Religious Policy in China and its Implementation in the Light of Document No. 19

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When contrasted with the outright repression of the Cultural Revolution period (1966-76), the current religious policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) looks almost liberal. The Party has however reverted to a system of control similar to that first introduced during the early 1950s, and religious believers still find themselves circumscribed by a variety of regulations and prohibitions.1

During the Cultural Revolution the religious policy of the CCP, then controlled by the radical Maoists, was to eradicate religion and replace it with Mao Tse Tung Thought, centering on the cult of Mao himself. The death of Mao and the fall of the leftist Gang of Four in 1976, however, heralded a turn-around in CCP policy in virtually every field. Economic pragmatism became the watchword, with the country redirected along the path of the Four Modernisations (in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defence).

While Deng Xiaoping was consolidating his hold in the government, and for a short period toying with political liberalisation, religious believers, who for 13 years or more had been able to meet together only clandestinely, if at all, were able to come out more into the open. Traditional religious practices resurfaced, particularly in the countryside. Both Catholics and Protestants were able to meet in homes more freely. Protestant house-church meetings, some of which had continued even through the Cultural Revolution (for example in the coastal provinces in the early 1970s), now multiplied across the country.2 Similar activities were in evidence in the Muslim north-west, where mystical Sufi orders held prayer and religious training sessions and an underground “Islamic Publications Centre” produced hand-written Korans and other Islamic texts.3

It soon became apparent that the CCP was rethinking its religious policy. In 1977 the Religious Affairs Bureau was reactivated, People’s Daily published an article stressing the need to study religion, and various “patriotic” religious personages began to reappear at government meetings. The CCP also reactivated the different “patriotic” religious associations in order that they should re-establish control over the mass of
religious believers and supervise “normal” religious activities, now declared legal within strict limits. In 1979 churches, temples and mosques were reopened under their auspices. By 1984 1,600 Protestant churches had been reopened, and in one province alone (Xinjiang) about 14,000 Muslim mosques.4

*For the background to the clause on religion in the new Chinese Constitution, adopted in the same year, see “Religion and the New Chinese Constitution”, RCL Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 130-34 — Ed.

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It was not until 1982, however, that the CCP had formulated its definitive policy on religion*. In March of that year the CCP Central Committee circulated Document No. 19 Concerning our Country’s Basic Standpoint and Policy on Religious Questions During the Socialist Period to Party committees across the country.5 This internal CCP document runs to thirty pages in the original and provides the ideological foundation for current CCP religious policy as well as detailed instructions for its implementation. A version for public consumption was published in the CCP journal Red Flag in June 1982; although basically similar, this version omits certain significant details contained in the confidential document. The introduction to Document No. 19 consists of a letter from the Central Committee which places it firmly in historical and ideological perspective as a product of the new era of Deng Xiaoping. Certainly by Communist Chinese standards the present religious policy of the CCP is ostensibly the most “liberal” that has been promulgated since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

The Marxist Ideological Basis of CCP Religious Policy

The CCP nevertheless still views religion from a dogmatic Marxist perspective and builds its religious policy on traditional Marxist stereotypes. The opening statement of the text of the document is uncompromising: “Religion is a historical phenomenon of a certain stage in the development of human society. It has its stages of growth, development and disappearance.” Religion is still viewed as a negative force, which, in a class society, originates “in the despair and fear of the proletariat under the great suffering caused by the system of exploitation, and in the need of the exploiting class to use religion as a narcotic, and as an important spiritual means to control the masses.” However, in a socialist society such as China, the CCP considers that “the class factor that has given rise to the existence of religion has already been basically eliminated.” It is recognised that religion “cannot be thoroughly eliminated in a short period of time” and that “it is inevitable that religion will exist and have an influence on some people for a long time in a

*For the background to the clause on religion in the new Chinese Constitution, adopted in the same year, see “Religion and the New Chinese Constitution”, RCL Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 130-34 — Ed.
socialist society.” Nevertheless, the CCP in a statement of faith maintains that “in human history, religion will ultimately disappear” and that there will come an era when “the vast majority of the citizens of our country will be able consciously to adopt a scientific outlook towards the world and life and will no longer need to look for spiritual support from the illusory world of gods.” This utopia, as described by Marx, Engels and Mao, is the “magnificent goal” which “our entire Party should strive hard to achieve, generation after generation”.

