

Charting the Russian Religious Renaissance*

YEVGENI PAZUKHIN

The 'religious renaissance of the 1970s' was a phenomenon confined almost exclusively to the intelligentsia of Moscow and Leningrad and to a lesser extent of the Baltic Republics. It ought more properly to be called an 'Orthodox renaissance' since it was Orthodox lay people who were involved. At that time I was living in Leningrad and participating actively in the Christian life of the city, so I will concentrate on the situation there over the past three decades (1960–1990), with some reference to Moscow. My main focus will be those who were active in the circles, seminars and groups of the Christian social movement; this activity took place against a background of less organised and more informal exploration by the Soviet intelligentsia.

The first external event to impel us and many other postwar groups into action was the so-called 'Khrushchev thaw'. People's minds were completely defrosted and they began to take an interest in previously forbidden subjects such as religion. Interestingly enough, the second spur to the search for truth was Khrushchev's antireligious campaign. The defrosted minds began to think in ways quite different from those which had been anticipated by the planners.

Of course, in the beginning Christianity was not the issue. Nor was it even religion in general. It all started with the recovery of our almost forgotten capacity to think, to see, to hear the world around us; the capacity for normal human behaviour. Ideas of God came back to us along with our renewed sense of life. Thus, in a sense, 'life' and 'God' were synonyms for us. It was all expressed in the one all-embracing word 'spirituality' (*dukhovnost'*). This included everything: culture, political activity, the free exchange of ideas, religion and so on. On the other hand, the concept of 'spirituality' contained within itself a pointer to something higher: it led us to the idea of existence of a completely different kind. In essence, the changes that had taken place in social life were for us a symbol of the transition from this life to another ('from death to life'). The syncretism of these searches for meaning created the preconditions for the emergence of a whole range of directions taken by our intelligentsia in the 1960s and 1970s. Two of these were of particular significance from a social point of view. They could be called the path of political activism and the path of religious searching. The first path found its fulfilment in the formation of the dissident movement, and the second in the 'religious renaissance'.

It must be admitted that even among those who followed the second path there were some extremely hazy ideas about religion. In the beginning the most dominant members of this group were homegrown yoga enthusiasts, Buddhists, even fascists

*This article was written in 1990.

(the last also assumed some sort of 'religious' halo). Interest in Christianity (or more specifically in Orthodoxy) took shape among us only towards the second half of the 1960s. In the main, this interest took the form of endless conversations about this same 'spirituality'. Some of us even read some religious books (which we obtained with great difficulty). Our reading was quite unsystematic: *Aurora* by J. Boehme, *The Holy Book of Thoth* in Shmakov's translation, *Asketicheskiye opyti* by Ignati Bryanchaninov and so on. Sometimes we would go to church. At that time, at the height of Khrushchev's relentless atheist campaign, this was in its own way a deed of spiritual valour. We were regarded with the same amazement by the old women who frequented the church and by passers-by who happened to look in. A few of us had already been baptised, and even did some preaching. This took place sometimes, it must be said, in very strange ways. I remember how two friends 'persuaded' me to be baptised: one held me down on a couch and another waved a scorching iron in front of my face (these 'arguments' had no effect). Some preached on the streets or on public transport and naturally ended up in psychiatric hospitals.

The 1960s saw the formation of small groups of young people with religious leanings. We gathered in each other's homes and talked about things 'in heaven, on earth, and under the earth', having about the same amount of understanding of each. We were carried away with one thing after another: the teachings of Nietzsche, of Schelling, of Freud, Buddhism, yoga, the occult and so on. To use the words of one of my friends, it was a real 'universal cocktail'. Some of us even tried to create something new out of this jumble: some sort of synthesis of virtually every philosophical doctrine and world religion. In fact, 'synthesis' along with 'spirituality' was one of the key concepts of that era.

Apart from theological books, which came our way extremely rarely, our source of 'religious information' was Russian classical literature (Gogol, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky) and also Russian poetry of this century (Mandel'shtam, Gumilev, Akhmatova, Tsvetayeva, Pasternak). This poetry, almost all of it unpublished, circulated in typescript and photocopies. This was essentially the first *samizdat* in Russia.

Our path to Christianity thus went by way of culture. This explains why in the 1960s and 1970s it was predominantly members of the creative intelligentsia who went to church. Our 'religious renaissance' began with a cultural renaissance. Within this group there was a syncretism in our terminology that was very revealing: cultural manifestations were defined in terms that were, strictly speaking, religious in character, and religious phenomena in turn were interpreted in cultural language. Many poets, for example, described their work as being 'attested by the Spirit' – they were absolutely certain that it was the Spirit of God that was moving their pen. At the same time, biblical texts and church services were sometimes evaluated in a purely aesthetic or intellectual manner.

In their creative works our artists and poets intertwined eroticism and religion at whim. (This had also been a characteristic of the 'religious renaissance' at the start of the twentieth century.) Dominant was the autoeroticism of the artist himself, the cult of the artist as 'Creator'. The Poet (with a capital letter) felt himself to be the most authentic embodiment of God's will in this world. I can testify to the religious veneration in which we held the poets, having myself met Akhmatova and Brodsky. The latter, at least in his early works, constantly presents the model of his own creative 'I', which is endowed with the sacrificial, immortal and omnipotent features of the divine. His poem *Shestviye*, for example, gives us the image of the 'dead soldier, the king' who 'endures suffering'. Of course this is not Christ, but it may well be a poetical transformation of his image which has undergone multiple reflection in the mir-

rors of creativity. All the religious poetry written in Leningrad in the 1960s and 1970s is characterised by similar kinds of transformations and substitutions – which do not, of course, reflect badly on the poets' intentions. A poet is partly a medium of spiritual, though not necessarily divine, powers and that is why the religious content of our 'religious poetry' is of a very doubtful quality, while as poetry it is often technically excellent. Various levels of spiritual substitution can be seen in the works of Bobyshev, Okhapkin, Kukriyanov, Mironov and Stratanovsky (these are Leningrad poets whose works have a religious content of some kind). The most spiritual works are possibly those of Yelena Shvarts. Art is always more truthful than its creators, however. Our poets spoke a lot about their devotion to Christianity; 'but by their fruits you shall know them'. The seed from which our brilliant 'religious renaissance' grew was that of 'witnessing to the spirit'; and its biggest fruits were poems in which God is portrayed as a witness to the divinity of the Poet. Generally speaking our religious search was intensified by all the fantasies and complexes which characterised the religious quest of the Russian intelligentsia at the beginning of this century.

