individual and the collective. These examples are not given because they are unique: they are instead intended simply to illustrate the existence of a Russian tradition of political and social philosophy that appears to offer ideas and reflections on the characteristic themes which have over the years been of concern to Christian Democrats in Western Europe: combining a defence of the value of the individual person with a search for social solidarity; insisting on the spiritual foundations of social life while simultaneously emphasising the significance of practical politics; and so on. The process of rediscovering and ‘popularising’ this tradition still has a good deal further to go (perhaps most obviously in identifying the elements which can specifically be labelled as *Christian Democratic* rather than as *Christian reflections on the status of political life*). However, given the traditional stance of the Russian Orthodox Church towards social and political questions, along with its vexed history of ‘collaboration’ with the Soviet regime during the decades after 1917, the process of rediscovery is a vital step in the construction of a viable Russian Christian Democracy.

**Leaders and Led: the Impact of Leadership and Belief on Political Development**

Too many political scientists ignore the impact of the past on the present, while too many historians view the present through the prism of the past. A viable Russian
Christian Democratic party (or parties) cannot emerge \textit{ex nihilo}, but must instead develop within an established historical and intellectual context which imposes constraints on the pattern of political change. At the same time, the collapse of the communist \textit{ancien régime} in Russia has, as noted earlier, ushered in an era of enormous institutional and ideological flux which provides a potential for change that seldom occurs in more stable times. The development of Christian Democratic ideas and movements in Western Europe has in the past been closely associated with major historical crises: the drama of 1848; the chaos of the years immediately after the Great War; and, above all, the period following the cataclysm of the Second World War. The growth of Christian Democracy – or at least a growth of interest in the Christian foundations of politics – during such times should not of course be a matter for surprise. The destruction of familiar social and political structures, along with the disintegration of established patterns of values, encourages a reconsideration of the basic foundations of human existence. The response can take many forms: support for a new ‘totalist’ ideology which purports to explain all aspects of human life; an emphasis on the experience of selfhood as the only reliable guide to the meaning of existence; or, naturally, a renewed interest in the spiritual dimension of community.

In a political system undergoing democratisation the significance of these responses depends on the extent to which they attract the support of significant sections of the population \textit{and} are able to acquire a coherent institutional structure. Sakwa has shown in detail the problems which have faced the burgeoning Christian Democratic movement in Russia over the past few years. At the same time, the argument set out above suggests that although the intellectual and historical legacy in Russia is very different from the one in which Western European Christian Democracy developed, there is no reason why some form of Russian Christian Democracy cannot establish itself as a significant political force. The final section of this paper therefore focuses on some of the ‘contingent factors’ which play a vital role in determining all aspects of political life.

The role of political leadership has over the years been rather ignored by political scientists, though a number of recent books and articles have acknowledged its importance in the process of democratisation which has taken place in Europe over the past few years.\textsuperscript{45} The development of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe during the years after 1945 was greatly influenced by figures such as Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Alcide de Gasperi; indeed, it barely seems an exaggeration to say that the history of Christian Democracy would have been very different without their distinctive political skills and presence. During the debate which has taken place in the past few years over the crisis of leadership in the western democracies the point has sometimes been made that the postwar period seemed to breed a distinctive group of political leaders whose dynamism and imagination contrasts vividly with the apparent passivity and inertia of their successors. Comparing the present generation of political leaders with their predecessors is of course almost impossible, not least because the tasks facing those responsible for determining public policy today appear to be infinitely more complex than those of a generation ago. However, there is no doubt that ‘leadership’ can have its greatest impact at a time of political crisis and institutional fragmentation. The collapse of an established social and political order, as happened in Europe during the Second World War, tears down the existing patterns of authority and creates a need for new sources of authoritative values. The destruction of existing institutional forms reduces the importance of routine politics and provides new opportunities for individuals who can establish themselves in the public mind as ‘charismatic leaders’ capable of moulding the develop-
ment of new social and political institutions by ‘infusing into [them] some of [their] charismatic vision’. This is not the place to consider in any depth the vast literature that has over the years been devoted to the whole question of charismatic authority, which resists objective description precisely because it refers to a subjective relationship between the charismatic leader and the wider population. There is, though, little doubt that charismatic leadership can play a vital role in facilitating political development, since it helps to provide a focus of authority at a time when new institutions are yet to prove that they will endure and establish their status as the ‘authoritative allocators of values’. The postwar history of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe can to some extent at least be seen as the gradual institutionalisation of the personal authority possessed by their original leaders. However, in Russia at the present time political leadership of a particularly personal kind continues to be of great importance; individuals, whether they be Boris Yeltsin or Vladimir Zhirinovsky, stand as the representatives of particular values which can serve not only to influence the course of current policy but also to inform the entire future development of the social and political system. The whole question of leadership remains equally vital for the Russian Christian Democratic movement, since individuals have come to represent a number of particular conceptions of Christian Democratic values and therefore particular conceptions about the movement’s future. The failure of Viktor Aksyuchits to establish his authority across the Christian Democratic movement has been an important factor in preventing it from achieving greater political success over the past few years.

