

Poland's Church on the Road to Gdańsk

ALEXANDER TOMSKY

Polish defiance is as strong today as in 1920 when under General Piłsudski a few badly equipped men won an astounding victory over the Bolshevik army. Today, 60 years later, the memory of this battle, known as "the miracle on the Vistula", survives in the popular mind and is cherished by those who are working for the revival of the Polish nation. The courage shown last summer by the unarmed strikers in the Gdańsk shipyards was perhaps even greater than that of Piłsudski's soldiers, for the strikers' enemy was within the gates. They faced the police, the militia, an army of informers and Soviet soldiers inside and outside Poland's borders. The strike leaders no doubt remembered their predecessors who organized the strikes on the Baltic coast ten years earlier, and how one by one they later disappeared in suspicious circumstances. Their courage cannot be explained by economic factors—the worsening supply of meat and other basic commodities—but was due to their sense of personal dignity, and to a spiritual hope that has survived in Poland.

If today in Poland the Communist Party is forced to relax its grip on society by the organized pressure of free trade unions and public opinion, this will be due in large measure to the survival and growth of the Church, for I would venture to suggest that the degree of freedom won by people in a totalitarian State is in direct proportion to the degree to which that country is Christian. The Christian faith has enabled people in Poland to overcome their fear and feeling of helplessness. No longer do they "accept the oppressive *status quo* as an inescapable reality and resign themselves to their fate of being helpless and passive subjects".¹ The moral values upheld by the Church have compelled many to take a stand against injustice and the infringement of human rights.

In Poland the survival of Christianity has been linked to the survival of the Roman Catholic Church as an institution. Conditions peculiar to Poland made the Church's continued existence possible: first, the combination of religious faith and patriotism in the national mind,

whose roots can be found in the 19th century when the Church preserved intact Poland's national identity; second, the Church's awareness of its social, cultural and political responsibility which has brought the Catholic faith into the centre of life; third, the historical prestige of the thousand-year-old Church whose Primate, according to ancient tradition, acts as *inter rex* when there is no legitimate ruler.

Many western observers of church-state relations in Poland have failed to understand, particularly since the early '60s, that the State intended to destroy the Church during the '50s, to restrict its activities within the four walls of its parish churches in the '60s, and to prevent it from growing in the '70s. It often seemed to western observers that if there was more freedom for believers in Poland this was the result of some reasonable *modus vivendi* worked out between sensible people in the Party and the Church. But in a totalitarian State such a compromise is not possible, for once such a State is established, it cannot but aim at total control over an individual's life, including his spiritual life. There is an overwhelming consensus among East European intellectuals that the symbiosis between politics and ideology is the *spiritus movens* of a totalitarian State. Whether or not Party members actually believe in communist ideology or merely pay lip service to it, they are forced by the machinery of which they are a part to insist on total subservience to Party policy, for any dissent threatens the Party's legitimacy and therefore its members' power and privileged position.

In its dealings with the Church the Party has had to act with care. It has used various propaganda tactics to divide the Church. For example, after the War the Pax movement under Bolesław Piasecki, former leader of extreme right-wing Falanga, received large government subsidies to promote co-operation between Catholics and communists in building socialism at a time when the Church was fighting for survival. Later, in the different climate of the "thaw" (after 1956), a Christian Social Movement was established to promote ecumenism, and this again was aimed at weakening the Church. In the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council state propaganda began to praise renewal theology and "progressive Catholics" while branding as conservative those who opposed state encroachments on the Church. The former Archbishop of Kraków, Cardinal Wojtyła, was a victim of these tactics: he was portrayed as a man who supported dialogue in contrast to the intransigent stand of Cardinal Wyszyński. But these tactics had little success in Poland,² although many western journalists who cherished high hopes of détente and believed in the gradual transformation of communism were taken in by them. In fact, behind the façade of friendly gestures made by government officials and the often repeated willingness of the Church to negotiate, little discussion took place between the two sides. Ever since the government had tried and

failed to break the Church and subordinate her to its policies in the '50s, church-state relations had come to resemble a war of attrition: on one side was "an all powerful State" using propaganda and bureaucratic restrictions to hamper the Church whenever possible, and, on the other, the spiritual resistance of believers who could not be intimidated by various forms of pressure.

