A REVIEW ARTICLE
WHO IS A CALVINIST?

Norman Geisler
256 pages, hardback, $16.99.

There is a line in the movie Braveheart which captures my motivation for writing this review. Prior to the first battle between the English and the Scots, William Wallace, unlike his fellow clan chieftains, was in no mood to negotiate with the English. When asked then why he was riding out to meet the English delegation, he said, "I'm gonna pick a fight."

My opponent in this theological bout is well known in most evangelical circles. Norman Geisler has authored dozens of books, the majority of which are geared toward a popular audience. His special field of interest has always been apologetics, and in one regard Geisler is somewhat unique among evangelical apologists due to his wholehearted commitment to Thomism (with an evangelical twist).

Geisler has rendered valuable service to the evangelical community over the years, and my remarks in this particular review are not intended to cast aspersion on his labors as a whole. In fact the conflict between this most recent effort of his and many of Geisler's other very helpful contributions to the evangelical cause accounts for much of my pugilistic demeanor. Geisler also has a reputation as a con-
troversialist. Depending with whom you talk regarding these conflicts, he is portrayed as either snarling and wearing a black hat, or waving his white hat as he rides off on his trusted steed into the sunset, having vanquished another threat to the Bible-believing homesteaders.2

In Geisler’s latest effort he wears a black hat. As the subtitle indicates, Geisler attempts to present a balanced view of divine election. The operative word here is balanced. One suspects at first glance that Geisler is seeking to steer a course between the turbulent waters of Calvinism and Arminianism. This endeavor has been attempted before with predictable results—usually earning only the scorn and disdain of the two parties on either side of the debate. However, on closer examination we discover that Geisler attempts no such compromise. His so-called balanced approach is between what he labels extreme Calvinism and extreme Arminianism. What does this adjective really identify? Extreme Calvinism turns out to be your common, garden variety five-point Calvinism, while extreme Arminianism is actually a form of neo-Arminianism which most evangelical Arminians would disavow—the open-view theism as advocated by the likes of Clark Pinnock. Once you recognize the kind of Arminianism which Geisler is pitting against traditional Calvinism, it should be evident what he is seeking to establish as the via media.3

Geisler’s work is certainly not balanced in the amount of space devoted to critiquing his two extremes. Only thirteen pages are devoted to examining extreme Arminianism, while more than two hundred pages are allocated for exposing what Geisler considers the errors and dangers of extreme Calvinism.4 One gets the distinct and vexing impression that Geisler considers extreme Calvinism to be considerably more harmful than extreme Arminianism.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs is made worse for those of us who stand in the Calvinistic tradition when we note Geisler’s disposition to retain the label “moderate Calvinism” for his balanced theological identity. This is completely baffling since he utterly repudiates practically everything that historically has been distinctive to classical Calvinism. He rejects four of the five points of classical Calvinism. He redefines predestination so that it ends up devoid of anything distinctively Calvinistic, and he concludes with this broadside to classical Calvinism, declaring it “biblically unfounded, theologically inconsistent, philosophically insufficient and morally repugnant” (p. 242). Given this rather unflattering assessment, who could possibly want to subscribe to this kind of theology? Geisler acknowledges that what he has dubbed extreme Calvinism amounts to a Who’s Who in the history of Christian theology: Augustine, the Reformers, the post-Reformation scholastics, the Synod of Dort, the vast majority of the English Puritans (William Ames, John Owen, the Westminster Divines), Jonathan Edwards, the Princetonians, Spurgeon, and contemporaries such as the late John Gerstner, John Piper, R. C. Sproul, and J. I. Packer. This does not faze Geisler in the slightest. On the contrary, because Geisler declares his allegiance to what he calls eternal security, he insists that he is entitled to call himself a Calvinist. In the course of this review I hope to demonstrate otherwise. Geisler is not a Calvinist.

