JOURNAL OF THE TRANSACTIONS

or

THE VICTORIA INSTITUTE.

VOL. XLIX.
JOURNAL OF
THE TRANSACTIONS
OF
The Victoria Institute,
OR,
Philosophical Society of Great Britain.

General Secretary: E. J. Sewell.
Lecture Secretary: E. Walter Maunder, F.R.A.S.

VOL. XLIX.

LONDON:
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LONDON:
HARRISON AND SONS, PRINTERS IN ORDINARLY TO HIS MAJESTY,
ST. MARTIN'S LANE.
PREFACE.

THE third year of the Great War, which has told somewhat seriously upon the Learned Societies of our land, has naturally affected the Victoria Institute in respect of material resources. It cannot be said, however, that it has exerted a prejudicial influence upon the useful work and high standing of the organization.

At a glance it will be seen that, in point of contents and interest, the present volume of Transactions fully maintains the high standard attained in pre-War years. The variety of the subjects brought before the Institute is very striking; and, quite naturally, to some extent they all have a bearing upon the great and fundamental religious issues which the War has impressed upon thoughtful minds.

Whether concerned with Science or Philosophy, with Religious Systems in general or Christian Principles in particular, the papers aim at such an exhibition of Truth as is calculated to fortify the minds of men and women in days when the follies of erroneous thought and the consequences of rash and immature action are sadly evident in the world.

As intimated twelve months ago, the Council has reverted to the custom of circulating in advance proofs of the papers to be read; and this practice has contributed, in an important degree, to a wider interest in the papers and more directness in the discussions.

During the year the Institute has mourned the loss of three of its Vice-Presidents—General J. G. Halliday, Mr. David Howard, D.L., F.C.S., and Professor Edward Hull, LL.D., F.R.S., each of
whom had borne a noble part in encouraging investigations in the interests of Truth. It is with regret, moreover, that we record the death, quite recently, of Rev. J. Iverach Munro, author of a paper in the present volume; also of Rev. Professor J. Hope Moulton, who contributed to volume XLVII a learned essay on "The Zoroastrian Conception of a Future Life." The last-named died on his way home from India, from the effects of exposure, following upon the sinking of his ship through attack by an enemy submarine.

In days when serious people are much occupied with thoughts of Divine Providence—realizing on the one hand that God is righteous and prayer-hearing, and on the other hand that He visits retributive justice upon those who oppose His will—the Institute should receive a large accession of new supporters.

Moreover, as we look forward to the new times foreshadowed by the very practical watchword "Reconstruction," how can we help but cherish, and seek to conserve, to the utmost of our power, the things that are essential to faith, and make for stability of character, alike with the individual and the nation? Such things are the vital concern of the Victoria Institute, and it is the care of the Council to see them represented in due proportion and order in each annual programme.

In War-time, as in other times, the aim of the Institute is to trace the Hand of God in the world, and to vindicate His ways among men.

JAMES W. THIRLIE, Editor.
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VICTORIA INSTITUTE.

READ AT THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, FEBRUARY 19TH, 1917.

1. Progress of the Institute.

In presenting to the Members of the Victoria Institute the Forty-eighth Annual Report, the Council would place on record their sense of thankfulness to Almighty God in that the Institute, through all the difficulties and trials of another year of War, has been enabled to carry on its work. The number of Meetings held has been slightly diminished: eleven, instead of the usual thirteen; but these have been well attended, and there has been no falling off in the interest displayed in the work of the Institute, or in the subjects brought forward at its Meetings.

2. Meetings.

Ten ordinary meetings were held during the year 1916. The papers read were as follows:—

"The Unity of Isaiah." By the Rev. J. J. Lias, M.A., Chancellor of Llandaff Cathedral.
"The Fulfilment of Prophecy." By the Rev. A. H. T. Clarke, M.A.
"Inscriptions and Drawings from Roman Catacombs." By the Rev. Prebendary H. E. Fox, M.A.
"The Influence of German Philosophy in bringing about the Great War." By the Rev. D. S. Margoliouth, D.Litt., F.B.A., Laudian Professor of Arabic in the University of Oxford.
"The Tidal Wave on the Off Side of the Earth from the Moon." By Professor Edward Hull, LL.D., F.R.S.
"The Influence of the War on Religious Life in Great Britain." By the Right Rev. Bishop J. E. C. Welldon, D.D., Dean of Manchester.


3. The "Jubilee" Commemoration.

The remaining meeting of the past year was one of especial interest, for it was held on May the 24th, 1916, the Fiftieth Anniversary of the First General Meeting, and therefore noted the completion of half-a-century of work. The occasion was marked by a Thanksgiving Service in Caxton Hall, Westminster, the first expressly religious service which the Institute has held. It was conducted by the Ven. Archdeacon Beresford Potter and the Rev. John Tuckwell, and addresses were delivered by the Rev. Harrington C. Lees and the Rev. Dr. J. G. Gillies. Later in the afternoon of the day the Commemoration Meeting was held in the same place, under the Chairmanship of Mr. David Howard, Vice-President, and several short addresses on the work and objects of the Institute were delivered by Members of the Council. Both the Service and the Commemoration Meeting were very well attended.


Volume XLVIII of the Transactions was issued early in November. In consequence of the shortage of paper and of the increase in the cost of printing, it has been condensed as much as possible, and is the smallest volume issued by the Institute. The method by which this reduction of space has been chiefly effected has been by publishing summaries of the Discussions instead of full reports, and by omitting the repetition of the Constitution and By-laws.

5. Council and Officers.

The following is the list of the Council and Officers for the year 1916:—

President.
The Right Honourable The Earl of Halsbury, M.A., D.C.L., F.R.S.

Vice-Presidents.
David Howard, Esq., D.L., F.C.S. (Trustee).
Professor Edward Hull, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., F.G.S.
Rev. Canon R. B. Girdlestone, M.A.
General Halliday,
Very Rev. H. Wace, D.D., Dean of Canterbury (Trustee).

In accordance with the rules the following members of the Council retire by rotation, but offer themselves, and are nominated by the Council, for re-election.

Lieut.-Colonel M. A. Alves, late R.E.
Alfred William Oke, Esq., B.A., LL.M.
Rev. D. S. Margoliouth, D.Litt., Laudian Professor of Arabic, Oxford.
R. W. Dibdin, Esq., F.R.G.S.
Joseph Graham, Esq.
Rev. Chancellor Lias, M.A.
T. G. Pinches, Esq., LL.D., M.R.A.S.


The Council also nominate the following gentlemen for election on the Council:

H. Lance Gray, Esq., and E. W. Maunder, Esq., F.R.A.S.
The Council nominate for election the following gentlemen to act with the Very Rev. the Dean of Canterbury, as Trustees:—

Arthur W. Sutton Esq., F.L.S. J.P. (Hon. Treas.).
Alfred William Oke, Esq., B.A., LL.M.

The Council have accepted the resignation of Mr. E. Walter Maunder, F.R.A.S., as Secretary and Editor of the Journal, Mr. Maunder having been recalled to his former post in Greenwich Observatory in consequence of the War. The Council have decided to divide the duties hitherto fulfilled by the Secretary between three honorary officials—an Editor, a Secretary for General Purposes, and a Lecture Secretary. They nominate Dr. J. W. Thirtle, Mr. E. J. Sewell, and Mr. E. Walter Maunder to the three offices respectively.

7. Obituary.

The Council regret to announce the death of David Howard, Esq., D.L., J.P., F.C.S., Vice-President and Trustee, and of the following Members and Associates:—


8. New Members and Associates.

The following are the names of new Members and Associates elected up to the end of the year 1916:—


9. Number of Members and Associates.

The following statement shows the number of supporters of the Institute at the end of December, 1916:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life Members</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual Members</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Associates</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Associates</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missionary Associates</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library Associates</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

showing a net decrease of 39, as compared with the total number of subscribers under the same headings reported in last year's return.

There are also 80 names on the roll of Honorary Corresponding Members.

10. Finance.

The cash statement appended to this report shows four chief features. First, a falling off in the regular income due to the above-mentioned decrease in the total number of subscribers. Next, a marked increase in the total receipts, due to the great generosity with which the Special Fund has been supported during the past year. Third, an important reduction in the cost of the Annual Volume; and fourth, the gratifying result that for the first time for twelve years no unpaid bills have been carried forward to the next account. It should be further added that the accounts not yet received for 1916 are quite small, being only such printing expenses as have been incurred since the publication of Volume XLVIII. With respect to the present year it is hoped that a considerable economy will be effected by means of the new arrangements as to the administration.

11. Special Funds.

The Council desire to acknowledge most gratefully the following donations to the Special Fund received during the year:

Dr. J. J. Acworth, £3 3s.; Anonymous, £3 3s.; E. M. Arrowsmith, Esq., £2 2s.; Mrs. G. Barbour, £1 1s.; the Rev. D. Baron, 10s. 6d.; Colonel Alex. W. C. Bell, 10s.; F. A. Bevan, Esq., D.L., £5; the Ven. Archdeacon H. E. J. Bevan, £1 1s.; Miss E. H. Bolton,
£3; Rev. W. S. Caldecott, £3 19s.; G. K. Christie, Esq., £1 1s.; the Ven. Archdeacon Brook Deedes, £1 1s.; the Rt. Hon. Lord Dunleath, £5; Miss F. Helen Freeman, £1 1s.; R. E. W. Goodridge, Esq., £1 1s.; Charles Gray, Esq., £5; Archibald Greenlees, Esq., £1 1s.; Alfred Haigh, Esq., £2; Mrs. C. S. Hogg, £1; J. Norman Holmes, Esq., £1; David Howard, Esq., D.L., £10; Professor Edward Hull, £2 11s. 6d.; Miss Zoe Johnson, 10s.; Williamson Lamplough, Esq., £3 3s.; the Rev. H. Lansdell, D.D., £1; Lieut.-Colonel G. Mackinlay, £1 1s.; Miss Amy Manson, £2 10s.; Charles H. F. Major, Esq., £1; John H. Nelson, Esq., £3 3s.; Alfred W. Oke, Esq., £2 2s.; Professor H. Langhorne Orchard, £1 1s.; E. W. Perkins, Esq., 3s. 6d.; Dr. T. G. Pinches, £1; F. H. Piper, Esq., £1; Dr. W. H. Plaister, £2 2s.; the Ven. Archdeacon Beresford Potter, £5 5s.; the Rev. J. W. Pratt, £1 1s.; Mrs. Pringle of Torwoodlee, £1 10s.; the Rev. P. Rose, 10s. 6d.; Martin L. Rouse, Esq., £1 1s.; E. J. Sewell, Esq., £1 11s. 6d.; Lieut. W. A. Shann, R.A.M.C., £1 1s.; Sir Alexander Simpson, M.D., 10s.; Dr. S. Ashley Smith, £1 1s.; Arthur W. Sutton, Esq., J.P., £5 5s.; J. D. Tremlett, Esq., £1; F. J. Waring, Esq., C.M.G., £1; W. Duncan White, Esq., £5; Mrs. George Wynne, 10s.; C. E. Baring Young, Esq., £70. Total, £171 7s. 6d.

Also for a second fund, to meet the expense of issuing advance proofs of the papers to be read at the Meetings:—T. B. Bishop, Esq., 10s.; the Rev. Prebendary H. E. Fox, M.A., £4; Lieut.-Colonel G. Mackinlay, £2; Alfred W. Oke, Esq., £1 1s.; Dr. A. T. Schofield, £1 1s.; the Rt. Rev. Bishop Welldon, D.D., £1 1s. Total, £9 13s.


The Council desire again to thank most cordially Messrs. Sewell and Lance Gray for their services as Auditors.

13. Fourth Award of the Gunning Prize.

The Gunning Prize was awarded during the year to the Rev. W. St. Clair Tisdall, M.A., D.D., for the best Essay received by the Council on the subject of "The Influence of Christianity upon other Religious Systems." The Essay was read at the Meeting held on the 11th of December, 1916, and will be published in Volume XLIX. The competition on this occasion was not restricted to Members and Associates of the Institute, but was thrown entirely open.
14. Conclusion.

The War is still with us, but it is the hope and prayer of all of us that the year on which we have entered may see the restoration of Peace. But though Peace is good and it is well that men should be in accord with one another, it is above all things necessary that Peace should be righteous, and that men should not join hand in hand in order to work iniquity, or to condone it. If, as we pray, a righteous Peace should be established, then an urgent duty will be laid upon us, for which we ought to prepare ourselves even now. That duty is suggested by the testimony of the Victoria Institute, which has been, and is, that the Holy Scriptures are given by inspiration of God, and set forth His Truth; that science and research do not invalidate this claim, but support it. It is of the utmost importance for this nation that it should return to its old recognition of the Divine gift to us in the Scriptures, and that the earnest, reverent, and believing study of them should once more become characteristic of our peoples.

Can the Victoria Institute help to bring this about? It is in the hearts of some of our Members and Associates that it can and ought to do so. One of these has offered £200 toward the bringing out of a series of tracts based upon papers which have appeared in the Transactions, showing what strong confirmations of His Holy Word God has given us in these last days; and another has undertaken the task of preparing them, so that they may be ready for publication with the return of Peace.

Signed on behalf of the Council,

HALSBURY.
CASH STATEMENT for the year ending December 31st, 1916.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECEIPTS</th>
<th>£ s. d.</th>
<th>EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>£ s. d.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash Balance from 1915</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Printing of these £186 2s. 5d. were the unpaid bills</td>
<td>276 15 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscriptions:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Binding of 1915.</td>
<td>28 14 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Member 1915</td>
<td>2 2 0</td>
<td>Stationery</td>
<td>13 18 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>69 Members 1910</td>
<td>144 18 0</td>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>227 8 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 1917</td>
<td>6 6 0</td>
<td>Rent, Light, Cleaning, &amp;c.</td>
<td>87 15 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Life Associate 1911</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
<td>Postage</td>
<td>33 6 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Associate 1912</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
<td>Expenses of Meetings</td>
<td>8 4 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1913</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
<td>Life Assurance</td>
<td>3 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Associates 1915</td>
<td>9 9 0</td>
<td>Library</td>
<td>1 18 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242 1916</td>
<td>254 2 0</td>
<td>Bank Charges</td>
<td>1 1 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 1917</td>
<td>5 5 0</td>
<td>Fire Insurance</td>
<td>0 12 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td>3 9 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cash Balance at Bank</td>
<td>0 16 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subscriptions:

- 1 Member 1915: £2 2 0
- 69 Members 1910: £144 18 0
- 3 1917: £6 6 0
- 1 Life Associate 1911: £1 1 0
- 1 Associate 1912: £1 1 0
- 1 1913: £1 1 0
- 9 Associates 1915: £9 9 0
- 242 1916: £254 2 0
- 5 1917: £5 5 0

Expenses incurred through Government taking over Hall engaged for Commemoration Meeting, and refunded by Government: £4 13 6

Total Receipts: £435 15 0

Expenses:

- £186 2s. 5d.
- £276 15 1
- £28 14 0
- £13 18 8
- £227 8 5
- £87 15 9
- £33 6 3
- £8 4 1
- £3 2 0
- £1 18 1
- £1 1 7
- £0 12 0
- £3 9 6
- £0 16 9

Total Expenditure: £687 2 2

There is a Capital sum of £500 2½ per cent. Consols, also the Capital of the Gunning Trust Fund, £508 Great India Peninsular Railway Stock.

GUNNING PRIZE FUND.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>£ s. d.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 11th, Victoria Institute, Printing, &amp;c.</td>
<td>10 0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 2nd, Dividend</td>
<td>77 0 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13th, Income Tax Refunded</td>
<td>8 6 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victoria Institute, Part Income Tax refunded, due to General Account</td>
<td>3 5 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. E. Montague, Clerical Assistance</td>
<td>2 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. W. St. Clair Tisdall, D.D.</td>
<td>40 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referees</td>
<td>9 9 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 30th, Balance at Bank</td>
<td>26 16 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: £91 12 9

We have verified all the accounts and compared them with the books and vouchers and found them correct.

January 18th, 1917.

E. J. SEWELL
H. LANCE GRAY Auditors.
IN MEMORIAM.

The Victoria Institute has sustained a severe loss in the unexpected death, on November 14th, 1916, of its Vice-President and Trustee, Mr. David Howard, J.P., D.L. He joined the Institute as long ago as 1873; became a Member of Council in 1877; a Trustee in 1890; and a Vice-President in 1903.

Mr. Howard died suddenly while travelling in a train to business, and the funeral took place on November 18th at St. John's, Buckhurst Hill. The following summary of the address delivered at the funeral service by the Bishop of Chelmsford will give some indication of the honour and esteem in which he was held by all who knew him.

His Lordship said that when in the presence of David Howard, all must realize that they were in the presence of a man—a man of fine, strong, and in some respects unique personality. One of his strongest characteristics was his all-round conception of duty; for of some men it was said that they did their duty in this respect or in that respect, but those who knew Mr. Howard realized that he was not a man who lived in compartments. He loved his country, and while taking his part in national affairs, he still had at heart the best interests of the district in which he lived; he was a keen business man, a man of affairs, and yet everyone realized that, keen as he was, he never allowed his business to swallow up his intellectual pursuits; he had a wonderful power of not allowing one thing to come so prominently into his life as to dwarf the other aspects of his life; but above all, he was keen as regards all things concerning the Kingdom of God; he was wise of counsel and filled with the Spirit of his Master, and was ever desirous that God's message of love should be carried to his fellow men. One might say of him that he was diligent in business, diligent in national and local affairs, yet fervent in spirit, serving the Lord. Some people who only knew him superficially, thought him to be obstinate in some matters, but those who knew him best, knew that it was not obstinacy, but conviction. Rightly or wrongly, he had arrived at a certain decision, and for him there was nothing more to be said. Though he was 77 years of age, he was never an old man; he was always young, and in his company one could not help feeling his cheerful, genial personality.
THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

OF THE

VICTORIA INSTITUTE

WAS HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 19TH, 1917,
AT 3.45 P.M.

Lieut.-Col. G. Mackinlay, Vice-President, took the Chair.

The Chairman opened the proceedings by announcing the death of General John Gustavus Halliday, Vice-President, on the morning of February 5th, 1917, at the advanced age of 94.

The Chairman continued: An officer of the old Indian Army (Madras Establishment), prominent as a devoted Christian all his life, he had been connected with the Victoria Institute since 1899, when he joined as a Member. He was elected a Member of the Council in 1903, and Vice-President in 1913. Endearèd to all who had the privilege of his friendship, he leaves behind him a fragrant memory—whose faith let us follow.

The Minutes of the last Annual General Meeting, held on February 21st, 1916, were read and confirmed.

The Secretary (Mr. E. Walter Maunder) read the notice convening the Meeting, and drew attention to the Annual Report and Cash Statement. He said: There are two or three points in the Report which are somewhat special. The first is, that a change has been made, or is proposed to be made, in the administration of the Institute. Up to the present time the main work of administration has lain in the hands of the paid secretary; but it became impossible for me to carry that work on any longer because I have been recalled to my former post at Greenwich Observatory, and, therefore, could no longer give the time required for the duties of the secretaryship. I, therefore, resigned; and the Council, on accepting my
ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING.

resignation, decided to divide the duties formerly fulfilled by the paid secretary between three honorary officials—an Editor, a Secretary for General Purposes, and a Lecture Secretary. Dr. J. W. Thirtle has kindly expressed his willingness to undertake the office of Editor, Mr. E. J. Sewell that of Secretary for General Purposes, and I am very gratified that the Council is willing to retain me as Lecture Secretary.

The second point of special interest is the Financial Statement. During this year a number of handsome donations have been made, in order to help the finances of the Institute. In all, a sum of £181 in donations has been contributed. The result has been that, for the first time for many years, we have been able to pay off all accounts within the year itself, and to carry nothing in the way of debt to the next year. There are one or two quite small bills, printers' bills, incurred in 1916, which have not yet been presented, but all accounts that have come in have been cleared off in 1916. This special fund for the purpose of placing the finances of the Institute on a firmer basis, was started in 1913, in which year the amount received was £52 16s. 3d., in 1914 it was £43 12s. 0d., in 1915, £14 13s. 6d., while this third year of the War we have received, as I have already said, no less than £181.

The third point to which I wish to draw attention is that one of our members has made a very striking proposition. He came to me some months ago and said that his business had brought him in somewhat more profit than ordinary during the War. It was a perfectly natural and inevitable thing that it should do so in his particular business, but he felt that such profit did not belong to him but should be offered to God. He had a large Bible-class composed of a number of young working men, and he had been impressed with the way in which the working population of this country had lost its faith in the Scriptures; and therefore he thought that if a number of tracts could be published, bringing out the results which were set forth in many volumes of the Victoria Institute, tracts which would appeal to such a constituency as he was acquainted with, it would be a great work, and might do something to fight that want of faith in the Bible which he so much deplored. He offered, therefore, the sum of £200 for that purpose, and Dr. Schofield has kindly undertaken the preparation of a series of tracts from the volumes in the Victoria Institute.
Bishop Thornton moved the first Resolution:—

That the Report and Statement of Accounts for the year 1916 herewith submitted be adopted, and that the thanks of the meeting be tendered to the Council, officers, and auditors for the efficient manner in which they have carried on the affairs of the Institute during the past year.

As an old member of the Institute, I think I voice the feeling of the Members and Associates when I say we have confidence in the Council and officers, and are very thankful indeed to feel that the valuable work of the Victoria Institute during this last year of strain and stress has been carried on so vigorously. The Institute is manifestly going strong, and we are thankful to the Council and officers for carrying on the work so efficiently.

The resolution was seconded by the Rev. Canon E. A. Chichester, and agreed to.

Mr. Norman Holmes moved the following resolution:—


The resolution was seconded by Miss Morier and carried.


Dr. Schofield seconded the resolution, and it was carried.
On the motion of Mr. J. O. Corrie, seconded by Mr. T. B. Bishop, H. Lance Gray, Esq., and George Avenell, Esq., were appointed Honorary Auditors for the year 1917.

The Chairman made a few remarks concerning the change of secretaryship: The War (he said) has forced upon us, as upon nearly every branch of life, new conditions and difficulties, and three gentlemen have most generously come forward to help us at this time. They are gentlemen who will command confidence. All three are on the Council, and we look forward to a time of very considerable prosperity under their guidance. Mr. Sewell, who is well known, and has given us two excellent papers, is Editorial Secretary of the Sub-Committee of the Bible Society, a very important position; he has kindly undertaken the ordinary work of secretary. Mr. Maunder is also well known; it is very good of him now that he has again taken up full work at the Observatory, and also, as I understand, for a time, the secretarialship of the British Astronomical Association, to continue a great part of his former work. The third gentleman, Dr. Thirtle, is likewise well known. He is assistant editor of The Christian, and author of several excellent works. He will not appear before us at these public gatherings, as he is always busy on Mondays, but he has kindly consented to undertake the editing of the volumes and discussions—work which although unseen is most necessary and laborious. All these gentlemen are honorary workers.

Another word about the assistance rendered by the gentleman who does not wish his name to be mentioned, and who has given £200 for tracts. We are very much obliged to him, and also to Dr. Schofield, who, as we know, has given lectures here. He is widely known and has been a very successful writer. He has already circulated a large quantity of literature on health subjects. Everything looks hopeful for the circulation of these tracts. We have celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Victoria Institute, but we are not old or worn out, and we hope that, with the blessing of God, this effort may usher in a renewal of youth. From the records of the Institute, which are very miscellaneous and rather difficult of access, Dr. Schofield may be trusted to bring forth truths and arguments to suit the men and women of our country.

Mr. Martin Rouse referred to the loss sustained by the death of General Halliday. He had attended the Meetings when, by reason
of old age, it was difficult for him to get on the platform. But his intellect was bright and clear, and he wished, by his presence, to show his thorough sympathy with, and support of, the efforts of the Institute.

On the motion of Mr. Joseph Graham, seconded by Mr. T. B. Bishop, the thanks of the Meeting were accorded to Colonel Mackinlay for presiding.
853rd Ordinary General Meeting,

Held in Committee Room B, The Central Hall, Westminster, on Monday, December 11th, 1916, at 4.30 p.m.

The Rev. Prebendary H. E. Fox, M.A., in the Chair.

The Minutes of the Meeting held on July 11th were read and confirmed, and the Secretary announced the Election of Mrs. Annie Trotter, Mr. Alfred Holness, Mr. P. Traer Harris, the Rev. W. Shaw Caldecott, and Miss Edith Mayfield as Associates of the Institute, and of the Rev. Walter Robbins, the Rev. G. B. Durrant, and the Rev. G. Parker as Missionary Associates.

The Secretary drew the attention of the Meeting to the great loss which the Institute had suffered by the recent death of David Howard, Esq., D.L., F.C.S., Vice-President and Trustee, and read a Resolution of sympathy with Mr. Howard's wife and family which the Council had passed that afternoon, the Members and friends present standing during the reading in token of respect.


Introduction.

When any two religions are brought for any considerable length of time into close contact with one another, it is natural to expect them to exercise more or less of an influence, for good or evil, upon each other. An instance of this is afforded by comparing the immense change which has been produced upon the religion of the Indian Aryans by the corrupt polytheistic and animistic faiths of the Daśyus, or native inhabitants, whom they subdued. Other influences besides this doubtless operated to effect the enormous change which becomes evident when we compare the religion of the Rig-Veda with Modern Hindûism, but not a slight part of the degradation which we find in the latter is directly traceable to the influence of which we speak. In the same way, the Buddhism of China is very different from Buddha's original teaching, as learnt from the Tipitakas of Ceylon, and originally of Magadha. The religions of Japan, again, have powerfully affected, and been in turn affected by, the Mahāyāna system of Buddhism introduced from Korea and China.
It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that, wherever we find that any other religion, ancient or modern, has for a long course of years been in contact with Christianity in any form, the former has had an impress made upon it by Christian rites and ceremonies, and even by Christian doctrines. Sometimes one result of this has been to modify the non-Christian faith very considerably. In some cases the latter has adopted certain Christian doctrines, in whole or in part. Sometimes the influence is manifested by the introduction of practices which have been openly adopted from those of Christian Missions. At other times, certain incidents related in the Gospels have been taken into the religious books of the other religion in a more or less modified form. Occasionally, Christian sentiments, and even maxims, have been consciously or unconsciously borrowed. But in whatever form, and under whatever disguise, Christianity has always exercised an influence.

Strangely enough, the elements thus taken over from Christianity have at times been erroneously supposed by prejudiced observers to have been derived by Christianity from the other system. Hence, in modern times, men have boldly asserted that the doctrine of our Lord's Virgin Birth has been derived from Buddhism, in which religion in none of its many varieties does that dogma really find place. So, too, the doctrine of the Trinity has been, quite as erroneously, traced to the Hindū Trimūrti. In all such cases, careful examination of the actual facts has shown that, either there is no real connexion or resemblance at all, or that the borrowing has been on the other side. For instance, when we hear people comparing the so-called "Resurrection" of Osiris with our Lord's Resurrection, we find that the ancient Egyptians taught that Osiris' body still lay in its tomb, and had not come to life again on earth, though his spirit was supposed to reign in Amenti. In the Finnish Kalevala, again, the story of Marjatta* is merely a confused and corrupt form of the Gospel narrative of Christ's Nativity. Thus the passage, instead of proving what a hasty opponent fancies, is really an example of the influence which Christianity has exercised on another religion.

It is true that there is danger, on the other hand, of being too hasty in ascribing to borrowing from Christianity ideas and practices which do not spring from it at all. Thus, when we find in certain forms of Hindūism the doctrines of Prasāda (Grace), and Bhakti (sometimes rendered faith), it would be

* Runo L. (Forsman's Finnish text and Finnish notes, name index).
wrong to assert that they are necessarily of Christian origin and borrowed from the New Testament. On the contrary, the doctrine of Prasâda "goes back as far as literature takes us" in the Bhâgavata religion. Bhakti, too, is found inculcated in the oldest part of the Bhagavad-Gîtâ, which may date from the second century B.C. But its resemblance to Christian "Faith" is not nearly so great as some have imagined.

Another instance of what we may call a fortuitous coincidence may be mentioned in order to emphasize the necessity of caution in this matter. In the Rig-Veda the dead is said to "go home," and the words Astam ehi are used in dismissing the spirit from the body when laid on the funeral pyre. Strangely enough, among the native inhabitants of Southern Bantuland, the same expression "to go home" is* used to denote the spirit's departure from the body. Yet it is hardly probable that the Bantu tribes ever studied the Rig-Veda, or were in close contact with the ancient Aryans in Vedic times.

Somewhat similarly, from certain casual resemblances between some of Seneca's sentiments and those in Saint Paul's Epistles, it has been supposed that the Roman Stoics had come under the Christian Apostle's influence; and to prove this a series of letters between them has been forged. But careful study has disproved the assumption. Again, an attempt has been made to show that Epictetus, if not actually at heart a Christian, at least had been powerfully impressed by what he is presumed to have learnt of Christian ethics, possibly directly or indirectly from St. Paul. The theory rests upon the fact that, in the Encheiridion and in Arrian's report of the philosopher's teaching, a very great resemblance in diction has been observed between Epictetus and the language of the New Testament. But our recently acquired knowledge of the common dialect of the Greek language used in ordinary correspondence and the literature of that time completely accounts for this resemblance, while there are in his writings and discourses many points in which his teaching is quite opposed to that of the New Testament. For example, he uses τατηνως and its compounds with the old heathen sense of "mean-spirited," instead of with the Christian significance of "humble." Moreover, his polytheism and pantheism are thoroughly Stoic, and completely contrary to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. His one reference to the persecuted Christians of his time shows neither compassion, sympathy, nor admiration; for, he says, in reference to fearless-

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* Macdonald in J.A.I., vol. xx, pp. 120, 121.
ness in meeting death, ἔτω ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναται τις σωτῆς διατεθήναι πρὸς ταῦτα, καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλαται.

In any such enquiry as that in which we are now engaged, it is necessary, therefore, to guard most carefully against being misled by merely casual resemblances. For example, in Pāli Buddhistic works, Buddha is sometimes styled Deva-Devo, which has been rendered, "God of God," and compared with the title "God of God" given to our Lord in the Nicene Creed. But there are two fallacies in this comparison which completely vitiate it. One is, that the Buddhism of the Pāli Canon practically denies the existence of any Being worthy to be styled "God," for Deva to a genuine Buddhist denotes a being inferior to Buddha, and needing to believe in Buddha in order to obtain Nirvāṇa. The other is that the Greek expression in the Creed is Θεός ἐκ Θεοῦ, God from God, which bears no real likeness whatever to the Pāli phrase.

It will be convenient to divide our subject into two parts. Part I treats of Ancient Religions which are now extinct. Part II deals with those religions which whether ancient or modern, are still in existence as a vital force in some part of the world at the present day.

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PART I.

INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY ON RELIGIONS WHICH ARE NOW EXTINCT.

A.—ON THE RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHIES OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

The rise of a new religion was by no means an unknown thing in the Roman Empire. Although in early days no foreign faith was permitted to spread among Roman citizens, yet the immense numbers of slaves brought from many different lands must have made the Romans aware that, besides their own gods (whether those of the State or of the family), many other deities were worshipped in their territory. In process of time the rites of Bacchus, of the Magna Mater (204 B.C.), of Isis, Serapis, Mithra, and other foreign gods and goddesses, found an entrance, openly or secretly, into Rome and the provinces. Each of these in turn exercised a greater or less degree of influence. Judaism had made itself something of a power (not altogether for good) in Rome long ere the preaching
of the Gospel there. The ancient Roman law* forbidding the introduction of extraneous religions was all but a dead letter in the first century of our era. Yet, as we know, Christianity was, almost or quite alone, exposed to terrible persecutions, beginning with that under Nero in A.D. 64 (for that in which the Jews under Claudius were expelled from the city affected Christians only accidentally, so to speak), and continuing at intervals until Constantine’s Edict of Toleration in A.D. 313.

Though Christianity was not declared a *Religio Licta* until A.D. 261, yet its very persecutions show how great must have been its influence upon the community. Nero’s persecution of a sect deemed “hostile to the human race” proved that its teachings were already felt to be exerting an influence opposite to that produced by other faiths, and hateful to those who were devoted to gladiatorial shows, sensual pleasures, and other evil things then popular. Another proof of its influence is afforded by the fact that certain of the Emperors admitted Christ into the number of the deities whom they worshipped. Lampridius says that Alexander Severus and Hadrian did this. Tertullian states the same, with less probability, of Tiberius. Severus, we are told, set up statues of Christ, Abraham, Orpheus, and Apollonius of Tyana, along with the Lares and Penates, in his private shrine.

The opposition offered to the progress of Christianity by learned men such as Celsus and Porphyry is yet one more indication of the extent of Christian influence. The same may be said of Lucian’s scoffs at *Peregrinus* (St. Paul?) and of the attempt to create in Apollonius of Tyana a heathen rival to Christ. Apart from Tertullian’s boast of the immense number of converts who in his time began to be found, even in the camp and the palace, and the evidence to the same effect borne by the failure of persecution to stamp out the new faith, and leaving aside the spread of Christianity from Syria to Britain and beyond the limits of the Empire to Armenia and the Goths, two facts must here be mentioned. One is the attempt made by Aurelian, in imitation of and in opposition to Christian Monotheism, to cause the Palmyrene Sun-god to be recognised as the Supreme God of the Empire (December 25th being entitled “Natalis Invicti”), and Diocletian’s effort to make Mithra the Protector of the Roman world; or, again, Julian’s exhortations to the heathen to imitate the Christians, whom he

* “Separatim nemo habessit deos, neve novos; sed ne advenas nisi publice adscitos privatim colunto.”
hated, in works of charity, and his endeavour to stir them up to devotion to Apollo and the other gods, that thus Christian progress might be stayed.

The second great fact, more important than all other evidence of the influence of Christian teaching on those who did not become Christians, is the gradual but steady process of the softening of cruel and brutal habits and customs, especially, perhaps, under the Antonines (A.D. 138–80). This softening influence was manifested in kindness to slaves and relaxation of the cruel laws relating to their treatment, in gentleness to children, in Trajan’s monthly allowance to Roman and Italian children of impoverished families, in increased facilities for education, and in other social ameliorations. Some of this may be attributed to the effect of good philosophic maxims; but such theories had been in the air, if we may so say, long previously, without being carried into practice, until Christian example had made them effective. Gaston Boissier* points to Marcus Aurelius’ tenderness towards his children, and contrasts it with Cicero’s and Seneca’s tone in speaking of the little ones.

The religious revival of the second century was no doubt largely influenced by Christianity, just as has been the case in our own time in India and Ceylon, where the progress of Christianity has produced many attempts to revive and purify Hindúism, Islám and Buddhism. In the ancient world also Christian influence led to an endeavour to purify morality and to call attention to the evil effects of heathen mythology. No doubt Plato and Seneca, among others, had already denounced these evils; but their philosophy had failed to effect a cure; nor were these men themselves examples of moral conduct. In the second century we find in the heathen world a tendency towards belief in One God spreading in the Empire; but, apart from Christianity and Judaism, this always, even among philosophers, led to Pantheism—not to the recognition of the Living God. Even Epictetus, though he approaches nearer to true Monotheism than any other philosopher of his time, never attains to it, nor does he free himself from the Pantheism of his school. The Octavius of Minucius Felix shows how powerfully Christian Monotheism attracted a clever Roman heathen to accept Christianity; and how different it seemed to him from the vague philosophical ideas on the subject with which he was acquainted!

No doubt Quadratus’ Apology, addressed to Hadrian, that of

* La Religion Romaine, vol. ii.
Aristides, and that written by Justin Martyr in Marcus Aurelius' time, all helped forward the progress of Christianity among the upper classes, and influenced those who did not actually accept the faith.

B.—ON TWO EXTINCT RELIGIONS OF PERSIAN ORIGIN, AND ON THE RELIGIONS OF THE KELTS, SCANDINAVIANS, AND FINNS.

The Persians have always been susceptible to foreign religions. Hence Mithraism, which in its day was Christianity's most dangerous rival, seems to have borrowed not a few of its rites from Christianity, or at least modified its own through Christian influence.*

Manichæism also, a compound of Mazdaism, Buddhism and Christianity,† endeavoured to attract adherents by borrowing largely from the latter. Mâñi (Manes) recognized a Triad consisting of the Father of Light, the Son of Light, and the Pure Spirit (or White Dove). He spoke of "Buddha, Zoroaster and Jesus" as his predecessors in the contest between the Kingdom of Light and the Kingdom of Darkness, and himself claimed to be the Paraclete promised by Christ. He employed such Christian terms as "the old man" (by which he meant the carnal body), "the new man," etc. In imitation of our Lord he chose twelve Disciples, or "Masters." These in turn consecrated seventy-two "Episcopi," who then ordained "presbyteri." The Manichaean Baptism and Sacred Meal may also have been of Christian origin. Holy Scripture was boldly perverted in order to support Manichaean teaching.

Among the Kelts, Christian influence may be traced in the legends which in Brittany led the people to look for the return of Lemenik (in Wales styled Lleminawg) to put an end to discords and to give his people victory over their foes. The Arthurian cycle contains much the same prophecy regarding King Arthur's expected reappearance. The story of the Holy Graal contains some Christian elements.‡

The Norsemen saw in their tale of the death of "Balder the Beautiful"§ a great resemblance to the Gospel account of Christ's character and death when they came under Christian influence.

† Journal Asiatique, November-December, 1911, and March-April, 1913.
‡ Villemarqué, Myrdhin.
§ Gylfaginning.
and learnt something of the Christian faith. It has indeed been thought that the whole story of Balder’s death and the description of his character, so different from that of the other Scandinavian deities, is due to some acquaintance with the Gospel Message.

Among the Slavonians it is not easy to trace influence to any great extent. On the Finns, however, as we have pointed out in the Introduction, the Gospel narrative of our Lord’s birth was not without effect, in that it left its trace on their ancient religion, as we learn from the legend of Marjatta.

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PART II.

THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY OVER RELIGIONS THAT STILL SURVIVE.

In dealing with this very extensive department of our subject, perhaps it will be best to divide it into three sections. In the first we shall treat of the influence of Christianity on the still extant religions of the Farther East, comprising India, China, and Japan; in the second we shall have to consider how Christianity has affected the faiths of the Nearer East—that is to say, Arabia, Persia, and Africa; and in the third to inquire what its influence has been on two religions which fit into neither of these divisions—to wit, Neo-Judaism and Neo-Zoroastrianism. This arrangement is not intended to be exact, but it is convenient for several reasons. Among other things, the chief religions of the Farther East may be said to have arisen long before the Christian Era, while those of the Nearer East are of much more recent origin. It is true that in a certain sense no religion has ever died out completely, and that no absolutely new religion has ever been born. Doubtless certain Islàmic tenets and practices may be traced back to a time prior to the death of Abraham, and are quite as ancient as anything to be found in the Rig-Veda of India; yet on the whole the fact remains that Islàm with its off-shoots originated as a system centuries after our Lord’s time, while Hindùism in its oldest known form, found in the Vedas, existed as a religion in very early times.
A.—Christian Influence on the Religions of the Farther East.

I.—Hindûism.

(1) Bhâgavantism in its Later Developments.

Hindûism, as Sir Monier Monier-Williams* has well pointed out, has assimilated with itself some feature of each of the various religions with which in its long history it has come into contact. The amorphous mass, though yielding to every impact, has yet shown sufficient power of resistance to absorb a great deal from without, while remaining in its essential characteristics unaffected thereby, and retaining its own philosophy and even many of its ancient rites and practices. Krishnâ, the most popular god in India to-day, is not among the deities mentioned in the Rig-Veda. His worship in all probability was borrowed from the aborigines whom the Aryans conquered and absorbed into the lower strata of the population. Demon-worship, idolatry, and probably the doctrine of transmigration, came from the same source. These are but examples of the way in which Hindûism in the past showed itself tolerant of new ideas and welcomed fresh deities into the Pantheon—as it does still. This plasticity, so to speak, would render it easy for various forms of Christianity to begin to exercise more or less influence upon the chief Indian religions (Hindûism and Buddhism especially) as soon as it came in touch with them.

This must have occurred as early as the first century of our era. Tradition relates that St. Thomas preached the Gospel in Parthia and India,† though it is true that the term India was used in an extremely vague sense in antiquity. Yet the fact that the name of the “Indian” king Gûndaphorus,‡ who is declared to have sent for and heard St. Thomas, is said to have been found in a Sanskrit form on an early coin, lends some support to the story that the Apostle visited the country. If so, it is very probable that Christianity has been known to some in India ever since that time. At any rate, the existence of the “Christians of St. Thomas” has been traced back to A.D. 522. Christian doctrines were certainly known in Northern India.§ “in the seventh century, and possibly long before this.”