The Church's Struggle for Survival (1947-1956)

The conflict between Church and State since the communist takeover in 1947 can be divided into three periods, 1947-1956, 1956-1970 and 1970-1980. During the first period, the Church fought for its survival as an institution against government attempts to gain control over it. The church press was banned, its land confiscated; Catholic schools, charitable organizations including even some hospitals were taken over by the government. Associations run by the Church were banned; agents infiltrated monasteries and seminaries to force priests to join the so-called "Patriotic Priests" organizations, an ecclesiastical fifth column designed to weaken the authority of the bishops. By 1953 several hundred priests and eight bishops had been imprisoned. The State aimed ultimately to subjugate the Church so that the hierarchy could no longer formulate its own pastoral strategy or its policy *vis-à-vis* the State. Such a Church would be the cause of its own downfall as is almost the case in Czechoslovakia. Roman Catholic publications in Czechoslovakia are written by people pliable to the authorities with disastrous results for Christian theology; all Roman Catholic priests are paid by the State—they are rewarded for neglecting their religious duties and dismissed should they try to spread the Gospel; the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Czechoslovakia is controlled by the State to such a degree that they rubber stamp government policies even when the latter are detrimental to the Church; their pastoral letters contain an admixture of state propaganda and many priests are embarrassed to read them out to their congregations. In Poland, however, the attempts to "nationalize" the Church failed. Apart from the strength of Catholicism as a "national ideology" with its messianic overtones, the Church was strengthened numerically by the post-war re-arrangement of Poland's borders. With the loss of large religious minorities, such as the German Lutherans, the Orthodox and the Jews, Poland became almost completely Polish and Catholic. At the same time the dictatorial regime, installed by the Soviet Union, lacked both legitimacy and any sizeable indigenous support.

In 1950 an agreement between Church and State was signed. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, the new Primate, was "forced" to recognize the regime's right to govern, and to endorse the new social order

by relinquishing the Church's traditional right to speak on economic, social and political matters. He no doubt accepted such a circumscribed position for the Church in order to save certain essentials—religious education in schools, the Catholic University of Lublin, church control of seminaries and of church appointments. Only until 1953, however, was he able to resist government attempts to interfere with church administration: in 1953 a decree was issued by the Ministry for Church Affairs which established the State's right to appoint bishops. Cardinal Wyszyński reacted by sending a letter to President Bierut in which he said:

If external factors were to make it impossible for us to appoint competent and proper people to ecclesiastical positions, we are resolved to leave them vacant rather than to place the spiritual rule of souls in the hands of unworthy individuals. And if someone from outside the Church should dare to accept any ecclesiastical position, let him know that by the same fact he falls under the heavy punishment of excommunication. Similarly, if we are faced with the alternative of either subjecting ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the State, thus making it an instrument of the latter, or of making a personal sacrifice, we will not hesitate; we will follow the voice of our Apostolic vocation and our conscience as priests, with peace of mind and the knowledge that we have not provided the slightest reason for persecution, that suffering becomes our lot for no other reason than the cause of Christ and His Church. We are not allowed to place the things belonging to God on the altar of Caesar. *Non possumus*.¹³

Later that year (1953) the Cardinal was arrested and the bishops had to take an oath of loyalty to the State. Nevertheless Cardinal Wyszyński's policy of flexible diplomacy towards the State and his insistence on total loyalty from his priests and bishops, enabled the Church to survive. Another man in his position with less understanding of communist tactics might have been more intransigent, and might have thus destroyed the structure of the Church at a time when the population, exhausted by the War, could not defend it.

