

The Reform Baptists Today

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Visitors to the Soviet Union since 1975 come back impressed by the growing religious freedom and the unmistakable growth and activity of Russian Baptists. But what is the present situation of the Reform Baptists (or *Initsiativniki*), officially called the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (CCECB)?

The Reform Baptist movement began 19 years ago in August 1961.¹ Many people who subsequently joined the movement were too young to remember the reasons for the split between the CCECB and the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB). So in 1976 the CCECB reprinted some of its first documents, which explain the reasons for the split,² claiming that the charges made against the AUCECB at that time were still relevant today.

During the summer of 1960 the Moscow leadership of the AUCECB had issued revised church Statutes and sent a secret letter (the Letter of Instructions) to all superintendents or senior presbyters, which stated, among other things:

In the past, due to insufficient knowledge of Soviet legislation on cults, certain of our congregations have violated it. There have been occasions when persons younger than 18 years have been baptized, when material aid has been given from the congregation's treasury, when biblical and other meetings of a specialist character have been held, which have allowed declamations of poetry, excursions for believing youth have taken place, financial accounts for mutual aid have been created, and meetings for preachers and for training choir leaders have been held . . . All this must now be eliminated in our congregations and our activities must be conducted in agreement with existing legislation.³

In 1961 the contents of this letter became known and a resistance movement was formed. K. F. Prokofiev and Gennadi K. Kryuchkov were sent to Moscow with a letter condemning the revised Statutes and the Letter of Instructions as "anti-evangelical documents". Meeting with only rebuffs

from the Moscow leadership, they addressed their own letter to the ECB congregation ten days later. "In our day", they pronounced, "Satan is dictating through the workers of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists".⁴ Their letter included three demands: the convocation of an All-Union Congress to approve new Statutes; repentance from the Moscow leadership for its sinful co-operation with the forces of Satan, or else the election of a new leadership; and wide-spread renewal in the church. Although the many letters circulated by the Reform Baptists during the next few years were full of religious language (such as repentance, sanctification, church reform), the fundamental issue in these letters was the demand that full separation between Church and State be restored. This had always been a key feature in the ECB confession of faith.

Official Soviet acknowledgement of the existence of the Reform Baptists did not come until 1967.⁵ Soviet sociologists quoted from the Letter of Instructions but failed to explain why such a self-destructive document was issued. Instead they presented a misleading picture and described a general crisis in Soviet evangelical circles: the evangelicals had capitalized on the psychological disruptions of the war to boost their membership; over 50 per cent of the new members, in a few places as many as 76 per cent, came from the Orthodox Church, which resulted in differing appreciation of Baptist rituals*; the over-all membership had aged and the number of members from the educated strata had declined; secularization above all was threatening to convert the Baptists into a geriatric society. Some of the younger leaders in the Baptist movement saw what was happening, so the sociologists argued, panicked, and tried to launch a major missionary drive to rejuvenate the membership and prevent its extinction. These younger leaders were prepared to violate the law to achieve their goals, whereas the Moscow leadership, who also recognized the need for rejuvenation, insisted on obeying state legislation. This official Soviet account did not mention the primary factor behind the split: the anti-religious campaign of 1959-64 launched by Khrushchev. The Party leader and Ilichev, the Party ideologue, considered the elimination of religion to be a prerequisite for Soviet society to move from socialism to communism.⁶ The officially-approved method to achieve this end was *vospitanie* (education of the population), which led to a dramatic increase in anti-religious propaganda. Although he supported *vospitanie* verbally Khrushchev naturally tended towards another method, *administrirovanie* (administrative measures). Thus monasteries and churches were closed in rapid succession and by 1966, out of the 22,000 churches that had been registered by the Orthodox before the campaign began only 7,500 churches approximately were left. A decade later the Reform Baptists listed 14 different administrative

*G. S. Lyalina, *Baptizm: illyuzii i realnost*, Moscow, "Politizdat", 1977, p. 15.

