

# Solidarity – the meaning of the experience

## A sociological survey

IRENEUSZ KRZEMINSKI

It is very difficult to give a sociological definition of the meaning Solidarity holds for the people of Poland. The formation of this, the first Independent Trade Union in Poland since the war, was a complex process reflected at many levels in Polish society, and it perhaps bore a deeper and more universal significance than has been generally recognised. For the Poles themselves, the Solidarity experience had a specific importance in relation to their sense of identity as a society and as a nation; but, as this analysis will seek to show, the movement in fact carried a message no less vital to the rest of the world.

The main difficulty in presenting a coherent picture of the development of the Union — in which as many as 12 million people were involved\* — arises from the fact that most criteria of modern sociological thinking do not adequately express the “organic” quality of the movement. In view of this, I shall approach the problem from the broadest sociological perspective, taking into account the thoughts and aspirations of those who helped to form the Union.

### *How to define Solidarity?*

How can Solidarity be defined in contemporary publicistic or political terms? Did it veer politically to the “left” or to the “right”? Was it socialist or Catholic? Should it be labelled “anarchist” and “revolutionary”, or “populist” and “radically Utopian”? It would be easy to go on listing such epithets depicting shades of the two key concepts in contemporary politics generally identified as “left” and “right”, “socialist” or “religious” (in this case “Christian”). Furthermore, it is worth remembering that these essentially arbitrary and meaningless labels have served Europe, and the world, to settle social and political issues of fundamental importance.

In Poland, however, a society ruled by a “left-wing” communist party arose hand in hand with the traditionally “right-wing” Catholic Church,

\*The population of Poland is 35 million — *Ed.*

to protest against the power of the party-state in the name of freedom, justice and democracy. This in itself must serve as evidence that the conceptual parameters which serve to define most socio-political situations in the contemporary world are wholly inadequate in this instance.

To many observers, Solidarity at first appeared in essence clearly to reflect the 19th century revolutionary ethos. It was indeed a spontaneous movement of mass proportions yet, despite this, it succeeded in exercising a remarkable degree of organisation and control over its activities. It gradually became clear that, if the situation in Poland was in any sense "revolutionary" it also reflected something quite unconnected with revolutionary ideology.

Attempts to qualify the term "revolution", and to make it more applicable to the Polish situation, have proved equally unsatisfactory. The phrase "self-limiting revolution"<sup>1</sup> has been widely used by sociologists and journalists in the West; yet it was applied curiously little within Poland or by Solidarity representatives themselves. Members of the Union preferred to avoid the term "revolution" because of its violent associations. In discussions between workers involved with the movement, documented in Alain Touraine's study of Solidarity,<sup>2</sup> the phrase does not appear even once. Instead, Union members preferred to refer to Solidarity as a "social movement". The phrase "self-limiting revolution" may be a striking one, but it is logically self-contradictory. It evokes a vague, and perhaps rather exciting paradox, but fails to convey the essence of the Solidarity movement. The Polish "revolution" demands a very detailed examination, and the elements which contributed to it need to be clearly set out, if we are to establish what lies behind the paradox itself.

Solidarity proved in effect to be a "non-revolutionary revolution"; and this was not only because its members avoided identifying themselves as revolutionaries, or using revolutionary rhetoric. According to Marcuse<sup>3</sup>, the revolutionary ethos is rooted in something he terms the "negative dialectic". The spiritual foundation of revolution is negation in the name of a higher ideal. It is a state of uncompromising moral and intellectual criticism. Revolution aspires to liberate man from the banality of daily life; it seeks to elevate him to a higher level of consciousness and involve him in an abstract world of "higher values". It holds in contempt everything that is banal or ordinary, and constrains the inspirations of the human spirit and the unmitigated expression of the personality. All that relates to body rather than spirit, object rather than idea, and which introduces an element of limitation in life is an insult to the revolutionary mentality. In theory, at least. For the true revolutionary knows all too well that he must sacrifice his honour and his ideals to the revolution and to the Utopia to come. He must, alas, turn his attention to the necessities

