CHAPTER IV

SEMANTICS AND NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION

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I. Semantics and Theories of Meaning

1. INTRODUCTION

Semantics is the study of meanings; but not simply the meanings of words. What is at issue is the varied meanings and kinds of meaning which belong both to words and to sentences as they occur within a context that is both linguistic and extra-linguistic. John Lyons comments in his *Structural Semantics*, "Any meaningful linguistic unit, up to and including the complete utterance, has meaning in context. The context of the utterance is the situation in which it occurs ... The concept of 'situation' is fundamental for semantic statement ... Situation must be given equal weight with linguistic form in semantic theory". It will be seen that this is not very far from the traditional concerns of New Testament exegesis, in which the aim is to discover and interpret the meaning of an utterance in relation to its historical and literary context. Semantics, however, also raises explicit questions about such issues as synonymy, multiple meaning, types of semantic opposition, kinds and degrees of vagueness and ambiguity, change of meaning, cognitive and emotive factors in meaning, and so on.

The relevance of semantics to biblical interpretation was demonstrated for the first time, but demonstrated decisively, with the publication in 1961 of James Barr's epoch-making book *The Semantics of Biblical Language*. Since that time there have been other attempts to apply principles of semantics, or at least of linguistics, to biblical interpretation, including most recently the very different approaches of Erhardt Güttgemanns, René Kieffer, John Sawyer and K. L. Burres. Although the study of semantics can be approached from the side of philosophy as well as linguistics, James Barr and in practice all these writers draw their insights exclusively from linguistics. Indeed the claim which will be put forward here is that in spite of his obvious knowledge of more recent writers, the fundamental inspiration behind Barr's contribution is the figure of Ferdinand de Saussure whose famous *Cours de linguistique générale* was published posthumously in 1915. Apart from some brief attempts by the present writer, perhaps the only studies, to date, to draw on more philosophical work in the service of
biblical interpretation are those of D. D. Evans and, less directly, O. R. Jones.8

If semantics is so important to New Testament interpretation, why have we had to wait until after 1961 for its insights and potentialities to become apparent? Either, it seems, the exegete can manage very well with only his traditional questions about vocabulary and grammar; or else, it seems, some convincing explanation is needed of why biblical scholars have been slow to avail themselves of its insights.

2. THE INHIBITING EFFECTS OF TRADITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LANGUAGE

Part of the answer to this question is suggested by Stephen Ullmann’s description of semantics as “the youngest branch of modern linguistics”. The earliest hints of a fully modern semantics came towards the end of the nineteenth century with the work of Arsène Darmesteter and more especially Michel Bréal.5 Semantic study at this period, however, was seriously hampered by a number of mistaken assumptions, some of which still find their way into the outlook of some interpreters of the New Testament even today.

These false assumptions include the following:

(1) that the word, rather than the sentence or speech-act, constitutes the basic unit of meaning to be investigated;6 (2) that questions about etymology somehow relate to the real or “basic” meaning of a word; (3) that language has a relation to the world which is other than conventional, and that its “rules” may therefore be prescriptive rather than merely descriptive; (4) that logical and grammatical structure are basically similar or even isomorphic; (5) that meaning always turns on the relation between a word and the object to which it refers; (6) that the basic kind of language-use to be investigated (other than words themselves) is the declarative proposition or statement; and (7) that language is an externalization, sometimes a merely imitative and approximate externalization, of inner concepts or ideas. Commenting only on three of these assumptions, Max Black writes, “Until comparatively recently the prevailing conception of the nature of language was straightforward and simple. It stressed communication of thought to the neglect of feeling and attitude, emphasized words rather than speech-acts in context, and assumed a sharp contrast between thought and its symbolic expression.”7 While such assumptions held sway, semantic enquiries could not advance beyond an elementary point.

An especially disastrous assumption for semantics was logico-grammatical parallelism.8 When interest grew in eighteenth and nineteenth-century linguistics in the relation between language-structure and national character, the effects of this error were particularly unfortunate. Supposed differences of conceptual thought were based on arbitrary differences of grammar.

The influence of such a view persists in biblical studies in a work such as
T. Boman's *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*, and we shall trace some of the ways in which James Barr rightly criticizes it. On the other hand, once we recognize that logical function, or meaning, is not wholly determined by grammar, huge questions in New Testament interpretation are opened up. Is Bultmann correct in claiming, for example, that what looks like an objective declarative statement, "God will judge men at the last day", really means an imperative: "act responsibly in the present . . ."? Certainly in everyday speech I may use an indicative to function as an imperative. If I exclaim, "This is poison", I may be making a declarative descriptive statement. But I may also be uttering an urgent imperative, "Quick! Fetch a doctor"; or giving a warning, "Look out! Don’t drink this"; or even uttering a reproach, "You forgot to put sugar into my coffee." The meaning of the words depends on their setting or non-linguistic situation, even more than upon grammar. Yet on the basis of the traditional view, "this is poison" is simply a statement, for "is" is a third person singular present indicative form in grammar.

The traditional view received two death-blows, one from linguistics and one from philosophy. From the direction of linguistics, Saussure pointed out the arbitrary character of grammatical forms. More sharply and decisively still, in his philosophical discussion of logic Russell showed in his Theory of Descriptions that "the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be the real one." Denoting phrases such as "the present king of France" or "the author of Waverley" cannot be reduced to simple referring expressions. Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves. The linguistic form "a round square does not exist" does not logically make an assertion about some non-existent entity called a round square; it is a negation of the statement, "an x exists which is such that ‘round’ and ‘square’ can be predicated of it simultaneously." The linguistic form of the expression conceals its logical function. But once this principle is accepted, the New Testament interpreter should be extremely cautious about making too much of such maxims as "this word is in the indicative, therefore it is a statement"; or "this verb is an imperative, therefore it expresses a command." Whether it is a command depends on the whole context and situation in which it is uttered. Thus, we shall be cautious about reading too much into the fact that, for example, an imperative or an indicative features in a particular verse. In Phil. 3:1 and 4:4, for instance, "rejoice in the Lord" (χαίρετε ἐν Χριστῷ) is admittedly a second person plural present imperative. On this basis Karl Barth writes that rejoicing "must" take place, because it is "expressed as an imperative", and W. Hendriksen insists that we are bidden "to rejoice in obedience to a command". But, firstly, it is possible that χαίρετε is a form of greeting, which is no more a command than "how do you do?" is a question. On the basis of grammar, one can imagine an exegete interpreting "how do you do?" as a call to self-examination! When Judas greets Jesus with a betraying kiss in Mt. 26:49, χαίρε means simply "hello", and certainly not "rejoice". In Phil. 3:1 and 4:4 F. W. Beare translates the word "Farewell". Secondly, even if we insist, after examining the historical and
literary setting (which Barth and Hendriksen fail to do), that χαίρετε still means “rejoice”, the fact that it occurs in the imperative is no guarantee that it must be understood as a “command”. If I cry “Help!” in the imperative, or “Lord, save me”, this is a plea; if someone tells me, “enjoy yourself”, but in the end I spend a miserable afternoon, this need not be “disobedience to a command”.

The task of Bible translation also reveals the utter impossibility of remaining wedded to the idea of logico-grammatical parallelism. In I John 2:26, for example, the writer states “I have written this to you (ταῦτα ἔγραψα νῦν) concerning those who would mislead you.” But ἔγραψα, although it is an “indicative” (I have written) does not serve primarily to describe the action of writing here; it in fact signals the end of a topic. So the New English Bible sensibly renders it, “So much for those who would mislead you.”

In Bible translation, the rejection of logico-grammatical parallelism stems not only from structural linguistics (discussed in II.2), and from a recognition of the conventionality of grammatical form (discussed in II.3), but also from the influence of Noam Chomsky’s type of “transformational” generative grammar (discussed in III). Eugene A. Nida and William L. Wonderly accept the principle of transformation in terms of “kernel” sentences as an axiom of Bible translation.15 Thus the complex R. S. V. sentence in Eph. 1:7 “... we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses” is analyzed into four “kernel” sentences: (1) (God) redeems us; (2) (Christ) died (or shed his blood); (3) (God) forgives (us); and (4) we sinned. The “quasi-kernel” structure is now: “we sinned. But Christ died; therefore God redeems us and he forgives us.” Today’s English Version then renders this: “by the death of Christ we are set free, and our sins are forgiven”; whilst the New English Bible has: “in Christ our release is secured and our sins are forgiven through the shedding of his blood.” Neither grammatical structure follows the Greek at all closely. Whether such a handling of the text is justified cannot be determined without carefully examining the issues which are discussed in the remainder of this essay.

