In 1977 Father Vasyl’ Romanyuk, a prisoner in the Soviet Gulag because of his struggle for religious and national rights, addressed a letter to Metropolitan Mstyslav, leader of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the West:

Your Grace! First of all, I assure you of my devotion and humility. I declare that I consider and have always considered myself a member of the U[krainian] A[utocephalous] O[rthodox] C[hurch] in spite of the fact that I formally belonged to a different hierarchy, for it is well known that the Ukrainian Church, Orthodox as well as Catholic, is outlawed in Ukraine. Such are the barbaric ethics of the Bolsheviks.¹

The appeal was a remarkable testimony that almost fifty years after the destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church formed in the 1920s and over thirty years after the eradication of the Church restored during the Second World War, loyalty to Ukrainian Orthodoxy still remains alive among Ukraine’s believers. It also demonstrates how shared persecution has brought new ecumenical understanding between Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics.

To discuss the position of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the Soviet Union is a difficult task, for since the destruction of tens of its bishops, thousands of its priests, and tens of thousands of its lay activists in the early 1930s (and once again after the Second World War), and its forcible incorporation into the Russian Orthodox Church, it exists more as a loyalty and an unrealised dream than as an active movement. But it is clear that a substantial number of Orthodox believers in Ukraine wish to restore Ukrainian Orthodoxy, while numerous others would be attracted to such a movement were it to be feasible.

In discussing the fate of Ukrainian Orthodox believers, one must see them as sharing the difficulties of all members of the Russian Orthodox Church — pressure on clergy, difficulty of retaining prayer houses, constant demands for demonstrations of Soviet patriotism. Within the struc-
ture of Russian Orthodoxy, Ukraine and Ukrainians occupy a position far greater than their proportion in the general population, due to the greater strength of religious activity in Ukraine than in Russia, particularly because of the reopening of churches during the Second World War and the desire to convert Ukrainian Catholics to Orthodoxy. It has been estimated that fifty percent of the functioning Orthodox churches in the USSR are in Ukraine (with over twenty-five percent of the all-Soviet total in the western and by tradition predominantly Ukrainian Catholic regions, which have a mere 7-8 million inhabitants). In addition, Ukrainians provide a very large percentage of vocations. In short, the post-war period has repeated the processes of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Ukrainians took commanding positions in the Russian Church. But unlike that period, when Ukrainian learning and ecclesiastical practices supplanted Muscovite ones, no such tendencies are apparent yet in Russia. The church in eastern Ukraine remains a bastion of russification, using Russian pronunciation of Church Slavonic and Russian as a language of preaching and administration, while only in western Ukraine, prompted by fear of widespread Ukrainian Catholic sympathies among formally Orthodox believers, does the Church use Ukrainian Church Slavonic and Ukrainian in preaching, and allow the retention of local liturgical practices, including markedly Uniate ones.*

In any examination of the Ukrainian Orthodox issue among contemporary Soviet believers, political, cultural and ecclesiastical factors far predating Soviet rule must be taken into account, above all the relation of Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism to Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the inter-relations of Ukrainian Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox. This short sketch permits mentioning only the major points, even at the risk of over-simplifying complex issues.³

First it is important to remember that the migration of the metropolitans of Kiev to Russian territory at the beginning of the fourteenth century left the Ukrainian lands without a resident ecclesiastical leader. Only in the mid-fifteenth century, with the Russian Church’s declaration of autocephaly from the Patriarchs of Constantinople, was a Metropolitan of Kiev, under the Constantinople Patriarch, established for the Ukrainian and Belorussian territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. Always in close contact with Latin Christendom, the Ukrainian Orthodox were influenced by the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. From the late sixteenth century a segment of hierarchs and laity united with Rome, forming the ecclesiastical body from which present-day Ukrainian Catholics descend. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Ukrainian believers