of existence as a sacrifice to the revolutionary cause. It is also worth noting here that the unlimited intellectual and moral criticism which, Marcuse claims, will ultimately lead man to the truth about himself, has been exploited by revolutionary movements, and by communist parties, to decry both excessive concern over bare necessity and over-enthusiastic commitment to the revolutionary spirit. The negative dialectic aims to reverse the process of individual "alienation" from the environment which, revolutionaries hold, is the effect of subjugation to social norms and class oppression. However, the return of a lost identity to man is expressed only in terms of violent rejection. The revolutionary movement is concerned with moral and intellectual negation as much as with physical destruction. It sanctions any form of resistance against tyranny and oppression in the name of values, dignity or freedom.

In the West "liberation movements" tend to be commonly associated with left-wing sympathies and the revolutionary ethos. Terms such as "progress" and "revolutionary change" have come to be identified with virtues like selflessness, responsibility and social conscience. The revolutionary seems morally in the right because he has declared himself against the oppressor in support of the oppressed. Despite the mood of resistance and protest intrinsic to Solidarity's existence, it was a movement born of a very different philosophical and moral tradition. It had little or nothing in common with the ethos which affirms revolutionary violence as a form of cleansing or cathartic release, or — above all — as an act of destruction in the name of a future Utopia. In terms of this tradition of political philosophy, a "self-limiting revolution" would imply a still-birth, for the very nature of revolution demands that it should flow its full course. In view of recent propaganda on the "radicalisation" of Solidarity, I feel that it is important to emphasise that throughout its legal existence, the Union operated on a principle of gradualist reform. The majority of its members genuinely believed that a single political act would achieve nothing, and that success could come only as a result of laborious endeavours to reweave the very fibres of Polish society. The aim of the Polish "revolution", then, was not to destroy, but to build; and it was here that it parted company with the revolutionary ethos.

Revolution is often defined as an extreme form of demand for social justice and compensation. The demands Solidarity put forward, however, bore none of the characteristics of an upsurge from the amorphous mass of human society rising collectively in the name of an "objective" common ideal. It would be more accurate to compare Solidarity's demands to the reactions of a man with his back to the wall, struggling to defend his dignity and his life. The Union was concerned with practicalities of survival, not with elevated values or ideals. Although it would be unfair to say that Solidarity put forward no claims

for compensation for its members, negotiations proved that reckoning and reprisal were matters of considerably greater concern to representatives of the Polish Communist Party than to the Union. A desire for compensation certainly motivated a number of professional groupings, and their demands reflected this; but overall the movement was not dominated by these tendencies, and if they emerged, their purpose was to seek justice rather than reprisal for the ill-treatment suffered by workers in the past. Any comparison with other contemporary movements on a similar scale (such as the Iranian revolution) must confirm the view that, on the whole, Solidarity maintained a remarkably successful balance between satisfying demands for compensation, and sustaining realistic negotiations for reform.

The movement sought to achieve long-term social change without resorting to violence, but the reforms it envisaged were absolute. The huge majority of the Polish population involved in the Union came to see that even if the simplest and most obvious social demands were to be met, the entire framework of their society and its institutions would need to be restructured. It is my view that the moral shakiness and disunity which Solidarity showed in the autumn of 1981 (and which communist propaganda branded "radicalisation") was symptomatic of a growing awareness that everything would have to be rebuilt.

The reforms put forward by the Union were economic, political, and cultural. Their span was indeed revolutionary in the socio-democratic sense of the word (which communist newspeak likes to dismiss as insipidly "reformist").

### *Solidarity and Socialism*

Let us now turn to the issue of Solidarity's relationship with socialism. The first thing which must be emphasised is that the use of the word "socialism" by Solidarity representatives was largely a tactical measure in a game of words with the party-state. It was simply a way of making space for the Union to act. In communist countries, the term "socialism" has a ritual significance quite unconnected with the western socialist tradition, and at the official level no one was in a position to deny allegiance to this hallowed principle. Within the Union, however, anything related to socialist ideology was handled with reticence and reserve. I would be inclined to disagree with those of my colleagues who argue that Solidarity had unwittingly absorbed the socialist propaganda inflicted on Polish society since the war<sup>4</sup> and unconsciously adopted it in its programme. It seems to me that this view fails to take three essential factors into account.

