

The Rise and Fall of *Pamyat'*?

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The political liberalisation which took place in the USSR during the late 1980s encouraged the emergence of numerous informal groups (*neformal'nyye gruppy*), devoted to everything from sport to politics. Many students of Soviet affairs have argued that this development marked the first stage in the emergence of a civil society, which had been crushed by more than 60 years of official repression.¹ However, while many of the new groups sought to promote and extend the reforms introduced by Gorbachev's *perestroika*, some of them articulated ideas and values that reflected a more sinister element in the Soviet political culture. The most notorious of these has been the *Pamyat'* organisation, which came to prominence in the mid-1980s. *Pamyat'* quickly aroused interest among Soviet and western journalists alike, who wrote reports about its members' penchant for dressing in black shirts and promoting a virulently antisemitic ideology. The group's activities have naturally aroused considerable concern among the former USSR's Jewish population, who fear that the rise of *Pamyat'* may signify a new chapter in the unsavoury history of Soviet antisemitism. While numerous anti-cosmopolitan campaigns have been directed against Soviet Jews during the past few decades, they have for the most part been firmly controlled and supervised by the regime. By contrast, antisemitism in the former USSR today seems to be taking a more spontaneous form. In the wake of the failed coup against Gorbachev, which at the time of writing seemed to presage a more open and democratic form of government, a new generation of politicians could begin to exploit anti-Jewish sentiment in their search for popular support. Anxiety about such a possibility plays a considerable role in prompting the continuing exodus of Soviet Jews from the former USSR.

Although a good deal has been written about the ideas propounded by *Pamyat'* during the second half of the 1980s, less effort has been made to examine the reasons for the group's impact on Soviet politics.² Its rise was largely a consequence of Gorbachev's decision to widen the boundaries of the 'public space' in Soviet life. His attempt to reduce restrictions on the dissemination of information (*glasnost'*) facilitated lateral communications between individuals in Soviet society, which in turn encouraged new forms of social organisation and association. Until recently, almost all these associations have been oriented either to promoting some form of political change (national independence, further liberalisation, etc.), or to bringing together individuals sharing an interest in a particular activity (sport, literature and so forth). Very few of the informal groups have sought to defend the *status quo* since, at least at first glance, few people outside the old *apparat* appeared to have many interests or privileges to protect. *Pamyat'* originated, as will be seen below, as a promotional group that sought to advance the interests of Russian culture and the Russian nation in the face of a supposed attack by the forces of 'cosmopolitanism'

and 'zionism'. However, during the second half of the 1980s, a number of conservative communists in the *apparát* realised that organisations espousing a chauvinist ideology could serve as a useful tool in their battle against *perestroika*. For this reason, the relationship between *Pamyat'* and the pre-coup regime was a complex one. Although *Pamyat'* originated as an unofficial group, which was by instinct suspicious of the very idea of communism, some members and factions within the movement seem to have enjoyed a privileged relationship with certain individuals in the old *apparát*. Therefore any attempt at unravelling the significance of *Pamyat'* in Soviet politics over recent years cannot rely on a study of changes in the group's organisational structure and ideological outlook. It must also take into account fluctuations in the political environment in which it operated.

During the past few years, the *Pamyat'* organisation has splintered into a large number of factions, a process which began as early as 1987. Personality conflicts among the group's leadership have been at least as important as ideological differences in bringing about this disintegration. While the existence of an organisation like *Pamyat'* reflects deep strains and tensions inside Soviet society, its long-term fortunes depend as much on its leaders' organisational skills as they do on the depth of antisemitic feeling among Soviet people. The collapse of the communist political system in the USSR created new opportunities for all political parties and groups. The second part of this paper will consider whether antisemitic groups are well placed to exploit these new opportunities effectively. In the first part, though, attention will be directed towards the process of fragmentation which has afflicted the *Pamyat'* group in recent years.

The Rise of *Pamyat'*

The original *Pamyat'* group almost certainly originated as a discussion group in the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry, probably around 1980.³ Initially, its members' principal interest was the defence of Russian cultural monuments against destruction, a cause which became popular in the Soviet Union during the 1970s when considerable numbers of people expressed fears about the pace of urban development. Very soon, however, the patriotic sentiments of *Pamyat'* turned into a much cruder form of chauvinism. The organisation developed an elaborate conspiracy theory to explain the destruction of Russia's cultural heritage, which it declared was the result of a secret war being waged by Jews and Freemasons. By 1986, *Pamyat'* meetings in Moscow and elsewhere were becoming notorious for their atmosphere of hysteria and latent violence. The émigré journal *Kontinent* carried a verbatim report of one of these meetings, and warned its members against 'the dangerous processes that are taking place today in our country under the guise of a cultural thaw'.⁴ By the beginning of 1987, *Pamyat'* meetings in the Soviet capital were attracting an audience of up to 800 people. The organisation's members became increasingly outspoken in their demands and in the spring of 1987 organised a series of demonstrations in Moscow protesting against the proposed redevelopment of Poklonnaya Hill.⁵ During this period, the Soviet political leadership began to worry that *Pamyat'* posed a threat to public order. In the second half of 1987 several articles appeared in leading Soviet newspapers attacking the group, which was condemned for its antisemitism and hostility to *perestroika*.⁶ The group's attempt to obtain registration as a legal association was also refused although, as in the case of many informal groups during this period, few serious attempts were made by the authorities to limit its activities. The government also failed to prosecute the organisation under Article 74 of the

Criminal Code (which bans the incitement of racial hatred), in spite of a petition from a group of Soviet Jews demanding that they should do so.⁷ By the end of 1987, *Pamyat'* had carved out a distinct niche for itself in Soviet politics, existing in the grey zone of semi-legality which distinguished the boundaries of the Soviet public space throughout much of the Gorbachev era.

During the mid-1980s, *Pamyat'* was headed by a seven-man council, whose most prominent members included Kim Andreyev, Viktor Vinogradov (an architect) and Dmitri Vasil'yev, a former actor and photographer. All three men played an important role in the public meetings of *Pamyat'*. Vinogradov often led discussions about the destruction of Russia's cultural heritage, while Vasil'yev tended to make rather less focused speeches, whose emotive content made them extremely popular with the audience. During this time, the Council issued a large number of manifestos and proclamations, calling for the defence of Russian nationhood against the threats posed to it by everything from the rising level of alcohol abuse through to the 'imperial' dissemination of western culture.⁸ The antisemitic tone of these manifestos was comparatively muted, possibly because their authors were afraid of prosecution under Article 74. However, they all contained the ritual attacks on zionism and cosmopolitanism which have served throughout Soviet history as a verbal screen for antisemitic tirades. The tone of these manifestos was unmistakably paranoid, sometimes to an almost hysterical degree, attacking the 'slander' and 'threats' made against *Pamyat'* in the Soviet and foreign press. They were also apocalyptic in style, presenting the tensions besetting Soviet society as a deep-seated confrontation between good and evil, the outcome of which would determine whether the country survived. At the same time, the group's publications spoke rather chillingly of a day of reckoning, in which those responsible for the destruction of Russia's social, moral and cultural health would be punished for their crimes.