*The Ukrainian Catholic (or Uniate) Church owed allegiance to Rome but used the eastern Orthodox rite in worship. In 1946 it was forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church. For information on its history and present-day life, see article on pp. 264-80.—Ed.
responded to the western Christian challenge by forming religious brotherhoods, in which the laity took an active part, to organise publications and schools. In 1632, Metropolitan Peter Mohyla adapted Jesuit models to form the famed collegium, later academy, that was the first modern Orthodox higher educational institution. He also defined the dogmas of the faith in a statement approved by the Orthodox patriarchates, but viewed as too Latin by many later Orthodox theologians. This whole period of religious ferment accompanied a Ukrainian cultural revival and is viewed by modern Ukrainians as essential in defining their spiritual culture. The great Cossack revolt of 1648 and the establishment of the Hetmanate gave protection to both Orthodoxy and the cultural revival, but political absorption into the Russian State was soon followed by religious integration (in 1685-86 the Kiev metropolitan see was “transferred” from Constantinopolitan to Muscovite jurisdiction). Learned Kievan clergyman poured into Muscovy, where the reforms of Nikon resulted in an Old Believer schism that undermined native Russian religious traditions. A new Imperial Russian Orthodoxy was formed in which the Ukrainian input was great. But with the political and cultural integration of the Ukrainian elite came an undermining of Ukrainian religious traditions from architecture to book printing and their replacement by the new official Russian Orthodox norms. As Orthodoxy became subordinate to the Russian State, the Church became an instrument of imperial ideology and Russification.

It was therefore natural that the rise of modern Ukrainian culture and national sentiment in the nineteenth century would challenge the Russian Orthodox control of Ukrainian believers. By the early twentieth century, both in Russia and in Ukraine, a church reform movement sought to revitalise religious life and remove the dead bureaucracy that governed the Imperial Church. But what in Russia remained a controversy between reformers and conservatives took on a national coloration in Ukraine. As throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, movements to improve the spiritual, cultural and material life of the popular masses took on a Ukrainian patriotic stance and opposed the russificatory policies of first the Tsars and then the commissars. In the early twentieth century most of the hierarchs and monks of the official Church in Ukraine defended the old regime and its policies, even at times supporting the chauvinist “Black Hundreds”. The reformers, who sought liturgical, constitutional and attitudinal reforms in the Church, came largely from the married clergy and the laity. In Ukraine a segment of the reformers sought use of the Ukrainian language in sermons, religious texts and the liturgy and a reform of the Church’s government. 4

By 1917 the Ukrainian Church movement demanded Ukrainianisation of the Church, a greater role for the married clergy and laity in its governance, and autocephaly. Persecuted by the conservative and
Russian chauvinist hierarchy, the Ukrainian Church movement became more and more radical. Frustrated by its failure to win over any bishops, but determined not to capitulate to the Russian hierarchs, a council held in St Sophia’s Cathedral resorted to the “Alexandrine” privilege, the consecration of a bishop by the grace of the Church represented by its clergy and laity. They declared the 1686 submission of the Kievan metropolitan see to Moscow as forcible and illegal, and saw Ukrainian Orthodoxy as always existing, but merely lacking its own hierarchy. In the 1920s, the Bolshevik regime favoured competition between Orthodox religious groups and embarked on a Ukrainisation programme to win the support of the Ukrainian populace. Therefore, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was allowed to develop; it gathered Ukrainian patriots around itself, and by its competition even forced the Russian jurisdictions to make concessions to Ukrainian sentiments. By 1928 Soviet policies began to change, and the revered Metropolitan Vasyl’ Lypkivs’ky was forced to resign. In 1929 the Church was charged in the show trial of the “League for the Liberation of Ukraine” and was annihilated in arrests and purges in the early 1930s. While all Orthodox groups were persecuted, only the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox were selected for total destruction, thus indicating the increasing russificatory tendencies of Stalinism.

During the Second World War, a new Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy was constituted out of the unquestionably canonical hierarchy of the pre-war Polish Orthodox Church, thus resolving the problem of the apostolic succession of hierarchy faced by the Church in the 1920s, and the Church spread in areas under German occupation. But with Stalin’s accommodation with Russian Orthodoxy, including the election of a new patriarch, the fate of the Ukrainian Churches was sealed. The return of Soviet rule meant first the destruction of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and in 1946 the forcible incorporation of the Ukrainian Catholics into Russian Orthodoxy at the spurious “Synod of L’viv”. From that time, Ukrainian Orthodoxy would be represented only by hierarchs in Europe, North and South America and Australia, although jurisdictional problems sapped the Church’s strength.

