The dimensions of ideological and political resistance in Poland today are very difficult to estimate. Known leaders of the opposition number perhaps a couple of dozen — and most are in hiding most of the time — but underground operations span the whole country and must have at least occasional impact on a significant proportion of the adult population. Opposition activities are conducted in a unique social atmosphere in which the open and the tacit constantly blend and interact. Work is done quietly in closed circles, and those involved generally prefer to remain anonymous; but the product which emerges is available to all, and its consumers — readers of underground publications, owners of illegal cassette and video recordings, audiences who listen in to Solidarity broadcasts or who attend ideologically tainted plays, concerts and exhibitions — are known to number millions.

The purpose of such activity is to inform and educate, to build up a framework of independent culture where ideas may be expressed in a language unrestricted by the token ideological genuflections still expected in the official environment. Much work is undertaken in co-operation with the Catholic Church, which can provide venues and offer encouragement or assistance to writers, artists and performers. Centres for Independent Education and “flying universities” are widely active, and in many areas associated with local parishes.

There are probably between five hundred and 1,000 underground publications currently circulating in the country. These range from illegibly-printed single-page leaflets to thick, competently-produced

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1 A poll conducted in 1985 by sociologists from the Independent Solidarity Office for Research on Public Opinion indicated that 25.9% of those asked received underground publications regularly; 47.2% received them irregularly; 21.7% seldom; 4.2% never. Only 0.8% refused to give a reply (Trybuna, 53/109, London, 1986).

2 “Flying universities” operate in groups of 15-20 students (generally aged under 21, although some mature students also participate). They usually meet on a weekly basis in different homes to take courses in history, politics, constitutional law, economics or philosophy. Lecturers tend to remain anonymous, although some prominent figures are known to have contributed.
books. Regional newspapers appearing weekly or monthly can have print runs of anything up to 60,000 copies. Issued by opposition cells, they are financed by their own cover prices and local donations, as well as by gifts from Polish communities and trade unions in the West. Their aim is to provide a forum for discussion, and to publicise news which does not filter through official media channels. The unofficial press is passed round in families, among friends, in factories, work-places, even schools, distributed at church gatherings or simply left on street corners. Most of the people who want to read uncensored literature have no difficulty in gaining access to it, although those involved in its writing, publication and distribution face the threat of prison sentences ranging from three to five years.

The views put forward in unofficial newspapers and periodicals have been known to have an impact even on the state media. Oppositionist ideas are harshly criticised or denounced in the newspapers and on television but they are not ignored. The underground press is not a phenomenon which the authorities can easily dismiss, and according to a recent report, the Minister of Culture, Mr Aleksander Krawczuk, has publicly stated that it does exert a positive influence "because it creates an atmosphere of freedom". Whatever the implications of this declaration — made against the background of all the house-searches, confiscations, arrests and attempts to infiltrate underground publishing over the last five years — there can be no doubt that, since the imposition of martial law, opposition literature has made its mark, reaching well beyond activist groups into the very fibre of Polish society.

It is impossible to discuss here the entire spectrum of views expressed by the opposition in the publications which have appeared since martial law was declared in December 1981. However, an attempt can be made to identify certain groupings and modes of thinking which have come to the fore, and which are particularly well reflected in the shades of attitude taken towards the institution which has become the traditional representative of the people in Poland: the Roman Catholic Church.