So much for a general overview of the book. It is time to examine the particulars. Any book which claims, as the dust jacket does, that this is “the definitive work on the relationship between divine election and human choice” should expect close scrutiny. Of course, this type of egregious enthusiasm is the opinion of the publisher. Naturally we should not blame Geisler for this mentis gratissimus. He is probably keenly aware of the book’s many shortcomings. (If not, he soon will be.)5 I suggest that over time this book will do very little to enhance Geisler’s reputation as a the-
ologist to be taken seriously. This is a pity because Geisler has much to offer, and I am inclined to believe that this particular book will cause many Christians in Reformed circles to dismiss him altogether.

I will spell out my reasons for poking Geisler in the eye with such a sharp stick by first examining the book's style. From beginning to end, Geisler's language is cast in a decidedly strident polemical tone. Polemical theology per se is not bad. The church needs polemics. Geisler's rasping polemical style, however, leaves a lot to be desired. As a Calvinist, I found it exasperating to read his analysis of what he labels as extreme Calvinism. To say that he has no sympathy for genuine Calvinism is an obvious understatement. This is understandable, however, given Geisler's training and background, but he constantly betrays the fact that he has little theological or historical understanding of what it is that provokes his animosity. The language of vituperation is called upon time and time again to fill the void of exegesis and argumentation. The author has the carping habit of either incorrectly stating or deliberately distorting the position of his Calvinistic opponents, so much so that for all its bluster, Geisler's polemic is vitiated by its lack of comprehension. Numerous examples from the book could be cited, but this audacious one will suffice. Geisler is never weary of trying to convince the uninformed that extreme Calvinists teach that irresistible grace amounts to divine rape. Calvinists like R. C. Sproul are said to teach that God forces people against their wills to accept the gospel (p. 97). Geisler is not a Calvinist.

In 1986 I pointed out that Geisler's presentation of the Calvinistic doctrine of irresistible grace was a caricature. I directed him to Warfield who long ago declared that irresistible grace or effectual calling is the hinge of any genuine Calvinistic soteriology. I know he read what I wrote because we later discussed the subject over lunch. There is really no excuse for continually misrepresenting the doctrine the way he does or for trying to pass his theology off as Calvinistic. Geisler, interestingly enough, exhibits some discomfort over John Gerstner labeling the kind of theology he embraces as Arminian (p. 53). But Gerstner was not the first person to point that out. Clark Pinnock made the same observation several years ago. It is not difficult to see how a strict Calvinist like Gerstner and an open-view Arminian like Pinnock could both come to the same conclusion. What is amusing are Geisler's protestations to the contrary. He admitted rather candidly that he agreed with Clark Pinnock's understanding of free will and very matter-of-factly says that the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity is incorrect (pp. 56-66). He goes so far as to say, "We are born with a bent to sin, but we still have a choice whether we will be its slave" (p. 65). In light of this statement we should refrain from calling Geisler an Arminian out of respect for the genuine followers of Wesley, because Geisler's position deserves to be labeled overtly semi-Pelagian. Geisler believes that God is conditioned by the exercise of faith (p. 71). In Geisler's scheme, faith not only precedes regeneration (pp. 226-31), but saving faith is the common possession of all people (pp. 181-91). Geisler says in effect that all men have the natural ability to please God. When confronted by Romans 8:7, Geisler, in words that Pelagius himself would have been inclined to applaud, declares, "It is true that we are sinners by nature, but that old nature does not make sin necessary any more than a new nature makes good acts necessary. The old nature only makes sin inevitable, not unavoidable. Since we are free, sin is not necessary" (p. 65). Geisler is not a Calvinist.

It is interesting to note who Geisler considers moderate Calvinists. Not surprisingly we find fellow dispensationalists L. S. Chafer, John Walvoord and Charles C. Ryrie. What is surprising is Geisler enlisting W. G. T. Shedd as a com-
panion in arms (p. 53). I am sure this would have greatly surprised the Old School Presbyterian who stood firm in his commitment to the Westminster Standards. The last book he wrote has this fascinating title: *Calvinism: Pure & Mixed; A Defense of the Westminster Standards* (reprint, The Banner of Truth Trust, 1996). It seems that this work is unknown to Geisler. However, Shedd’s *Dogmatic Theology* is actually cited by Geisler to support his assertion that Shedd is to be grouped with Geisler and his fellow moderate Calvinists. Space does not allow for quoting extensively from Shedd’s *Theology*, but anyone who will take time to read it will realize that Geisler’s claim is completely without foundation.12 Shedd was, if we used the same standard that Geisler applies to other five-point Calvinists, an extreme Calvinist. Geisler is not a Calvinist.