abuses* which they had experienced, ranging from various forms of harassment to arrest and imprisonment.⁷

The major campaign launched against the churches in 1959 has not yet been halted. The State, however, has had to re-evaluate its policy several times during the past 20 years, and in recent years it has attempted to camouflage the fact that the campaign was a failure.⁸ Following Khrushchev's dismissal in 1964 there came a "year of drift".⁹ Then pressure on the churches was once more renewed, albeit with greater emphasis on *vospitanie*. Since 1970 there have been signs of an attempt to establish a stable situation: the situation in the early 1970s could be characterized as a stalemate which later came to be described as normalization and was confirmed in 1975 by revised legislation. Since 1975 Soviet policy on religion has been two-pronged: persistent pressure on dissident groups such as the Reform Baptists on the one hand, in contrast to, on the other, increasing relaxation of pressure on obedient denominations such as the AUCECB in an attempt to woo the dissidents back into the fold of the approved churches.¹⁰

Many evangelicals welcomed the action of Gennadi Kryuchkov and his associates in resisting the state-imposed Statutes of 1960. According to Soviet sources, as many as 110,000 Baptists had joined the Reformers by 1963, support reaching a peak of 155,000 in 1966.¹¹ In 1963 the State permitted an All-Union Congress, the first to be held for 22 years, at which the delegates approved the revised church Statutes. These Statutes went a long way in adopting the changes proposed by Kryuchkov but were regarded as inadequate by many believers, and support for the Reform Baptists continued to grow. At the next congress in 1966 still further revisions of the Statutes succeeded in transforming the AUCECB once more into a "Free Church" with a congregational policy which affirmed the Bible as the primary basis for its life and practice. Since 1966 faith in the Moscow union has gradually been restored and at each subsequent AUCECB congress there have been reports of additional groups of *Initsiativniki* rejoining the AUCECB.

The revisions of the Statutes were not the only reason for their return. The election of new leaders or the replacement of an offending local pastor

*More than 500 Reform Baptists had been put in prison; numerous congregations had experienced physical force from the authorities; hundreds of children had been interrogated; hundreds of children had been refused entrance into educational institutions; all the leaders and most of the members had experienced harassment and terrorization, many had lost their jobs and were then prosecuted under newly-introduced parasite laws; large quantities of literature had been confiscated, houses had been confiscated, authorities had prevented church services by physically transporting believers elsewhere; the old and sick were kept in prison contrary to Soviet legislation; frequent arrests—some persons arrested as many as three times in nine years; preventing marriage and funeral services; fines for attending an unregistered worship service which totalled 100,000 roubles by 1970; and the leaders of their union were not permitted to work full-time as clergy and had therefore gone into hiding.

have also played their part. For many the primary reason for returning has been fatigue: after 15 years of being harassed, of meeting in the woods and paying fines, the need for peace and quiet finally overruled other considerations. After all, they would say, the word of God is preached in the registered church, people are converted, and God is blessing there too. Still others came to the conclusion that the intransigent position of Kryuchkov and his associates revealed a spiritual arrogance that they could no longer support. Some of the Reformers have persisted in demanding total repentance from the AUCECB leaders who had acknowledged, at least to some degree, that they had committed grave mistakes. When unity talks were held in 1966, the Reformers refused to give Moscow leaders the brotherly kiss, stating that they did not consider them brothers but rather persons on the road to perdition.