The Thaw and its Aftermath (1956-1970)


Khrushchev's secret speech in which he attacked Stalinism at the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union in February 1956, sent shock waves through the whole of Eastern Europe. In Poland Władysław Gomułka, who had previously been sentenced for "nationalist deviations", became the new Party Secretary. Cardinal Wyszyński and all other imprisoned priests were released; the church-state agreement of 1953 was abolished and a new one negotiated which gave the State the

right only to approve—or veto—and not appoint church leaders; religious education, which had been banned from schools, was reinstated.

But the change in Party leadership did not lead to any fundamental reform. Gomułka was no revisionist and had no intention of breaking with Moscow. He had been propelled to power simply because he was a well-known communist and had suffered under the previous discredited government. He considered it politically necessary to heal the rift with the Church, yet very few people realized at the time that this was only a tactical manoeuvre. Cardinal Wyszyński decided to support the regime rather than heed Pope Pius XII's warning against co-existence with communists, and as a result he soon had to pay a heavy price.

The new church-state agreement, negotiated in an atmosphere of goodwill, was intended to delineate each side's sphere of autonomy. The State recognized the Church's right to administer its own affairs while the Church agreed to respect existing laws and regulations. But within six months the truce came to an end: the legal separation of Church and State was undermined by the totalitarian aspirations of the government. Thus began a long and difficult period for the Church during which every "legal" means was used by the State to restrict the Church's freedom of action. Strict censorship was imposed once again and all information about the Church was eliminated. Church collections were heavily taxed and the seminaries were rated as luxury hotels. Seminarians were conscripted into the army; the creation of new parishes in the rapidly growing industrial towns was banned; the publishing of religious literature was kept to a minimum with the almost total exclusion of books for children; and between 1958 and 1961 the authorities did everything they could to obstruct religious education in schools.

Whereas during the period before 1956 naked terror was used to break the autonomy of the Church, now administrative pressure was applied. The government hoped that the Church would slowly die, but Cardinal Wyszyński resisted this pressure. He moved religious instruction to catechetical centres which were organized in churches and parish halls. When in August 1959 the government issued a decree which required all catechists to register, he ordered parish priests to refuse the form of acceptance provided by the local office for religious affairs. The State attacked the Church at both parish and national level: in the parishes the faithful defended their priests against tax collectors and their churches against demolition orders, while on a national level the mass media waged vigorous campaigns against religious obscurantism and Cardinal Wyszyński, who was portrayed as an ultra-conservative, anti-ecumenical churchman who supported a



Memorial to those killed in Gdańsk during the 1970 strikes. The inscription reads: "To want is to be able". (© Keston College)

Below "Solidarity" delegation, representing the free trade unions in Poland, during their visit to the Vatican in January 1981. From left to right: Lech Wałęsa; Anna Walentynowicz; wife of Lech Wałęsa; Kazimierz Świątoń (founder of the Silesian free trade union movement). (© Keston College)



Above Mass is celebrated in the Gdynia shipyard near Gdańsk (Poland) where in August 1980 the workers went on strike in support of free trade unions. The part played by the Church in the growth of demands for social justice and human rights is examined by Alexander Tomsky in an article, "Poland's Church on the Road to Gdańsk", pp. 28-39. (© Keston College)





Procession (1980) following the crowning of the Madonna in the village of Lipinki (Poland): 150,000 people were present (see p. 39). After the election of Pope John Paul II in October 1978, the prestige of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was greatly enhanced and thousands of people began returning to its fold.



Left One of the hundred churches in Przemyśl diocese (Poland) which were built without state permission (see p. 35). In 1980 peasants in this diocese set up three Believers' Self-Defence Committees and appealed to world public opinion to help them to defend their churches.

(Photographs, courtesy Keston College)

type of primitive "religious folklore". A number of factors made his defence difficult. His criticism of the system's *raison d'être* had little support in the '60s when there was economic stability and a steady rise in the standard of living. On the international level, the policy of *rapprochement* between East and West and the Vatican's *Ostpolitik* did not favour Cardinal Wyszyński's uncompromising stand. Moreover, many Polish Catholic intellectuals in the '60s were interested in "dialogue" with Marxists and western theological developments.