Co-operation and Conflict

It is usually estimated that over ninety per cent of the Polish population is Catholic and neither the authorities nor the opposition can ignore the part played by the church in the social and political life of the country. As the only legal, fully operational non-state

institution in Poland since Solidarity was disbanded, the church has again become the sole platform for the expression of public feeling. It has acted as mediator between society and the state for more than forty years and has been the main source of aid and advice to those who have come into conflict with the authorities and suffered harassment, persecution, or imprisonment. In the late 1970s, its position was further enhanced by the open acknowledgement which it received from the many groups within the growing dissident movement, irrespective of their political differences. These included: ROPCIO (The Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights), which worked openly; KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland), a small but unconditionally defiant underground group noted for having brought the term "independence" back into the vocabulary of the Polish opposition; Ruch Młodej Polski (The Young Poland Movement); as well as KOR (Workers' Defence Committee) and the non-Catholic intellectual elite associated with it. By the end of the decade, KOR had produced a new opposition counter-culture in which the workers, the intelligentsia and the church were all actively involved. This helped to provide the impetus for the formation of Solidarity, both as a trade union and as the national, social and cultural movement it eventually became. The election of a Polish Pope in October 1978, his visits to Poland in 1979 and 1983, the rise and fall of Solidarity in 1980 and 1981, martial law and its aftermath all contributed to the consolidation of the church's position as the body most fully representative of the mass of the population — encompassing not only their religious loyalties but also their cultural and political aspirations.

The burden of that position has laid the church open to all the criticism which an institution upholding the feelings of the people is liable to encounter. The quality of its leadership has been called into question, as have its policies towards the state and its attitude towards the opposition. Above all, it has been called to task for not being sufficiently resolute and consistent in pressing the social and political demands which seem to follow from its moral and religious teaching.

The church has remained beyond criticism only in its function as a welfare organisation. Since 1982, it has offered free medical, financial and legal assistance to anyone who has needed it. During the period of martial law, priests helped families to trace internees, provided basic necessities for people dismissed from their jobs for political reasons, and arranged the payment of fines imposed on those arrested during

*KOR (Komitet Obrony Robotniczej) was a group of intellectuals of diverse opinions and affiliations, founded to help workers following riots in Radom and Ursus in 1976.*
demonstrations. Apparently, some priests also provided refuge for activists hiding from the authorities, and later had to face the consequences.

The opposition repeatedly expressed its gratitude for this support in the underground press. However, during the course of 1982, debate about the nature of the relationship between the church and the underground began to surface. This debate, which has since continued with varying degrees of intensity, may be related to a more general recurring disagreement over policy and principle within opposition circles.

Given that the opposition unequivocally rejects the Communist Party state as a viable form of government, it must decide what kind of strategy to adopt. The question is whether to stand up and hit out at the risk of jeopardising the life of the country, or instead to nurture a form of passive resistance — which might eventually engulf and dissolve the system, but which also runs the risk of sinking into indifference and apathy. On the whole, the option of passive resistance has tended to prevail. Since the imposition of martial law, the opposition has grown, if anything, increasingly cautious in its calls for public protest and open action against government policies and practice. The focus has turned towards the clarification of ideas and the formation of political and organisational programmes.

In debate, the dividing line seems to fall between those who give priority to the principle of unity and the long-term survival of the Polish people as a nation on the one hand, and those who prefer to promote the notion of liberty and national independence on the other. Since December 1981, the church leadership has tended to favour the principles of unity and survival, to the degree that in public statements, the Primate, Cardinal Glemp, has on occasion appeared to decry the aspirations to liberty and independence which have formed the backbone of Polish cultural identity for over two hundred years. In taking up this position, the church leadership has implicitly given sanction to the line of priority selected by the more moderate or "realistic" sector of the opposition, and at times overtly dismissed as extreme the priorities of the more radical or idealistic elements within it. It therefore comes as no surprise to see the harshest criticism of the church coming from the more hard-line factions, which often associate cautious words and moderate hopes with selling out to the state.

\[5^\text{The Church in Poland Under Martial Law, (London: NSZZ "Solidarność" Information Office, June 1983).}\]
The largest and most far-reaching opposition group at present is that descended from the Solidarity Trade Union itself. It is represented by the TKK\(^6\) (Interim Co-ordinating Commission), a clandestine guiding body set up in April 1982 by Zbigniew Bujak. Its declared purpose is to put pressure on the state to honour the 1980 Gdański agreement and to put into practice the programme adopted by the first Solidarity National Congress in September 1981, which sought to make the authorities subject to a greater degree of control from below.