This ideological position differs from the root and branch extermination approach of the Cultural Revolution. But the premise is still basically negative and the ultimate goal identical; only the timetable and the methodology differ. In principle, religion has no place in the new socialist society. It is a phenomenon which is at best tolerated and manipulated by the Party for its own purposes. At a time when the more obvious manifestations of this policy appear more promising than for many years, it is particularly important not to forget that the underlying rationale is still fundamentally antagonistic to all religion. It is encouraging that the CCP now officially eschews the use of force to eliminate religion, and regards this method as “completely wrong and extremely harmful”. However, the arrest and interrogation of many Protestant and Catholic Christians in 1983 shows that even this Central Committee dictum may be waived in the Party interest.

The CCP View of Religion in China

In the eyes of the CCP, religion in China has a bad pedigree: “During the prolonged period of feudal society and the century-long period of semi-feudal and semi-colonial society, all the religions in our country, generally speaking, were controlled and used by the ruling class and made to play a major negative role. The feudal landlord class, the warlords and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie at home controlled Buddhism, Daoism and Islam, while the foreign colonialists and imperialist forces which came later primarily controlled the Protestant and Catholic churches.” But since 1949, “religions in our country have undergone a radical change because of profound social reforms and the reform of the religious systems, and the contradictions on religious questions have largely become contradictions among the working people.” Such a statement could only have emanated from the era of Deng Xiaoping; previously, under Mao, many religious believers suffered because of their “bad” class origins, and were often unfairly labelled and punished as counter-revolutionaries.

The CCP interpretation of the religious history of China since 1949 is still ambiguous and does not reflect historical reality. In general the seventeen years prior to the Cultural Revolution are regarded as having
seen "great results in religious work under the guidance of the correct principles and policies of the CCP Central Committee." It is admitted that after 1957 "'Leftist' mistakes in our religious work gradually began to develop" but these are not regarded as having become "serious" until the Cultural Revolution a decade later. Even a passing acquaintance with the history of the Church in the fifties, however, reveals that it was precisely during this period that the CCP achieved total control over all religious organisations, closed down large numbers of temples and churches, imprisoned large numbers of priests, pastors and laymen, and limited religious activities to those supervised by the newly-created patriotic religious organisations. The release of many religious leaders from prison and labour camp in 1979-81 was tacit admission by the government that it had erred when in the 1950s many of them had been imprisoned as "rightists". It is therefore ironic, to say the least, that both the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and the Protestant Three Self Patriotic Movement (TPSM), in accordance with the official CCP view of history, still hold up this dark period as a model for their policy today, in order to legitimise their own origins.

United Front Work

The key to understanding CCP religious policy is a clear understanding of CCP "united front" work. This strategy, which was perfected in the struggles against the Kuomintang (nationalists) and the Japanese, involves winning the support of the majority of sectors in society for, or at least their acquiescence in, CCP policy, and isolating, neutralising and ultimately destroying die-hard opposition, reduced by CCP tactics to an ineffective minority. Since 1949 the minimum conditions for participation in the united front have been anti-imperialism and patriotism, defined as love for socialism and the new China under the leadership of the CCP. The present leadership of the CCP states unequivocally: "Strengthening Party leadership is the basic guarantee for dealing properly with religious questions. The Party's religious work is an important component part of the Party's 'United Front' work and mass work and involves many aspects of social life." Document No. 19 then reveals the detailed nature of CCP control of religious affairs in a significant section omitted from the public Red Flag version: "Therefore at all levels our Party committees must powerfully direct and organise all relevant departments including the United Front departments, the Religious Affairs Bureaux, the Minorities Affairs departments, the Legal departments, the Propaganda, Scientific and Health departments and the Trade Unions, Youth League, Women's Federation and other people's organisations, to unify their thinking, understanding and policies, and to share the work responsibilities, cooperating closely to take this important
task resolutely in hand.”