Cardinal Wyszyński believed that the Church, to prevent secularization, had to be at the centre of Polish society. With great ingenuity he made the Church popular by organizing national "festivals of faith" which were designed to strengthen the link between patriotism and the Catholic faith. In 1957 he initiated a remarkable programme of spiritual renewal which was to last for nine years and was to culminate in the celebrations marking a thousand years of Christianity in Poland. Every diocese was involved: a catechetical programme was undertaken by whole parishes; this programme included the renewal of the vows of loyalty made by King Casimir in 1656 to God and the Virgin Mary, after a few noblemen had managed to defend the monastery of Częstochowa against Swedish invaders. This massive programme of evangelization was devoted to particular themes each year. The Millennial celebrations themselves in 1966 were a great success despite the regime's counter-propaganda which stressed a thousand years of Polish Statehood, and despite the restrictions placed on pilgrims and publicity (even Pope Paul VI was refused a visa to attend the celebrations). In fact the festivities strengthened the Polish people's sense of unity as Catholics.

By the late '60s many were disillusioned with Gomułka's socialism; young people particularly found the regime oppressive—they had high expectations and were attracted by the pageantry, national traditions, patriotism and the sincerity and friendship which they found in the Church. Belief in the official ideology was in decline and few still thought that the Party could be reformed from within. Christianity in contrast was emerging as the only "alternative ideology" which could unite the people against the State.

The Struggle for Human and National Rights (1970-1980)

The shots fired at striking workers on the Baltic coast in December 1970 shattered the last vestiges of legitimacy left to Gomułka's discredited government. A Polish commentator recently said:

The murder of so many innocent people was a shock the like of which had never been experienced in Poland before. Never before had Poles killed so many Poles. The armed stood against the

unarmed . . . People accepted Edward Gierek, the new leader, without any guarantees of institutional reform because they wanted to get rid of Gomułka, they wanted at all costs to forget the nightmare of the recent bloodbath.⁴

Gierek's inaugural speech as Party leader revealed a significant ideological shift typical of the new period. In contrast to the aggressive ideology of Stalinism and the liberal nationalistic rhetoric of Gomułka, he portrayed himself as a pragmatist, a technocrat who promised a new deal for Poland. He had nothing to say about his own brand of socialism but instead attempted to assure his hearers that within the existing *status quo* he would alter the balance of the economy in favour of private consumption. The new regime like its predecessors wanted a *rapprochement* with the Church in order to restore calm and stability. The government announced that it would "strive for full normalization of relations between Church and State", but the Main Council of the Church responded by deliberately waiting for concrete proof of the government's goodwill. The Church laid down conditions for a *rapprochement* which read like a charter of rights: the bishops declared that "the government must uphold the right to national self-determination based on freedom of conscience and religious life; the right to shape one's own national culture in a Christian spirit; the right to social justice, to information and free expression of one's own views and demands; the right to minimum conditions which would ensure every family a dignified existence; and the right to live freely without fear of insult, harassment or persecution . . ." ⁵ Thus from the outset Church and State were set on a collision course: each spoke a different language.

The new leadership could not risk dialogue on this basis and decided instead to pretend that constructive discussions were under way. On 3 March 1971 a meeting between the Prime Minister and Cardinal Wyszyński was much advertised by government and Pax papers which praised the good intentions of both sides. The Church had been granted permission to build a few churches but no fundamental concessions were contemplated. Instead the government decided to bypass the Polish hierarchy by establishing links with gullible Vatican diplomats. The development of such relations was used in official propaganda to stress the government's benevolence towards the Church; and during the many visits of Cardinal Casaroli and Archbishop Poggi, the Vatican was praised for its peaceful policy of détente and for supporting the Soviet-sponsored European Security Conference. But the Polish hierarchy no doubt soon tired of hearing this continuous barrage of propaganda proclaiming "respect towards the Catholic community" when in fact the circulation of Catholic papers continued

to be restricted, when censorship remained as ruthless as ever and seminarians continued to be conscripted into the army.