During the course of 1991 the future for Christian Democracy looked far brighter than is currently the case. The RCDM in particular issued various programmes and declarations setting out in impressive detail its values and beliefs, which were based upon a commitment to ‘the ideal of freedom and creative responsibility’. The party proclaimed its support for the development of ‘inner self-restraint, solidarity and self-discipline’, and called for the moral revitalisation of Russian society. At the same time the leadership of the RCDM attempted to move beyond the articulation of abstract principles to the discussion of concrete policies. The emphasis in the party’s documents was on ‘gradual piecemeal reform’, deemed to be the most appropriate response for a Christian party conscious of ‘the fundamental duality of the two spheres of human existence’. A pragmatic policy style avoided falling prey to the ‘delusory revolution of salvation involving huge upheavals’, while at the same time rejecting political quiescence and withdrawal from the world. This stance echoed the one which has been characteristic of Western European Christian Democratic parties during the past few decades. However, although these parties were founded on a commitment to a common set of values, they have often favoured sharply different policies. The MRP in postwar France supported a radical programme of social and economic reform, while the German CDU has in recent years implemented an economic policy that owes a great deal to laissez-faire and free-market principles. Indeed, this diversity has itself become one of the defining features of European Christian Democracy. The policy documents issued by the RCDM during its first year or so suggested that the party instinctively supported a ‘German’ form of Christian Democracy. It proclaimed its support for the organisation of the economy on market principles and favoured the use of transfer payments rather than state regulation to protect the poorest and most vulnerable members of society. The RCDM’s other commitments – to the defence of human rights, to the reform of the education system and so on – were also entirely consistent with the spirit of Western European Christian Democracy.
There does not seem to have been any great disagreement about economic and social policy within the RCDM during the early 1990s. The divisions which ripped the movement apart instead came about because of differences over the attitude that should be taken towards the territorial integrity of the former USSR, along with disputes over the political tactics which were most appropriate for the RCDM. Critics of Aksyuchits, such as the veteran dissident Fr Gleb Yakunin, became increasingly concerned that the RCDM leader was adopting a more and more nationalist stance which was at odds with the party’s commitment to the promotion of ethnic harmony and support for the autonomy of the national minorities. Yakunin was particularly perturbed by Aksyuchits’s willingness to forge alliances with various nationalist and ‘national-bolshevik’ groups that promulgated principles and values that were totally at odds with those traditionally promoted by Christian Democrats. The disintegration of the RCDM as a unified organisation has been dealt with expertly elsewhere, and there is no need to repeat a description of the process here. It is instead sufficient to make two points. In the first place, whatever Aksyuchits’s virtues as a political leader, it seems clear that he was unable to articulate a vision of Christian Democracy during the early 1990s which proved compelling enough either to attract mass popular support or even to hold his own party together. In the second place, it must be admitted that the events of the past few years have probably made it harder for any party or organisation in Russia expressing Christian Democratic principles to win a large degree of public support in the future. Nevertheless, while any Russian Christian Democratic party or movement will face formidable obstacles in the future when trying to establish itself as a major political force, the situation is still far from hopeless.

Although the extent of religious belief in Russia is hard both to measure and to categorise, survey evidence suggests that Christianity commands a good deal of public respect. In a 1992 survey, more than 70 per cent of those approached responded positively when asked what feelings were evoked by the word Christianity. Other surveys taken around the same time indicated that most of the major churches (including the Russian Orthodox Church) were viewed in a positive light. The political significance of these patterns remains uncertain. One recent study suggests that religious commitment in postcommunist Russia tends to be correlated with stronger than average support for market-oriented reform – although the extent of the correlation is comparatively weak. If these surveys are correct, they suggest that a party which bases its appeal upon a commitment to Christian values and market-oriented reform should be able to attract a high level of popular support. Worryingly, though, the evidence also implies that the relationship between nationalism and Christian belief remains quite strong in contemporary Russia, which suggests that it may be difficult for any future Russian Christian Democratic Party to imitate its western counterparts’ strong commitment to the principle of international reconciliation and cooperation. If it is indeed true that the section of the electorate which is most inclined to declare its support for Christian principles also tends to express support for nationalist goals then the political leadership of any party which seeks to attract their support will always be tempted to adopt policies that are informed by nationalist values. In a fluid social and political situation, in which clear patterns of economic differentiation have not yet acquired a well-defined form, political affiliation is always likely to revolve around ideological commitment rather than material interests. This is not, as some western academics have implied, necessarily a bad thing. Debate about core values is a vital part of the process of democratic transformation. However, perhaps the greatest challenge facing future Christian Democratic leaders
in Russia is to ensure that they help to mould the debate and do not simply follow public opinion. The history of Western European Christian Democracy in the years immediately after 1945 shows the importance of effective leadership in enabling new political parties to establish a clear identity and overcome the danger of fragmentation and vision.