* Hindûism, p. 85.
† Eusebius, Hist. Ecc. III, 1.
§ Hopkins, Religions of India, p. 567.
As far as morality is concerned, Christian influence upon the life of India and upon the teaching given by its poets and philosophers was certainly very slight in early days. In neither the Mahâbhârata nor in any of the Purânas do we find anything resembling Christian, or even merely human, beneficence taught; but in matters of less import we discover traces of the influence of Christian theology, though very much misunderstood and corrupted. Such an authority as Dr. Grierson is of opinion that the Bhâgavata triad, consisting of Bhagavân, his various Incarnations, and his Śakti, may have originated, in part at least, from some confused knowledge of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, learned from the Syrian Church of Malabar, the Śakti (Lakshmi) being derived from the conception of the Virgin Mary, possibly confused with the Holy Spirit. He supposes that the influence of other branches of the Christian Church may also have made itself felt, even though it would be rash to attribute the doctrine of Avatâras entirely to this source; for in Vedic literature—dating long before the Christian era—the same idea is found in connexion with Brahmâ, Indra, and Vishnu, though later it was held in reference to Vishnu only. *

The Avatâra doctrine, though bearing some resemblance to the Christian belief in an Incarnation, and doubtless powerfully influenced thereby, is distinguished from the latter by two important characteristics. Firstly, in an Avatâra Vishnu does not really become a man (or a fish, or a boar, or whatever else it may be), but only assumes that form for a time “in sport” (īdā); in fact, he acts a part for a special purpose, somewhat according to the Docetic theory. Secondly, the god in his Avatâras is never regarded as a model for man’s imitation, from the moral or from any other standpoint.† Even in the Bhâgavata Purâna, which Grierson thinks very probably dates from the thirteenth century, and is certainly a late work, the Hindû conception of an Avatâra is what we have said, for we read: “The transgression of virtue and the daring acts which are witnessed in gods must not be charged as faults to these glorious persons. Let no one other than a god ever, even in thought, practise them.”‡

Later still Tulasi-Dâs, in the sixteenth century, though teaching that Râmaçandra should be worshipped as the one Incarna-

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‡ Book X, cap. 33, sl. 30, 31.
tion of Vishṇu, still maintains something of the same view, for he says in his Hindi Râmâyana: "The fool who, in the pride of knowledge, presumes to copy them [the gods], saying, It is the same for a man as for a god, shall be cast into hell for as long as the world lasts."*

So, too, Māṇikka Vācakar says of Śiva’s manifestation of himself in a somewhat similar manner, that all his appearances are illusion. Whether he seems to be a groom, a coolie, or something else, he is all the time the “Great Deceiver,” with nothing real in the appearances.

Perhaps one of the earliest dogmatic statements about the manner and object of Vishṇu’s various Avatāras is that contained in the Bhagavad-Gītā, where the god says:—†

“For whenever, 0 son of Bharata, there occurs a decrease of religion,
An uprising of irreligion, then I produce myself:
For the preservation of the pious and for the destruction of evil-doers,
For the establishment of religion, I am born from age to age.”

Here again we see that there is a great and essential difference between the Hindū Avatāra and the Christian Incarnation doctrine. But there is sufficient resemblance to warrant the conclusion that, though the former is not derived directly from Christian teaching, yet its development has been steadily carried on in such a way as to approach nearer and nearer to the Christian doctrine, though without ever coinciding with it. Tulasi-Dās’s near approach to monotheism in his devotion to Rāma, whom he endeavours to depict as in part divine and in part human, shows at once how deeply the Indian mind feels the need of an Incarnation, and how completely the Avatāra theory fails to satisfy that natural human yearning for personal knowledge of, and communion with, the Living God.

In the legends about Krishṇa—at least in their late Purānic form—clear traces of Christian influence are evident. When Krishṇa first appears in Sanskrit literature, in the Čhandogya Upanishad,† there is nothing either divine or mysterious about him. In the later parts of the Bhagavad-Gītā he is depicted as an Avatāra of Vishṇu, but nothing is related of him which in

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* Farquhar, pp. 394, 395.
† Book IV, sl. 7, 8.
‡ Book III, § 17, 6.
any way recalls to us the Gospel narrative. On the other hand, in the Śândilya Sûtras, which Cowell has shown to be quite modern in date, we find distinct, though grotesque, imitations of the Gospel account of such incidents as the Massacre of the Innocents, the Birth in a stable, and the visit of three Wise Men.* Even in the Purânas, which give marvellous tales about Krïśṇa, these details are not found. They are therefore additions to the Hindû version of the story. Hopkins† is quite certain that these legends were introduced into India and attached to the Krïśṇa-myth from Christian sources later than A.D. 600. He thinks they were probably brought to India at the time when (in A.D. 639) King Śilådëya welcomed some Syrian Christians to his Court. Of still later introduction is the account of how Krïśṇa restored to life a believing woman's son, which is recorded only in the quite modern Jaimini-Bhârata.

The Purânas, which give accounts of the mythical life and deeds of Krïśṇa, have exercised and still exercise an almost unbounded influence upon the minds of the masses in India. Hopkins thinks that there can be no doubt that the development of these legends owes a great deal to garbled accounts of certain incidents in the life of our Lord. “The outer Christianity reflected in the Purânïc legends is as palpable as it is shocking.”‡ As Krïśṇa is represented as delighting in murder and adultery, it is no wonder that love is always identified with sensuality and power with cruelty. As Viṣṇu merely plays a part and does not set a moral example for man's imitation, hence to the Indian mind there is nothing revolting in Krïśṇa's sporting with the Gopis or in his other deeds recorded in the Purânas. He is the Divine Actor, lightheartedly playing a part in the tragic comedy of human life. If we remember that these Sanskrit writers consider that history and fable are one and the same thing (itihåsa), we can understand that garbled, confused, forms of certain Gospel scenes may have been the original sources of these Krïśṇa-legends.

Here it may be useful to enquire, by what criterion are we to decide whether these legends about Krïśṇa have arisen from corruption of the Gospel narratives, or whether, on the other hand (as some modern opponents have asserted), the Gospel accounts have been derived from the Indian legends about

* Weber’s Krïśṇa’s Geburtsfest (Krïshnajanmåśåtami).
† Rel. of India, pp. 430, 431, 503, note.
‡ Ibid., p. 429.
Krishna. The matter is of some importance because we find the same Antichristian argument starting up again and again, in slightly different forms, in reference to many Bible narratives, both in the New Testament and in the Old. The criteria are two. The first is that, other things being equal, the simpler and more unvarnished form of an account is more ancient than the highly elaborated, for "a story never loses in the telling." The second is that, if we have any knowledge of the dates at which the two accounts were composed, the older of the two cannot have been derived from the later. Thus these criteria would prove that the writer of the narratives of the Creation, the Fall, and the Flood, in Genesis, did not borrow his information from Milton's "Paradise Lost."

Other illustrations are easily given. For instance, in Sanskrit literature there are several accounts of the Deluge which is said to have occurred in Manu's time. One of these is found in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and another in the Mahābhārata. Now if we compare these two narratives with one another, we perceive that the simpler form of the story is that given in the former: and this is also the earlier in date of composition. The story of Buddha's life and death in the Pāli canonical books of the Tipitaka is vastly simpler and less elaborated than that in the much later Sanskrit Lalita Vistara.

Just in the same way the earliest forms of the tales about King Arthur given in Nennius and in the Lives of the Saints are less poetical and far less romantic than those found in Malory, in the Welsh Red Book of Hergest, in Tennyson's "Idylls of the King," or even in Geoffrey of Monmouth. The recently discovered Sumerian tale of the Flood seems, as far as its fragments have been deciphered, less fanciful and less full of details than the Babylonian story of Šit-Napishtim which was found in Assurbani-pal's library at Nineveh. Reasonable criticism would apply the same criteria to the solution of certain Old Testament problems. It would thus appear, for instance, that the Hebrew account of the Flood as given in Genesis is more ancient than the Babylonian, and cannot have been derived from it. In the same way, if there is any connexion between the Egyptian "Tale of the Two Brothers" and the history of Joseph in Genesis, the Hebrew narrative cannot have been taken from the Egyptian legend, though the converse process is quite possible.

* Eighth Adhyāya, 1st Brāhmaṇa (Bibliotheca Indica, vol. i, pp. 525 sqq.).
If we apply these two criteria to the Purānic legends of Krishna, it will be evident why we decide that they may contain corrupt accounts of certain events recorded in the Gospels, but that the contrary hypothesis is uncritical.

It is only right to say that the assertion that these Purānic legends speak of Krishna's Virgin Birth, his Crucifixion, and his Resurrection, is absolutely void of the slightest foundation.

But, beside these late legends about Krishna's supposed doings, the religion of his worshippers has another and far more important aspect, the doctrinal. Two of the most noteworthy doctrines are those relating to Prasāda and Bhakti. The doctrine of Prasāda in the Bhāgavata religion goes back to about the second century B.C.* Both the Vaishnava and the Śalva Schools teach that the Deity is full of grace and pity (karuṇā). This conviction grows steadily stronger and stronger in mediaeval times,—doubtless in large measure through Christian influence—but it cannot be said to owe its origin to historical Christianity. It is rather, in Tertullian's words, "the testimony of the human soul, naturally Christian." We welcome it as an example, one out of many, of the way in which "the light that lighteth every man coming into the world" has illuminated some hearts and poured into their darkness some of the dawning rays of the Sun of Righteousness. The light might have been quenched long since, had not the Gospel message, however feebly, sounded forth in the eager ears of a few of India's noblest sons, and enabled such men, and especially the comparatively modern vernacular poets, Tulasi-Dās, Tukārām, and Māṇikka Vācakar, to proclaim once more these great truths.

The doctrine entitled Bhakti-mārga or the "Way of Devotion," that is salvation through devotion to Viṣṇu or to one of his Avatāras, may be said to be peculiar to Vaishnavism, and specially to Bhāgavantism. These Avatāras are all personal deities, such as Krishna and Rāma. The human soul (jīva) is held to be an emanation from Bhagavān and to live forever as an individual, instead of being absorbed again into the Deity, as some Hindū sects teach. The soul is subjected to transmigration after transmigration, until it becomes free (mukta) from all bonds through having gradually grown to perfect devotion (bhakti) to Bhagavān. Having in this process and by means of devotion become like the Deity, the conscious, personal soul

remains for ever sitting in perfect happiness at His feet. Here again we trace the influence of Christian teaching, though it is strangely mixed with the Pantheistic Hindu idea of emanation and that of Metempsychosis, and uses terms which, like Mukta, are elsewhere employed to convey the contrary conception of absorption into the impersonal All.

Yet it must be admitted that, probably because the doctrine of bhakti in its fully developed form is not truly indigenous in India it has been much abused and misapplied. Even in some of the Upanishads salvation through bhakti has come to mean escape from the punishment of sin through the simple, even unconscious, repetition of such names as Râma, Nárâyâna, or other Avatâras of Vishnu. Thus we read in the Kârâyanâ Upanishad, v. 5, “He Who reveres the phrase Om, Namo Nârâ-yanâya (Amen, honour to Vishnu), his portion shall be Vai-kuntha’s Heaven.” The robber Valmiki, when murdering Brâhmaṇs, used the word mâr (strike). As this word when spelled backwards becomes the sacred name Râm, he was not only saved by its repetition but became equal in dignity to Brahmâ himself.

Much later, too, absolute devotion of tan, man, dhan (body, mind, property) to the service of a man who, being descended from someone reputed to have been in some degree an incarnation of Krishnâ, is esteemed the proper recipient of divine honours, is declared to be necessary and sufficient to procure salvation for the devotee. Caitanya* (born about A.D. 1485) made this a distinctive feature of his system. This still leads in India to the most immoral conduct, and the total submission of the worshipper to the caprices of inhuman monsters, guilty of the most abominable wickedness.

We must add that in modern India a strenuous effort is being made to render Krishnâ the successful rival of Christ as the object of men’s entire devotion. A book entitled, The Imitation of Krishnâ, appeared some years ago. The title speaks for itself, and displays this rivalry openly. But, beside this, the influence of Christianity is shown in the fact that imitation of Krishnâ implies that he should be taken as a model, though this is contrary to Hindû thought about the functions of an Avatar. Just as in the last days of Classical heathenism the influence of Christianity was clearly manifested in the effort made by Julian the Apostate and others to revive the worship of Apollo and

other forms of the Sun-god in opposition to the claims of Christ, so it is in India at the present time in relation to Krishṇa.

An attempt has been made to prove the existence of Christian influence in the composition of the Bhagavad-Gītā, and quite a number of passages have been culled* from it and compared with those in the New Testament, with which it has been thought that some similarity exists. But the more carefully the Bhagavad-Gītā is studied, the less grounded does the comparison appear to be. Such comparisons are apt to be misleading, and the greatest care should be exercised before admitting them. An instance of this is afforded by the supposed quotation of the Golden Rule in the Mahābhārata. This enormous Epic consists of some 220,000 lines. Some scholars suppose it to have been begun in the fourth or fifth century before Christ, and completed about the end of the sixth century of our era. Hence it would be quite possible for a passage from one of the Gospels to occur in it, yet there are good reasons for doubting the Christian origin of the sentiment referred to. It occurs more than once in the form

"Na tat parasya sandadhīyāt pratikūlam yad ātmanas":
"One should not inflict upon another what is unpleasant to oneself."

The resemblance to the Golden Rule is clear. But this form of the precept differs from that in the Gospel by being purely negative, while that which our Lord gives in Matt. vii, 12, is positive. The difference here is enormous. Again, it should be noticed that the same negative form of the precept occurs in earlier Buddhist works. For example, in the Dhammapada we have:†

"Na hi verena verani sammant' idha kudāčanaṁ, Averena-ča sammanti, esa dhammo sanantano":
"For not by hatred are hatreds ever caused to cease here (on earth): by absence of hatred they are caused to cease; this is the perpetual rule."

As this book is pre-Christian, the sentiment cannot be due to Christian influence. It is, moreover, well known that Confucius uttered practically the same opinion, for he commended "Reciprocity,"‡ saying it meant, "Do not to others what you would not wish done to you." From the Buddhists it was adopted by the Hindūs, and is repeated in various forms in the Hitopadśa, the Pāṇḍātantra, and other Sanskrit works.

* E.g., in Monier-Williams' Hinduism, pp. 212-217.
† SL. 5, cf. SL. 133, 134, etc.
‡ Analects, Book XV, 23.
At least one passage in the Mahābhārata may well be due to Christian influence—the account of the future Kali-Avatāra of Vishnū. There it is stated that, at the end of the age, Vishnū will appear as Kalki, mounted on a white horse, bearing in his hand a drawn sword, for the purpose of slaying the wicked.* This may be derived from Revelation vi, 8.

Some writers have been much impressed with the importance of the conception which they think is represented by the word Trimūrti, but the most opposite views have been expressed on the subject. Certain writers have thought that this “great Hindū doctrine of the Trinity” is borrowed from Christianity, and they mention it as a very potent argument in proof of the extent of early Christian influence in India. On the other hand, it has been asserted that this doctrine is very ancient in India, that it is one of the leading dogmas of Hindūism, that the Christian Church has here taken over into her theology a doctrine which is purely heathen, and that the proof of its Hindū origin is that in the Elephanta Cavern near Bombay a statue with three faces, representing the Trimūrti and “of immense antiquity,” still exists.

The whole argument well illustrates the danger of yielding to prejudice instead of calmly studying the facts of the case. These are† briefly as follows: (1) The figure in the Elephanta Cave is now admitted to represent not the Trimūrti, but only Śiva in his three aspects; (2) It is a sculpture of quite modern date, not more than some five or six centuries old; (3) the Hindū Trimūrti represents three distinct gods, Brahmā, Vishnū, and Śiva, not a tri-unity, but a Triad, such as is often found in many different religions (cf. the Capitoline Triad of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva); (4) The conception‡ in India is not older than the Middle Ages, and hence may have been due to Christian influence; (5) especially because the word Trimūrti as an adjective meaning “three-formed” (tri-formis) is applied in Sanskrit literature to each of the three gods, Brahmā, Vishnū, and Śiva; (6) At any rate, the “doctrine of the Trimūrti” is not an essential part of Hindūism, indeed, it can hardly be called a Hindū doctrine at all, since it is of no importance whatever in comparison with Belief in the Transmigration of Souls, the necessity for preserving caste, the religious supremacy of the Brahmins, and not a few other matters of that kind.

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* Book XII, sl. 12, 941, sqq.
† Cf. Moore, pp. 344, 345; Hopkins, p. 387.
‡ De Gubernatis, Enciclopedia indica, p. 363; De Harlez, Védisme, Brahmanisme et Christianisme, p. 112.
Rāmānuja, who flourished about the middle or end of the twelfth century of our era, was one of the chief founders of Hindū sects of the Middle Ages. His influence on those who came after him was immense, and it has by no means ceased in our own day. He, like many other leading Indian religious teachers, ventured to discard Sanskrit, and to use the living vernacular instead. In this matter there is a parallel between the Reformation in Europe and the attempts to reform Hindūism in India. A leading feature in the teaching of all these mediæval and modern Hindū religions is the great and growing emphasis which they one and all lay upon the necessity of bhakti. In no other way can salvation (mukti, moksha) be obtained than by this personal devotion to Vishnu in one of his manifestations, usually as Rāma or Krishņa. As has already been pointed out, the bhakti thus inculcated is very different from that mentioned in the Bhagavad-Gītā. It is far nobler and more spiritual, and the development is distinctly due to Christian influence upon the minds of Rāmānuja and his followers. There is in their teaching a near approach to belief in a Personal God, Who is full of grace and pity, and with Whom the devotee can attain to spiritual communion.

Rāmānanda was one of Rāmānuja's most distinguished followers. He chose for himself twelve disciples, taught the brotherhood of all believers, and declared that all castes were equal in the sight of the Deity. Christian influence is here very evident, although it is a well-known fact that from very early times all Indian ascetics have shaken off in their own persons the bonds of caste, in common with all other human ties and obligations.

Kabir taught about the end of the fourteenth century, and was another of Rāmānuja's followers. The details of his life are uncertain and legendary, but it is evident that he was a sincere seeker after truth. He is claimed by both Muslims and Hindūs, and he undoubtedly was something of an eclectic. This no doubt caused him to feel more sympathy with Hindūism than with the cold and exclusive theology of Islam. What we know of his teaching is fragmentary, and is contained in books written long after his death, especially the Bijak (about A.D. 1570), and part of the Ādi Granth of the Sikhs, circa 1590). Legends concerning him show clear traces of some knowledge of the Gospels among his followers, who mistakenly ascribed to their master things they had heard of Christ. Hence the legendary account
of Kabir's life contains remarkable parallels with certain incidents in the life of our Lord. There seem, for instance, to be some references to Virgin Birth. As a boy, Kabir worsts a learned Pudlit in argument (cf. the Lalita Vistara and the Apocryphal Gospels). He was blamed for associating with outcasts, and he miraculously supplied food to the poor. The religious leaders of the day were excited to hostility against him. He is said to have raised a boy and a girl from the dead. Women devotees waited upon him. Sikander Lodi tried to put him to death, but failed. Some of the details of his trial before this sovereign seem to have been modelled on those related of Christ's trial before Pilate. Kabir appears to have delivered his teaching orally and to have written nothing. Among the sayings recorded of him are several which recall certain passages of the New Testament. Such are the following:

"The things which are seen are transitory."
"What God desires is purity of heart."
"Men are saved by devotion (bhakti), and not by works."
"Perfect love casteth out fear."
"Whatever I have is not mine own: it is Thine. It is Thine own that I give Thee; what have I?"
"Small is the door of devotion as the tenth part of a mustard-seed. The heart of men is swollen with pride to the size of an elephant (cf. Matthew xix, 24, and Qur'an, Sûrah vii, 38), how can he pass within?"
"Those who sought found."

Kabir's disciples exist to the present day. They are known as Kabir-panthis, or "Walkers in Kabir's path." They are urged to fast on the last day of each lunar month and on Sundays. They celebrate a kind of sacrament, entitled "Jol-Prasâd ("Candle-flame and Grace," the word prasâd—in Sanskrit prasâda, "Divine favour,"—having now come to denote the food consumed in this rite), in which a kind of wafer is eaten. The ceremony is supposed to confer eternal life, if worthily performed. It is clear that Kabir was "not far from the Kingdom of God." There must be many more such humble seekers in India to-day.

Guru Nânak, the founder of the religion of the Sikhs (Sanskrit Sishya, "disciple"), was born at Lahore in A.D. 1469. He inculcated the Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of his own disciples. Nânak taught

* Wescott, Kabir and the Kabir-Panth, p. 36.
practical monotheism, but his followers persist in* worshipping him as an Incarnation, and then the Adi-Granth, their sacred book, as containing the Divine teaching which he received and gave. But the Sikhs are steadily sinking back into a debased Hinduism, though retaining the name and the outward rites of their faith.

Caitanya was born about A.D. 1485. His leading doctrine was the need of devotion (bhakti) centred in a man in each generation, who would be an Incarnation of Krishna. The influence of the Bhagavad-Gita is very strong in his system.†

Tulasi-Das belonged to the Ramânandî sect, and lived in the sixteenth century. His Braj Bhâshâ "Râmâyana" (which must not be confounded with the Sanskrit epic of the same name) teaches the worship of Râmacandra as the one Incarnation of the god Vishnu. The book contains a very great deal of what we may almost call Christian teaching under the garb of Hindu names and expressions. This is specially the case with regard to his teaching on devotion and grace. Christians might well employ much of the language in which he speaks of these subjects, were it not that the object of his devotion is not the historic Lord Jesus Christ, but the legendary Râmacandra, supposed to be an Avatar of the god Vishnu. It is because of their heathen associations that all Indian reformers have failed, and that their followers have sunk into Hindu sects, often polytheistic and immoral. Perhaps nothing in Tulasi-Das and in Mânîkka Vâcikar, who is often associated with him, is more distinctively Christian in origin than their doctrine of Vicarious Suffering. This seems to have brought much comfort to their own souls. And, as there is nothing of the kind in Hinduism, it is one of many indications of the influence which Christianity has exercised in moulding the religion which they taught.

(3) Modern Hindu Sects.

Our limits do not allow us to deal at all fully with the many sects of modern Hinduism, upon all of which Christian influences have been exerted to a greater or less degree. All we can do is to indicate how these influences have worked, and are even now working, in two of the chief of such Neo-Hindu forms of religion: (1) the Brahma-Samaj and its offshoots, and (2) the Arya-Samaj.

* Lillingston, The Brahma Samaj and Arya Samaj, p. 40; Moore, pp. 351, 352.
† Monier-Williams, Hinduism, p. 146; Lillingston, p. 35; Moore, pp. 134 sqq., 339.
The founder of the Brahmo-Samaj, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, was educated under direct Christian influence, but for some reason did not openly and fully accept Christianity. He endeavoured to reform Hinduism from within by correcting its abuses and borrowing from Christianity what seemed to him most necessary for the moral and spiritual regeneration of his country. He was influential in helping to abolish the practice of widow-burning, even before he founded the new sect in 1830. He taught belief in a Personal and Holy God, and even in outward matters adopted Christian methods of worship and conduct. In the Brahmo-Samaj he ordained the celebration of weekly united services, at which, in imitation of Christian worship, hymns were sung, a sermon delivered, and passages read from the Vedas. As he grew older, he felt that he had not succeeded in establishing a religion which would satisfy the heart of India. Yielding to no one in his admiration for Christ, he yet denied His Deity; but near the end of his life he admitted that India must finally accept the Christian faith.

His successor, Debendra-Nath Tagore, was less inclined towards Christianity. But in endeavouring to arrest its progress he imitated Christian practice by training and sending out missionaries to preach the doctrines of the Brahmo-Samaj and also by literature and educational work. To the ancient Hindu doctrines of Yoga, Bhakti, and Jñāna, Keshab Chandra Sen added the Christian conception of Sevā (service of God). In 1881, when there took place a division in the Samaj, the Sādhāran Brahmo-Samaj separating from the main body, Keshab Chandra Sen’s adherents called their sect “the Church of the New Dispensation” (Nava Vidhāna). He introduced Baptism and the Communion and then the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, identifying the Father, the Son, and the Blessed Spirit respectively with the Hindu Triad of attributes, Sat-Čit-ÂNanda (Existence, Thought, Joy), which in the Upanishads constitutes one of the names of Brahma (Śaḍvidānanda).

Brāhmaism, as the Brahmo-Samaj movement has been called, has had a great influence upon India through its social reform work. It has accustomed many people to look upon that movement with more favour than if such reforms had come directly instead of indirectly from a Christian source. But its tenets, though preached by quite a number of highly educated and most able men, have appealed only to the upper classes of Hindus, and among them only to those who have received a

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* Lillingston, Moore, Encyc. of Rel. and Ethics, vol. ii.
Western education. Not having given Christ His proper place, Brâhmaism is only an enlightened philosophical Theism, not "the power of God unto salvation." Everything in it productive of good is due to direct Christian influence. It claims to be the Universal Religion, but has already failed, even in India itself.

It should, however, be noticed that all these various Samâjes have broken entirely with orthodox Hindûism in one great point. All the Six Orthodox Systems of Hindû philosophy adopt as an axiom the statement, "Nâvastuno vastusiddhiḥ," which exactly corresponds to the Lucretian "Ex nihilo nihil fit." These modern movements admit instead that God can create, and has created, the Universe neither from Himself nor from some self-produced form of matter. Hence they avoid the Pantheism, with all its attendant confusion of evil and good, which is the very soul of Hindûism. This change is indicative of the immense effect which Christianity has produced on them.

The Ârya-Samâj, founded in 1875 by Dayânand Sarasvati, differs from the Brahmo-Samâj and its offshoots in being profoundly anti-Christian. It has become more of a political than of a religious movement, however. Its founder affirmed that not only all true religion, but all modern science, is contained in the Vedas. In worship the Ârya-Samâj retains the ancient Aryan fire-altar, burning homa (soma), or incense. Its creed is vague, and many of its members speak highly of Atheism, which doubtless they cherish in their hearts. It is more noted for bitter hatred of, and opposition to, Christianity than for anything else. Yet in worship and methods of work it has largely imitated Protestant Christianity. On Sunday morning there is worship, consisting of hymns, reading of the Vedas, and a lecture or sermon. Controversy, street-preaching, distribution of tracts, publication of newspapers, establishment of schools and orphanages, and the sending forth of missionaries, are among its methods of propagation.

We may sum up the influence of Christianity upon Hindûism in its various forms by making use of the following two quotations from the writings of men whose experience of India has been extensive. Our own study and personal knowledge of the subject lead to precisely the same conclusion.

"Christian dogma," says Hopkins, "was formally introduced into South India* in the sixth century; it was known in the

* Religions of India, p. 567.
North in the seventh, and possibly long before this; it was the topic of debate by educated Hindûs in the sixteenth and seventeenth. It has helped to mould the Hindûs' own most intellectual sects; and, either through the influence of Christian or native teaching, or that of both, have been created, not only the Northern Monotheistic Schools, but also the strict Unitarianism of the later southern sects, whose Scriptures, for at least some centuries, have inculcated the purest morality and simplest Monotheistic creed in language of the most elevated character." As an example he mentions the Sacred Kural of Tiruvalluvar Narayana.

Again, Sir Narayan Chandarvarkar, a Justice of the High Court and Chancellor of the Bombay University, says: "The ideas which lie at the heart of the Gospel of Christ are slowly but surely permeating every part of Hindû society and modifying every phase of Hindû thought."

II.—MAHÂYÂNA BUDDHISM IN CHINA AND JAPAN.

Though Buddhism originally rose in India, it has long since died out of India proper, surviving in its Hinayana form only in Ceylon. Its later phase of Mahayana Buddhism, beginning in Northern India, reached China in early times, and thence spread through Korea to Japan. Mahayânism, instead of being an Atheistic philosophy, as Buddhism originally was, has become a religion of many gods, with much ritual and not a few doctrines very different from those of the Tipitakas, though the original Buddhist philosophy still in great measure underlies it.

A recent writer† has asserted that Mahayânism may be justly styled "New Testament Buddhism," and that, though it has not borrowed from Christianity, it yet holds so many of the same leading doctrines in common with the latter that it may be said to be "an Asiatic form of the same Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ," having developed them independently. This view has been refuted in the Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute.‡ The fortuitous resemblances in a few outward matters are slight, and seem to owe little or nothing to the influence of even Nestorian Christianity, while in doctrine the differences are immense. Yet Mahayânism in China has

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* C.M.S. Review, December, 1914, p. 732.
† Dr. Timothy Richard, The N.T. of Higher Buddhism.
‡ Vol. xlvii, pp. 253 sqq.
borrowed from Taoism and from local heathen sects. Its preachers have adapted their teaching and practices to those around them in order to commend their religion to the Chinese.

It is therefore not a priori improbable that the Mahāyānists learned something from Christianity, even though Christians were somewhat few in China in early days. Yet, wherever we test the doctrines that some think have been adopted under Christian influence, the result is to disprove the theory. Examples of this are: the “Western Paradise”; the doctrine of Trikāya (i.e., of the triple body of the Dharmakāya); the supposed Mahāyāna “Trinity,” consisting of Amitābha, Ta Shih Chih, and the goddess Kwan-yin; the identification of Kwan-yin with the Virgin Mary and also with the Holy Spirit; and the worship of Amitābha Buddha, the Ruler of the “Western Paradise.” But Amitābha is such in the Saddharma Puṇḍarīka, a Sanskrit Buddhist work dating from A.D. 250 or earlier, and containing much material that was accepted by Mahāyānists in India long before they met with Nestorian Christianity in China. If Christian elements were really incorporated into Chinese Mahāyānism under Nestorian influence, they have long since vanished.* Some assert that the Buddhists derived belief in the Virgin Birth of Buddha from the Gospels; but the Buddhists held no such doctrine; on the contrary, many passages in their books clearly state that his father was Suddhodana.

In the Lalita Vistara and other romantic stories about Buddha, both in Sanskrit and in Chinese versions, many marvels are attributed to him. It is quite possible that, as in Krishna’s case, some of these tales may have originally been distortions of accounts of our Lord’s miracles, or imitations of them, and may have been associated with Buddha in India in comparatively early days. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove this, especially as some of them are found in a simpler form in the Tipitakas, and are more ancient than the introduction of Christianity into India.

In the books of the T’ai Ping, or “Vegetarian,” sect of Chinese Buddhists there occur phrases which have been “picked up, perhaps at second hand,” from Christian sources. The leaven of Christianity is thus working, steadily but slowly, among Chinese Buddhists, but has not yet produced such plain proofs of its presence as in India.

In Japan, although all sects of Buddhists are Pantheists in theory, yet in the "Pure Land" sects there are many resemblances to Christian doctrine. The belief that Salvation—i.e., deliverance from transmigration, or, more properly, the chain of karma—may be obtained by devotion to and trust in Amitābha (or, as he is usually called, Amida) Buddha is, no doubt, the old Hindū doctrine of bhakti, but it has developed in Japan as in India, under Christian influence. The Jō-dō sect recognise Amida as the only Saviour, yet they also worship Kwan-non (the Chinese goddess Kwan-yin) and various Buddhas. A reformed sect entitled Shin Shu, founded by Shinran, who died in A.D. 1262, make Amida their sole object of worship, and in this sense are Monotheists.

A recent writer† says that the Pure Land sects (i.e., the Jō-dō and the Shin Shu) bear in many points of doctrine an obvious likeness to Christianity. "The virtual Monotheism, especially of the Shin Shu; the emphasis on man’s inability to achieve salvation by his own powers; his dependence on the power of another; the infinite compassion of Amida, who before innumerable ages provided this way by which even the weakest and the most ignorant and the greatest sinners may be saved; faith in Amida’s gracious purpose to save all as the essence of religion; gratitude as the spring at once of piety and morality—such are the salient points of comparison. To not a few students it has seemed that a teaching so widely at variance, not only with primitive Indian Buddhism, but with its later developments, and so closely akin to Christianity, not in certain isolated features, but in a whole complex of fundamental ideas, can only be explained by Christian influence."

But here we should remember that the worship, love and devotion are given to a being that never existed, instead of to our Lord Jesus Christ; that the salvation aimed at is deliverance not from sin, but from transmigration; and that we should guard against the danger of reading Christian meanings into Buddhist phraseology.

Christianity has recently exercised an immense influence upon Japanese life and customs in general, quite apart from its doctrinal effect upon Buddhism and Shintoism. Hence a great change has come over the scene since Professor Chamberlain wrote‡: "Not the loosest of European viveurs, not the lewdest

* Dr. Griffis, Religions of Japan.
† Moore, vol. i, pp. 135, 136.
‡ Quoted by Otis Cary, Japan and its Regeneration, p. 28.
grogshop-haunting English Jack-ashore, but would have blushed at the really unimaginable indecency which preceded our advent in this country. Why, until we—the Yokohama, Tokyo, and other foreign residents—came here, and had been here long enough for our influence to be generally felt, the very sweet-meats were indecent, the very toys of the children were indecent, the very temples of religion were indecent." Christianity by its mere outward influence has already changed all this, and the effect on Japanese religion must be immense.

In Japan the progress of Christianity has produced opposition from the Buddhists: and, as in India and previously in the Roman Empire, this opposition has manifested itself in the adoption of Christian methods of working. "Where Christians established schools for young men the Buddhists built others under their own control; where the Christians had succeeded in arousing an interest in the education of girls, the Buddhists, unmindful of the low estimate they had always put on women, opened schools for girls; and they speedily imitated Young Men's Christian Associations, women's prayer meetings, orphanages, temperance societies, summer schools, and other institutions inaugurated by the Christians."* Apart altogether, therefore, from the number of people who have become Christians in Japan, the leaven of Christianity is working far and wide among both Buddhists and Shintoists.

B.—Influence of Christianity upon the Religions of the Near East.

Arabian Muhammadanism as a religion has itself been declared to be rather a Christian heresy than an anti-Christian faith. This, however, is an error into which no real student of Islam can possibly fall. Islam may rather be described as a Jewish heresy than as a heretical form of Christianity. Muhammad was successful in the end largely because he ultimately became very much the victorious Warrior-Prophet which the mass of the Jews (and somewhat similarly many Arabs) hoped their "King Messiah" would be when He came. The Qur'an is the book of a distinctly Semitic religion, in which certain beliefs and practices of the heathen Arabs are brought into close alliance with many of the teachings of the Jewish Talmud. There are also in it ideas borrowed from Zoroastrianism and from the Apocryphal Gospels. The هِلَّ الْكِتَاب

* Cory, p. 87.
(People of the Book) so frequently mentioned in the Qurʾān are the Jews rather than the Christians, though the term doubtless includes the latter. Yet it is beyond dispute that the influence which certain forms of Christianity exercised over Muhammad and his book was considerable; and this influence must endure as long as the Qurʾān is revered.

Muhammad never read the New Testament, nor even the Old, and never met with anyone who could put the Gospel message clearly and truly before him. Hence the Qurʾān gives a false view of Christianity in several respects. It is evident from the Qurʾān that Muhammad fully thought that the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity was that the Virgin Mary and Christ were deities to be worshipped as well as God the Father—i.e., that Christians believed in a triad of deities, of whom Muhammad declared two to be merely creatures who might be destroyed at God's pleasure. This view was due to Muhammad's observation of corrupt Christian worship. Again, Muhammad supposed—perhaps through Docetic or Manichæan teaching—that the belief that our Lord had died upon the Cross was altogether false and dishonouring to Him. The Qurʾān states that Jesus was not slain,* was not crucified, but that "He was represented unto them (the Jews) by another," who was put to death in His stead. But the Qurʾān admits that Christ was taken up into heaven alive. One passage represents God as saying to Christ that He would cause Him to die, and would bring Him to life again; and various explanations of the verse are given by commentators.†

All Muslims, to whatever sect they belong, believe that Christ will come again, though they fancy that He will then "break the Cross, kill the swine,"‡ and preach Islam, compelling all men to accept it. He will remain on earth for a while, after which He will die and be buried in the tomb left vacant for Him between the graves of Muhammad and Abu Bakr at Medina.

Belief in the coming of the Mahdi, or "Guide," is widespread in Islam, and is doubtless derived from the Christian doctrine of the Second Advent of our Lord. It has become very prominent in Persia (where it has helped to produce Bābīism) and in Northern India and the Panjâb. In North Africa, the

* Sūrah IV, 155, 156.
† Sūrah III, 47; cf. Sūrah's XIX, 34, and V, 117.
‡ Mishkât, Arabic ed., pp. 464, 471.
Sahara, Nubia and Somaliland it has had grave political results in wars and massacres.

Mixed though it is with error and with fables drawn from the Apocryphal Gospels, yet the testimony borne by the Qur'ān to our Lord is extensive and remarkable. He is recognized as "a Spirit from Him" — i.e., from God—and is hence in tradition and still more frequently in ordinary conversation termed "the Spirit of God." He is a Prophet and an Apostle. He raised the dead and healed the sick. Many miracles are ascribed to Him; His Virgin Birth is admitted; and to Him alone among the prophets mentioned in the Qur'ān no sin is attributed. This is not the case with Muḥammad himself. In fact, if we take all the Qur'ānic testimony to Christ together, Muslim controversialists fail to disprove the fact that higher titles are given to Him than even to Muḥammad. One tradition, it is true, represents Him, as well as all other prophets, * refusing in Muḥammad's favour to undertake the office of Intercessor with God Most High on behalf of sinners on the Day of Judgment; but no passage in the Qur'ān supports this.

The Qur'ān bears testimony to the Bible as "the Word of God," which the Qur'ān was "sent down" to attest.

A great deal is told us about Abraham, Joseph, David, Solomon, and other Old Testament characters, though in rather an incorrect manner. The Apostles (العورون) of our Lord are mentioned, though the distinctive word used to denote them is Ḥethiopic, and points to Christian influence from that country. A garbled account is given of the descent of the sheet in Peter's vision (Acts x, 9–16), in which it is mentioned as an actual occurrence and confused with the institution of the Lord's Supper. The prophets Sāliḥ and Hūd have been thought to represent two early Christian missionaries to the Arabs. Even the Christian legend of the "Seven Sleepers," as related by the Syrian Jacob of Sarūg (died A.D. 521) is found in the Qur'ān,† where they are styled "The Companions of the Cave." Christian monks are also spoken of, not always with approval. In one passage Christians are declared to be the nearest of all people in kindness to Muslims,‡ though elsewhere they are condemned

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* Mishkät, p. 480.
† Sūrah X VIII, 8–25.
‡ Sūrah V, 85.
to very harsh treatment indeed if they refuse to accept Islâm. Muhammad admits that Christ is the Word of God (宙λος τοῦ Θεοῦ, John i, 1; Revelation, xix, 13), but fancied that he was himself predicted of in the New Testament as “The Paraclete,” evidently confounding Παράκλητος with Περικλήτως, of the latter of which words the name Muhammad might seem to be no very erroneous translation.

Volumes have been written regarding different aspects of the influence exerted by Christianity upon the Qur'an and its author, but what we have said is a fair résumé of the subject.

The Qur'an makes no attempt to depict Muhammad as in any marked degree resembling our Lord, but later Muhammadan tradition endeavours to represent him as rivalling and far excelling Christ in miracle-working. In this the Muhammad of tradition becomes distinctly an Anti-Christ.* Since a star led the Magi to Christ's cradle and angels sang at His birth, later Muslim traditions tell how much greater marvels heralded the birth and conception of Muhammad. In spite of the statement of Muhammad himself in the Qur'an that God had not gifted him with the power of working miracles, yet tradition ascribes miracle after miracle to him.† He compelled trees to follow him, he split the moon in two, he cast an evil spirit out of a child and made it depart in the form of a dog,‡ he caused water to flow from his own fingers in abundance to quench his followers' thirst in the desert, he ascended to the Seventh Heaven§ and passed into the very presence of God on his night journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and back.

The object of all these inventions is to show how much Muhammad surpassed Christ in his miracles. Attempts have been made, not only by the Shi'ah sect and by the Sâfis but also to a less degree by the “Orthodox” or Sunni sect, to attribute to Muhammad a nature and position more than human though less than Divine. Some of the titles of Christ in St. Paul and St. John have been ascribed to Muhammad. He is often called Nûru'llâh (نور الله), “God's Light,” and is declared to have been formed out of the light of God, to have been the first thing God created. God is stated to have said, “O Muhammad,

* Vide Dr. Koelle, Mohammed and Mohammedanism; also the Raudâtul Ahbâb, Qîsaṣul Anbiyâd, Arâis mê Tîjân, and Mishkât.
† Mishkât, pp. 522 sqq.
‡ Mishkât, p. 533.
§ Sûrah XVII, 1; Mishkât, pp. 521 sqq.
If it were not for thee, I should not have created the world." It is a Sufi tradition that makes Muhammad say, "He that hath seen me hath seen God" (an imitation of John xiv, 9). This does not represent the "Orthodox" view, but it is an extreme instance of the influence upon Islam which rivalry of Christ's claim has produced. The fact is that, just as among thoughtful Jews it became felt that some link or "Mediator" between the Creator and creation was necessary, so learned Muslims found that they could not logically approach the Unknown God, the One, except through a Mediator of some kind. Hence it has become necessary to invest Muhammad with more or less of this character in Sunni theology, while 'Ali holds even a higher one among the Shi'ites.