3. WORDS AND MEANINGS

Genuine advances in semantics were decisively inhibited all the while the word was viewed as the basic unit of meaning. But in some types of exegesis the assumption still lurks in the background that words are the basic carriers of meaning, whilst sentences convey the exact sum of the semantic values of their verbal components. A virtue is made out of the method of moving over a text “word by word”. Side by side with this is often the assumption that exhaustive interpretation must proceed by way of analysis, atomizing language into ever-smaller and smaller units. Such an approach may seem to be connected with a theory of “verbal” inspiration, but is in reality based, rather, on ignorance about the nature of language. As Saussure has shown decisively in one way, and Wittgenstein decisively in another, the meaning
of a word depends not on what it is in itself, but on its relation to other words and to other sentences which form its context. Dictionary-entries about words are rule-of-thumb generalizations based on assumptions about characteristic contexts. Admittedly these comments will be qualified in due course; for words do indeed possess a stable core of meaning without which lexicography would be impossible, and there is also a legitimate place for word-study. Nevertheless, the most urgent priority is to point out the fallacy of an atomizing exegesis which pays insufficient attention to context.

This should heighten our appreciation of the value of all technical work in biblical studies which seeks to shed light on the historical and literary contexts of utterances. In a valuable article John F. A. Sawyer compares the emphasis placed on “context of situation” in linguistics with the account taken of situation, setting, or Sitz im Leben in form criticism. Indeed he goes as far as to claim, “The relation between Gattung and Sitz im Leben in Old Testament literary theory is potentially more important for semantic theory (my italics) than a number of situational theories put forward by the professional linguistian from Bloomfield to Firth.” Thus the necessity and value of standard techniques in New Testament studies is not simply a question which can be decided on theological grounds alone. Because biblical language as language can only be understood with reference to its context and extra-linguistic situation, attention to the kind of question raised in critical study of the text is seen to be necessary on purely linguistic grounds. To try to cut loose “propositions” in the New Testament from the specific situation in which they were uttered and to try thereby to treat them “timelessly” is not only bad theology; it is also bad linguistics. For it leads to a distortion of what the text means. This point will emerge with fuller force when we look at the structural approach of Ferdinand de Saussure (below, II.2).

There are also other inbuilt limitations in the traditional approach to language. For example, a persistent pre-occupation with descriptive assertions or “propositions” tends to flatten out the distinctive contributions of biblical poetry, metaphor, parable, and apocalyptic, reducing it all to the level of discursive “units of information”. A consideration of the issues discussed in the remainder of this essay, however, will show that a “mechanical” emphasis on verbal and propositional forms is not only pre-critical in terms of Biblical studies, it is also obsolete in terms of semantics, violating virtually every modern insight into the nature of meanings.

II. Some Fundamental Principles in Saussure and Modern Linguistics and their place in the work of James Barr

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) is rightly regarded as the founder of modern linguistics. He viewed language as a social and structured system thereby preparing the way for a structural semantics. We may trace the outlines of his thought under four headings: (1) the contrast between synchronic and diachronic methods of language-study; (2) the structural ap-
proach to language; (3) the connexion between structuralism and conventionality, with its implications about the relation between language and thought; and (4) the basic contrast between langue, the language system, and parole, actual speech. All four principles are fundamental for semantics, and three, at least, feature prominently in the work of James Barr.

1. SYNCHRONIC AND DIACHRONIC APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE

By “diachronic” linguistics Saussure means the study of language from the point of view of its historical evolution over a period of time. By “synchronic” linguistics he means “the relations of co-existing things . . . from which the intervention of time is excluded . . . the science of language-states (états de langue) . . . Synchrony and diachrony designate respectively a language-state and an evolutionary phase.”

Saussure’s point is not, as is occasionally thought, that one of these methods is right and the other wrong, but that the two methods are fundamentally different, and perform different tasks. Certainly of the two, synchronic linguistics has priority both in importance and in sequence of application. But as long as the two methods are kept distinct, each has its own role to play.

During the nineteenth century comparative philology had become the centre of interest in linguistics, and much energy went to the formulation of laws of development, such as Grimm’s law and Verner’s law, which could account for the phenomena of language-change in terms of general scientific principles.

It is against this background that Ferdinand de Saussure voiced his protest, “The linguist who wishes to understand a state (état de langue) must discard all knowledge of everything that produced it and ignore diachrony. He can enter the mind of the speakers only by completely suppressing the past.”

Saussure illustrates the principle from chess. To understand the state of a game it is unnecessary and irrelevant to know how the players arrived at it. A chess problem is simply set out by describing the state of the board.

During the years between Saussure and Barr, the priority of synchronic description became a fundamental and universally accepted principle in semantics; and the distinction between synchronic and diachronic perspectives has become an axiom in linguistics. In particular this principle strikes at etymologizing in semantics. Many writers, including a number of biblical scholars, believe that the etymological meaning of a word is somehow its “basic” or “proper” meaning. As James Barr comments, “We hear from time to time that ‘history’ ‘properly’ means ‘investigation’ (Greek ἱστογία) or that ‘person’ ‘basically’ means ‘mask’ (Latin persona).”

But can an etymological meaning based on diachronic investigation, or even inference, concerning the long distant past be the “real” meaning of a word from the point of view of synchronic enquiry? The English word “nice” is said to be derived from the Latin nescius, ignorant. Is “ignorant” the “basic” meaning of “nice”? When Englishmen say “Good-bye” do they
“properly” mean “God be with you”? “Hussy” is etymologically a doublet of “housewife”, but can it be said on this basis that if I were to call someone a hussy I “properly” meant only “housewife”? 22 As James Barr rightly asserts, “The main point is that the etymology of a word is not a statement about its meaning but about its history.” 23 Hundreds of words diverge from or even (like “nice”) oppose their etymology.

We may admit that in lexicography, etymological considerations may occasionally be of value, as, for example, in cases of homonymy, when two distinct words of different meanings have the same lexical form. But biblical scholars have not been content to restrict their study of etymology to such cases. As a general principle Edmond Jacob declares, “The first task of the Hebraist in the presence of a word is to recover the original meaning from which others were derived.” 24 The very arrangement of the Hebrew lexicon of Brown, Driver, and Briggs may seem to encourage such a procedure. Some writers, says J. Barr, have even interpreted the word “holy” in terms of an English etymology. Contrary to actual usage in Hebrew and Greek, they take its “basic” meaning to be that of “healthy” or “sound”. But in practice, Barr insists, this is only “a kind of opportunist homiletic trick” whereby “holy” may be thought to lose some of its less attractive and more challenging features. 25 Norman Snaith certainly goes to the Hebrew, rather than to the English, for the meaning of “Blessed is the man . . .” in Psalm 1:1. But he claims that “happiness of” or “blessed” is related by etymology to the idea of “footstep”, or “going straight ahead”. Hence, supposedly, “this shows how apt is the use of the first word . . . The happy man is the man who goes straight ahead.” Barr observes, “There is not the slightest evidence that these associations were in the mind of the poet, and indeed some of them were almost certainly unknown and unknowable to him.” 26