Conclusion

The development of a Christian Democratic movement in Russia will inevitably take a different form from that in Western Europe, since the historical legacy is so different. At the same time the enormous diversity of Christian Democratic parties in the west of the continent suggests that a party can be genuinely Christian Democratic while at the same time possessing well-defined national characteristics and a distinctive political profile. The comparative failure of Christian Democracy in Russia, at least in the first three years following the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, has complex roots. The development of democratic politics in formerly communist Eastern Europe necessarily involves a prolonged and complex ‘learning process’, both for the general population and for the new political actors who have come to the fore in the postcommunist era. The rapid rise and fall of new political parties which has been characteristic of Russian politics over the past few years should hardly be a matter for surprise. Many of the bitter debates and splits which have characterised the Christian Democratic movement simply echo those which have occurred in parties across the political spectrum. The formation of new Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe during the years around the end of the Second World War was hardly painless either. Although the total collapse of one political system inevitably leads to chaos and confusion, it also provides fresh opportunities to break with patterns inherited from the past and to establish a new foundation for social and political life.

The most worrying aspect of Christian Democratic politics in Russia over the past few years has been the willingness of some of its most prominent leaders to build coalitions with individuals and groups whose views set them firmly on the ‘national-chauvinist’ wing of the political spectrum. It was seen earlier that there is in the Russian intellectual tradition a strand which has for centuries proclaimed that the country’s population exhibits a spiritual profundity which sets it apart from that of other countries. The Western European Christian Democratic tradition rests above all on an acknowledgment of the imperfectibility of human life; the task of the politician is to improve the condition of the human community while at the same time recognising that it cannot be transformed. In the Russian intellectual tradition, by contrast, there has too often been a failure to recognise a distinction between is and ought. Just as the radical intelligentsia of the late nineteenth century failed to recognise that human nature and human society were not infinitely malleable, so there has been a failure among many Russian writers and philosophers to acknowledge that the Russian cultural tradition does not contain within itself a spiritual genius that sets it apart from its neighbours. Of course, numerous writers ranging from Frank to Solzhenitsyn have warned against such a collective spiritual arrogance. Nevertheless, the association of Christianity and nationalism in Russia is a powerful one which has deep roots. The splits within the RCDM on this very issue are a depressing reminder of the past. They illustrate powerfully how Russian Christian Democrats need to explore more fully the democratic as well as the Christian foundations of their political views.
Notes and References


3 See, for example, many of the contributions in David Hanley (ed.), *Christian Democracy in Europe: a Comparative Perspective* (London, 1994).


8 For a classic statement of this thesis from the perspective of political science, see Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York, 1967), especially pp. 1–64.


14 Mayeur, *op. cit.*, p. 43.


23 For a full account, see Rauch, *op. cit.*


28 Fogarty, *op. cit.*, chapter 3 passim.


The most famous statement of this kind was the memorandum written by Konstantin Aksakov for Alexander II in 1855, which is contained in Marc Raeff (ed.), Russian Intellectual History (New York, 1966), pp. 230–51. For a rather different account of the Slavophiles’ view of the state see N.I. Tsimbayev, ‘Zapiska K.S. Aksakova “O vnutrennym sostoyanii Rossii” I ego mesto v ideologii slavyanofil’stva’, Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, seriya istoriya, no. 2, 1972, pp. 47–60.

For a brief description of the controversies, see Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (Harmondsworth, 1982), pp. 114–17, 121–5.

For details see Algirdas J. Kasulaitis, Lithuanian Christian Democracy (Chicago, 1976).

For a general discussion on this theme see Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR (Boulder, CO, 1987); also see Agursky, Ideologiya natsional-bol’shevizma (Paris, 1980) on the same topic.


A treatment rather along these lines, stressing the ‘gnostic’ elements in the Russian intellectual tradition, can be found in Alain Besançon, The Intellectual Origins of Leninism (Oxford, 1981).


Ibid., p. 54.


See, for example, the approach taken in Giuseppe De Palma, To Craft Democracies: an Essay in Democratic Transition (Berkeley, CA, 1990).


Sakwa, ‘Christian Democracy and civil society...’.


White et al., op. cit., p. 83.