The relationship between these two 'renaissances' was perceived very clearly by one of the participants in the 'round table' published in *Vestnik Russkogo khristianskogo dvizheniya* no. 149:

It was a spontaneous process fraught with unpleasant transformations. The justification for calling it a 'renaissance' – it was described in narrower terms as 'the revival of a revival' – was that it was an attempt somehow to renew what is known as the 'Russian renaissance', that is the religious, philosophical, spiritual and cultural renaissance of the start of this century. ... In fact this was the regeneration of that section of society involved in spiritual and creative culture.'

This quotation explains why the 'religious renaissance' of the 1970s affected the creative intelligentsia more than anyone else and also why it is impossible to consider it separately from the general cultural and sociopolitical situation. Such a non-traditional way of entering the Church had specific peculiarities. People who receive an Orthodox education grow organically into church life; but right up to the end we did not feel at home in the Church. This resulted in a kind of tension and hysteria in our relationship with church reality – or rather, two types of hysteria: the 'hysteria of alienation' and the 'hysteria of accepting everything'. Those suffering from the first type rejected everything that did not conform to their 'ideal' of church life; those suffering from the second type accepted everything with enthusiasm — including those things which ought to have been altered or even excluded from church practice. Both these attitudes were two aspects of a fetishisation of tradition which itself arose in the context of being cut off from tradition.

Two attitudes of mind associated with the Russian intelligentsia thus made their appearance, the first characterised by self-exaltation, the second by extreme self-abasement. In the former we meet the 'critically thinking personality' who tries to shape everything to his own pattern; in the latter we encounter zealous attempts to fit oneself into a Procrustean bed regardless of who made it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s it was members of the intelligentsia belonging for the most part to the first of these two types who entered the Church. Along with the negative elements already referred to, they introduced something positive into church life. With their arrival, cultural, social and political issues began to impinge on the consciousness of the Russian Church, which had been isolated from everything secular. The creative and

humanitarian intelligentsia squarely confronted the Church with the problem of *man*. Thus contemporary Russian Orthodoxy achieved personality.

At the start of the 1970s members of the unofficial Leningrad humanitarian intelligentsia began to establish religious-philosophical circles and seminars. One of the first of these studied Russian religious philosophy of the turn of the century and met at the flat of the poet Sergei Stratanovsky. Next was a cultural religious-philosophical seminar which lasted some time and involved the brothers Konstantin and Mikhail Ivanov, Boris Ivanov and Tat'yana Goricheva. After this a Jewish seminar was started. All these groups were uncoordinated and operated under conditions of extreme conspiracy, often unaware of one another's existence. It was not until the mid-1970s that a seminar arose in Leningrad which aimed to unite those among the intelligentsia who were engaged in a religious search. Like so many aspects of the spiritual life of Russia at that time, this seminar had a very complicated genesis. It was the fruit not only of the religious quest, but also of the evolution of more general cultural processes.

The 'bulldozer exhibition' of 15 September 1974 was the first spur towards an organised movement involving unofficial cultural groups.² It was followed by an exhibition in Izmailovsky Park and then exhibitions in the 'Gaza' and 'Nevsky' palaces of culture in Leningrad and at the Exhibition of Economic Achievements in Moscow. In order to defend their right to creative freedom artists risked their freedom, their health and even their life. Of the Leningraders, for example, Vadim Filimonov was sentenced to one and a half years, Yuri Zharkikh was gassed on a train and Yevgeni Rukhin died under suspicious circumstances.

An atmosphere of extreme tension and overstimulation reigned at the exhibitions. People queued for days, regardless of the weather, to see the forbidden art. The significance of the events obviously went beyond mere painting, and even culture in general. It touched the deepest layers of existence, evoking confused feelings of terror, rapture and unreality, as if we had quite unexpectedly found ourselves in a new dimension of existence. Indeed, we experienced a feeling very close to religious ecstasy.

Members of the literary Bohemia were naturally also gripped by this feeling. During the early exhibitions we came into close contact with artists. Some of us even got involved in what they were doing – for example, the open-air exhibition at the St Peter and St Paul Fortress. It was their example that encouraged us to attempt to publish officially an anthology of poems by Leningrad poets. We called it *Lepta* (*The Mite*); it included several hundred poems by 32 authors. Compiling it took four months and in June 1975 *Lepta* was submitted to the Leningrad department of the 'Sovetsky pisatel' publishing house. Of course it was not published, but the very process of putting it together united members of the unofficial literary world and was the beginning of regular *samizdat* in Leningrad. The entire group which had initiated the anthology became the editorial board of the almanac *Chasy*, from which two *samizdat* journals, *Chasy* and *37*, subsequently descended.

Meanwhile we continued to be involved in other kinds of cultural activity. Poetry evenings were held regularly at the premises of the Writers' Union and in private flats. While we were discussing the poems our conversation would regularly turn to religious matters. We decided to devote several evenings to religious art. One evening, for example, the artist Vadim Filimonov gave a lecture on 'Christianity and abstract painting'. I presented a study of the epistles of St Paul. We began to realise that a systematic study of theology was needed.

The idea of a religious-philosophical seminar in which we would all learn from

each other was proposed by Tat'yana Goricheva. We started meeting at the end of October 1975. Goricheva turned out to be an excellent organiser – it took great skill to stimulate and direct the activity of the assorted crowd of people who attended the seminar. What kind of people did this crowd consist of? A portrait of a typical participant will to some extent be the portrait of a young, religiously minded member of the 1970s intelligentsia. This type of person would normally be doing something creative (or would say he was) – an artist, a poet, an essayist – and would tend to view his creations as the revelation of a divine principle. The overwhelming majority of the seminar's participants would be very far from traditional forms of religion. Even those who insisted they were church members normally held quite individual religious views. What unified all these people was not similarity of dogma, but conviction that the religious search should be completely free: in the psychological atmosphere of those years it was not difficult to accept this 'spirit of freedom' as the Spirit of the Lord.