How does the Ukrainian Orthodox problem affect the position of believers in Ukraine and what significance does it hold for the future? First, the Ukrainian question remains one of the major unresolved issues for the Orthodox world. In 1924 the Patriarch of Constantinople proclaimed the 1686 transfer of the Kiev metropolitanate as illegal, thus placing in question the Russian Church’s position in Ukraine. But on a more basic level, the Ukrainians face the problem of being the second most numerous national body of Orthodox believers, but having no church of their own in the USSR. However fictitious their republic’s autonomy may be, the Ukrainians cannot help contrasting the position of
their fifty million-strong homeland with the tiny Macedonian republic of Yugoslavia, which has its own autocephalous Orthodox Church separate from the Serbian one, or the Georgian republic of the USSR, which has its own autocephalous Orthodox Church recognised as such by the Moscow Patriarchate.

But the problem is far more than one of national pride. As long as Russian Orthodoxy, whether official or dissident, remains the instrument of Russian nationalism, it inevitably evokes resentment from Ukrainian believers. It is but one more sign that the formally atheistic internationalist Soviet regime uses one measure for Russians and their culture, and another for non-Russians. On the other hand, the Russian nationalist trends among Orthodox dissenters, including Solzhenitsyn, must trouble Ukrainian believers. At a time when the Russian Orthodox Church is becoming more Ukrainian in its constituency, pressures are inevitable. So far the official Church has made a few concessions: the active role permitted Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev, Exarch of all Ukraine, in international forums, the publication of a Ukrainian-language journal of the Patriarchate, *Pravoslavny visnyk* (Orthodox Herald), a limited edition of a Ukrainian prayer book and the retention of Ukrainian Church Slavonic in Uniate areas. Many of these gestures may be seen as intended for the Ukrainian diaspora, but they inevitably strengthen the position of Ukrainians in the Church. What is harder to judge is the effect of the increasing number of Ukrainian clergy, above all from the patriotic western Ukraine, including traditionally Orthodox (Volhynia, Bukovina) and Catholic (Galicia, Transcarpathia) regions. As they as well as western Ukrainian believers have fanned out throughout Ukraine they have undoubtedly disseminated their patriotism and their non-Russian liturgical practices. (Anyone who has attended church in Kiev and L'viv knows how substantial the differences still remain.) We have information from new Orthodox testimony from the eastern Ukraine that the KGB is concerned about the increase of western Ukrainian clergy and is trying to stop the practice of candidates from the vocation-rich western dioceses going east to be ordained. In 1977, the Bishop of Poltava, Feodosy, a native of the former western Ukrainian Volhynian stronghold of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, addressed a lengthy letter to Brezhnev on the position of the Church in his diocese. In it he recounts the following confrontation with the authorities:

I. Ya. Nechytailo says that I am "enticing clergy to Poltava from the western regions of Ukraine". At present two priests from western Ukraine serve in the Poltava area — neither of whom I knew previously and therefore could not "entice" them. It seems to me that one should not be surprised that two priests from the western regions of Ukraine serve in the Poltava region, but rather one should be surprised why they should not
serve here? Why does the regional representative* [Nechytailo] divide Ukraine into two, when we have one? And why should one part be set against the other? What crime did the regional representative see in that people of some region, let us say western, go to live in other regions, eastern, or the reverse?10

But if Bishop Feodosy seems concerned to treat all Ukrainians equally as his faithful, other bishops remain closer to the official Church's and the regime's traditions of Russian chauvinism. In spring 1974, the editors of the underground journal, The Ukrainian Herald, challenged Metropolitan Filaret:

And maybe the Exarch will tell us what he did with Father Sava of St Volodymyr's Cathedral in Kiev, after he began delivering his sermons in Ukrainian? Maybe he can also tell us why in 1972 only four students from the L'viv region were accepted into the Odessa Theological Seminary? Why an atmosphere of [Russian] chauvinism pervades the seminary? Why services in the churches of Ukraine are conducted in Russian, with the exception of the western regions, and even there not in all areas? In Volhynia, for example, only Russian is used in almost all the churches. Why is there no religious literature published in the Ukrainian language? No, the Exarch will not answer these questions. We will do this for him. It is because there is no official Ukrainian Church in Ukraine. Moscow usurped the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church in eastern Ukraine in the thirties and the Greek-Catholic Church in western Ukraine in the forties. Moscow's Orthodox Church is an instrument of russification. Key administrative positions in the Church are held by obedient lackeys who care only about their earthly comforts and who receive a dole from the satanical regime for their black hypocritical deeds.11