Firstly, the discrimination with which the Union treated socialist slogans and programmes, and the reticence with which socialist rhetoric was used in public and in private.

Secondly, the fact that there have been marked inconsistencies in the

propaganda generated by the state since the war meant that the various generations involved in Solidarity had been exposed to very different forms of ideological indoctrination; so if Union members shared a common network of associations inspired by the word "socialism", this was thanks rather to a tradition which had survived independently of official propaganda.

Thirdly, even if it is shown that features of the socialist tradition did appear in the demands Solidarity put forward, and the slogans it selected, it is also evident that its political philosophy was not limited to that tradition. The Union acted upon very different ethical principles from those inherent in socialist thinking.

At the political level, this difference was reflected in its close alliance with the Catholic Church. Irrespective of the religious commitment of individual members, the church came to be generally recognised as a platform for the expression and defence of values which Solidarity represented. This is an important point, for in narrowly political terms it could perhaps be argued that, being the sole independent institution in Poland, the church was an indispensable partner for the reform movement. In fact, the political aspect of such an alliance was a secondary issue for Solidarity, and the partnership did not imply total agreement between the church hierarchy and the Union on specific issues. That which Solidarity shared with the church was not political allegiance, but moral values inherited from the Christian tradition.

The socialist doctrine holds that culture is an autonomous human achievement in which God plays no part. To socialists, religion (particularly Christianity) is at best a cultural landmark on the road of social progress. A few socialist ideologues have recognised the social and psychological value of religion; and its usefulness in encouraging social cohesion and giving psychological support to the alienated personality. However, modern socialism firmly denies any limitations based on faith, either to the capacity of the human mind for acquiring knowledge, or to the moral independence of man. According to socialist beliefs, man is by nature "good", and has no need of God to act wisely and well; he can perceive social evils and inadequacies independently, and possesses the innate capacity to achieve happiness and an ideal society by tapping the creative energy of every individual for the good of the collective. It is here that the principle of egalitarianism, so fundamental to socialist thinking, has its source.<sup>5</sup>

### *Solidarity's Christian foundations*

In Poland, however, 12 million people joined a movement founded on a wholly different perception of the nature of reality, which in turn came to be reflected in their activities.<sup>6</sup> For the majority of members, involvement

in Solidarity reinforced the view that Christianity was at the foundation of an objective moral order active in the world. They saw this as a truth manifest in the Polish cultural tradition, and as the correct source of inspiration for social action. Christianity, and the Catholic Church as its institutional representative in Poland, was seen as indispensable in the protection of man's personal identity and independence. Human rights were determined not by man, but by God, and possessed an absolute moral significance, irrespective of any further values instilled by social conditioning.

Interestingly, this affirmation of Christian morality as a working basis for social relations was not necessarily determined by faith or religious affiliation. Non-believers gave equally strong support to the view that Christianity provided a foundation for a respect of human dignity and individual rights, and that the Catholic Church stood to defend these values. Throughout its existence, Solidarity maintained its position as a movement founded on the Christian tradition, irrespective of its vacillating political relationship with the church.

It is important not to underestimate the influence of the teachings of Pope John Paul II in this connection. During his first visit to Poland in 1979, the Pope spoke about the religious roots of social morality, and of the "natural rights" of man as laws beyond the reach of human jurisdiction. Human rights and human dignity are, the Pope indicated, intrinsic features of the divine order of creation. For most members of the Solidarity movement, then, a sense of an "objective order of values"<sup>7</sup> was inextricably bound up with God and Christianity. The Catholic Church represented a defence of the rights and dignity of man, which express an objective moral order present in the world. Related to this is the problem of "truth" as an absolute criterion for social, cultural and political judgement. Much of Solidarity's thinking and performance developed from an understanding of truth as a method by which the objective order of things could be revealed.