With reference to Muhammad, the effect has been to apply to him many of the highest titles of Christ. This shows how completely many Muslim theologians have become convinced that reason requires the existence of someone possessed of these attributes. Refusing to admit Christ to be such, they have endeavoured to clothe Muhammad with these titles of Christ, though without seeing how completely contrary all this is to his low personal character. It has been pointed out that any learned Sunni would agree* that St. Paul's words† about our Lord, "who is the firstborn of all creation; for in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers, all things have been created through him and unto him, and in him all things consist; and he is the head of the body, the Church (of Islam), who is the beginning, the Firstborn, that in all things (Muhammad) might have the pre-eminence," with these few requisite changes, apply to Muhammad. All such statements can be matched, for instance, in the Arabic "Poem of the Mantle," where it is said, "All glory and praise be to Muhammad, the glory of history, the firstborn of all creatures." But all this shews what an immense influence Christianity has had upon the present form of the theology of Orthodox Islam. Some of the Muslim unorthodox sects have borrowed much more than this.

The Druses, for example, go so far as to declare the tyrant Hâkim an Incarnation of God, and worship him as such. The sect of the 'Ali-ilâhis take their name from the fact that they

* Zwemer, Muhammad or Christ, pp. 130, 131; Nicholson, Mystics of Islam, pp. 82, 83.
† Col. i, 15-18.
assert the same of 'Ali. The Shi'ites in their doctrine of the Imâms and Bâbs have paid Christianity the compliment of imitation to some degree. The Babi-Bahâî doctrine teaches that Christ has become incarnate again in the Bâb, and the Father in Bahâ'u'llâh, who is sometimes too denoted by the title Kali­niatu'llâh. All these sects are in reality deeply opposed to our Lord's claims, but their opposition is manifested in denying to Him His proper rank and assigning it to others instead. Doubtless other external influences are partly the source of many of these errors, but that of Christianity perverted is unmistakable.*

The Babi-Bahâî faith has made extensive use of the New Testament. In some of their books it is quoted almost more frequently than the Qur'ân. There are a vast number of New Testament terms borrowed and used quite freely, but in an unnatural sense, thus teaching false doctrine. It would take far too long to treat at all fully of these matters. For example, "Resurrection" is used to denote conversion to belief in the Bâb, or now in Bahâ'u'llâh: the second Advent of Christ is said to mean His reincarnation in Bahâ, etc. The claim to be the Universal Religion, the Religion of Peace, and of Universal Brotherhood, the preaching of God's Fatherhood, etc., etc., are all from Christianity. Bahâism is an insidious heresy, largely Pantheistic, and in essence bitterly opposed to Christianity as well as to Islâm.

It is upon Sûfiism, however, that Christian doctrine has particularly left its mark. That strange and composite system has been powerfully affected by many other influences too, among which Vedântism and other Hindû forms of belief and practice may be specially mentioned. But the very word Sûfi itself is derived from sûf, "wool"† because the earlier Sûfis adopted a woollen garment from the Christian ascetics who were their models of conduct; though here again Indian influence is indirectly noticeable, for asceticism and monasticism are not originally Christian but Buddhistic. Many Sûfi rules and opinions are derived from those of the Christian ascetics. This is the more remarkable because Orthodox Islâm, as taught in the Qur'ân, is quite opposed to celibacy and asceticism. The earliest Sûfis were possessed with the Qur'ânic fear of God; but ultimately, under Christian influence, love to God became one of the leading features of this philosophy, though expressed

* Íqân: Bâyân, etc.
† Abû Naṣr 'Abdullâh, Kitâbu'l Luma' fi't Taṣawwuf, pp. 22–30.
in unsuitable language and often using "erotic and bacchanalian symbolism."* Sufi writers trace back to Christ this inculcation of love to God, and Jalâlu’ddin and Bâyazîd both assert, in accordance with the New Testament, that man’s love to God is the result of God’s love to man (cf. 1 John iv, 19). We find many passages in Sufi books which evidently owe their origin to certain New Testament verses. For example:

Muhammadan tradition says that God said to David:

كُنتُ كُنّا مَنْيَنِيّا فَأَحْبَبَتُ انَا أَكْشِفُ وَخَلَقْتُ الْهُدَيْلَ لَكَ انَا أَكْشِفُ

"I was a hidden treasure, therefore I desired that I should be discovered, and I created the creation (mankind) in order that I might be discovered." (Cf. Matt. xiii, 44.)

Suhrawardi quotes the words: “Except a man be born again” (John iii, 3, 5).

Even the celebrated old Greek saying, γνώθι σαυτόν, became known to the Sufis through Christian writers, and in the form مَنْ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ فَقَدْ عَرَفَ رَبَّهُ is ascribed to ’Ali. Sufis represent Muhammad as saying, “He that hath seen me hath seen God” (cf. John xiv, 9). This is hardly exceeded in audacity by the sentence to which Husain ibn Mansûru’l Hallâj owed his death at Baghdâd in A.D. 922: “I am the Truth (God).” To Hallâj is ascribed the saying: "If thou seest me, thou seest Him; and if thou seest Him thou seest us both.” Another Sufi, Hallâl, said:

"Thy will be done, O my Lord and Master; Thy will be done, O my purpose and meaning."

The Mașnavî of the famous Sufi poet Jalâlu’ddin Rûmî is full of Christian sentiments, though the Pantheism which underlies Sufism pervades the whole book. In spite of this, much more reverence is shown to our Lord than to Muhammad or even to ’Ali. In fact, in even those passages in which honour is ostensibly paid to either of the latter, careful study of the spirit of the poem displays something very different in the writer’s mind. A very large number of passages contain open or implied references to the New Testament. A few of these may be given here.

* Nicholson, pp. 4, 5.
OF CHRISTIANITY UPON OTHER RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS.

"If thou desirest mercy, shew mercy to the tearful:
If thou desirest mercy, be merciful to the feeble." (Cf. Matthew v, 7.)

"Whosoever has a soul pure from lusts,
Soon seeth he the Majesty of the Pure Hall" (i.e., God). (Matthew v, 8.)

"By His grace He rendereth each senseless thing intelligent:
His wrath hath rendered the wise blind." (Luke x, 21.)

"No leaf falleth from a tree
Without the decree and bidding of that Ruler of the Throne." (Luke xii, 7.)

"Since that Righteous Man is the Word of Truth (i.e., God),
His hand in doings is the Hand of God."

"If there be thousands of snares in a step,
When Thou art with us there is no grief." (Romans viii, 31.)

"One word lays waste a world;
It makes dead foxes lions." (James iii, 5, 6.)

These are but a very few passages, selected almost at random, out of a large number which occur in the Masnavi. Sometimes
the resemblance is great, especially in sentences modelled on those in the Sermon on the Mount. In other passages there is much less verbal likeness, but the spirit is largely that of the New Testament, with which, unlike Muḥammad, Jalālu’ddīn was well acquainted.

Not a few other Persian writers shew some knowledge of the New Testament. It will be enough, however, to refer very briefly to the poet Sa‘dī. At the beginning of the Bustān he thus writes:—

اَدیمُ رَسِیم سَفرُ عَامِ اُوْسَت
چِه دَعْمِ یِراَس خُوْانِ یَغِما چِه دَوَسَت

“The surface of the earth is His universal table (cloth),
Whether foe or friend come to that princely banquet.”
( Cf. Matthew v, 45.)

In the same book Sa‘dī tells in strange form the Parable of the Prodigal Son. The following sentence reminds us of James i, 27:

طَریقَةٌ لَدَخْمَت خَلقِ نیست
به تسیم و سیاده و دلِّق نیست

“The Religious Life is nought but the service of mankind:
It consists not in the rosary and the prayer-carpet and beggar’s bowl.”

In the Qur’ān itself the Bible is spoken of under the title of the Taurat (Law, Pentateuch), the Zabūr (Psalms), and the Injil (Gospel). A passage from each of the three is quoted, viz., Exodus xxi, 23–25, in Sūrah v, 49; Psalms xxxvii, 29; in Sūrah xxii, 105; and Matthew xix, 24; in Sūrah vii, 38. Moreover, Tradition represents Muḥammad* as quoting 1 Corinthians ii, 9, in the following form: "God Most High said: ’I have prepared for My servants the righteous what eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it occurred to the heart of mankind.’" Al Ghazālī refers to this passage as being found in the Qur’ān, but it is not.

The doctrine of the Light of Muḥammad, and of its existence before the world was,† and that all things were created from portions of that light, is no doubt borrowed from the Gospel references to Christ as the Light of the World, and to the light

* Mishkāt, p. 487.
† Qīṣaṣu‘l Ṭabīyā, pp. 2 and 282.
in Him being the Light of men (John i, 4, 5; xii, 41), though perhaps affected also by old Persian traditions of the Royal Glory which beamed on the brows of Jamshid and his successors.

Neo-Muhammadan sects are numerous; among these the Ahmadis, or followers of Sayyid Ahmad, and the Qâdiyânis are specially well known in India. But, apart from any such, there exists in India, Egypt and Turkey especially, a large and increasing body of men who have in great measure broken with Islam, though still retaining the name of Muslims. They claim for Islam a great deal of Christian morality, denouncing polygamy, concubinage, divorce, the veil and slavery as contrary to Islam when rightly understood, and as tolerated by Muhammad only for a season. Some of these men strongly advocate the education and freedom of women. They throw overboard the Hadith and the Orthodox ancient Commentators on the Qur'an, and endeavour to make the latter the foundation of their faith. Even the Qur'an itself is "liberally" interpreted,—so liberally, in fact, that they attempt to prove that Muhammad was in no true sense a polygamist.

Efforts are even made to whitewash their Prophet's moral character, and to show that Islam was not propagated by the sword. They assert that true Islam is consistent with modern thought, civilization, and enlightenment. Their leaders, however, are in general fanatically opposed to Christ's claims and to Christianity, reading the Bible only to disprove it, and welcoming as an ally every attack on the Christian Faith. Yet they adopt Christian Missionary methods, such as schools, colleges, and the use of the Press for controversial and educational literature. They even send out Missionaries to oppose ours. The influence of Christianity is seen in all this, though Western anti-Christian influence is united with it to revive and defend Islam. Yet the New Islam is further removed from the Old than from Christian ethics at least. The movement to translate the Qur'an into other languages is also due to imitation of Christian work. Neo-Islam already shows signs of having only the choice between turning into Atheism and yielding to Christianity.
It would be a mistake to derive the Targumic doctrine of the Memrā (เมื่นิ) or Dibbārā* (דיבברא) from Christianity, for it is doubtless taken from Philo, and through him from Plato. In fact, St. John used the word "Logos" of Christ in order to direct the thoughts of men to recognize that, instead of being a philosophical abstraction, there really does exist a Logos, and that He has been manifested in Jesus Christ, God's Son. But even in early post-Christian Jewish works, though hatred towards our Lord is painfully and blasphemously expressed, we find the doctrine of Mediation taught. The Mediator is called Metatrōn (מְטָטִירוּנ) or Mitātrōn (מיטטרון), and sometimes Mitātor (מיטטור), a word derived from the Latin Metator, or from μετατύραννος or μετάθρονος. He is identified with the Voice of God which "measured" the waters to divide them, and which "measured" out to Moses the boundaries of the Promised Land.† "Metatrōn" is said to be Enoch's name in Heaven after his ascension,‡ and he is called the "Great Writer." He sits in a golden chamber to write down the good deeds of Israel.§ His name is the same as his Lord's,¶ he holds rank next to God (referring to Exodus xxiii, 21), and is seated in the innermost room nearest God, whereas all the angels are bidden to wait behind the Veil.¶ He is even styled "the Prince of Eternity," (סַר שֵׁיֵל). This seems in a great degree due to Christian theology.

The Zohar is now known to be a forgery of the thirteenth century; yet in it there are so many points of accord with Christian teaching that, believing the book to be very ancient, some distinguished Jews in the Middle Ages are said to have been led by the book to profess Christianity. The very fact that it was composed by a Jew, and largely accepted by Jews, shows how strong Christian influences had even then become among their learned men.

* In Targum of Jonathan on Numb. VII, 89, e.g., Dibbārā is distinctly a Person
† Genesis Rabba, § 5.
‡ Jerusalem Targ. on Gen. v, 24.
§ Chagigah 15, a.
¶ Sanhedrin, 38, b, referring to Ex. xxiv, 1.
¶¶ Cf. Chagigah, 16, a.
In more modern times a great change is taking place among enlightened Jews in reference to our Lord. In their modern editions of some of their older literature, all abuse of Him and slanders about him and His birth are suppressed. This, in itself, is a great proof of Christian influence. The New Testament is widely read, especially in Hebrew and Yiddish. In fact, it is not too much to say that many Jews feel that for them there is no choice between accepting Christianity or becoming Atheists. Many who still profess Orthodox Judaism show great respect for our Lord; some even admit that He was the Messiah, though they deny His Deity. Reformed Judaism has even gone so far as to recognize Sunday, instead of Saturday, as their Sabbath, and to worship in the vernacular.

II.—ON NEO-ZORAISTRIANISM.

One sect of the Parsis in Bombay accept as inspired a volume entitled “Dasâtîr-i Âsmâni,” which professes to contain messages divinely given to fifteen prophets of ancient times. It is supposed to be “in the language of Heaven,” but is written in the Arabic character, and seems to be a bad attempt to transliterate the original Pahlavi. It is accompanied by a translation into the Dari form of Persian, and this is said to have been made by the “Fifth Sâsan.” Possibly the book was composed considerably after Sâsânian* times in Persia. It teaches transmigration and other doctrines very different from those of the Avesta, and its theology bears decided traces of Muslim influence. Many of the titles given to God are those used by Muslims, but even these come originally from Jewish and Christian sources. God is One, Merciful, Just, Loving, “the Giver, the Forgiver,” etc. But direct Christian influence is seen, for instance, in the statement that the Archangel Bahman (Vohumanô) came into existence by God’s command, and is styled “the Word of God,” and Reason is “the medium between God and His creatures.”†

An earlier Pahlavi revelation, dating from early in the sixth century, is the “Artâ Virâf Nâmak.” The story told in this book of how Artâ Virâf ascended in spirit into Heaven and brought back an account of what he saw there, confirming Mazdæan teaching, may have been an imitation of the “Visio

* The Parsis say the Dari translation dates from Khusrau Parviz time (A.D. 590-595).
† Original note to II, 70.
Pauli," which is a legend founded upon II Corinthians xii, 2-4. This, however, it would be hard to prove with absolute certainty.

The "Zarâtûsht Nâmâh," a Persian poem of the thirteenth century,* though it shows traces of Christian influence, need not detain us long. Near the beginning we read: "Know thou the truth that God is One; He hath none like Him, no Rival. Since thou wishest to hold the True Religion, first believe in the Being of the Creator." Again later we have it said of God: "He is the King, and we are slaves." These are but two instances to show how much Islâm has affected the book. Though Christian influence is very slight in comparison (for we can hardly hold that the Darûn ceremony, being the Avestic draonô, is taken from the Lord's Supper, in spite of some resemblance between them), yet we find the Golden Rule in a negative form given by Zoroaster:—

[Dehâm Kfâst] هرچه‌ی خواهی نخویش
[مشواد ایبیه کسرا که آید بپیش]

"Whatever thou wishest not for thyself, wish not that it befall anyone."†

But there is one "prophecy" in the book which is distinctly due, in form at least, to Christian influence. It is the prophecy of the Parsi Messianic King, Bahram Hamavand. He will spring from the royal Kayânian family. At the time of his birth "stars shall rain down from Heaven" (cf. Matthew xxiv, 29). At the age of twenty-one years he will gather a numerous army from all parts of the world, and "will take from his enemies the desire of his heart."‡

There are only a few thousand Zoroastrians or Mazdayasnyans (Mazda-worshippers) now left in Persia; the great mass of them, amounting to about 100,000, are in Bombay. These have little knowledge of their own religion, but very many of them have been educated in Christian schools and colleges. As a consequence, they know the Bible fairly well. They have nearly all ceased to worship the sun, and they profess to be Monotheists. Through Christian influence they have become noted for philanthropy, and they have learned to value education for

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* V.D. 1278.
† Verse 1256.
‡ Verses 1480 sqq.
women as well as for men. They maintain schools and hospitals; their women are given almost as much liberty as is enjoyed by Europeans, and though apparently careless about religious matters, except perhaps regarding funerals and other ceremonies, they are otherwise the most progressive people in India.

CONCLUSION.

We have now briefly studied the influence exerted by Christianity upon other religions, whether extinct or still existent. Quite apart from that influence which has resulted in the conversion of multitudes, in ancient and in modern times, from such religions to full faith in Christ, it is evident that the effect of the preaching of the Gospel upon those who have not accepted it as "the power of God unto salvation" has already been immense, and is still growing. Even many of the bitterest opponents of our faith have borrowed much from its teachings, have admired (as the Emperor Julian the Apostate did) its fruits, and have paid it the compliment of imitating its methods of working. Yet no weapon forged against Christianity has prospered. Truly the words of our Divine Lord are in process of fulfilment: "The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, till it was all leavened."

Motto:

न चान्यदुःखे मति मेजस्ति सोख्यं ॥

"Na ċāṇyaduḥkhe sati me'sti saukhyam."

(Jātaka-Mālā I, 23.)

DISCUSSION.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Meeting had listened with great interest to the extracts which Dr. Tisdall had read from this most important paper. The subject was a very large one, and Dr. Tisdall had confined himself to a few of the principal religions. Many new religions had arisen in the Christian Era: some in our own time, and most of them had borrowed to a greater or less extent from Christianity, but had left out its great essential fact. One example of the influence which Christianity had had upon the world was
furnished by the epoch from which we dated our chronology; this year is "1916 Anno Domini," the "Year of our Lord," and that era is adopted even by heathens and unbelievers. So Christianity had an effect upon the social conventions of the world as well as upon its religions.

The Rev. J. J. B. Coles, M.A., expressed his great indebtedness to Dr. Tisdall, and desired to ask whether, in reading the sacred books of the many religions with which he had dealt, he had ever come across any statement as to the deity of the Person of Christ, or as to the Atonement which He made. Referring to the section of Dr. Tisdall's paper on Neo-Judaism (p. 50), the Targumic doctrine of the Memra was there derived from Philo, and through him from Plato. Dr. Inge, in his history of the Doctrine of the Logos, traced it further back, namely, to Heraclitus, the Ionian philosopher of Ephesus, who flourished about 500 B.C. Professor Margoliouth, on the other hand, gave it an earlier source: he claimed that the "Wisdom of Solomon," now placed in the Apocrypha, was really due to Solomon, and was his commentary upon Holy Scripture as it existed in his day. The doctrine of the Logos, if this were so, was traced back a thousand years before Christ, for it was clearly set forth in the 8th chapter of the Book of Proverbs. Dean Inge, in the book referred to, expressed surprise that St. Paul did not use the word "logos"; might not the explanation be that St. John, in the opening of his Gospel, was referring to the introduction of the Divine action into this world, but St. Paul's philosophy took a wider range and embraced all the works of God?

Professor H. Langhorne Orchard, M.A., B.Sc., desired to move a hearty vote of thanks to the Author for a paper that was comprehensive, critical, impartial, and fair. He had pointed out that where Christianity and a false religion both possessed a common truth, it did not necessarily follow that one was derived from the other; both might be derived from the primal revelation. The Author's criticisms upon the theories of Avatāra, Trimūrti, and Krishna were of great value. He wished that Dr. Tisdall had not omitted to define "Christianity"; in some passages he had spoken of it as "the Gospel," in others as "Christian teaching." These terms were not always synonymous. He concurred most heartily in the concluding words of the Essay: "No weapon forged against Christianity had prospered."

Mr. M. L. Rouse, B.A., B.L.: Might not the idea of The Logos
equally well be traced to Zoroaster as to Plato and Heraclitus. There is a Divine person known in the Zendavesta as Truth, distinct from Ahuramazda, the All Wise; and it counsels its readers, for holiness and salvation, to come to know and to please both these heavenly beings; while representations of a Divine Trinity are found upon Persian monuments. Yet why need we go to such sources when we find the Old Testament narrative illustrates so well the statement in John i, 18, concerning The Logos, “No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who has gone into the bosom of the Father, He set Him forth”; for whereas Moses was told by Jehovah, “No man can see my face and live,” Moses and Aaron and the twenty-four elders “saw God and did eat and drink”; and when Jacob had first wrestled with an angel, or heavenly messenger, and then, when conquered, had held on until he was blessed, he exclaimed, “I have seen God face to face, and my life is spared”; and afterwards in blessing his grandchildren, evidently looking back at the event, he said, “The God before whom my fathers Abraham and Isaac did walk, the God who hath fed me all my life long unto this day, the Angel who hath redeemed me from all evil, bless the lads”. . . And such instances could be multiplied.

Rev. John Tuckwell, M.R.A.S.: We are all of one mind with Professor Orchard, I am sure, in our high appreciation of the valuable Essay our Lecturer has produced as the Gunning Prize. In discussing a question of this nature, involving the comparison of the Christian religion with other religious faiths, it is important for us to keep in mind the distinction between what is essential and what is adventitious in all these religions. Some men are better, and others are worse, than the faiths they profess. But in them all, and in all men, there is one fundamental element, sometimes described as the religious instinct, and which M. Bergson attributes to the *elan vital*, which is present wherever there is life. Be it so, but it is indispensable that the religious instinct should have an appropriate environment in which it can live and develop. What we see in most of the religions of the world is the religious instinct blindly trying to make an environment for itself. But if God has implanted in man a religious instinct, it seems incredible that He should not have provided also an environment of Truth suited to its exercise and development, otherwise the instinct would have been as useless as the fins of a fish with no water in which it could swim, or the wings of
a bird with no atmosphere in which it could fly. It needs, therefore, the revealed religion of Scripture to tell us what this environment is. No wonder, therefore, that other religions should now and then borrow truth from Christianity, for they cannot with all their efforts provide of themselves a fit environment for the religious life. The true environment of the religious life is Christ; the new-born soul is in Christ, we live in Christ. No other religion could possibly provide this environment, and there are other truths distinctive of the Christian faith which no other religion could possibly provide or possess. The mind of man could never have conceived the Divine way of salvation—that the Son of God should become incarnate, take upon Himself our nature, die upon a cross, rise again from the dead, and on condition of faith grant forgiveness and life eternal to every believer in Christ, sustaining the life of the soul by the gift of the Holy Spirit. These truths provide an environment for the religious life which is peculiar to the Christian Faith.

LECTURER'S REPLY.

The Lecturer, in acknowledging the vote of thanks, pointed out that the Logos was not the subject of his paper. The two Hebrew, or, more correctly, Aramaic, expressions, which he had mentioned on p. 50, were translations of a Greek word—Logos—which was used in writings earlier than the Targums. St. John, in using the term Logos, therefore, was using a term that was already recognized and in current philosophical employment, and he taught that the true Logos was Christ. He, the Lecturer, might have traced the term back to Heraclitus, or even to ancient Egypt, as some German writers had done, but he thought this very doubtful, and, at any rate, it was apart from his subject.

Nor did he think that we could find either the Logos or the Trinity in Zoroastrianism. He had gone carefully into what Zoroaster taught as to monotheism. Did Zoroaster teach that Ahuramazda was one deity with six attendant spirits, or was the principal amongst seven spirits of equal rank? He thought the latter was the case. One did not find a pure monotheism in early Zoroastrianism. All that could be said was that there was a nearer approach to monotheism than anywhere else, except in Judaism and Christianity. The modern Parsi, when he asserted his belief in One
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God, was not looking back to Zoroaster. But earlier still the one primeval faith taught belief in One God.

The Meeting adjourned at 6.10 p.m.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATION.

Mr. E. Walter Maunder, F.R.A.S.: In studying Dr. Tisdall's paper, the reader cannot fail to be impressed, not only with the breadth of his learning and his mastery of his subject, but also with the fidelity with which he has carried out the purpose of the Council in their choice of the subject for the Gunning Prize competition.

There is a school at the present day, commanding a very wide subconscious influence beyond its avowed adherents, which regards Christianity, not as a living organism, but as a more or less happy collection of fragments from a large number of earlier religions, and "the debt which Christianity owes to other Faiths" is a constant theme with it. The Council wished the reverse side of the problem to be examined, for assuredly other religions have come under the influence of Christianity, and have imitated it or borrowed from it, or have modified their own creeds in opposition to it. Dr. Tisdall's paper has presented to us some striking examples of the influence of Christianity in modifying alien creeds in a direction towards itself. Might I suggest that there is a very remarkable case in which another religion has been fundamentally modified away from it?

When the Jewish nation, having put to death its Messiah, determined upon the rejection of the Apostles whom He had appointed to build up His Church, the teachers of the nation were necessarily driven to organize a theology which should be definitely anti-Christian. Thus, Dr. Schechter, in "Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology," points out that though we have no Rabbinic literature of the same date as the books of the New Testament, the Mishna, or Law of the Lip, is evidence of the existence of Rabbinic work during that period, and he considers it probable that "the teaching of the Apostle Paul, the antinomian consequences of which became so manifest during the second century, brought about a growing prejudice against all allegorical explanations of the Scriptures"...

"A curious alternative is always haunting our exegesis of the Epistles. Either the theology of the Rabbis must be wrong, its conception of God debasing, its leading motives materialistic and coarse,
and its teachers lacking in enthusiasm and spirituality, or the Apostle to the Gentiles is quite unintelligible."

The inevitable result of the refusal of salvation in that Name whereby alone men can be saved, was the exaltation of the letter of the Law, in opposition to its intention and spirit, resulting in the endless mazes of casuistry in which the Rabbis delighted.

SUBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE ESSAY.

Before the reading of the paper, the Secretary read the following order of the Council defining the subject and purpose of the Gunning Essay this year:—

"THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY UPON OTHER RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS."

"Note.—The design of the paper is to exhibit—not the success of Christianity in winning converts from other faiths, but—the manner and extent to which other religions, while still remaining distinct systems, have yet modified their doctrines (including their eschatology), their customs and social and ethical standards, in consequence of Christian teaching.

"It is desired that the essays should be precise in thought and language, that, where possible, authorities for statements should be given, and that generalities and declamation should be avoided."
584TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING,

HELD IN THE CONFERENCE HALL, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, JANUARY 15TH, 1917,
AT 4.30 P.M.

A. T. SCHOFIELD, ESQ., M.D., IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the preceding Meeting were read and confirmed, and
the Secretary announced the election of Mrs. Sarah D. Nicholl and
Miss C. Hussey as Associates of the Institute, and the election of
Miss Ethel D. James, B.A., Associate of the Institute, as a Member.

The Chairman said that it was with very great pleasure that he called
upon the Very Rev. the Dean of St. Paul's to read his paper on
"Christian Mysticism." It was an occasion of gratification to the
Victoria Institute to be addressed by one who had devoted much of
his life and attention to so important and difficult a subject as that upon
which he was about to speak.

CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM. By the Very Rev. W. R. INGE,
M.A., D.D., Dean of St. Paul's.

THE MYSTIC AS THINKER.

THE subject on which you have been so good as to invite me
to speak to you is one on which I have written and
spoken so much that I am afraid some of you may be able
to guess only too well the sort of thing which you have to
expect from me about it. I will try not to repeat myself more
than I can help, and the subject is very large—indeed, inexhau­
sitable. Moreover, if there is any truth in the contention of the
mystics themselves, it is so much bound up with vital experi­
ence that seventeen years of life—and that period has elapsed
since I wrote my Bampton Lectures—cannot go for nothing in
one's attitude towards it. For no one can talk or write profit­
ably about mystical religion, or Christian mysticism, unless he
is trying to some extent to make the experiences which he
describes his own. And in this quest experience, rather than
learning, is the educator. The mystics (says Royce) are the
most thoroughgoing of empiricists. They are absolutists, no
doubt; the spiritual world for them is an eternal fact, not an
ideal; but their Absolute is at the same time the goal of
spiritual progress—a goal which is, in a manner, present at every stage of the race; the mystical ladder, we may say, is a progress within the infinite or absolute, and ultimate reality in the sphere in which the spirit moves. Consciousness is not the measure of our apprehension of the truth; much of our deepest life is submerged; but the spiritual life must be lived (vécu, as Bergson is so fond of insisting); otherwise our words about it will ring hollow.

In spite of the vogue which the word mysticism has undoubtedly gained since the beginning of the present century—a vogue which is itself strong evidence of the degree in which the centre of gravity in religion has swung round from authority to experience—it is still necessary to say something about the meaning of the word. Perhaps the long half-conscious association of the word with nebulousness and airy nothingness (mysticism!) is no longer to be found. Most people know something about the Greek mysteries, and that mystery and sacrament mean the same thing, but the idea still prevails that the mystic is a religious dilettante—that his religion is an aesthetic luxury—a dainty fancy which takes pleasure in finding "loose types of things through all degrees," so that anything may be a "symbol" of anything else, and we may transform the world into a cryptogram or a system of masonic signs, as it suits our pleasure. It is suggested that one attraction towards becoming a mystic is that it enables us to maintain an attitude of graceful indifference to sublunary problems, and especially to our duty towards our neighbour.

Several writers have tried their hand at definitions. I will give three recent ones. Granger: "Mysticism is that attitude of mind which divines and moves towards the spiritual in the common things of life, not a partial and occasional operation of the mind under the guidance of far-fetched analogies." Rufus Jones: "Mysticism is that type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and immediate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most acute, intense, and living stage." R. C. Moberly: "It is an inward light which makes itself manifest as character; a direct communion of love which is also, to the fullest extent, wholly rational at once and wholly practical; it is as much knowledge as love, and love as knowledge; it is as truly contemplation as activity, and activity as contemplation. This is the ideal of mysticism." This last is wanting in precision. I should lay stress on the first-hand quality of all mystical religion. Mysticism is religion new-given.
It may be that the majority in every age must be content to live on tradition, to believe on trust, and to repose on the common strength, but it is necessary that there should be a select few who are called to see for themselves. They cannot take their convictions on hearsay; they are not satisfied even with what ordinary people call experience. They are impelled by an inner necessity to come, if it may be, into immediate contact with the spiritual realities which encompass us, to "taste and see how gracious the Lord is." The mystic is he who has succeeded, at least in a measure, in this quest. Like the Old Testament patriarch, he can say, "I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved."

In this address I can only touch upon some aspects of a great subject. The popular and approved method now of writing about mysticism is to treat it as a chapter or branch of the psychology of religion. A mass of literature has appeared during the last twenty years, among it being works by W. James, Starbuck, Coe, Leuba, Murisier, Delacroix (the ablest), and many others. Materials have been collected in great abundance to illustrate the varieties of religious ecstasy, the means by which it can be induced or encouraged; the state of health, age, and condition of the experient; the fluctuations between joy and misery—the rapture and the dark night of the soul; the duration of the visions and their contents—these and many other subjects in which religion and medicine might dispute the right to make a diagnosis of the case, have been investigated with great industry and excellent results. Nevertheless, since I must leave out something, I choose to leave out all this side of the subject. It is, after all, an external method of treating a great fact in the life and experience of the race—the fact, I mean, that many thousands of men and women have been absolutely convinced that they have had immediate assurance and consciousness of the Divine, that they have seen Him Who is invisible and visited the land which is very far off. The psychologist does not deny the truth of these intuitions; it is not his business either to affirm or deny anything about ultimate truth. But by his way of treating the mystics as medical "cases," whose abnormal experiences are, if possible, to be accounted for by the state of their nerves or by the austerities through which they have gone, he does practically assume that the mystical experience is purely subjective, or at any rate that the most interesting part of the phenomena is in connexion with psychopathy. That, I venture to say, is not the most favourable attitude for studying the things of the spirit. The
spiritual life has its own laws, which are different from those of the body—I will even say, adopting the tripartite classification of our natures into body, soul, and spirit, that the laws of spirit are different from the laws of soul. I think we shall understand the mystics better, and even more scientifically, if we adopt provisionally their own point of view, and assume that when they tell us that they have had an illumination from above, they are speaking the truth, and are neither deceivers nor deceived.

I shall therefore not take the psychologist’s standpoint in speaking of mysticism; I shall rather assume the mystical experience as a fact, guaranteed by the numerous persons who have testified to it. And I wish in this address to consider the special characteristics of the intellectual life of the mystic. Some of you may feel inclined to protest that the intellect is not an active or necessary factor in mysticism. The mystical experience, it will be said, is pure, immediate feeling, a thing given as it is. It is purest and most trustworthy when it is taken simply as it is, not “sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought.” The intellect, it will be said, works over the remembered experience, the wonderful illumination, and distorts it. It selects, rejects, and rearranges; it moulds the experience in accordance with preconceived notions—e.g., the scholastics of mysticism have often arrayed mystical experiences in a chronological order. According to these authorities, the first stage is a period of disquietude and oscillation, in which the subject, uncertain what he is seeking and how to get it, renounces effort and abandons himself to passivity. Then comes the response—the period of visions and auditions, of trance and ecstasy—all the “mystical phenomena.” Thirdly, a period of depression, pain, and feeling of dereliction. Lastly, of expansion and tranquil joy, when the soul has recovered from its sickness, and knows that it has what it desired. Or, again, another scheme divides the ascent of the soul into three stages of purification, illumination, and union. But are these stages really experienced, and always in the prescribed order? Or does the intellect impose its own forms upon the memory, giving the experience a shape and order which they had not of themselves? Again, how often the intellect has interpreted the mystical experience in terms of dogma or philosophy! The mysterious visitant of the soul, which at the time merely appeared as something divine, something not ourselves and higher than ourselves, is invested by the intellect with the attributes of Christ or the Virgin Mary. The mystical state, which is
independent of forms of faith, and is identical in the Buddhist, Mohammedan, or Christian, is turned into a revelation of the truths of some particular creed. The same is true of philosophy. Nearly all speculative mystics have been influenced by Neoplatonism, and have adopted the philosophy of Plotinus as the framework of their theology. But this does not prove that the mystic, as such, has had the Neoplatonic philosophy revealed to him as the truth about God, the world, and himself. The dogmatic system, or philosophic system, imposed by the intellect upon the consciousness, is really extraneous and irrelevant. We shall (so we are told) get nearer to the heart of mysticism by neglecting the dogmatics and the philosophy of the mystics, and attending only to what they seemed to hear while they were "hearkening what the Lord God will say concerning me."

There is much truth in all this. But, on the other hand, it is a blunder in psychology to suppose that there is or can be any "pure" experience in which the intellect has no part. Certainly no record exists, or could exist, of any such "pure" experience; so that if we wish to banish all intellectual constructions from our survey, we shall be unable to use any of the great mystical literature which was usually composed a considerable time after the experiences described, and which invariably bears the marks of analytic and synthetic thought. We shall be restricted to our own private experiences of ecstasy, if we have had any such; and we shall soon be convinced that it would be easier to reconstruct a vision of a sunset exactly as we saw it on a given day last year, than to reproduce the exact forms and colours of a heavenly vision seen by us during prayer. Perhaps in such visions there is no form—nothing clear or definite at all; perhaps all the outlines are drawn afterwards by the intellect.

But why should we be so anxious to get rid of the results of reflexion? Why should we suppose that the original undifferentiated, formless vision is higher and more trustworthy than the same experience after it has been thought over and studied? It seems to me mere superstition to suppose that the vision was inspired, but that we spoil it as soon as we subject it to thought and scrutiny. There is no higher guarantee of the truth or value of a sudden illumination than of the truth of a dogma or of a philosophy. All the mystics have been afraid of self-deception in their visions. And the most emotional and least intellectual have suffered most from these vagaries of the imagination. No, there is nothing sacred or infallible in pure intuition, and strictly there is no such thing. We must, therefore, give up the attempt to separate the mystic's memories of what he
actually saw from the mental reconstruction of it made by his mind. Memory itself is a creative activity, not the turning back of pages to a previous chapter. When we study one of the speculative mystics, we have before us a man who is trying to co­ordinate and put in their proper places certain unusual data of consciousness, of which he has the same, or a higher degree of conviction than he has of the objects presented to his senses. His mysticism is not merely the highest stage in a logical pyramid. It is something that he has lived through, and is trying to understand. Why in the world should we leave our Plotinus and Eckhart, Boehme and Coleridge, and Emerson, and go to some hysterical nun in the hope of getting our mysticism “pure?” Religion from which reason has been strained off proves on inspection to be a very muddy liquid. At any rate, if we are to learn from the mystics, we must not listen to them only when they speak of experiences which are strictly “not transferable”; otherwise the wisest of them will tell us that they can teach us nothing. “He who has seen God is silent,” as one of them says. We will take the mystical experience as a solid fact, guaranteed by those who have had it, though they cannot pass it on to us; we will ask them how God and the world and the human soul appear to those who have had this experience. That they can explain to us, and it is that which we want to learn from them. We shall find that they do not call in their mysticism at every step in their philosophy. Rather that remains till the last as the summit and crown of earthly and heavenly wisdom. They are quite ready to meet other philosophers on their own ground. But the heavenly vision shines all the time in front of them. It shows them in what direction they ought to move. It inspires them with something more than faith and hope—with a blessed certainty that the unity and reality which they seek as philosophers is a fact which they have seen afar off, so that they know that it is there. Ethics can show us what ought to be metaphysics what must be; they engage in these quests with joy and confidence, therefore they already know—though only in absolutely general terms and without outlines—what is.

“What is reality?” is the primary question to which we must all return some answer. Is it matter—is it the world which may be resolved into particles—molecules, atoms, etc.? Matter is always on the point of vanishing away—science has subdivided the molecule till there is little left of it except something of the nature of electricity. If we confine ourselves, by abstraction, to merely quantitative categories, as if extension were the only ultimate fact, we shall be driven, if we are logical, to
mere mathematics, symbols which correspond accurately to nothing in the real world. Matter, however, is a mere abstraction. All that gives it meaning and value—all that gives it any quality whatever—is plainly bestowed upon it by the soul. The world of the man of science is full of values and qualities other than spatial: even if he calls himself a materialist, his world is full of soul. It is not the particles of matter to which we can attribute purpose, beauty, design, wisdom, etc. All these are gifts from the soul, when it informs matter and imposes upon it a meaning and a destiny. The attempt, which science has often set before itself, to detach existence from value, and to describe to us a world of existence without values, is a hopeless attempt, and one which betrays some mental confusion. The real world may prove to be something higher than the soul-world; it is certainly not anything lower. If there were nothing but matter, there could be no materialism; there certainly could be no sound science. For science is concerned with the appraisement and valuation of the world of existence. Take the most materialistic of philosophers, and you will find that his work is full of poetical, dramatic personalization of ideas. How naturally he breaks into capital letters! It is no use to spell God with a small "g" if you are driven in the next page to spell "Nature, Force, Energy," etc., with capitals. Nature, say many modern philosophers (Fechner, Lotze, Eucken, Max Müller, etc.) is possessed of soul throughout. This is not merely revived hylozoism: it means that reality is not matter existing independently and viewed from outside by the mind or soul. All that we call real is in a sense created by soul. Soul is inwoven with the innermost texture of the world as it really is. And so when we look upon the wonders of nature, we are contemplating that which owes its being to the highest principle that we can discern within ourselves. Many, like Plotinus, Emerson, etc., have spoken of the "universal soul," or over-soul, to which our souls are in some mysterious sort of subordination, and the characters of which are reflected by nature as in a mirror. (I shall show you presently that we cannot stop at soul—soul drives us upward to that which is above itself; but we are trying to follow the intellectual ascent of the mystic, and we have so far got merely to soul, as the spiritual principle which creates the world as we know it—creates it as a mirror to reflect itself and give actuality to its own activity.) Therefore, when we contemplate the glories of Nature, it is no vain fancy if we find in them types and shadows of our own highest thoughts, and of that which is above and beyond our highest thoughts. We need not trouble ourselves by asking
whether we bring to nature the beauty which we find there. In a sense we do; but only in the sense in which we are one with the spiritual principle which creates those glories and endues the visible forms with the hues of the Divine goodness, wisdom, and beauty. The power of seeing the Divine in nature varies almost infinitely in different people. The true genius of nature—mysticism—is a rare product—much rarer than might be inferred from those who talk and write of such experiences at second hand. Those who have it not may console themselves with the reflexion that this gift is rarely found associated with a very keen and delicate human sympathy. One is a compensation for the other. Wordsworth affords a case in point. One quotation will be enough to illustrate his wonderful power of reading inanimate nature.

“He looked:
Ocean and earth, the solid frame of earth
And ocean’s liquid mass in gladness lay
Beneath him. Far and wide the clouds were touched
And in their silent faces could be read
Unutterable love. Sound needed none,
Nor any voice of joy: his spirit drank
The spectacle: sensation, soul, and form,
All melted into him; they swallowed up
His animal being: in them did he live
And by them did he live; they were his life."

This degree of mystical intuition is a rare gift; but many who could not describe their feelings, which are indeed partly subconscious, derive great benefit from contact with nature. We shall hardly aspire, with Blake,

“To see the world in a grain of sand
And a heaven in a wild flower,
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
And eternity in an hour.”

But many will echo the words of Kepler, “My wish is that I may see the God Whom I find everywhere in the external world, in like manner within and inside me.” The order, beauty, and “concordia discors” of nature, its vastness and minuteness, above all, perhaps, its crushing refutation of the puny individualist, who wants to live for himself and make his surroundings conform to him.

“The lesson writ in red since time began,
A hunter hunting down the beast in man;
That till the chasing out of its last vice,
The flesh was fashioned but for sacrifice.”
I must not expatiate on this attractive theme. Soul contemplates nature, and in contemplating creates. The image of the universal soul (a Christian would say of the Spirit that breathed upon the waters) floats over all nature, and is reflected in it. We seize resemblances; we recognize the likeness of that which we desire to see, and a peculiar thrill of joy passes through us. A whole network of obscure sympathies and symbols surrounds us: now and then we see something clearly, at other times an àµνεδρα συμπάθεια; generally we see nothing, to our own misfortune.