Next on my complaint list is Geisler’s vice of never defining his terms. The most glaring is his use of the term free will. It is difficult to determine precisely what Geisler means by this all-important term despite the fundamental place held by this concept in his thinking. One reads this book in a constant state of suspension, looking for some clear definition of the exact theological or philosophical sense in which the ever-recurring term free will is employed. Geisler does equate free will with free choice and concludes that since people do possess the ability to choose at the horizontal level of human activity, then they must possess the same ability on the vertical level with God (p. 33). Geisler appeals to texts such as 1 Peter 5:2 (where Christian wives are called to willfully submit to their own husbands) and 2 Corinthians 8:3 (where Christian giving is done without compulsion) and triumphantly declares that the Scriptures teach free will! This is bad enough but gets worse as Geisler goes on to declare that extreme Calvinism teaches that the human will is destroyed (p. 57). How can Geisler make that statement, especially if we accept at face value his claim to have read and digested the writings of Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Owen, Edwards, et. al.? The word *skulduggery* comes to mind when I read something like this. Geisler is not a Calvinist.

Foreknowledge and predestination fare no better in Geisler’s hands. He says he rejects the Arminian understanding of election based on foreknowledge and then proceeds to tell us, “Whatever God knows, He determines. And whatever He determines, He knows” (p. 52). A few pages later he adds, “There is no contradiction in God knowingly predetermining and predeterminately knowing from all eternity precisely what we would do with our free acts” (p. 54). What? Huh? This sounds like something out of an old Abbott and Costello routine. (I did say I was out to pick a fight.) Predestination, as defined by Geisler, ceases to be anything but an aspect of God’s prescience. God does not predestinate anything. He simply knows ahead of time what will occur and ratifies the decisions that we make. In the final analysis Geisler’s position differs very little from that put forth by open-view theists like Clark Pinnock and Greg Boyd. Open-view theists believe that God does not know events before they occur—once they do, however, God is able to work His purposes. In Geisler’s theology God knows the future exhaustively—but that is all He does—He knows what will happen, but He is passive. God does not actively predetermine anything. To say as Geisler does, “God sees what we are freely doing, and what He sees, He knows, and what He knows He determines,”13 is just doublespeak. Geisler is not a Calvinist.

Exegesis is not Geisler’s forte. The various texts he appeals to in order to establish his position are simply ranged like so many pieces of furniture to suit his taste. Here is an example of how he turns John 6:44 on its head.

*No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me
draws him, and I will raise him up at the last day." According to extreme Calvinists, this speaks of an irresistible drawing by God. They note that the word “draw” (Greek: elkuo) means to “drag” (Acts 16:19; James 2:6).

In order to understand the issue properly, a number of things must be taken into consideration. First, like any word with a range of meaning, the given meaning of this Greek word must be determined by the context in which it is used. Sometimes in the New Testament it does mean to drag a person or object (cf. John 18:10; 21:6, 11; Acts 16:19). At other times it does not (cf. John 12:32; see also below). Standard Greek lexicons allow for the meaning “draw” as well as “drag.” Likewise, the Greek translation of the Old Testament (the Septuagint) uses it in both senses. Deuteronomy 21:3-4 employs it in the sense of “drag” and Jeremiah 38:3 to “draw” out of love.

Second, John 12:32 makes it plain that the word “draw” cannot mean “irresistible grace” on the elect for one simple reason: Jesus said, “But I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to Myself” (John 12:32). No true Calvinist believes that all men will be saved.

Third, the word “all” cannot mean only some men in John 12:32. Earlier (John 2:24-25) when Jesus said He knew “all” men sin, it was clear that He was not just speaking of the elect. Why then should “all” mean “some” in John 12:32? If He meant “some,” He could easily have said so.