The atmosphere at the sessions of the seminar was to a large extent defined by those who came to them: bohemians, some of them alcoholics and drug addicts, habitués of the famous 'Saigon' cafe on the corner of Nevsky Prospekt and Vladimirsky Prospekt. The sessions sometimes turned into 'happenings': people came who were drunk or high on drugs. Quite often people who were simply insane turned up. It must be remembered that our seminar was the only open, active, unofficial cultural activity in Leningrad at that time (all the others were deep underground). There was simply nowhere else for people wanting to meet in cultural freedom to go. They came, then, not so much because they wanted to learn but because the atmosphere satisfied their desire to find something 'different' and to break free from the constraints of official atheism. It is therefore understandable that the membership of the seminar was constantly changing. We met in different flats and each time there were different people present, apart from the core group of six or seven. Sometimes as many as 80 people crowded into one room. They sat on tables, on windowsills, on bookcases and on blankets spread out on the floor. Most of them did not participate in the discussion of the lectures; it sometimes seemed that they were not interested in the subject at all. Nevertheless, 30 to 50 people came every time. Several hundred people attended the seminar at one time or another.

In circumstances like these any systematic study of patristic theology was of course doomed to failure. There were too many people and the meetings were wrongly organised. So we soon had to change the format. We would have a lecture on some theme concerned with Christianity and culture, and then discussion. Topics included religion and poetry, Christianity and humanism, Christianity and nationalism, 'neo-Christianity'. In the final stages of the seminar we again turned to what had originally stimulated our religious search: Russian religious philosophy of the turn of the century. Developing this tradition, we published a collection of articles under the title *Tserkov', kul'tura, ideologiya*, in the style of the famous *Vekhi*. I fear that its main value was as a courageous idea.

The best time for the seminar was when it met at flat 37, no. 20 Kurlyandskaya Street near the Baltic Station, where Tat'yana Goricheva and the Leningrad poet Viktor Krivulin, who were married at that time, lived in the later 1970s. The flat was in the semi-basement and you could get in through the window. As well as the constant crowd of people there were a great number of stray cats which were fed generously by both hosts and guests. The number of this flat gave its name to the journal 37, which from 1976 was the journal of the seminar. It was subsequently given the subtitle *Zhurnal pravoslavnoi kul'tury* (*The Journal of Orthodox Culture*), which in

my opinion did not fully correspond to what was published in it. It was not Orthodoxy but religion in its broadest sense which provided the extraordinarily convenient and accommodating platform on which people of very different and sometimes opposing views, from occultists and Tantrists to adherents of Orthodox tradition in its most conservative form, were able to gather in the 1970s.

Guests often attended sessions of the seminar: representatives of other religious groups and societies, including the Jewish seminar. Even Anthroposophists came. We had very close links with the Baptists, both registered and unregistered. Of the Orthodox clergy only Fr Lev Konin (now living in Paris) took part in our work, and the late Fr Sergi Zhelukov sometimes attended, but on the whole the clergy were completely indifferent to us. On the other hand, another organisation was very interested in us. I suspect that informers were present at nearly every seminar. No one who attended the seminar was subjected to serious persecution, however. Some people had difficulties at work, but the consequences never went any further. Those who did end up in prison or who were forced to emigrate suffered for reasons unconnected with the seminar. Vadim Filimonov, the activist in the artists' movement mentioned earlier, was condemned on a false accusation of hooliganism and was subsequently exiled from the USSR. Vyacheslav Dolinik was sentenced to four years' labour camp and three years' exile for links with the NTS. The seminar had met in his flat for two and a half years. Fr Lev Konin was at first put in a psychiatric hospital and then exiled. Another active participant in the seminar, Lev Rudkevich, was forced to emigrate. Some other seminar members met a similar fate. Tat'yana Goricheva was exiled from the USSR for 'Christian feminism'. There were two or three sessions after she left, but the seminar could not continue in the same way without her. We could not recreate the atmosphere which had prevailed under her leadership.

Apart from the journal 37, about the only achievement of the seminar over the five-year period of its activity was 'atmosphere'. None of us gained a systematic knowledge of theology and therefore the main purpose of the seminar, to educate, was unfortunately not fulfilled.

The members of the 'Seminar on the Problems of the Religious Renaissance in Russia', which was active in Moscow from 1974, set themselves tasks on a larger scale. Its organisers and leaders were Aleksandr Ogorodnikov and Vladimir Poresh. To begin with they focused on the young people associated with Fr Dmitri Dudko, but later parted company with him. The reasons were typical: they thought Fr Dmitri was using his priest's powers rather too freely and infringing the personal freedom of his parishioners.

According to Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, the basic idea of the seminar was to find out how Christianity can function under a totalitarian regime and with the Church held captive by an atheist state. The Muscovites attempted to create not simply a seminar but a community – a vessel for a new spiritual reality. They called their journal *Obshchina* (*Community*). Its chief editor was Vladimir Poresh. Material for the journal was several times confiscated by the KGB, and as a result only one double issue was produced, of approximately 350 typewritten pages.

Like the members of the Leningrad seminar the members of the Moscow seminar were social outsiders. For example, only roadsweepers came to one of the sessions. The Moscow seminar lacked a firm, organised structure and its programme was not well enough defined. It started its work with discussions on the same theme as that of its Leningrad counterpart, namely culture and religion. Later it took on a more educational character and finally turned into a series of lectures on Orthodox dogma given

by Lev Regel'son. The Moscow seminar thus evolved in a similar way to the one in Leningrad, from religion in a broad sense to a clearly acknowledged Orthodox church orientation. Yet the fate of the members of the Moscow seminar turned out to be much more severe than that of the Leningrad members. Ogorodnikov, Poresh and several others were sentenced to various periods of imprisonment.

It is important to emphasise that from the very beginning of its existence right up until its dissolution the Moscow seminar did not pursue any political or even 'anti-soviet' aims. On the contrary, it held a naive, romantic idea of the possibility of an imminent spiritual 'conquest of the world for Christ'. The theme of 'spiritual struggle' was prominent in letters from members of the seminar to several church organisations and religious groups abroad, and also in articles in the journal *Obshchina*. It was clear, of course, that any attempt to achieve ideological emancipation would more or less automatically lead to punitive action on the part of the state and that any contact with the West would be seen as 'betrayal of the Motherland' and as collaboration with foreign subversion and intelligence centres.

The Moscow and Leningrad seminars first joined forces in 1979 not long before the Moscow seminar was finally dissolved. Ogorodnikov was already in prison. Poresh was on the point of arrest. Contact between the two seminars, and even the merging of the two, promised many new possibilities but none of these was fated to be realised.