But what is soul? Is it a fixed entity at all? Can we draw a line where our souls leave off and the universal soul or Divine Spirit begins? Is not the soul a wanderer over all fields of being, from top to bottom? Has it not affinities with the Absolute, with the Eternal World of Spirit, with the sphere of its own proper activities, and, below itself, with matter? Potentially it is all things: a microcosm. And what is its relation to the objects of its perception, to which it stands, as we have said, as a kind of Creator? Does it create the values which it perceives? Are truth, beauty and goodness only facts for the soul—psychical products only valid within the soul's range of activity? Surely not. The soul, if it affirms anything decisively, repudiates this dignity for its own subjective activity. Things are what they are, not at all because we think them so—no, not when our thoughts are most inspired. The glories which we see in nature are glories which the soul confers upon that all but non-existent abstraction, "matter"; but whence does the soul draw them? Does she find them in herself? Are they her own qualities? No, they are not; of that we feel quite sure. And therewith goes, for us, the whole base philosophy of pragmatism, which makes the human soul the measure of all things. No, the soul sees good and bad, fair and ugly, true and false, in itself and its surroundings, because the objects of its thought are indeed so. It recognizes an order of reality above itself, a sphere of existence which owes nothing to soul, and to which soul owes everything. When we contemplate the eternal laws of God, we are engaged with something above ourselves, something more thoroughly real than the world as it reveals itself to our souls, something of which the soul itself is but a pale reflexion. So the soul-life carries us up of necessity beyond itself. Not here is our final home. The world of spirit, which for the mystical thinker is the sole world of ultimate reality, is called the κόσμος νουτός of Plotinus, Spirit by most moderns, heaven in religious language. We are driven to admit
that there must be such a world by some purely philosophical arguments, which I have not time to discuss—contradictions involved in the ideas of time and space, obliging us to postulate an *eternal* world, above these categories; contradiction in the ideas of change and permanence, of unity and plurality. This purely intellectual consideration converges upon the same point with the moral aspiration for a perfection realized somewhere, a goal of striving; and with the beatific vision, already seen “in mists and shadows dim” by the mystic.

In this world of ultimate reality the contradictions above mentioned are reconciled. Instead of time we have eternity—a state in which all that ever has been or will be lives together in a timeless present—lives in its real character and ultimate tendency, as God knows it to be. Instead of space, with its mutual exclusiveness of all objects, we have τὸ ἄλλο σὲ ἄλλῳ. There is no hindrance to union in the spiritual world except discordance of nature. All are transparent and known to each other. In this sphere we believe that the mind and purpose of God are fully realized and also fully active; for this is another antinomy which is transcended ἐκεῖ. The divine attributes of goodness, wisdom and beauty, make a triple star; they cannot be resolved into each other; none is subordinate; all are shining together in harmonious perfection. There evil, if not annihilated, is overcome and transmuted; there all in our world that has any real meaning and value, all that has any divine and eternal quality, is preserved safe for evermore. All human spirits live with God in the rank which belongs to them, and enjoy the felicity which is possible to them. There are, no doubt, lost spirits—mysticism is not concerned to assist universalism; but their punishment must be such as a perfect being could inflict. *Poena danni*, yes; torture, no. In this, the spiritual world, relation between subject and object is closer than ἐναπόθα. Spirit beholds the spiritual world as identical with itself. They cannot be separated. The eternal “ideas” are not outside the eternal mind—they are its expression, its speech, its actuality. In this world the soul finally comes to itself, and reaches its true home; but in thus attaining its consummation it passes from the lower soul-life into that higher and completer life which we call spiritual. It lives in God’s presence, with face ever turned to him.

Popular religion thinks and speaks of heaven as future. A recent philosopher has said that to cast the ideal into the future—to identify heaven with some future triumph—is the destruction of all sane idealism. Certainly, to the mystic, heaven is a.
state rather than a place. It lies all about us, closer than breathing; “There is not much between us and it,” as Plotinus says. It is the eternal abiding reality of which this world is the shadow. But we need not try to get rid of the notion of futurity in connexion with heaven. Time is the form of the will. When we regard our lives as the working out of a unitary purpose—a process still going on—we must look forward to the realization of it as lying in the future, as, indeed, it does. We must look upon these finite purposes as being actually and in very truth working themselves out in time, and as taking their final place in the eternal order after they have been accomplished in time. There are philosophical difficulties, I know, in this conception; but it is what we cannot help believing if our probation is a reality, if the conflict between good and evil is a reality; if the time process has a meaning and justification; if, finally, the attributes of God are creative and active forces, and not merely unmoving qualities, fixed pictures of perfection. Mysticism asserts that this spiritual world, which can be proved to be a necessary truth by philosophy, is given as a fact by the highest experience of the soul. It asserts that we can and do know, in part and at certain times, the eternal spiritual world. We can transcend the limitations of our finite existence; we can live the life of the hidden man of the heart. Such a life is not foreign to the nature of the soul. The way to it is by love and yearning, which are natural to the soul when she sees glimpses of her father’s house and the home from which she has been exiled. The relation between ἐνταῦθα and ἐκεῖ—a philosophical rather than a religious problem—Plotinus says πάντα ἐνταῦθα ὅσα κάκει, and says that the vision is ἴσος οὐ θέαμα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἴδειν. The entrance into the spiritual life may be compared with the glimpses of a fourth dimension: an entirely new and higher sphere of existence, unexpected before. “The new birth.” No thinker has emphasized this more than Eucken. It is the basis of his philosophy. We have now answered the question, “What is reality?” It is the contents of the mind of God, manifested chiefly as perfect goodness, wisdom, and beauty. It is the universe, but not the material universe nor the universe in space and time, but the sum total of created things in closest union with the creative Spirit, without Whom they could not exist for an instant. All that has meaning and value here is there, but transfigured and essentialized. In order to reach this real spiritual world, we must ourselves become real and spiritual. We can only see what is akin to ourselves. There-
fore self-discipline, communing with God, "desire and longing," and the practice of good—all these are necessary.

"But," I shall be reminded, "the spiritual world is, after all, not the summit. The more specially mystical part of Plotinus (for that is what you have been giving us) comes at the end, after the realization of the spiritual world. Mystical philosophy is not content with the lucid sunny fields of Plato's Elysium, amid the eternal ideas and perfect types of beauty; it penetrates, or seeks to penetrate, deeper yet into the mysteries of the Divine essence, into the light which no man may approach unto, or the darkness which is the secret place of the Godhead." It is perfectly true that the mystics have been led on into this strange region, both by their experience and by their philosophy. Philosophically they have felt that, though in the κόσμος νοητός all differences are harmonized, yet there still remains, in νοῦς and νοητὰ, a vestige of duality which indicates that the ideal goal has not yet been quite reached. Besides, if at each stage we mount a step higher by contemplating what is next above us, to what must spirit turn? Must there not be a πνευματικός θεότητος, an Absolute Unity? Plotinus, in recognizing the necessity of this conclusion, is careful to place the Absolute "beyond existence." Existence requires unity in duality—a certain degree of discretion and determination. So Eckhart distinguishes between the Godhead and God. The Absolute is even called "Nihil" by Erigena. It is above all description and determination.

Lastly, what connexion has this philosophy of religion with Christianity? It is easy to say, "None"; it is easy to show that Buddhism and Mohammedanism (Sufis) mysticism has been in all essential features much the same as Christianity; it is easy to show that the Alexandrian divines were not very successful in fitting the Christian Trinity into a Neoplatonic frame; it is easy to show that no single Christian dogma is involved in the mystic's creed, and that he is quite independent of any Church, needing none. But (1) the Christian determination to unite in the Christ Logos the creative and redemptive office was even philosophically a great advance. It gives a motive for creation. It is successfully worked into the system of most of the Christian speculative mystics; it supplies them with a philosophy of suffering and sacrifice which we do not find in Plotinus. This is an important point which I have not time to discuss. (2) Mysticism, we said, was religion at first-hand. The religion of Christ was eminently this, and so has more in
common with Mysticism than it has with much of the later ecclesiastical religions. "Life is always raised to new levels, and receives a new dynamic quality whenever God becomes real in personal and social experience" (R. Jones). Christianity in its origin was essentially a rich and vivid consciousness of God, rising to a perfect experience of union with God in mind and heart and soul. It was a personal exhibition of the Divine in the human, the Eternal in the midst of time. The direct impact and power of Christ's life on His followers is the most extraordinary thing in the Gospels; it, and not any portents, caused the realization that He was Divine. Christ always taught His disciples to expect a personal experience of God like His own, though less in degree. This Christianity is in its very heart a mystical religion. The first Church was a mystical fellowship, in which each member had received the Holy Ghost. In St. Paul the mystical element is very strong. Christ's "method of inwardness"; His directions as to prayer; His ideality and attitude towards wealth, towards death; His emphasis on love—all His teaching implied, we may say, a mystical philosophy of religion.

DISCUSSION.

The CHAIRMAN said he was sure those present would agree with him in expressing their great indebtedness to Dean Inge for his paper; their indebtedness in a very special degree.

Mysticism was now all in the air, and the pendulum, which in Huxley's days pointed to the material, had now swung far over towards the spiritual; some thought too far. There was no doubt, however, that the word Mysticism had been dragged through the mud to such an extent as to have become, as the Dean had said, spelt with an "i" rather than with a "y." The word therefore as applied to Christianity had been looked at askance by some, and it certainly stood in need of that careful definition which Dean Inge had given. He had pointed out that Mysticism formed an essential part of Christianity. Now any real advance in Christianity was due to the translation of Divine truths into facts, or, in other words, the substitution of personal knowledge of God for second-hand knowledge; and that in itself was Mysticism. He would ask them to allow him to read again words which he was sure they would be sorry to forget (p. 69, lines 18-27), "Mysticism asserts... she has been exiled." Those words should be written in all our hearts.
He could not close without alluding also with great pleasure to the wonderful glimpses of the future state that Dean Inge had given with so much eloquence. All present had had a great privilege in listening to such a paper.

Mrs. E. Herman (author of *The Meaning and Value of Mysticism*, who was present by invitation of the Council) was called upon by the Chairman to open the discussion.

Mrs. Herman said: It gives me peculiar pleasure to be here—thanks to the kindness of the Council—and to enjoy the privilege of listening to Dean Inge, to whom, in common with all students of Mysticism, I am under great obligation. May I be permitted to say, that in my own humble efforts to help students of Mysticism towards a just appreciation of its main tendencies, I have consistently striven to show that all valid Mysticism involves intellectual activity of the highest order, and that I owe my convictions upon this point to the influence of the Dean’s Bampton Lectures on “Christian Mysticism,” which first set me to investigate the philosophical affiliations of the great Mystics. In expressing my high admiration of the paper to which we have just listened, I would only draw attention to a question asked at its close. “What relation,” asked Dean Inge, “has Mysticism to Christian thinking?” The connection in which this question was put suggests at least an alleged cleavage between mystical philosophy and Christian thought. I venture to submit that there is indeed such a cleavage, and that while Mysticism represents an integral element of Christianity—the element of inwardness—it has not provided a fruitful principle for Christian thinking. I cannot substantiate this position in any convincing manner in so short a time; I can only indicate its basis. Briefly, the cleavage between mystical theology and the main stream of Christian thought is that the former centres in the Incarnation, while the latter finds its normative principle in the Cross. It arises out of a living experience of redemption, and it is this experience, and not Neoplatonic speculation, as we find it in the philosophical mystics, that has proved the source of the most influential developments of theology. Church history is one long commentary upon this text. The great thinkers who made Church history were men who sought to formulate, not a Christology primarily, but a Soteriology: men whose interest in redemption was the animating pulse of all their thought. I need only remind
you of how this worked out in Gnosticism. The only Gnostic thinker who left a deep mark upon history was Marcion; and Marcion, by his personal concern for redemption, almost pulled Gnosticism over to Christian ground. We know how St. Paul and St. John, in using the Logos-conception, burst these Greek philosophical terms to pieces, as it were, and re-shaped them into fit vehicles for the expression of the mystery of redemption. We know how the men who saved Christianity from the secularization of Gnosticism, such as Tertullian and Irenæus, had the certitudo salutis as the driving power of their thought. We also know how thinkers like Lucian and Arius worked out their systems without any genuine soteriological conviction, and how their work has perished, whereas that of Athanasius stands. At every point of its development theological thought of the great creative order has had for its motive a practical interest in redemption. The weakness of philosophical Mysticism seems to me to lie in its attempt to graft upon the schema of Christian doctrine conceptions borrowed from a system based upon entirely alien presuppositions. The result has been that, on its intellectual side, Mysticism has often trailed away into sterile by-paths of Christian thought.

The Rev. J. J. B. Coles, M.A., said they were greatly indebted to Dean Inge for the help they had had in his writings and lectures. He had, as he had said, not dealt with the subject that afternoon from the psychological standpoint, but it was rather a question of the intellectual life of the Mystic. He (the speaker) thought it was right that they should bear this in mind and keep to the special line and department which the Dean had himself mapped out. No doubt he would agree that in questions connected with the intellect of the Mystic, and also intellect generally, the question of memory was very important.

The question he desired to ask about memory was this: How far could we accept the definition both of Eastern and Western Oriental ideas of memory as being intellectually sound and complete? Blake wrote about the "Sculptured Halls of Los" or the "Great Memory." If we went to Oriental Mysticism we found that the question of memory arose in connection with what were called "the Akashic records." If we took a turn to the writings of a scholar such as Dr. Rudolf Steiner, we found that he had adopted the idea of these "halls of memory," and so it seemed to
be very general with them, that there was apparently a record, in
the ether around us, of all mundane affairs, and that we got our
information from this mystic source. He would ask Dean Inge
whether Christian memory was not a much more reliable and
comprehensive thing. For instance, there was memory which
perished with disintegration of the brain, but spiritual memory,
memory of the soul, was much more important, lasting and eternal.
Was not the memory of the soul a distinct thing from the memory
of the brain? If in this soul-life we would be saved from false
ideas of Mysticism, and be guarded against evil suggestions from
the unseen world, our intellect should be guided and instructed by
the written Word of God. If that was not the case, if our actual
memory and power of reasoning were not built up solely by the
Word of God, we should be in danger of holding a very defective
view of Christianity itself.

Rev. A. GRAHAM-BARTON said: I rise to express my gratitude
to the reader of the paper, who has proved himself to be a master of
mystical lore.

At the same time, I am convinced that he is going against the
conclusions of many of the chief Mystics when he seeks to give a
supreme place to intellectualism in the realm of the Mystic.

I submit that whatever part the intellect may be invited to take
after the vision, or ecstasy, it has no place in the illumination of the
spirit.

I think that Moberly's definition of Mysticism, as quoted by the
Essayist, that "it is, to the fullest extent, wholly rational," is scarcely
in keeping with actual experience.

Reason retires when the soul gives itself entirely to the meditation
of the purely spiritual.

It is then that the ideal is attained, and oneness with God
glorifies. Ruysbroeck, in his De Calculo, puts the case in a clear
light.

He writes: "Simple unity with God can be felt and possessed by
none save by those who stand before the immense brightness with­
out reason and without restraint." If we do not distinguish soul
from intellect, and the moral from the mental, our faith will be at
peril.

I do not agree with the Dean when he denies to the soul an entire
entity, and speaks of it as wandering across an abyss.
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I am satisfied that the soul is a separate entity, and, whilst dependent upon outer help, is self-existent.

I would have liked the Dean to have differentiated more the Mysticism Christian from the other mysticisms. Ancient Hinduism and Modern Spiritualism, Oriental Theosophy and Christian Science, in their mystical teachings, are surely at discord with the mystery of Godliness as given in the Divine Word.

The richest mysteries to me are the simplest. By the regeneration of the soul there enters, by the Holy Spirit, the best of mystical experiences. All else, I fear, is merely the romance of religion.

Dean Inge might make his message more clear by seeking to distinguish the absolute from the relative. Although the unknowable is as fathomless as infinity itself, yet the glimpses of the far-off glory, given to us by seers like him, call forth our highest gratitude.

Mr. E. Walter Maunder, F.R.A.S., said he felt that the Victoria Institute had been very highly honoured in being addressed by so eminent a thinker as Dean Inge upon a subject of so much interest and difficulty. For himself he must express himself deeply grateful, because he must admit that of the literature of Mysticism he knew little or nothing. His studies had lain in a very different direction. He hoped Dean Inge would forgive him if, as a scientific man, he confessed he was compelled to disagree with the sentence at the foot of page 64. He felt that the Lecturer's treatment of matter might be likened to the efforts made by one man to turn another out of a room. The first man would give a little push in one direction and then a little push in another direction, continually shifting his own standpoint the while, and so little by little he would elbow his opponent off the premises. He did not think matter could be treated in that way. He did not think it was possible for us to consider matter as empty of reality; to regard it as "a mere abstraction" was, he thought, forbidden to us by the very fact that our own nature was in part material. So with regard to the particular illustration used in the paper:

"Matter is always on the point of vanishing away—science has subdivided the molecule till there is little left of it except something of the nature of electricity."

The statement, so far as the last words went, was correct enough,
but the inference seemed to him to be in exactly the opposite direction from that drawn by the Lecturer. Time was when we knew nothing of the structure of matter; now we know a good deal. Surely the inference was that that which possessed so complex a structure was real. There was a time when the planets were simply points in the heavens: mere mathematical points, having “neither parts nor magnitude,” but only position, and their positions seemed to change capriciously. Now we had telescopes and could study their surfaces and see the seas on Mars and the clouds on Jupiter. Surely that did not point to the planets having no existence; the details which we perceived upon their surfaces were an argument for the actuality of the planets.

The subject in hand that afternoon was not Mysticism in general, but “Christian Mysticism.” As he listened to the Lecturer, the question arose in his mind, “Were any of the New Testament writers mystics?” And he turned in thought to the first Epistle of St. John. Was there ever elsewhere expressed in so short a document so full an apprehension of the presence of God, and such fervent devotion towards Him? Had we not there mystical writing of the very highest possible character? If we read that little treatise through, we saw that St. John came straight to the fact of the Incarnation. “That which was from the beginning”—He Who was from all eternity—and then St. John continues: “Which we have heard, Which we have seen with our eyes, Which we have looked upon and our hands have handled of the Word of Life.” He came at once to Christ born in the world. Surely there could be no Christian Mysticism in any true sense of the word, that did not in like manner sum itself up in our Lord Jesus Christ, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, Who was made Man, and born into this world. If that was so, if it was true that He Who was throughout all the ages, came into this world, and became Man for our salvation, then we had stamped upon manhood the character of reality. And every science pointed in the same direction. If we left religious and philosophical questions on one side, and came to pure science, we found that man himself was ultimately the one standard to which we referred all things. Why was this? Was it not because man was made in the image of God, and God purposed before all the ages to bring His only-begotten Son into the world as Man?
He was extremely grateful to Dean Inge for his paper, which was full of suggestion and would repay much study and thought.

Mr. Joseph Graham observed that allusion had been made to the fact that Mystics existed in all religions—Buddhist, Mohammedan, and so on; and if that fact were accepted there was nothing peculiar to Christianity in Mysticism. If Mysticism existed in all religions, the fact seemed to be that it arose from something in the human mind, something common to all; and he ventured to explain it on this ground, that owing to the condition into which mankind had come from the Fall and by the existence of sin, the harmony of man's nature, body, soul, and spirit, had been disturbed. Secondly, there would be found all over the world men of strong spirit reaching out by their spirits to the infinite; and practically that was Mysticism. He was very much struck by what Mr. Maunder had said in calling attention to the Incarnation of Christ, and he would carry his thought just a step further. St. Paul prayed that our whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and St. John said: "When we see Him, we shall be like Him." The question was: What like? "In His person, and in Him only, up to the present moment, has been restored harmony of body, soul, and spirit." In Christ Jesus there was a Man with a body perfectly adapted to the needs of the spirit; and it was the purpose and aim of Christianity to bring man to that condition. However much the spirit of a man might reach forward towards it, he was hampered in the present circumstances both by his body and his soul. True Mysticism, therefore, was a reaching out towards that which Christ had attained, and which we were assured on the authority of Holy Scripture He had attained on our behalf.

Professor Langhorne Orchard, M.A., B.Sc., said he was in agreement with what Mr. Maunder had said so well about matter. Certainly matter was not an abstraction: it was a reality. It was not the highest reality: the highest reality was spiritual. He could not concur with the gentleman who said intellect was foreign to Christian Mysticism. He thought himself that the supreme intellect was found in God and Christ. With regard to the definitions which were quoted on p. 60, it appeared to him that Mr. Rufus Jones gave the best; but the essence of Christian
Mysticism was communion with God, and in that definition the idea of communion was not expressed. Christian Mysticism found its very life in communion with infinite Love. We love God because He first loved us, was at once the plea and the power of Christian Mysticism. "God has shone forth from the recesses of the infinite, and I have seen His glory in the face of Jesus Christ. That glory has attracted me, and I live for it. I want it in order to satisfy the deepest needs and longings of my being." That was the essential thought in Christian Mysticism—communion with God. God was the infinite Spirit; God was the infinite Light; God was the infinite Love, Who had come forth to seek and to save him who was lost. That was Christian Mysticism as he understood it—spiritual harmony, harmony with God, based upon communion springing out of obedience, in response to Divine Revelation.

He wished to thank the author for his able and deeply thoughtful Paper.

The Secretary read the following note from the Rev. Canon R. B. Girdlestone, M.A.:—"We ought to thank the Dean for his helpful and suggestive Paper. The Greek word 'mystery,' to which he refers on p. 60, is rare in the O.T., and is used in the sense of 'secret.' St. Paul uses the verb once (Philippians iv, 12) as marking his initiation into the secret of contentment. I suppose that Mysticism is a reaction from Positivism, and marks a mode of attaining knowledge of spiritual things in which the senses and the reasoning powers are in the background. It marks a short cut to spiritual things, and is almost the same as intuition, being something like Coleridge's 'reason.' The Dean deals with it as the product of intellect; but this and other words are used in slightly different senses by different writers. The Mystic mainly has to do with the spirit-world, and the mental process which he goes through is akin to inspiration, and may be illustrated by the experiences of Ezekiel and St. Paul. It implies, or ought to imply, a certain sympathy with divine holiness; for the pure in heart shall see God—mystically, but really.

I once saw in Tours a striking statue of Descartes. There is a book in his right hand, and his left hand is pressed against his heart; beneath him is engraved the time-honoured sentence, 'Cogito, ergo sum.' The ego is at the root of all human sensation, thought and feeling. It is the soul or self, and gets into touch with God
through faith and prayer and submission; and Jesus Christ is the bond of union between the self and 'the God of the spirits of all flesh.' We are all Mystics if we are in touch with the Eternal, though we do not all put our philosophy into the same words.”

Mr. M. L. Rouse, B.A., B.L., said that he had been much pleased that the Lecturer had stated that it was not the miracles but their intercourse with Christ, which had led the Apostles to accept Him as the Messiah (Mr. Rouse here quoted the call of five of the Apostles, recorded in St. John i, before the Lord had wrought any miracle). Mr. Rouse asked “Have not Christian Mystics generally made the mistake of living too much in retirement?” and instanced the case of Madame de la Mothe Guyon, who confided her three very young daughters to guardians in order that she herself might be free to lead an ascetic life. Daniel, on the other hand, though he devoted himself to prayer, yet when his prayer was ended arose to do the king's business, and did it so well that his adversaries could find no fault in him.

LECTURER'S REPLY.

The Lecturer, in replying, said he wished to express his thanks for the kind things that had been said about his Paper. He hoped some of the speakers would excuse him if in his reply, which must be short, he confined himself to two only out of the points which had been raised, the two which seemed to be the most important. The first was the objection that had been raised that the great Mystics had on the whole expressed themselves in a hostile sense towards human reason, and that therefore he very much overemphasized the intellectual side of his subject. It was necessary to distinguish between the reasoning faculty and the higher reason. According to the philosophy with which he had been dealing, the discursive reason belonged to the soul and not to the higher spiritual life, because its whole function was to distinguish between things and ideas on the plane of the soul-life. Therefore we could quite understand that some of the Mystics had insisted that we must not stop short at the stage of reasoning in that sense. The higher faculty was certainly not purely intellectual, but neither was it destitute of intellect. It was rather the whole personality, the whole man, the mind and will and affections exalted into a higher plane where they worked together. Therefore the vision of God was vouchsafed to the whole man, and not to one particular
faculty. There were, he knew, a good many Mystics who had disparaged intellect because they wished to rest knowledge of God on pure feeling. Professor Flint said that pure (?) feeling was pure nonsense, and he believed that was true. We found, in point of fact, that those Mystics who had trusted to feeling without any kind of reflection or any intellectual light had been a prey to the most childish, foolish, and painful hallucinations. The history of Mysticism showed that it could not be separated from the intellect altogether. As a rule the philosophic Mystics had been free from the great drawbacks of the mystical life which came upon some in the nature of what were called mystical phenomena, apparitions, auditions, and all that deplorable farrago of superstition which filled some books.

The other point upon which he wished to say something was the question raised by Mr. Maunder about matter. It was his fault that he did not explain that he was talking during part of his address rather in a Platonic manner, and using matter in the Platonic sense. Matter, for the Platonist, is not "material." It is the residuum left after all that gives meaning to phenomena has been abstracted. But the "materialist" errs in that he imports into his system a mass of ideas and valuations which, on his own principles, he has no right to use. If he confines himself to matter and energy, he will have nothing to work with but mathematical symbols, which have only a hypothetical existence.

The Chairman said this brought their proceedings to a happy conclusion, and he asked those present to pass a hearty vote of thanks to the Lecturer.

The Meeting adjourned at 6.25 p.m.

Written Communications.

The following written communications were received before the Meeting, but were not read, owing to lack of time:—

Mr. T. B. Bishop:—The researches of science have taught us that there are no two organisms in nature that are exactly alike, and especially are we told that no two human beings ever have existed, or ever will exist, that are absolutely alike in every part and combination of their structure. Nothing is perhaps more wonderful than the varieties of feature and complexion which are to be found
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in the small space occupied by the human face. It would certainly be extremely inconvenient if we were all exactly alike.

Now is it not extremely probable that there is just as much diversity in the characters of men, and in their attributes of mind and soul? And may we not take it as quite certain that God deals with each one according to his characteristics?

On page 61 of the paper reference is made to Mr. William James, whose book, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, is so often referred to. I once glanced through this book, and I saw that he gave extracts from writers of various schools of thought who had written of their own religious experiences, and he seemed to treat them as representatives of all Christians. But they could not be representative of the very large class of people who would never dream of putting their innermost thoughts and feelings upon paper.

From all that we read of the Mystics who lived in the Dark Ages, and whose writings or whose memoirs have come down to us, it seems clear that most of them must have been earnest and faithful men. They could not have had the Word of God in such an accessible form as we have it to-day—they certainly had no reference Bibles and concordances. Doubtless God taught them. What we may call by the name "intuition," was in their case doubtless the teaching of God's Holy Spirit, given, in each case, according to their need.

One great danger of the present day is that people, and especially young people, should mistake their own feelings, and their own ideas, which often may mean their own desires, for Divine guidance. All genuine Christian experience must be founded on Christian doctrine, and all Christian doctrine must have for its foundation, facts—the facts that are revealed to us in the Word of God, and these are briefly summarized for us in the Creeds. It must never be forgotten that our religion is based on facts, and we must beware of any teaching, by whatever name it is called, which ignores any of these fundamental facts. There is the fact of God the Father, of God the Son, and of God the Holy Spirit: the fact of our creation, the fact of sin, the fact of our redemption, and the facts of future reward and punishment. We cannot afford to omit in our teaching any of the essential facts.

It is an exceedingly grave statement that we find on page 60 of the paper—that the centre of gravity in religion has swung round from
authority to experience. We cannot rightly consider anything as true Christian experience unless it is founded on authority—on the authority of God’s Word.

When we turn to the older Mystics such as John Tauler, of Strasburg, Nicholas of Basle, and Suso, whom we read of in Mrs. Bevan’s *Three Friends of God*, and Lady Julian of Norwich, and Richard Rolle, who lived in the 14th century, and of whom the Rev. Dundas Harford has written, we find them true to the most fundamental evangelical truths (though Suso was a severe ascetic), and their writings justify the definition of Mysticism by Rufus Jones, which we find on page 60 of the paper as “that type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and immediate consciousness of the Divine presence.” Then again Bishop Hall’s *Christ Mystical* is a delightful and deeply spiritual volume of the 17th century, and was much loved by that wonderful soldier-mystic, General Gordon. With such Mystics we can have the fullest sympathy, and their history cannot fail to be helpful.

But we must not forget the danger there is of any teaching in the present day that would at all exalt the personal feelings and experiences of even the holiest of men unless these are based on the sure foundations of God’s Word.

**Mr. Sydney T. Klein, F.L.S., F.R.A.S.**—The great charm running throughout Dr. Inge’s paper on “Christian Mysticism” is, I think, the absence of all sophistry and theological diction; one feels at once that he is a true lover of his subject, by the tender way in which he handles all matters that are sacred, and therefore dear to those who, like him, have set out on the true Quest.

I like the broad-minded way in which he acknowledges that the Quest is open alike to all, whatever religious denomination they may belong to. Every human being is surely a potential son of God, and yet the presentation of the Absolute, with its infinite variety of aspects, must be so different to every individual that the same definition of Mysticism will not satisfy everybody, and each phase of humanity will have its special aspect.

I agree entirely with the writer that the Quest is not helped by the Intellect; but I would go further, and say it is only when we have realized the limitations of our finite Intellect, and therefore its uselessness for comprehending the Infinite, that Mystical experience
becomes possible. I should define the Mystical state as a looking inwards instead of outwards; it is the realization of the Immanence of God, that we are indeed one with the All-loving, and that the Spiritual is nearer to us and has much more to do with us than the physical has, if we could only see the truth and recognize its presence.

The Intellect is necessarily governed by the Objective owing to the conditions of our earthly life. We are living in a world of continuous and multitudinous changes; in fact without those changes we could have no cognizance of our surroundings, we should have no consciousness of living. All our sense organs require movement or change for their excitation, because they can only act under the modes or limitations of time and space: these necessitate motion as the very basis of apprehension, because motion is the product of those two modes, namely, the time that an object takes to traverse a certain space; and as our conceptional knowledge is based upon our perceptual knowledge, our very conceptions are limited by time and space, and are therefore governed by the objective. On the other hand, the Mystical or Spiritual outlook is unlimited, everything that is objective to the finite is subjective to the Spiritual. For example, the whole of Creation may be looked upon as the materialization, in time and space, of the “Thought” or Will of the Absolute; the Intellectual outlook can, as it were, only look on the outside, the forms or phenomena, of that materialization, whereas the Mystical inlook enables us to understand the noumena or meaning of that thought.

Intellectualism, or what I will call Intellection, can only look upon that great “Thought” as a long line of events, in sequence, stretching from past to future eternity; it is obliged by its limitations to look lengthwise at time, as though it were similar to our dimension in space, and has no knowledge of it in any other direction, but the Spiritual outlook, being independent of time-limitation, can realize that “Thought” as being, what in our finite expression we should call, instantaneous, and the whole of creation from beginning to the end of time would be lying open to view. This may be clearer if we take as illustration our mode of gaining knowledge by reading a book. Intellection insists that one word comes in front of, and is followed by, another word: it can only think in finite sequences; the contents of that book can only be examined as though it were a long line of words, a succession of thoughts, but, if pressed, Intellection
has to acknowledge that the whole book, the completed thought, is lying there open to view.

It is difficult, as the writer has pointed out, for those who have not gone through a certain experience, to understand the language of the Mystics; the experience is not in any way a *vision* in the ordinary acceptance of the word, it is not anything that can be seen, heard or felt by the touch, it is entirely independent of the physical senses. The "still small voice," which may at times of rapture be momentarily experienced in music, is something much more wonderful than can be formed by sounds; but it cannot be held or described in finite words, and yet it is much more real and dear to us than the outward physical impression.

Intellection tries to solve the question of questions in the form: "Can I (with my intellect) find out the Absolute so that I may possess him?" And the answer ever comes back: "No, because I am trying to storm the Sanctuary of the Unthinkable, the Infinite, by means of a ladder which cannot reach beyond our finite conceptions, and can deal therefore only with the shadows cast by the outlying ramparts upon our physical plane"; he is, of course, looking in the wrong direction, namely, outward instead of inward; but the Mystic asks the question: "Can the Absolute find me out and possess me, and thus make me feel that that which is within me is akin to, is, in fact, a part of Him, and that I am possessed thereby?" And the answer ever comes back from those who are on the true Quest: "Yes, because the Unthinkable, the Hidden, which desires to be found, is ever trying to come into our consciousness to waken the knowledge that His Sanctuary, or what is called the Kingdom of Heaven, is within us, that we are not an external but an internal creation of the All-loving." Such a realization, like the "still small voice" in music, is far above analysis and synthesis or intellectual gymnastics as employed by Intellection.

Rev. John Tuckwell, M.R.A.S.:—I am much disappointed at being unable to be present at the reading of this paper. It is a subject in which I feel a deep interest, and there are some questions relating to it on which I should have welcomed further information.

I have accepted the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as true, but the Mystics tell us that they have come into direct contact, at the summit of the "mystical ladder" (page 60), with the Infinite or Absolute or Ultimate Reality, and often spell those terms with
capital initials. What I am anxious to discover is (to take one of the terms referred to), who or what is this Absolute? (spelt with a capital initial on page 67). Does this Absolute possess the attributes of personality? Does He or It think, design, plan? If there be such an Absolute, what is His relation to the God of the Bible—"the Eternal, Invisible, the only wise God"? According to some writers, the two cannot be identical, for their attributes are not identical. Are we then to conclude, as Professor William James suggests, that the God of the Bible may be a Personality subordinate to the Absolute? If so, Mysticism is unscriptural; I for one must reject it and regard Christian Mysticism as impossible.

The Dean’s answer to the question "What is reality?" (page 69), I am afraid is not very satisfactory. He says it is the contents of the mind of God manifested chiefly as perfect goodness, wisdom, and beauty. In expanding this definition he tells us that these "contents" are not the "material universe," but the "sum total of created things," which presumably must include what we know as the "material universe." But how can "created things"—not the purpose, design, or foreknowledge of them, be it observed, but "created things"—be conceived of by us as included in the contents of the mind of God? Such difficult phraseology and definition of terms makes the whole subject of Mysticism suspect to those of us who believe that truth is always clear. If the experience of the Mystic is a Divine reality, I for one desire above all things to possess it, but am held back from the pursuit of it by its apparent irreconcilability with the truths revealed in Holy Scripture.

Again, the Mystic, whether Buddhist, Mohammedan, and Christian, claims to have had a certain experience, and we have no right to deny it, and I am glad that the Dean admits that it must be subject to an intellectual interpretation. But if Mysticism be "religion at first hand" (page 70), what are we to do with the claims of Christ? The Buddhist and Mohammedan reject Christ as Mediator and Saviour. A modern writer on Mysticism says it would make no difference to him if it were proved that no such person as Christ ever existed, for he is in direct contact with the Absolute. Mysticism, when it professes to see all things in universal harmony, must needs make light of the Scripture doctrines concerning sin and atonement, for sin is only a dissonant chord in the universal Oratorio. The Dean kindly tells us that those of us who have not the Mystic gift
may be consoled by the fact that "this gift is rarely found associated with a very keen and delicate human sympathy" (page 66), and yet on page 70 he says that "the religion of Christ was eminently mystical." Surely this is a contradiction. Where was there ever such keen and delicate human sympathy as that of Christ? These two statements, it is not easy to reconcile.

Mysticism, so far as it cultivates the inner realities of religion rather than merely external forms, may be welcomed if it be true, but in the Scriptures we have "a more sure word of prophecy unto which we do well that we take heed, as unto a light shining in a dark place."
585TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING.

HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5TH, 1917.

E. J. SEWELL, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the previous Meeting were read and signed.


The CHAIRMAN called upon the SECRETARY to read a paper on "Islam and Animism," in the absence of the Author:

**ISLAM AND ANIMISM.** By the Rev. S. M. ZWEMER, M.A., D.D.

THAT Islam is a composite faith is clear, not only from its origin, but from its present-day character and its historical development. Its three-fold source was Judaism, Arab Paganism, and Christianity. These heterogeneous elements of Islam were gathered in Arabia at a time when many religions had penetrated the Peninsula, and the Kaaba (or Sacred House) was a Pantheon. Unless one has a knowledge of these elements of the "times of ignorance," Islam is a problem. Knowing, however, these heathen, Christian, and Jewish factors, Islam is seen to be a natural and comprehensible development. Its heathen, Christian, and Jewish elements remain, to this day, perfectly recognizable, in spite of thirteen centuries of explanation by the Moslem commentators. Rabbi Geiger, in his celebrated essay, first pointed out how much Islam owes to Judaism;* and in his book, *The Original Sources of the Qur'an*, the Rev. W. St. Clair Tisdall, D.D., devotes a chapter to the influences of ancient Arabian beliefs and practices on Islam. There is no doubt that at the very outset Mohammed introduced

*Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthum aufgenommen, von Abraham Geiger, Bonn, 1833.*
Pagan and animistic elements into the new faith. Abu'l Fida' calls attention to a number of religious observances which were thus perpetuated under the new system.

It is not our purpose in this paper to speak of the pre-Islamic beliefs of the Arabs in general, but to show that there are many animistic ideas in the Moslem creed and ritual to-day, which can best be understood by a comparison with similar beliefs in the Pagan world. By animism we understand "that stage in human development in which man believes in the parity of all existences so far as their possession of sentient life is concerned." Men in that stage may hold that a stone, a tree, a mountain, a stream, a wild animal, a heavenly body, a wind, indeed any object within the realm of real or fancied experience, possesses just such a "soul" as he conceives himself to have, and that it is animated by desires and moved by emotions parallel to those he perceives in himself.*

The subject is large, and we can only give in outline some of the beliefs and practices, with the hope that further investigation may be made on the lines indicated.

In the very use of the Moslem creed we have a superstitious use of the names of God against demons and Jinn. Their belief in angels with all its ramifications, and especially their eschatology, shows the same animistic basis. Their belief in how the spirit leaves the body; the benefit of speedy burial; the questioning by the two angels of the tomb; the visiting of the graves and the presentation of offerings of food and drink on the graves—all this is mixed up with Pagan practice, and can be traced to its source in the collections of Tradition.

The Koran itself has the power of a fetish in popular Islam. Not only is the book eternal in its origin and used for mystic purposes, but only those who are pure ritually may touch it. Certain chapters are of special value against evil spirits. The two chapters, i.e., of the "Elephant," and the one entitled "Have we not Expanded?" are almost universally used for the early prayer as a safeguard against pain. At funerals they always read the chapter "Y.S."; and when in fear of Jinn and spirits, the chapter of the Jinn. One has only to read this last chapter with the commentaries on it to see how large a place this doctrine occupies in popular Islam. The cure for headache is said to be the 13th verse of the chapter called "al-Ana'am," or the Cattle, which reads: "His is whatsoever dwells in the night

or in the day: He both hears and knows.” Against robbers at
night a verse of the chapter called “Repentance” is read, etc.

It has been shown by A. J. Wensinck,* that animism and a
belief in demons lie behind the Islamic prayer-ritual. In the
preparation for the daily prayer—especially in the process of
ablation—the object of the Moslem seems to be to free himself
from everything that has connection with supernatural powers
or demons as opposed to the worship of the one true God.
Wensinck tells us that these beliefs have nothing to do with
bodily purity as such, but are intended to free the worshipper
from the presence or the influence of evil spirits.† Goldziher
had already shown in one of his essays that according to Semitic
conception water drives away demons. There are many
traditions which find a relationship between sleep and Jinn.
During sleep the soul, according to animistic belief, leaves the
body. Therefore, one must waken those who sleep quite gently,
lest the soul be prevented from returning. Not only during
sleep but during illness demons are present, and in Egypt it is
considered unfortunate for anyone who is ceremonially unclean
to approach a patient suffering from ophthalmia.