Essential to the question of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is the Ukrainian Catholic issue. It is clear that the regime has allowed the Orthodox Church greater freedom in the western Ukraine, as well as its Ukrainian face, in order to win over the suppressed Ukrainian Catholics. For every active member of the Ukrainian Catholic catacomb Church, there are many priests and believers in the official Orthodox Church who would return to their ancestral Ukrainian Catholic faith immediately, if the Church became legal. But for the present this element as well as the real converts to Orthodoxy form a strong lobby which views the proper role of the Orthodox Church as similar to that of the traditionally patriotic and activist Ukrainian Catholic Church. They press for the pursuit of this role at least at the parish level. The tremendous increase in the catacomb

*Sc. of the Council for Religious Affairs — Ed.
Ukrainian Catholic Church in the last few years will obviously strengthen this party’s hand.

Although in recent years there have been a number of noble protests by Orthodox Russian believers in defence of Ukrainian Catholics,\textsuperscript{12} it is still safe to say that most Russian Orthodox (like Russian atheists) find the Uniates alien and incomprehensible. In contrast, throughout the twentieth century, common patriotism and common suffering have drawn Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics together. In order to “de-russify” the Church, Metropolitan Lypkivs’ky suggested looking to Ukrainian Catholic practices, which had remained free of the dictates of the Synodal Russian Church. In the 1930s, the great Ukrainian Catholic metropolitan, Andrii Sheptyts’ky, defended Orthodox believers against Polish religious persecution. To this day the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy in the West condemns the forcible conversion of the Ukrainian Catholics in 1946 (something to my knowledge, that has not been done by the émigré Russian Synodal Church or the former Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Metropolia, now the Orthodox Church in America). Father Romanyuk’s statement is, I believe, indicative of a widespread sentiment, particularly among intellectuals. Even the most ardent Orthodox cannot but have respect for the tenacious struggle of his fellow-Christian Ukrainian Catholics. Whether Russian Orthodox believers can fully understand this western and ecumenical drift among Ukrainian Orthodox is a major question.

In recent years, it is clear that young Russians have turned more and more to the Church for spiritual and national values. Here, as always, Ukrainian youth are in a difficult position, particularly in eastern Ukraine where the Church is so Russian. It is indicative that when Valentyn Moroz, a son of Orthodox Volhynia, defended the spiritual legacy of Ukrainians as represented by the church of the Hutsul mountaineers of Kosmach, the very church of which Father Romanyuk was pastor, he asserted:

\textit{In 1773 it was reconsecrated as a Uniate Church but by this time this had lost its former significance. Galicia had become a province of Austria. Polish rule had come to an end. The Uniate movement had become integrated into Ukraine’s spiritual life. The struggle against it and the defence of Orthodoxy ceased to be a national problem. On the contrary, Russia soon began using Orthodoxy as a means of russification in the lands taken from Poland. The most important task was the preservation of the Church.}\textsuperscript{13}

His statement reflects the contrast of how a Ukrainian and a Russian patriot must view the role of the Orthodox Church in the past — the Russian can see it as a national church that defended his people’s cultural
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legacy — the Ukrainian has two national churches, and cannot forget the official Orthodox Church’s alien nature and negative role in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There has yet to be a study of the spiritual and cultural values of Ukrainian intellectuals and dissenters. It seems clear, however, that their search leads more to the past (Mohylan Orthodoxy, the brotherhood, Ukrainian Baroque) and the rich Christian folklore of their people (Christmas Holy Eve supper carols, the vertep or holiday puppet theatre, etc.), than to official Orthodoxy. Anyone who has viewed “Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors” and the other Ukrainian ethnographic films of the 1960s cannot but feel this strongly.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia has also turned to its spiritual roots in the broad cultural sense in its attempts to preserve its legacy. Here it is at a great disadvantage compared with the Russian intelligentsia, since historical, literary and art history works that would be permitted and even encouraged in Russia are forbidden as “nationalist” in Ukraine. The pogrom of intellectuals in the early 1970s brought research in fields such as pre-1917 Ukrainian history to a halt, and destroyed almost all historical journals: Seredni viky na Ukrayini (Middle Ages in Ukraine), Istorychni dzherela ta yikh vykorystannya (Historical Sources and their Utilisation), Kyyivs’ka starovyna (Kievan Antiquities), etc. While scores of art books appear in Leningrad and Moscow, it was only the appearance of a book on Ukrainian icons in the USA that forced the Soviet authorities into allowing one in Kiev. The vast icon collections assembled by Metropolitan Andrii Sheptyts’ky remain stored precariously in church basements in L’viv. While destruction of churches and other cultural monuments is an all-Soviet phenomenon, the KGB works with particular zeal in Ukraine, accusing opponents of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”.