The means by which this was to be achieved was a source of sharp disagreement in Solidarity circles in the spring of 1982,\(^7\) but the alternative which has been most widely adopted by the opposition since then has shifted the emphasis from strategically planned political struggle towards decentralised activity conducted within a network of small groups. The Solidarity underground aims to resist the system by withdrawing from it and creating a second, independent, pluralist society, encompassing the whole range of social, cultural and political activities which are the features of any normal social organism. The strength of this, as one leading oppositionist has emphasised,\(^8\) is that the centralised state monolith is counterpoised by a polycentric, pluralist, tolerant, and democratically-minded society united by its commitment to the principles of sovereignty and non-violence. The existence of such an alternative will allow Polish society to prepare for independence in the long run, Kulerski maintains, and will protect it from the danger of imposing a new kind of authoritarian regime upon itself. The Solidarity trade union now represents one of many underground structures within the opposition as a whole, and the role of the TKK tends to be emblematic rather than representative or organisational. It has been described by one leading activist as “the standard of a dispersed regiment”,\(^9\) a symbolic point of reference for the underground network throughout the country.

The unofficial newspaper most closely associated with the TKK is *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (The Mazowsze Weekly). It has appeared since February 1982 and has a circulation of between 19,000 and 30,000 copies.\(^10\) The paper publishes regular information about decisions

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\(^6\) *Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna.*

\(^7\) In Spring 1982, Jacek Kuron put forward an argument for the organisation of the underground as a serious conspiratorial centre which should prepare and direct a national uprising to overthrow the regime. See J. Luxmoore, “The Polish Church Under Martial Law”, *RCL*, this issue, p. 126.


Opposition and Church in Poland

and statements made by the TKK, although Zbigniew Bujak stated in the first issue that neither he nor the TKK would interfere with its editorial policy. The views Tygodnik Mazowsze has published since then have indeed been wide-ranging and representative.

The TKK puts considerable emphasis on the need for unity within the opposition and tries to steer clear of factional confrontation. It emphasises the importance of close co-operation with the church, particularly in moments of crisis. More radical factions such as Niepodległość (Independence) have criticised it, however, for lacking a firm programmatic line and proper organisation, and for laying itself open to easy infiltration by the secret police.11

In addition, there are a number of para-Solidarity organisations and political groups — including Niepodległość — which share many of Solidarity’s aims and sometimes its membership, but see themselves as independent and reserve the right to act on their own initiative. Their attitudes towards the church range from consistent expression of allegiance to stinging criticism of particular policies, and depend largely on the degree to which they are prepared to identify the strength of the church with the social and political good of the country.

One ardent proponent of support for the church is Glos (The Voice), a group which originally appeared in 1977 from within KOR, but which also claims association with the national-democratic current in the Polish opposition.12 Since martial law, Glos has consistently defended the position and policies of the church, and particularly of Cardinal Glemp himself. It has argued that the role of the church is above all to influence those in power and to nurture a form of spiritual resistance within the community. Christianity is the main ideological opponent of the communist system, Glos holds, and only Christianity can offer a system of social order which will restore freedom and guarantee peace and justice in Poland. More controversially, however, in its programme published in May/June 1983, Glos maintained that the way forward was to create an accord between the church, the army and Solidarity. This idea was based on the assumption that, during the Solidarity era, the party had disintegrated and was effectively suspended by General Jaruzelski when martial law was imposed. The army was thus the strongest element in the new order, though its position was neither consolidated nor permanent. For the opposition, the key lay in the conflict between the army and the party, because the army needed support from Solidarity and from

11Niepodległość, No. 21-22, September/October 1983.
12The National Democrats were a political party organised by Roman Dmowski at the beginning of this century. They were characterised by their fundamentalist nationalism and their loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church.
the church in order to assert its authority. So it was here that the
opposition should be looking in its search for an effectual partner in
dialogue. The group declared that, failing this, it was prepared to
revert to the more widely accepted notion of an underground society
and its "long march" towards greater freedom and democracy.