During the late 1980s, the *Pamyat'* organisation began to fragment into a number of factions, which have engaged in internecine warfare with one another (see below). This process has taken place even in Moscow, where in May 1988 Vasil'yev effectively relaunched the organisation under the name of 'The National-Patriotic Front *Pamyat'*'. Vasil'yev's group has remained by far the largest of the *Pamyat'* factions. He himself claimed in 1989 that his group had 20,000 active members in Moscow, along with some 30 other 'cells' dotted around the country which looked to him as their leader. A more plausible estimate, made at the end of 1990, suggested that the real number of *Pamyat'* members belonging to Vasil'yev's group in Moscow was around 400.⁹ Even so, the 'National-Patriotic Front' has consistently dwarfed all other *Pamyat'* factions, few of which today have an active membership of more than a hundred. However, many of the best-known 'scandals' involving *Pamyat'* members during the past few years have primarily been the work of activists from these smaller groups. In the distorted world of *Pamyat'*, Vasil'yev has been something of a moderate.

The Organisational and Ideological Fragmentation of *Pamyat'*, 1987–1991

Russian nationalist ideology is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon, consisting of many different strands; it has defied numerous attempts by scholars to develop a coherent framework of analysis.¹⁰ During the past quarter of a century, perhaps the most important distinction has been between the 'national bolsheviks', who view the communist state as heir to the traditions of Imperial Russia, and those who believe that the 1917 Revolution was a betrayal of the values inherent in their country's

distinctive social and political constitution.¹¹ In its extreme guise, modern national bolshevism has espoused a form of neo-Stalinism, praising the dictator for transforming his country into a powerful state, recognised and respected throughout the world. The Vasil'yev faction of *Pamyat'* has never espoused such a 'strong' variety of national bolshevism. However, during the mid-1980s the ideas put forward by the group in its various manifestos suggested that its leaders were prepared to accept the legitimacy of existing Soviet state structures, providing they were imbued with a suitable sense of Russian patriotism. At a meeting in March 1987, Vinogradov exhorted his listeners to respect the symbolic importance of Moscow in Russian life since it was 'the capital of our homeland *and the world communist movement*' (my italics) – neatly combining patriotic and ideological motifs.¹² The organisation bitterly criticised the Soviet Communist Party for expelling a number of *Pamyat'* members for their beliefs, and demanded their immediate reinstatement. During the early Gorbachev years, *Pamyat'* publications even claimed to identify strongly with the General Secretary's *perestroika* programme and demanded 'legal recognition so that we can consolidate all the patriotic forces in favour of the Party's new political course'.¹³ At the same time, *Pamyat'* sought to relate the Soviet period of Russian history to its pre-revolutionary past, claiming that 'the enemy is he who . . . seeks to prove that the history of our state began only in 1917, and dispenses with the historical experience of the nation.'¹⁴

This endorsement of Soviet institutions might have been at least partly inspired by tactical shrewdness. It is possible that *Pamyat'* leaders hoped that it would encourage the authorities to treat the organisation in a lenient manner. Vasil'yev has since claimed that he was always critical of the institutions and values inherent in the Soviet state. Certainly in the years following the campaign against *Pamyat'* in the Soviet press, which reached its height in 1987–8, the ideology of the Vasil'yev group began to develop rapidly in an overtly anticommunist direction. During the mid-1980s, the organisation had already taken a generally favourable line towards religion, campaigning for the restoration of Orthodox services in the Kremlin's Uspensky Cathedral and demanding freedom of conscience for all believers. However, *Pamyat'* manifestos of that period tended to avoid talking too specifically about religion, preferring to stress the more general notion that the country was facing a moral and spiritual crisis. The Orthodox Church was presented as one aspect of Russia's traditional constitution, and as such worthy of respect; it was not, however, treated as the single most important element in Russian culture. From the middle of 1988 onwards, however, religious themes have become increasingly important in the ideology of Vasil'yev's *Pamyat'*. Religion is treated as a vital component in Russian nationhood, and participation in church ritual is emphasised as an important process in the formation of an authentic Russian character.

The front page of a first edition of the newspaper *Pamyat'*, published by Vasil'yev's group in 1989, illustrated the growing role of religion in the organisation's outlook. The opening editorial was devoted to the spiritual importance of the Easter celebrations in the calendar of the Orthodox Church (although delays meant that the paper was not actually published until later in the year):

That great event, the resurrection of Christ, is celebrated by the Orthodox Church as the most important of its festivals. It is the festival of festivals and the celebration of celebrations. This festival is called Easter, that is the day on which there takes place our passage from life to death and earth to heaven [*nebo*]. The celebration of the resurrection of Christ continues for

a whole week (seven days), and the service in the church is distinctive, more ceremonial than at other festivals.¹⁵

The editorial continued with a description of the Holy Week rituals. The didactic tone suggests that its author assumed that his readers would have only the sketchiest notion of the religious significance of the Easter celebrations. Vasil'yev and his colleagues appear to have identified a crucial task of *Pamyat'* as promoting knowledge of Orthodox Christianity, helping to restore the popular respect for the church supposedly destroyed by 70 years of atheistic propaganda. Other articles in the same newspaper provided detailed accounts of individuals in Russian history who played an important role in developing the country's religious consciousness, such as Alexander Nevsky. Vasil'yev's *Pamyat'* has consistently campaigned for the restoration of the Orthodox Church's role in Russian daily life, claiming that the spiritual decay of the nation can be solved only when the whole population 'turns with an open heart to Orthodoxy'. The group has also demanded the restoration of church property, expropriated by the Bolsheviks after the 1917 Revolution.