Of course, there were other Christian groups and communities in Moscow. Among them were Fr Dmitri Dudko's community, the network of small Christian brotherhoods surrounding Fr Aleksandr Men', and 'Ekumena' headed by the layman Sandr Riga. All of these were subjected to some degree of pressure and several individuals, for example Fr Dmitri and Sandr Riga, were singled out for persecution.

The end of the 1970s saw a sharp intensification of repression of 'alternative thinkers', including Christian activists. This period lasted until the mid-1980s and was one of the gloomiest periods of our postwar history: the defeat of the dissident movement, the occupation of Afghanistan and the collapse of illusions about a 'religious renaissance'. A strengthening of conservative feeling was evident not only in politics but also in religious spheres. The free search for religious truth began to be supplanted by a demonstrative adherence to tradition, and the aspiration towards Christ by a fanatical faith in the Church. It is worth emphasising the fact that at that time most of us believed in the Russian Orthodox Church in all its historical actuality. This change in the nature of the search for religious truth was given extra impetus by a significant renewal of Orthodox laity. In the new wave which came into the Church in the late 1970s and early 1980s it was members of the technical intelligentsia who predominated, rather than representatives of the creative humanitarian intelligentsia. These people tended not to emphasise individual personality, as those influenced by the thinking of the 1960s had done, but rather to suppress it. It seems to me that the enthusiasm most of them had earlier experienced for the East played a large part in the formation of their church consciousness. Many of those who joined the Church in the late 1960s and early 1970s had also shared this enthusiasm, but it had been overcome by the critically inclined and intellectually active creative intelligentsia in the course of their becoming part of the Church. However, the second wave of intellectuals did not possess so much humanitarian culture and could not see the abyss which divided the East from Christianity, and so they brought into church life quite alien elements of eastern mystical teachings and associated occult practices. Moreover, what attracted them about the Russian Orthodox Church was its evocation of eastern mysticism and occultism, that is, its least Christian aspect. It was no

accident that what they singled out from church tradition were the legalistic and priestly elements. These new parishioners brought to contemporary Russian church life a peevish rejection of all that is 'worldly' and unquestioning submission to the authority of the 'guru', in this case the Russian Orthodox priests who allowed themselves to be influenced by the new Orthodox laity. Our priests, who as a rule were intimidated and poorly educated, began to feed themselves on the 'theology' of the active and often more erudite neophytes – a theology which under an Orthodox shell was frequently of eastern mystical or rationalist content. This eastern passivity and quietism proved more acceptable to our clergy than the European activity and scepticism more often adopted by our creative intelligentsia. All this points to the conclusion that from the end of the 1970s the flock was to a certain extent creating its own pastors, with lamentable results for everyone.

Nevertheless, the Christian movement which emerged into the 1980s was undeniably a healthy seed in that it was a natural reaction against the self-deception and bombast characteristic of many of the Orthodox intelligentsia of the previous decade. At the end of the 1970s people were talking about the 'triumph of the Light of the Transfiguration'; by the start of the 1980s the subjects were the traditional empty phrasemongering and dense theological ignorance of the intelligentsia. The attempt to abolish 'religious illiteracy' led to the setting up of a religious study seminar in Leningrad early in 1981. Its tasks were formulated in a *Manifesto* adopted at one of its early sessions.

The past decade has heard much talk of Christianity. Now it is time to live and believe in a Christian manner. ... The Apostolic Church received blessings which can be passed on to us: the true living teaching of Christ – a teaching which is not just reliable but genuine. We must learn within the Church as God's messengers and from the Fathers of the Church who express the truth of the Church.

We know less about our faith than any child who has learnt the law of God – the basic prayers, the layout of the church, the holy objects, the ceremony of worship. ...

Learning in our situation is very difficult. We have no teachers, no books, no suitable conditions for lessons. ... In view of this the most rational teaching method would seem to be to learn together. ... We must develop a programme of study (perhaps based on that of the theological seminary) in which everyone participates actively in the study process. The subject matter should be chosen in advance and, as far as possible, be chosen by the participants.

Our main task must be 'mutual education', which will probably take more than a year, but there are other tasks too, which could each be achieved separately in parallel to the main task. These include teaching the faith to our children, catechising neophytes, preaching, and the development of Orthodox theology. The most important of them is possibly genuine Christian fellowship in community and the greatest possible involvement of church members in the life of the Church. ...

Any question may be asked, any doubt expressed. It is important only that the answers that we find correspond with Orthodox teaching and, particu-

larly, with the spirit of Orthodoxy. The most important condition for this is meeting for prayer in the community of the Church, which must be a feature of the entire period of our studies.

As well as combatting 'religious illiteracy', then, the seminar's aims were the formation of community, missionary activity and the greatest possible involvement in church life.

One of the main conditions of the seminar was that all the participants attend every session, though, naturally, by no means all of them did so. Another principle was the maximum involvement of all members. The slogan 'If you're not going to work, you can't take part' dated from the very beginning. This was necessary not only for the creation of an optimal working environment but also to ensure security. The biggest potential danger was from 'ballast', as in Tat'yana Goricheva's seminars, where a percentage of the participants were informers.

Thanks to our organisational efforts we succeeded quite quickly in establishing an effective study process. The first thing we studied was *Tochnoye izlozheniye pravoslavnoi very* (*An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*) by St John of Damascus. We tried to stick as closely as possible to patristic sources. A programme of study gradually came together which included the basic theological disciplines of liturgy, the history of the Church, dogmatics and exegetics. Sometimes we studied other subjects, such as patristics and Christian anthropology. It is clear that our manifesto and programme were strictly Orthodox in spirit. This was the trend at that time. The overwhelming majority of us were grasped by a wave of neophytical rapture. Yet I would very much have liked to see room for personal Christian search in our new seminar, such as had characterised the religious-philosophical seminar of the 1970s. It was this desire of mine which led to conflict in the early stages of the 'liquidation of our illiteracy'.