Another group which regards the church institution as a vital ally is
Polityka Polska (Polish Politics), which has published an analytical
journal by the same name since autumn 1983. Polityka Polska does
not see itself as a formal organisation, but rather as a platform for the
formation of political ideas, although the journal seems to make
frequent reference to the national-democratic tradition in pre-war
Polish politics. One article published in 1984 emphasised that the
national-democratic concept of personal fulfilment as something to be
realised only within the national community is a reflection of the
Christian notion of the relationship between the individual and
society. It also suggested that the church in Poland, and indeed the
Pope himself, had absorbed much from the national-democratic
understanding of what the nation and state really are. Polityka
Polska has pronounced the church’s policies in recent years
far-sighted and realistic, though not fully appreciated by many within
the opposition. The group has made it clear that it regards
Catholicism as a powerful unifying force, with the church as the
highest authority and — at present — the spokesman for national
interests. Regarding political strategy, it does not hold with the idea
that the underground society is a feasible long-term proposition, but
prefers to think in terms of achieving an "internally sovereign
society", or a situation in which the influence of the party on national
life is limited as far as possible within the present system. Such a
solution must be achieved through dialogue with the authorities, and
through policies characterised by flexibility, realism and reason.

The TKK, Glos and Polityka Polska may differ over questions of
policy and tactics, and over their understanding of the national
political landscape, but they share a common belief in the supreme
importance of unity and survival, and value the contribution made by
the church towards achieving consensus on the priority of these
principles. The degree to which the groups are prepared to identify the
Polish nation with Catholicism and the church institution vary from
the firm association envisaged along the lines of the national-
democratic tradition, and pursued by Glos and Polityka Polska, to the
somewhat looser, complementary connection envisaged by the TKK.

\[13\] Teresa Hanicka, "Political Groups in the Polish Underground", RFE Research,
RAD Background Report/118 (Poland), 14 October 1985.
\[14\] A. H., "Dziedzictwo Narodowej Demokracji" (The National Democratic Heritage),
Polityka Polska, 1984 No. 4, pp. 42-56.
\[15\] Hanicka, "Polish Underground".
which looks more to the precedent of the KOR-church alliance of the late 1970s.

The factions which prefer to emphasise the principles of national independence and liberty over those of unity and survival vary no less in their interpretations of the political picture and of the means by which their goals might best be achieved; but they do share the view that the political interests of society should be represented and acted upon by society itself, and not be too closely associated with the church, its policies and its beliefs. Three representative organisations will be mentioned here: KOS (The Committee of Social Resistance), Solidarność Walczaca (Fighting Solidarity) and Niepodległość (Independence).

Of these, the group closest to the centre, and to the TKK, is KOS. Its programme declares a readiness to co-operate with all forms of resistance arranged by the TKK leadership and ensures consultation on key matters, although the organisation acts independently. It regards itself as “a socio-political movement and not a trade union” and will not therefore operate as a branch of Solidarity. In so far as it is a political movement, KOS tends to have a social-democratic emphasis, in the tradition of KOR, but as a social movement it also attracts people with a broad range of political views.