Vasil'yev's *Pamyat'* has also become increasingly monarchist in the past three years, reflecting its move away from any sympathy with the values and institutions of the old-style communist political system. This, of course, has echoed a wider change in popular sentiment within Russian society. Meetings calling for the restoration of the Royal Family have been well attended throughout the USSR during the past few years, and have attracted the support of a number of important cultural figures. A Monarchist Party has also been established, though its popular support is still limited. There is, of course, no inherent reason why those seeking to restore a monarchist constitution should endorse antisemitic attitudes. Many intelligent articles have been written during the past few years arguing that the restoration of the monarchy could fill the political vacuum left by the disintegration of the communist political system. However, contemporary monarchism in the USSR is often associated with xenophobia and dislike of all things foreign. Many of the monarchist broadsheets circulating in the past two years or so have expressed rather chilling and apocalyptic sentiments: 'The last days of the West are drawing near – its wealth and its debauchery. It will suddenly be overcome by poverty and ruin. Its wealth is unjust, evil, oppresses the whole world, and depraves it like a new and worse Sodom.'¹⁶ The support for the monarchy expressed in the publications of Vasil'yev's *Pamyat'* has generally been rather more restrained. Tsar Nicholas II is usually treated with great reverence, and his religious devotion and purity of character are emphasised. Vasil'yev himself has argued that the restoration of the monarchy would require the election of a new ruler, as happened in Russia in the early 17th century.¹⁷ In the autumn of 1990, he rejected the idea that a surviving member of the Romanov family should ascend the throne, preferring to follow the 19th-century Slavophiles in demanding that the choice of monarch should be made by a specially convened Council (*Zemsky Sobor*). The crown would then presumably be passed on to the heirs of the chosen ruler, according to the principle of primogeniture.

The fragmentation of the original *Pamyat'* movement in the late 1980s reflected both ideological and organisational differences between its members. The first major group to break away from the main *Pamyat'* organisation, in 1987, was headed by Igor' Sychev; he was later joined by two other figures, Ivan Myshkin and Vladimir Novikov, about whom little seems to be known. Between 1987 and 1989 this group articulated an extreme national bolshevik ideology, distinguished by its great respect for Stalin. This may account for the support it attracted from conservatives in the

media and elsewhere, and certainly explains Vasil'yev's scathing comments about Sychev.¹⁸ In the following years, however, the Sychev group increasingly began to support an 'Orthodox-monarchist' ideology, while paradoxically continuing to revere Stalin for his struggle against 'zionism'. In 1989, the Sychev group developed close links with a group headed by Valeri Yemel'yanov, a long-time antisemitic activist who articulates pagan and anti-Christian themes in his own work (see below). From the summer of 1990 onwards, however, one Soviet source suggests that the Sychev group performed yet another *volte-face*, when it began to distance itself from other extreme Russian nationalist groups in an attempt to draw closer to the liberal forces grouped around the Democratic Union.¹⁹ By the end of 1990, the group had only a handful of active members.

The ideological and tactical volatility of the Sychev group during the past few years illustrates the near-impossible task of finding any rationale for the schisms and battles within the *Pamyat'* movement. Other Moscow-based defectors from the original *Pamyat'* have included N. Filimonov and I. Kvartalov, who broke away in the autumn of 1988, ostensibly after a disagreement with Vasil'yev over money. By the autumn of 1989 this faction, too, was espousing a monarchist platform, although the language used in their manifestos was far more overtly racist and antisemitic than that employed by Vasil'yev. In recent months, the Filimonov faction has been mentioned in some quarters in relation to the murder of Father Serafim Shlykov, a Russian Orthodox priest based in Moscow, who had many connections with Soviet and foreign Jews as a result of time he spent at a mission in Jerusalem. It has been claimed that Filimonov and his followers wished to take over Fr Shlykov's church, although it is not clear whether they had any further aims beyond this in view. However, it should be stressed that no evidence has yet been found linking any *Pamyat'* group to the murder. One Soviet journalist has charged the organisation with fomenting the kind of hysterical atmosphere in which such crimes become acceptable, although some might question this attempt to indict *Pamyat'* of 'indirect guilt'. The various *Pamyat'* factions themselves, along with their sympathisers, angrily attack any attempt to link them with the murder of Fr Shlykov, or any of the other violent attacks on Orthodox priests which have taken place in recent months.²⁰

By the beginning of 1989, another Moscow-based *Pamyat'* faction, this one headed by Sergei Vorotyntsev, had come into existence. Its formal platform was fairly similar to that of the main Vasil'yev faction, emphasising such demands as the restoration of religious education in school.²¹ However, according to one source, by 1990 this faction had merged with yet another, headed by Aleksandr Kulakov (who had in turn broken away from the Filimonov group). Kulakov himself acquired a good deal of prominence in Moscow during 1991, where he gave press conferences articulating views which are extreme even by the standards of *Pamyat'* groups.²² Another long-standing Moscow *Pamyat'* faction has been headed by two brothers, Vyacheslav and Evgeny Popov. They were expelled from the Vasil'yev faction as long ago as 1987, apparently for their 'national-communist views', seemingly vindicating Vasil'yev's claim that he has never had any sympathy with the Soviet regime.

Rather more is known about the group headed by Valeri Yemel'yanov, whose ideological views distinguish him very sharply from individuals such as Vasil'yev. Most current *Pamyat'* factions either actively espouse Orthodox Christianity or are at least benignly indifferent to it. By contrast, Yemel'yanov believes that Christianity is part of the zionist conspiracy which he described at length in his book *Dézionisation* (published a few years ago in Paris). Yemel'yanov has described Jesus Christ as the first leader of a Masonic lodge! His antisemitism appears to be rooted entirely in

ethnic rather than religious considerations. He claims that Prince Vladimir, who is usually credited with bringing Christianity to Russia in the 9th century, was of Jewish parentage. Yemel'yanov himself is an extremely unstable personality, like many of those associated with *Pamyat'* factions; in 1980 he was found guilty of the brutal killing of his wife, although his punishment was reduced because he was deemed to be insane at the time the crime was committed.²³ However, his basic argument that Christianity distorted Russian cultural development, rather than acting as its foundation, does have some parallels in both Russian and western thought. A number of ideologists of German nazism, most notably Alfred Rosenberg, attempted to develop a new religion incorporating ancient beliefs and cults during the 1930s and 1940s, in the belief that these were the most authentic expression of the national soul.²⁴ Similarly, a number of 19th-century Romantic thinkers interpreted folk religion as a more genuine reflection of national character than the artificial rituals of Christianity. Not surprisingly, however, Yemel'yanov's endorsement of these ideas has attracted a bitterly critical response from many activists in other *Pamyat'* factions. It also led to the establishment of yet another breakaway faction in 1990, headed by Igor' Shcheglov and based in the Moscow region.