In China even today it is clear that the CCP assumes the right to control religious believers and that separation of Church and State and genuine religious autonomy are unthinkable. Although the leadership of the patriotic religious organisations loudly assert their independence, in fact as “people’s organisations” they are ultimately responsible to the Religious Affairs Bureau which itself is under the United Front Work Department. Both these organisations are totally staffed by Party members, who of course are atheists.

The Patriotic Religious Organisations

The officially recognised patriotic religious organisations play a crucial role in the structure of CCP control of religious believers. There are eight such national organisations: the Chinese Buddhist Association, the Chinese Daoist Association, the Chinese Islamic Association, the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, the National Administrative Commission of the Chinese Catholic Church, the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ College, the Three Self Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches of China and the China Christian Council. The basic task of these organisations at all levels is defined as “to assist the Party and government in carrying out the policy of freedom of religious belief, to help the broad masses of religious believers and the personalities of the religious circles continuously to raise their patriotic and socialist awareness, to represent the legitimate rights and interests of religious believers, to organise and lead the masses of religious believers in carrying out normal religious activities . . . All the patriotic religious organisations should obey the leadership of the Party and the government.”

In this statement attention should be given to the phrase “normal religious activities”. In the new constitution, which was adopted in December 1982, Article 36 on religious affairs also asserts that “the State protects normal religious activities.” What is normal? In principle, only those activities supervised by the patriotic religious associations are regarded by the government as legitimate, and those which are carried out independently do not enjoy the State’s “protection” and may still incur reprisals. Document No. 19 states: “All the normal religious activities which are carried out in the places for religious activities and all the normal religious activities which are customarily carried out in believers’ homes, such as worshipping Buddha, chanting sutras, burning incense . . . should be organised by the religious organisations and the believers themselves. They are protected by law and none should interfere.”

The CCP does, then, allow certain private religious activities
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conducted in the home. However, where such activities take on too organised a character, and are on a larger scale, the CCP still views them with disfavour. In particular, Protestant house-church meetings are singled out for criticism (again, in a section deleted from the public version): "So far as Christians carrying out religious activities in house meetings are concerned, these should in principle not be permitted, but they should not be rigidly stopped. Through work undertaken by the patriotic religious personnel to persuade the religious masses, other suitable arrangements should be made." Bishop Ding, head of the Protestant TSPM, stated in Hong Kong in April 1984 that there were over 10,000 such house-meetings across China, as compared to only 1,600 officially reopened church buildings. Since 1980 TSPM policy appears to have been to assert control over these groups. In some cases the "persuasion" has included closure of recalcitrant meetings unwilling to accept TSPM control, and, especially in the latter part of 1983, the arrest and interrogation of numerous house-church leaders for activities deemed "abnormal", such as itinerant evangelism and active witness, especially to young people under 18. In most cases this harassment has been carried out behind the scenes, with little documentary evidence. In Shanghai, for example, house-church leaders were informed that as TSPM churches had been reopened they were required to terminate their own activities. Over the years, Chinese believers have become attuned to interpreting every change in direction of the prevailing political wind, and to take appropriate action. Reports from some large cities show that the larger house-churches have split into smaller cell-groups in the last two years or so.

One well-documented case of how the CCP and the patriotic religious organisations implement present religious policy is that of the Da Ma Zhan house-church in Canton. In 1980 an elderly pastor, released from twenty years' imprisonment, resumed activities in his home and gradually built up a flourishing church of some two hundred people. Apart from Sunday worship services, this church held regular prayer and Bible study meetings, and training sessions for young Christians. However, on 5 December 1982 the local Canton TSPM and Canton Christian Council issued a mimeographed broadsheet which Christians at their churches were asked to read then hand back. Entitled Material for Oral Propagation Concerning Endorsement of the Municipal People's Government Religious Affairs Bureau's Curb on Lin Xiangao's Illegal Activities, this broadsheet accused Pastor Lin of mimeographing Christian books privately, and of recording sermon tapes which he distributed to other parts of China. He also was accused of allowing some "foreign missionaries to carry out religious activities in his home without the agreement of our China Christian Council". What is most significant, however, is that Article 36 of the barely promulgated new constitution
was quoted in full, and was clearly interpreted as meaning that the type of activity engaged in by Pastor Lin falls outside of the “normal religious activities" protected by the State. The timing of the document is thus significant, as is the fact that other house-churches in Canton were urged “to consider this experience seriously, draw a lesson from it and quickly change their attitudes.” Viewed in the context of the TSPM’s continuing efforts to assert control over the existing house-churches, the message was clear: “The doors of the two city Christian organisations are wide open, welcoming everyone — even those who have made mistakes — to change their attitudes and return to the big family which ‘loves our country and loves religion’”. After claiming that “stopping Lin Xiangao’s illegal activities is a powerful measure taken by the government to uphold normal religious activities” and that the TSPM will “fully implement this correct expression of the policy of freedom of religious belief”, the broadsheet closes with a scriptural text: “How pleasant it is when brethren dwell together in unity.”