The Moslem, when he prays, is required, according to tradition,
to cover his head, especially the back part of the skull. This,
according to Wensinck, is also due to animistic belief; for evil
spirits enter the body by this. Goldziher has shown that the
name given to this part of the body (al-qafa) has a close relation­
ship to the kind of poetry called Qafiya, which originally meant
a poem-to-wound-the-skull, in other words, an imprecatory poem.
It is therefore for the dread of evil powers which might enter
the mind that the head must be covered during prayer. (The
references are given both to the Moslem tradition and to the

* Der Islam, Band IV, “Animisma und Dämonenglaube.”
† It is this demonic pollution which must be removed. I quote two
traditions from Muslim, vol. i, pp. 112–3. “Said the Prophet: ‘If any
of you wakens up from sleep then let him blow his nose three times. For
the devil spends the night in a man’s nostrils.’” And again: “Said
Omar ibn el-Khattab (May God have mercy on him), ‘A certain man
performed ablution, but left a dry spot on his foot.’ When the Prophet
of God saw it, he said: ‘Go back and wash better,’ then he returned and
came back to prayer. Said the Prophet of God: ‘If a Moslem servant
of God performs the ablution when he washes his face, every sin which
his face has committed is taken away by it with the water or with the
last drop of the water. And when he washes his hands, the sins of his
hands are taken away with the water or with the last drop of the water.
And when he washes his feet, all the sins which his feet have committed
are taken away with the water or with the last drop of the water until
he becomes pure from sin altogether.’”
Talmud, on which they are based.) Again, it is noteworthy that places which are ritually unclean are considered the habitation of demons, such as baths, etc. According to tradition a Moslem cannot perform his prayer without a Sutra or some object placed between himself and the Kibla, in order, as tradition says, "that nothing may harm him by passing in between." This custom is doubtless due to belief in spirits. The call of the Muezzin, according to al-Bukhārī drives away the demons and Satan.*

Among the Arabs before the time of Mohammed, and among Moslems to-day, especially during prayer, sneezing is an ominous sign, and should be accompanied by a pious ejaculation. This also is clearly animistic. Among the tribes of Malaysia the general belief is that when one sneezes the soul leaves the body.† At the close of the prayer, as is well known, the worshipper salutes the two angels on his right and left shoulders. Not only the preparations for prayer and prayer itself, but the times of prayer have a distinct connection with animistic belief. The noon-day prayer is never held at high noon, but a short time after the sun reaches the meridian.‡ Wensinck points out that this is due to the belief that the sun-god is really a demon and must not be worshipped by the monotheist. According to al-Bukhārī, the Prophet postponed the noon-day prayer until after high noon, for "the greatest heat of the day belongs to the heat of hell." Nor is it permitted to pray shortly after sunrise, for "the sun rises between the horns of the devil."

In spite of the assertion of God's Unity, there are many other things connected with Moslem prayer which show Pagan magic, e.g., the power through certain words and gestures to influence the Almighty. These practices were prevalent before Islam. Goldziher mentions the custom of incantation (Manāšīda), similar to that practised by the heathen Kahīns, by certain leaders in the early days of Islam; it was said "if so-and-so would adjure anything upon God, he would doubtless obtain it." He refers especially to magical elements in the prayer for rain.§ Among the Turkish Moslems there is a superstition regarding the value of "rain-stones," called Yada Tashi, or in Persian, Sangī Yada. This superstition dates from before their conversion

* Kitāb al-Adhān, section iv.
† See Kruijft, Animisme.
‡ This is indicated in modern Moslem almanacs by minutes and seconds.
§ See al-Bukhārī, who gives magical formulæ to be used on such an occasion. Certain of the Companions of the Prophet were celebrated as "rain-makers," e.g., Abbas, his uncle, and others.
to Islam, but still persists and has spread to Morocco. In Tlemcen the Moslems in time of drought gather 70,000 pebbles, which are put in 70 sacks during the night; they repeat the Koran prayers over every one of these pebbles, after which the bags are emptied into the wady with the hope of rain.*

Although the practice of casting out demons by the performance called the Zar is not in accordance with orthodox Islam, and has met with protest on the part of Moslems, it is still prevalent in North Africa, Arabia, and Turkey.† According to Snoucke Hurgronje all nationalities in Mecca practise the Zar. Even if they give it another name in their own country, they very soon adopt the word Zar, although the national differences continue. The Zar is an evil spirit which can only be cast out by ceremonies that are Pagan in their character and consist of animal sacrifices, the drinking of blood, etc. The Zar spirits in Egypt are divided into several classes. In Cairo there are the Lower Egypt, the Upper Egyptian, the Sudanese, and the Bedouin-Arab Zars; some writers refer also to Abyssinian, and even Indian spirits. Another subdivision is that of sex; there are male and female spirits, and child spirits, belonging to the high, middle, or lower classes. In Cairo, according to one report by Kahle, the animal is killed by the sheikha above the head of the Zar bride, who must open her mouth and drink the warm blood, the remainder running down her white garments. The theory is that it is not she who drinks, but the spirit in her. In Luxor one drop of the blood is placed on the forehead, the cheeks, the chin, the palms of the hands, and on the soles of the feet. Probably the blood has to be drunk also. The claws and feathers of the fowl are laid aside carefully as a special gift to the spirit.‡

Conjuring spirits, or exorcising demons apart from the Zar, is also common by the use of certain prayer formulas. These formulas compel God to do what is requested, and indicate a belief in the fetish power of the words themselves. It is especially the use of the names of God and the great name of God that produce these results. There are many different lists of the names. Kastallani points out no fewer than twenty-three variants. In later days, under the influence of the Sufis, the

† D. B. Macdonald, Aspects of Islam, p. 4; Paul Kahle, "Zar-Beschworungen in Egypten," in Der Islam, Band III, Heft 1, 2, Strassburg, 1912.
‡ For an account of these ceremonies as practised to-day all over Egypt, see The Moslem World, vol. iii, pp. 275-282.
number of God’s names increased to 1001! One of the most popular books of common prayer, by Abdallah Mohammed Gazali (died 870 A.H.), illustrates this magical use of God’s names, and often uses such expressions as “I beseech Thee by Thy hidden and most Holy Name which no creature understands, etc.” There are many books on the magical use of the names of God, especially one called Ḍāwa al-jaljuliyeh (i.e., jalla jallahu).

These names of God are used not only for lawful prayer, but for strength and power to execute unlawful acts. This shows that they have a magical rather than a holy character.*

In addition to magical formulas there is the use of the hand, especially the forefinger (sabāba); this is called the finger for cursing. Goldziher gives many illustrations of how the forefinger was used in magical ways long before its present use in testifying to God’s unity. A controversy arose in Islam very early about the raising of the hands in prayer.† Who can doubt that this indicates also a magical use of the hands? A hand is still used as an amulet against the evil eye. It is made of silver or gold in jewelry, or made of tin in natural size, and is then suspended over the door of a house. The top of a Moslem banner is generally of this shape. Moslems call it the “Hand of Fatima.” The superstition of the hand is very common, especially in lower Egypt, and seems to be borrowed from the Jews. The following points are to be noted: It is unlucky to count five on the fingers. All Egyptians of the lower classes, when they count, say: “One, two, three, four, in the eye of your enemy.” Children, when at play, show their displeasure with each other by touching the little fingers of their two hands together, which signifies separation, enmity, hatred. The same sign is used by grown-up people, in discussion. In addition to all this, they use the hand for the gesture of cursing, by raising both hands slightly with fingers extended and making a downward motion to call down the curses of God upon those toward whom the fingers are pointed. This is called Takāmis.

Mr. Eugene Lefebure‡ writes: “There never was a country where the representation of the human hand has not

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* A vast literature on the use of God’s names and the magic of numbers has grown up, called Kūṭūb al-Ruḥāniyat, on geomancy, ornithomancy, dreams, etc.
† It is regarding the position of the hands that the four sects have special teaching, and can be distinguished.
served as an amulet. In Egypt as in Ireland, with the Hebrews as with the Etruscans, they attribute to this figure a mysterious power. In the middle parts of France they have the hand made of coral, and the Arabs in Africa and Asia believe that the fingers of an open hand, like the horn, have the power of turning away the evil eye. This belief they have inherited from the Chaldeans and the Phœnicians, which belief they share with the Jews. Whether it be the figure of a hand, or the hand or fingers taken from a corpse, he who possesses a talisman of this kind is sure of escaping bad influences. In Palestine this goes by the name of Kef Miryam; in Algeria, the Moslems in our French colonies very appropriately named these talismans La Main de Fatima; and from this source another superstition has been developed:—the mystic virtues of the number five, because of the five fingers of the hand [* or its sinister power].

In the prayer called the Qūnūt, which takes place after the morning prayer (Ṣalāt), the hands are raised in magical fashion. Goldziher believes that the original signification of this was a curse or imprecation on the enemy; such was the ancient custom of the Arabs. The Prophet cursed his enemies in this way; so did also the early Caliphs. In Lane's Dictionary (art. on Qunut) we find the prayer given as follows: "O God, verily we beg of Thee aid, and we beg of Thee forgiveness. And we believe in Thee, and we rely on Thee, and we laud Thee well, and we will not be unthankful to Thee for Thy favour, and we cast off and forsake him who disobeys Thee: O God, Thee we worship, and to Thee we perform the divinely-appointed act of prayer, and prostrate ourselves; and we are quick in working for Thee and in serving Thee: we hope for Thy mercy, and we dread Thy punishment: verily (or may) Thy punishment overtake the unbelievers." It is said of the Prophet that he stood during a whole month, after the prayer of daybreak, cursing the tribes of Rial and Dhekwān. We read in Al-Muwatta (Vol. i, p. 216) that at the time of the Qūnūt they used to curse their enemies, the unbelievers, in the month of Ramadhan. Later on, this custom was modified or explained away.

Not only in formal prayer (Ṣalāt), but also in the Du‘a (petition), there are magical practices, especially in the prayer for eclipse, by the raising of the hands. We are told in al-Bukhari that on one occasion the Prophet, while praying for rain, "raised his hands so high that one could see the white skin of

* M. Lefebure, in his short work, La Main de Fatima, has gathered all that is known on the subject.
his arm-pits!" In the case of *Du'a*, therefore, the *Kibla* is said to be heaven itself, and not Mecca.

Another gesture used in *Du'a* is the stroking of the face or of the body with the hands. This custom is borrowed from the Prophet, and has also magical effect. At the time of his death the Prophet put his hands in water and washed his face with them, repeating the Creed. The use of water to drive away demons is a well-known Semitic practice.*

We now pass on to Moslem ideas of the soul.

The conception of the soul and the belief in a double among Moslems closely resembles the idea of the Malays and other Animists. "The Malay conception of the human soul," we read, "is that of a species of thumbling—a thin, unsubstantial human image, or mannikin, which is temporarily absent from the body in sleep, trance, disease, and permanently absent after death. This mannikin, which is usually invisible, but is supposed to be about as big as the thumb, corresponds exactly in shape, proportion, and even complexion, to its embodiment or casing—i.e., the body in which it has its residence. It is of a vapoury, shadowy, or filmy essence, though not so impalpable but that it may cause displacement on entering a physical object. . . . The soul appears to men (both waking and sleeping) as a phantom separate from the body, of which it bears the likeness, manifests physical power, and walks, sits, and sleeps."† What this idea has become in Islam, we shall see in a moment.

That the shadow is a second soul, or is a semblance of the soul, is also an animistic idea. The same thing appears in Islam, for the shadow of a dog defiles the one who prays as much as the dog himself.‡ The Javanese believe that black chickens and black cats do not cast a shadow because they come from the underworld. When one reads of this, one cannot help comparing with it the Moslem belief in the *Qarina*.

Among all the superstitions in Islam there is none more curious in its origin and character than the belief in the Qarin

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* Goldziher, in the *Nöldeke Festschrift*, I, 316, "Zauberelemente im Islamischen Gebet." Many miracles, due to the healing stroke or touch of the Prophet's hand, are recorded in lives of Mohammed, e.g., *Sirat al-Halabi* (margin), vol. iii, p. 231.


‡ I have not found this stated in the Traditions, but it is a well-known belief in Egypt and in Arabia. Mohammed himself had no shadow because he was created of Divine light. *Sirat al-Halabi*, vol. iii, p. 239.
or Qurina.* It probably goes back to the ancient religion of Egypt, or to the animistic beliefs common in Arabia as well as in Egypt, at the time of Mohammed. By Qar in or Qurina the Moslem understands the double of the individual, his companion, his mate, his familiar demon. In the case of males a female mate, and in the case of females a male. This double is generally understood to be a devil (Shaitān or Jinn) born at the time of the individual's birth, and his constant companion throughout life. The Qurina is, therefore, of the progeny of Satan.† Al-Tabari, in his great commentary (Vol. xxvi, p. 104), says the Qar in or Qurina is each man's Shaitān (devil), who was appointed to have charge of him in the world. He then proves his statement by a series of traditions: "His Qur in is his devil (Shaitān)"; or, according to another authority there quoted: "His Qurina is his Jinn."

The general teaching is that all human beings, non-Moslems as well as Moslems, have their familiar spirit, who is in every case jealous, malignant, and the cause of physical and moral ill, save in so far as his influence is warded off by magic or religion. It is just here that the belief exercises a dominating place in popular Islam. It is against this spirit of jealousy, this other self, that children wear beads, amulets, talismans, etc. It is this other self that, through jealousy, hatred, and envy, prevents love between husband and wife, and is responsible for many injuries and disappointments.

As an example of the usual animistic practices connected with saint-worship and at the graves of the saints, I may mention what takes place at the village of Sennouris in the Fayoum, at the grave of Mohammed Marādnī, a famous wali.‡ His tomb is next to the village mosque, and I was allowed to visit it. The doorway is studded with nails driven in by votaries, together with votive offerings of hair, nail parings, and teeth, as well as shreds of clothing. On the tomb there was a collection of amulets, placed there as offerings by those who sought the intercession of the saint. Near the grave is a

* The Koran passages are the following:—Chapter of the Cave, v. 48 (see especially the Commentary of Fahr er-Razi, margin, vol. 6, p. 75); Chapter Kaf, vv. 20-30; Chapter of Women, vv. 41-42; Chapter of the Ranged, vv. 47-54; Chapter "Detailed," v. 24; Chapter of Gilding, vv. 35-37.

† For a fuller statement of Moslem teaching regarding the Qurin, the reader is referred to my article in the Moslem World, vol. vi, No. 4.

‡ Plural, awliyā = saint, intercessor, redeemer, surety. The Hebrew word goēl is translated wali in the Arabic Bible.
large stone urn, probably a remnant of Grecian civilization. It is badly battered, and rests on the incline of an old and dirty well. This stone urn, they firmly believe, was carried by the saint on his little finger and put here in the Fayoum. Moslem women come on Fridays to bathe in the urn as a cure for all diseases.

One of the charms which I was allowed to take with me consisted of a double calico bag in which was a bit of paper sewn up with the following inscription:

"In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate, this charm affords an exemption, in the name of God and His Apostle, from Um Mildam (the queen of all the evil Jinn), she who devours flesh and drinks blood and crushes bones. O Um Mildam, if you are a Jewess, I forswear you by Moses, the mouthpiece of God (upon Him be peace!); if thou art a Christian, I forswear thee by Jesus Christ (upon Him be peace!); and if thou art a true believer, I forswear thee by Mohammed the Prophet (upon him be prayers and peace!). If thou art none of these, I will have nothing to do with thee, for God is a good protector and defender through His Apostle."

There are hundreds of similar saints and tombs in Egypt. Tree-worship, which is so common in nearly every Moslem land, is also undoubtedly connected with the old practices of Arabian idolatry, or was borrowed from other pagan lands. According to Doughty, the traveller, whose observations are confirmed by all those who know the Arabs, the Bedouins look upon certain trees and shrubs as menhals, or abodes of angels and demons. To injure such trees or shrubs, to lop their branches, is held dangerous. Misfortune overtakes him who has the foolhardiness to perpetrate such an outrage.

Stone-worship is not uncommon in Islam. Stones were used as fetishes in Arabia before Islam, and one may well compare the reverence paid to the Black Stone at Mecca with the worship of aerolites in the Indian Archipelago—as Professor Wilken shows in his chapter on the subject.*

It is well known that there are other sacred stones in the Hejaz, and not only here but in many lands of the Near East. In Arabia and Egypt I have known of such objects being covered with oil by devotees and forming the centre of weird rites by the women folk at night. In the use of animals (totems) as amulets to guard the house or the place of business,

we also have a heathen custom that prevails throughout all Moslem Egypt. The crocodile is especially common, just as it is in the Indian Archipelago, though other animals are also used. I have just received a specimen from Damanhour. It consists of a stuffed mongoose with an Egyptian cobra twisted around its body, and is put on houses or shops to prevent the effects of the evil eye and to ward off robbers. It also preserves children from envy and jealousy. This sort of object generally hangs above the door. The common name for it is Hami al-Beit or Hafiz al-Beit. Yet the people who dwell there say, "There is no God but Allah!"

Many animistic customs are in vogue among Moslems in connection with the marriage ceremonies. The reader is referred to a complete treatise on the subject by Edward Westermarck (Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco, Macmillan, London, 1914). One has only to compare such practices with those of pagan tribes to see how much of animism lies behind them. There could be no clearer proof that animism persists in Islam than a comparison of the practices current in the older Moslem lands, such as Arabia and Egypt, with those of the Indian Archipelago. In one of the standard works on the subject† we note, for example, the following practices, which find their parallel in present-day Islam: Hair offerings, because hair is the seat of soul-stuff;+ the offering of nail-parings to saints or on the tombs of notables. Moslems in Egypt also carefully bury their nail-parings because they are in a sense sacred. We may compare with this a tradition given by Mohammed:§ "His Excellency the Prophet said: 'Whosoever cuts his nails and trims his moustachios on Saturdays and Thursdays will be free from pains of the teeth and eyes.'"

The rosary is used for three distinct purposes. It is used in prayer and Zikr, for counting pious ejaculations or petitions; it is used for divining; and, lastly, for healing. The first-named practice is called Istikharah. It is related of one of the wives of Mohammed that she said: "The Prophet taught us Istikharah (i.e., to know what is best), just as he taught us verses from the Book, and if any of you want anything, let him perform ablution and pray two rak'as, and read the verse:

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* Kruijt, Het Animisme, p. 215.
† Het Animisme in den Indischen Archipel, by Alb. C. Kruijt (Leyden).
§ Mohammed's hair has become famous as a fetish, and has power to heal, Sirat al-Halabi, vol. iii, p. 238.
'There is no other god,' etc." To use the rosary in this way the following things must be observed: The rosary is grasped within the palms of both hands, and is then rubbed together; then the Fatiha is solemnly repeated, after which the user breathes upon the rosary with his breath in order to put the effect of the chapter into the beads. Then he seizes a particular bead and counts toward the "pointer" bead, using the words God, Mohammed, Abu Jahal. When the count terminates with the name of God, it means that his request is favourably received; if it terminates with Abu Jahal it is bad; and if with Mohammed the reply is doubtful. Others considered it more correct to use these three words: Adam, Eve, the devil. When these words are used, the Adam bead signifies approval, the devil bead disapproval, and the Eve bead uncertainty, because woman's judgment is fickle. This use of the rosary is almost universal among the common people. The rosary is also used for the cure of the sick. In this case it depends on the material from which the beads are manufactured. Those made of ordinary wood or of mother-o'pearl are not valuable, but a rosary made of jet (Yusr) or Kuk (a particular kind of wood from Mecca) is valuable.

Of magic in general, as practised to-day by Moslems, we cannot speak at length. I may mention, however, the use of magic bowls or cups, which goes back to great antiquity. Generally speaking, the cups are of two kinds. One is called Taset al-kha'dda (from the Arabic root kha'dha, which means "to shake your cup").* It is also called Taset al-Turba. This kind is used for healing, and to drive away the ills of the body. A specimen carefully kept by old families may be seen in the Arab Museum, made by an engraver called Ibrahim, in A.D. 1561. According to a Coptic writer, the owners of such goblets often lend them to others who need them. The right manner to use the goblet is to fill it with water in the early morning, place some ordinary keys in it, and leave them until the following day, when the patient drinks the water. This operation is repeated three, seven, or forty consecutive nights until the patient gets rid of the evil effects of his fright. It would not be strange if the oxide of iron acted on the patients! The Moslem goblets in use to-day generally contain Koran inscriptions, and the keys spoken of are suspended by wires from the inner cup, which rests in the centre of the Tüsch. This is

* See Lane's Dictionary. Others say it comes from a root signifying to terrorize, to make fall into a fit; i.e., the cup of terror.
fastened to the cup by a screw, allowing the inner cup to revolve, so that the keys reach every portion of the outer goblet.

In conclusion, we are not so much concerned with the fact of animism in Islam as we are with the failure of Islam to meet animistic practices and overcome them. Gottfried Simon has shown conclusively that Islam cannot uproot pagan practices or remove the terror of spirits and demon-worship in Sumatra and Java among Moslems. In the conflict with animism, Islam has not been triumphant.* Christianity, as Harnack has shown, did win in its conflict with demon-worship in the first struggle, and is winning to-day.†

Animism in Islam offers points of contact and contrast that may well be used by the missionary. Christianity's message and power must be applied to the degrading superstitions of Islam, and especially to these utterly pagan practices. The fear of spirits can be met by the love of the Holy Spirit; the terror of death by the repose and confidence of the Christian; true exorcism is not found in the Zar, but in prayer; so-called demonic possession can often be cured by medical skill, and superstition of every kind rooted out by education; Jesus Christ is the Lord of the Unseen World, particularly the world of demons and of angels. Christ points out the true ladder of Jacob and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man—He is the sole channel of communication with the other world. With Him as our living, loving Saviour and Friend we have no fear of "the arrow that flieth by day nor of the pestilence that walketh in darkness."

DISCUSSION.

The CHAIRMAN welcomed an account of Islam from so high an authority as Dr. Zwemer. Resident as he was in a Moslem country, and constantly engaged in discussion and intercourse with Moslems, he had given a most excellent and valuable idea of what modern

Islam was. And it was well to realize the difference between theoretical Islam and actual, practical, modern Islam. It had often been said that the usual plan of controversialists, in comparing two faiths or two sets of doctrines, was to take one at its ideal best and the other at its practical worst and compare the two in that way. Too often that was done in comparisons drawn between Christianity and Islam. Islam was taken at its theoretical best, i.e., the best pronouncements of those who were authorities in their faith, and then Christianity was taken at its practical worst—everything that could be raked in from the most unchristian practices on the part of nominal Christians—and was regarded as representative of Christianity. Therefore it was well to know from such an authority as Dr. Zwemer what extraordinarily superstitious, ignorant, and malignant doctrines and practices formed part of the beliefs of Moslems.

Dr. Zwemer declared the object of his paper to be to show that

"there are many animistic ideas in the Moslem creed and ritual to-day, which can best be understood by a comparison with similar beliefs in the Pagan world."

That, no doubt, was a very valuable purpose, but he (the speaker) very much wished they had had the author of the essay present, because there were several points in the paper which seemed to go rather wide of that description. He described animistic belief as

"that stage in human development in which man believes in the parity of all existences so far as their possession of sentient life is concerned."

He (the speaker) thought it must have struck everyone that there were a great many instances given of superstitious beliefs among Moslems which had very little connection with any such definition as that. He would have liked Dr. Zwemer to explain how he connected those things. He said they were "doubtless" of animistic origin, whereas considerable doubt arose on this point in his mind. Again, he wished they could have had an intelligent Mohammedan present to criticize such a presentation of Islam. He would have found, he thought, a great many openings for maintaining that in Christian countries there were beliefs which virtually correspond with some of those referred to, more particularly in countries like Portugal and South America. We would be rather
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disinclined to accept those beliefs as representing Christianity simply because they were held by people who are nominally Christian. Although Dr. Zwemer set out that certain beliefs were "part of the Moslem creed and ritual," he (the speaker) thought that such a statement could only be justly made if the beliefs in question were part of the acknowledged creed and ritual of Islam. However, he thought the end of the paper—the last paragraph but one—really set out what was its proper conclusion and contention:—

"We are not so much concerned with the fact of animism in Islam as we are with the failure of Islam to meet animistic practices and overcome them."

That did appear to stand out from the paper—that Moslems contrived to hold these superstitious opinions along with the pure doctrines of the religion of Islam:—

"Islam cannot uproot pagan practices or remove the terror of spirits and demon-worship in Sumatra and Java among Moslems. In the conflict with animism, Islam has not been triumphant. Christianity, as Harnack has shown, did win in its conflict with demon-worship in the first struggle, and is winning to-day."

With these remarks the Chairman declared the subject open for discussion.

Mr. Collett expressed deep indebtedness to Dr. Zwemer for a very instructive paper. He thought he had given the true key to the situation at the very opening, when he said that Islam was derived from Judaism, Christianity, and Paganism. He (the speaker) ventured to suggest that it might have been even more correct to say from corrupt Judaism, corrupt Christianity, and Paganism. There, he thought, we got the real secret of the false and corrupt teachings of Islam.

There was a very instructive remark on page 91:

"In Luxor one drop of the blood is placed on the forehead, the cheeks, the chin, the palms of the hand, and on the soles of the feet."

At once his (the speaker's) mind went to Lev. xiv, where we have an account of the Divine instructions for the cleansing of the leper, and he could not help seeing there the true source from which that
formality of Islam sprang. Other similar instances might be mentioned, one of them appearing on page 95. According to the teaching of Islam, every individual was accompanied by an evil spirit! Surely that was a corrupted and perverted version of the beautiful truth, revealed in the Scriptures, that all true children of God are accompanied by angelic messengers—ministering spirits sent forth to “minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation” (Heb. i, 14); while of little children, the Lord spoke of “their angels” (Matt. xviii, 10).

The Chairman pointed out, for the guidance of speakers, that the subject was Islam and Animism, not a comparison between Animism and Christianity.

Mr. Joseph Graham, alluding to the Chairman’s mention of certain aspects of purity and truth in Islam, said he was reminded of Gibbon’s remark concerning the Mohammedan summary of faith: “There is one God, and Mohammed is His prophet,” namely, that the familiar statement contained the greatest truth and the deepest lie. Further recalling his reading of Gibbon, the speaker said that Mohammed was, on the one hand, struck with the degeneracy of the Jews from a religious point of view, and on the other hand, disgusted with the way in which Christianity had been wrapt up in forms and ceremonies and superstitions—very much akin to what had been described in connection with Islam.

They might venture, perhaps, to give Mohammed credit for honesty, and a desire to put forward truth in place of the error which he observed; but inasmuch as he was not speaking from the inspired Word, he was thrown upon resources which must inevitably lead to error—his great error being to proclaim himself as the prophet of God. He recognized the “claims” of Jesus Christ, and Moses, and others; but he was careful to establish his own claim above them all. The inevitable result was a system which needed to be bolstered up from any source available.

He thought the special interest of the paper was that it was a statement by one who was in touch with modern Islam. The intention of the paper apparently was to show that, as the inevitable consequence of the position which Mohammed took up, there was a gathering from all sources without a true guide such as we had in the Holy Scriptures, and that gathering must necessarily be affected
by the practices and doctrines of the people among whom the religion was promulgated.

Mr. C. E. Buckland said that, in reading The Moslem World, a quarterly conducted by Dr. Zwemer, he had noticed frequent mention of the spread of Islam among the wild tribes of Africa. Apparently these tribes turned more readily to Islam than to Christianity; and Dr. Zwemer's paper seemed to supply a very possible explanation of the fact. The animistic and superstitious beliefs and practices in Islam were just the kind of things that would commend themselves to tribes who knew no better. Therefore, he would have liked to hear more about them. If animism and Islam were related, then missionaries to Moslems were supplied with a clue which they might well take up in dealing with African tribes.

Mr. M. L. Rouse, B.A., B.L., adverting to the remarks of the previous speaker, said that the Africans had tree-worship—sacred trees to which they devoted unfortunate children. A child would be found sitting under a tree and no one was allowed to feed him, and there he had to die because offered as a sacrifice to the spirit of that tree. Sacred trees also prevailed in China, under which people addressed evil spirits. He thought with the last speaker that the reason Mohammedanism gained ground was partly because it tolerated such superstitions, and partly because it was a religion which did not impose on men the task, so repugnant to human pride, of overcoming evil with good; which did not bid men be gentle and forbearing, but bade them attack their enemies and propagate religion by the sword, as Mohammed did at the outset.

Mohammed was nephew of the guardian of the Kaaba at Mecca—a stone about nine inches long, which was fabled to have been once a ruby, but to have become black through weeping over the sins of the world! Thus a kind of soul was given to this stone, and that idea of course still prevailed. It was still a scene of worship. Mohammed as a young man had to set up the Kaaba again when the sacred house in which it was kept fell out of repair. He learnt all the rites which were practised, and went through them; and therefore it was only natural that, while setting up a worship of one God, he should retain many such rites. Nor, conversely, was his monotheism a wholly new thing at Mecca; for while we read that
he demolished 360 idols that stood round the sacred house, he found this idolatry heaped over an earlier worship of the one true God; seeing that the Kaaba was fabled to have been set up by Abraham to commemorate an interview of the Almighty One with Adam on the spot. Mount Arafat, which was near, was supposed by the Arabs to be the site of Eden.

When Mohammed began to revolt from the follies and cruelties of idolatry, he was brought under various religious influences from without. A Nestorian monk named Boheira talked much with him upon the superiority of Christianity to heathenism; and he was then brought into contact with a famous Jewish Rabbi, Abdollah ibn Salaam, who held repeated interviews with him, and to a certain extent instructed him in the Jewish religion. When Mohammed decided that he was an apostle and must propagate his meagre Deism, he thought the Jews would accept it; and when they refused, and even treated his overtures with contempt, he was spurred to vengeance and made war upon them, cruelly persecuting them, or driving them out of the castles and towns in Arabia which they then possessed.

Thus Mohammedanism was mainly a form of Judaism; but when Mohammed found that he was not accepted as a kind of fresh Moses, he made his religion differ more and more from the Jewish. Hence, probably, he became less eager to drive out existing superstitions; and accordingly many of these became part and parcel of Mohammedanism.

Rev. A. GRAHAM-BARTON thought it was well to know that Mohammedanism, in its teachings, had not only largely taken in forms of false Judaism and Christianity, but also embodied within it a large part of genuine Judaism and Christianity. Moreover, it is well to note that, but for the existence of Judaism and Christianity, there would have been no Mohammed and no Mohammedanism. It was part of those two great faiths, with a large addition of Pagan systems which were in existence in the world at the time of its appearance. Animism, which had been brutalized into a materialistic form, had played its part in the world of religion. While he was convinced that Christianity was undoubtedly first and foremost, yet there were a great many places and times in the world’s history where and when Christianity had no chance of
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playing any part, and we had to recognize that Mohammedanism, with all its defects, had had to play its part, and God may have recognized its work.

Mr. Maurice Gregory described Dr. Zwemer as one of the greatest experts in mission work amongst the Moslems all over the world; and therefore the lecture would serve as an introduction to questions of deep significance. We were all familiar with The Arabian Nights, a book full of spirits and magic. Even the "bowdlerized" edition, as we have it, gives some kind of idea of the world in which nineteen-twentieths of the Mohammedans of 1917 live.

Mr. E. Walter Maunder, F.R.A.S., commented upon one sentence on p. 88. Dr. Zwemer quoted the following definition:—

"By animism we understand that stage in human development in which man believes in the parity of all existences so far as their possession of sentient life is concerned."

"One stage in human development." Was animism a stage in the way up or in the way down? There was one great writer who had dealt with this question, St. Paul, who said that animism was on the way down. When men "knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise they became fools." If we go through the whole list of animistic beliefs, and look at them carefully, we shall see evidence of degradation. There was some vitality about animism. Quite so. Take a dead body, and before long life would be found in it. What sort of life? Maggots and worms. So, when a religious belief was allowed to die, sooner or later corrupt things would fasten upon it.

We need not go to Egypt or countries of the East to find animism. It could be found here in London among men who had lost faith in Christianity. Only two or three days ago an advertisement was sent to the Victoria Institute of a book—an expensive book—advocating belief in a certain form of animism. And this in England in the twentieth century! Not very long ago he gave a lecture, a little way out of London, at a literary institute connected with a large and flourishing church. When he was leaving, one of the members, a scientific man, told him that he was taking up seriously the study of the occult, which was simply degraded
animism of past centuries. Thus we find animism in a gross form growing up in a so-called Christian country in the twentieth century, called the century of light, reason, and science. He sympathized with the feeling that so many had expressed that it was a great loss that they had not had Dr. Zwemer present on the occasion.

Miss Hussey expressed an opinion that animism and a belief in Jinns were not later additions to Islam, but had the authority of the Koran itself, notably in the stories about King Solomon.

Lieut.-Col. Alves, in proposing a vote of thanks to the writer of the paper, said that animism seemed to be a corrupted form of something that had a real existence and warranty from Scripture, which, however, did not teach that form of animism which was set forth in the paper. In illustration we have our Lord's words: "I tell you that, if these should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out" (Luke xix, 40); also the earthquakes and signs from heaven accompanying certain great events. But for these the word "animism," which connotes conscious existence, is scarcely right. Regarding incantations and divinations, these have been strictly forbidden to both Israelites and Christians; but Scripture has not said that they are not realities of a demoniacal kind. Indeed, the terrible judgments denounced against their practisers hint that they are far more serious than mere impostures.

The Chairman supported the vote of thanks to the writer of the paper. The discussion had, he said, shown that those present were deeply interested in the subject.
The romance connected with the power and the wonders of Nineveh and Babylon has for ages attracted the attention of the world, and this romance has, perhaps, been rather increased than diminished by the legendary nature of what has come down to us with regard to the realm of which Babylon was the capital. Surrounded, as it was, by the mystery with which tradition had invested it, hints of other wonders over and above those related by the historians naturally fired the student's imagination.

And that Babylonia was in very deed a country of wonders there can be no doubt. As everyone who has watched the progress of the Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia knows, the Persian Gulf region is, for Europeans, an inhospitable tract, parched, dry, and rainless in summer, and swampy, notwithstanding drainage (to a certain extent) by innumerable waterways, in winter. In the wet season, malaria reigns, and the stranger finds life altogether too burdensome. Babylonia's fruitfulness in springtime, and later, is wonderful. It is one of
the principal homes of the date-palm—that tree whose fruit both Babylonians and Europeans have always highly appreciated. Otherwise, however, the tract north of the Persian Gulf is a treeless plain, into which all timber which the people need has to be imported. Before the fierce heats of summer it is a land of corn, and the fruits of the earth which are able to grow there, and it might become one of the granaries of the world.

Here, in this land of the Middle East, were located, of old, two races—the Sumerians and the Akkadians—non-Semitic and Semites respectively; races suited to the soil, who became thoroughly acclimatized to their fruitful but sun-scorched country. Divided, in the beginning, like the Heptarchy in England, into several small states, a great nation ultimately arose by their gradual amalgamation under the military pressure and leadership of Babylon, and became the pioneer of ancient civilization in the Semitic East. The irrigation of their land had made the states of Babylonia great canal-diggers; the dearth of stone made them great users of brick in the constructions and buildings; and the bitumen-springs of Hit supplied them with a substitute for mortar ("slime"). The floods which inundate the country in the early spring, when the snows melt in the Armenian mountains, probably obliged the Babylonians to become geometers, as they had to find and reinstate the boundaries of their plots. As agriculturists they were, in their day, probably unsurpassed, and they were among the earliest of great cattle-raisers and ass-breeders. Their literature was largely drawn upon by the Greeks and the Romans in the domain of sacred myth and history, and many thousands of documents testify to their knowledge and acuteness as lawyers, their inventiveness as writers and poets, and the wonders of their mythology and their religious system—their teachings in the domain of cosmology and theology. Their trying climate and the other disadvantages under which they laboured do not, therefore, seem to have impaired their energy as workers and as inventors, or their progress in war, art, literature, or such of the sciences as they were acquainted with, for besides agriculture it is probable that not only writing, but also astronomy, began in the Land of Shinar.

These primitive states of Babylonia had begun their political careers more than 3000 years before Christ, and they progressed from the position of small states to that of a “united kingdom” under one political head. This took place about 2000 years B.C.; and during the period following the great Hammu-rabi, who is identified with Amraphel, the realm of Babylon saw many
changes, and passed more than once under the rule of the kings of the daughter-state, Assyria, which had acknowledged the overlordship of Babylon even during the reign of Hammu-rabi. In this we may, perhaps, see the result of a less enervating climate than that of the south, notwithstanding the success of the Babylonians on the whole in war and the more civilizing activities of life. How far the Assyrians, on their side, were civilizers, is uncertain, but such an energetic people as they were must have had their ideas, like their southern neighbours.

For a long time it had been the desire of the Assyrian kings to become masters of Babylonia, and, as already stated, they had from time to time succeeded, but failed to make permanent the conquest of the land. This was therefore undertaken by Sargon of Assyria, who, however, seems to have found the task he had set himself not an easy one. His opponent was Merodach-baladan, the Chaldean chief of the tribe of Bit-Yakin, who had ascended the Babylonian throne. Of the two pretenders, it is probable that Sargon of Assyria had the better claim to the rule of the land, as he was the descendant of two kings of Assyria who were acknowledged at the same time as kings of Babylonia. As a people akin to themselves, speaking the same language, having the same literature, and professing practically the same religion, the Babylonians probably had little or no objection to Assyrian rule. Sargon, therefore, found the efforts of his army crowned with success, and he was able, after a solemn entry into Babylon, to take up his abode in Merodach-baladan's palace, and receive the tribute of the Babylonian clans which he had subjugated. The subjugation of the Chaldean king only took place in 709 B.C. Sargon died (probably at the hands of an assassin) in 705 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Sennacherib. The Chaldean ruler, Merodach-baladan, took advantage of the change to come forth from his hiding-place, and aided by the Elamites and such of his followers as he could get together, succeeded in installing himself comfortably in his old palace at Babylon. Merodach-baladan's fresh term as ruler, however, was a short one, for the Assyrian king, having settled his affairs as well as he was able, again invaded Babylonia, drove out the Chaldean, taking much spoil and treasure, and reduced to subjection a number of rebellious Chaldean and Aramean tribes, including those of Puqudu (Pekod), Hagararu, and Nabatu (Nabatean). Merodach-baladan took refuge in Nagitu, a city on the Elamite shore of the Persian Gulf.

Apparently feeling that things in Babylonia would go better under a Chaldean ruler, Sennacherib placed on the throne
Bêl-ibni, the Belibus of the Greeks, called Elibus by Alex. Polyhistor. This new ruler, however, did not give satisfaction—possibly he had tried to shake off the Assyrian yoke—and he was therefore carried off as a prisoner to Assyria, and Sennacherib’s eldest son, Aššur-nadin-šumi, was placed on the Babylonian throne. Whilst the Assyrian king was warring in the neighbourhood of Cilicia, however, the Elamites seem to have been plotting against Assyrian rule in Babylonia. Sennacherib therefore went, “in ships of Hatti”—that is, Phœnician galleys (which were dragged overland and launched on the Euphrates)—to Nagitu in Elam, where Merodach-baladan had taken refuge, and captured another pretender, whom he calls Šuṣub, and whom he carried in chains to Assyria. This led to reprisals on the part of the Elamites, who invaded Babylonia and carried off Aššur-nadin-šumi, the king, Sennacherib’s son, to Elam, and set on the throne Nerigal-uṣēzib (693 B.C.).

Nerigal-uṣēzib only ruled for a year or eighteen months, as he was captured by the Assyrians, whose armies passed the Elamite border, and ravaged the country “from Râs (Rosh) to Bit-Burnaki.” They would have been better employed, however, in watching over affairs in Babylonia, where another pretender, Muṣēzib-Marduk, mounted the throne, and ruled for four years. It seems probable that this new King of Babylonia in some way incurred the displeasure of Menanu (Umman-menanu), the King of Elam, who, after a battle with the Assyrians, the result of which is doubtful, aided by an army composed of Elamites and Babylonians, took Muṣēzib-Marduk, and delivered him to the Assyrians. Sennacherib now again (688 B.C.) became King of Babylon. Whether on account of an attempt upon his life, or because the Babylonians were always favouring the cause of pretenders, giving him endless trouble, or, most probable of all, on account of the loss of his son, he destroyed the capital, committing such cruelties that the inhabitants never forgot them; and the seeds of such hatred were thus sowed which were to bring forth for Assyria the deadliest of all fruits—her own destruction.

This is a lesson which militarist powers will never learn—the wreaking of vengeance upon the innocent or the less guilty does not conduce to friendly feelings any more than do the breaking of treaties and ruthless neglect of the usages of civilized warfare.

Eight years more of life were left to Sennacherib before his assassination by his sons, but during this period there is nothing to show the state of affairs in Babylonia. To all appearance
the land was left unmolested, though under Assyrian rule. Further light upon this period may be expected if the records (as is possible) still exist. The assassination took place in 680 B.C., and, according to the Babylonian Chronicle, was due to a revolt, which lasted a month and twelve days. Two days less than two months after the beginning of the revolt, Esarhaddon son of Sennacherib, mounted the throne.

To all appearance a milder rule in Babylonia began with the new reign, and an attempt was made to conciliate the people, though with only partial success. During this period Babylonia had practically no history—her lot was that of Assyria, or what her Assyrian rulers ordained for her. It is hardly too much to conclude, however, that Esarhaddon had profited by his father's experience (its bitterness was doubtless well deserved), and allowed the Babylonians all the liberty they had been accustomed to enjoy.