When we come specifically to the New Testament, it will be seen that it can be seriously misleading to base the meanings of words on their use in Plato or in Homer, let alone on their etymologies. For example, it is sometimes suggested, as Barr points out, that λειτουργία “means” a work (ἐργα) performed by the people (λαὸς) perhaps through a priestly or kingly representative. But at least by the time of Aristotle the word had simply become a generalized one for any kind of “service” or “function”. 27 Sometimes interpreters seek to read too much into a dead metaphor. Thus “to show compassion” (σπλαγχνίζομαι) is said to be a matter of one’s innermost being, since σπλάγχνα means “internal organs”. But the metaphor is no longer any more a live force than when we speak of “losing heart”. Similarly, it is sometimes claimed that ὑπέρτης in 1 Cor. 4:1 “literally” means the under-rower (ὕπο + ἐρήμος) of a ship. 28 But the word has become a dead metaphor meaning simply “servant” or “assistant”; no more than “dandelion” “literally” means dent de lion or “lion’s tooth”. Occasionally someone even uses diachronic investigation in a way that leads to sheer anachronism, as when we are told that “witness” (μαρτυρία) means “martyrdom”; or, worse still, that δύναμις in the New Testament “properly” means “dynamite”!
Neither Saussure nor Barr rules out diachronic linguistics as illegitimate. Indeed it may be helpful to use diachronic study to demonstrate that the meaning of a Greek word has changed in between Plato and the New Testament. It is proper to trace the historical evolution of a term and its changing semantic value, provided that two factors are borne in mind: firstly, that synchronic description is the pre-requisite of diachronic study at every separate stage; secondly, that adequate attention is paid to the phenomenon of semantic change. David Crystal sums up the point made by Saussure: "Both are subjects in themselves, with different procedures of study and largely different aims. Neither excludes the other ... But ... a synchronic description is pre-requisite for a proper diachronic study." 29

2. THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO LANGUAGE

In his introduction to the English edition of Saussure's work, W. Baskin, his translator, comments, "Saussure was among the first to see that language is a self-contained system whose interdependent parts function and acquire value through their relationship to the whole." 30 In Saussure's own words, "Language is a system of interdependent terms (les termes sont solidaires) in which the value (la valeur) of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others." 31 He adds, "Within the same language, all words used to express related ideas limit each other reciprocally ... The value (la valeur) of just any term is accordingly determined by its environment." 32 Words or other linguistic signs have no "force", validity, or meaning, independently of the relations of equivalence and contrast which hold between them.

Once again Saussure illustrates the point with reference to chess. The "value" of a given piece depends on its place within the whole system. Depending on the state of the whole board when one piece is moved, resulting changes of value will be either nil, very serious, or of average importance. A certain move can revolutionize the whole game, i.e. radically affect the value of all the other pieces. "Exactly the same holds for language." 33

This brings us to a major pair of categories which are fundamental and central in modern linguistics, namely to syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. A linguistic unit, Saussure pointed out, is related to the rest of the system within which it functions in two distinct ways. Firstly, it has a linear relationship with other words or units with which it is chained together. "Combinations supported by linearity are syntagms." 34 In the phrase "a crown of thorns", the word "crown" stands in syntagmatic relationship to "a" and "of thorns"; just as in the phrase "God is righteous", "righteous" has a syntagmatic relation to "God is". From a semantic viewpoint, if "eat" stands in syntagmatic relationship to "bread", "meat" and "cheese" but not to "water", "tea" or "beer", this contributes to establishing its meaning, as the ingestion of solid food.

The paradigmatic relation was called by Saussure an associative relation.
although writers in linguistics prefer the former term. This is the relation between a word or linguistic unit and another such unit which is not present in the actual utterance, but which might have been chosen in its place. In the phrase “a crown of thorns” the words “laurel” or “gold” could have been slotted in, in place of “thorns”. Thus “thorns” stands in a paradigmatic relation to “laurel”, “gold”, “silver”, and so on. In “God is righteous”, the word “righteous” stands in paradigmatic relation to “good”, or “merciful”. This principle is so important that John Lyons states that one of the two “defining characteristics” of modern structural linguistics is the axiom that “linguistic units have no validity independently of their paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations with other units.”

The relevance of this principle to New Testament interpretation has been conclusively demonstrated by Erhardt Guttgemanns and by Kenneth L. Burres. Guttgemanns, for example, shows how the meaning of “righteousness” in Romans turns partly on its syntagmatic relations to “of God” (Θεοῦ) and “on the basis of faith” (ἐκ πίστεως). Burres discusses the meaning of “reveal” (ἀποκάλυψις) partly in terms of its syntagmatic or “syntactic” relations to “righteousness of God”, “wrath of God”, and other phrases; partly in terms of its paradigmatic or “paratactic” relations to φανερώω and its two-way relations (e.g. in 1 Cor. 14:6) to γνώσις and προφητεία. The aim in the case of Burres’ work is to build up a semantic field of terms relevant to the semantic value of “reveal” in Paul.

The notion of paradigmatic relations is connected with the semantic axiom that meaning implies choice. For example, “pound” (weight) draws part of its meaning from the fact that it functions to exclude ton, stone, ounce, or dram. It also draws part of its meaning from its syntactic relation to butter, cheese, or apples. On the other hand, “pound” (money) draws part of its meaning from its paradigmatic relation to 50p, 100p or £5; and part of its meaning from its syntagmatic relation to “pay me a” or “change for a”. Thus Guttgemanns examines the paradigmatic relations of “righteousness of God” to “power of God” and “wrath of God”, as well as its syntagmatic relations to “on the basis of faith” and “on the basis of law”. Similarly the meaning of κατὰ σάρκα depends not only on its syntagmatic relation to Ἰσραήλ (“earthly” Israel) or ἁγιοί (wise according to “human standards”); but also on its paradigmatic relation to κατὰ πνεῦμα (spirit).

Saussure’s notion of “associative fields”, which depends largely on paradigmatic relations, thus provides a way into the task of mapping out a semantic field. K. L. Burres uses both syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations to map the semantic field surrounding Paul’s uses of words meaning “to reveal”.

In view of the importance of the field, Barr and Burres each supports Trier’s point that a word has meaning not autonomously or independently but “only as part of a whole” (nur als Teil des Ganzen); only within a field (im Feld). All the same, criticisms about words as units of meaning should not be taken too far. No less an authority than G. Stern has written: “There is no getting away from the fact that single words have more or less perma-
nent meanings, that they actually do refer to certain referents, and not to others, and that this characteristic is the indispensable basis of all communication.” 39 Or as Stephen Ullmann puts it, more moderately, “There is usually in each word a hard core of meaning which is relatively stable and can only be modified by the context within certain limits.” 40 Word-studies, then, are not to be dismissed as valueless.

When James Barr ruthlessly criticizes many of the articles in G. Kittel’s multi-volume Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, it might be tempting to imagine that he is mainly attacking the method of word-study. But word-study as such is not his main target of criticism. His real complaint is against what he calls “illegitimate totality transfer”. 41 This occurs when the semantic value of a word as it occurs in one context is added to its semantic value in another context; and the process is continued until the sum of these semantic values is then read into a particular case.

Barr illustrates this fallacy with reference to the meaning of ἐκκλησία, church, in the New Testament. “If we ask ‘What is the meaning of ἐκκλησία in the New Testament?’ the answer may be an adding or compounding of different statements about the ἐκκλησία in various passages. Thus we might say (a) ‘the Church is the Body of Christ’ (b) ‘the Church is the first installment of the Kingdom of God’ (c) ‘the Church is the Bride of Christ’, and other such statements.” 42 In one sense Barr concedes, this is the “meaning” of “church”. But it is certainly not “the meaning of ‘church’ in Matt. 16.18.” Yet preachers and expositors often lump together the meanings of words drawn from various different contexts, and “expound” them as the meaning of the word in a given verse. Barr quite successfully shows, for example, that this error is committed by Grundmann in his article on ἀγαθός “good”, in Kittel’s Dictionary.

This error stands in complete contrast to the principles elucidated in modern linguistics after Saussure by Eugene A. Nida and by Martin Joos in particular. Nida asserts, “The correct meaning of any term is that which contributes least to the total context.” 43 For example we might define the semantic values of “green” in several ways: as a colour, as meaning inexperienced, as meaning unripe, and so on. Similarly, we might define “house” as a dwelling, lineage, and a business establishment. But as soon as we place “green” and “house” in syntagmatic relation to each other, we minimize the semantic values of each, so that “green” can only be a colour, and “house” only a dwelling. In the case of “greenhouse” the contribution of “green” almost disappears. Yet if “green house” were a phrase in the New Testament, we could imagine an expositor exploring the supposed “richness” of each term separately, and then adding together the components into one great theological compound. On the other hand Martin Joos calls it “semantic axiom number one” that in defining a word it must be made to “contribute least to the total message desirable from the passage where it is at home, rather than e.g. defining it according to some presumed etymology or semantic history.” 44 Nida concludes “Words do not carry with them all the meanings which they may have in other sets of co-occurrences.” 45 Thus in a
balanced comment on the whole question of word-meaning. R. H. Robins adds that words may be convenient units about which to state meanings “provided that it is borne in mind that words have meaning by virtue of their employment in sentences . . . and that the meaning of a sentence is not to be thought of as a sort of summation of the meanings of its component words taken individually.”