Further evidence of the degree of control exercised by the local patriotic religious organisations and the CCP is furnished by various internal TSPM regulations at the provincial level. For instance, in Yunnan province the TSPM limits the religious activities of each reopened church to inside the church building, forbids making converts among young persons under the age of 18, and threatens transgressors with “re-education” and punishment by the “relevant department of the government” (most probably the Public Security Bureau).14 Similarly, local TSPM regulations in Fujian Province state that “no religious activities are permitted outside the jurisdiction of the local (TSPM) church” and that “we should not seek to convert youths and children under 18 to the Christian religion, or instil religious thinking in the students, neither to attract nor intimidate people to join the Christian faith.”15

Unsurprisingly, leaders of the patriotic religious organisations deny the existence of such prohibitions. Government spokesmen have sometimes cited the continuing influence of “leftist” officials at the local level as the reason for continuing harassment of religious believers. This is plausible and may well be true in some cases, but in view of the existence of the documentation it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the public image of religious freedom assiduously cultivated by the patriotic religious organisations differs from the internal reality. The degree of this difference depends on the tightness, or otherwise, of the current Party political line.

In 1983 the political atmosphere gradually became more oppressive, culminating in the anti-crime campaign and the anti-spiritual pollution campaign. Since March 1983 seven Roman Catholic priests have been imprisoned for refusal to join the CPA and continued loyalty to the
Vatican. The case of the 76-year-old Bishop Joseph Fan of Boading in Hebei Province is illuminating. On 10 January 1984 the Religious Affairs Bureau confirmed that the Bishop and his assistant had been sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for “colluding with a foreign country, plotting to jeopardise the sovereignty and security of the Motherland”. In fact the Bishop’s “crimes” were maintaining contact with the Vatican and secretly ordaining priests and bishops loyal to the Vatican outside the CPA structure.\textsuperscript{16} In the latter half of 1983 many Protestants active outside the TSPM framework were also arrested and interrogated or suffered house-searches. The clampdown was most serious in the central province of Henan (where at least two hundred were arrested), and in Shanghai and Canton (about a dozen arrested in each city); but reports have been received from Christian sources within China of some arrests of house-church Christians in at least thirteen other provinces.\textsuperscript{17} Since the beginning of 1984 the CCP has virtually ended the anti-spiritual pollution campaign and many of those arrested have since been released. But some leaders are still in detention. The fact that, overall, conditions for religious believers are much better now than during the Cultural Revolution and that the majority of believers are reasonably safe so long as they operate within the bounds laid down by the patriotic religious associations does not lessen the seriousness of a situation where those who operate outside those bounds, often for conscience’s sake, face continual pressures, and, if the CCP line hardens, even arrest.