I gave a course on the exegesis of the New Testament. When we reached the Sermon on the Mount I invited everyone to prepare his or her own interpretation of the passage. (I got this idea from Biblical discussions I once took part in with the Baptists.) However, the response was a genuine storm of indignation. They accused me of pride, of heresy and of trying to understand through human wisdom that which is revealed only through the mystical experience of the Church. My attempts to defend myself with references to the Bible and the writings of the Holy Fathers all met with failure. It was only then that I understood that in that situation logic and theological argument were absolutely useless. I had come up against a fanaticism based exclusively on authority (in this case the authority of the Orthodox hierarchy) and an *a priori* rejection of any approach based on reason. This conflict ended with the departure of the most 'Orthodox' of our members (who were mostly women); but the rest of us continued to work with great enthusiasm. In the five years of the seminar's existence there were hardly any instances of speakers failing to appear or coming to sessions unprepared. I had rarely seen such industriousness among our intelligentsia.

It can be said in conclusion that most of the participants gained a great deal from the seminar, especially those who worked hard, but there was no tangible result. We did not fulfil our main aim, let alone the other tasks laid out in the manifesto. Our attempts to involve the most creative and industrious people did not always meet with success. The most upsetting thing of all, however, was that after five years of work the seminar did not have a collection of the materials it had worked through. Much effort had gone into preparing them and they could have been of use for

similar ventures in the future.

Such were the internal problems we came up against in the course of our activity; and there were a lot of external problems too. Some of these were very basic: the absence of essential literature, time to prepare lectures and sometimes simply a place to hold them. It must be remembered that these seminars were held in a constant state of terror and in conditions of the strictest conspiracy. At that time many religious activists were being persecuted before our eyes.

It is true to say that we did not experience pressure from the secular powers directly. I later understood that the church hierarchy had been chosen as the means of exerting pressure over us and it fulfilled its mission zealously. People often ask what the role of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy is in the Christian social movement. The correct answer is that with very rare exceptions their role is to suppress it. We did succeed in securing the blessing of one priest at the beginning, but we soon sensed his growing reserve and then his active opposition to what we were doing. He expressed support for our work but in practice he did all he could to curtail it, especially after one of the highest representatives of church authority heard about us and demanded that 'this sect' be dispersed. The priest then began to intimidate me constantly in our conversations, attempting to force the seminar to cease its work. He told me I could find myself receiving forced treatment in a psychiatric hospital or even end up in prison on a charge of antisoviet activity – and judging by the repressive measures then being applied he was probably right.

Of course, normal human logic tells us that the study of Orthodox theology can in no way be classed among 'particularly dangerous crimes against the state', but then, the logic which governed us at that time was certainly not normal. The point of legislation, propaganda and punitive practice in our country over the decades was not the suppression of 'antistate activity' but the prevention of any independent activity as such, any spontaneous and unsanctioned manifestation of individuality. In the end the priest who had originally given us his blessing retracted it and announced that our seminar was nothing other than a 'heretical assembly', and he literally threw me out of his church as an incorrigible 'heretic'. How far must people's consciousness have been perverted for a basically good and clever man to be able to do something like that! He knew very well that there was nothing heretical about our activities. Did those members of the hierarchy who encouraged him really not realise that by accusing us of heresy they were doing something more terrible than accusing us of breaking the law separating church from state, say, or even the law on antisoviet agitation and propaganda? Did they really not realise what sin they were laying on their souls by making this accusation unjustly? According to the Church, a heretic is condemned to eternal death, and so an accusation of heresy as a lever of political pressure is even more terrible than the use of psychiatry to achieve political aims – and all the more so if we consider into whose hands the lever was put. Anyway, for us, the members of the seminar, the suppression of our church activity by the church hierarchy itself came as a terrible shock. The seminar subsequently broke up mainly because of the extreme confusion and humiliation most of its participants were experiencing.

How can the hierarchy's position be explained? I do not think it was simply the result of the pressure it was subjected to: the pressure has now disappeared but the hierarchy has hardly changed its position at all. It is one of the paradoxes of Soviet life that the church hierarchy which was scorned and persecuted for decades in the USSR has turned into a privileged social caste. During the Brezhnev epoch a symbiosis between church and secular power gave the Russian Orthodox hierarchy a comfortable existence and insurance against any possible surprises from the flock,

and so any attempt to rouse them from their habitual lethargy is treated as the most loathsome heresy by our archbishops.

We should note the remarkable coincidence that the final break-up of the seminar came in the spring of 1985 just when a new 'thaw' was beginning in our country. Of course, no one then even thought there might be a chance in relations between church and state on the way, although the social climate as a whole was changing in various ways. Under the influence of these changes the Christian community in Leningrad began to gather its scattered forces.

In February 1986 church intelligentsia members of an educational seminar founded a seminar for the study of Russian Orthodox church history to coincide with the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of Rus'. Like its forerunners this seminar was based on the principle of mutual teaching. For two years it undertook a detailed study of the main stages of prerevolutionary Russian church history. The seminar gradually became more open in character as the internal political situation changed. At the same time, however, an unfortunate tendency began to manifest itself: as external pressures lessened, centrifugal forces grew. The ties which up until now had united Orthodox laymen involved in these kinds of activity began to weaken swiftly. Lines of demarcation first noticed at the start of the 1980s became more and more distinct as *perestroika* developed, especially with regard to traditional Russian Orthodox values. Many of those who had earlier been inclined to criticise certain aspects of church life now started decisively rejecting almost the whole of the church tradition. At the same time the former traditionalists now became even more energetic, sometimes even fanatical, in their adherence.

Differences were particularly clear in evaluations of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy. The more liberal among the Orthodox laity accused the hierarchy of conformism, of collaboration with the authorities and of betraying the interests of the Church; while the more 'Orthodox' considered the hierarchy to be the mainstay of church life, referring to the sacrament of priesthood and the continuity of grace. They regarded any criticism of the hierarchy as undermining the foundations of the Church, and accused their opponents of Protestantism and defection from Orthodoxy. The 'Liberals', in their turn, accused the traditionalists of ritualism, of extreme conservatism and of being out of touch with the real and urgent problems within the Church. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the hierarchs had begun to find their voice in the course of the internal political changes and had started actively and openly attacking their critics from among the church intelligentsia. The result of all this was a tendency towards schism in the Church which intensifies with every year.

As a result of these destructive processes, nationalist tendencies have been reinforced, first in the social and political spheres and then in the field of culture and religion. The existence of cultural or religious nationalism in Leningrad was not, in my opinion, suspected until the mid-1980s. When we were young we never thought of each other in terms of nationality. The appearance of chauvinism could be compared to 'cultural intervention': until very recently Leningrad had reason to be proud of its internationalism in the cultural sphere as well as in church circles, but now newcomers who seem to have come from outer space have begun to talk about the domination of Russian culture and religion by non-Russians.