Pamyat' groups have of course been active in cities other than Moscow. Although Vasil'yev's group has supporters throughout the USSR, a large proportion of them seem to be concentrated in Moscow and its environs. By contrast, cells which have developed in other parts of the country have usually operated in an extremely independent manner, responding to local conditions and circumstances. *Pamyat'* factions in Leningrad acquired a reputation throughout the Soviet Union during the late 1980s for their extreme views and use of 'direct action'. As early as 1988, a group headed by Yuri Riverov organised a series of controversial rallies in the city's Rumyantsev Gardens, in which its members paraded in black shirts shouting antisemitic slogans. In the following months, the leadership of the local *Pamyat'* group broke with Vasil'yev, although they continued to style themselves the 'National-Patriotic Front'. In 1989, Aleksandr Romanenko founded the organisation *Patriot* in the city. Although always organisationally distinct from *Pamyat'*, the group has in the past articulated many of the same extreme antisemitic beliefs. Unlike *Pamyat'*, though, *Patriot* succeeded in winning official recognition from the conservative authorities in Leningrad, in spite of the offensive tone of its publication *V bloknot patriota*, which published racist jokes under the guise of 'popular humour' (*narodny yumor*).²⁵ Another *Pamyat'* faction, called the 'Union for National-Proportional Representation', headed by Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili, was also active in Leningrad during the late 1980s. Its leader, who died recently, was a particularly bitter critic of Vasil'yev, condemning him for his supposed moderation and elitism. (Smirnov-Ostashvili claimed proudly in interviews with the Soviet press that most of the members of his own group were of 'workerist' origins; he also vehemently criticised the intelligentsia for its 'anti-national' bias.) As with most *Pamyat'* groups, the ideology of this faction has been contradictory, praising the conservative institutions of the Soviet state (KGB, army etc.), while seeking to reconstruct it on the basis of the religious foundations of its Tsarist predecessor. The group published its own rather venomous broadsheet, *Russky klich* (*Russian Clarion*), which has carried articles praising Iraq for its attacks on Israel. More chillingly, the newspaper has also published the names and addresses of individuals who have criticised *Pamyat'* and its leaders. *Russky klich* also made the unlikely claim that the policy of the pre-coup Soviet Communist Party was greatly influenced by the existence of a powerful Jewish lobby within the organisation. Smirnov-Ostashvili himself rose to prominence in

January 1990, when he played a leading role in the demonstrations which disrupted a meeting at the Central House of Writers in Leningrad.²⁶ Protesters wearing black shirts and armbands brought the proceedings to a halt, by invading the conference hall and shouting antisemitic slogans. After complaints that the authorities had not done enough to crack down on such patently illegal activities, Smirnov-Ostashvili was arrested and brought to trial, where the public prosecutor accused him of putting forward 'fascist views'. In October 1990 he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment in a labour colony (where he subsequently committed suicide).²⁷ He was replaced as head of this faction by Dmitry Baronov and Evgeny Lugov. In general, *Pamyat'* groups active in the Leningrad region, at least before 1990, tended to be more overtly sympathetic to the communist authorities than those in Moscow. Since the local party leadership was inclined to look favourably on *Pamyat'* activities, there was perhaps less immediate stimulus to adopt a radically anticommunist position. Even so, by the beginning of 1990 Russian nationalist groups in the city were already increasingly divided between 'whites' and 'reds'.²⁸ Local *Pamyat'* groups seem to have followed their counterparts in Moscow by turning in an increasingly anticommunist and monarchist direction.

During the past decade, some of the most dramatic expressions of antisemitic sentiment have occurred in provincial towns, such as Sverdlovsk, although most of these incidents were not the work of *Pamyat'* cells.²⁹ Even so, *Pamyat'* groups have been established in dozens of cities in the former USSR during the past five years. Some of these are at least formally part of Vasil'yev's 'National Patriotic-Front *Pamyat'*'; others have looked for inspiration to one of the breakaway factions already mentioned. Other groups, such as Novosibirsk's 'Patriotic-Union *Pamyat'*' appear to have no formal organisational affiliation to other groups, although they have participated in conferences of like-minded groups. The activities of this organisation, like those of many other *Pamyat'* cells in provincial towns, have been strongly influenced by local circumstances and regional issues. For example, since Novosibirsk's 'Patriotic-Union *Pamyat'*' has a large proportion of highly educated members in its ranks, and is located in an area where ecological issues have acquired great prominence during recent years, environmental issues have played a major role in its activities. Originally, the group had a large number of communists among its membership, probably accounting for its somewhat 'national-bolshevik' orientation. From 1990 onwards, however, this began to change, although the group's newspaper still tended to be supportive of conservative elements in the Soviet leadership.³⁰

The connections between *Pamyat'* activists around the USSR have usually been very informal, based on personal contacts made at Slavic cultural festivals and similar events. However, there have also been a number of attempts to hold regional conferences bringing together *Pamyat'* activists and their sympathisers in other ultra-nationalist groups, such as *Otechestvo*. A number of *Pamyat'* factions, including those of Smirnov and Kulakov, came together in 1990 to form a 'Popular-Orthodox Movement', although in practice the new organisation did not seem to eliminate tension between the participating groups.³¹ Ideological and personal disagreements have always weakened any attempt to develop a long-term policy of cooperation. Outside Leningrad, many groups followed the same ideological path as Vasil'yev's *Pamyat'*, taking an increasingly anticommunist position during the period 1990–91. In cases where procommunist sympathies continued to linger, at least until recently, this often reflected close ties between local activists and officials in the local party and state bureaucracies.

It has been claimed that during the months before the August coup a number of

Pamyat' groups had begun to adopt a policy of 'entryism', infiltrating other organisations in order to influence their activities.³² This tactic has certainly been used in the past by *Pamyat'*, for example when it took over the cultural and historical association VOOPK in 1987, using a mixture of stealth and deception.³³ However, at that time few informal organisations were particularly aware of *Pamyat'*, since its activities had not yet received much attention in the Soviet press. More recently, by contrast, they are almost certain to know of its existence and style of operation. While *Pamyat'* members have in the past certainly had links with official organisations, such as the pre-coup KGB, and especially with other informal conservative Russian nationalist groups, this should not necessarily be seen as evidence of 'entryism'. In the case of the KGB, for example, the reverse has almost certainly been true; *Pamyat'* factions have been infiltrated by informers reporting to the security services. In the case of other Russian nationalist groups, the links with *Pamyat'* may reflect nothing more than the shared values between their respective memberships.