3. CONVENTIONALITY IN LANGUAGE AND ITS CONNEXION WITH STRUCTURALISM

Saussure was certainly not the first to show what he called “the arbitrary nature of the sign” in language. “No-one”, he writes, “disputes the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign, but it is often easier to discover a truth than to assign to it its proper place.” What was distinctive about Saussure’s assessment was, firstly, that he described it as the very first principle in language-study, which “dominates all the linguistics of language; its consequences are numberless.” Secondly, the far-reaching effects of this principle on the relationship between language and thought, or between words and concepts, emerge clearly only against the background of structuralism. Saussure’s structural approach, we have seen, calls in question a semantics which is based entirely on the word as a unit of meaning. This now enables us to expose what Barr has called the one word/one concept fallacy, and also to challenge the drawing of inferences about national “thought” made on the basis of linguistic distinctions which turn out to be arbitrary.

There are everyday phenomena in language which make it clear that the relations between language and the world depend in many respects on arbitrary or conventional factors rather than on “nature” or even logic. These include homonymy (when two words of different meanings have the same form, e.g. “he left me”, as against “turn left”); polysemy (when one word has multiple meanings, e.g. “board and lodging”, “board of directors”, “board from the floor”); opaqueness in vocabulary (e.g. in contrast to the transparent meanings of onomatopoeia); and diachronic change in language. Saussure, however, points simply to the very basic fact of differences both in vocabulary and in grammar between different languages, when logically the same semantic value is involved. The relation between the French word soeur and a sister is no more “natural”, “inner” or “logical” than it is in the case of the German Schwester or the English sister. Similarly, in terms of grammar, in the sentence ces gants sont bon marché, “these gloves are cheap”, bon marché functions logically or semantically as an adjective, but is not an adjective from the arbitrary viewpoint of grammar. (We have already referred, in philosophy, to the parallel observations of Russell about such phrases as “the present King of France”, or “a round square”). Further, in terms of morphology, bon marché is composed of two words which correspond to the one word “cheap”. Even the limits of the word as a unit have an arbitrary element. In Latin and in Greek amo and
must be translated by two words in English and in German, "I love," and "ich liebe." Saussure concludes, "The division of words into substantives, verbs, adjectives, etc., is not an undeniable linguistic reality."

We have already noted some of the fallacies involved in logico-grammatical parallelism. The other side of the coin is the equally misguided attempt to draw inferences about the distinctive thought of a people, for example, about "Hebrew thought" or "Greek thought", on the basis of its grammatical categories. Eugene A. Nida writes, "The idea that the Hebrew people had a completely different view of time because they had a different verbal system does not stand up under investigation. It would be just as unfounded to claim that people of the English-speaking world have lost interest in sex because the gender distinctions in nouns and adjectives have been largely eliminated, or that Indo-Europeans are very time conscious because in many languages there are tense-distinctions in the verbs. But no people seems more time-orientated than the Japanese, and their verbal system is not too different from the aspectual structures of Hebrew. Furthermore, few peoples are so little interested in time as some of the tribes in Africa, many of whose languages have far more time distinctions than any Indo-European language has."

J. Pedersen, T. Boman, and G. A. F. Knight are among the many Biblical scholars who have made pronouncements about "Hebrew thought" on the basis of grammatical categories. Knight, for example, asserts, "the Hebrew almost invariably thought in terms of the concrete. There are few abstract nouns in the Hebrew language." T. Boman argues, again mainly on the basis of a grammatical and morphological investigation of linguistic categories, that Israelite thinking is "dynamic, vigorous, passionate" while "Greek thinking is static, peaceful, moderate, and harmonious." For example, he claims that even stative verbs in Hebrew express an activity rather than portray a static state of affairs. Some of his most extreme arguments occur in connexion with quantity and number. The so-called "concept of number" is arrived at in Greek and in modern thinking in terms of visual representation. But the distinctive "concept" in Hebrew is evident from the "meaning" of the word "two": "Shenayim comes from the verb shanah - double, repeat, do for the second time. Thus the Hebrews form the concept of number not, as we do, through visual perception, but through frequent repetition of the same motion." Similarly, the two words for "small" come from verbal forms meaning "to diminish", "to become less"; and the word min which expresses "more than" in comparative degree really means "away from". Boman actually concludes "Number or quantitive variety is thus not something spatial and quantitive but dynamic and qualitative." When Saul is said to be "taller than" all the people, he dynamically towers over and "away from" the others!

But not only is this to argue on the basis of a supposed logico-grammatical parallelism; it is also to compound this particular error with further arguments of a diachronic or even etymological nature, and to ignore the role of context in semantics. If, for example, min means "away from" in
many contexts, its context in a comparison restricts its semantic value to "more than". On the one hand, Boman's method flies in the face of structuralism; on the other hand, as Barr concludes, "Boman's kind of interpretation of language . . . depends to a great extent on the logico-grammatical unclari ties of the older grammar, and evaporates with the stricter method of modern linguistics." 56 This is not to say that all of Boman's conclusions are wrong. For sometimes, as Barr admits, he expresses an insight which may have independent value as an exegetical observation. 57 Barr does not dispute that Hebrew uses of language may sometimes be more "dynamic" than Greek or English near-equivalents. The error, however, is to attempt to base such conclusions on dubious linguistic arguments which ignore structuralism and conventionality in language, and Barr has performed a valuable service in subjecting this approach to systematic criticism.

This brings us to a fundamental principle in semantics, about the relationship between language and "concepts". Commenting on claims made about the Hebrew or Greek "mind" or "way of thinking", David Crystal makes a crucial observation. He writes, "One often hears statements of the form 'Language X has a word for it, but Y has not, therefore X can say something Y cannot', or 'X is a better language than Y.' This fallacy stems from the misconception . . . that the unit of translation-equivalence between languages is the word . . . The fact that Y has no word for an object does not mean that it cannot talk about that object; it cannot use the same mechanical means to do so, but it can utilize alternative forms of expression in its own structure for the same end." 58

The implication which is made by the vast majority of writers in linguistics is that, in John Lyons' words, "No language can be said to be intrinsically 'richer' than another — each is adapted to the characteristic pursuits of its users." 59 The number of classifications under which "life" or "the world" could be described is virtually infinite. The distinctions which already exist within a given language, then, reflect only those that have hitherto in the past been of importance for that particular culture. But they do not absolutely determine the limits of what can be said in the future, for example by a creative thinker within that culture, or by a translator. This is not entirely to deny that there may be some element of truth in the well-known hypothesis of B. L. Whorf, based on the outlook of Wilhelm von Humboldt, that the structure of a language may influence a culture in terms of its thought. For, firstly, the translation or expression of certain ideas may be made easier or more difficult by the presence of this or that distinction, or lack of distinction, already to hand in a language. Secondly, habits of language-use make certain ways of thinking easier or more difficult in the sense shown by Wittgenstein. But difficulty does not mean impossibility. The weaknesses of the Whorf hypothesis have been demonstrated by Max Black, among others in several discussions. 60 Even so-called primitive languages are, as Edward Sapir admits (in the words of David Crystal) "not better or worse; only different." 61

Biblical scholars, however, have been quick to draw far-reaching con-
clusions about Hebrew or Greek “thought” on the basis of vocabulary-stock. John Paterson, for example, makes the far-fetched statement that the ancient Israelite was “economical of words”, because “Hebrew speech has less than 10,000 words while Greek has 200,000. Thus a word to the Hebrew was something . . . to be expended carefully.” He was a man of few words, for “He knew there was power in words and that such power must not be used indiscriminately.” I have tried to expose the fallaciousness of this whole approach in the study to which I have referred on the supposed power of words in the biblical writings.