KOS has emphasised that its ultimate goal is independence for Poland and, once this has been achieved, a democratic system in which free and open political competition may operate. The group was formed immediately after the imposition of martial law, and operates as a decentralised network of clandestine five-man cells, which expands as members of each cell set up cells of their own. It is likely that thousands of people are involved throughout the country. As far as possible, anonymity is maintained and contact is confined to one’s closest collaborators. Activities tend to concentrate mainly on education and culture, and the organisation produces its own fortnightly paper which is distributed all around the country in editions of between 6,000 and 15,000 copies. Overall, KOS holds to the accepted notion of an independently active underground society as the means to bring about a gradual dissolution of the totalitarian system and to develop national and social awareness in preparation for a democratic form of government. The group does not think in terms of destroying the communist system in order to start afresh, but rather along lines of persuading the authorities to loosen their grip on the economy, so that eventually the system will change of its own accord. Where KOS differs from the TKK is in the firm delineation of

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16 Interview with KOS, Kultura, January-February 1984 Nos. 1-2, pp. 89-100.
17 KOS was founded by some ex-members of KOR.
18 Hanicka, “Polish Underground”.
its political goal, national independence, in its interest in foreign affairs and the international peace movement, and in its insistence upon a clear differentiation between spiritual and political issues. It regards the role of the church as predominantly that of a moral guide, and its own function as that of a representative political body.\(^{19}\)

This kind of position is more fully represented by another significant underground organisation: **Solidarność Walcząca** (Fighting Solidarity). This launched its activities in Wroclaw in June 1982, six months after martial law was declared, when a group of oppositionists led by a well-known activist, Kornel Morawiecki, broke away from the Solidarity Underground Regional Strike Committee to undertake work considered incompatible with the status of Solidarity as a trade union.

**Solidarność Walcząca** supports the TKK in principle but, like KOS, reserves the right to act on its own initiative. It has representative groups in at least six of Poland’s main cities and is thought to have cells in all walks of life throughout the country.\(^{20}\) It publishes its own weekly paper in editions of up to 20,000 copies, issues a monthly journal, **Biuletyn Dolnośląski** (The Lower Silesia Bulletin) and at least three other periodicals. It has also published books, including Solzhenitsyn’s **Gulag Archipelago**. The organisation claims to have an active membership of several hundred, as well as help and support from sympathisers whose numbers are unknown but could run into tens of thousands.

The declared aims of **Solidarność Walcząca** are considerably more radical than those of Solidarity itself, and the methods it advocates are more forthright. Its programme calls for the establishment of a free and independent Polish republic and declares the overthrow of the present regime to be its goal. It rejects the possibility of any form of co-operation or agreement with the authorities, and is critical of the policies of the TKK and its notion of achieving change through dialogue within the framework of the present system. The group has on occasion called for strikes and demonstrations against the advice of the TKK. More controversially, **Solidarność Walcząca** does not rule out the use of violence as a means of achieving its goal, although — perhaps to neutralise growing public scepticism — its leader, Kornel Morawiecki, has emphasised that “organisationally and emotionally” the group is not ready to take up this kind of action.\(^{21}\)

None the less, the group has stated that it looks to the Christian tradition for its roots,\(^{22}\) although it does not see the church as an

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\(^{19}\)Interview with KOS, *Kultura*, 1984 Nos. 1-2, pp. 89-100.

\(^{20}\)Hanicka, “Polish Underground”.


\(^{22}\)Hanicka, “Polish Underground”. 
institution with a role to play in politics. Solidarność Walczaca sees the defence of freedom and of the church as a responsibility to be shouldered by society, rather than the defence of human rights as a responsibility to be borne by the church. “We should gather in churches,” one of the group’s most respected supporters, Anna Walentynowicz, said in an interview with Biuletyn Dolnośląski: “We should get to know each other in churches, but we should not expect the church to fight our battles for us.”

This attitude is also shared by the most radical, if not revolutionary, of the opposition factions active in Poland since martial law, Niepodległość (Independence), which in February 1985 published a joint statement with Solidarność Walczaca declaring an intention to co-operate and to strive to consolidate the opposition movement as a whole. Niepodległość formally declared itself as a liberal-democratic political party in November 1984. Its prime concern is personal and national liberty and, since the early months of 1982, the group has advocated the formation of a militant underground structure prepared to overthrow the present regime, and has denounced milder approaches to opposition activity as inadequate and above all ineffective. Ultimately, it aspires to bring about the formation of a pluralist parliamentary democracy in Poland with a free market economy and considerable regional autonomy. Individual freedom and economic decentralisation are the key concepts on which the group’s programme is based, although, according to some sources, Niepodległość may also have had some direct association with the radical pre-martial law opposition group KPN (The Confederation for an Independent Poland), and may have drawn something of its political philosophy from there.