A general feeling of frustration within the Church produced a new attitude towards the regime and its many restrictions on the Church. People realized that, whenever possible, they should organize their religious life without asking or informing the authorities. Since 1969 a festival of religious songs, "Sacrosong", has become popular among young people and has attracted large crowds in spite of official silence about it. Since 1972 a movement of religious renewal (to be known later as the Light and Life Movement) has developed and has organized summer camps for children, students and even parents. The organizers soon encountered strong opposition from the local authorities: children attending such camps were often evicted by the police, and farmers who had allowed them to pitch their tents on their land were heavily fined. In the diocese of Przemyśl over a hundred churches were built without state permission; the peasants, while building them, pretended they were constructing farm buildings. There were constant clashes with the police: whole areas were cordoned off and electricity and water supplies were cut off. Priests in Przemyśl diocese were heavily fined but their energetic bishop, Ignacy Tokarczuk, persistently encouraged them to defy the authorities and would himself often come at night to consecrate the newly-built churches.⁶

By 1973 the government, following the Soviet model, was openly trying to consolidate its hold on the country. A school reform was inaugurated which required children to stay at school in the afternoons so that they could not attend catechism classes. An older student union was dissolved, its name was changed into "socialist union of students" and its leadership changed to guarantee greater control by the Party. In 1975 amendments to the Polish Constitution were announced. Three proposals in particular aroused concern: the principle of the "leading role of the Party" was to be firmly asserted; the "unshakeable and firm bond" with the Soviet Union was to be built into the Constitution; and it was stated that "citizens' rights are inseparably linked with the honest fulfilment of duties". The Church protested not only by insisting on the rights of Catholics (the overwhelming majority of the population) but also by criticizing the way the government ruled.

Since the many protests of intellectuals against the Constitutional amendments in 1975-76, the socio-political system in Poland has been frequently described by the Church as deeply immoral and opposed to the Catholic concept of social order. Bishop Tokarczuk delivered a sermon in Przemyśl Cathedral on Ash Wednesday 1976 in which he summed up Poland's situation: Polish citizens, he said, had to live with lies; they were said to have elections but these only involved confirming candidates; they were said to be equal, but some people were more

equal then others; despite official declarations about the normalization of church-state relations, Polish Catholics could not build churches freely, or publish freely, and believers were under pressure to give up their faith. Bishop Tokarczuk went on to say that in Poland there was state capitalism which was worse than capitalism: in Poland workers were not allowed to strike and the employer controlled the unions and the courts, in short, everything.⁷

Although few bishops were as outspoken as Bishop Tokarczuk, they gradually became convinced that only consistent pressure from below could achieve some tangible results. Behind the façade of the government's polite words and the bishops' insistence that they were not undermining the political system by championing the rights of citizens, the ideological conflict was intensifying. In May 1976 Kąkol, the Minister for Religious Affairs, summed up the Party's view in a speech to a group of trusted Party activists:

Even though, as a Minister, I have to smile to gain the Church's confidence, as a communist I will fight it unceasingly. I feel ashamed when comrades from other countries ask me why so many Poles go to church, I feel ashamed when guests congratulate me on the spread of religion in Poland. Normalization of relations with the Church is not capitulation. We will not make any compromises with the Church. It has only the right to carry out its observances within the confines of the sanctuary. We will never allow it to evangelize outside those walls. We will never permit the religious upbringing of children. If we cannot destroy the Church, we shall at least stop it from causing harm.⁸

After the June 1976 strikes at Radom, Płock and Ursus which forced the government to withdraw increases on food prices, the Church defended the workers who had been imprisoned and protested when others were sacked and beaten up in reprisal. Church leaders argued that peace, order and economic efficiency could be restored only by winning the confidence of the people, and that this could only be done by respecting human rights. They encouraged the people to give financial help to the persecuted workers and their families. This time, however, the Church was not alone in attempting to put pressure on the government. A small committee of intellectuals was set up to defend the workers: it aimed to collect money for the families, to provide the accused with legal help and to publicize their plight. Soon it began to circulate a bulletin informing the public of developments. Since then a powerful dissident movement has grown up despite police harassment. It has concentrated on clandestine publishing, on organizing discussion groups and even on organizing public demonstrations.