Finally, their being drawn by God was conditioned on their faith. The context of their being “drawn” (6:37) was “he who believes” (6:35) or “everyone who believes in Him”; (6:40). Those who believe are enabled by God to be drawn to Him. Jesus adds, “This is why I told you that no one can come to me unless the Father has enabled him” (John 6:65). A little later He says, “If anyone chooses to do God’s will, he will find out whether my teaching comes from God or whether I speak on my own” (John 7:17). From this it is evident that their understanding of Jesus’ teaching and being drawn to the Father resulted from their own free choice (p. 92).

Geisler does not cite any of the major commentators to support his interpretation—because there aren’t any. He accuses Calvinists like John Piper of “reading one’s theology into the text as opposed to reading the text” (p. 88). But if ever there was a book designed to teach seminarians how not to use the Bible, Geisler’s book would be on the recommended reading list. Over and over again one reads Geisler’s exegesis of the Scriptures in a state of utter amazement. After reading Geisler’s interpretation of the relevant texts of Scripture, I felt like shouting with Popeye, “That’s all I can stand, and I can’t stand no more!” It is painfully apparent that Geisler does not possess the tools to do technical exegesis. A lot of people, many Calvinists included, lack the training to do this—but that does not mean that they can’t understand a text like John 6:44. Geisler, on the other hand, has had years of experience in teaching theology and apologetics in evangelical institutions, and as I mentioned earlier he has written on a broad range of topics and has a reputation as one of evangelicalism’s leading apologists, but you would never have guessed that to be the case after reading this book.

It is to be expected that a book that refers to traditional Calvinism as extreme Calvinism would heap opprobrium on the doctrine of limited atonement. Geisler, true to form, is adamant in his opposition to this distinctive feature of confessional Calvinism and concludes that “the stark truth of the matter is that the God of extreme Calvinism is not all loving. Limited atonement necessarily means God has only limited love” (p. 85). We noted that exegesis is not one of Geisler’s strong points; after all, he is a philosopher and not an exegete by training, but I expect better from him when it comes to logic. Let’s follow Geisler’s logic here. Could we say with the Universalists that Geisler’s God is not all-loving? If God does not make salvation possible for Satan, is He guilty of not being all-loving? Geisler does
have in some sense a limited atonement since it is restricted to humanity. But in actuality Geisler does not believe that the death of Christ saves anyone. In fact, according to him the cross of Christ does not actually redeem a single soul. All that the work of Christ does is to make salvation possible. I have no desire to be read as asserting that Geisler intends to deny or imply that the atoning work of Christ is really not redemptive. But his language certainly leaves the distinct impression that faith, not the blood of Christ, actually redeems. In Geisler's hands the doctrine of substitutionary atonement is emptied of all its meaning. Listen carefully to how Geisler states this:

Of course, if substitution is automatic, then everyone for whom Christ is substituted will automatically be saved. But substitution need not be automatic; a penalty can be paid without it automatically taking effect. For instance, the money can be given to pay a friend's debt without the person being willing to receive it. Those, like myself, who accept the substitutionary atonement but reject limited atonement simply believe that Christ's payment for the sins of all mankind did not automatically save them; it simply made them savable. It did not automatically apply the saving grace of God into a person's life. It simply satisfied (propitiated) God on their behalf (1 John 2:2), awaiting their faith to receive God's unconditional gift of salvation, which was made possible by Christ's atonement (p. 85).

Geisler's assertion is a non sequitur. There is a suppressed premise necessary to be supplied before the assumed conclusion follows and that premise, found nowhere in 1 John 2:2 (or elsewhere in Scripture) is that propitiation is something that has to be appropriated. No! Propitiation is made by Christ and does not need to be supplemented by something we do before it becomes an actuality.

Geisler gleefully declares that Calvin agrees with him on this point, and that the great Reformer was, in this regard, not one of those extreme Calvinists. To bolster his claim Geisler refers his readers to “the classic work of R. T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (Oxford, 1979)” (p. 155). Obviously Geisler is unaware of the fact that Kendall's thesis has not been able to stand the test of time. Paul Helm produced a devastating critique, and noted post-Reformation historian Richard A. Muller has likewise poked holes in Kendall's thesis. Jonathan H. Rainbow, after doing extensive research at Strassbourg, wrote a Ph.D. dissertation that not only debunks the Kendall thesis but establishes on firm ground Calvin's Calvinism, especially as it pertains to particular redemption.