At meetings held throughout Poland between September and November 1980, the question of "objective truth" was raised with surprising frequency. It was generally held that "truth" was the sole foundation on which a new and solid social framework could be established. Indeed the primary grievances levelled at the party-state related to evidence that the party had lied to and misled the population — that it had, in short, deliberately misrepresented objective truth. Considerably more emphasis was laid on the moral aspect of official falsification than on social injustice or the economic crisis.

Within the bounds of a close identification with Roman Catholic values, Solidarity members tended to move in one of two directions. For some, the emphasis on human rights and the dignity of the individual was a universal issue; while for others, these values came to be associated with

their sense of national identity. To be true to oneself, they felt, was to “be Polish”.<sup>8</sup>

It would be unfair to accuse the more nationalistically orientated element within the Union of the authoritarianism or xenophobia frequently characteristic of nationalist groupings, although admittedly, since Solidarity was officially disbanded, these features have emerged in the underground movement. In my view, this is undoubtedly a symptom of the potentially dangerous, though sociologically justifiable, growth of nationalist sympathies in Polish society since the declaration of martial law in December 1981.

### *The Christian ethos of the Solidarity programme*

The Solidarity programme was clearly not “socialist” in terms of the East European understanding of “developed socialism”, since even non-believing members of the Union regarded religion and the Catholic Church as essential points of reference. However, the early stages of its economic programme indicated that this was based on a notion of corporate ownership fundamental to socialist thinking. The programme, which remains incomplete, sought to combine the idea of corporate ownership with a technocratic approach to organisation. It could not be called purely socialist, but was rather an economic experiment combining elements from the socialist and conservative traditions. It sought to reconcile different forms of ownership to best effect, permitting private profit and enterprise while taking the common good into account. The plan was formulaic, yet allowed opportunities for individual economic initiative, with the state acting as mediator between different forms of ownership and production for the sake of the common good and the protection of the weak. The Solidarity programme demanded the application of a new range of economic concepts, and it seems that at the time economists were ill-prepared to draw up a new model based on the untested proposals which were put forward.

<sup>8</sup> The innovations Solidarity proposed were evidently non-revolutionary in the sense that every aspect of the Union’s activities was to remain within the rule of law. In the early stages of the movement’s existence workers were often heard to remark, “We are not revolutionaries; we are not concerned about power; we simply want to live normal lives.” To them, to live normal lives meant not to be exposed to political tyranny, but to be self-sufficient and responsible for their own and their families’ material well-being. Consequently, there emerged in Solidarity a combination of political values which the modern tradition tends to regard as incompatible. An assertion of proletarian power was here complemented by a defence of individual rights; democracy was allied with a belief in absolute natural law; individualism was related to the collective; material values placed side by side with idealistic values; and

the concept of majority rule went hand in hand with the notion of social liberty. In the final analysis, however, the aspirations Solidarity sought to express may perhaps most usefully be related to the Tocquevillian concept of the "civil society". The main current of Solidarity's activity was directed, I believe, at a rediscovery of the full meaning of the word "citizen", and at achieving social reform consistent with that meaning. The concept of the "civil society" lies at the very foundation of modern democracy. Above all it relates the position of the individual, and the community as a whole, to the rule of law. It guarantees the rights of every individual, and protects society from autocratic tyranny and oppression by other communities.<sup>9</sup> It is also probably fair to say that democracies built on concepts other than the "civil society" tend to fail and emerge as travesties of proletarian power. For it is essential that the people, the community, and the individual citizen should operate as a single co-ordinated body. I regard this as an important point, since, over the last hundred years, sociological thinking has been guided largely by the Marxist idea of the "new social order" which emerged from the revolutions of the 18th century, and brought an end to the social dominance of the aristocracy.

In accordance with the Marxist tradition, modern western society tends to be labelled as "capitalist" considerably more often than it is described in terms of the "civil society", as defended by Alexis de Tocqueville. I hesitate to suggest that the Tocquevillian tradition of sociological analysis is dying, but it seems that, in the social sciences particularly, leading intellectual trends are more closely associated with Marxism than with the Tocquevillian school. Moreover, de Tocqueville is regarded as belonging to a political tradition which, for many years, intellectuals liked to dismiss as "conservative" or even "reactionary". The main currents in sociology today seem predominantly concerned with expressing an ideology critical towards the "bourgeois democracy", which communist ideology countered with the "revolutionary democracy" or the "dictatorship of the proletariat". According to the Marxist formula, democratic states founded on the notion of the "civil society" are established bourgeois dictatorships and, even though the practical establishment of the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat" in communist states has to some extent compromised the Marxist doctrine in western eyes, the idea of the "civil society" has not been adequately re-evaluated as a result.