The reasons why the Reformers persisted in rejecting the AUCECB reforms as inadequate are understandable. They had been denied the right to participate at the congresses for which they had appealed so courageously. They had demanded that all ties with the State should be severed, and although the new Statutes recovered their evangelical and biblical tone, the AUCECB leaders (including the new leadership) still persisted in emphasizing the need for obedience to state legislation. In the unity discussions of 1969, it became apparent that the two sides differed philosophically in their understanding of the proper role of the State in church life. General Secretary Karev tried to explain his actions since 1960 by comparing them with the Apostle Paul, who had encountered a series of closed doors on his second missionary journey. During the history of the atheist State, he claimed, the door was sometimes wide open for Christian work, but in 1929, for example, the door was closed. "We all went to prison. Then Stalin died, and the door began to open, but only till 1959, when the 21st Party Congress decided to make a swift end of organized religion, that door became very small . . . and so, in view of this situation, we articulated the 'closed doors' by means of the Letter of Instructions and the Statute in 1960" (see *AS* 770, p. 221). Kryuchkov did not find the parallel applicable, stating that Christ did not close doors, therefore one should not let circumstances dictate.

As the years passed, the re-unification that both sides continued to affirm verbally became increasingly unlikely. At crucial moments such as the congresses in 1966 and 1969, key Reformers were in prison or on trial, and their associates could not in good conscience agree to a reconciliation. Each additional arrest, each slanderous article in the press, especially those which made the AUCECB sound like a partner of the State, built up a psychological barrier to unity. Above all, the Reformers remained unshakeable in their conviction that the existing legislation on religion still demanded that Caesar be given more than his due.

The Reform leaders soon recognized that despite continuing pressure,

their cause was winning. When believers were sent to prison or into exile, new churches would spring up in other areas and when the authorities removed all the leaders of a church, others in the congregation would assume their role.¹² Out of this emergency situation an expanding corps of self-taught preachers began to emerge. Thus religion was not disappearing as the authorities had hoped, and because of the abusive treatment which the authorities administered to innocent believers, the general population came to sympathize with these believers.

With the State's policy of normalization, especially after 1975, the Soviet authorities adopted a new tactic. Whereas earlier two out of every three applications for church registration had been refused, the authorities now began to offer registration to churches, including Reform Baptist congregations. Some churches were even offered registration without having to agree to the restrictive terms of Soviet legislation and the CCECB issued instructions for application procedures that would avoid any compromise.¹³ Soon, however, the CCECB became concerned at the authorities' insistence on registering churches as autonomous societies, thus rejecting their right to claim affiliation with the CCECB. The CCECB began to suspect that after an appropriate number of their churches had been registered, the State would allow a new Council to be formed, thereby leaving the present CCECB without a supporting constituency.¹⁴


Another, more positive aspect of the Reformers' situation is the decline in the number of their members held in prison on religious grounds. This number has been declining steadily since 1968, and especially since 1975.¹⁵ In 1979 the number stood at a record low of 32 prisoners, and among those released in 1979 was Georgi Vins, the CCECB general secretary. In addition, whether due to official policy or the desires of local officials for peace and quiet, the authorities have been turning a blind eye to many church activities that are technically illegal.

The CCECB: its activity and organization


In December 1969 the authorities finally allowed the CCECB to hold a conference in Tula. A year later the CCECB submitted a statement to the government which pointed out that almost all CCECB congregations had applied for registration, had refrained from speaking publicly about continuing persecution and had taken practical steps to regulate relations with the authorities, for example, by notifying them about where meetings would take place. "Is there a lawyer," they asked, "who can, after all this, call the activities of the Council of Churches and the ECB congregations illegal?"¹⁶ In a letter to Premier Kosygin in which CCECB spokesmen requested that their elected leaders should receive the legal right to be freed from work and industry in order to work full-time for the church, they emphasized that:



Mgr Michael Fu Tieshan administers communion to Chinese Catholics in Peking. Mgr Fu Tieshan was elected as the new Bishop of Peking by the Catholic Patriotic Association and was consecrated in December 1979 against the wishes of the Vatican. The restoration of organized religious life under China's new leadership is examined in "The Future of Religion in China" pp. 4-10. (© Associated Press.)



A Buddhist priest in the Temple of Universal Rescue (Peking). In 1979 a Society for the Study of Tibetan Buddhism was established in Peking, and, in addition, the Dege Buddhist scripture publishing house in Sichuan began reprinting Buddhist scriptures. (Courtesy Keston College.)