The emergence of the opposition movement in Poland has introduced a third force in church-state relations. The many unofficial periodicals which began appearing revealed the enormous damage inflicted on economic and cultural life by 30 years of misleading propaganda. Irrespective of their political preferences, all the opposition groups agreed that the process of social disintegration had to be resisted through moral revival; people needed to find the courage to be themselves and to reject a life based on hypocrisy and fear. By fighting for a moral and national revival, the dissidents found that they were defending the same values as those upheld by the Church which they came to regard as the only moral authority in Poland. They supported the Church's struggle for believers' rights, and the unofficial press reported every major event in the Church's life, and published the uncensored text of sermons and pastoral letters. The opposition movement soon affected intellectuals who worked in official Catholic institutions such as the Catholic University of Lublin, Intellectuals' Clubs, and who published various periodicals. Furthermore, since the emergence of the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) and the appearance of *Spotkania*⁹ (a journal produced by young Catholics in Lublin since 1977), it has become clear to the bishops that Catholics now form a large part of the movement and regard the Church as their natural ally.

The convergence between the opposition movement and the Church alarmed the government because, in the worsening economic climate and after the ratification of the Helsinki agreements, the government could only deal effectively with the dissidents if the Church remained uninvolved. But it was too late. In May 1977 a protest fast was organized in the Warsaw church of St Martin on behalf of those workers imprisoned after the 1976 strikes and on behalf of those arrested for helping the prisoners' families. The authorities portrayed those who took part in the fast as terrorists, but the Church did not give way to government pressure and refused to evict the demonstrators. In Kraków, after the security forces had murdered Stanisław Pyjas (May 1977), a young student who had organized an independent student union, Cardinal Wojtyła preached a bitter sermon against the regime during the Corpus Christi Procession in June. He expressed the outrage of the community: he praised the students for turning the day of festivities (*juwenalia*) into a day of peaceful mourning rather than violent demonstrations. "This shows", he said, "that our young people are capable of thinking about fundamental problems, such as social justice and peace, human rights and national rights." He attacked censorship for "imposing a false picture on society" and appealed to people's "sense of internal freedom and responsibility".¹⁰

The government could do little except woo the Church. It gave up its

plans for educational reforms and, after some delay, gave permission for more churches to be built. On 1 December 1977 Gierek met the Pope in the Vatican. Later that month he met Cardinal Wyszyński for the first time and assured him that the government wished to preserve religious freedom. Realizing that pressure on the government had yielded concessions, even if at an official level they were regarded as tactical only, the Church no longer hesitated in demanding greater freedom. Throughout 1978 the bishops repeatedly attacked censorship, calling it a weapon of the totalitarian State. They demanded religious programmes on radio and television; they demanded that the Church be granted legal status; they asked for more paper to print Catholic publications. A government official was heard to complain that the Ministry for Religious Affairs was being bombarded with petitions and protests from diocesan bishops who demanded that all restrictions on believers be lifted. Then, while rumours were circulating that a large-scale offensive was being prepared against the dissidents, an event took place which entirely altered the balance of power between Church and State. On 16 October 1978 Cardinal Karol Wojtyła of Kraków was elected Pope.