I therefore find I must once again describe Solidarity in terms which westerners usually prefer to avoid lest they appear to be condoning the evils of capitalism. And indeed, the interpretation of Solidarity as an experiment in the practical realisation of the theory of the "civil society" has presented an insoluble dilemma in western eyes, fuelled no doubt by the involvement of academics and other sectors of the Polish intelligentsia in the Union movement.



### *Different Views within Solidarity*

The formation of a separate independent Union for professional academics and intellectuals, and all the problems which arose when its members applied to join Solidarity, may be explained partly by mutual prejudice between academics and workers, and partly by their differing perceptions of social reality. The academic grouping tended to take a more "sociological" view of social reality. To them, democracy was a technical solution, allowing for the free play of social and political forces. Their thinking failed, however, to grasp the spirit of the cultural foundations of modern democracy. They saw Solidarity as a mass movement which presented a threat to social and political pluralism. This view was particularly widespread among members of the so-called "October generation" — a group of distinguished academics with positivist and liberal views, who spoke out particularly after October 1956. They found it quite impossible to conceive of a spontaneous movement which could guarantee the protection of human rights and dignity. The decision to accept members of the academics' Union into Solidarity was made after exhaustive and stormy discussion, but in a remarkably democratic way, and serves — I think — as further evidence that the concept of the civil society was beginning at this stage to crystallise into a working formula guiding Union activity.<sup>10</sup>

However, a populist grouping with an ideology similar to communism undoubtedly sought to make itself felt within the Solidarity movement. In his survey of Solidarity<sup>11</sup>, Alain Touraine shows that — particularly in Gdańsk — some members regarded Solidarity as a class movement which had an obligation to guarantee workers their rightful hegemony in a society which they were seeking to free from the yoke of the party-state. The thinking adopted by this grouping was certainly related to the Leninist model; they saw Solidarity as a spontaneously created workers' party, even though they firmly rejected the Leninist notion of an external, "avant-garde" leadership.

There were perhaps certain parallels between the views held by the "populists" and those professed by the intellectual, "liberal" group. Both failed to see the "civil society" as a realistic foundation for democratic reform. The populists felt a need to protect themselves from liberalising influences and from any attempts by a "cleverer" minority to gain privilege and power over the silent majority, while the liberals were for their part concerned about the defence of "pluralism" from mediocrity, which can become the rule when uniformity is established as a social priority.

Yet the opposition and conflict generated by these views in many areas of Poland failed in the end to affect the main current of the movement. Indeed it served only to reveal more fully that the "civil society" was a

concept foremost in Solidarity's thinking, and a guiding light in its political strategy.

*The concept of equality in the Solidarity "revolution"*

Above all, the civil society is built upon the principle of equality before the law. It guarantees the rights of the individual, and guards society against oppression by a privileged group. It demands an attitude of responsibility towards law and institutional practice, and protects the individual through the relationship it establishes between him and the community. For the civil society is essentially a community of citizens, founded upon the interaction of the rights and interests of the individual with the rights and interests of others, to create a "common good".

Alexis de-Tocqueville bases his analysis of democracy, and the dangers therein, on the issue of "equality". Modern Marxist critiques of capitalist democracies likewise begin with this issue. Within Solidarity, the controversy between the individualist principles of the intelligentsia and the more collectivist ideas of the workers may be seen, I think, as a response to the dilemma of how to reconcile "equality" with "liberty". At another level, it also reflects the religious basis of the Polish "revolution".

For the Poles, "equality" did not indicate uniform egalitarian relations between individuals and society. The word referred rather to the equality of all before the law, and to a fair system of justice. This idea, which was of course by no means new, served as a frame of reference for the Union as it developed. Even in discussions relating to the privileges enjoyed by the party élite in Poland, use of the term "equality" was by and large confined to the context of social justice, rather than advanced for the promotion of egalitarian ideology.