James Barr has little difficulty in citing and criticizing what he calls “arguments of the ‘the Greeks had a word for it’ type which so proliferate in Biblical theology.” For example, J. A. T. Robinson writes, “If we ask why it was that the Jews here (i.e. in language about “flesh” and “body”) made do with one word (basar) where the Greeks required two (σῶμα and οὐρά) we come up against some of the most fundamental assumptions of Hebraic thinking about man.” The difference in vocabulary-stock shows, according to Robinson, “that the Hebrews never posed, like the Greeks, certain questions the answer to which would have forced them to differentiate the ‘body’ from the ‘flesh’.” Barr comments, “This statement could not have been written except in a total neglect of linguistic semantics.” It may be that this criticism should be softened in the light of the half truth represented by the Whorf hypothesis. But the main force of Barr’s criticism is undoubtedly correct.

Barr also criticizes the methodological procedure of Kittel’s Theological Dictionary of the New Testament according to which in effect, “the lexical-stock of N.T. Greek can be closely correlated with the concept-stock of the early Christians.” The Dictionary is a dictionary, in practice, of words; but it purports to be a “concept-history” (Begriffsgeschichte). Thus a contributor writes not about “the Greek word —” but “the Greek concept —”. The temptation to which this leads is to commit the “illegitimate totality transfer” (which we described and discussed in II, 1). Since words and concepts do not necessarily correspond with each other isomorphically, such ambiguity of terms can only be misleading, and the confusion becomes still worse when some German scholars use Begriff to mean both “concept” and “word”.

4. LANGUE AND PAROLE

The distinction between langue and parole, so important for Saussure, has been taken up in connexion with the form criticism of the gospels by Erhardt Gütgemanns. According to Saussure, language (either langue or, in a different sense langage cf. Sprache) must not be confused with speech or actual speaking (parole; cf. sprechen). Langue “is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty.” It is inherited within the community; and is “the sum of word-
images stored in the minds of all individuals . . . a storehouse filled by the members of a given community . . . Language is not complete in any (individual) speaker, it exists perfectly only within a collectivity.” Langue is thus the language-system which, as it were, waits in readiness for acts of speech. By contrast, parole is “the executive side of speaking . . . an individual act”. 67

Parole, the actual concrete act of speaking on the part of an individual, is the only object directly available for study by the linguist, although from its study he draws inferences about the structure of a langue. In his work on form-criticism E. Güttgemanns stresses the sociological and communal character of a langue, in contrast to the individual origin of paroles. 68 The paroles of the individual are objectified in written forms, for only an individual can do the actual writing. On the other hand the written paroles reflect the oral tradition of the langue of the community. One of Güttgemanns’s points is that just as langue should not be confused with parole, so the “laws” which apply to the growth of oral traditions should not be made to apply to forms which already have been committed to writing by individuals. He believes that traditional form criticism in Germany has not been careful enough in keeping apart (1) written forms, individual speech, parole; and (2) oral forms, the language of the social community, langue.

One consequence of Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole is of interest to the New Testament interpreter. We have already stressed in connexion with paradigmatic relations (in II.2) that “meaning is choice.” The interpreter cannot know how much significance to attach to an author’s use of word x until he also knows what alternatives were available to him at the same time. It is often said, for example, that the choice of ἀγάπη and ἀγαπέ to mean “love” in the New Testament is especially significant because Christian writers chose them in preference to ἔρως and ἐρως and also to φιλία and φιλία. Supposedly agapē is a discerning and creative love; erōs is a passionate love which seeks self-gratification; whilst philia is a more general word for solicitous love or kindly inclination. But before we can say with certainty that a New Testament writer “chooses” to use ἀγάπη we must first establish whether the other two words for love were genuinely live options in the contexts concerned. It is not enough to ask whether different words for “love” might be available in first-century Greek in general. In this respect a lexicon may even be misleading. We must also ask: what words for love were available for use in the linguistic repertoire of the New Testament writer in question? Words may perhaps exist in Greek of which he is unaware, or for which he has a personal dislike for any of a variety of reasons. It would then be thoroughly misleading to argue that he has chosen word x as against these.
III. Other Basic Tools in Field Semantics, Linguistics and Philosophy

1. TOOLS IN FIELD SEMANTICS: TYPES OF OPPOSITION AND SYNONYMY

We have already seen the principle laid down by J. Trier that a word has meaning "only as part of a whole... it yields a meaning only within a field" (nur im Feld gibt es Bedeutung). Following the implications suggested by Saussure's structuralism, the task of the semanticist, as Trier saw it, was to set up lexical systems or sub-systems (Wortfelder) in terms of semantic relations of sameness or similarity of meaning (synonymy); of opposition or incompatibility of meaning (antonymy or complementarity); and of a special kind of inclusiveness of meaning (hyponymy) as where one word expresses a class ("furniture") to which the items belong ("chair", "table"). In broad outline this describes the programme of field semantics. 69

E. A. Nida has suggested that more use should be made of the methods of field semantics in Biblical lexicology. He writes, "Quite new approaches to lexicology must be introduced... Critical studies of meaning must be based primarily upon the analysis of related meanings of different words, not upon the different meanings of single words." 70 According to the traditional method, the lexicographer would take a word such as "run", for example, and distinguish in terms of its syntagmatic relations (1) running along the road; (2) running a business; (3) a run on the bank; and so on. But the method in field semantics would be to compare "run" in the first sense with words to which it stood in paradigmatic relation, such as "walk", "skip", "crawl"; and to compare "run" in the second sense with "control", "operate" and "direct". In this way a "field" very much like Saussure's "associative field", or system of paradigmatic relations, may be constructed.

The traditional attention to syntagmatic relations in lexicology is in fact complementary to newer methods. In New Testament Greek, a traditional lexicon-entry under πνεῦμα for example, would distinguish between (1) wind or breath; (2) men's spirit; (3) the Spirit of God; and (4) spirit beings. The "field" approach would examine the first category in relation to άνεμος, πνεό and λαύλαψ; the second category in relation to σάρξ, ψυχή, σώμα, and so on. A diagram will illustrate how the two approaches can be complementary.

Katz and Foder put forward a comparable system of lexicology, in which they call the first explanatory term (noun) a grammatical marker; the second set of terms (e.g. human, divine) semantic markers; and the third set of subdivisions within the semantic markers (e.g. mind, breath) semantic distinguishers. I have then added Greek words which commence the construction of a semantic field.

We must now look more closely at different types of opposition. In a whole book devoted to the subject C. K. Ogden lists some twenty or so examples, most of which involve a distinctive type of semantic opposition. 71 The basic distinction, however, is between what he calls opposition by cut and opposition by scale. The sharpest type of opposition by cut is the relation of two-way exclusion known as complementarity. The denial of the one
πνεῦμα

noun

(of natural forces)

(human)

(divine)

(other supernatural agencies)

1. wind
2. breath
3. spirit (in contrast to body)
4. seat of emotion, insight, etc
5. person, the whole man
6. The Spirit-beings
7. spirit-beings
8. evil spirits

άνεμος, πνέω
λαίλαγ, ἄφιεναι
πνοή, τὸ πνεῦμα,
ἀνεμίζομαι.

σῶμα,
σάρξ,
ψυχή,
ἐμπνέω,
ἐμφυσάω.

χαρδία,
ἐταφάχθη
τῇ πνεύματι,
etc.

τὸ ἐμὸν
πνεῦμα,
με,
ἵμαι,
etc.

ἐν δυνάμει,
κύριος,
ἐκ θεοῦ,
τὸ πνεῦμα
tοῦ κόσμου,
etc.