Those interested in Ukrainian spiritual and artistic culture inevitably turn to the Holy City, the Second Jerusalem, Kiev. Here the situation is catastrophic, since communist plans to build a new Soviet capital led to virtual cultural genocide in the city of the Golden Domes in 1934-35. St Michael’s Gold-Domed Monastery, The Church of St Basil, the Brotherhood Monastery of the Epiphany, the Collegiate Church of St Nicholas, the Church of Sts Borys and Hlib (Boris and Gleb) and many others were all destroyed and in the end nothing was built in their place. Interestingly enough, while Ukrainian Baroque churches were removed from the face of the earth, the nineteenth century Synodal period St Volodymyr’s (Vladimir’s) Cathedral, built in eclectic Russian style, was left standing and now serves as the Metropolitan’s cathedral.

In the last few years there has been a spate of publishing activity involved with the rather arbitrarily proclaimed 1500th anniversary of Kiev in 1982. There are those who see this celebration as intended to divert attention from another anniversary — the fiftieth of the artificial

*Shown in cover photos — Ed.
famine that cost five to seven million lives in Ukraine. But whatever its purpose, new books on Kiev and its art have been published and for the first time modern Ukrainian translations of the chronicles have appeared: The Primary, the Kievian and the Galician-Volhynian. While the authorities intend the anniversary to affirm “East Slavic” (read All-Russian) unity throughout the ages, the Ukrainian intelligentsia have used it to provide at least a little access to Ukraine’s spiritual and cultural legacy. The 1500th anniversary of the city must also be seen in the light of the looming millennium of Kievian Christianity in 1988. It is, of course, painful for Ukrainian Orthodox to remember that the city of Metropolitans Hilarion, Peter Mohyla and Vasyl Lypkovsky now contains a mere exarch of the Moscow Patriarchate. Pope John Paul II’s call to Ukrainians to prepare for the celebration of the millennium of their Christianity has resonance not only for Ukrainian Catholics, but also for Ukrainian Orthodox. Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic churches in the west will be joining together for conferences and scholarly publications intending to reaffirm their spiritual legacy and bring their churches’ plight to the world’s attention. It is clear that this will sustain their believers in Ukraine. It will be interesting to see how far the Soviet authorities will go in allowing the Moscow Patriarch to celebrate the millennium of “Russia’s” Christianity in order to combat Ukrainian spiritual rebirth.

As with all Soviet policies on religion, foreign affairs play a major role in Soviet calculations. Patriarch Pimen and Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev have important parts to play in “ecumenical contacts”, and “peace offensives”. Obviously the existence of large and active Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the West is extremely troublesome to them. The Ukrainian Catholics with their support from Pope John Paul II and their access to the Vatican Radio are the greater problem. But the Ukrainian Orthodox, particularly in the person of the energetic Metropolitan Mstyslaw, have been successful in using many forums to defend believers in the Soviet Union and to raise the Ukrainian Orthodox problem in international church circles. At his election in 1971, the new Patriarch of Moscow announced the “reunion” of Ukrainian Orthodox abroad with his Church as a major goal. Indeed, Moscow’s recognition of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Metropolia as the Orthodox Church in America in 1970, with the avowed goal of gathering all Orthodox believers in the US and Canada, cannot be seen as divorced from the Soviet government’s and Moscow Patriarchate’s plans to undermine Ukrainian Orthodoxy abroad. During recent visits to the USA, Metropolitan Filaret, facing thousands of demonstrators for the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic Churches, mendaciously asserted that all Ukrainians wish to belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. The newly-passed resolution of the US Congress calling for religious freedom for the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic
Churches obviously causes discomfort to Filaret and to his superior, Patriarch Pimen. Regrettably, until now many of the western broadcasting companies who send information on religion and religious services to the USSR have seen Orthodoxy as only Russian in culture and language, thus depriving Orthodox Ukrainian believers and Ukrainian Orthodoxy of support. Consequently the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada has begun its own transmissions.