Magdalena Gadomska's enquiries into contemporary class consciousness<sup>12</sup>, carried out in 1979, clearly support this view, as do the investigations of Marxist precepts conducted by W. Wesołowski<sup>13</sup>. These also show that, among workers, the concern over legal sanctioning of social privileges was far greater than their interest in the establishment of absolute social equality.

However, the Communist Party saw fit to exploit the egalitarian principle for tactical purposes in order to discredit the Union. This occurred particularly following the regional elections organised by Solidarity in May and June 1980. Some of the most important agreements reached at local meetings related to rates of pay for Union leaders; and here the question of "equality" naturally arose. In fact, the payments agreed were in many cases higher than normal and drawn from fees paid by Union members. This was justified on the grounds that Solidarity's leaders deserved a higher wage since they had been elected for their personal qualities to represent the Union membership. Communist

propaganda made considerable mileage out of these decisions, and called repeatedly for a “radically egalitarian” stand from Solidarity members.

### *The religious basis of human dignity*

The key value for which Solidarity stood was not equality, but human dignity. The individual was seen as a free agent, morally responsible for his fate as a human being, and hence as a citizen. Such an understanding of man’s condition emerged as the result of a faith in humanity’s ultimate answerability to God for the quality of life, and for the preservation and protection of individual dignity. The Solidarity ethos was rooted in a metaphysical perception of reality, and its understanding of equality was based on faith in a God who makes no social discrimination, and in belief in the human capacity equally to make moral judgements and to live a good life by loving both God and neighbour.

Workers’ demands for the introduction of religion into public life were overwhelming. Open masses were organised in Gdańsk for striking shipyard workers, and later in the Warsaw steelworks for workers in support of the Gdańsk strikes. Demands presented to the authorities by shipyard workers in summer 1980 included the inclusion of religious material in the mass media, particularly the transmission of Mass on radio and television. This was included as one of a series of “practical” demands to assist the improvement of living standards and working conditions. Natural rights were therefore seen as integral to the values of the community, with all the responsibilities involved; and this way of thinking in fact permitted the conceptual reconciliation of equality and liberty. “Equality” referred to the moral condition of all men equally called to redemption. In practical terms this indicated that individual dignity was determined not by social status or national origin, but by man’s status as a being created in the image of God. Equality before the law and the withdrawal of any privileges which might undermine the dignity of another may thus be seen as aspects of a metaphysical dimension inherent in the concept of the “civil society”.

Within this perspective, “equality”, “common values” and “social unity” could not be viewed as ethical absolutes and, in this way, religion proved to be a remarkably firm foundation for political pluralism. The establishment of a new social order took on moral proportions; it was a task set by God, and as such proved to be a problem which was far richer, more complex and profound than the intellectual conceptualisation of political pluralism. The religious base protected every individual and group in society, in acknowledgement of common human dignity; and it also affirmed the value of social and cultural variety, of intellectual pluralism, of differences in attitude, and of particular individuals or groups whom the community wished to honour.

It is perhaps not surprising that the religious dimension which evidently determined the development of the Solidarity movement was not fully expressed or possibly even perceived by all those involved. Yet my remarks are by no means purely speculative. Referring once again to Alain Touraine's investigations<sup>14</sup>, it is worthwhile to note that in conversations between workers recorded in June and July 1981, Solidarity was discussed as a means for liberating the personality and protecting human dignity. One member of the group in question declared that "man the free agent" was the motivating value at the source of Solidarity's action. Within a few months the notion of man as a free agent, and of the moral necessity to defend his condition, came to be issues raised during discussions on democracy throughout the country — particularly in the higher echelons of the Union.

It is my view that an acknowledgement of the necessity for democratic decision-taking, on the grounds of man's moral condition and of his "citizenship", demonstrates a profound maturation in the Union's thinking. Furthermore, I would argue that this was a sociological motive for Union action wholly unprecedented in the history of trade unionism; and I suggest that the term "Christian humanism" might best serve to describe it.