λειτουργικά
δαίμων,
πνεύματα,
δαιμόνιον,
ἀγχή,
etc.

etc.
involves the assertion of the other, and vice versa. Paul sets the word χάρις, “by grace”, in opposition to ἐξ ἔργων “by works” in this way in Rom. 11:6. “Grace” and “works” derive their semantic value from their very relation of complementarity. Thus Paul writes, “if it is by grace, it is no longer on the basis of works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace.” Similarly F. Gütgemanns attempts to shed light on ὁσιωσθῆναι θεοῦ righteousness of God, in Rom. 1 by showing that in that chapter it stands in a relation of opposition to ὑποτεθῆναι θεοῦ, wrath of God. 72

Not every kind of opposition functions in this way, however. What is strictly termed a relation of antonymy is a one-way relation of opposition which is relative and gradable by scale. Rom. 5:6–8 illustrates this kind of opposition. To say that a man is “good” (ἀγαθός) is to deny that he is positively bad. But on the other hand, to say that he is “not good” does not entail “he is bad”. For “good” may stand in contrast to “law-abiding” (δικαιοςύνη) and a man may be law-abiding but neither good nor bad. Similarly in the gospels a “great” crowd or a “large” crowd stands in opposition to a “small” crowd; but a crowd which is “not large” need not be small. The type of opposition involved in grading-words like “good” and “great” is different from that entailed by such terms as “grace” and “works”. In an article published elsewhere I have tried to unravel the complex semantic relationship between πνεῦμα, spirit, and ἀναστήρεια, flesh. 73 In certain contexts to live according to the Spirit stands in a relation of complementarity to living according to the flesh (cf. Rom. 8:9, 12). On the other hand, whilst the Corinthian believers are in some sense men of the Spirit (1 Cor. 2:6–16: 12–14) in another sense Paul refuses to accept their inference that therefore they are “not fleshly” (3:1–4).

One more type of opposition deserves attention, namely that of converseness. “Buy” and “sell” stand normally in a relation of converseness, for if a buys x from b, it can be said that b sells x to a. But when Paul says in 1 Cor. 6:19 that Christians are “bought” (ἀγοράσκω) with a price, we cannot transform this into a converse sentence using “sell”. The semantic application here is the warning that theological uses of ἀγοράσκω entail a slightly different meaning from “buy” in ordinary commercial contexts.

There are also different types and degrees of synonymy, or sameness or likeness of meaning. Absolute, total, and complete synonymy is extremely rare in ordinary language. Absolute synonyms, if they do exist, are usually technical terms from areas such as medicine; perhaps “semantics” and “semasiology” are absolute synonyms. The major test of synonymy is interchangeability. S. Ullmann writes, “Only those words can be described as synonymous which can replace each other in any given context, without the slightest alteration either in cognitive or emotive import.” 74

A moment’s reflection will disclose two principles. Firstly, most so-called synonyms are context-dependent. In many contexts “jump” is synonymous with “leap”; but we do not say “that noise made me leap.” “Sick” often means the same as “ill”; but we do not talk about a bird of sick omen, nor say that we are ill of repeating the same thing. Similarly in New Testament
Greek καινός and νέος are clearly synonymous when both mean "new" as applied to the "covenant" (διαθήκη, e.g. cf. Heb. 8:8 with Heb. 12:24); but a writer would not presumably speak of καινόν φώσμα (dough) or of a young man as καινός. It could be misleading, then, to answer "yes" or "no" to the simple question: are καινός and νέος synonyms? The semanticist will ask, rather: in what kinds of context, if any, are they synonymous?

Secondly, many words are synonymous with others at a cognitive level, but not in emotive terms or in terms of register. We might write to "decline" an invitation, but hardly to "reject" it; yet it is difficult to see any great difference between them in cognitive scope. "Decease" is more formal and professional than "death": whilst "passed on", "popped off", "was called to higher service" and "kicked the bucket" all have their own special overtones. Similarly in certain contexts Mark’s κράβαττος, mattress, may be cognitively synonymous with Matthew and Luke’s κλίνη, bed; but the colloquial overtones of Mark’s word are deemed inappropriate by Matthew and Luke. Sometimes similar actions or attitudes can be described by terms suggesting overtones of moral approval or blame. Thus Bertrand Russell begins his well-known "emotive conjugations" as follows: "I am firm, you are obstinate, he is pig-headed; . . . I have reconsidered, you have changed your mind, he has gone back on his word." "Reasoning" in the New Testament can be alluded to with overtones of disapproval (διαλογισμός) or either neutrally or with approval (cf. νόημα, νοῦς).

Three further comments may be made about synonymy. Firstly, another test of context-dependent synonymy can be provided by antonymy. "Wide" is a synonym of "broad", for example, in contexts in which "narrow" would be applicable: a narrow plank or a narrow road. But we do not talk about a narrow accent: only of a broad one. "Deep" and "profound" thought stand in opposition to "shallow" thought; but the opposite to a deep voice is a high one. Secondly, synonymy may be explored in diachronic linguistics. Sometimes over a period of many years two words may move more closely together in meaning, and if they become total synonyms one may eventually disappear. David Clines has shown in an unpublished study that this happens to αγαθός and καλός. In classical Greek they are distinct, αγαθός being reserved mainly for moral goodness; in New Testament Greek they are usually synonymous; in modern Greek αγαθός has disappeared. Sometimes, however, the procedure may be reversed, and what were once synonyms may develop in different directions. Thirdly, synonymy raises questions of style. Many writers call on similar terms, for example, simply to avoid repetition of the same word. In such contexts similar terms may become more clearly synonymous. It is likely that this is the case, for example, with ἀγαπάω and φιλῶ in John 21:15–17.

2. TYPES OF VAGUENESS AND METAPHOR

Certain kinds of vagueness are useful and desirable. Language would be impoverished if we could never talk about "furniture", but only about chairs
and tables; or never talk about something’s being “red”, without specifying whether we mean crimson or scarlet; or never talk about “flowers” without explicating whether we mean tulips, roses, or a mixture of both. When the New Testament interpreter comes across a superordinate term like ἄσια, badness, it is a mistake to insist on a greater degree of precision than that suggested by the text. I have argued this point in two articles, one with reference to the applications of the parables, the other with reference to the meaning of σάντις in 1 Cor. 5:5.76

One type of vagueness is due to lack of specificity, of which superordinate terms supply some, but not all, examples. A skilful politician may retain universal support, for example, if he promises to “take steps” to meet a crisis; he loses some votes if he is forced to specify what steps.

Another type of vagueness is due to lack of a clear cut-off point on a scale. Words like “urban”, “warm”, and “middle-aged” are very useful, not least because they are not quantified precisely like “above 60°F.” or “between 39 and 61 years old.”

A third type of vagueness is that of polymorphous concepts, which are of special interest in philosophy. The meaning of a word of this type cannot be given in generalizing terms, but only as different meanings apply by way of example in different contexts. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle and others, insist that we cannot say in general what “thinking” is; only give examples of the application of the term in specific situations. G. E. M. Anscombe examines the logic of “intention” in this way; and A. R. White underlines the polymorphous character of “attention”. What attending is depends on what we are attending to. It seems likely, to my mind, that πίστις, faith, has this polymorphous character, especially in Paul. Depending on the situation or context it may involve intellectual assent, or practical obedience; it may stand eschatologically in contrast to sight; or mean a Christ-centred appropriation of God’s gift. To try to overcome this so-called ambiguity by offering a generalizing definition is to invite misunderstanding about what “faith” means.

Too often in biblical interpretation exegetes have looked for exactness where the author chose vagueness. Must the “horrifying abomination” in Mark 13:14 refer specifically to the violence of the zealots, or to a statue of Titus, or to Caligula or Hadrian? Must “Son of man” be robbed of an ambiguity which may have commended the term to Jesus? Might not the New Testament writers have wished to keep some ideas open-ended no less often than we do?

We must also glance briefly at metaphor, which is not unrelated to questions about vagueness. A live metaphor presupposes a well-established use of language (often popularly called the “literal” meaning) and then extends this use in a way that is novel or logically odd. The aim of this extension is twofold. Firstly, it sets up a tension which is intended to provoke the hearer into some reaction; secondly, it provides a model, or picture, or frame of reference, according to which the hearer now “sees” the point in question in a new way. It should be stressed, however, that this happens
only when a metaphor is genuinely “live”. Most metaphors very soon become dead metaphors. This is one crucial difficulty confronting the New Testament interpreter about biblical metaphors. The well-known metaphor of the Christian’s armour in Eph. 6:14–17 has become dead metaphor, or even a mere analogy or simile, because a term like “sword of the spirit” has itself become an established use of language. Sometimes a new translation will recapture some force by replacing an old metaphor by a new but closely-related one. Thus “gird up the loins of your mind” in 1 Pet.1:13 becomes “stripped for action” in the NEB. On the other hand “anchor of the soul” (Heb. 6:19), “fed you with milk” (1 Cor. 3:2) and “living stones” (1 Pet. 2:5) still retain an element of their original tension without alteration.