All too often Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian believers are forgotten in discussions of religious problems in the USSR. They obviously complicate the question of the defence of churches and believers, but if they are ignored, it distorts our understanding of the religious situation and undermines the position of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The hostility that so many Russian Orthodox leaders and believers, whether of the Soviet-controlled Moscow Patriarchate, the underground Russian Orthodox movement or the émigré churches, have shown towards the aspirations of Ukrainians for their right to their own Orthodox Church weakens the position of all believers in the Soviet Union and plays into the hands of the communist authorities. Ukrainian Orthodox believers are forced to view the Russian Orthodox Church with suspicion, as a persecutor which pre-dates the Soviet regime. As the major student of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, Bohdan Bociurkiw, comments:

When the Second World War brought a dramatic reversal in Stalin's religious policy and gave a new lease of life to the Russian Orthodox Church, the latter was unabashedly put to use as an instrument for the sovietisation and russification of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics. As in the secular sphere, so, too, in ecclesiastical life the very concept of "Ukrainisation", let alone independence, has assumed a "nationalist" and "subversive" connotation. But behind the facade of the "monolithic unity" of the regime and the Russian Church, Ukrainisation remains a very much alive, if suppressed, idea and an unfulfilled popular aspiration.

4On the history and traditions of the Ukrainian Church movement, see Dmytro Doroshenko, Pravoslavna Tserkva v mynulomu suchasnomu zhytii ukrayins'koho narodu (Berlin, 1940) and Nataliya Polonska-Vasylenko, Istorychni pidvalyny UAPTz (Munich, 1964).
5 For the Church's justification of this practice, see Ivan Teodorovych, Blahodatnist' Yerarkhiyi UAPTs (Regensburg, 1947). On the issue of autocephaly see Aleksander Lotots'kyi, Avtokefaliya, 2 Vols. (Warsaw, 1935-38).


7 On the problems of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the West see my article, “The Ukrainian Orthodox Churches and the Ukrainian Diaspora” (pp. 16-25) and that of Petrusia Markowsky, “The Rise of Ukrainian National Consciousness and the Formation of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada” in Vitrazh (Great Britain) No. 11 (June 1980). Also see the monograph by Paul Yuzyk, The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, 1918-1951 (Ph.D thesis, University of Minnesota, 1958) (newly published, particulars unavailable to me) and Odarka S. Trosky, The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada (Winnipeg, 1968).

8 A Ukrainian translation of the Tomos, 13 November 1924 is published in Polonska-Vaslyenko, Istorychni pidvalyny UAPTs, pp. 113-16.


12 See the letter of Yelena Sannikova to Pope John Paul II published in the Documents section of this issue (pp. 293-94 — Ed.).


15 I discuss these problems in a review of V. P. Kolosova and V. I. Krekoten, compilers, "Ukrayins'ka poeziya” in Kritika, XVI, No. 1 (Winter, 1980), pp. 24-40.

16 See the catalogue of the exhibit now being held at the Ukrainian Museum in New York: Titus D. Hewryk, The Lost Architecture of Kiev (New York, 1982).


18 For the announcement of the joint plans of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches to celebrate the millennium, issued on 27 June 1981, see The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, Autumn 1981, p. 325.

19 I discuss this delicate problem in “The Ukrainian Orthodox Churches”, op. cit., pp. 22-24.


21 For the full texts of Senate Congressional Record 18 (27 April 1981) and House Congressional Record 123 (1 May 1981) which include articles to:

1. Call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to permit the concrete resurrection of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches and other independent religions in the largest non-Russian nation both within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in Eastern Europe.
3. Bring to the attention of all national and international religious councils the nature of this Stalinist crime and perpetuated violation of basic human rights, with an appropriate appeal to the commitment of their resources towards achieving the objective of this resolution”,


22 Bohdan Bociurkiw, “Ukrainization Movements within the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church”, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* III-IV (1979-80), p. 111.

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