In the matter of the succession to the throne, however, Esarhaddon made a serious mistake, for instead of leaving the twofold crown to his elder son, Aššur-bani-āpli, the "great and noble Asnappar" of the book of Ezra, he divided his domain, giving Assyria to this ruler and Babylonia to his second son, Šamaš-šum-ukīn, the Saosduchinos of the Greeks. It may be supposed that the elder son was the suzerain of the younger, who had to act practically as the elder's lieutenant. If this was the condition, however, Saosduchinos soon sought to have it set aside, and the two brothers found themselves in conflict one with the other. It seems to have been during or immediately after the first Elamite campaign that Aššur-bani-āpli had to turn his attention to affairs in Babylonia, and begin operations against his "faithless brother," to whom he had "done good," and "had appointed to the kingdom of Babylon." In a word, according to his own account, he had behaved with great generosity toward Saosduchinos, but "he constantly sought to do evil—above with his lips he speaks good things; below in his heart he was a plotter of rebellion (kāšîr nīrtu)." The Babylonians, who had been Aššur-bani-āpli's faithful subjects (wārdānī dagīl pānī-ā), he turned aside, and spoke "speech of untruth" (dābab tā-kētē) concerning the King of Assyria with them. The people whom he thus turned aside were the Akkadians, the Chaldeans, the Arameans, and those of the sea-coast from Aqiba to Bāb-salimetī. But in addition to this, Saosduchinos set against his brother, King Umman-īgaš, of Elam, whom Aššur-bani-āpli had befriended as a fugitive, together with the Kings of Media, Phœnicia, and Sinai.
Saosduchinos having placed all the chief cities of Babylonia in a state of defence against his brother, Aššur-bani-āpli sent his army and besieged Sippar, Babylon, Borsippa, and Cuthah. More than one princely sympathiser in Elam supported Saosduchinos, but risings in Elam prevented them from having any useful effect. In the train of this war for supremacy between the two rulers followed famine and pestilence, in which the Babylonians "ate the flesh of their sons and their daughters." This state of things is fully confirmed by contemporary documents, though not with regard to the cannibalism.* In the end, as Aššur-bani-āpli has it, the gods threw Saosduchinos into the blazing fire, and thus ended his life. What actually happened—whether his palace was set on fire or he built a funeral-pile and perished by his own will and deed, or by some really accidental cause, is uncertain. It may be noted, however, that the last King of Assyria met with a similar fate. The picture of Babylon after the siege as given by Aššur-bani-āpli is terrible, though hardly worse than what we have had about Belgium when the German armies overran it. One circumstance, however, is worthy of note, namely, that whereas the Babylonians were in the position of rebels, the Belgians were an independent nation, owing no allegiance to the Germanic Powers in any way.

Aššur-bani-āpli died in 626 B.C., and the rule fell into the apparently weaker hands of Aššur-ētil-īlānī, who, in his turn, was succeeded by Sin-šarra-iškun, the Saracos of the Greeks. During these two reigns Babylon seems to have been peaceful—biding her time, perhaps, and waiting for a leader, though without knowing whence he was to come. Come, however, he did at last—a leader who was not a real Babylonian, but a Chaldean named Nabû-âbla-uṣur (Nabopolassar), a general sent by the Assyrian King Saracos, either to put down a revolt or to act as military governor of Babylonia.

It was a foolish thing to do on the part of Saracos, but in excuse it might be pleaded that Nabopolassar had hitherto been faithful, and was the most suitable person available. But the temptation was altogether too great, and, being invited, he joined the Median and the Scythian rulers in their attack on Assyria. The capital, Nineveh, is said to have held out for three years, at the end of which time the river, having "become its enemy," undermined a part of the wall, the result being that a gap was formed through which the enemy entered. Recog-

* See the *Journal* of the Victoria Institute, 1893, pp. 25 and 41-43.
FROM WORLD-DOMINION TO SUBJECTION.

nizing that all was lost, Sin-sarra-iskun (Saracos) caused a funeral-pyre to be erected, and having mounted it with his wives and concubines, fire was set thereto, and he perished in the flames. Thus ended the mighty Assyrian Empire, which had had its beginnings at Assur (now Qala’a-Shergâl) close upon 2000 years before.

II.—WORLD-DOMINION.

Nabopolassar had now attained the height of his ambition, and perhaps more, as it is very probable that he became not only King of Babylonia, but of Assyria also; for when Cyrus took Babylonia, Assur was one of the cities of his new domain. Henceforward the centre of political activity was transferred to Babylon. Though, doubtless, it was hard for the Assyrians to relinquish their proud position as a world-power, they probably found their conqueror a sufficiently mild ruler. Both Assyria and Babylonia had the bond of understanding which a common language always assures. Records of this period from Assyria would naturally be interesting. All that can be said is that, judging from certain names, some, at least, of the Assyrians seem to have migrated to Babylonia, and to have engaged in trade there. It is practically certain that they were at last identified with the natives of that more southern land, and in this connection it is noteworthy that Xenophon does not use the word “Babylonia” when speaking of it; the word used is “Assyria,” and its ruler is the Assyrian king.

Having seated himself firmly upon the throne of the dual monarchy of Babylonia and Assyria, Nabopolassar proceeded to assure to himself the western domains over which the Assyrian kings had held sway. To this end he set out to re-establish Babylonian power in Syria, where Sargon of Agade had made his influence felt 2200 years earlier, and Hammu-rabi had warred as overlord. Unfortunately the Bible narrative does not help us here, and we are indebted to Berosus, as quoted by Josephus, for the history of this period. After the division of the territory of Assyria, of which Egypt formed a part, the eastern allies began to quarrel among themselves, and the King of Babylon decided to act on his own account. Syria at that time was in reality a vassal of Egypt, Egypt having taken possession of it on the fall of Assyria. Having received news that the governor whom he had set over Egypt, and over parts of Cæle-Syria and Phœnicia, had revolted from him, he was not able to bear it any longer, and, committing certain parts
of his army to his son Nabuchodonosor (Nabû-kudurri-uṣur or Nebuchadrezzar), who was then but young, he sent him against the rebel. This is regarded as having taken place in 605 B.C. The governor attacked by the young Nebuchadrezzar was apparently Necho, who was completely defeated at Carchemish, and expelled from Syria.

Whilst upon this expedition, Nebuchadrezzar heard of the death of his father at Babylon, and hurried home to prevent complications. On arriving at Babylon, he found that all was quiet, his supporters having looked well after his interests. Thus auspiciously did the great king begin his reign (604 B.C.). His father had occupied the Assyro-Babylonian throne for twenty-one years.

Unfortunately the inscriptions of Nebuchadrezzar, though numerous, refer mainly to his architectural works. In this, however, they support the saying attributed to him in Daniel stated to have been uttered whilst enjoying the view of the city from the roof of his palace: “Is not this great Babylon which I have built, for the house of the kingdom, for the height of my power, and the honour of my majesty?” His inscriptions, however, do not show these words to be true—they only indicate that he rebuilt and enlarged the royal palace, now represented by the brick masses known as the Kasr, and rebuilt many of the great temples. He was, however, very proud of what he had done, and the enamelled brick bas-reliefs of the lion, the bull, and the dragon of Babylon which he had caused to be carved in the brickwork of the Ištar-gate, and probably elsewhere, are specially mentioned by him. In the inscriptions, however, there seems to be no distinction between the terms “build” and “rebuild,” so that we must acquit the great king of uttering, either to himself or to others, a deliberate lie. The origin and foundation of Babylon possibly go back to 4000 years before Christ.

When Nebuchadrezzar came to the throne, he found himself king of a mighty nation, consolidated by his father’s talent, and he could boast of having had a hand himself in its enlargement and in measures for its greater security. Everything was, to all appearance, at peace, and the new king had no reason to fear either a pretender to the throne or attack from without. This satisfactory state of things, however, was not to last, for Jehoiakim, King of Judah, as related in 2 Kings xxiv, 1 ff., after paying tribute for three years, rebelled, but was again reduced to subjection (604–602 B.C.).

Later, apparently owing to the promises of the King of
Egypt, Jehoiachin, son of Jehoiakim, in his turn incurred the hostility of the King of Babylon, who sent an army to besiege Jerusalem, and afterwards journeyed thither himself. The capture of the city followed, and the Jewish king, with his Court, were carried away to Babylon (598 B.C.). The number of captives on this occasion exceeded 10,000, and the treasures of the palace and the Temple formed part of the spoil. The country was not annexed, however, for Nebuchadrezzar made Mattaniah King of Judah instead of Jehoiachin, changing his name to Zedekiah (Bab. form $idqā, $idqaa, or $idqaya).

Passing years seemingly weakened any gratitude Zedekiah may have felt to the power which had raised him, and, encouraged by Pharaoh Hophra, he rebelled in the ninth year of his reign, the result being that Jerusalem was once more besieged. Pharaoh Hophra thereupon marched with an army to the help of his ally; but this move gave the Jewish capital but little relief, for Nebuchadrezzar's army merely raised the siege of Jerusalem long enough to defeat the Egyptians (Jer. xxxvii, 5–7). The city was taken at the end of a year-and-a-half, notwithstanding a very courageous resistance (July, 586 B.C.).

Zedekiah, with his army, fled, but was pursued by the Chaldeans and captured near Jericho. Nebuchadrezzar was then at Riblah with his officers (2 Kings xxv, 6), and there judgment was at once pronounced against the faithless vassal, whose sons were slain before his eyes, his own sight destroyed, and he himself carried captive to Babylon. It was a barbarous sentence, but quite in accordance with the customs of the age, just as the legal formalities apparently conformed to Babylonian usage. The destruction of the Temple and all the principal houses in the city, by Nebuzaradan (Nabû-zêr-iddina), the captain of Nebuchadrezzar's guard, followed, and those remaining in the city were carried captive. The lowest class of the people only remained, in order to carry on the cultivation of the land. Naturally a new governor was appointed—not, as might reasonably have been expected, a Babylonian, but a Jew—Gedaliah, son of Ahikam. His death at the hands of his own countrymen took place shortly afterwards, and with him disappeared the last vestige of Jewish rule in Palestine.

The turn of Tyre came next, and it is said that Nebuchadrezzar blockaded this maritime port no less than thirteen years (585–573 B.C.).

From a fragment of a tablet in the British Museum, referring to Nebuchadrezzar's thirty-seventh year (567 B.C.), we learn that
he made an expedition against an Egyptian king, who seems, from the remains of his name, to have been Amasis. In this record a city—or, perhaps, a province—called Pûtu-yâmân is referred to, and described, apparently, as being a distant district "within the sea." This idiom is used by Assûr-bani-âpli when speaking of Cyprus.

Notwithstanding the doubt which exists with regard to Tyre, it is certain that the Babylonian king ultimately became master of the city, for a contract exists dated there on the 20th of Tammuz, in Nebuchadrezzar's fortieth year. Another tablet, dated at āl mät Suba', "the city of the land of Zobah," on the 16th of Tammuz in the same year—that is, six days earlier—is noteworthy, as it may point to the march of Nebuchadrezzar's army to take possession of the seaport, or, possibly, to some movement of troops thither for the consolidation of Babylonian power. The tablet dated at Tyre, in the fortieth year of Nebuchadrezzar, however, must have been drawn up during the rule of the judges who governed Tyre after the end of the reign of Baal, and suggests that they acted under Babylonian suzerainty. From this tablet we learn that the governor of Kades (Kidîš) at the time was Milki-idiri, but all the witnesses to the document seem to have been Babylonians, possibly present in Tyre in some official capacity. (See pp. 126-130.)

The destruction of Babylon by Sennacherib has already been referred to, as well as Esarhaddon's work there. In addition to these two rulers, however, both his sons—Šamaš-šum-ukin or Saosduchinos and Assûr-bani-âpli, "the great and noble Asnapper"—worked at restoring the temples. Nebuchadrezzar, in spite of this, doubtless found much to do there, and numerous records bearing his name deal at length with his architectural work. The great temple of Belus (Merodach), in Babylonian È-sagila, together with È-temen-ana-ki, "the temple of the foundation of heaven and earth," also called "the tower of Babylon," connected with it, were restored by him, as were likewise many, if not all, of the other fanes of the great city. His inscriptions also confirm what the classical authors say in recording that he made Babylon practically impregnable by means of high and massive walls and a well-constructed moat. To the above must be added the quays which he built along the banks of the Euphrates, which flowed through the city, and the augmentation of the great palace which Nabopolassar, his father, had built, by another just as extensive, which, he states (and this is confirmed by Herodotus), was erected in fifteen days! It is to be noted, however, that all the provisions for the defence of
Babylon which he places to his own credit are attributed by Herodotus to Nitocris, who was probably one of Nebuchadrezzar’s queens. The hanging gardens, said by Herodotus to have been built by Nebuchadrezzar for his “Median” queen, Anuhia, were probably already in existence, as is implied by one of the bas-reliefs in the Assyrian Saloon of the British Museum; it was carved for Aṣṣur-bani-āpili, the “great and noble Asnapper.” It shows a slope, the highest portion of which is supported on arches, and the whole is richly planted with trees and irrigated by streams of water—a real oasis in a land which, during the hot season, is simply a desert. The celebrated “Ištar-Gate,” discovered by the German explorers, is specially referred to by Nebuchadrezzar in the India House Inscription.

Wise, warlike, energetic, and religious, the second Nebuchadrezzar will always live in history as the type of an Eastern ruler of old who knew how to raise the nation which he governed to the highest pitch of its ancient glory and power. He was succeeded by his son, Awil-Maruduk (Evil-Merodach) in 561 B.C.

Who were the men who helped Nebuchadrezzar to attain for his country the height of its glory? Certain of his captains are named in the contract-tablets, but these were not to all appearance very highly placed officials. Queen Nitocris is credited with having thought out the scheme of the city’s great defences—the walls, the lake, the winding river, which brought the navigator to the same spot on three successive days—and we may take it for granted that the great king may have been largely aided by the suggestions of this princess as well as by his other wives, notably the Median one, who doubtless suggested the arrangement, or at least the improvement, of the terraced plantation known as the “hanging gardens”; but the organization of the kingdom, both civil and military, must have been the king’s own. It is worthy of note how suddenly these ancient powers fell from the lofty heights which they had attained with the departure of the genius which had raised them. The warlike energy of the ruler having departed, his reputation rested on his administrative ability, which lasted as long as his intelligence, and then, when his successor took his place—possibly an inexperienced man—plots and counter-plots brought confusion into the realm, and the falling-away, though slow, became more and more pronounced. That this happened in the case of Babylon, we shall see in the pages which follow.

Evil-Merodach, Nebuchadrezzar’s son and successor, was apparently a man of a very different stamp, as is implied by the
statement in 2 Kings xxv, 27–30, where we learn that he honoured the captive King Jehoiachin of Judah, and placed his throne, in the latter's thirty-seventh year, above the thrones of the kings who were in captivity with him, changed his prison garments, and let him eat at the royal table for the remainder of his days. The Babylonian king doubtless felt that this was an honour due to an unfortunate prince no longer young. That Evil-Merodach displeased the Babylonians, there is no doubt, for, according to Josephus, Berosus states that “he governed public affairs lawlessly and extravagantly,” probably meaning that he displeased the priestly and military classes. The Babylonian priest states that he was slain by his sister's husband, Neriglissoiros (Neriglissar, the Babylonian Nergalšarra-usur), who then mounted the throne (559 B.C.).

Being an adorer of Nergal, the god of war, pestilence, and, as we may believe, sudden and violent death in general, it seems likely that the Babylonians—if they knew, which is doubtful—did not regard his having murdered his brother-in-law as a crime barring his mounting the throne. He himself, it is true, does not refer to the circumstances of his succession. He is content to describe himself as “son of Bel-šum-iškun,” a personage probably of some importance, but of whom nothing is known except that Neriglissar makes him to be of royal rank. It is noteworthy that, before assuming the crown, Neriglissar was engaged in many commercial transactions, which, perhaps, indicate that he and his family were originally “princes of the people”—rich men who, by their commercial activity, had become known to a large section of the population; and it is probable that Neriglissar had used this popularity, together with his royal connections, as a stepping-stone to the supreme position to which he aspired. That he favoured the priestly class may be assumed from the fact that, in the first year of his reign, his daughter Gigitum wedded Nabû-šum-ukin, a priest of the celebrated temple of Nebo at Borsippa, on the New Year's Day.

Like Nabopolassar and Nebuchadrezzar, he poses as patron of E-sagila, the great temple of Belus (Merodach) at Babylon, and E-zida, at Borsippa, to which his son-in-law belonged. With regard to the government of his kingdom, he states that Nebo had caused his hands to hold a just sceptre, and Ura, prince of the gods (he was identified with Nergal, god of war, referred to above) had given him his weapon to keep the people and preserve the country. This looks as though the god of pestilence was also the god of the assassin. After mentioning his father, Bél-
šum-iškun, “king of Babylon,” he speaks of the restoration and
decoration of E-sagila and E-zida, of the palace which he built
for himself in the capital, and other architectural work.

He died in Nisan or Iyyar of the 4th year of his reign, and
was succeeded by Lâbâši-Maruduk, the Greek Laborosoarchod,
his son. According to Berosus, he occupied the throne for nine
months only (555 B.C.). He is said to have been a mere youth
at the time of his accession, but from a tablet dated in his father
Neriglissar’s second year, he would seem, in 557 B.C., to have been
old enough to have a separate establishment, his house-steward
having been Nabû-sabit-qatê, a royal-official. Berosus states
that “a plot was hatched against him, and he was tormented to
death, by reason of the very ill-temper and ill-practices which
he exhibited to the world.” The contract-tablets seem to indi­
cate that his reign lasted not nine months, but nine weeks
only.

Though the prosperity of Babylonia seems to have been well
maintained during this period of short reigns following the
death of Nebuchadrezzar, it is clear that there was a considerable
amount of discontent; and that feeling, on the part of the people,
or the more highly-placed administrative officials, had reached
such a point that they had no inclination to allow a young
ruler like Lâbâši-Maruduk sufficient time to show what he could
do. It is clear, also, that they had another personage in their
mind, who, they thought, would be more successful. This man
was Nabonidus, who possibly had already had some experience
in administrative work, and if so, he had probably gained the
confidence of a certain section of the people. One thing, how­
ever, is clear, and that is, that plotters, during his reign, were
either non-existent, or altogether unsuccessful. In addition to
the confidence which his personality seems to have inspired,
there was the fact that he had a son possessing a considerable
amount of energy, who, had he been allowed to ascend the
throne, might have changed the course of events for Babylon;
but the crisis came too early, as the sequel will show.

Neriglissar, judging from his cylinder-inscription, considered
it needful to lay stress on his royal descent, real or assumed, but
apparently Nabonidus had nothing of that nature to bring
forward as a claim to public and official support when he
ascended the throne. He could only state that he was son
of Nabû-balatsu-iqbi, the rubû émqû, “prince sagacious,” or the
like. Who this personage was we have yet to learn. But
although he only bases his claim to the nation’s goodwill on this
member of his ancestry, the Book of Daniel, in describing
Belshazzar, his son, as "son of Nebuchadrezzar," suggests another, namely, that Nabonidus had espoused a princess of Nebuchadrezzar's family. Two copies of a contract in the British Museum, moreover, make a certain Nabonidus to have borne the title "king of the city" (probably Babylon), but whether this had anything to do with the last king of Babylon or not is uncertain. We shall return to this subject, however, later on. (See pp.19-20.)

Unfortunately the Babylonian Chronicle dealing with Nabonidus's reign is very incomplete. Toward the beginning of this record, some ruler, probably a Babylonian, is said to have stayed for a time at Hamath (māṭi Ḫamāṭi) in the month Tebet. After this he seems to have gone to Ammanānu (mount Amanus?) to cut down trees. Later on, the Chronicle has a reference to the sea of the Land of Amurrū—that is, the Mediterranean coast, which the Babylonian king, imitating his predecessors of older time, may have visited. Remains of other lines suggest details, but nothing really certain, and then comes a gap. Whether the above, and the historical statements which must have occupied the gap, refer to the reign of Nabonidus or not, is uncertain.

Where the text is again readable, however, there is no doubt that the reign referred to is that of Nabonidus. This paragraph speaks of Astyages' march against Cyrus, the revolt of the army of the former against him, and their handing him as a prisoner to Cyrus. Cyrus then entered Ecbatana, Astyages' capital, and took a great quantity of booty.

According to the great cylinder-inscription of Nabonidus, this had been revealed to him three years previously in a dream, in which, when the Medes were besieging Haran, Merodach commanded Nabonidus to rebuild the temple of the moon-god Sin in that city. The Babylonian king, however, did not know that the army of Astyages had revolted against him, and delivered him to Cyrus, "his (Merodach's) young servant," but he refers to the booty captured by the Anzanite* king. Nabonidus then goes on to give details of his restoration of the temple at Haran, which city would probably yield many important records to the explorer.

Noteworthy is the fact, that the writer of the Babylonian Chronicle was not so liberal-minded as the king of Babylon, who speaks so appreciatively of Cyrus. As far as one can judge, any great and praiseworthy deeds that Nabonidus may have done

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* Anzan or Anšan was a portion of Elam, and under Cyrus's rule.
are left unmentioned. When we come to Nabonidus's seventh and following years, he seemingly complains that the king was then in Temâ (probably "the city of the king's house"); and his son, with the army and the great men, were in Akkad. The king did not go to Babylon, Nebo did not go to Babylon, Bel (Merodach) did not go forth, and the New Year's festival did not take place. This happened for several years, and the people apparently became discontented, as much importance was attached to such observances. As to the priesthood, their murmurings must have been deep, if not loud, as the temple-treasury probably suffered from lack of the usual offerings. In the ninth year of Nabonidus's reign the queen-mother died in Dur-karâši on the Euphrates, and the son of the king and his soldiers mourned for her three days. At this period Cyrus, who is here called "king of Persia" (šar mât Parsu), gathered his army, and crossed the Tigris below Arbela. Whether this was a threat against Babylonia or not is uncertain; but he seems to have taken some ruler captive, and to have taken "that silver," or "his silver" (kaspu šāšu). The record being mutilated, the traces merely suggest that Cyrus placed a garrison in this district, but withdrew it on a new king being appointed. This, as will be seen later, would be characteristic of his methods. What the presence of an Elamite officer in Akkad in Nabonidus's tenth year portends is uncertain—perhaps Cyrus was trying to come to an agreement with the Babylonian king upon some political matter.

The paragraph referring to the neglect of the gods is repeated for Nabonidus's eleventh year, and may have been introduced for all the remaining years of his reign. Naturally there was a reason for this omission on his part, such as, that he was suffering from some malady which confined him to his palace. Nevertheless, his interest in the temples of his land was very marked, for he often restored them, and took great pleasure in having their foundations explored to find the records of early kings, his predecessors, which he read, and duly restored to their places, in accordance with custom.

At this point there is a considerable gap in the record until Nabonidus's seventeenth year, the last of his reign, of which a translation will be found in the Journal of the Institute for 1914, pp. 186 ff. From this it would seem that the neglected ceremonies had been resumed, probably on account of the danger of invasion which, it was felt, was now very near. In the month Tammuz, Cyrus had reached Opis, and a battle took place there, in which the words which follow imply that the Babylonians
were defeated. A few days later Sippar was taken without fighting, and Nabonidus fled. On the 16th of Tammuz Babylon was entered by Gobryas (Darius the Mede) with the army of Cyrus, and it was apparently in that city that Nabonidus was taken prisoner. Efficient measures were taken for the protection of the Temple of Belus, and probably, also, for the other sacred places of the Babylonians. On the 3rd of Marcheswan Cyrus entered Babylon, and deputations met him asking that the city might be spared—a grace which was at once accorded. On the night of the 11th of Marcheswan Gobryas seems to have made an attack on some portion (? the citadel) which still held out, and "the son of the king died."* Six days' mourning—the last three days of the year and the first three of the next—for him took place.

Such is the story of Babylon's rise to power during the days of Nabopolassar and Nebuchadrezzar, and her subjection under Nabonidus and his son Belshazzar, who was apparently regent.

Now, in the translation which I gave in the Journal of the Institute for 1914, I followed the Babylonian Chronicle, which makes Sippar to have been taken on the 14th day of Tammuz, the fourth month. This, however, is not confirmed by the contract-tablets found there, and it is clear that the copyist of the record in the British Museum has made a mistake, and written Tammuz—the ideograph for which has one wedge less—for Tisri, the seventh month. A tablet indicated by Strassmaier as being dated in the month Chisleu of the seventeenth year of Nabonidus, probably really belongs to Nisan, the first month of that year, so that the real "last date" seems to be that of the Sippar tablet bearing the date "10th day of Marcheswan"—that is, the day before Belshazzar's death.

Combining this with the data of the Chronicle, we see that the invasion and conquest of Babylonia occupied 42 days—it was probably on the 1st day of Tisri that Cyrus fought the battle of Opis, and he assumed the rule of the country, through Gobryas the Mede, his administrator, on the 12th of Marcheswan. Normal life at Sippar was hardly disturbed until the 10th of Tisri, and resumed its usual course on or before the 24th of

* Contract-tablets in the possession of Mr. W. Harding Smith imply that Belshazzar held, as Sir H. C. Rawlinson suggested many years ago, the position of viceroy; and that Gobryas also occupied a similar position in the time of Cambyses.
Marcheswan. The capital’s calm was disturbed for a few days less, and would have resumed its course a few days earlier but for the crowds of petitioners seeking the new ruler’s presence.

Naturally, this was a wonderfully rapid conquest, and it was carried out, as the Babylonian Chronicle indicates, with a minimum of disturbance to the conquered. It has often been said that Xenophon’s *Cyropedia* is a romance, and this may be true; but one thing is certain, and that is, that Xenophon lived much nearer to the time when the events recorded therein took place than we do, and must have known—certainly from Persian sources, and perhaps from the Babylonians themselves—what really happened.

Xenophon also tells of the reputation Cyrus had for clemency, and the most noteworthy instance of it is that in which (*Cyrop.* V, p. 82, in Nimmo’s series) he proposes that labourers (agriculturists) should be left by both sides to pursue their daily work, in order that, after the war, want and famine might be avoided, and to this the Assyrian king consents.

In Xenophon’s account of the taking of Babylon, the well-known story of the entering of the city through the river-bed whilst a festival was in progress is given. It was apprehended that the Babylonians might try to drive back the invaders by attacking them from the house-tops, but Cyrus pointed out that this could easily be stopped by setting fire to the porches, as the doors were of palm-wood, painted over with bitumen. The entry into the city was duly effected, and by a ruse they got the people within the palace to open the gates. The King (Belshazzar) was found with his sword in his hand, surrounded by his friends, eager to defend him. Overpowered by numbers, he died fighting for his life and his throne; as for saving his country, that was past hoping for.

The castles—that is, the palaces of Nabopolassar and Nebuchadrezzar—having been given up by their now demoralized defenders, the people were commanded to deliver up their arms, which they did. The Magi (evidently the Babylonian priesthood) were then ordered to choose for the gods the first-fruits of certain lands owned by them, in accordance with the usage in conquered countries; and houses, palaces, and property were delivered to Cyrus’s followers as rewards for their services. The Babylonians were then directed to cultivate their lands, pay their taxes, and serve those to whom they were severally given.

Cyrus, having let it be known that people might seek his presence, either to pay homage or to consult with him, they
came in such disorderly multitudes that precautions against a renewal of this state of things had to be taken. The crowds who sought him seem to be referred to in the Babylonian Chronicle, but this record contains no mention of disturbances of any kind. The statements of the Chronicle, an official document, are probably to be preferred.

When Cyrus entered the palace, he sacrificed to Vesta (doubtless one of the forms of Zerpanitu) and "Regal Jove" (Bel-Merodach), with other deities whom the Magi (Babylonian priesthood) thought proper. Cyrus seems to have been of opinion that the common people of Babylonia entertained considerable enmity toward him, and he therefore surrounded himself with guards, those most closely attached to him being eunuchs. For the keeping of the city a Persian garrison was installed, for which the Babylonians had to provide. A long speech is attributed to him, in which he tells his followers that according to the laws of war all the property of the conquered belonged to them, and they were entitled to take it if they so chose. Whether this was in any case actually done does not appear, but it may be regarded as hardly probable, as the Babylonians seem to have lived fairly contentedly under his rule—or, rather, under that of Cambyses and Gobryas the Mede, both of whom acted as governors-general in turn.

Notwithstanding all possible defects that may have belonged to his nature, Cyrus showed consideration for the country, friendliness toward the people, but severity in matters which concerned his own safety and authority after having assumed the title "King of Babylon." In an age far more barbarous than our own he exhibited a moderation and a breadth of view which but few, in more civilized times, have shown; and it may truly be said that if his dynasty did not last the fault was not his.

* * *

At the close of his Paper, Dr. Pinches showed an interesting series of lantern slides.
APPENDIX.

TEXTS.

1. Nabonidus, "King of the City."
2. The Babylonians at Zobah.
3. The Babylonians at Tyre.
4. The latest date of the reign of Nabonidus.

1. Nabonidus, "King of the City."

The following document is preserved in two examples, both of them, apparently, copies of an original which has not yet been found. The variants probably indicate that the copyists were not very careful in reproducing the characters of their original:—

(British Museum, S + 769 and S + 734.)

(1) A-di-i-îlu abli-šu ša Nabû-zêr-ididdina (var. -id-di-na)
(2) u šînnînî Hû-î-iš-ti aššatî-šu (addition: Iltu Hû-li-tu"m")
(3) Mar-duk-a mâra (var. ma-ra)-šu-nu a-na šîmi ha-ri-îs (var.
šîmi (?) ha-ri-su (?), a-na omitted) (4) a-na Šu-la-a abli-šu ša
Zêr-uки́n id-dîn (var. i-nam-dîn) (5) bu-ut (var. bu-ut-tî)
sî-hî-i u pa-ki-ra-nu (6) ša ina muḫḫî (var. muḫḫî) Mar-duk-a
el-la-û (var. i-li-mu na-šu-u) (7) A-di-i-îlu Ak-ka-du-u (?)

(9) šwēlu mu-ki-nu Nabû-na'id ša āli āli (var. ābil šwēlu šarrī ...)
(10) A-kar'-u Mu-šê-zê-Bêl (11) abli-šu ša Mar-duk-a Zêrî-ja
(12) abli-šu ša Babîla-a-a (var. Ba-bî-la-a-a) Kên-zêrû (13)
abli-šu ša Ya-di-i-îlu (var. A-di-i-îlu) Re-mut âblî (var. âblî-šu
ša) Mar-duk-a (14) u šwēlu tup-šarru Nabû-zêr-ikša (-ša) âblî-
šu ša Re-mut Hû-uš-ši-tî ša Mu-šal-lîm-i Maruduk (15) waraḥ
Sa-baṭî ūmu šîššerû šattu samattu (16) Nabû-kudurri-ušûr
šar Bâbîlî.

Translation.

Adî'i-îlu, son of Nabû-zêr-ididdina, and Hûlîtî, his wife,* have
given† Marduk'a, their son, for the price agreed upon, to Sulâ,
son of Zêr-uки́n. Liability to refusal and annullment, which
were upon Marduk'a, exist not—Adî'i-îlu and the Akkadian
have taken (it).‡

* Addition, "the divine Hûlîtûm."
† Var. "will give."
‡ The probable translation of the variants šlimu našû Adî'i-îlu mâra-šu
šîti-šu našû is: "It exists not—it is taken away. Adî'i-îlu (and) his
son with him have taken it away."
Witnesses: Nabû-na'id, who is over the city*; Akar'u; Mušêzib-Bêl, son of Marduk'at†; Zêria, son of Bâbilaya; Kên-zéri, son of (Y)adi'i-ilu; Rêmut, son of Marduk'at; and the scribe, Nabû-zêr-ikkiša, son of Marduk-ušabši (?). Ḥuṣṣiti-ša-Mušallîm-Maruduk, month Sebat, day 16th, year 8th, Nebuchad­rezzar, king of Babylon.

For such a short text, the variants are numerous, and suggest a defective original. Nevertheless, recent discoveries in the matter of transcription indicate that the whole may not be so suspicious as it looks. Assyrian variants show, that ḫ, â, may be read as ya, and it is therefore possible, that Yadi'i-ilu is the true reading in every case. The reason of the transposition of Marduka into Dukmara in lines 11 and 13 is unknown—the original Sumerian form of the name is Amar-uduk, “the steer of day,” and as uduk, “day,” contains the same ideograph as the name of the Sun-god Šamaš, this transposition may be due to Egyptian influence, scribes of that nationality having been accustomed to place divine name-elements first.

2. THE CONTRACT DATED AT ZOBAH, 564 B.C.
(British Museum, 84–2–11, 26.†)

OBVERSE.

EDGE.

* Var. “the son of the king . . . .”
† Var. Duk-mar-a.
Transcription.

Obv. Imeru ša ₇Warad-₇Ma-me ₇ablî-šu ₇ša ₇Gimil-₁lu
₇ablî-šu ₇Epeš-(-eš)-₁li ₇a-na ₇bar ₇ma-na ₇šiššet ₇bar ₇šiqli ₇kaspi
₇a-na ₇Suba-bu-sar-a ₇ablî-šu
₇sa ₇Kar-mi-ša-a-a ₇id-din ₇bu-ut
₇kalû-tu ₇ša ₇išten ₇imeri ₇E-ti-l-₁lu
₇ablî-šu ₇ša ₇Remut ₇ablî-šu ₇Da-bi-bi
₇m.Nerigal-iddina ₇ablî-šu ₇ša ₇Dayan-₇Maruduk
₇ablî-šu ₇Lugal-₁ra-₁zu ₇na-šu-₁u
₇imeru ₇šu-gu-ru-₁ru ₇ša ₇ina ₇muh-₁ši
₇ap ₇pi ₇šu ₇ši ₇in ₇du
Rev. ₇awelu ₇Mu-kin-₁nu ₇Man-nu-a-ki-₁-₁addu
₇ablî-šu-ša ₇Li-sir ₇Ar-a-bi ₇ablî-šu-ša
₇ša ₇Nabû-šu-₁u ₇m.Nerigal-₁še-₁zib.
₇ablî-šu ₇ša ₇Tab-ni-e-a ₇abil ₇Ir-a-₁ni
₇awelu ₇tu-₁pšarru ₇Nabû-šum-₁iddina ₇ablî-šu ₇ša ₇warag. ₁Du’uzi ₁umu ₁šisseru
₇šattu ₁irba’a ₇Nabû-kudurri-uṣur, ₁šar ₁Bâbili₇ki.

Translation.

(Concerning) the ass which Warad-Meme, son of Gimillu, descendant of Épeš-⁻⁻, sold to Subabu-sara’, son of Karmiṣaya. Étillu, son of Rēnuit, descendant of Dabibi, (and) Nerigal-iddina, son of Dayan-Maroduk, descendant of Lugal-arazû, respond. The ass is a spirited one, upon whose nose there is a mark.

Witnesses: Mannu-a-ki-Addu, son of Liser; Arabi, son of Sa-Nabû-šu; Nerigal-ušēzib, son of Tabne’a, descendant of Irani; scribe: Nabû-šum-iddina, son of Ululaya. City of the land of Zobah, month Tammuz, day 16th, year 40th, Nebuchadrezzar, king of Babylon.
Notes.

This tablet apparently has more Biblical interest than that from Tyre. As already stated, it is dated six days earlier. The place where it was drawn up, al mat ʕuba’, must be the capital of the tract known as Aram Zobah. As this form of the name is practically exactly that of the Hebrew יבנה it is doubtful whether the ʕabiti of the Assyrian tribute-lists be the same place or not. Most scholars, however, think that there were two districts of the same or similar names. This, of course, is possible, but farther than that we can hardly go. The position required for the Assyrian ʕabiti is between Hamath and Damascus, though Aššur-bani-apli’s great historical cylinder indicates that there was a place of the same name in the Hauran. The Hebrew Zobah was a place of great mineral wealth, and rich in vineyards and fruitful fields.

Among the names in this contract is that of Subabu-sara’ son of Karmišaya, or “the Karmišite.” The first element of Subabu-sara’ reminds us of the Old Testament Shobab: (1) the name of one of David’s sons, and (2) a son of Caleb. The first character of Karmišaya is doubtful, but if, by chance, the reading be correct, the name may be a shortening of Carchemishite (Karkamišaya). Otherwise we ought, perhaps, to read te instead of kar, making Temišaya, “the Temišite.” The true reading will, perhaps, be revealed by again consulting the original, but this can only be when the British Museum is again opened to the public.

If sara’ have any connection with the Hebrew יפ, Šubabu-sara’ may mean “Shobab the prince,” or the like. It is also worthy of note that maq may be read instead of ba (Šumabu-sara’), but that adopted in the translation is more probable.

In line 12 מ is written for מ. It is noteworthy that, in line 13, there is no determinative before Irani. The day of the month, line 16, is slightly doubtful.

3. THE TABLET DATED AT TYRE, 564 B.C.


Obverse.
FROM WORLD-DOMINION TO SUBJECTION.

6. ṣalšet bûrāti ū mārē-šu-nu
3. m·Mil-ki-i-di-ri ãwēlu bel piljati
   ša āl Ki-di-iš ib-ba-kam-ма
   a-na m·Abla-a ābli-šu ša m·Nadin-āhi ābli ãwēlu šangu
   d.Šamaš

9. i-nam-din ki-i la i-tab-bak-ka
   ḥamšet ma-na kaspi m·Mil-ki-i-di-ri
   a-na m·Abla-a ābli-šu ša m·Nadin-āhi ābli ãwel šangu d.Šamaš

Transcription.

Obv. A-di-i ūmu ḫamišsērû ša waraḫ Ayari
šalšet bûrāti ū mārē-šu-nu
3. m·Mil-ki-i-di-ri ãwēlu bel piljati
   ša āl Ki-di-iš ib-ba-kam-ма
   a-na m·Abla-a ābli-šu ša m·Nadin-āhi ābli ãwēlu šangu
   d.Šamaš

6. i-nam-din ki-i la i-tab-bak-ka
   ḥamšet ma-na kaspi m·Mil-ki-i-di-ri
   a-na m·Abla-a ābli-šu ša m·Nadin-āhi ābli ãwel šangu d.Šamaš

Rev. ãwēlu Mu-kin-nu m·Bu-un-du-ti
   ābli-šu ša m·Nabû-ušallim ābīl m·Na-bu-tu
12. m·Mu-še-zib·Maruduk ābli-šu ša m·Abla-a
    ābli ãwēlu ba’iri m·Marduk-šakin-šumi ābli-šu
    ša m·Marduk-ēṭir ābīl m·E-te-ru
15. u ãwēlu ūṭupšarru m·Pir-ḫu ābli-šu ša m·Su-la-a
    alu Šur-ru waraḫ Dumuzi ūmu ēšraa-šinû
    šattu īcba’a d·Nabû-kudurri-ušur, šar Bâbîlīki.
On the 15th day of the month Iyyar, Milki-idiri, governor of Kidis, will bring the 3 cows and their young, and will give (them) to Ablaa, son of Nadin-ahi, descendant of the priest of the Sun-god (Samaš). If he do not bring (them), Milki-idiri shall pay to Ablaa, son of Nadin-ahi, descendant of the priest of Samaš, 5 mana of silver.

Witnesses: Bunduti, son of Nabu-usallim, descendant of Nabu; Muszib-Marodak, son of Ablaa, descendant of the fisherman; Marduk-šakin-šumi, son of Marduk-ētir, descendant of Eteru; and the scribe, Pir'u, son of Šulaa. Tyre, month Tanimuz, day 22nd, year 40th, Nebuchadrezzar, king of Babylon.

There are no unusual words in this inscription. It is doubtful whether the names of the contracting parties (except Milki-idiri, who was a Phoenician or a Tyrian), and those of the witnesses and the scribe, give any information. Ablaa, as the descendant of a priest of the Sun-god, may have come from Sippar (Abu-habbah), in Babylonia, but the other people mentioned in this inscription were probably from Babylon.

4. THE TABLET RECORDING DELIVERIES IN MARCHESWAN OF NABONIDUS'S 17TH YEAR (538 B.C.).


Translation.

½ a mana of silver with 1 gur of barley from the king's store, for necessities, have been given to Bēl-šunu, descendant of Zērūtu, Šamaš-āhē-ēriba, descendant of Nabu-ana-katu₄-sirih, Šabdīa, son of Marduk, Rēmut-Bēl, son of Ikišaya, and Abu-lā-īdū, son of Marduk, who is going to the city Ruzabu, to the presence of the revenue-officer, about the sheep.

Marcheswan, day 10th, year 17th, Nabonidus, king of Babylon.

* Written in Sumerian, Ada-nu-zu.
I have not revised this inscription, and quote it from Strassmaier's copy, the date of which I suppose to be correct. The text is marked in the British Museum, "A.H., 83-1-18, 295," and is, therefore, one of the tablets excavated at Sippar (Abu-habbah) by the late Hormuzd Rassam. Even in war time, it is evident that the king's business was attended to. The position of Ruzabu, the city to which Abu-la-idû was going, is not known. Instead of z and b, however, s and p might be substituted, making Rusapu, which closely resembles the Hebrew Rezeph. The Assyrian form of this name, however, is Rasapu. Nevertheless, identification with Rezeph is not altogether excluded, especially when we consider that it is identified with the modern Rusafa, south-west of Sura, on the Euphrates, and also on the Palmyra road.

It is noteworthy that this record (practically an historical document) has no witnesses. This is owing to the fact that, though belonging to the class of dated inscriptions, it is not really a contract.

DISCUSSION.

The CHAIRMAN: We have had this evening, I think, one of the most fascinating of the many addresses which Dr. Pinches has given us. He has reconstructed for us the history of Babylon during the most interesting part of its existence, and I think he has brought home very vividly to us the politics and the intrigues of that time. And as we are now in a state of war, we can appreciate very keenly that the men who lived in those days acted very much as, unfortunately, men act in these.