\textit{Minorities and Religious Policy}

CCP religious policy has been formulated with the national minorities very much in mind. China has 55 recognised national minority peoples, totalling 67 million people, occupying approximately half of China’s total land mass. Document No. 19 recognises that “the minority nationalities nearly all believe in religion”. In the past the CCP has had great difficulty in controlling Tibetan nationalism, and Muslim separatism in Xinjiang. Nationalist sentiment fuelled by religious fervour still lies only just below the surface in these areas today. Since 1979 the CCP seems to have made genuine efforts to improve conditions for the national minorities, and has allowed a considerable degree of religious relaxation. In Xinjiang alone some 14,000 mosques have been reopened. Although most Buddhist temples were destroyed in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution, some have been restored, and the CCP has promised to open two hundred more temples and monasteries by 1988.\textsuperscript{18}

The strength of religious belief in such areas as Tibet and Xinjiang is tacitly recognised by the special regulations for local CCP cadres. It is admitted that “a small number of Party members have acted in an extremely harmful way, not only by believing in religion but also by
taking part in stirring up religious fanaticism.” Those who remain loyal Marxists are in danger of becoming “divorced from the masses”. So special dispensation is granted them to attend minority festivals and customs which have a traditional religious character. However, whether Party cadres will be able to “thoroughly abandon religious beliefs in their minds” while “suitably respecting and observing minority customs and conventions” remains to be seen. The resurgence of Islam and of Lama Buddhism in minority areas suggests that Marxism is still very far from having won the decisive ideological battle in these remote regions.

**Religious Policy and International Relations**

The CCP recognises that “Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, which are important religions in China, also have an important place internationally”. As in other communist countries, religion is regarded as a useful tool for promoting political ends and is deliberately used as such: “At present along with the daily increase in our international exchanges, the external contacts of our religious circles are also increasing daily and play an important role in expanding our country’s political influence.” In accordance with CCP policy, patriotic religious leaders are permitted to “carry out mutual visits and friendly exchanges with the religious circles of every country.” Since 1979 this policy has been vigorously developed with a constant stream of Chinese religious delegations to all parts of the world. Conversely, many foreign religious delegations have been welcomed by the patriotic religious organisations in China. Such exchanges are designed to build up international support for the patriotic religious organisations; and also to reduce the influence of “the reactionary religious forces in the world, especially the imperialist religious forces, including the Roman Curia and Protestant missions (which) are also attempting to exploit every opportunity to carry out infiltration activities in order to ‘stage a return to China’.” This pointed attack on the Vatican and Protestant missions was, again significantly, omitted from the *Red Flag* version of CCP policy. The patriotic religious organisations are told that they must reject the interference of any foreign churches, and oppose evangelisation by any foreign organisation, as well as the smuggling of religious literature into the country. Large donations from abroad, even if given unconditionally, can only be accepted by the religious associations after permission has been obtained from local or central government.

Particular hostility is vented against “underground churches and other illegal organisations set up by hostile foreign religious forces in our country, in order to carry out espionage and sabotage activities under the cloak of religion.” Presumably, this is aimed against “loyalist” Catholics who maintain contacts with the Vatican, and house-church Christians
who have some contact with Christian organisations abroad. In both cases, it seems a distortion of the facts to state that they have been “set up” by hostile forces abroad. At any rate, CCP members are exhorted to crack down on them resolutely” in accordance with the law “after careful surveillance and after gaining concrete evidence at the right time.” This appears to have been what happened in 1983 in the case of the arrests of both the Jesuit fathers and certain house-church Christians. Despite the negative aspect of this policy, overall it seems fair to say that the CCP has been quite successful in promoting the image of China as a country in which religious freedom is fully enjoyed. Most foreign religious delegations have been impressed by the genuine contrast between today’s flourishing churches and mosques and the situation during the Cultural Revolution. Relying on official guides and interpreters and the statements of leaders of the patriotic religious organisations, they rarely have the opportunity to penetrate more deeply by, for instance, meeting religious believers privately. Although there are broad parallels between the present Chinese situation and that in the Soviet Union — “illegal” mimeographing and distribution of religious literature, believers forming groups outside the Party-controlled religious organisations, and periodic arrests of religious dissenters — the CCP seems to have been noticeably more successful than its Soviet counterpart in convincing the outside world of the benevolence of its religious policy. 19

Training of Patriotic Religious Leaders

When the CCP decided to resurrect the religious associations in 1979, most of the available leaders were elderly. In the case of the Christian Church, some priests and pastors who had recently been released from labour camps were persuaded to join the patriotic religious associations. It is likely that many of the present clergy within both the TSPM and CPA structures privately hold reservations about the system but for one reason or another have opted to work from within. The chronic shortage of leadership has made the training of younger religious leaders a priority. Document No. 19 states: “systematic training and education of a young generation of patriotic religious professional workers has real significance for the future image of the religious organisations”.