These changes have affected seminar members too. In earlier days we hardly ever looked at national questions but from the mid-1980s onwards some members became keenly interested in national values. The seminar saw stormy discussions and even quarrels during the sessions on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. One of the educational seminar's most active participants later headed the Leningrad branch

of *Pamyat'* for a while.

Conservative-nationalist tendencies in culture and religion had been evident in Moscow significantly earlier than in Leningrad. In many respects Moscow differs radically from Leningrad (and indeed from all other parts of the country). Even in the most stagnant times Moscow was host to a rich variety of tendencies, directions and possibilities. The cultural and religious life of the capital was always characterised by tension between the opposing forces of extreme conservatism on the one hand and unrestrained liberalism on the other. In my view this is a consequence of the fact that Moscow has been much more closely in touch than anywhere else in the country with European civilisation. On the one hand the status of capital city predetermines intensive intrusion by the West while on the other hand it provokes energetic opposition. The powerful 'magnet' of Europe has generally speaking 'decentralised' the cultural process in Moscow. Leningrad is concentrated round one cultural centre; Moscow contains a very large number of diverse and completely unconnected circles.

At the same time, things which in Leningrad were separated into strict compartments in Moscow flowed freely into one another: for example, official and unofficial culture. Contact and cooperation between the official and unofficial intelligentsia were virtually nonexistent in pre-*perestroika* Leningrad whereas in Moscow they were a commonplace phenomenon. In Leningrad, for example, it would be quite impossible to imagine *samizdat* with contributions from official writers like the almanac *Metropol'*.

Only the capital city, thanks to the presence of a large number of missions and correspondents there, was able to remain a significant centre of political opposition even in the most stagnant times. This is obvious from the fact that during the 1970s the predominant form of *samizdat* in Moscow was political in content. In Leningrad, on the other hand, *samizdat* was almost exclusively cultural in nature, although after the start of *perestroika* the balance between political and cultural *samizdat* in Leningrad began to be redressed.

The differences between Moscow and Leningrad naturally extend into church life. In postwar Moscow there were more gifted and courageous priests than anywhere else in Russia (except perhaps in Leningrad under Metropolitan Nikodim) and the policy of the secular authorities towards the Church in Moscow was defined to a much greater extent by considerations of international relations than in other dioceses. This often meant that church policy in Moscow was more repressive than elsewhere but sometimes it meant that it was more liberal. Nowhere else were so many Christian activists arrested and sentenced, but nowhere else could priests act as freely as in the capital. It is quite impossible to imagine any activity anywhere in the provinces during the years of stagnation like that which Fr Dmitri Dudko undertook for so long without being punished, or like that of the well organised network of brotherhoods surrounding Fr Aleksandr Men'.

This difference between Moscow and the rest of the country became even more apparent during the period of *perestroika*. It was only in the capital that the hierarchy gave permission on the first request for priests to visit schools, clubs and other institutions to talk about the Christian faith. I suspect that this was the result of pressure from the secular authorities. Moscow is the facade of an empire. It is first of all in Moscow that the West forms its judgment on the political situation in the country as a whole. Where else if not in the capital city should the triumph of freedom of conscience be demonstrated?

Christian social organisations in Moscow are also significantly more active than anywhere else. Muscovites have already made several attempts to create a nation-

wide mass Christian movement. The first initiatives came from Christian dissidents who were released from camps and exile in 1987, notably Fr Gleb Yakunin, Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, Zoya Krakhmal'nikova, Feliks Svetov and Sandr Riga (Vladimir Poresh was released in 1986). It was around these people that activists from among the clergy and laity began to gather. One of the first actions taken by this nascent group of Christian social activists was the *Pis'mo devyati* (*Letter from the Nine*) of 23 May 1987 to Gorbachev and the Russian Orthodox bishops in which they formulated a new concept of church–state relations. The letter ended with a call for recognition of the Church in all the fullness of its spiritual, social and legal existence.

All that the Church today is waiting for, all that it is fighting for, could we believe be expressed in one word: recognition. This would not be recognition as a cult which has survived from the past, but as an independent spiritual, legal and cultural reality, whose existence is not a burden but one of the many genuine assets and treasures of our country. The right to be a Church such as it is called to be in accordance with its evangelical and apostolic faith must be granted to it at this time of its 1000-year jubilee.

Usually slow and lazy, in this instance the church authorities acted very efficiently. Metropolitan Yuvenali of Krutitsy and Kolomna called a press conference for foreign journalists to talk about the 'antichurch activities of Fr Gleb Yakunin' (he simply did not mention the others). It was hard to make sense of what the metropolitan had to say, but his message was basically that unless Fr Gleb changed his behaviour, he would again be forbidden to serve as a priest.

As a reaction to this letter and similar manifestations of lay church activity I might cite the document *Obrashcheniye glav i predstavitelei tserkvei i religioznykh ob"yedinenii SSSR k religiozным deyatelyam i pastve* (*Appeal by Leaders and Representatives of Churches and Religious Associations in the USSR to Religious Activists and to the Flock*) adopted at an ecumenical gathering at the Trinity-St Sergius Monastery in late 1987. The document talks about a number of members of 'various churches' who have 'gone astray': 'they all have a nihilistic attitude towards the direction that religious life has traditionally taken and adopt an implacably didactic critical tone towards religious leaders. They attempt to set themselves up in opposition to the Church or religious association, claiming the right to express the true interests of believers.' It is obvious from this excerpt that the *Appeal* was composed in the best traditions of internal political documents from the darkest period of 'stagnation'. (We should note that the reaction of the Soviet authorities to the *Letter of the Nine* was somewhat more positive. Some of the points raised in the letter even appeared in official publications.)

The next step to be taken by the Christian activists was the creation of a committee to prepare for the celebrations of the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of Rus'. Then they announced plans for a systematic series of religious-philosophical seminars, of theological meetings and so on. Unfortunately all these initiatives collapsed before they could take shape. Differences in ideas, aims and tactics and purely personal ambition very soon began to manifest themselves. Independent groups began to set themselves up, and these were frequently hostile to each other. In Moscow such groups included the circle of church activists centred on Fr Gleb Yakunin (which went on to found the 'Church and *Perestroika*' movement), the group publishing the journal *Vybor* (*Choice*) which was to initiate the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, and the group associated with the *Byulleten' khristianskoi obshchestven-*

nosti (*Bulletin of Christian Social Concern*), from which arose the Christian Democratic Union of Russia, now splintered into several groups. The period of co-operation among groups for Christian social concern in Moscow thus lasted for about a year, from spring 1987 to spring 1988. In Leningrad it lasted a little longer.