Communion is celebrated in the Protestant Three-Self Movement church in Rice Market Street, Peking.



Three pastors of the Protestant Three-Self Movement church in Peking. Only in 1979 was the Protestant Three-Self Movement able to begin active work again. (All photographs courtesy Keston College.)

The activity of the CCECB is not connected with a violation of social order, or with infringing the rights of citizens, and does not concern itself with socio-political or similar questions, but only with internal church questions.¹⁷

The Soviet authorities, however, rejected these requests and arguments. Georgi Vins and Gennadi Kryuchkov—the CCECB general secretary and chairman respectively—were ordered to take gainful employment, but after 10 months both felt themselves compelled to go underground in order to direct the work of the church. Soon virtually all the members of the CCECB were in prison while the remaining few were hunted like criminals. Vins was finally captured in 1974 and served five years of hard labour in spite of the publicity which his case received in the West. More than 535 appeals were drawn up by believers between August 1975 and October 1976.¹⁸ These mentioned repeatedly over 30 different types of complaint.¹⁹ For example, believers complained frequently about local persecution of churches, about fines and the authorities' refusal to register congregations. Many complained that in spite of the Helsinki Agreement and CRA (Council for Religious Affairs) chairman Kuroyedov's claims in *Izvestiya* about religious freedom, they were experiencing the opposite. An equally high number of complaints focused on the pressures experienced by parents and their children: children were being ridiculed at school so that some parents stopped them attending. Many appeals reported that parents were threatened with the loss of parental rights.

Given this long history of state oppression, the continued existence of the CCECB is remarkable. Moreover, it has organized a dynamic programme of missionary activity and youth work. Kryuchkov and Vins, who have been the dominant figures among the Reform Baptists, were 34 and 32 years old respectively when the movement began. Both were relatively well-educated (Kryuchkov was an electrician and Vins an engineer) and both were no strangers to prison (Vins's father had first been imprisoned when Georgi was only two and eventually perished in a labour camp, while Kryuchkov's father served a prison sentence when Gennadi was only three). These two men were joined by nine or ten others to form a council plus a small corps of evangelists, who travelled throughout the Soviet Union visiting congregations, trying to win more supporters, supervising local leadership and maintaining the vital communication links between the congregations. These men demonstrated impressive organizational skills, but a more important quality in the eyes of their supporters were their spiritual qualities.²⁰

The CCECB was organized in 1965. Within a few years regional unions formed in the Caucasus, the Baltic region, the Leningrad area, the Ukraine, and also in Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan. The Siberian union, for example, had elected a senior presbyter for each of its nine *oblasts* and the

union itself met twice yearly with 45 to 60 participants. Here they shared reports on the local need for literature, on members' financial needs (especially those with relatives in prison), the number of believers who had been sentenced, and discussed general church life. These were always highly secret meetings and CCECB members took part, providing reports on their work. Despite the potential for an abuse of power in such conditions of secrecy, informal sources indicate that CCECB activity at all levels was highly-organized and included regular financial reports. At a regional level, individuals were appointed to supervise youth work, to organize transport, and assume responsibility for communication, choral work, evangelism and finance.

A related organization, the Council of Prisoners' Relatives (CPR) formed in 1964, probably deserves more credit than the CCECB for bringing Soviet policy against the churches into disrepute. A carefully-organized communication system has enabled them to share detailed information about prisoners and all the other administrative measures against believers. Lidiya Vins (Georgi Vins's mother) was the most famous chairman of this council, but after her imprisonment in 1970 her role as leader declined. She was already 67 and in bad health when she was released. A younger woman, Galina Rytikova, whose husband Pyotr was an evangelist and candidate member of the CCECB, took over the leadership and instituted a regular system of reporting through the CPR *Bulletin*, which has appeared regularly since 1970. In early 1979 she went into hiding with her three smallest children after being threatened with the loss of parental rights. She finally received reassurances permitting her to return home, but in the autumn of 1979 both her husband and son were arrested.