Niepodległość is probably the only underground organisation to remain entirely outside the umbrella of Solidarity and the TKK. It refuses to acknowledge the TKK as a representative leadership and holds that the Solidarity trade union is politically passé. Not surprisingly, it has been subjected to severe criticism by other groups within the opposition, particularly those which advocate a gradualist approach to change and regard the rapid overthrow of the present regime as a potential cataclysm for the whole country. Niepodległość has itself suffered internal splits within the last

23 Anna Walentynowicz was a founder of one of the free trade unions set up in Gdańsk in 1978. “Don’t Wait for Instructions: An Interview with Anna Walentynowicz, Biuletyn Dolnośląski, January 1985 No. 1 (59).
24 Hanicka, “Polish Underground”.
26 KOS has had particularly sharp exchanges with Niepodległość (Hanicka, “Polish Underground”).
18 months, and little is being revealed about its activities. It is not known if groups associated with it exist outside Warsaw, Kraków and Katowice, and the circle of activists involved is kept strictly anonymous — although a few arrests have been made known. 27

The periodical Niepodległość, published by the group, is a forum for the analysis and debate of political theory. It has been printed in editions of up to 5,000 copies, but some claim that its circulation is considerably wider, and that it particularly attracts workers, rather than the more “establishment-oriented” intelligentsia. 28

The controversial and, some might suggest, subversive views on the role of the church which Niepodległość has put forward find their roots in its emphasis on the difference in function, allegiance and responsibility held respectively by the church and by political groups. The church, Niepodległość argues, is obliged to hold talks with the government and to co-operate with it to some extent if it is to fulfil its social role and continue caring for the needy or teaching the young, and similarly if it is to maintain its privileges of publication and church-building or its position as a body capable of negotiating effectively for the release of political prisoners. It is up to the political opposition to maintain a hard line, Niepodległość declares, and to reject de facto communist rule by refusing to co-operate with the system and by questioning its legality — because if the opposition does not do it, no-one else will. Furthermore, the argument goes, it is important to take into account the world-wide interests of the Vatican. An article published in Niepodległość in mid-1983 29 put forward the view that the Vatican’s concern over the position of Catholics in the Soviet Union — especially Lithuania and the Baltic States — could conflict with any sympathies the Pope might cherish towards the opposition in Poland. “It is unfortunately true that the Kremlin will have to be paid for any concessions in the East (i.e. the Soviet Union),” the author holds, “and what does the Roman Catholic Church have to offer the Soviet authorities? Only its policies in Poland, because that is where it is strongest.” The article goes on to discredit the Primate’s Advisory Council for not taking account of the real — rather than declared — interests of the communist authorities, for not allowing innovative, creative political thinking, and for laying itself, and the country, open to manipulation by the state. 30

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Negotiations to establish diplomatic relations between the Polish People’s Republic and the Vatican were under way at the time and their success would bring considerable benefit to the image of the Polish government world-wide. Maya Latynski, “The Church : Between State and Society”, Poland Watch 5, Washington DC, 1984.
30 “Gra Watykan-Moskwa” (The Vatican-Moscow Game), Niepodległość, No. 18-19 June/July 1983.
It is true that Niepodległość stands outside the main body of the opposition in airing such views without qualification, but articles sceptical of church policy and of the church leadership have appeared periodically in many underground journals over the last five years, often at times of particular national tension: in the aftermath of the imposition of martial law, after the suspension of Solidarity in October 1982, in the run-up to the Pope’s visit in June 1983 or after the murder of Fr Jerzy Popieluszko in November 1984. Only a flavour of the thoughts expressed can be offered here by way of illustration.