The Political Potential of *Pamyat'*-type Groups

It was noted earlier that the rise of *Pamyat'* was largely a consequence of the policies of *glasnost'* and *perestroika*; social and political liberalisation provided the opportunities necessary to establish new and independent forms of association. The failure of the coup against Gorbachev, and the final collapse of the communist system that has followed in its wake, has created a huge amount of 'political space' in which new organisations and parties can compete for the allegiance of the population. The fortunes of *Pamyat'* and other antisemitic groups will depend on their skill at adapting to these new political circumstances. On the one hand, they may prove adept at tapping the depressing strand of anti-Jewish sentiment that can be found throughout the territories of the former USSR. On the other hand, they might find it difficult to thrive in a more open political system, where their activities could attract a hostile response from the new authorities gradually emerging in Moscow and the republics.

A number of commentators have drawn attention to the links between *Pamyat'* groups and conservative communists in the political leadership, before the coup of August 1991. Certainly, there has often been a temperamental sympathy between the two sides, based on a shared hostility to 'finance-monopoly capital' and the internationalism it represents. Many *Pamyat'* publications have reserved their bitterest attacks during the past few years for Gorbachev's close aides, most notably Aleksandr Yakovlev, who has been a long-standing critic of extreme Russian nationalism. A newspaper issued by at least one *Pamyat'* faction during mid-1990 unambiguously aligned itself with conservative communists. It carried a copy of an article by Nina Andreyeva, whose attack on *glasnost'* in the pages of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* in the spring of 1988 became a *cause célèbre* in Soviet society.³⁴ The same publication even described the head of the Russian Communist Party, the unimaginative and conservative *apparatchik* Ivan Polozkov, as the potential saviour of Russia. In addition, the links between conservative communists and *Pamyat'* factions have at times taken on a more direct character. In some cities, *Pamyat'* cells were able to rely on a degree of official patronage during the late 1980s, in the form of access to printing presses and meeting-places. At the beginning of 1991 the former head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, even went so far as to praise certain *Pamyat'* activities in public, although he firmly condemned the 'extreme, disloyal, undemocratic methods' of some of its members. One ex-KGB officer has claimed that a former senior official

in the organisation, Filipp Bobkov, hoped to mobilise *Pamyat'* activists in support of the communist regime in the same way that the prerevolutionary police tried to exploit the patriotic feelings of trade unionists as a means of encouraging loyalty to the Tsar.³⁵ However, it is important not to overestimate the extent of the links which existed between *Pamyat'* groups and conservative communists before the recent coup attempt. Although certain key officials in the KGB and other organisations probably offered discrete support to various *Pamyat'* factions, they remained intensely suspicious of the organisation's ideological hostility to Marxism-Leninism and its involvement in outbreaks of public disorder. *Pamyat'* has always been in essence a 'grass-roots' movement, unlike such organisations as the United Front of Russian Workers, which was formed by conservative communists in the spring of 1989 with the aim of mobilising popular sentiment against *perestroika*. An article by G. Anishchenko published in *Glasnost'* in 1990 rightly noted that 'the communist government and groups like *Pamyat'* can be temporary allies or they can be temporary opponents, but they can neither ultimately unite nor become each other's main enemy. Their ideals lie in different spheres and can intersect only on the periphery.' For this reason, the loss of power by communist hardliners in recent months will not necessarily have a great impact on the fortunes of *Pamyat'* factions.

Pamyat' has frequently been called a fascist organisation, although the term has usually been loosely applied as a critical epithet rather than as a serious analytical tool. Of course, the enormous ambiguity surrounding such concepts as 'fascism' means that any attempt to determine whether the various *Pamyat'* factions warrant the label is probably doomed to fail amidst a welter of conceptual confusion. Nevertheless, the vast literature on the rise of fascism, especially during the inter-war period, can help cast light on the way in which extreme nationalist and antisemitic groups of the *Pamyat'* type can develop into powerful social and political organisations.

Only two of the fascist movements that emerged in Europe between the wars were able to take power by their own efforts: those of Italy and Germany. Other fascist-type groups usually developed in imitation of one of these two models, although they often took on a specifically indigenous character. In both Italy and Germany, the development of the fascist movement went through at least two distinct phases. In the first place, there emerged a *core group* of supporters, many of whom were soldiers demobilised at the end of the First World War. Thousands of them were organised into private militias and quasi-military organisations, which then engaged in more or less open warfare with other political groups. However, in order to obtain power, these core groups had to increase their appeal among both the mass of the population *and* key sections of the social, political and intellectual elites. The dynamics of each of these two stages of development was not necessarily identical. The conditions which stimulated the rise of fascist-type core groups did not always facilitate the development of a mass movement. In the contemporary Soviet context, the political and economic changes of the past five years have encouraged the emergence of groups like *Pamyat'*, which self-consciously present themselves as defenders of national culture and purity against a range of internal and external threats. However, if *Pamyat'*-type groups want to increase their influence in public life during the years ahead, they will need to mobilise far larger sections of the population than has so far proved possible.

The American political scientist Juan Linz has set out a number of conditions which facilitate the rise of fascist-type core groups.³⁶ These conditions, he claims, consist of 'a complex mixture of random circumstances and deep-seated structural processes'. Linz's conditions, which were originally intended to apply to inter-war Europe, can

be adapted to cast light on the emergence of *Pamyat'* factions during the past few years in the USSR. The first factor noted by Linz is the existence of a sense of national betrayal or humiliation. Although the Soviet Union has not suffered military defeat in the manner of Germany during the First World War, the collapse in the USSR's power and international prestige has been dramatic. In Germany during the 1920s, Hitler's fledgling Nazi Party attracted considerable support among those sections of the population that believed that the defeat of 1918 could be explained only by the existence of traitors and internal enemies amongst the political leadership. Similarly, most contemporary *Pamyat'* groups blame both the Communist Party and the 'zionist conspiracy' for Russia's parlous state. In both cases, the sense of national betrayal and hatred engenders a climate of brooding resentment and paranoia. Certain groups in the population find it easier to believe in conspiracy theories purporting to explain national decay rather than engage in a sober and rational analysis of the problems facing Soviet society. In the words of Anishchenko, *Pamyat'* factions effectively argue that 'neither you nor I is responsible for what has happened and what is happening in our country. An external enemy is to blame.' In such a situation, rhetoric and passion insidiously begin to replace a more restrained and analytical form of discourse.