The CCECB has a department for evangelism and another for publishing. Since 1971 its publishing activity has increased, under the guidance of Georgi Vins and later Kryuchkov. The underground publishing house *Khristiyanin* has managed to survive to the present day in spite of extensive measures to discover its whereabouts. One printing press was discovered in 1974 and another in 1977, but other presses quickly replaced the ones confiscated. In 1978 *Khristiyanin* printed its first Bibles and in 1979 10,000 copies of a songbook were printed.²¹

One printing press was run by a small electric motor which used only a small amount of electric current. It was constructed out of washing machine rollers, bicycle pedals and chains and other assorted materials, and could be packed into a few small suitcases at very short notice to be carried elsewhere. To enable this press to function, numerous supporters throughout the country were busy stripping bark from trees in Northern Siberia, burning tyres and finding scraps of suitable metal in order to provide the proper chemical mixture for making ink and other necessities. Hundreds of other people were involved in collecting and transporting the paper.²²

Dissension within the CCECB

The secrecy necessary when operating under such conditions has led to serious problems. On 22 May 1976 an expanded meeting of the CCECB, including 100 representatives from churches throughout the Soviet Union, met in Khartseisk (Rostov *oblast*) to hear a tape-recorded message from Kryuchkov. A major section of his speech consisted of a personal attack on fellow council members S. G. Dubovoi and P. A. Yakimenkov, and on the Ukrainian evangelist Iosif Bondarenko. He accused Dubovoi of having compromised himself with the KGB and questioned Bondarenko's integrity. Soon rumours were circulating that Bondarenko had absconded with 50,000 roubles. How else was one to understand the fact that his name had been removed from the most-wanted criminal list and that he had been able to return to his home in Riga? This internal conflict soon became public, and a year later AUCECB leaders claimed that the Reform Baptist movement was splitting up into three parties.²³ Eventually it became clear that Bondarenko had been falsely accused. Bondarenko began his third prison term in August 1978 because of his evangelistic activities.²⁴

Questions of policy lie behind the conflict. Since the CCECB remained under constant state pressure, some of the leaders were re-assessing the CCECB structure. Kryuchkov and Vins emphasized the need for a highly-centralized structure because they felt that there was strength in unity, while a local autonomous congregation was more liable to capitulate under extensive pressure. Dubovoi, on the other hand, felt that a federated structure, which would give greater authority to the regional unions, was more suited to the conditions under which they were operating. Both he and Bondarenko were also coming to recognize that the charge and counter-charge relationship between the CCECB and the AUCECB was counter-productive. They felt that in many local situations practical unity—at least fellowship—should be sought with those registered churches which clearly had integrity. They could not support the advice given in *Bratsky Listok (Fraternal Leaflet)*, Nos. 1-3, 1975, that member churches should keep their distance from AUCECB churches, and not even use the same church building at different times lest they fall under the sway of the AUCECB affiliate.

Kryuchkov as leader is in an unenviable position. After three years of imprisonment and nine years spent in hiding so that he might remain true to the uncompromising stance first articulated in 1961, he finds it difficult to moderate his position. He has to rely on his contacts for information and must always be alert for possible betrayal. Previous experience has demonstrated that the CCECB's own ranks contain Judases (as do the ranks of the AUCECB). He is therefore not in a position to make an objective evaluation based on adequate information about the policies and practices of the rival union.

The problem of distrust has been aggravated through gradual attrition

so that the declining remnant has been forced to become more exclusivist, both doctrinally and in its attitude to fellow believers. Georgi Vins* categorically rejected a recent AUCECB charge that the Reform Baptists were now requiring individual members to make a regular detailed confession of their sins before their presbyter, something akin to Catholic confession. Whether this charge is accurate or represents an attempt to associate the CCECB with a new sect remains to be seen. It has, however, been clear from the outset that while the Reformers tended to emphasize sanctification as a dramatic confession of sin and transformation of life-style, the AUCECB placed much greater emphasis on sanctification as a process of growth in Christian living, charging the other side with perfectionism.