The interpreter has to steer a very careful path between evaporating the force of a metaphor by total explication, and leaving its meaning open to doubt. If a metaphor is already dead even in the New Testament, no harm is done by erring on the side of clarity. Thus “hand of the Lord” (Acts 11:21) becomes “the Lord’s power” in Today’s English Version; and “pass from me this cup” (Luke 22:42) becomes “free me from having to suffer this trial” in the Spanish Version Popular. But it is a different matter when the metaphor is a live one. It is difficult to justify, for example, the rendering of Paul’s “put on Christ” (Gal. 3:27) by “take upon themselves the qualities of Christ himself” (Today’s English Version). A metaphor is to make the hearer think for himself, often by means of some deliberate ambiguity. It gives us something as a model for something else without making explicit in exactly what way it is supposed to be a model. We could say of metaphor what F. Waismann says of poetry: “Its mission is to break through the wall of conventional values that encloses us, to startle us into seeing the world through fresh eyes.” If metaphor is eliminated or turned into simile, as W. L. Wonderly recommends as a “basic technique” of popular Bible translation, this entire dimension is lost.

The literature on metaphor is extensive. It should warn us against ever talking about Biblical metaphors as “mere” metaphors, as if to imply that metaphorical language is somehow inferior to non-metaphorical discourse. But it is also evident from this range of literature that there are different types of metaphors with different purposes; and that the line between metaphor and non-metaphor is not in fact a line but a continuous scale, passing through “dead” metaphor and merely figurative language such as metonymy or synecdoche. Robert Funk and Sallie TeSelle have argued that the parables of Jesus function as metaphor; and in theology, especially with reference to Bultmann, it is crucial to distinguish between metaphor and myth.

3. SOME EFFECTS OF RECENT APPROACHES IN LINGUISTICS

Ideally a comprehensive discussion of the present subject would include an examination of transformational grammar with special reference to the work of Noam Chomsky. However, in practice this area is far too complex
and technical to allow for a brief summary in a few paragraphs. Our aim in this section, therefore, must be more modest. We shall attempt to describe and evaluate only the uses to which this approach has been put at the hands of those engaged in Bible translation. This concerns especially the work of Eugene A. Nida, who speaks enthusiastically of the insights of transformational grammar, and in particular draws on the technique of reducing the surface structure of stretches of language to its underlying kernels.

Nida and Taber write, "One of the most important insights coming from 'transformational grammar' is the fact that in all languages there are half a dozen to a dozen basic structures out of which all the more elaborate formations are constructed by means of so-called 'transformations'. In contrast, back-transformation, then, is the analytic process of reducing the surface structure to its underlying kernels." We have already illustrated this principle by noting certain kernel forms behind Eph. 1:7. Nida and Taber further cite the example of Eph. 2:8, 9: "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God— not because of works lest any man should boast." This can be reduced to seven kernel sentences: (1) God showed you grace; (2) God saved you; (3) you believed; (4) you did not save yourselves; (5) God gave it; (6) you did not work for it; (7) no man should boast. The kernel sentences may in principle undergo further transformation in terms of what Chomsky calls "deep structure", but whilst this is of interest in theoretical linguistics Nida and Taber question its practical value for the Bible translator. The translator's task, they suggest, is firstly to reduce utterances to kernel sentences by "back-transformation" (if necessary making explicit any elements that are still ambiguous), and then at the end of the process to reformulate the kernels into a linguistic structure which best accords with a native speaker's understanding in the receptor language.

One merit of this approach is to demonstrate, once again, the arbitrariness of surface-grammar and the fallacy of assumptions about logico-grammatical parallelism. The surface-grammar of the final translation may not necessarily correspond to the surface-grammar of the original Greek. In this respect, translation is a creative task and not merely a mechanical one.

We must also note, however, that the contrast between surface grammar and deep grammar is used as a means of eliminating certain types of ambiguity. As long ago as 1924, Otto Jespersen noted the fundamental difference in structure between two such superficially parallel phrases as "the doctor's arrival" and "the doctor's house". The reason for the difference is that, in Chomsky's terms, "the doctor's arrival" derives from the transform "the doctor arrived", which has the form NP/Vi (noun phrase/intransitive verb); whilst "the doctor's house" derives from the transform "the doctor has a house", which has the form NP/Vt//N (noun phrase/transitive verb/noun in the accusative). This example of transformational techniques is already employed, by implication, in New Testament exegesis and in traditional grammar. The
traditional contrast between “objective genitive” and “subjective genitive” is usually explained in what amounts to transformational terms. In 1 Cor. 1:6, for example, the phrase “the testimony of Christ” (τὸ μαρτυρίων τοῦ Χριστοῦ) is, as it stands, ambiguous. If it is subjective genitive it derives from the transform “Christ testified”, in which “Christ” is subject; if it is objective genitive it derives from the transform “Paul testifies to Christ”, in which “Christ” is (indirect) object. Similarly, as the phrase stands, “love of God” (ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ) in 1 John is ambiguous, and has to be interpreted as deriving either from the transform “God loves . . .” (subjective genitive), or from “. . . loves God” (objective genitive). It is a regular manoeuvre in Today’s English Version to remove ambiguity of this kind by clearly reflecting one particular transform. Thus “light of the world” (Mt. 5:14) becomes “light for the world” (objective genitive, from “lights the world”); and “the promise of the Holy Spirit” (Acts 2:33) becomes “the Holy Spirit, as his Father had promised” (objective genitive, from the transform “the Father promised the Holy Spirit”, excluding the alternative transform “the Holy Spirit promised”).

Transformational grammar often seeks to make explicit elements of meaning which are implied, but not expressed, in a sentence. Chomsky comments, “Surface similarities may hide distinctions of a fundamental nature . . . It may be necessary to guide and draw out the speaker’s intuition in perhaps fairly subtle ways before we can determine what is the actual character of his knowledge.” 84 This principle is of positive value in Bible translation, provided it is recognised that, once again, translation inevitably becomes interpretation. Sometimes it is possible that this technique of making linguistic elements explicit goes further than the text allows. Thus it is questionable whether Today’s English Version is justified in translating καὶ ἴδων ἐν Ἱησοῦ τὴν πίστιν αὐτῶν as “Jesus saw how much faith they had” (Mark 2:5). The R.S.V. simply has “when Jesus saw their faith”. But presumably the translators of Today’s English Version would claim to be making explicit what they judged was implicit in the text.

One further point arises from this principle of making linguistic elements explicit. It demonstrates that statistical statements about word-occurrences may often be superficial or even misleading guides to the occurrence of actual concepts. K. L. Burres makes this point about “boasting” in Rom. 3:27. 85 The text reads: “Then what becomes of our boasting? It is excluded. On what principle? On the principle of works? No, but on the principle of faith.” In this form of the text “boasting” occurs once only. But if we allow a transformational analysis to unpack occurrences which are implicit but functionally operative, Burres suggests that we now have: “Then what becomes of our boasting? Our boasting is excluded. On what principle is our boasting excluded? Is our boasting excluded on the principle of works? No. Our boasting is excluded on the principle of faith”. “Boasting” now occurs five times.

Although Nida succeeds in demonstrating points of value in transformational approaches for Bible translation, however, I still have hesitations
about certain uses of these techniques. Firstly, in spite of Nida’s obvious awareness of the problem, the translator must be on guard against thinking of semantic equivalence simply in cognitive terms. If “decease”, departure from this life”, and so on, could all be transformed into the kernel sentence “he dies”, it would be easy to overlook the emotive, cultural, or religious overtones of meaning which may have been important in the original utterance. Nida would no doubt agree that every effort must be made not to lose sight of this problem. Indeed he and Taber stress this very point in a chapter entitled “Connotative Meaning”. Secondly, the notion of kernel sentences comes too near for comfort to Wittgenstein’s earlier notions in the Tractatus about elementary propositions. We cannot attempt to evaluate the theories of the Tractatus in this essay, but it is not irrelevant to point out that in his later writings Wittgenstein expressed his own deep dissatisfaction with theories of meaning which are arrived at in this way. Theories about a “universal” grammar of objects, events, abstracts and relations are too reminiscent of the theory of language which Wittgenstein first propounded and then rejected. These criticisms do not invalidate this whole approach, but they perhaps call for caution over the ways in which it is used.