The second condition facilitating the emergence of fascist-type core groups is the breakdown of state authority, which allows violent groups in society to operate with a degree of impunity. In Weimar Germany, for example, the government was initially unable to crush the activities of the *Freikorps*, in spite of their obvious challenge to the country's social and political order. During the years of *perestroika*, the Soviet state has shown an increasing weakness in the face of challenges by successive groups: national minorities, independent trade unions etc. *Pamyat'* factions have often been able to flout the law, albeit occasionally with the tacit consent of those in positions of power. Their activities have frequently been designed to make the authorities look weak and impotent. During the trial of Konstantin Smirnov-Ostavshili, mentioned earlier, *Pamyat'* supporters packed the court room and displayed banners attacking the judge and other officials. The defendant himself constantly tried to interrupt the proceedings, while his supporters showered him with flowers every time he spoke. According to press reports, the atmosphere at the trial at times resembled that of a macabre carnival.³⁷ Smirnov himself was lionised in a number of extreme Russian nationalist publications, and treated as a martyr suffering from persecution by the state authorities. The ability of groups like *Pamyat'* to flout state authority is of course greatly increased when the authorities are themselves divided and lack a strong sense of direction. The self-confidence of *Pamyat'* supporters during their demonstrations in the late 1980s, especially in the Leningrad region, almost certainly reflected their knowledge that they were unlikely to be prosecuted for their activities.

Linz also identifies a generalised national 'cultural crisis' as an important factor in facilitating the emergence of fascist-type core groups. The Italian philosopher Croce argued that the emergence of fascism, in his own country and elsewhere, was the consequence of a form of spiritual breakdown, in which the values of tolerance and humanity were replaced by a new and hideous ethic emphasising struggle and victory. The failure of Marxism-Leninism to attract support among the Soviet population during the past few decades has left an ideological vacuum in society. During the 1970s and early 1980s the Soviet population, like those of many East European countries, engaged in a form of 'internal emigration'.³⁸ Large numbers of people sought to establish a framework of individual meaning within the confines of their personal life, avoiding any but the most ritualised and meaningless acts of public

engagement. The population's withdrawal from the public world effectively destroyed all forms of social communication. Until the mid-1980s all public political discourse, with the exception of the *samizdat* publications emanating from the dissident movement, was conducted within the confines of the wooden language of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. However, since this failed to engage the large majority of the population, a paradoxical situation resulted. The flood of social and political discussion published in the pages of the official press in reality concealed an almost complete absence of genuine debate. In such a distorted world, where an all-embracing legitimating ideology has lost its persuasive or explanatory power, there is a natural tendency for certain groups to try to replace it by their own 'totalist' ideology. In the absence of developed forms of social and political communication, a fascist-type core group may be very successful in articulating the grievances and resentments that have developed over many decades, during a time when they were denied public expression. By behaving in ways that are more dynamic and active than other groups in society, a fascist-type core group can often acquire an influence (or notoriety) in public life that is out of all proportion to its real size. During the past few years *Pamyat'* publications, with their sloganeering style, appeared to offer the Soviet population a new message promising national redemption, while in reality offering nothing beyond a series of banal and simplified demands for change.

Linz correctly noted that fascist-type core groups emerged most readily in inter-war Europe when they could find a natural constituency ready to listen to the distorted message articulated by the fascist party leadership. In Germany, the Nazis initially found the greatest response among demobbed soldiers and students, perhaps because these two groups by definition existed outside the main social institutions. During the last few months of 1991 the Kulakov faction of *Pamyat'* identified precisely these groups as its prime target for recruitment purposes. There is also some evidence that, at least from the late 1980s, *Pamyat'* activists have made a particular effort to indoctrinate schoolchildren.³⁹ It seems quite possible that soldiers returning from Eastern Europe and encountering a society in which they have low status and few prospects of a rewarding job will respond to the kind of chauvinism articulated by *Pamyat'* groups. Similarly, while many students are involved in the new 'liberal' political parties established during the past two years, *Pamyat'* has been active in a number of universities throughout the former USSR. It seems reasonable to imagine that as the economic crisis becomes worse, the frustration of increasingly large sections of the population could be translated into increased support for groups like *Pamyat'*, whose leaders' show of dynamism and self-confidence can give the impression that they may have answers to the problems overwhelming the authorities.

While it is easy enough to identify some of the factors that enabled *Pamyat'* factions to develop, it is by no means clear whether they are likely to break out of the ghetto of 'marginal politics' and exert a significant influence on politics and society. A comparison with the literature on European fascism is of limited assistance, since the social and economic conditions in the former USSR are so different from those prevailing in the rest of the world, either before or after the Second World War. For example, the familiar argument that fascism in Nazi Germany was the product of the petty bourgeoisie, challenged by the rise of both big business and the labour movement, is hardly applicable in the case of the USSR (although some journalists and academics have tried to make the parallel).⁴⁰ Linz has argued that the emergence of fascist movements between the wars was largely structured by their status as 'latecomers' on the political scene, forcing them to compete with established parties enjoying a well-defined social base. According to this account, fascist movements

were forced to develop a new and dynamic ideology in order to attract support away from the existing political parties. Of course, the pattern of political activity in the former USSR is quite unlike that of pre-war Europe. Even so, Linz's insights can cast light on some of the political and tactical dilemmas that will face *Pamyat'* groups as they attempt to establish themselves as the authentic voice of the Russian nation.

The collapse of the old political system in the USSR has left behind a vacuum which can be filled only very slowly. Even now that a new institutional framework has been agreed upon by leaders of the republics and the former central government, it will take a long time for 'informal' organisations such as political parties to function effectively. As long as the situation is so fluid, every newly established political party and group will compete for the population's support. It was mentioned earlier that extremist organisations like *Pamyat'* could do well if they exploit the sense of frustration that seems certain to develop in the future, as the population realises that economic reform is going to be an extremely slow and painful process. The absence of well-established political parties means there is an enormous amount of space on the political spectrum available to any organisation capable of articulating ideas that strike a popular chord. An opinion poll carried out in the spring of 1989, at a time when the campaign in the media had already made the Soviet population well aware of the antisemitic and chauvinistic ideas espoused by *Pamyat'* groups, showed that around 30 per cent of Moscow citizens who had heard of the organisation viewed its activities in at least a 'partly positive' light. This figure rose to 41 per cent among those with a low level of education, and was generally higher among workers in manual occupations. Support also tended to be high among the young, perhaps reflecting their greater alienation from mainstream social and political values.⁴¹ Of course, in the light of the dramatic changes of the past few months, these figures may no longer reflect current attitudes among Russian citizens. Nevertheless, they provide some grounds for thinking that about a third of the population, at least in cities like Moscow, might be responsive to a message combining antisemitic and patriotic motifs.