Dr. Pinches refers to the character of Babylonia—i.e., of Mesopotamia, as our troops have learnt to call it at the present time. We have one member, who has been a considerable time in Mesopotamia, and who not only knows that region, but also the Punjab very well indeed, and his view upon Mesopotamia is this: During the last few years the habitable portion of the Punjab has been largely extended, following on the sinking of wells right out in the desert and the extension of irrigation, so that the amount of country now under cultivation has greatly increased quite within a short space of time. The most prosperous peasantry in the world at the present time are now living where ten or fifteen years ago there was apparently an unreclaimable desert.
If this were done in Mesopotamia, and the land was irrigated as in the palmy days of Babylon, there is very little doubt that there would be room for millions of agriculturists; and we have in India exactly the population that wants that outlet. There is a great population, growing faster than the country can accommodate it, and Indians are finding their way into British colonies, where there is no suitable place for them. Here is a country, practically without inhabitants, ready for them.

Dr. Pinches makes a little reference to the astronomy of Babylon. That is a subject upon which I would like to say a few words, but not to-night—it would take one too far. The history of the beginnings of astronomy is one of very great interest, and Dr. Pinches and other Assyriologists have thrown a great deal of light upon it.

On page 113 Dr. Pinches notes that when speaking of Babylonia Xenophon uses the word Assyria. I should like to ask him what he would say about the use of the words Assyria and Babylonia in Holy Scripture. To the ordinary layman Assyria is sometimes used where he would expect Babylonia and Babylonia where he would expect Assyria, and the Higher Critics have laid much stress on the fact.

There was just one other point I wished to mention. Dr. Pinches says:—

Cyrus proposes that labourers (agriculturists) should be left by both sides to pursue their daily work, in order that, after the war, want and famine might be avoided, and to this the Assyrian king consents.

Commentators on the Book of Job have pointed out that it has been generally the custom of the Bedouin Arabs to raid the agricultural districts, but it was a point of honour with them that they left the men alive. They did not kill the cattle or the labourers; they regarded them as the goose that laid the golden egg, and expected to come back the next year and raid them again. But you remember that Job's servants told him that the Sabeans and the Chaldeans had fallen upon them and slain the men at the ploughs. Dr. Pinches may be able to say whether that seemed to throw any light on this particular matter—whether the Chaldeans were usually in the habit of doing what the Bedouin Arabs abstained from doing—that is to say, slaughtering the peasants instead of merely robbing them.
Rev. John Tuckwell, M.R.A.S.: I have listened with great interest to Dr. Pinches' paper, and have imagined myself as something like an attendant at a funeral—the burial of the Higher Criticism. One or two things interested me particularly. There was the reference to astronomy. In our Chairman's book, *The Astronomy of the Bible*, which I would earnestly recommend to everyone who has not read it, it is pointed out that the Babylonians were only just able to refer to constellations which came within their purview. But farther north we have other constellations; and I think I am right in saying that he attributes the earliest knowledge of astronomy to nationalities or tribes farther north, whose knowledge descended to the Babylonian plains when the first inhabitants came from the mountains into the plains.

Dr. Pinches has referred to the buildings of Nebuchadrezzar, who stands upon his palace and says, "Is not this great Babylon which I have built?" He has a little hesitation in allowing those words to be exactly appropriate to the Nebuchadrezzar of that time. But I think, if I may recall the fact, it will serve to establish the statement as correct that the city had been practically destroyed by Nabopolassar. When, therefore, Nebuchadrezzar comes into possession of it, there would no doubt have been a great deal for him to do. He would build the palaces and temples and erect new walls around. It would not be understood by those who heard his words that he had absolutely built the whole city as well as the temples and other permanent buildings which it would be regarded as more becoming he should build.

May I refer to the use of the word Assyria? In several passages of Scripture it is used as comprehending both Babylonia and Assyria. We always speak of Assyriology to cover the whole science and whole subject stated. So you find in the Book of Ezra the country is called Assyria. Therefore it quite establishes the propriety of the line used by Xenophon when he speaks of the whole country as Assyria. I thank Dr. Pinches most heartily for his admirable paper, which will be of great value in future in referring to the history of the time as established in the Book of Daniel.

Mr. M. L. Rouse, B.A., B.L.: When the conquest of Babylonia began, one thing that attracted the conquerors was the immense fertility of the region. One of the chieftains returned with a great quantity of dates, and said to his associates: "Look what spoil awaits you
if you go and conquer that land." The Bible, it is true, speaks of Babylonia as all desert and dry waste, and so forth; but that prediction need not have been fulfilled immediately. In fact, one of the great proofs of the truth of the Bible is that Babylonia remained the same a long time after the Bible was completed. It was at a later time that the condition of desolation began, and it was completed by the wanton destruction of the Saracens and Turks.

May I say one word about the death of the queen-mother? Who is this queen-mother who in the ninth year of Nabonidus's reign died, and for whom the son of the king mourned? If the queen-mother died, and Nabonidus and his family were not related to her in any way, because, meanwhile, there had been another little dynasty, and if Nabonidus's son had not married the daughter of Nebuchadrezzar, as we suppose from the Bible, then who is this queen-mother? Surely it was because they were related to this queen-mother that they mourned for her. She seems to me to have been the wife or one of the wives of Nebuchadrezzar, the mother of the wife of Belshazzar. According to this theory, Belshazzar mourned the daughter of Nebuchadrezzar, and hence, in the solemn interview between Daniel and himself, he is reminded that Nebuchadrezzar his ancestor—we believe his grandfather—underwent that humiliation from God, and had his kingdom restored to him. I think that point proves that Nabonidus married a daughter of Nebuchadrezzar, and hence Belshazzar was a grandson of Nebuchadrezzar.

The Rev. H. J. R. Marston, M.A.: Can we alter the reading of the closing chapter of Daniel and instead of reading Darius read Gobryas?

Dr. Pinches: I think we ought to regard him as being the same as Gobryas. He may have been known by two names.

Mr. Martin Rouse: A lady wishes me to ask whether the facts we have had are from inscriptions, or whether some are from Berosus. May I ask another question? When we had the last and most interesting paper in 1914, the German discoveries were fully under discussion, and it seemed to me that it could only have been the citadel of Babylon they had discovered, and that Babylon must have been a far vaster country. Otherwise how could Sir Henry
Rawlinson have found Nebuchadrezzar's bricks in so many towns and villages?

The Chairman: I think the meeting will agree to pass a hearty vote of thanks to Dr. Pinches for a paper of most uncommon interest, and also for the very beautiful series of slides with which he supplemented it.

Dr. Pinches: I am very much obliged to you for your kind reception of my paper, and for the vote of thanks. Our Chairman is an authority upon astronomy; and I have no intention of contending what he says in that matter. I was much interested in what he said of the wells in the Punjab. I think it very possible that the fertility of Babylonia might be increased by some such means. She has rivers, and I believe Sir William Willcocks' scheme consisted in digging canals.

The remarks upon Cyrus's proposal that the labourers should be spared were also very interesting. I am quite prepared to accept the theory that the Chaldeans were a very merciless lot, though probably they were not worse than many other nations and tribes among their contemporaries. I do not think Cyrus had any intention of recommending that the labourers and cattle should be spared in order that he might come and rob them again the next year. I think his aim was higher. His aim was to become king of Babylonia, and leave the people in possession of all their property.

I am glad to think with regard to the Book of Daniel that the Higher Criticism is in fact buried. The tablets of which I have published accounts certainly do seem to imply that the portion of the Book of Daniel referring to the taking of Babylon is as correct as we could expect it to be. That is exceedingly satisfactory.

I have mentioned in the paper that there is no distinction in Assyrian inscriptions between "build" and "re-build," and that may be the case in Daniel. So when Nebuchadrezzar said, "Is not this great Babylon which I have built?" the word "rebuilt" would come within the meaning of the term employed. I do not say that he claims to have built Babylon. We know that Babylon and its temples go back to a more ancient period than his time, or even that of his father. One thing is certain, that portions of Babylon were destroyed again and again and rebuilt by various kings; and Nebuchadrezzar did not claim to have done more than that.

The fertility of Babylonia is very great. It would be a very fine
country to annex. It might supply grain of which this country has a limited amount. We have to import, it is said, four-fifths of our needs every year, so it would be decidedly advantageous if we could profit by the fertility of Babylonia.

Mr. Rouse suggested that the queen-mother referred to might have been a princess of the house of Nebuchadrezzar. That is very probable, and of course if she was Belshazzar's grandmother it would explain the mourning for her. But we have to consider that any other princess of the royal house may have been mourned for in the same way.

As to whether all my statements are from inscriptions—No, they are not, because a great many of the points are not touched upon by the inscriptions. I have drawn upon the Bible record, and upon Berosus as quoted by Josephus. Berosus is sometimes not quite trustworthy. I regard the Biblical record as being superior in that respect.

The extent of Babylon was the last question. Of course, we know it was regarded as a city of enormous size. How large, it is difficult to estimate, because I believe no traces of any outer wall are found. The portion thrown on the screen is described as being about the size of Munich or Dresden, and would be the old city. It would correspond with what we call "the City" in London. Naturally the increase of population made the construction of houses outside the walls absolutely necessary. It always occurs with great capitals, and that was the case with Babylon.

The meeting adjourned at 6.25 p.m.

**WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS.**

**Dr. Thirtle:**—

The fact that Xenophon speaks of Babylon as "Assyria" is highly significant. Clearly the two names were regarded at the time as connoting the same thing. I suggest that the practice is explained by the fact that the prestige of Old Babylon survived in the conquering empire of Assyria. Does not modern usage illustrate the designation of countries by two names; one old, the other more recent? Beyond question, the old-time America is continued in the modern United States; and moreover, in common speech (not too
precise), the more ancient Britain is confounded with "England." In each case the two names are employed interchangeably. In a work published some years ago I pointed out the bearing of such interchange of names upon the familiar Isaianic problem. In the early division of Isaiah, Babylon and Assyria are found in close connection (as, for instance, in chapters 13 and 14), a fact which suggests that the Babylon of the second part of the Book was not the New Babylon of the Exile, but rather Old Babylon as continued in the Assyrian Empire. From the inscriptions we know that the kings of Assyria claimed to be kings of Babylon; and thither they deported prisoners (2 Chron. xxxiii, 11; cp. 2 Kings xvii, 24 ff.). Moreover, it is noteworthy that Cyrus, King of Persia, was also styled "King of Babylon" (Ezra i, 1; v, 13).

Rev. ANDREW CRAIG ROBINSON, M.A.:—

Three accounts—and three accounts only—of the career of Cyrus have come down to us in the writings of classical antiquity—

1st. The account of Ctesias preserved in a fragment of Nicholas of Damascus.
2nd. The account of Herodotus contained in the first Book of his History.
3rd. The account of Xenophon contained in his Cyropedia.

Which of these is contradicted, and which supported, by the cuneiform inscriptions?

According to Ctesias, Cyrus was the son of a fellow named Atrades of the Mardian tribe, whose poverty caused him to live by plunder, whilst his mother, whose name was Argoste, made a living by keeping goats. This must be allowed to have been a very lowly origin indeed.

According to Herodotus, Cyrus was the son of a private Persian of good family named Cambyses, and his mother's name was Mandane, the daughter of Astyages, King of Media.

According to the cuneiform inscriptions, Cyrus was of royal descent. The Cyrus Cylinder proclaims his royal pedigree:—

"I am Cyrus King of the host, the great King, the powerful King, King of Zindir, King of the land of Sumer and Accad, King of the Four Regions, son of Cambyses, the great King,
King of the city of Anzan, the grandson of Cyrus, the great King, King of the city of Anzan, son of Sispes (Teispes), the great King, King of the city of Anzan; the all-enduring royal seed whose reign Bel and Nebo love.”

This royal descent of Cyrus is confirmed by the royal pedigree of his kinsman, Darius Hysdaspes, recorded in the great Behistun Rock Inscription. There Cyrus is referred to by Darius as “of our race,” and Cyrus and Darius are shown to have had the same ancestor, Teispes, King of the city of Anzan, son of Achaemenes, from whom this line of Persian kings are called the Achaemenians.

There is also a short inscription on the ruins of Murghab, the remains probably of the tomb of Cyrus, repeated four times, “I am Cyrus the King, the Achaemenian” (Rawlinson, Trans. Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. X, Part II, p. 276).

In the light of these inscriptions, the narrative of Ctesias with his robber married to a goatherd, and his ridiculous story of Cyrus as a “kitchen knave” in the household of Astyages—his stirring up of the Persians to rebel against the Medians, and the decisive battle in which 60,000 Medians were slain—which has been gravely accepted as serious history, may surely be dismissed with utter contempt.

Then Herodotus is contradicted also by these inscriptions, for his account makes Cyrus the son of merely a Persian of private rank—not son of a king, the descendant of a line of kings. So his wonderful story—which was eagerly accepted by antiquity, and also by grave historians of more recent times—about the son of Harpagus, whom Astyages, King of Media, had served up at a banquet for his father Harpagus to eat—an incident famous in antiquity under the allusion “Median banquets” passes away, and with it the victorious revolt of Cyrus and the Persians against the Medes.

So the natural story of Xenophon in the Cyropedia holds the field. He relates—in agreement with the cuneiform inscriptions—that Cyrus was the son of Cambyses, King of Persia; and he further says, in this agreeing with Herodotus, that his mother was Mandane, daughter of Astyages, King of Media. He gives a very natural account of the boyhood of Cyrus spent for a time at his grandfather’s court in Media. After the death of Astyages, his son Cyaxares succeeded to the throne; and being threatened with war by the Babylonians, he sent to his brother-in-law, Cambyses,
requesting him to send to him his nephew Cyrus in command of a contingent of Persians. The uncle and nephew took the field, and carried on a successful campaign against the Babylonians. After a time, Cyaxares, who was of an indolent disposition, retired to his kingdom of Media, and Cyrus prosecuted the war. After he had invaded Babylonia, a local noble named Gobryas, governor of a principality under the King of Babylon, joined him. Later on in the Cyropedia, Xenophon relates in detail the stratagem of lowering the depth of the river by which Babylon was taken. In agreement with what the annalistic tablet seems to say, he states that it was Gobryas (in conjunction with another officer named Gadatas) to whom Cyrus committed the command of the force of Persians, who entered the city in the night of a great festival and by whom Belshazzar was slain.

After the fall of Babylon, Xenophon relates how Cyrus paid his uncle a visit in Media, on which occasion Cyaxares gave him his daughter in marriage, and saying that he had no legitimate male child, bestowed upon Cyrus the kingdom of Media as his daughter’s dowry. Cyrus, on his part, told Cyaxares “that a house had been set apart for his special use in Babylon, and Government offices (archeia) as well, so that whenever he should come thither he might be able to put up in a residence of his own” (Cyropedia, VII, 17, 18, 19).

Since then Xenophon, who has so much to say about this King of Media, Cyaxares II., is confirmed in so many points regarding the birth and career of Cyrus by the cuneiform inscriptions, we are entitled to claim that if we identify Darius the Median with this Cyaxares of Xenophon, we are not identifying him with an imaginary person who never existed, but with a real historical king, who is not mentioned by Ctesias or Herodotus simply because they were in the same ignorance of his existence as they were of the royal birth of Cyrus, and of the existence of his lieutenant, Gobryas.

Of Darius the Median, Josephus says that he carried Daniel the prophet into Media, and honoured him greatly; and he relates the incident of his being cast into the den of lions. And this would seem to be the true explanation of the sixth chapter of the Book of Daniel—namely, that the whole of the incident there related
occurred in Media. The story in Daniel vi would surely seem to require that he whom the presidents approached with divine honours must—pace Dr. Pinches*—have been a king, and not a mere lieutenant, like Gobryas.

[* And the tablets referred to in footnote on p. 122.]
587TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING,
HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, MARCH 5TH, 1917,
4.30 P.M.

PROFESSOR H. LANGHORNE ORCHARD, M.A., took the Chair.

The Minutes of the last Meeting were read and confirmed.

The SECRETARY (Mr. E. J. Sewell) announced the Election of
Rev. F. N. Carus-Wilson, M.A., and Mr. A. E. Youssef, B.Sc., as
Associates of the Institute.

The CHAIRMAN, in few words, called upon Clement C. J. Webb, Esq.,
M.A., to read a Paper upon the difficult but important subject of "The
Conscience."

THE CONSCIENCE. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, Esq., M.A.,
Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford.

In doing me the honour of asking me to address you to-night, you did not, I am convinced, expect that I should attempt
in the short time at our disposal to treat in any exhaustive fashion the important and difficult subject of the Conscience, or look for more from me than some reflections upon it which might suggest a point of view from which it may be approached, and might prove provocative of further discussion.

It is at once obvious that the use of the word Conscience in an absolute sense, ancient though no doubt it is, is yet a secondary use. Like the variant Consciousness, which represents along with it in English the Latin conscientia and the French conscience, but from which it is distinguished by its special association with morality, it primarily calls for a genitive to follow it. Consciousness is consciousness of some object; Conscience in the narrower sense is consciousness of rightness and wrongness, of moral quality, in actions. This should always be borne in mind, for it is apt to be overlooked when Conscience is, as it were, personified and spoken of as though it were an inward witness (the old English word for Conscience was Inwit)—an inward witness and judge of our actions, distinguishable from ourselves as the performers of the actions which it observes.
This absolute use of "Conscience" is, of course, nothing new. We find it in St. Paul, by whom the Stoic term συνειδησίας of which conscientia and conscience are translations, is frequently used; though it is rarely found in the New Testament outside of his writings, never perhaps outside of those of authors who stood under his influence. We can trace it and the personification of Conscience back to the tag from Menander, ἀπασιν ἡμῖν ἡ συνείδησις θεὸς. It may even be said to be implicit in the σιν, the con, which signalizes the knowledge spoken of in the word as something existing alongside of, and therefore in some sense distinct from, another more direct or immediate knowledge, which is presupposed by it and which is mine as the doer of the acts which are observed and judged. Although, perhaps, the force of the cognate word Consciousness has been weakened by its use as a rendering of the German Bewusstsein, it also ought strictly to be used only of a reflective knowledge—of what is sometimes distinguished by modern writers on philosophy as self-consciousness, or at least of a kind of knowledge which only a self-conscious being can possess. And in Conscience this reference to reflection has not been lost; the word is always understood to mean a sort of awareness in which one's own actions are the object, from which as conscientious one distinguishes oneself as a subject. It is just for this very reason that the personification of Conscience, as though it were another person from the persons who act and whose acts are observed and judged, is so easy and, one may even say, inevitable.

The medieval schoolmen distinguished, as is well known, Conscientia (συνείδησις) from Synderesis, and it is in some respects regrettable that this distinction should have fallen into disuse. The history of the word Synderesis is obscure, and, so far as it is known, curious. It no doubt represents a Greek συντιθενσις, which was probably, like συνείδησις itself, a technical term of the Stoics; what the precise significance of that term was has been disputed, but it came, in the degenerate form of Synderesis, into the vocabulary of medieval philosophy from a passage of St. Jerome's commentary on Ezekiel, in which, among other interpretations of the prophet's vision, he mentions one according to which the man, the lion, and the calf represent the three so-called parts of the soul enumerated by Plato in the Republic, the rational, the passionate, and the appetitive, while the eagle stood for that which the Greeks called συντιθενσις, which is above these and beyond them, namely, the spark of conscience, scintilla conscientiae, which was not extinguished in the heart of man by the Fall, and, by means
whereof we, when overcome by pleasure or by passion, or sometimes even when deceived by a show of reason, perceive that we are sinning. Here, then, has been recognized, under the name of *synderesis*, a fundamental capacity for perceiving moral values, unaffected by the Fall, and so common to all members of our race, a capacity yielding what may be called a natural conviction of sin.

Of the precise relation of *synderesis* to *conscientia* different accounts were given by different schoolmen; we may content ourselves with mentioning that of St. Thomas, by whom *synderesis* is considered as the *habitus*, the disposition or capacity whereof *conscientia* is the *actus* or exercise in particular cases. It is, as I said, in my judgment a loss that the use of a word should have been laid aside, the employment of which secured the recognition of an important distinction, which, too often, for want of a corresponding distinction of name, has escaped notice; I mean the distinction between the capacity for discriminating right from wrong, a capacity which we must claim for ourselves, if morality is to have any meaning for us at all, and the exercise of that capacity in particular cases, an exercise sometimes supposed to be invested with a sort of infallibility and finality which are only the reflection of the *ultimateness*, if I may use the word, properly belonging to the capacity, as it belongs to all the fundamental capacities of our spirit, which do not suffer explanation beyond themselves.

This is not to imply that the capacity and its exercise are separable, as they are certainly distinguishable. They are not. I will try to illustrate what I take to be their mutual relations by an analogy from the sphere of mathematical intuition.

It is only as existing in *lines* that we can be aware of *straightness* or of *curvature*. We are not first acquainted with abstract straightness and then recognize it in a line. Yet if we had not already recognized straightness or curvature in lines actually seen, we could not come to learn what they are from repeated experiences of straight or curved lines. That is to say that straightness, the universal quality of straightness, is only known or knowable in particular straight lines, yet our acquaintance with it is not obtained by induction from numerous instances of straightness, still less (as Mill suggested) by induction from lines which are not themselves really straight at all but only approximate to straightness. The *a priori* character, nevertheless—to use Kant's expression—which must thus be recognized as belonging to our fundamental geometrical intuitions, does not secure us from mistakes due to defective
sight, inattention or the like, as to the straightness or the reverse of a particular line. It is not otherwise in the sphere of morality. What the distinction between right and wrong is or means, can only be known in instances. If anyone professes not to understand it, we can only take some instance of each, some act, for example, of loyalty and some act of treachery; and ask him whether he does not recognize a distinction between them, even where materially the acts are indistinguishable, e.g., in two cases of the intentional dropping of a bomb by an aviator on a munition factory, in the one case, however, by an enemy aviator, in the other by one in the service of the country whose munitions he attacks. Yet, while only in an instance can the distinction of right and wrong in actions be perceived, and while there is no way of coming at the knowledge of the distinction except by perceiving it directly in some instance—for it could never be explained to some one who did not perceive it in some instance—nevertheless this does not make it impossible to dispute whether this or that act is right or wrong.

We might, perhaps, use the mediæval distinction of *synderesis* and *conscientia* to help ourselves in expressing this, and might say that the infallibility or, rather (if I may so put it), the incorrigibility of *synderesis* does not carry with it such infallibility of *conscientia* as would make it impossible to dispute whether a particular act is right or wrong: though in the last resort there is no going beyond the direct perception of rightness and wrongness in an instance, and no external criterion of rightness can be found, any more than there can be found an external criterion of truth. In the last resort we must see for ourselves that a proposition is true or an action right. We must see it, I say, for ourselves; but we can only see it for ourselves because it is so independently of our seeing it. The view of rightness or moral goodness which lays all the stress on the subjective side, on the apprehension of it in abstraction from the substance or nature of what is apprehended, is akin to the “subjective idealism” which makes the existence of what we perceive by means of the senses depend upon, or consist in, our perception of it. Such positions tend towards pure scepticism and are only saved from reaching it through a want of thoroughness in their advocates. Thus, in the sphere with which we are now concerned, that of morality, we find people professing a boundless “liberty of conscience,” but secretly relying for what they will admit as genuine “conscience,” upon an unconfessed or incompletely confessed authority. We shall see examples of
this presently when we turn, as I propose we should now turn, from these general considerations as to the nature of Conscience to the question of that Liberty of Conscience which has so often served as a trumpet whence no doubt "soul-animeing strains" have sometimes been blown, but which (it must be confessed) has also sometimes given but an uncertain sound.

What do we mean by Liberty of Conscience? It cannot of course mean liberty to have Conscience, that is consciousness, of the moral quality of actions. For this cannot be directly exposed to external interference. Does it then mean liberty to act according to what one knows to be right? It does mean this; but it has also generally been taken to include beside this liberty to act according to what one thinks to be right, and it is in respect of this part of its meaning that the chief difficulties connected with the subject arise.

One can only know, in the proper sense of the word, that to be right which is really right; but one may think that to be right which is not so, as well as that which is. Yet opinion may be mistaken for knowledge both by the person who opines or thinks, and by others to whom he communicates his opinion; while, although we may doubt whether knowledge can be mistaken for opinion by him who knows, it is certain that we may mistake others' knowledge for opinion. This is so, not only in respect of morality, but of other things also. Freedom to express all sorts of opinion is admittedly a security for the progress of knowledge; not that all opinions are equally valuable or likely to lead to knowledge, but that restraint of the freedom to express any opinion is a sure means to hamper minds in their advance towards knowledge, especially since there can be (this I will ask to be allowed to assume) no tribunal of authority set up whose infallibility in distinguishing truth from error can possibly be guaranteed. And so far as we are dealing merely with speculation on morality, the same arguments as can be brought forward in favour of allowing a general freedom to express all sorts of opinion will apply in respect of morality also. But it is and, one may say, is universally held to be, a different matter when we come to social conduct. It is doubtful whether there is anyone, even among those who are most unwilling to grant the existence of any limits to the right to enjoy freedom of action in accordance with Conscience, who does not draw the line somewhere.

One may disguise this from oneself by saying that Conscience cannot enjoin certain actions; but in so saying one has assumed at a certain point that ability in themselves always to distinguish
knowledge from opinion in others which, as we saw, cannot be conceded to any person or body of persons without investing them with the prerogative of infallibility. Unable—and, if what I said above is true—unable from the very nature of the case, to give an external criterion of rightness any more than of truth, the champions of Liberty of Conscience are apt to fall back upon the subjective criterion of what is called Conscientiousness. Now it is no doubt true that insincerity has no claim to be respected in this matter. Insincerity is the negation of Conscience, for the insincere assertor of a view not only does not know it to be true, in the sense in which that may be affirmed of anyone who only thinks it to be so, but he knows that he neither knows nor, properly speaking, even thinks so. But the doctrine that all sincerely-held opinion is entitled to be free to take effect, cannot be maintained, as is well known, without great difficulty. And, to say the truth, the ordinary man means by a conscientious opinion—or objection—something more than a sincerely-held one. This is, I think, shown by the fact that everybody feels that there is something absurd in the attitude inevitably taken up by the law, where the rights of the conscientious objector are recognized, for which proof that the objection is not insincere is a sufficient proof of its conscientiousness. When one hears of a “conscientious objection” to vaccination, one naturally thinks at once of some such scruple at the use of human means of defence against disease as is, or was, I believe, entertained by the Peculiar People; and however unreasonable we may consider such a scruple to be, one feels that the violation of a religious scruple which one does not share may be the first step on an inclined plane ending in the auto-da-fé, and is not to be taken without serious hesitation. But quite inevitably, as I said, the protection afforded to a religious scruple has to be extended to a sincere conviction based on argument, such as one school of medical practitioners would use against another, to show that the process involves a risk to health sufficient to outweigh the chances of protection which it offers from a worse disease. Such a conviction may no doubt be more reasonable in the eyes of most of us, whether we share it or not, than the scruples of the Peculiar People. But it is obviously not what one would naturally mean by a “conscientious objection.” It lacks the association with religion which that phrase undoubtedly carries with it. That such an association with religion is commonly connoted by the expression, is attested by the difficulty experienced by members of the Tribunals set up under the recent Military Service Act in dealing with “conscientious
objectors" to military service who base their objection on what are described as moral, not religious grounds. To some members of Tribunals, little accustomed to meditate on the relations of morality and religion, an objection did not seem to be religious at all or entitled to respect in that character, which neither appealed to a text of Scripture nor depended on the formal tenets of a recognized religious body. Sometimes, too, to the objector himself the associations of the word "religion" were exclusively with texts and creeds and organizations for common worship, so that, not acknowledging the authority of texts or creeds, nor belonging to any religious denomination, he preferred to call his objection "moral" rather than "religious," and thereby puzzled his judges by a distinction to which they were not accustomed. Of course the objection thus called "moral" was really in most cases essentially "religious." The distinction had practical importance only because the existence of the view put forward lacked the external attestation afforded by it being on record as a tenet of a religious body, or as the literal meaning of a text acknowledged as authoritative. But the whole difficulty went to confirm the original association in the minds of most men, of "conscientious objection," properly so called, with religion.

Historically, it is manifest that it has been mainly over questions of Religion that men have fought and died for Liberty of Conscience. What was it then precisely that they were fighting for?

I think it will be found that, where we most readily allow the champions of Liberty of Conscience to have been in the right, they were contending for the right not to be disqualified for the privileges of citizenship by religious opinions irrelevant to the duties of citizenship, or even (as some early Christian apologists pleaded in their own behalf) predisposing them to the performance of those duties. With the Quaker's scruple at the form of an oath, we may or may not sympathize: but we shall most of us admit that, since he attached no less sanctity to his affirmation than other men attached to the oath, it would have been unreasonable to go on insisting upon a formality, however superstitious the objection to it, which a man might be an exemplary citizen and yet dislike, and even dislike on grounds that might be held should be conceded by the State, so far as the State professed Christianity. There was, in a word, nothing in the Quaker's objection to the oath inconsistent with the common understanding upon which the existence of the State depends.
You will remember Charles Lamb’s severe essay on *Unitarian Protests*; protests, that is, which were left by some Unitarians of his day in the vestry after being married by a clergyman of the Church of England, directed against the Trinitarian formula used in the Marriage Service of that Church. Had these protesters taken the stronger line which Lamb would have persuaded them to take, and been married by a rite of their own, risking the penalties of illegality, we could have sympathized with their action, I think, on a ground similar to that on which we saw we could sympathize with the Quaker’s refusal to swear in a court of justice. Dissent, we should feel, from the doctrine of the Trinity, raises after all no presumption whatever that the dissenter means less or other by marriage than the mass of his fellow-citizens. Once the question is raised, it is plainly seen to be unfair to hamper a fundamental right of citizenship with the obligation to profess agreement with the majority of one’s fellow-citizens on an issue quite irrelevant to the business in hand.

But the conscientious objection of which we have lately heard most, that to military service, is surely quite wrongly classed with the Quaker’s to the oath and the Unitarian’s to the Anglican Marriage Service. Assuming the State to be really in danger of destruction by a foreign foe, a citizen who refuses to take his share in its defence is declining a fundamental duty of citizenship implied in the common understanding on which the existence of the State depends. This is so quite independently of the totally different question which has sometimes been confused with it, the question, namely, whether the permanent establishment of conscription or some other form of compulsory military service is the best method for guaranteeing the security of the State in time of need. The out-and-out objector to combatant service, whether Quaker or no—as distinct from the mere political opponent of conscription—is not, like the Quaker who insists upon affirming instead of swearing, doing in substance exactly what the State asks of him, and merely scrupling at a particular form which has become traditionally attached to the doing of it. He is, in fact—or should be, if he understood his true position—resigning all claim to the protection of the State, and making himself—for Conscience’ sake, no doubt—an outlaw. He has no further claim upon the State. He cannot protest in the name of Liberty of Conscience when treated as a criminal. He may be a martyr for righteousness, but a victim of tyranny he is not. Hegel says quite rightly that only because a State is strong, so that it can dispense with their service and feels itself in no danger from their propaganda, can
it tolerate Quakers with their refusal to take part in the self-defence of the community. That the Quaker is "conscientious" in this refusal is really irrelevant. What would he himself say in the case of a conscientious Thug who, at the opposite extreme of opinion to his, took it to be his religious duty, not to decline to slay his country's enemies in time of war, but, on the other hand, to slay his fellow-countrymen in time of peace?

But are we not, it may be asked, to agree with the Apostles in the Acts, that we should "obey God rather than men"? Must we not, when, to the best of our judgment, God forbids what man commands, refuse obedience to the latter? No one surely would answer this question except in the affirmative; but it is quite another question how far it is right to claim that man should not penalize the refusal.

In the original context of the phrase, the Apostles no doubt confidently appeal to their judges to approve their choice of obedience. But who were their judges? They were the Sanhedrin, the religious court of their nation, sitting to judge them in the name of the same national God whom they claimed to be obeying. A like situation has often recurred in the history of the Christian Church and its spiritual tribunals. But the State, nowadays, at any rate, does not pretend to speak in this way as the mouthpiece of God. The analogy in the case of the State is the assertion of a legal or constitutional right against an usurping executive—such as the protest of Hampden against the ship-money in the history of our own country. I do not, of course, mean to deny that the authority of the State is in a very real sense divine. "There is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God." But there is a distinction, recognized in Christ's precept to render unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's and unto God the things which be God's, between the secular and the spiritual authority, which is entirely relevant to the present issue.

I am not concerned to defend the action of those who, some years ago, chose to be "passive resisters" against the demand for payment of an education rate which they conceived to be designed to subsidize instruction in the tenets of a religious body from which they dissented. It was, indeed, often observed at the time that it was hard to draw the line between their policy and one which would be inconsistent with the maintenance of the State at all, since this, even in the most democratic community, must at least involve the occasional and temporary submission of the minority to measures regularly carried against
them by a majority in a free assembly. But although the
defenders of "passive resistance" were often sadly to seek in
their logic, it is plain that their position was quite otherwise
defensible than that of our conscientious objectors to military
service. Though they had no definite constitutional guarantee
or fundamental law to which they could appeal, they were
undoubtedly in fact appealing to a recognized principle of the
British commonwealth, that of the equality of religions before
the law, which they conceived, rightly or wrongly, to have been
violated. They were appealing to a common understanding
among the citizens of this country, not to an authority altogether
beyond the State, in obedience to which they would be prepared
to sacrifice city and citizens alike. Once more, I am not for a
moment denying that such an authority there may be, or that
such a sacrifice may not be sometimes demanded. What I am
denying is that the State can justly be called upon to recognize
a claim to transcend its jurisdiction altogether on the ground
that the claim is "conscientiously" or sincerely made.

I pass from this particular subject of the relations of the
State to the individual conscience, so-called (let us remember)
by a natural courtesy, since in its strictest sense one cannot be
said to have conscience or consciousness except of what is really
right, whereas no one doubts that many statements of
"conscientious" conviction express mere opinions and often
erroneous opinions. Recent controversies have brought this
subject much before our minds; but there is a question of the
relation of the individual conscience to the social conscience or
consciousness of right and wrong, which goes deeper than that
of its relation to the demands of the particular form of society
which we call the State. For my own part I have no hesitation
in denying the claim of the State to be the supreme and all-
embracing society in the sense that, as a German publicist is
quoted by the late Henry Sidgwick as saying, "the maintenance
of the State justifies every sacrifice, and is superior to every
moral rule." I consider that in nothing did the Christian
religion make a more notable ethical advance upon the ethical
teaching of classical antiquity than in its clear recognition of a
duty transcending that of the citizen. The distinction between
Church and State—a distinction in which the late Lord Acton
saw the historical guarantee of political liberty, as Auguste Comte
had seen in it the historical guarantee of intellectual liberty, is
characteristic of Christendom, because it is a consequence of this
feature of Christian morality. No doubt the Church in putting
forward a claim for itself to be the supreme authority in morals
may repeat the similar error, previously, and again since, committed by the State. But still it remains true that the recognition of a double allegiance by a citizen who is also a Christian Churchman is a permanent testimony to the impossibility that membership in any finite and visible organized community can be the completely adequate expression of the infinity of the human spirit.

Yet this is not to say that the individual as such can escape into a realm of merely individual duty, which is not in any sense social. The expression “private conscience” may well prove misleading. Probably it was first used to mean the conscience of what it was right to do as a private person as distinguished from the conscience of what it was right to do as a person acting in a public capacity. But the phrase is sometimes used very carelessly; and it comes to be taken almost as though it belonged to the essence of Conscience to be private.

Now, as was said in an earlier part of this paper, Conscience, to be Conscience at all, must indeed be one’s own. But “private,” in a strict sense, it could not be without abandoning all claim to rationality; for Reason can never be private. It is essentially what we share with all rational beings; it is essentially that in us which apprehends what is objectively real, independently of the peculiarities belonging to our apprehension of it. To think of the Conscience as “private” is to represent it, not so much in the light of a kind of reason as in the light of a kind of sense; and many would see no harm in this. But even my senses I distrust if they disagree with other people’s; that is, I distrust their report of the real world. Our perceptions must indeed be our own; and, as we saw before, so must our rational apprehensions also. But they need not be, and, on the whole, we prefer them not to be, peculiar. It is the madman who of all men lives most in a world of his own; the genius, on the other hand, is he who gives the touch of a common nature which “makes the whole world kin.” So, insistence on the privacy of Conscience in morals may lead to mere individual taste or passion masquerading under the name of “private conscience.” There is indeed always a moral danger in the cultivation of moral dissent for dissent’s sake. The great reformers have usually appealed to the tradition of the society in which they appear. “If ye had believed Moses, ye would have believed Me.” They claim to be faithful to the principles which all acknowledge—more faithful than their neighbours. They have indeed often appealed to the tradition of the society in a way that is unhistorical, representing what they recommend as having actually occurred in a
legendary past. But the substance of the appeal to antiquity is independent of its legendary setting. It is, in fact, an appeal to the tradition of the society as a living thing, with a tendency to grow in a definite direction. It is implied in the appeal that to the unsophisticated conscience the congruity of the new teaching or reformed practice with what it already recognizes as good, will be apparent; to reject it would involve self-sophistication. Hence the reformer's conscience, though it may be solitary in the sense that something has dawned upon it which has as yet dawned on no one else's, is yet not properly called "private." A really private revelation to an individual conscience, there could be no sin in others rejecting. A great saint or reformer may be the first to perceive a moral truth, just as a great man of science may be the first to make a discovery in nature. Either may have a knowledge which no one else shares; but the knowledge is not on that account "private." Others would share it did they use their own reason as faithfully; and he who has it makes haste to communicate it, and makes no doubt of its communicable, that is, its public character.

The worship of the "private conscience," as such, is thus quite irrational. But it may, notwithstanding, be an important principle that everyone's conscience should be equally respected, not because everyone's is equally likely to be right, but because of the danger of making a general rule as to whose conscience is to be preferred to his neighbour's. It may be right for the community to interfere as little as possible, on the same principle as that on which some actions which we think had better not be done we yet also think had better not be forbidden or punished by law. But nobody thinks thus of all actions, and in the case of Conscience it is plainly not reasonable to extend the rule of acquiescence to consciences which object to the performance of duties on the discharge of which by its members the very existence of the community depends. We may recognize that the danger of what is called in a general way "Socialism" lies in the direction of impressing the judgment of the community on the individual, and so losing the progressive impulse supplied by individual criticism—not private criticism (except in the sense of criticism by one who is not an official), but criticism brought into the public stock. The opposite danger is that of what is sometimes called laissez faire. Here the common ideal is not recognized; the community's judgment is lost, and along with it the proper starting point of the individual conscience. It is not impossible for both dangers to be combined. One finds such a combination
sometimes in quarters which pass for being specially enlightened. People in their contempt for what they call *conventionality* pay no respect to the feelings which echo in the individual conscience the traditional judgments of the community, treating them as mere private prejudices, while they attempt so to remodel the life of the community as to deprive these feelings of the support afforded them by public opinion.

Whether, then, we consider the antithesis of the individual conscience and the public conscience, or judgment of the community, or that of the individual conscience and the objective good, we must be on our guard against ascribing to the individual conscience by itself the value that belongs to the whole moral fact. What is of supreme worth is the conscientiously willed good: not what, if conscientiously willed, *would be* good, but is actually unwilled or unconscientiously willed—that is, willed but not willed because it is known to be good: nor yet the bare form of conscientious volition; but the concrete conscience informed with knowledge—and therefore not private—willing the real and objective good.

**DISCUSSION.**

The **Chairman** : I am sure we all thank the author of the paper for the skill and dialectical subtlety with which he has handled a subject of undoubted difficulty, and the importance of which cannot, I should say, be over-estimated. We find that Socrates followed his good demon, as he called it, meaning by "demon" a being partly divine and partly human whom he supposed to be resident within him, whose function was to guide him from error and lead him into truth.

The importance of Conscience we know was recognized in the Word of God, the Bible—all through the Divine Book. The great Apostle, too, says how we should respect even what was supposed to be a weak conscience, the possessor of which did not see the whole truth about matters; yet so long as he believed his ideas to be true, he was bound to follow them. We might, of course, try to persuade him, and reason him into abandoning his weak conscience and getting a strong one in its place; but we were never to force the weak conscience on any account. What did St. Paul aim at? He aimed at this: "Herein do I exercise myself to have a conscience void of offence toward God and toward man."
That is the essence of the Christian religion. Conscience, indeed, supplies the very basis of all respect for authority and government. It lies at the very basis of all religion. If I were asked to define Conscience, I should be asked to do what has never yet been successfully accomplished, I think. I cannot agree with the definition (on p. 143) that Conscience is simply consciousness of good and evil. I cannot agree that that, though true so far as it goes, is adequate. There is much more in Conscience than simple consciousness of good or evil. We find what the great German philosopher, Kant, calls the categorical imperative. It tells us what we ought to do. It does not merely show; it commands and guides.

The importance of Conscience we recognize continually in the affairs of daily life. If we meet anyone who appears to be conscienceless, we generally give him more or less a wide berth. Quite rightly, for such a person is unreliable. What are we seeing now in Europe but a terrible illustration of the result of disregarding Conscience. "We know we did wrong," said the German Chancellor; "in violating the neutrality of Belgium, but it was military necessity." That Nemesis has pursued Germany, and will pursue her until the War is over. When one looks at those battlefields where some of the best manhood of Europe has shed its blood, the voice of that blood cries from the ground, and it finds an echo in desolate homes and in broken hearts, in the cries of the widows and the children, against making jettison of great moral principles.