The first legal activity by church associations in the USSR after decades of underground existence was a conference held in Leningrad in April 1988 on the theme of the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of Rus'. Two traditions combined to produce the conference: the tradition of illegal Christian seminars and that of the annual conferences on cultural subjects conducted by the semi-legal *Klub-81*. These two traditions were synthesised in the title of the conference, 'Tsennosti khristianskoi kul'tury' ('The Values of Christian Culture'). It lasted for three days with 18 lecturers from Leningrad and Moscow; several hundred people attended.

We could hardly have run such a large-scale conference without assistance from a most unexpected source: members of the committee of the Leningrad City *Komsomol* offered to help us find somewhere to hold it. As a result many of the sessions took place in large, comfortable auditoria. Part of the conference was even shown on Leningrad television, on the programme *600 Sekund* (*600 Seconds*). In contrast to the Leningrad *Komsomol*, the Leningrad diocese viewed the conference in a very negative light. Archpriest Vladimir Sorokin, rector of the Leningrad Theological Academy, was deputed to express this opinion. Apparently so that no one should doubt his authority, he appeared at one of the sessions wearing a cassock (he was the only priest present to do so, by the way). No one had invited the archpriest to the conference and he was not down to speak in the programme. Nevertheless, he demanded the floor and so we allowed him ten minutes only, as we had planned eight lectures for a four-hour session and naturally none of the speakers had kept to their time limit.

He devoted his speech to an energetic exposition of the view that the business of the conference was unchristian. A Christian, he said, must do nothing other than go to church and pray – any form of social activity is from the devil. The style and content of his speech reminded us very much of the kind we had hated when made by our party functionaries, but paradoxically, the reaction it evoked was quite different.

When his time limit was up we attempted to remind Fr Vladimir of the programme, but he was offended and turned to the hall for support. The organisers of the conference nearly paid with their own lives for attempting to halt the rhetoric of the rector of the Leningrad Theological Academy. People rushed onto the stage, ready to tear to pieces those who were 'insulting the clergy'. I think that if Fr Vladimir had appeared at the conference in clothes appropriate to his function they would have done the same to him.

Despite everything, the conference marked the emergence from underground of the independent Christian social movement in Leningrad. However, in Moscow similar conferences turned out to be the last underground undertakings of their kind. In contrast to the Leningrad conference they provoked an extremely negative response from the authorities. On the eve of a conference organised by the journal *Vybor*, for example, there was a fire in the building they had rented for the event – and it was said that firemen were present. When the participants gathered instead at the theatre on Sretenka the militia and religious specialists in civilian clothes soon turned up threatening to use force if they did not disperse. So the conference was held in a private flat. A conference organised by the editors of the *Byulleten' khristianskoi obshchestvennosti* was also held in a private flat. It subsequently became known that several participants in this conference too had been put under pressure by the

authorities. It is my belief that the reason for this and the reaction to the *Vybor* conference was the emphatically alternative nature of these events as opposed to the official celebrations which were taking place at the same time.

It was in fact during the celebrations of the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of Rus' that it became clear that the multiple problems facing Russian Christians and all those seeking Christ were going to be solved not by the clergy but by a concentrated cooperative effort on the part of the laity. One of our most difficult problems is the spreading of Christian knowledge. In September 1988 the 'Obshchestvo khristiankogo prosveshcheniya' ('Society for Christian Enlightenment') was founded in Leningrad to address this issue. Study sessions take place two or three times a week, and over the past two years courses of lectures have covered various aspects of Christian teaching and church tradition, such as dogma, exegesis, the history of the Church, liturgy, hymnography and so on. There have been numerous seminars on the problems of the contemporary Church, on religious philosophy and on Christian culture as well as discussions on the themes 'Christianity and Orthodoxy', 'Monastic and worldly piety' and 'Christianity and atheism'. Studies are led by members of the society and by academics and university lecturers invited to give talks on particular topics. Foreign visitors talk about their own churches. In the past academic year we had lessons on church singing and this year (1990) we are going to begin catechism courses. At major festivals such as Christmas and Easter we have celebratory evenings with performances by choirs, poetry readings, exhibitions, raffles and so on. Again, the committee of the Leningrad city *Komsomol* has helped us to find places to hold our activities.

Unfortunately, the diocese of Leningrad provides no such support. Characteristically, as the Soviet state became more tolerant towards the spreading of Christian knowledge, Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad³ issued an order (in the autumn of 1988) forbidding the clergy in his diocese from getting involved in Christian enlightenment. Orthodox Christians who had joined the Society for Christian Enlightenment wrote to him twice asking him to give the priests in his diocese his blessing to participate in the work of the society but they received no answer. This is probably because the activity of the society is broadly ecumenical. A large number of lay people agreed with the Church in its negative attitude towards this attempt to place Christian values above religious nationalism. This was what led to conflict in the early days of the SCE. Many of those who were invited to participate in the work of the society demanded as a condition for doing so that the word 'Christian' in the title be replaced by the word 'Orthodox'. When their demand was refused they became very negative about the activities of the SCE.

A conflict during the society's inaugural meeting was the origin of an open split in the Christian social movement. One of the people who had taken the initiative to found the SCE invited a Pentecostal to join its governing board. There were loud protests from many of those present. One active participant in the Leningrad religious seminars made his protest clear by leaving the building where the assembly was taking place. He subsequently became leader of the 'Obshchestvo po izucheniyu pravoslavnoi kul'tury im. Ignatiya Bryanchaninova' ('the Ignati Bryanchaninov Society for the Study of Orthodox Culture'), which was clearly founded as a counterbalance to the 'Society for Christian Enlightenment'.