But this is beside the point. In his zeal to denigrate limited atonement, Geisler, as I said, ends up eviscerating substitutionary atonement in the process. Thoughtful Arminians have realized that substitutionary atonement, in any form, is incompatible with their doctrine of free will (which is Geisler's position). Warfield in his review of the Arminian John Miley's Systematic Theology made this observation, which applies with equal force to Geisler.

We have space for only a few remarks on the discussion of the atonement. The problem was to find a doctrine of atonement conformable to the Arminian fundamentum, which Dr. Miley does not hesitate to place in its psychology of the will. “Freedom,” he says, “is fundamental in Arminianism. The system holds accordingly the universality and provisional nature of the atonement, and the conditionality of salvation” (p. 275). “The cardinal doctrines of the Wesleyan Soteriology” being thus determined—“that the atonement is only provisory in its character, rendering men savable, but not necessarily saving them”; and that salvation is condi-
tional in the sense of a real Synergism (p. 169)—"with these facts," Dr. Miley remarks, "the atonement of satisfaction must be excluded," and "the rectoral theory maintained as the only doctrine of a real atonement agreeing with them" (p. 169). The former part of this conclusion, at least, seems to us perfectly solid, and we go thoroughly with Dr. Miley in his clear proof (p. 122) of the untenableness of those schemes that seek to unite an atonement of penal substitution and conditional universalism.18

I could have expanded this review to twice the size, but I will forgo that temptation. Geisler is certainly entitled to his opinion on these matters. I would have responded to his book with less vinegar had he not vilified genuine Calvinism and tried to pass himself off as a moderate Calvinist. I can well imagine the consternation from Geisler and his fellow dispensationalists if someone wrote a book that depicted your standard run-of-the-mill dispensationalism as extreme dispensationalism and then sought to claim the label moderate dispensationalist because the author held to a vague form of premillennialism but rejected such dispensational distinctives as the Israel/church dichotomy and the pre-tribulation rapture.

Geisler, and I say this for the last time, is not a Calvinist in any sense of the word. He really is not even one of those horrible hybrids called a Calminian. At best Geisler is an inconsistent Arminian; at worst he is a confused semi-Pelagian. I know this is a harsh assessment, but it is nonetheless a very valid one. Geisler will no doubt loudly protest, insisting that he holds unwaveringly to the core doctrines of evangelicalism. But he comes across in this book as someone who seems to glory in putting together a patchwork theology oftentimes, as this volume demonstrates, with pieces of cloth that clash and tell all with eyes to see, that the person responsible for this ugly theological quilt didn't know what he was doing. I expected better from someone of his stature.

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Notes

1. I have in mind Geisler's contribution to the efforts of the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, i.e., "Philosophical Presupposition of the Biblical Errancy" in Inerrancy, Norman Geisler, ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1979), 307-36; "Process Theology and Inerrancy" in Challenges to Inerrancy (Chicago: Moody, 1984), 247-84; and "Explaining Hermeneutics: A Commentary on the Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics Articles of Affirmation and Denial" in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy and the Bible, papers from ICBI Summit II, E. D. Redmacher and R. D. Preus, eds. (Academic Books, 1984), 887-904. There is however, a certain degree of unevenness in Geisler's works. John Frame takes Geisler to task for his essay on "Philosophical Presupposition of Biblical Errancy" and concludes with a statement that rings true to Geisler's book on election as well. "Geisler is not a stupid man. He is a well-trained philosopher and a zealous Christian. But this Epilogue would be unworthy of a first-year seminarian. My opinion is that Geisler has been spreading himself much too thin. He has been publishing far too many books, going on too many debating trips. His other writings indicate that he is capable of careful thought. He ought to clear his schedule sufficiently so that he can think carefully more often" (The Westminster Theological Journal [Vol. 45:2, Fall 1983], 441).