The current debate as to whether Solidarity was a Catholic movement or a socialist one is quite understandable, for the Union did embrace elements related to various forms of "socialist humanism". However, Solidarity resolved the conflict between humanism and religion in an unprecedented way by relating the value of individual human life and dignity to the Divine Plan of Creation. In the final analysis, the human personality could be weighed only against the relation and subordination of all mankind to God.<sup>15</sup>

*Translated from Polish by Irena Korba.*

<sup>1</sup>The phrase was first used by Jadwiga Staniszkis in *Pologne — la révolution autolimitée*. Paris: 1982.

<sup>2</sup>A. Touraine, F. Dubet, M. Weviorka, J. Strzelecki, *Solidarité. Analyse d'un mouvement social*. Fayard, Paris: 1982. As a member of Alain Touraine's team, I also refer to unpublished materials available for reference at the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty Library, University of Warsaw.

<sup>3</sup>H. Marcuse, *Rozum i rewolucja*. Warsaw: 1966. See also H. Marcuse, *Essays in Critical Theory*. Boston: 1968.

<sup>4</sup>M. Marody et al., *Polacy '80*, Warsaw: Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw 1981.

<sup>5</sup>I. Krzemiński, *Lepsze Jutro*. A survey of the socialism of Stanislaw Ossowski written in tribute to Professor Ossowski. Not yet published.

<sup>6</sup>Father J. Tischner takes a similar view. See: J. Tischner, *Etyka Solidarności*. Kraków: Znak, 1981. Also: J. Tischner, *Polski kształt dialogu*. Krag: 1981.

<sup>7</sup>Max Scheler's phrase. See: M. Scheler, *Resentiment a moralność*. Warsaw: 1977.

<sup>8</sup>I. Krzemiński, "Proces formowania sie NSZZ Solidarność" in I. Krzemiński, G. Bakuniak, H. Banaszak, A. Kruczkowska, *Polacy — Jesień '80*. Warsaw: Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, 1983.

<sup>9</sup>W. Karpiński, "Cień Metternicha" in *Tocqueville — wolność a demokracja*; also *op. cit.*, *W Central Parku* (In Central Park). Paris: Libella, 1982, essay: "Strona Tocquevilla".

<sup>10</sup>I. Krzemiński, "Jak powstał i działał NSZZ Pracowników Nauki Techniki i Oświaty" in I. Krzemiński et al. *Polacy — Jesień '80*.

<sup>11</sup>Touraine et al., *Solidarité* (*op. cit.*) and unpublished material.

<sup>12</sup>M. Gadomska, "Przemiany w percepcji podziałów społecznych", in *Spółczesność polskie czasu kryzysu* ed. S. Nowark, Institute of Sociology, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 1984.

<sup>13</sup>Compare the following: W. Wesołowski, *Struktura i działanie społeczeństwa polskiego*. Warsaw: 1970; K. Słoczyński, W. Wesołowski, *Struktura i ruchliwość społeczna*. Wrocław: 1973; W. Wesołowski ed, *Kształt struktury społecznej*. Wrocław: 1978; W. Wesołowski ed, *Przeobrażenia struktury społeczeństwa socjalistycznego*. Warsaw: 1978; W. Wesołowski, K. Słoczyński, *Investigations on Class Structure and Social Stratification in Poland 1945-1975*. Warsaw: 1977.

<sup>14</sup>A. Touraine, *Solidarité* *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup>This view falls into line with the spirit of the interpretation of Christian tradition given by the Second Vatican Council. The degree to which the Council influenced the social consciousness of the Poles presents an interesting sociological problem outside the scope of this study.

Published by Keston College  
on 10 March 1986  
to coincide with the 40th anniversary  
of the liquidation of the Ukrainian  
Catholic Church in the Soviet Union  
in 1946

## FOR MY NAME'S SAKE

Selections from the writings of  
*Iosyp Terelya*

Documents and letters illustrating  
the life and thoughts of Ukrainian  
Catholic spokesman Iosyp Terelya who  
is currently serving his seventh term  
of imprisonment

Price: £1.00 + 40p postage and packing