I believe that this kind of diversification is inevitable and even fruitful. Our country is in need of any kind of Christian activity and the more Christian associations of all kinds the better. It is another matter altogether when under the guise of Christianity people exploit the Soviet population's complete theological ignorance by

introducing deeply anti-Christian and clearly pagan ideas. I recall an incident at a conference in Leningrad on the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of Rus'. During a discussion on the future of Christian culture a representative of the Leningrad division of *Pamyat*' announced that the main task of the Russian Orthodox Church was to purge itself of all Jews. When he was asked whether Christ was not a Jew, he said certainly not, but a similar question about the Virgin Mary sent him into a trance. He collapsed on to a chair which fortunately happened to be next to him and sprawled there for two minutes. Then he came to and laboriously uttered the words, 'In my opinion, no.' I think that if he had been asked 'Was she Russian?' he would have said yes, and that for two pins he would have told us the touching story of a simple Russian peasant called Khrestos who went to preach to the Jews about our Russian Orthodox God and was crucified for it. (I have not made this up. Some of our Russian people really do believe this legend.) Real, historical Christianity has been replaced by a nationalist myth. Regrettably, our history has repeatedly shown that we assimilate pseudomessianic doctrines more easily than the ideals of the Gospel. We have been tempted by the false soteriology of bolshevism; may God protect us from the temptation of the false soteriology of nationalist religion.

By the end of 1988 the Christian social movement in our country had completely emerged from underground. A very wide spectrum of different Christian initiatives made their appearance. I will mention only some of those which have developed in Leningrad during the past 18 months. To begin with there is the already-mentioned Ignati Bryanchaninov Society for the Study of Orthodox Culture, registered with the Russian Cultural Fund. It numbers around 300 people and has branches in Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov. Within the society are small circles studying Church Slavonic and church singing and a centre for organising pilgrimages to Russian monasteries. There are series of lectures on the history of Russian religious culture, moral theology and Russian religious philosophy. The society also has a Sunday school.

The Ignati Bryanchaninov Society is on the right of the spectrum of Christian social groups in Leningrad; at the opposite pole is the 'Otkrytoye khristianstvo' ('Open Christianity') Society which was founded at about the same time and aims to develop serious dialogue between Christianity and atheism. The members of Open Christianity see contemporary European atheism as a product of the historical evolution of Christianity, and they believe that this close relationship is the basis for mutual understanding and fruitful collaboration between atheists and Christians. One of the main things Open Christianity does is to organise debates which attract a wide range of believers and nonbelievers. The society also does active educational work among young people and takes part in political life.

Not long ago another Christian society was founded in Leningrad. The 'Svobodnaya Rossiya' ('Free Russia') Society claims to be centrist; its aim is to bring together the national and democratic traditions. The society's members think that the key to the Russian national tradition is Orthodoxy, and that the social function of Orthodoxy consists in asserting the principle of *sobornost*'. The society sees its task as educational, creative and political activity.

One Leningrad organisation which is clearly political is the Leningrad branch of the 'Khristiansko-demokratichesky soyuz Rossii' ('The Christian Democratic Union of Russia'). This political party looks towards the European Christian Democratic movement and its programme derives from the works of one of the latter's most important theoreticians, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany Richard von Weizsäcker. Central to this theory is the idea of overcoming the contradiction

between the law (the state) and love (Christianity). The Leningrad branch of the Christian Democratic Union devotes a lot of its attention to charity: helping invalids, old people and orphans. In autumn last year the Christian Democratic Union of Russia was accepted into the Christian Democratic International.

As Christian societies grew in number the question of their collaboration arose. In January 1990 representatives of three of the groups mentioned above – the Society for Christian Enlightenment, the Leningrad branch of the Christian Democratic Union of Russia and the Free Russia Society – organised the ‘Leningradskiy sovet khristianskoi obshchestvennosti’ (‘The Leningrad Christian Social Council’). In close contact with other Christian groups in Leningrad, Moscow and the Baltic States as well as a number of western European countries the council organised a conference on the subject ‘Christianity and society’ (18–20 May 1990). There were three sections – theoretical, political and social – and dozens of speakers from Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic States, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Western Europe. The main result of the conference was that it gave a relatively complete picture of all the numerous and varied Christian societies springing up in our country and the chance to compare them with the activity of Christian societies in the West. The conference’s organising committee still faces the big task of analysing all the material. Only a proper analysis will permit an objective evaluation of the Christian social forces in our country and make it possible to plan cooperation. Several preliminary conclusions can be drawn, however. Christian groups often act independently and many simply do not know of each other’s existence. Even those which are informed are not always capable of fruitful collaboration.

The most common reason for disagreement is differences in attitude towards the traditional denominations and the possibility of collaboration with people of other confessions. At the conference these differences found expression on the one hand in calls (especially from foreign speakers) for the fullest possible development of ecumenical contacts and on the other hand in charges against western Christians of plots against Orthodoxy. Political and nationalist bias was much in evidence. As in society as a whole, the Christians at the conference were generally identifiable as ‘liberals’ or ‘conservatives’. Beside this basic demarcation, however, there is a whole spectrum of more individual and specific reasons for division: disagreements on particular theological and philosophical questions; disagreements on the role of secular culture in the life of a Christian (these being usually between Orthodox believers and Baptists); and the personal ambitions of group leaders. The last led to a split in the Christian Democratic Union of Russia and hinders collaboration between Christian societies in both Moscow and Leningrad.

Ambition and intolerance of the opinion of others on the part of several participants meant that the Leningrad conference was unable to adopt any final document, although whole packets of documents containing suggestions made by practically all participating groups were adopted later. Among these were documents on the life of Christians in Russian society today, appeals from Christian political and charitable organisations, an appeal to a Local Council of the Church on how patriarchs should be elected, and an appeal to the international Christian community with a call to create a European Christian Movement.

Such pluralism is symptomatic. It shows that the Christian community in our country is feeling the effect of accelerating centrifugal forces and that regardless of the lack of unanimity it is capable of reaching a qualitatively higher level of cooperation. Genuine Christian unity is certainly not about thinking exactly alike, but about unity in diversity, based not on a religious ideology which is obligatory for all, but on

love for our neighbour. Only this kind of unity, including the principle of genuine *sobornost'*, is capable of providing the basis for effective activity by the Christian community in our country.

Notes and references

¹ 'O russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi. Chetyre otveta na anketu', *Vestnik RKhd*, no. 149, pp. 278–9.

² For details see A. Gleizer, 'Chetyre chasa svobody', *Gorizont*, no. 4, 1990.

³ Now Patriarch Aleksii II.

(Translated from the Russian by Emma Watkins.)