2. Geisler gained quite a bit of notoriety for leading the charge in the Evangelical Free Church against the views of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School professor Murray Harris on the nature of the resurrection body.

3. Robert Traill, a seventeenth-century Scottish divine, spoke directly to this matter in a way that is appropriate to Geisler's effort: "But that which concerneth our case, is, that the middle way betwixt the Arminians and the Orthodox, had been espoused, and strenuously defended and promoted, by some Nonconformists, of great note for piety and parts; and usually such men that are for middle ways in points of doctrine, have a greater kindness for that extreme they go half-way to, than
4. I suspect that Geisler is alarmed over the influence John Gerstner's Wrongly Dividing the Word of Truth: A Critique of Dispensationalism (WG/H) and R. C. Sproul's two books, Chosen by God (1986) and Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will (1997) have had amongst evangelicals, and this accounts for Geisler devoting the bulk of this book to critiquing Calvinism.


6. Geisler was schooled at the old dispensational Detroit Bible College (renamed William Tyndale College), Wheaton College and a Catholic school, Loyola University in Chicago. He has taught at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Dallas Theological Seminary, Liberty University, and now serves as President of Southern Evangelical Seminary in Charlotte, North Carolina.

7. Warfield refers to this statement of Adolf Schlatter as an excellent example of implicit Arminianism, and R. C. Hyatt, Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will (Baker, 1997), has had amongst evangelicals, and this accounts for Geisler devoting the bulk of this book to critiquing Calvinism.


10. Ibid., 168.

11. Among Shedd's other significant writings are his Sermons to the Natural Man (1876), Sermons to the Spiritual Man (1884), Theological Essays (1877), Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy (1893), his excellent two-volume History of Christian Doctrine (1889), and his very fine Critical and Doctrinal Commentary on Romans (1879). Geisler should have consulted Shedd on Romans 8:29-30. This would have served him well. He would have properly understood the text. As it is, Geisler's interpretation of the passage is seriously flawed (p. 70). Geisler would also have realized the true nature of Shedd's Calvinism.

13. Predestination and Freewill, 73.

14. In seeking to parry the Calvinistic thrust of Romans 9:16, Geisler stubs his toe rather badly by claiming, "The Greek word for 'of here is $ek$ which means 'out of'. It is a reference to the source of salvation, not the means by which we receive it—this means it is a free act of our will in receiving it (John 1:12; Eph. 2; etc.)" (p. 59). There is no $ek$ in the Greek text of Romans 9:16.

15. Paul Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists (The Banner of Truth Trust, 1982).

16. Cf. his Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: Vol. I, Prolegomena to Theology (Baker, 1987), 22, and the book he co-authored with James Bradley, Church History: An Introduction to Research, Reference Works, and Methods (Eerdmans, 1995). Regarding Kendall's work, the authors point out: By way of example, one recent historian of Christian thought, in attempting to prove that various post-Reformation Reformed and Puritan writers held a voluntaristic soteriology, has argued that the Puritan theologian, William Ames, placed repentance (an act of the will) definitively prior to faith (which necessarily involves the intellect). He cites Ames as follows: "While repentance is indeed an 'effect' of faith, 'Repentance in respect of that carelessness, and anxiety and terror from the law which I hath joined with it doth goe before Faith, by order of nature, as a preparing and disposing cause.'" The sentence in which the citation occurs itself raises questions. If Ames could say that repentance was an "effect" of faith, does this statement relate to the sentence apparently cited in full by Kendall? When the citation is checked out against Ames's actual text, however, all becomes clear. In the first place, what appears to be a full sentence is in reality only the first of three independent clauses in a single sentence. In the second place, the sentence, when cited in its entirety, actually proves the opposite point: the "order of nature" to which Ames refers occurs only in the unregenerate and it relates to the so-called second or pedagogical use of the law. Understood, however, as an effective and genuine turning from sin, repentance, Ames makes clear, must follow faith as an effect follows its cause. Contrary to Kendall's conclusion, this rather neatly mirrors Calvin's view. Woe to the unsuspecting writer who trusts the secondary source for citation of primary sources! (p. 42).