State policy: recent developments

In April 1979 Georgi Vins was released from prison and exchanged with four other Soviet dissidents for two Soviet spies. But should this be interpreted as a friendly gesture from the State towards the CCECB? The Reform Baptists were happy that Vins's lot had been eased, but felt that this gesture could hardly augur well for their movement. During the past decade, a disproportionately large number of Reform Baptist leaders of Soviet German extraction have emigrated to West Germany, leaving noticeable gaps in the ranks,²⁵ and now that Vins, who was after all the main leader of the movement, has also left and been rendered virtually harmless, the remnant in the Soviet Union will need to find new leaders in a situation where men with the educational and intellectual qualities of Vins are rare in ECB ranks. The release of Vins therefore signifies that the State does not anticipate a change in policy that could lead to the legalization of the CCECB.²⁶

Soon after the release of Vins, this writer met Ye. A. Tarasov of the CRA who has administrative responsibility for the Protestants and other non-Orthodox Christians. When we suggested that the other Baptist prisoners (as well as other religious prisoners) might be released as a gesture of mercy, he repeated the official view that they had violated the law and therefore must be punished. When we replied that in each case the law which they had violated invariably concerned religion, he had little to say except to point out that Gennadi Kryuchkov had not paid his tax for the past ten years.²⁷

Perhaps a more unsettling attitude communicated by the CRA was Tarasov's answer to another question. Scholars in the West are accustomed to distinguishing different periods of Soviet policy towards religion. For example, the Khrushchev period from 1959 to 1964 is described as a period of major pressure on the churches, whereas after the legislative changes of

*Vins replying to my question in Paderborn, West Germany, 29 September 1979. WS.

1975, it seems possible to detect a change of policy. When asked whether the term "normalization" accurately described present Soviet policy towards the churches, Tarasov with considerable vehemence insisted that the question was incorrectly conceived. As early as January 1918, he argued, Lenin had spelled out Soviet policy towards the churches through the declaration on Church and State and that policy had never changed. True, it had been affected by changing circumstances, but the only thing that had really changed was the policy of the churches. When the churches, for example the Orthodox Patriarch Tikhon, had opposed the Soviet State (had been disloyal to Soviet power), he had been punished for political, not religious reasons. But when religious denominations finally changed their ways and became loyal to the Soviet power, a *modus vivendi* became possible. He insisted that the opposition of communist ideology to religion remained unchanged. Such an interpretation of the history of Soviet policy towards the churches will hardly bear up under careful analysis, but it communicates an attitude which suggests that the prospect, especially for religious dissidents such as the Reform Baptists, remains bleak.

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All churches in the Soviet Union are hoping that the greater openness and increased international contact will help prevent another Khrushchev-type attack on the churches. AUCECB churchmen are well aware that should the CCECB disappear, the major reason for the many concessions recently granted them by the State will also disappear. It will then remain to be seen how much their links with fellow believers abroad will help them.

The most recent Soviet study (by G. S. Lyalina) of the Baptist conflict concluded that this internal crisis had been successfully overcome, especially by the AUCECB Baptists.²⁸ The church had been rejuvenated, and Lyalina also had to admit that the Reform Baptists had attracted many young people. Nevertheless this study concluded that a new crisis of even greater proportions was confronting the evangelicals—a crisis which they were unlikely to overcome. The young people in their ranks with a better education and a better standard of living would fall prey to secularization, and the Baptist churches were ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of the modern secular world. Some Soviet Christians have already acknowledged to this writer that church attendance is not as regular for the mid-week services as it once was, that the sense of dependence on God is not as strong when you sit in a comfortable pew as when you are meeting in the woods. As for the Soviet authorities, with their paranoia about religion as a threat to society, they may continue to persecute that corps of resolute Christians who persist in withholding from Caesar what does not belong to him, thereby unnerving those of us who do not like to go through doors that appear to be closed.