It is noteworthy that, even in the present more relaxed atmosphere of Deng Xiaoping’s China, ideological and political orthodoxy still takes precedence over other considerations. “The task of the religious colleges is to train a rank of young professional religious workers who politically love the motherland, support the Party’s leadership and the socialist system and who are fairly accomplished in religious learning.” Furthermore, “all young religious professional workers should continually raise their patriotic and socialist consciousness, strive to raise
their cultural level and religious knowledge, and loyally uphold the Party’s religious policy”. Those older patriotic religious workers who were used by the CCP to supervise and control religious affairs in the 1950s have a key role in training the younger generation. “Thus, the younger workers will be united with the original progressive elements in religious circles, and will become, under Party leadership, a strong core guaranteeing that our religious organisations maintain their activities in the right direction.” The reopening of various seminaries and theological schools in China has to be viewed in the light of these definite CCP statements.

Some Conclusions

A stereotyped Marxist view of religion remains the ideological foundation of CCP religious policy. This is unlikely to change, and will ensure that the Party, in principle, remains hostile to religion. However, pragmatic considerations also now loom larger than before. It is recognised that outright repression did not work during the Cultural Revolution, and, in principle, the use of force is eschewed. The legal recognition of the major religions is a repudiation of Cultural Revolution extremism and affords religious believers some protection in the pursuit of their religious activities. The CCP is conscious that it must avoid needlessly offending both international opinion and the religious minority peoples of China. All this is for the better. However, through the patriotic religious organisations the CCP still seeks to control and limit religious activities. Implementation of religious policy within China may vary from public statements made for international consumption. At the local level, implementation may also vary depending on the attitudes of local officials, and the strength of “leftism”. It remains true, however, that CCP religious policy sets definite limits to the enjoyment of religious freedom, beyond which believers step at their peril.

1See R. C. Bush, Religion in Communist China, Nashville and New York, 1970, for a documented account of CCP control over all religious activities in the 1950s.
4South China Morning Post, 11 April 1984; Beijing Review, 13 June 1983.
5The authenticity of this document is no longer in doubt, although first made available in the Taiwan-produced Studies on Chinese Communism in March 1983. The present writer has seen a copy as reprinted by the People’s Publishing Company (Ren Min Chu Ban She) in Tianjin in August 1982. 90,000 copies were printed for internal circulation among cadres.
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Bureau in Canton of the establishment of the mechanism of control in the early 1950s, see G. N. Patterson, Christianity in Communist China, Waco, 1969, pp. 1-20.

9 Document No. 19, Section 7.


11 Da Gong Bao, 11 April 1984.


13 Guanyu Yonghu Shi Renmin Zhengfu Zongjiao Shiwu Chu Zhizhi Lin Xiangao Weifa Huodong di Koutou Xuanchuan Ziliao. Broadsheet dated 5 December 1982, put out by Canton TSPM/Canton Christian Council. The case of Pastor Lin is well known among Chinese Christians overseas: it is likely because of this that he was not arrested, and since 1983 has been able to resume meetings on a much smaller scale although under close surveillance.

14 Guanyu Yonghu Zhengchang Zongjiao Huodong Di Jüedìng (Decisions Regarding the Safeguarding of Normal Religious Activity), Yunnan Province TSPM Committee/Yunnan Province Christian Council, May 1982. A full English translation is available from Christian Communications Ltd, PO Box 95364, Tsimshatsui, Hong Kong.

15 China News and Church Report, 8 July 1983.

16 South China Morning Post, 17 July 1983; Sunday Examiner, 30 December 1983.

17 Xing Dao Wan Bao, Hong Kong, 14 December 1983; South China Morning Post, 12 March 1984; Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 March 1984.


19 In 1979 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published a collection of Soviet documents on religion, entitled Religious Policy in the Soviet Union. The extent to which the CCP has drawn on Soviet example is an area which needs study.