While the flux in politics in the former USSR suggests that there may exist potential for a mass movement articulating antisemitic and chauvinist ideas, the obstacles to its emergence are still formidable. In the first place, the demise of the old guard in the Soviet leadership will reduce the official patronage and support available to groups like *Pamyat'*, which may make them more vulnerable to prosecution. The second obstacle faces all political parties and organisations in the post-communist USSR and its successor states, namely, the problems of learning how to organise effectively in order to win support in an increasingly open political environment. The fierce feuds in the *Pamyat'* movement during the past three or four years have created enormous bitterness among the various factions, which makes it almost impossible for them to cooperate with one another. There are some contacts between the extreme antisemitic groups in the former USSR, often forged at various cultural festivals and similar events. Even so, it is still difficult to see how a revitalised *Pamyat'* movement could effectively identify a stable and coherent group of supporters. Its dramatic rhetoric and use of 'theatre politics' may succeed in winning support at times of economic difficulty and political instability; turning this into reliable long-term political support, however, is quite another matter. Of course, all new political parties in the former USSR are finding it difficult to locate their 'target audience'. Nevertheless, movements of the *Pamyat'* variety face the additional problem of proclaiming themselves to be national movements whose appeal cuts across class divisions. While this gives them a potentially enormous audience, in practice it makes it difficult for

them to focus on the grievances and fears of particular sections in the population; this in turn makes it hard to mobilise support effectively. The attempt by Kulakov's faction to overcome this problem, by targeting certain groups in the population as potential supporters, may reflect an awareness of this problem. However, there are few signs that other *Pamyat'* groups are making concerted efforts to enhance their appeal among particular sections of the population.

Conclusion

Antisemitic and chauvinistic groups traditionally gain support during times of social, economic and political dislocation. The current rise of nationalism and antisemitism throughout Eastern Europe is, at least in part, a consequence of the population's frustration and fear about the region's economic and political future. Although xenophobia is deep-rooted in the political culture of many countries in the area, it has become far more apparent in the two and a half years since the old communist institutions fragmented and gave way to new patterns of political activity. In the case of the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism has created a paradoxical situation for the country's Jewish population. On the one hand, they have witnessed the disintegration of a hostile regime which for many decades orchestrated campaigns against its Jewish citizens. On the other hand, they recognise that the collapse of centralised political authority has provided opportunities for new antisemitic groups to increase their influence in daily life.

Now that the Soviet Union has disintegrated into a number of independent nation-states, Russian nationalists of various hues are likely to give increased attention to the problems faced by Russian minorities living outside their homeland. There are already cries from the ethnic Russian population in Latvia against a proposed Nationality Law which demands that all residents must be able to speak the local language in order to qualify for citizenship. These protests have received a sympathetic response from certain important individuals in Russia itself. In the future, some Russian nationalists may well point to the treatment of minorities in Latvia and elsewhere as a justification for a wholesale programme of Russification inside their own country. In the past, such a programme might not have received particularly great popular support. Under present conditions, however, anyone playing the 'nationalist card' could strike a chord with the population. The comparative success of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in the 1991 Russian Republic Presidential elections may well hold portents for the future. Although he was heavily defeated by Boris Yel'tsin, Zhirinovskiy received a surprisingly high degree of support for his Russian nationalist programme and pronouncements.

While a resurgent Russian nationalism could play a significant role in affecting future political developments, it by no means follows that the various *Pamyat'* factions examined in this paper will themselves exercise much influence. The rise of *Pamyat'*, as noted earlier, symbolised the emergence of the antisemitic element in Soviet political culture. Even so, the faction-fighting and squabbling which has marked the movement's recent history, along with the sometimes bizarre antics engaged in by its members, has largely confined it to the political backwaters. There may well be considerable popular support for certain ideas articulated by the movement, but *Pamyat'* has never managed to instil in the mind of the mass population a sense that it can become a major political force. The aura of eccentricity and marginality that has dogged *Pamyat'* since its rise to prominence destroys its chances of being taken seriously as a political movement. Nor do any of the other

radical Russian nationalist groups which developed in the late 1980s, such as *Otechestvo* and *Patriot*, appear any better placed to exert real political influence. Although these organisations publish many journals and broadsheets, they seem unable to develop the kind of large-scale support and organisational basis necessary to thrive in the new political system developing on the territory of the USSR. However, the traditional image of *Pamyat'* supporters as men with 'dull eyes and bloated faces' who 'are capable only of carrying out someone else's will' may stand in need of some correction.⁴² The history of inter-war Europe reveals the danger of dismissing a political movement simply because it recruits from the margins of society. Nevertheless, in the years ahead the most influential Russian nationalists will be those who manage to operate within the mainstream of their country's social and political life. By channelling political debate into new avenues, which focus on the significance of ethnic identity as a factor in national life, they may be able to win the support of significant sections of the Russian population.

Notes and References

- ¹ See, for example, G. Hosking, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union* (London, 1990); S. Frederick Starr, 'Soviet Union: a civil society', *Foreign Policy*, no. 70 (Spring 1988), pp. 26–41; M. Malyutin, 'Neformaly v perestroike', in Yu. N. Afanasev (ed.), *Inogo ne dano* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 210–27.
- ² Among the mass of writings on *Pamyat'*, the best general introduction can be found in S. Carter, *Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* (London, 1990), which attempts to relate the organisation to the nationalist traditions in Russian culture.
- ³ It has been claimed that *Pamyat'* originated as a discussion circle formed around the writer Vladimir Chivlikin. However, the most prominent leader of *Pamyat'*, Dmitri Vasil'yev, has himself identified the Aviation Ministry as the initial setting for the emergence of the organisation. For a general account of the early days of *Pamyat'*, see J. Wishnevsky, 'The origins of Pamiat', *Survey*, vol. 30, no. 3 (October 1988), pp. 79–91.
- ⁴ *Kontinent*, no. 50 (1986), p. 211. For other early references to *Pamyat'* in the émigré press see, for example, *Russkaya mysl'* (21 November 1986).
- ⁵ For details, see *Arkhiv Samizdata*, no. 5975. It was as a result of these demonstrations in Moscow during the Spring of 1987 that a delegation from *Pamyat'* met Boris Yel'tsin, who at that time headed the Communist Party in Moscow. The meeting did not appear to lead to any lasting reconciliation between *Pamyat'* and the city authorities. According to one account, however, *Pamyat'* regretted Yel'tsin's fall from power in Moscow, which took place a few months later. See S. Bialer, *Politics, Nationality and Society inside Gorbachev's Russia* (Boulder, Co, 1989), p. 108.
- ⁶ See, for example, the article about *Pamyat'* by E. Lesoto, published in *Komsomolskaya pravda* on 22 May 1987, which resulted in a flood of letters to the editorial office. A selection of these was published in the same newspaper on 24 June under the heading 'O chem zabyla Pamyat'.'. Many contributors praised *Pamyat'* for its defence of Russia's cultural heritage and criticised the tone of Lesoto's article.
- ⁷ C. Moniquet, *Histoire des juifs soviétiques* (Paris, 1989), p. 299.
- ⁸ See, for example, *Arkhiv Samizdata*, nos 6079, 6138 for the full texts of two important *Pamyat'* manifestos dating from this period.
- ⁹ J. Dunlop, 'A conversation With Dmitry Vasil'ev', *Radio Liberty Report on USSR* (15 December, 1989). For the lower estimate of *Pamyat'* membership in Moscow, see *Sobesednik* no. 9 (December 1990), p. 1.
- ¹⁰ Amongst the vast numbers of books and articles on this subject which try to develop a framework of analysis, the following are particularly noteworthy: A. Yanov, *The Russian New Right* (Berkeley, CA, 1978); J. Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ, 1983); D. Hammer, *Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics*

(Boulder, Co and London, 1989).