¹The most detailed treatment of this movement up to 1966 is contained in Michael Bourdeaux: *Religious Ferment in Russia*, London, 1968; Bourdeaux's *Faith on Trial in Russia*, London, 1971, updates the story to 1970.

²*Bratsky Listok*, Nos. 4-5, 1976.

³L. N. Mitrokhin, *Baptizm*, Moscow, "Politizdat", 2nd. ed. 1974, p. 80; cf. A. I. Klibanov and L. N. Mitrokhin, "Raskol v sovremennom baptizme", *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, No. 3, 1967, p. 86.

⁴*Arkhiv Samizdata (AS)* 770, pp. 1-11, Radio Liberty, Munich.

⁵See A. I. Klibanov and L. N. Mitrokhin, "Raskol v sovremennom baptizme", *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, No. 3, 1967, pp. 84-110.

⁶I am following the persuasive interpretation of Otto Luchterhandt, *Der Sowjetstaat und die Russisch Orthodoxe Kirche*, Köln, 1976, pp. 119-22.

⁷*AS* 441.

⁸For details see my forthcoming book, *Soviet Evangelicals Since the War*, chapter 5.

⁹Andrew Blane's appropriate phrase, "A Year of Drift", *RCL*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1974, pp. 9-15.

¹⁰Cf. a similar interpretation by Michael Rowe, "Soviet Policy Towards Evangelicals", *RCL*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1979, pp. 4-12.

¹¹Calculation based on statistics given by G. S. Lyalina, *Baptizm: illyuzii i realnost*, Moscow, "Politizdat", 1977, p. 42.

¹²Based on interviews of recent Soviet German immigrants to West Germany which the author has conducted systematically since 1974.

¹³*Bratsky Listok*, No. 4, 1975; translation in *RCDA*, Nos. 4-9, 1975, pp. 117-20.

¹⁴*Bratsky Listok*, Nos. 1-3, 1975; translation in *RCDA*, Nos. 4-9, 1975, pp. 114-17.

¹⁵The total number of prisoners were: 240, August 1968; 176, November 1969; 187, January 1971; 186, 1972; 181, March 1973; 187, June 1973; 188, January 1974; 110, June 1975; 69, December 1976; 53, May 1977; 40, September 1978; 34, March 1979; 34, December 1979.

¹⁶*AS* 622, p. 19.

¹⁷*AS* 629, p. 9.

¹⁸*CPR Bulletin*, Nos. 27-38.

¹⁹See the useful summary in *Religion und Atheismus in der UdSSR*, Nos. 1-2, 1977, Appendix III, pp. 1-45.

²⁰Soviet German interview data.

²¹*Glaube in der 2. Welt, Informationdienst*, No. 7, 30 April 1979, p. 12.

²²*CPR Bulletin*, No. 61 (Spring 1979), p. 18 reports the arrest of someone whose house in Martuk (Kazakhstan) contained two tons of blank paper.

²³i.e. a Bondarenko-Dubovoi group; Kryuchkov and the CCECB; and the CPR with the Rostov church.

²⁴His brother Vasili informed me recently that Iosif remains steadfast, though the hard¹ labour has not helped his heart condition.

²⁵Approximately 6,000 have emigrated, and have established a church union of 15 congregations which supports its own mission programme.

²⁶For a similar viewpoint see the commentary in *Dein Reich Komme*, May-June 1979, p. 6.

²⁷Kryuchkov has been in hiding since 1970; he has no income but lives from the charity of fellow members.

²⁸G. S. Lyalina, *Baptizm: illyuzii i realnost*, Moscow, "Politizdat", 1977, p. 170.