Some Underground Views of Church Policy

In April 1982, four months after the declaration of martial law, and at a time when church-directed aid programmes were already well under way, Tygodnik Mazowsze published an article acknowledging the value of the church’s help but questioning the moral implications of its political attitude. It was entitled “Can We Defend Ourselves From Hatred?” and referred back to the sermon given by the Primate on 13 December 1981 (the day after martial law had been imposed), calling for non-resistance and calm. 31 “We were told that we must not put our faith in physical force, and that there is nothing of greater value than human life,” the writer commented,

How many of us thought then that there are things of more value than life, and that this was what Christianity had taught us. We turn to the church waiting to hear what to do and how to defend ourselves. And we hear that we must not submit to hatred. This is not an adequate answer . . . there is a danger that, if the church continues to deviate away from the feelings of society, then it will not be heard at the decisive moment and at a time when its call for moderation would be particularly valuable to those who are desperate and hopeless. 32

The article provoked a series of letters, many of which defended the church and insisted that its role was primarily spiritual rather than representative of national aspirations. 3 The debate was nevertheless something of a milestone for Tygodnik Mazowsze, being the first in which the wisdom of the Primate’s words was so directly challenged.

32 “Christian”, “Czy obronimy sie przed nienawiścią?” (Can We Defend Ourselves from Hatred?), Tygodnik Mazowsze, 6 April 1982.
33 Tygodnik Mazowsze, 9 and 28 June 1982.
Another upsurge of criticism followed in the last two months of 1982, after the legal suspension of Solidarity, and the failure of the underground's call for a general strike on 10 November. The call was effectively neutralised by Primate Glemp's strong condemnation of strike plans, and was followed some weeks later by his appeal to the suspended actors' union (ZASP) to give up its boycott of state media performances. It was known that negotiations between the Primate and General Jaruzelski were taking place at the time and the Primate's more radical critics began to talk of "an alliance between the cross and the club". Among the more moderate sector of the opposition, meanwhile, it was rumoured that there was a secret agreement between the church and the regime, made without the consent of the people and at Solidarity's expense. Within the church itself, criticism of the Primate's policies was also growing. 35

On the whole, Tygodnik Mazowsze sought to play down the role of the church in the failure of the November strike. It acknowledged that the hierarchy was trying to create a political arena for further action to benefit the country as a whole, and giving the regime enough elbow room to go along with some of society's demands without losing face. 36 It also published an article by Maciej Poleski, arguing that, far from abandoning Solidarity, the church was striving to forge a "third alternative" in continuing its dialogue with the state, and hoping to create a situation which might lead Poland out of its exhausting stalemate. Nonetheless, the article contained a veiled warning, indicating that if the church ever completely abandoned Solidarity, it must expect to find itself the next target of repression. 37

In January 1983 Archbishop Glemp was made Cardinal. The event served to dampen rumours that the Pope was dissatisfied with the Primate's performance. Then, in June, the Pope arrived in Poland. The visit took place in an atmosphere of great warmth and rejoicing, but in the underground press a heated debate was taking place regarding its political implications, its timing, and above all its price — since the authorities had emphasised that it could only occur if the atmosphere in the country was appropriately calm. Now, Polityka Polska rose to defend the Primate's methods, publishing a lengthy piece praising the consistency, flexibility and effectiveness of Cardinal Glemp's policies, and his steady determination to see the visit through and boost morale in the country. 38