IV. A Concluding Example of Semantic Exploration: Justification by Faith

By way of conclusion I shall try to show how a particular set of problems in New Testament interpretation may be solved, or at least made to look very different, by explorations into questions of semantics and logic. Since hitherto we have been looking mainly at tools which have been forged in general linguistics, I shall conclude by glancing at some possibilities which emerge against the background of linguistic philosophy. Beginning with the contrast between descriptive and evaluative language-uses, I shall draw on Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing as”, on his idea of the “home” setting of a language-game, and on the concept of analytity or “grammaticalness” in his own sense of the term. I shall apply these notions to three standard problems raised by justification in Pauline thought.  

1. How can the Christian be both “righteous” and yet also a sinner? E. Käsemann speaks of the “logical embarrassment” of this doctrine, and F. Prat exclaims, “How can the false be true, or how can God declare true what he knows to be false?” Various answers have been put forward: for example, that dikaiôô (δικαίω) means to make righteous, rather than to count righteous; that “righteousness” refers only to God’s acting as champion, to vindicate the oppressed; that the “righteousness” of God means his saving power; or that “being made righteous” means “put into a right relation with God”, without special reference to ethics or to ethical status. For reasons which cannot be discussed here, I do not think that any of these approaches is entirely satisfactory. The “paradox” remains that the Christian is a sinner, but that God regards him as if he were righteous.

2. Is justification present or future? Many passages indicate that it is a present reality (Rom. 5:1, 9; 9:30; 1 Cor. 6:11); but in Gal. 5:5 Paul states
unambiguously that believers “wait for the hope of righteousness” in the future. Many interpreters of Paul, following Weiss and Schweitzer, believe that it “belongs strictly speaking” to the future, but is also effective in the present.

3. How can Paul place “faith” in contrast to “works” when it is not, as Whiteley puts it, “another kind of work”; it is not a species of the same genus? It is not as if “having faith” were a trump card which could be played if one had run out of “good works”.

Taking these three problems together, I shall now make three suggestions about the semantics, or logic, of Paul’s language.

(1) In speaking of the believer as iustus et peccator we are not dealing with two sets of descriptive assertions which may be true or false; we are dealing with two different evaluations or verdicts each of which is valid within its own frame of reference. Whereas two mutually exclusive assertions stand in a relation of contradiction or perhaps “paradox”, this is a misleading way of describing the logical relation between two competing evaluations. If one man claims “x is black”, and another man claims, “x is white”, one of them must be wrong. But if one claims “x is satisfactory” or “x is fast” and the other claims “x is unsatisfactory” or “x is slow”, each may be a valid assessment in relation to a different frame of reference. In particular, Wittgenstein examines the phenomenon of “seeing x as y”. A man may see a puzzle-picture, now as a series of dots, now as a face. He may see a drawing of a cube now as a glass cube, now as an open box, now as a wire frame, now as three boards forming a solid angle. What is seen remains the same; but how it is seen depends on its function within a system or frame of reference provided by the viewer. If a thing can be “seen as” more than one possible thing, there must be more than one possible frame of reference within which it can be viewed. Donald Evans argues this point about “onlooks”, in which we “look on” x as y. In Pauline thought the Christian is “seen as” or “looked on” as righteous or as a sinner, because he can stand within two alternative frames of reference.

(2) These two frames belong, respectively, to eschatology and to history. In the context of history, in terms of what he is in this world and of what his past has made him, the Christian remains a sinner. Justification is strictly a matter of the future, when he will be acquitted at the last judgment. Nevertheless the eschatological frame is the decisive one because it corresponds with future reality, and it can be brought forward and appropriated in the present by faith. In this sense, justification becomes a present reality, for it is granted “apart from the law” (Rom. 3:21, cf. Gal. 2:16; Phil. 3:9). In as far as the believer is already accorded his eschatological status, viewed in that context he is justified. In as far as he still lives in the everyday world, he remains a sinner who awaits future justification. History and eschatology each provide a frame or logical context in which a different verdict on the Christian is valid and appropriate. In Wittgenstein’s sense of the “home” setting of a language-game, eschatology is the home setting in which the logic of justification by faith receives its currency.
(3) We are now in a position to see that “justification” and “faith” have an internal, “grammatical”, or analytical relation to each other in this setting. “Faith”, in the context of justification (certainly not in all contexts in Paul) means the acceptance of this future-orientated onlook as being effectively relevant in the present. The verdict which, for external history, will be valid only at the judgment day is valid for faith now. From an external viewpoint, justification remains future; but faith involves stepping out of that purely historical frame of reference. In this sense, faith for Paul is not as remote from Heb. 11:1 (“faith is the substance of things hoped for”) as it is often imagined to be. But if this is true, faith may now be seen not as a merely external means which somehow “procures” justification, but as part of what justification is and entails. In Wittgenstein’s terms, to say “justification requires faith” is to make an analytical statement about the grammar or concept of justification. It is like saying, “Green is a colour”, or “Water boils at 100°C.” It does not so much state a condition, in the sense of qualification for justification, as state something more about what justification involves and is.

I have deliberately concluded with a speculative example suggested by the philosophical side of semantics. Many of the insights drawn from linguistics offer largely negative warnings to the New Testament interpreter, urging him to proceed with rigour and with caution, and challenging a number of cherished assumptions. A number of insights drawn from philosophers, however, seem to offer fresh perspectives sometimes of a more positive nature. In this essay we have also noted philosophical contributions to the study of synonymy and metaphor. Both sides, however, offer indispensable contributions to the interpreter of the New Testament in so far as he is concerned with language and meanings. He can ignore their methods and conclusions only at his own peril.

NOTES


1. For my articles see notes 9, 48, 73, 76, 86. For D. D. Evans see n. 91 and for O. R. Jones see n. 93.


6. "Probably all mediaeval philosophers, all the 16th and 17th century authors, and later Johnson and Mill, and still later Freg... Meinong, Russell... and Wittgenstein (in their earlier work) – all of them de facto constructed theories of meaning of names, and tried, with varying success, to extend them to all linguistic expressions, above all to sentences. In doing so they were motivated by the belief that the meaning of a sentence... is a function of the meanings of its components." J. Pelc, Studies in Functional Logical Semiotics of Natural Language (The Hague 1971), p. 58.


22. Some of these examples, and many more, are suggested by S. Ullmann, Semantics, pp. 97–9, and Principles of Semantics, pp. 171–257.
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25. Ibid., p. 113.
29. D. Crystal, op. cit., p. 58.
30. F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. xii.
31. Ibid., p. 114, and Cours de linguistique générale (édition critique) fasc. 2, p. 259 col. i (Baskin’s translation has not been without criticism).
33. Ibid., p. 89; cf. p. 110.
34. Ibid., p. 123.
40. S. Ullmann, Semantics, p. 49.
41. Ibid., p. 218.
42. Ibid.
45. E. A. Nida, loc. cit., p. 86.
47. F. de Saussure, op. cit., p. 68 (cf. édition critique, p. 152–3).
50. Ibid., p. 110.
53. T. Boman, Hebrew Thought compared with Greek (London 1960), p. 27.
54. Ibid., p. 165.
55. Ibid.
57. E.g. Boman’s remarks about practical atheism in Psalm 14:1, op. cit., p. 48–9.
65. J. Barr, op. cit., p. 35.
68. E. Gütgemann, *Offene Fragen zur Formgeschichte*, pp. 50-54.
69. Cf. J. Trier, op. cit., 6ff. I am not concerned to draw too careful a distinction between the “linguistic field” (sprachliches Feld) of Trier and the “semantic field” (Bedeutungsfeld) of Ipsen or Porzig. For the distinction see S. Ullmann, *The Principles of Semantics*, pp. 156-69; cf. also J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, pp. 44-50.