It is impossible to describe fully the impact of this election on Poland. However, it is now apparent that the influence of Pope John Paul II has completely altered the political situation in Poland. When the news of Cardinal Wojtyła's election first reached Poland, the psychological barrier dividing believers and non-believers was broken down. The Church, once excluded from public life, was now in everyone's thoughts and people began to talk freely about their faith and their Pope. They wanted to know more about Christianity and about the Pope's travels round the world. They realized how isolated they had been from the rest of the world: they began to listen to foreign broadcasts and to obtain books from abroad. The Church's prestige was enormously enhanced and thousands of people began returning to its fold. One Party member, for example, reacted in this way:

While watching the Pope's installation on television I suddenly found that I, my wife and daughter were on our knees. I, a member of the Communist Party, who had not been inside a church for perhaps 15 years, was now crossing myself. It was a victory for this man, a victory for our Cardinal and the Church. It was also my own victory!¹¹

Believers who had become accustomed to being treated as second-class citizens now lost their fear. By the spring of 1980 over a million people had signed (giving their name and address) petitions demanding religious broadcasts on radio and television. Religious pilgrimages, processions and ceremonies with their strong patriotic overtones were

attended by large crowds. In 1980 in the village of Lipinki 150,000 people were present at the crowning of the Madonna. Ordinary people, whom the opposition movement could never have influenced, felt part of this religious and national revival, aware now that they had a protector in the Vatican. In the Przemyśl diocese, peasants set up three Believers' Self-Defence Committees and appealed to world public opinion to help them to defend their churches (built without official permission) against demolition squads.

Had Gierek known what would happen during the Pope's visit to Poland and that he himself would be removed from office 14 months later, he would have prevented the visit taking place. The Pope's words about God and man and Poland were heard in an atmosphere of wrapt attention: the Pope seemed to be able to communicate with everyone personally. For people who had become accustomed to the official language of "newspeak", every nuance and allusion in the Pope's simple yet cultivated sermons became deeply significant.¹² Those who heard him speak felt that they were celebrating their freedom and dignity as children of God, and young people particularly were moved by this experience of authenticity. The Pope's message was simple: the Church should not abdicate her responsibility to man in his moral, religious, economic and political dimension. Believers should not be afraid of insisting on their rights, rejecting a life based on lies and "doublethink"; they should not be afraid of suffering with Christ. In view of later events in the Gdańsk shipyards last summer, it is worth recalling his words to Polish workers: "Remember one thing: Christ will never approve of man being considered merely as a means of production." His appeal to all could not be forgotten: "On you alone will depend the future."

Poles gained a sense of confidence and unity as a nation after the Pope's visit. The peaceful and resolute resistance of Polish workers, who a year later organized free trade unions, was a result of this religious experience.

¹Leszek Kołakowski in the introduction to *Survey* Vol. 24, No. 4, 1979, p. 5.

²"O Krakowskim Papieżu i jego Polskiej podróży" by Stefan Kisielewski in *Res Publica* (Warsaw edition) No. 3, 1979, pp. 19-28.

³Pierre Lenert, *The Church in Poland, The Sword of the Spirit*, London, 1963, p. 73.

⁴"1956, 1970, 1980" by ABC in *Kultura* No. 11, Paris, 1980, p. 21.

⁵*Listy Pasterskie Episkopatu Polski (1945-1974)*, Paris, 1974, p. 615.

⁶See Adam Boniecki, *Budowa Kościołów w Diecezji Przemyskiej, Spotkania*, London edition, 1980.

⁷*RCL* Vol. 8, No. 1, 1980, Bibliography p. 82.

⁸*Dissent in Poland 1975-1977*, London, 1979, p. 148.

⁹See "*Spotkania: Journal of the Catholic Opposition in Poland*" by Piotr Jegliński and Alexander Tomsky in *RCL* Vol. 7, No. 1, 1979, pp. 23-8.

¹⁰*Gazeta Nidzielna*, 24 July, 1977, London.

¹¹*Spotkania* (Lublin edition) No. 8, July 1979, p. 5.

¹²Stefan Kisielewski in *Res Publica* (Warsaw edition) No. 4, 1979, p. 89.