- ¹¹ For an account of the origins of national bolshevism, and its leading early protagonist Nikolai Ustryalov, see M. Agursky, *Ideologiya Natsional-Bolshevizma* (Paris, 1980).
- ¹² *Russkaya mysl'* (15 May 1987).
- ¹³ *Arkhiv Samizdata*, no. 6138, p. 4.
- ¹⁴ *ibid*, p. 16.
- ¹⁵ *Pamyat'* (izdaniye natsional'no-patrioticheskogo fronta Pamyat'), no. 1 (Moscow, 1989), p. 1.
- ¹⁶ *ibid*, p. 12.
- ¹⁷ *Legitimist*, no. 5 (October 1990).
- ¹⁸ See, for example, the comments made by Vasil'yev in his interview with John Dunlop (see note 9).
- ¹⁹ V. Pribylovsky, *Slovar' novykh politicheskikh partii i organizatsii Rossii*.
- ²⁰ *Voskreseniye*, no. 8, p. 4.
- ²¹ A copy of the Vorotyntsev manifesto can be found in *Nezavisimy bibliograf*, no. 4 (1990). The same edition also contains useful material relating to other *Pamyat'* factions in Moscow and Leningrad.
- ²² For brief details in English, see L. Hirszowicz and H. Spier, 'In search of a scapegoat: antisemitism in the Soviet Union today', *Institute of Jewish Affairs Research Report*, no. 3 (1991).
- ²³ Yemel'yanov was originally a member of the main Vasil'yev group, and was among the delegation which was received by Yel'tsin in the summer of 1987. For a brief account in English of his background and views, see H. Spier, 'Russian chauvinists and the thesis of a Jewish world conspiracy: three case studies', *Institute of Jewish Affairs Research Report*, no. 6 (1987).
- ²⁴ See, for example, M. Bendesilio, *Nazism Versus Christianity* (London, 1939).
- ²⁵ The technical quality of *V bloknot patriota* was generally quite high. It also contained ritual attacks on Russian 'democrats', strongly suggesting that its authors may have received some kind of help in publishing the broadsheet.
- ²⁶ *Literaturnaya gazeta* (24 January 1990).
- ²⁷ The sentence aroused strong condemnation from *Pamyat'* sympathisers. See, for example, *Voskreseniye*, no. 7, p. 4.
- ²⁸ At a conference held in Leningrad in March 1989, sharp divisions were already apparent between the local branch of *Pamyat'* (headed by N. Shirayev) and Russian nationalist groups of an overtly national bolshevik persuasion. These tensions grew worse during the following year. As a result, by the beginning of 1990 there was an almost total schism between the 'red' and 'white' Russian nationalist groups in the city.
- ²⁹ During the early 1980s there were several accounts of Nazi-style demonstrations in towns such as Sverdlovsk and Kurgan. At the same time, the emergence of the celebrated Lyubertsy, in an eastern suburb of Moscow, drew attention to the emergence of an antisemitic and violent streak among a section of Soviet youth.
- ³⁰ See, for example, the article 'Ternisty put' sozdaniya RKP' in *Pamyat'* (*Gazeta patrioticheskogo ob'yedineniya Pamyat'*) (Novosibirsk, 1 July 1990). On 3 June 1990 the same publication printed a copy of a telegram sent by the Novosibirsk 'Patriotic Union' to Moscow praising the programme of the conservative *apparatchik* Ivan Polozkov.
- ³¹ In 1988, Novosibirsk's 'Patriotic Union' played a part with other organisations in creating a 'Union of Patriotic Organisations in the Urals and Siberia'. The group's newspaper has also carried details of journals issued by other Russian nationalist organisations, and has published accounts of various cultural festivals which seek to bring together Russian 'patriots' of various types. Conferences seeking to unite Russian nationalist organisations have also taken place in Moscow and Leningrad, but have achieved few concrete results. For details of the 'Popular-Orthodox Movement', see *Sobesednik*, no. 9 (December 1990).
- ³² L. Dadiani, *Sovetish Heimland*, summarised in Hirszowicz and Spier, 'In search of a scapegoat...', p. 6.

- ³³ VOOPK (an acronym for the Russian title of the 'All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments') originated as an organisation dedicated solely to cultural affairs, and played a considerable role in the debate about the Russian cultural renaissance during the 1970s. However, Viktor Vinogradov in particular played a leading role in helping *Pamyat'* sympathisers gain election to leadership positions in the organisation. As a result, the character of VOOPK changed considerably.
- ³⁴ Nina Andreyeva, 'Ob initsiativno-uchreditel'nom s''yezde RKP', *Pamyat'* (Novosibirsk), 3 June 1990.
- ³⁵ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Soviet Union)* (21 January 1991). For brief details of Filipp Bobkov's involvement with *Pamyat'*, see the interview with Valentin Korolev in *Ogonek*, no. 43 (1990), p. 30.
- ³⁶ J. Linz, 'Political space and fascism as a latecomer', in S. Larsen and B. Haghret (eds), *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism* (Bergen, 1980), pp. 153–89.
- ³⁷ *Kommersant*, no. 29 (1990).
- ³⁸ For a useful discussion of these issues, see V. Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People* (New York and Oxford, 1989).
- ³⁹ See Hirszowicz and Spier, 'In search of a scapegoat . . .', p. 6; *Izvestiya* (14 August 1988).
- ⁴⁰ For a discussion of the 'Nazi' overtones of various *Pamyat'* factions, see *Izvestiya* (14 August 1988); *Literaturnaya gazeta* (14 February 1990).
- ⁴¹ R.J. Brym, 'Perestroika, public opinion and Pamyat', *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1989), pp. 23–32.
- ⁴² The words are those of the writer Vladimir Dudintsev, quoted in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (24 January 1990).