35 At a meeting at the Warsaw Curia offices on 7 December 1982, the Primate was severely criticised by priests. See Luxmoore, op. cit., p. 149.
36 Tygodnik Mazowsze, 15 December 1982.
37 Tygodnik Mazowsze, 24 November 1982.
38 Józef Wierny, "Refleksje po pielgrzymce Jana Pawła II" (Reflections Following the Visit of John Paul II), Polityka Polska, 1984 No. 4, pp. 1-6.
A few months later, early in 1984, the underground again expressed sharp criticism of the Primate, after his transfer of the popular dissident priest Fr Mieczyslaw Nowak from his Warsaw parish of Ursus to the provinces. This seemed an obvious concession to state policy and, KOS argued, confirmed the way in which the Episcopate’s attitude towards the regime had been developing over the past two years: “The policy of conciliation with the regime, which has been forced through by the Primate apparently with support from the Episcopate, has brought the church perilously close to the point where it must lose social support,” one article maintained:

The church’s successive concessions to the demands of the authorities have not brought the fulfilment of any of society’s more significant demands, or even of the church’s own, purely religious, demands... On the other hand, this policy does threaten to bring about a decline in social support for the church — which is dangerous both for the church and for society.39

Whether or not the church did indeed register any loss of social support during 1984, by the end of the year it could boast a massive following. In November, the young, much-loved dissident priest Fr Jerzy Popieluszko was murdered by agents of the secret police. The event and the trial which followed made international headlines and require no further comment here, but its presentation in the Polish underground press well illustrates the differences in attitude of the radical factions and the more conciliatory opposition groups. Niepodległość re-emphasised the need for the opposition to take a firm, independent political stand. It saw the murder of Fr Popieluszko, and the debates on opposition policy which it had aroused, as evidence of the weakness of earlier tactics and of the need to establish a firm programme of resistance if further similar tragedies were to be prevented.40 Tygodnik Mazowsze, on the other hand, emphasised that church-state tension was on the increase, and predicted that a new period of selective repression could be at hand. It was quick to affirm that the church and society had been abused together, and that they now stood as a single unit — with Fr Popieluszko as their new patron — ready to defend themselves against the common enemy.41

As far as available sources show, in the months after the murder the sense of repression experienced by the church and the opposition

41 See for instance Tygodnik Mazowsze, 21 February 1985 or 25 April 1985.
seems to have grown. The hierarchy’s stand against the state appeared to harden. The number of outspoken priests rose substantially, and special Masses for the homeland — which Fr Popieluszko had initiated — became a standard feature of church activity. The church leadership repeatedly stated that it would continue to take up its position in public debate and that the church would decide for itself whether or not to support various forms of political activity. The authorities, on the other hand, began to dwell less on internal differences within the church and insisted that the church institution should not allow itself to become involved in public matters not directly related to the spiritual welfare of its faithful.42

On the whole, the aftermath of the Popieluszko murder saw the church and the opposition increasingly on the same side of the fence. As the divide between the church and the authorities grew more apparent, that between the church and the opposition tended to diminish. Although church-state dialogue was not wholly abandoned, and secret talks between Cardinal Glemp and General Jaruzelski were held in June 1985 after an 18-month break, signs of any increasing consensus of opinion between the church and the authorities again began to fade when it was announced in September 1986 that long-standing negotiations for a church-sponsored Agricultural Foundation to help Poland’s private farmers had been abandoned.43

In addition, there have been indications that General Jaruzelski may desire a less independent role for the church than it has so far enjoyed,44 and if this is indeed the case, it is likely to play a part in consolidating the church’s firmer stand and its increased proximity to the opposition. Nevertheless, within the church itself and within the underground, there has remained a tension between the gradualist, “realistic” approach which upholds the priority of unity and the survival of the Polish people, and the more hard-line libertarian approach, which insists that only drastic action can produce results.45

This continues to be a key to the debate on policy and tactics which feeds Poland’s brand of social resistance, and may prove to be an important source of stimulation, as well as constraint, and thereby contribute to its survival.

44“General Jaruzelski on Church-State Relations”, RFE Research, 13 August 1986.
45See, for instance, “Współrzędzić czy nie klamać” (To Share in Government or Not to Lie), Arka (Kraków), 1985 No. 11, pp. 182-86.