What is Conscience, indeed? I am disposed to define it—and I hope I shall not burn my fingers where so many have burnt theirs—as the faculty of duty. We may say duty to God and duty to man. From duty to God, however, follows duty to man because God has commanded it. The faculty of duty. What is it that Conscience does? This spiritual faculty, as I call it, compares moral qualities with the supreme law, the Moral Law. Just as you may compare a line with a ruler to see whether it is straight or not, so Conscience compares the moral qualities in moral action—the moral qualities such as justice, truth, mercy, and love and their opposites; compares those with the moral standard—the Law of God, the Moral Law. If a quality is straight, and agrees with the straight or righteous law, it is called good; but otherwise it is called bad, and the more it deviates the worse it is.

That I take to be the faculty of Conscience, or the moral sense, as
some have called it. It allies itself with all our physiological faculties. A man feels and knows; and the moral faculty, the faculty of duty, allies itself with the senses. There is a feeling of pleasure when we follow the guidance of Conscience, and a feeling of pain when we do not follow that guidance. Conscience also allies itself with knowledge; it associates faculties with the actions in which they become apparent, and perceives intuitively and at once whether the moral faculty agrees or not with the moral standard. To the will, Conscience makes special appeal.

It appears to me that, throughout his paper, the author has made the mistake of regarding Conscience as referring specially to action. In our own case, no doubt, we can see if our actions are right or wrong—and why? Because in our own case we know the motives, and therefore the moral qualities. In the case of other people, however, not knowing their motives, we may get into all sorts of difficulties because unable to see the moral quality of their actions. We guess at it; we argue about it. There we bring in intellectual judgment, and the combination of true conscience and intellectual judgment has greatly confused the subject of Conscience. That lax use of the term Conscience, in which intellectual judgment enters as well as the moral faculty, has done a great deal of mischief to clearness of thought on the subject.

Miss Hodgkin: There is one point in Mr. Webb's lecture to which I venture to draw attention:

"A citizen who refuses to take his share in the defence of his country is declining a fundamental duty of citizenship . . . . he is resigning all claim to the protection of the State, and making himself—for conscience' sake, no doubt—an outlaw. He has no further claim upon the State."

In reply, I would say that there are duties of citizenship other than the one which the lecturer considers "fundamental." How does the Quaker compare with citizens generally in respect of the fulfilment of duties other than military? A large amount of the religious liberty enjoyed in our country to-day is the result of the stand made by our Quaker forefathers 260 years ago, when 2000 of them were in prison at one time for conscience' sake. I recall the stand for freedom made by John Bright, the work of Joseph Sturge for the liberation of the slave, the influence of
Elizabeth Fry in the matter of prison reform, and of Samuel Bowley and others as pioneers in the cause of Temperance. Again, think of the service rendered to humanity by Lister, whose discovery of the use of antiseptics is said to have saved more lives than have been lost in battle during the nineteenth century. I would remind you of all that Friends have done in the cause of education and philanthropy and social reform; of their labours in connection with the Bible Society, both at headquarters and throughout the country; not to speak of the high moral tone of the lives lived by quiet, inconspicuous members of our community during these 260 years. They have endeavoured to live those lives in humble dependence upon the guidance of the Holy Spirit of God, speaking directly to their consciences in harmony with the Holy Scriptures. Thus it has become a common saying that "a Quaker's word is as good as his bond."

Is there not something due from the State in consideration of this high ideal of Christian citizenship? Are these the people that should be treated as outlaws because they sincerely believe that their allegiance to the Prince of Peace, and His command to love our enemies, forbids them to take human life? These principles Friends have held as long as they have been in existence. They have held them consistently during other wars, with the full knowledge of the Government, and have not been banished from the country on account of it.

By the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, France sent 2000 Huguenots to perish as galley slaves, and drove thousands more from her shores by persecution, but at the same time she robbed herself of one of her most valuable moral assets. What was her loss was England's gain. Surely no member of the Victoria Institute would wish to banish the Quakers by making life in our Empire impossible for them, as it would be if Conscription were to become permanent! In refusing to take human life we are only following in the steps of the early Christians. For about the first three centuries of our era Christians as a rule refused to fight. "I am a Christian, I cannot fight," was their testimony. If the Church of Christ had kept true to this early testimony, who can say that she would not have carried public opinion with her in this matter?

That the Arm of the Lord is sufficient for those who put their
trust in Him instead of in the arm of flesh, has been abundantly proved by Friends, both as regards the individual, the community, and the State. Under William Penn the State of Pennsylvania was founded without bloodshed, and was maintained in peace for seventy years without an army in the midst of a population of savage Indians who were constantly in conflict with neighbouring States not governed by peace principles.

Personally I feel that the right attitude for Friends is to give themselves to the help of their country in every way short of taking life or making munitions. To many of us, who seem to be standing aloof, loyalty to our country is a burning passion, second only to the allegiance we owe to our Lord and Master. It is that allegiance which forces us to be in the despised minority amidst the enthusiasm of the War. There are few of us, even Quakers, who are not sharing in some way in our nation's agony. I myself have eight nephews in the War, either fighting or healing.

The Secretary read a communication from Dr. Schofield, as follows:—

"Being unable to attend the meeting, and having read Mr. Webb's paper, may I ask the author if he does not recognize three internal arbitrators or powers of arbitration—the Intellectual, that judges the right and wrong in matters of mind, logic, etc.; the Aesthetic, that judges in matters of art authoritatively; and the Moral, or what we generally term Conscience? Does not what is meant by the word cover all three powers?"

The Rev. A. Graham-Barton suggested another definition of Conscience. He said: I regard Conscience as innate to start with, and being innate, it is a recognition of dual authority—God and myself. I hold that Conscience carries with it this conviction—whether a man believes in God or not—that someone knows, some power knows beside himself. When I do an act which, in my judgment, is wrong, I am conscience-stricken, and that stricken conscience is the result of an inner belief, evident against my own will, that someone knows as well as myself.

I think we do not perhaps just compare moral qualities in Conscience. We are so often called upon to act immediately without seeking to compare; and I hold, with Rousseau and Kant, that Conscience never errs. I do not care whether it is an educated and
enlightened or an illiterate conscience. Conscience always voices the right or wrong when the act is to be done, and we become conscious in ourselves. With regard to the *Synderesis*, that is a fundamental capacity which the lecturer ventures to assert may have existed before the Fall. To my mind, it is most questionable. I cannot understand that, in a condition without wrong, a quality could be determined upon something that does not exist; and therefore I consider that Conscience came in with the Fall, with the consciousness of wrong and right, and not with the consciousness of right only. It was the presence of right and wrong that determined the matter.

With regard to the question of liberty of conscience our lecturer ventures to assert that those who were passive resisters in days gone by were often "sadly in need of logic," a most daring assertion to make, because it is against the truth. The question of freedom of conscience for passive resisters lay entirely along religious lines. Whilst the State has a perfect right to control the bodies of men, and even regulate their morals, the State has no right whatever to interfere with a man's religion, for which he has to answer to God himself.

**Mr. Sidney Collett:** I am sure we must all be very grateful for this learned discourse. At the same time, I feel that it would have been much more helpful if the lecturer had dealt in particular with the Scriptural aspect of the subject. For instance, we read of evil conscience, vile conscience, and serene conscience. Of the child of God we read: "good conscience," "pure conscience," and "conscience void of offence." If I listen when the voice of Conscience speaks within, then that voice will speak again. If I refuse to listen to that voice, the probability is that I shall silence it, and it will not speak again. But—and here I must somewhat disagree with the previous speaker—an important thing to remember is that man is a fallen creature, and therefore Conscience alone is not a reliable guide. I wish to refer to two remarks, one at the foot of page 142:

"The spark of conscience, which was not extinguished in man by the Fall,"

and the other at the top of page 143:

"A fundamental capacity for perceiving moral values, unaffected by the Fall."
As to the first statement, I entirely agree; it was not altogether extinguished by the Fall. With the latter I disagree; it was, I believe, affected by the Fall. Witness, for example, the case of Saul of Tarsus. Saul tells us: "I verily thought within myself I ought to do many things contrary to Jesus of Nazareth." He was acting according to his conscience when fighting against God, and probably it was the same thing in the case of the murderers of Christ, and hence the last prayer: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." Peter referred to the same thing when, preaching to the same murderers, he said: "Brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it." So, when all is said, I believe Conscience is only an infallible guide when it is guided by the Word of God, and enlightened by the Holy Spirit of God. It may be that that is referred to in the last line but one of the paper, "Conscience informed with knowledge."

Mr. E. Walter Maunder, F.R.A.S.: I have read the paper with exceeding interest. It deals with a difficult subject in a very courageous but careful manner, and I felt some fear that in the short time in which we had to study it, some of us might miss the precision with which Mr. Webb has developed the various stages of his argument. Mr. Webb has been careful throughout his paper to define each point in succession as he raised it. May I take, as an example, Miss Hodgkin's protest on the part of the Quakers? I believe that we all had a personal sympathy with her in her apologia for the Quaker position. But I do not think Mr. Webb intended to attack it. If I turn back to the foot of page 148 I find that Mr. Webb says in effect that the Quaker cannot claim from the State that form of protection which his own conscience leads him to denounce as sinful.

"He may be a martyr for righteousness, but a victim of tyranny he is not."

There is a great distinction between the two. Perhaps an illustration will serve as a definition better than a good deal of argument. If we turn to the Acts of the Apostles we find that very soon after the day of Pentecost the Apostles were taken before the Sanhedrim and forbidden to preach, and then scourged. They did not complain about the scourging; they accepted that with joy because they were accounted worthy to suffer shame for Christ. They suffered for His
sake gladly. Some years afterwards St. Paul was at Philippi, and the military authorities seized him and Silas, and had them cruelly scourged, and thrust into prison, without any form of trial, but simply to please the mob. Against this act of tyranny St. Paul protested strongly, and not without success. So far as I know, the Quakers have themselves always observed the same kind of distinction. The Quakers, as Miss Hodgkin has reminded us, helped many slaves to escape when slavery existed in the United States. They protested against slavery, but when they were sent to prison or were fined for helping slaves to escape, they submitted to the authority of the State peaceably and went to gaol and paid the fines without a protest. That is a consistent attitude.

I think some points raised by other speakers were due to want of time for the careful reading which this most careful paper demanded, a paper for which I feel that we are much indebted to the lecturer. Two statements which I have marked as being of first importance are on page 144:

"In the last resort we must see for ourselves that a proposition is true or an action right. We must see it, I say, for ourselves; but we can only see it for ourselves because it is so independently of our seeing it."

I think those sentences are well worth our keeping in constant memory.

Mr. Joseph Graham: I should like to add a tribute to the excellence of the paper. Mr. Collett got near the line of thought which I wish to emphasize. That is, concerning the conscience that is misleading. We know men do very extraordinary things in the name of Conscience; and so far as the definitions I have heard have gone, I see no reason to suppose that men are not quite conscientious in doing those things. There seems to me, therefore, to be some other quality coming in. Conscience, no doubt, is an inward voice speaking to everyone, and if that voice is listened to in a regenerate heart it will lead right, but not necessarily with the majority. How, then, to reconcile the majority to the individual? That is a point I should have liked Mr. Webb to deal with.

Mr. M. L. Rouse, B.A., B.L.: Professor Orchard, I think, criticised Mr. Webb a little needlessly in saying that, when he spoke of liberty of conscience, he associated Conscience always with action.
The fact is that the writer of the paper started by saying that Conscience was a quality, but that it was exemplified by action; and what we meant by liberty of conscience did not mean liberty to have conscience, but liberty to act according to individual conscience. The point was whether one should allow liberty to act upon what man thought to be right in every case. Conscience was not defined as action. It was defined as something previously existing, and exemplified by action.

On the other hand, I would like to offer a few criticisms. We are told that personification of Conscience is found in Paul, but I can only discover two instances in which Paul can be said to have personified Conscience. The first is that in which he says: “My conscience also bearing me witness” (Romans ix, 1). The other case is where he is speaking to the heathen, and says, “Their conscience bearing witness” (Romans ii, 15). Otherwise, I cannot find that the apostle Paul personified Conscience. It might equally be said that John did so when he wrote: “They went out one by one, convicted by their own conscience.” That might be held to be personification, but in neither case can you be positive. It might simply be the realizing through the faculty of conscience.

I thought the brief letter from Dr. Schofield, summing up the three faculties, the intellectual, the æsthetical, and the moral, was excellent; and to me it commends itself, and is surely right. I believe with Mr. Collett that we all have a conscience, and Butler proved that by taking an extreme case. He said: “Is there any heathen tribe, however base, which would not condemn the action of a man who did a vile turn to someone who had saved his life?” There is no tribe who would not condemn that. If Conscience did not exist, they might equally say it was right or wrong. There would be nothing to decide it in their minds.

The Chairman: It is now my pleasing duty to ask you to pass by acclamation a vote of thanks to the very able and talented (though not apparently altogether convincing) author of the paper to which we have had the great pleasure of listening. As my earlier observations have been a little discussed by one or two gentlemen, for whom I feel respect, perhaps I may be allowed to say that when the Apostle speaks of a good conscience and of an evil conscience, he means a conscience that approves, and a conscience that
disapproves. The statement of St. Paul that: "I verily thought within myself that I ought to do many things contrary to Jesus of Nazareth" wants looking into a little bit. "Verily I thought within myself." "I reasoned within myself."

Taking Conscience to be what most people mean by it, it is not merely a moral faculty, but an intellectual judgment as well, as to whether an action is good or right. This is exactly what I dissent from. I say Conscience is nothing but a moral faculty which intuitively compares moral qualities and their opposites with the moral standard, the divine law, approving or disapproving; I limit Conscience to that. If you bring in also inferences drawn by the intellectual judgment, and call the compound thing Conscience, you will get into serious difficulties, and your Conscience will certainly be a fallible thing. The categorical imperative, as Kant calls it, that we should do right and avoid wrong—is the function of Conscience. It is the production of a good will, that is, will which will continually go with the right, never with the wrong. That is what I understand by Conscience. "I verily thought within myself." It was not his conscience told him to do that. It was his mistaken judgment, his mistaken reasoning. What did his conscience tell him to do? His conscience told him he should have sought in prayer to God to know the right. That is what Conscience told him to do, and what it tells every human being to do. I should define Conscience as the faculty of Duty.

LECTURER'S REPLY.

I thank you for the kind vote of thanks you have given me. In the short time that remains I shall not be able to deal with all the interesting points that have been raised. Mr. Maunder's apologia for me on the subject of what I said respecting the Society of Friends is one which I completely accept. It was far from my wish to minimize the immense services which the nation, the Church, and the whole of the human race owe to the Society of Friends in many directions. I did not wish for a moment to deny that, while at the same time contending, as I still do, that there is the distinction that Mr. Maunder discovered in my paper, and pointed out.

I should like to say something with regard to the three faculties that Dr. Schofield mentioned, but must forbear. I do not think that
anything I said about Conscience should be construed to exclude or to be inconsistent with the doctrine of the categorical imperative. I always think there is something misleading about the dual quality of God and ourselves.

With regard to the personification of Conscience, I should, perhaps, accept the correction that I did not perhaps mean to say that all the passages in St. Paul were properly described as personification. I meant rather what I call the use of Conscience in the absolute sense. The word is found only in St. Paul. The only other thing I would wish to say is with regard to the passage at the bottom of page 142 and the top of page 143. I do not venture here to express a view one way or the other upon the difficult problem about the Fall. I am not stating my own opinion, but simply describing or giving the contents of the passage by Jerome, whom I was quoting.

Thanking you once more for your kindness in listening to the paper and your criticisms of it.

The Meeting adjourned at 6.20 p.m.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATION.

Rev. John Tuckwell, M.R.A.S., wrote:—

The Institute is greatly indebted to Mr. Webb for his learned and thoughtful paper. It is necessary to emphasize, as he has done, the fact that the conscience is as much a faculty for “perceiving moral values” as the eye is for perceiving colours. It is not the mere expression of “the average opinion of society.” There is what may be called an average conscience, but there is also a superior conscience, and all great struggles for reform are struggles between the two. There was a time when the average conscience cried out against the Supreme Conscience “Crucify Him! Crucify Him!”

The average Judaic conscience scattered the Apostles from Jerusalem. The average pagan conscience flung the Christians to the lions. The average Romish conscience tortured “heretics” with thumbscrew, rack and fire; and in each case this went on until the superior conscience won in the struggle.

Mr. Webb is mistaken in his exposition of Passive Resistance.
The appeal of the resisters was not to "a recognized principle of the British Commonwealth—that of the equality of religions before the law" (p. 150). There is no such "principle," there is no such "equality." The resisters appealed to an authority beyond the State; and, like Daniel of old, refused to take a willing part in what they regarded as hostile to the interests of the Kingdom of God. On the other hand, they acknowledged the authority of the State over their goods, and took the consequences. It was thus a conflict of the superior conscience against the average conscience.

My address this evening is on the Geography of Palestine, viewed in the light of its being the Land Promised of God to His Chosen People: one aspect being the physical features of the country adapting it to be the home of the Chosen People, the other being the situation of the country relative to the rest of the world, especially the great empires of antiquity.

Of course there is a want of material for this purpose—nothing can be laid down with great precision; and my object this evening is not so much to show the effect of the physical features upon the actions of the Chosen People, as to call attention to the possible effects of their environment, and to emphasize the possibility—nay, the necessity—for each one of us to judge for himself of the early days of Israel, by making a study of the manners and customs of primitive peoples. These manners and customs are much the same all the world over, and can be studied in this country as amongst primitive tribes; and the most useful book for the study is the Bible.

It is usual to suppose that in this quest it is necessary to possess the power of acquiring languages readily, but though this gift is most useful as an accessory, the chief requirement is the power of observation, and the chief work to be done is the
development of that power; and this is a paying concern, as it fits us also for all the duties of life.

During the years I have spent in contact with primitive people I have found that, underlying the customs which went to make up their religion, there was always a natural religion which seems very much the same everywhere, and which, when you have once got a grip of, you find that you can get along with the people.

It was on account of this knowledge that, at the commencement of the Egyptian Campaign, 1882, I volunteered, with confidence, to go on a mission to the Arabs of the east of the Suez Canal, to gain their adherence to our side. I did not know any of them, but having lived amongst the Bedouin of Palestine, I was satisfied that I could manage them. In my scheme, sent from Chatham to London, 10th August, 1882, I proposed to go into the desert with three assistants, to keep watch day and night against the only dangers I apprehended—assassination and poison. On the 26th of August I was on my way to Suez, for work in the desert under the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief, and I was engaged for several months in bringing to light the facts concerning the murder of Professor Palmer and his companions; and I traversed a great portion of the ground occupied by Israel in the Wilderness of the Wanderings. I have thus had some opportunity for forming an opinion as to the effect of the physical features of the country on the character of the people. At the same time, I must point out that there are two matters which very much reduce the apparent effect of the physical features upon the people: one is the overwhelming might of the Egyptian and Assyrian powers when in contact with Israel, and the other is the irresistible power of the Almighty when wielded on the side of Israel.

In the ordinary work of the world we do not know whether there is any direct interposition in favour of nations that try to do the will of God; but in the case of the Chosen People the action of the Almighty is laid bare before us, and of course it transcends all other cause and effect.

There is another matter which I may be pardoned for alluding to, and that is the question how far people speaking different languages can make themselves understood to each other when engaged on the same work, when it is of a nature agreeable to the Almighty. My impression is that people who are acting in the right way do recognize each other without the necessity of speech. It will often be noticed that in a just cause the most
antagonistic sects and individuals will sink their differences and work together with no apparent discussion of the subject. It is in the East, where there are so many antagonistic sects, that one best notices this. I will instance a case in point. When I was at Suakim in 1886 I met a Sheikh from the interior, who told me that he had been a great friend of General Gordon; and I questioned him as to their conversation together. He said they were sitting together on a mat, and that General Gordon said to him in Arabic: "We are working together in the same cause," and that he replied in Arabic, "If you are content, I am content." I asked what more they said; he replied: "Nothing more: we exchanged thoughts."

THREE DOMINANT MATTERS IN PALESTINE.

(1) It has unique geographical features which influence its climate, and to some extent its food, owing to a great fissure on the earth's surface called the Jordan Valley.

(2) Its geographical position is also unique. In early days it was not only the sole line of communication between the great centres of the ancient world, Egypt on the south, and Babylonia, Assyria, and Elam on the north, but its configuration and mountainous character made it a point of vantage in the struggles constantly going on between the nations of old; and at the present day its position possesses potentially a great military value.

(3) Lastly, it was selected by the Almighty as the cradle of the religion that is to cover the earth as the waters cover the sea.

These matters, however, only act in conjunction with others which also have their effect on the condition of mankind, and which I will briefly enumerate and give some account of—matters affecting national character:

1. Racial Characteristics which permanently influence the doings of a people, and which cannot be eradicated or be abnormally developed, because they are part and parcel of the race.

2. (a) The effect of tradition and civilization in the past.
   (b) The effect of civilization in the present day.
   (c) Environment.

3. Training—
   (a) Amongst savage races.
   (b) Amongst civilized races.
   (c) Obstacles to be overcome.
   (d) Patriotism.
4. Geographical conditions affecting a nation
5. Revelation and religion, as contrasted with superstition and errors.
6. The direct interposition of the Almighty exercised in the sight of the whole world.

(1) Racial Characteristics.

It is well understood that races possess permanent and dominant characteristics which differ in each. Children in a family, however they may differ in appearance, disposition, and temper, possess potentially the same character—that of the race. Vicissitudes and struggle for existence may dwarf a tribe, but it will regain its standard condition when it returns to favourable circumstances. A tribe may at one time be strung up to a high pitch of excellence, and at another time it may slacken off to a very low pitch, but it cannot change absolutely beyond its limits. Some races are born to dominate and some to serve. History gives instances of races which under trials have shaken off their sloth, as did Israel at the Exodus, the Spartans and the Sikhs; but it was all within limits which could not be exceeded. Influences affect different races, and affect even the same race, differently under different circumstances. A timid, feeble tribe, to-day, suffering any amount of indignity and oppression, may to-morrow, by indiscreet handling, be converted into an enthusiastic fighting race in defence of their rights or their homesteads, for which they will struggle to the last. Or they may catch on to some religious idea under one of the fanatical leaders that arise from time to time. Geographical conditions affect different races differently, stimulating some to exertion and reducing others to sloth. In the long run, however, race characteristics must tell, and can never be eradicated, though the race itself may be destroyed.

As to the Chosen Race, the raw material of their characteristics cannot have varied very much from that of other Semitic tribes, but training and early habits and customs, and the application of the Law, have given them a strong bias against the worship of false gods.

(2) The Effect—

(a) of Tradition and Civilization in the Past.

Tradition has a very potent effect on all races, and the rulers realize and act upon it. By tradition a race is induced to
submit to oppression, whilst the elderly men enjoy all the good things in this world; as in the ancestor worship, transmigration of souls, and hell-punishment of Buddhists and Hindoos. They are all invented to keep the bulk of the people in order whilst under oppression. Amongst the more savage races the rulers use witchcraft and sorcery for a similar object. Working on the fears of the people through tradition is also employed for good purposes. The Moslem Arabs of the present day people the desert with jinn and genii, the fear of which tends to keep order and honesty and a code of honour where no law and order exists. The Israelites in their wanderings seem to have had the same idea of the jinn as the Bedouin have of the present day. Where the fear of God is feeble in a race, in the interests of law and order some belief in and fear of supernatural agencies is a necessity; and so long as it is not perverted to the means of injustice by the rulers, it acts well. Although the Bedouin are keen for murder and theft at all times, yet we may rely on their honour and honesty provided certain ceremonies are performed.

I found that my knowledge of jinn and demons, from reading Arabian stories, enabled me to get a good deal of honest work out of the Bedouin and other primitive tribes.

Even civilized races must rely upon the supernatural for keeping law and order amongst those who have no fear of God's Law; and it seems to me that we have in our own country been taking great risks during the last sixty years in sweeping out all tradition without adequately putting the fear and love of God in their place in the minds of the children.

We have done it so thoroughly and effectually that there has been made a clean sweep from the minds of the children of all tradition and local history and folk-lore, and at the same time we have managed to get rid of all the country fairs and meetings, all the games and fun, that used to go on in the country-side, together with all the interesting stories, historical and mythical; so that the children's minds are absolute blanks in regard to anything but the four walls of the school-room. No wonder that when they leave school they wish to get away from the country which had been made so uninteresting to them, and gather together in the towns. Life is much more interesting when every locality has its local tradition, weird or otherwise, and when by means of fairy tales and local traditions the whole world is peopled with sprites and elves; and I may state my conviction that children who are accustomed to such lore are far more likely to do well in the world, as all fairy
tales and legends are based on the fundamental idea that your sin will find you out.

Amongst the Israelites of old, everything in nature was endowed with some super life, and sprites and demons and jinn abounded in all deserted places; and above all was the majesty of the Almighty riding on the whirlwind, controlling the tempest, with the winds and floods obeying Him: "Wind and storm obeying His word."

(b) of Civilization of the Present.

The present war is teaching us that civilization without the fear of God is a danger to nations.

(c) Environment.

The effect of environment is well seen in the influence on the Israelites of the adjoining and surrounding heathen.

(3) Training—

(a) Amongst Savage Races or Primitive People.

Amongst savage races there may be some whose intellects are quite as keen as those of the highest in Europe, whilst on the other hand there are others who have only the intellects of children.

Thus individuals may be trained to a high pitch of excellence, but not so the race itself. Here lies the difficulty with native tribes in South Africa. A tribe cannot receive the same laws as white men, yet members of the tribe may be better educated and more highly civilized than the average white man.

In a surveyor's office in South Africa I have seen blanket Kaffirs working out abstruse mathematical problems, and I have conversed all day with a Kaffir guide from Lovedale College, and failed to find any difference between his mind and that of a European.

If the children of savage races are taken in hand early enough, they will form habits which are lasting.

(b) Amongst Civilized Races.

No more striking instance in all history can be cited than the training of our nation for war since 1914, and only one reason can be given for the thoroughness and celerity with which it has been carried out, and that is that the hearts of all were in the job.
On the other hand, in the case of the Israelites, their bodies were trained to fight in a year, but for the work before them their hearts were in their stomachs, and it took forty years to allay the hankering after the flesh-pots of Egypt, and then only by killing off all the old people who had formed their habits in Egypt. Of the effect of early training on the mind I will give a case in point. I was acquainted with a converted Jew at Jerusalem, who told me that he was in great distress because his conversion was only partial, in that for several hours of the day his early habits influenced him and he returned to his very strict order of Judaism; during the remaining part of the day he was an earnest Christian, and there seemed to be no means of altering his habits. I looked upon him as being really an earnest Christian, and he subsequently lost his life at Safed in giving his testimony as a Christian.

I may cite another instance of the effect of early habits. On board a troopship it is difficult to get soldiers to sing hymns at a parade service, or in daylight, on Sundays—they are too shy; but get them together in the dark in any part of the ship, and they will sing hymns together for hours with the greatest fervour, returning in thought to their boyhood at home. Then when a lantern is introduced, and they see each other, the illusion vanishes and they are mute.

(c) By Encountering Difficulties.

Where there is grit in a nation there is no healthier method of advancement than encountering obstacles. Reading without tears, and other approved methods of evading difficulties, are not healthy methods. This is the secret of the Boy Scout movement: the boys are taught to come up smiling to their difficulties, tackle them and overcome them.

We have two splendid examples of nations overcoming obstacles, in Holland and Switzerland: the former in reclaiming their land from the sea, and the latter in preserving themselves free from the encroachments of the great nations surrounding them.

(d) Patriotism.—In a small degree.

(4) Geographical Conditions Affecting Nations.

The physical features of a country may affect a nation by means of its climate and food, by inducing industry or sloth, and by affecting the temperament of a people by its configuration.
The Climate of Palestine.

The climate differs from that of other parts of the Mediterranean seaboard, owing to peculiar physical conditions on its eastern side.

Stretching right away from the Taurus, on the north, to the Gulf of Akaba on the south, is a great fissure or crack upon the earth's surface, forming the valley of Coele-Syria and the Jordan Valley. This fissure is the deepest depression visible on the earth's surface, and gives the peculiar characteristics to Palestine. The waters of Jordan, commencing nearly at the level of the ocean at the southern foot of Hermon, at Dan, run into the Lake of Galilee at a depth of 600 feet below the ocean, and into the Dead Sea at 1300 feet below the ocean; from the southern end of the Dead Sea the bottom of the depression rises some hundreds of feet towards Akaba, so that the waters are quite cut off from the ocean.

The Jordan has a very rapid fall of about 10 feet in a mile between Galilee and the Dead Sea, and is justly called the Descender. For thousands of years this river has existed for no purpose except as a boundary, and is waiting to be utilized. There have been schemes for irrigating the whole plain of the Jordan from Galilee, but nothing has been done. There is wealth in these waters, and now that the world will want money, the Jordan may come into its own. In prehistoric times this fissure of the Jordan is assumed to have been an arm of the sea, open to the ocean at Akaba, but owing to the rise of the land it has been cut off for a very long period and has been reduced in volume by evaporation until there is nothing left of it but the scanty waters of the Dead Sea, which contains in its bosom all the salt which was once contained in this arm of the sea. This Jordan fissure has been subject to volcanic outbursts, of which there are many indications at the present day, one of which is a line of hot springs from north to south. The level of the Dead Sea rises and falls yearly within certain small limits, according to the amount of water coming into it from the Jordan and its tributaries, the input being balanced by the evaporation. All evidence goes to show that since the earliest historical times there has been no sensible change in the level of the Dead Sea; so that the physical condition of the valley is practically the same as it was at the dawn of history. To the west of the Jordan Valley is the mountain chain of Palestine, stretching from the east of Dan to Beer-Sheba, about 120 miles. This range is about 2000 to 3000 feet above the ocean, and
slopes down to the west in swelling hills, terminating in the rolling plains of Esdraelon, Sharon and Philistia, bordering on the Mediterranean.

To the east are the purple walls of Moab. The effect of this valley, so far below the level of the ocean, is to cause a tropical climate and a semi-tropical vegetation within the lower portion of the depression, giving to eastern Palestine fruits and vegetables of a more southern clime.

In winter-time the heat of the valley is tempered by the cold winds from the Lebanon, and Hermon to north; but as the snow melts on the mountains, the heat in the valley rises and becomes excessive, registering over 110 degrees F. at sunrise in the summer, and rendering life about the Dead Sea insupportable to Europeans. To what extent this abnormal climate may affect the residents of Palestine we have no means of judging, as the Bedouin ascend the slopes of the hills as the summer advances, and the few fellahin living at Jericho do not appear to go down to the Dead Sea.

We have no certainty of any large cities existing about the Dead Sea after the destruction of the Cities of the Plain, but there were large cities at Jericho and other sites below the level of the ocean, and magnificent gardens and highly cultivated lands; and it is to be noted that all the great cities of the New Testament about the Sea of Galilee were about 600 feet below the level of the ocean. It may, therefore, be concluded that the only part of the valley that was avoided was the vicinity of the Dead Sea.

There is no evidence to show what effect this abnormal climate had upon the character of the people, but the physical features no doubt had an effect on the minds and thought of the people, reflected in the imagery of the Psalms.

Much has been written on this subject, but when a Chosen People are under the shadow of the Most High it seems to me impossible to conjecture the effect of scenery upon their minds.

**Physical Features and Industry.**

At the time of the Exodus the Promised Land was termed a land flowing with milk and honey, and this is usually accepted as meaning a land of herds and flocks; but it was also "a land of brooks of water, of fountains, of wheat and barley and vines and fig trees and pomegranates, a land of oil-olive and honey."

Now we find two conditions of the land at present. Where the hill-country has been neglected, the mountain sides have been washed quite bare of all soil, which is heaped up in the
valleys, so that there is very little vegetation or produce, but where capital and labour have been expended a great change takes place.

In the hill-country, even now, the white skeletons of the old systems of terracing are visible in parts; but the rich loamy soil is washed down into the wadis, leaving the hillsides bare and desolate and glaring in their nakedness. A cultivated strip may be seen at the bottom of the wady, subject to being swept away by any storm of rain, forming a torrent down the bare hillsides or withered away before its time by the reflection of the sun from the bare rocks. Place the valley in proper hands, and note the results. The earth from the bottom will be carefully carried up the hillsides, and laid out in terraces supported by stone walls, on which are planted young fruit-trees—those of a more delicate kind being placed on the northern declivity in order that they may not suffer from the sun’s rays. The trees thrive rapidly; as they do in Palestine; the rain falls, but not as before, rushing fiercely down the bare rocks and forming a torrent in the valley. No; now it falls on the trees and terraces, percolates quietly into the soil, and into the rocky hillside, and is thus absorbed, without injuring the crops at the bottom of the valley. The rain that sinks into the rocks will shortly reissue in perennial springs, so refreshing in a thirsty land. The trees having now moisture at their roots, spread out their leaves in rich groves over the land. The sun’s rays do not fall on the ground, but on the green leaves and fruit, by which they are intercepted and absorbed, giving no glare or reflection. The heat of the sun causes a moisture to rise from the trees and soil beneath them, which, on reaching the higher and cooler winds, is condensed into visible vapour—clouds—constantly forming as the breeze passes over the grove, so that, so to speak, each grove supplies its own umbrella. The climate is thus changed. Where were hot glaring sun, dry wind, dry earth, stony land, absence of verdure, are now to be found fleecy clouds floating through the balmy air, the heat of the sun tempered by visible and invisible vapours, groves with moist soil, trickling streamlets issuing from the rocks, villages springing up apace, with fair arable lands below them—Palestine regenerated. This is no dream: I have seen this change take place in Palestine on a small scale in three years.

Thus the fertility of the land depends in a high degree on the industry and security of the people; and the hard work they have to perform cannot have failed to develop the character of the people.
"All the Syrian religions reflect the Syrian climate. Israel alone interprets it for moral ends, because Israel alone has a God Who is absolute righteousness. Here again is another instance of those many points at which the geography of Palestine exhausts the influence of the material and the seen, and indicates the presence on the land of the unseen and the spiritual." (H.G.H.J., p. 76.)

The Desert of the Wanderings.

Generally in January and February there is plenty of rain over the Tih—so much so that water for drinking, both for man and beast, can be found every few miles in the plain, and all over the hills. During November, December and March there are often dense mists, moist fogs, and heavy dews, which saturate the shrubs with moisture, and even deposit moisture amongst the rocks, so that flocks do not require to go to water. These mists depend upon the wind, and often alternate with intense droughts. The rainfall may roughly be estimated at 12 inches per annum. Sheep do not thrive during the hot weather, but goats seem to enjoy it. There are no cattle. The Bedouin congregate together during the summer near the springs of water and palm-groves. In the spring they have grass and water everywhere, and are free to go where they like. In winter they are in great straits, for they have to go where they can find herbage, and yet have to drive their flocks to water, sometimes a distance of twenty miles or more. This they do about twice a week, sending their camels for water for the camp when they have quite run out of it. It is quite a mistake to suppose that the Bedouin do not grow corn. Each tribe has its cultivated land (as well as its palm groves), and they grew as much corn as they require for their sustenance.

The Peninsula of Sinai.

The rainfall in the peninsula is at the present time considerably less than in the desert of the Tih, and the drought is excessive. It is ascribed to the gradual decrease of the trees—since the Egyptian government imposed a tax of charcoal on the Bedouin. There are the remains, in the valleys, of cultivated lands abandoned for years on account of the drought. In these places there still exist the corn magazines and watch houses. Every Bedouin family has its garden of palm-trees—the date stones are boiled down for the goats.
Amongst early Semitic people a wide distinction was drawn between land irrigated by man and land watered from the sky or by streams, the latter belonging to the gods.

“For the land whither thou goest to possess it, is not like the land of Egypt, whence ye came out, where thou sowedst thy seed, and wateredst with thy foot, as a garden of herbs:

“But the land whither ye are passing over to possess it, is a land of hills and valleys, of the rain of heaven it drinketh water; a land which Jehovah thy God Himself looketh after; continually are the eyes of Jehovah thy God upon it, from the beginning of the year even unto the end of the year.”

Food.

I do not know what the present up-to-date view is as to the differentiation of mankind, but I suppose that I may assume that “before the close of the palaeolithic times all the primary divisions of mankind were specialised in their several habitats by the influence of their surroundings,” and that these differences are permanent so far as the short space occupied by history is concerned. The principal influences are climate, food, soil, natural boundaries, and the general aspect of nature.

These influences, however, have had their say in past times, and during the comparatively short space occupied by historical times we cannot expect to find that they can have had any appreciable effect upon Israel on moving from Egypt to the wilderness, or again into the Land of Canaan, in affecting their permanent characteristics.

There are, however, other aspects of the subject connected with food which we may consider. The manner of living in Egypt, in the desert, and in Canaan, was profoundly different, giving rise to different customs. For example, the treatment of the stranger and the laws of hospitality are part of the life of all primitive races, differentiated by the surroundings of nature.

Without the general convention concerning the stranger and hospitality, races could have had no communication with each other except in a hostile manner; without these common laws, the various trade routes would not have been immune: without them, Ulysses’ voyages would have ended in disaster, and Livingstone and Stanley could not have forgathered in Darkest Africa.

The code of Israel was enriched under the Law by many
advances on the old rules, and by it chivalry was first introduced to the world, but the old rules of natural religion continued in force.

As these rules govern all life amongst primitive people, I will give some instances of their application in modern times.

The Good Offices of the Star Smaiyyeh.

The star Smaiyyeh is connected amongst the Bedouin with a legend about Moses, and they consider it unwise to undertake a journey when it is approaching the moon. In September, 1882, Smaiyyeh was approaching the moon, and they were much concerned about it in connexion with the war. It is the star depicted on the Turkish ensign, within the Crescent, and the Moslems expected great help from it.

This star played a very important part with us towards the close of our proceedings in the desert, as I will relate.

After the murderers of Professor Palmer and his comrades had been brought to justice, I went into the desert to erect a great stone cairn and wooden cross on a conspicuous hill overlooking the spot where the murder was committed. Miss Charrington and her brother were present, and we established the memorial with much ceremony, and consecrated the ground according to Christian rites; but we all agreed that it ought also to be consecrated effectually according to local Bedouin customs, and I consulted the Bedouin and Egyptians present as to what we could do in the matter. It so happened that at that time a cheery old Bedouin fell very ill, and was left near our camp by his comrades to take his chance. This man we brought into a tent and tended, and, on his turning the corner, he expressed great gratitude to us all, especially to Miss Charrington, who had been very kind to him. In conversation with him, I stated my anxiety to get the cairn and cross made taboo to the Bedouin, and the matter evidently very much dwelt on his mind, as during the night he had a vivid dream concerning it.

He related to the Bedouin and to us that he had seen the star Smaiyyeh come down from heaven and gather up all the souls of the murdered ones into his bosom and carry them up to the cairn and deposit them there, and subsequently carry them back to the wady. This made the spot taboo to the Bedouin, and the dream was given out through the desert and the place was not molested.

The taboo of the desert is, as far as I have observed, entirely in favour of law and order.
Our Desert Cook and his Brother.

The cook I employed in the desert was half-brother to one of the principal murderers for whom we were looking, and who was eventually convicted and executed; and the employment of this cook caused me many remonstrances from amongst those Europeans who did not understand the customs of the Bedouin.

In the first place, this murder was not wholly approved amongst the Bedouin, as there was a smack of disregard of ancient usage about it. It was a doubtful case, and not entirely in keeping with the laws of hospitality, which are the first laws of all primitive people—need I say of all people who have any religion. In the second place, I knew that our cook did not entirely approve of his brother, and that if he had the moral courage to stay with us, we should be comparatively safe from poison, which was our principal danger. This is how I looked at it. The cook knew that if we were poisoned he would be deemed guilty, and would be hunted down with the others; whereas if he acted in good faith he might in some manner help his brother. Of course, after his brother was executed there was an end of the matter; he had admitted his guilt, and the cook could serve us with a clear conscience. My view was that the cook, knowing that he would be suspected, would take every precaution against anyone else poisoning us, and so I looked upon his being a safeguard instead of a danger. I mention this case because it shows how differently the subject can be looked at—of course, as there were other lives than my own concerned, I had to convince the authorities on the spot that I had reason on my side, and they took a practical view of all these matters.

In all countries outside civilization one has to guard against poison in food, and sometimes one has to take very odd precautions.

At Suakim, where I was Governor in 1886, I found at Government House convicts of the deepest dye told off as our official servants and boatmen, and I chose a well-known poisoner to make the coffee, which is always served to visitors, and I did this as a precaution against poisoning. The face of the Chief Civil Intelligence Officer may be imagined when he was first served with coffee by the hands of such a convict, but when I gave my reason he quite agreed with me. Of course, as the host I had, in accordance with ancient custom, always to drink before my guests, and I may say I was not unmindful of the convict, who always drank the first cup of coffee of each brew!
(5) RELIGION, NATURAL AND POSITIVE.

To estimate the effect of religion upon a race, we must know exactly what is meant by the term.

In the early days of Israel there were only two forms of religion in existence: namely, the natural religion of all the world, differing according to tribe; and the positive religion to which the Israelites were subjected at Sinai.

Natural religion is a method of disciplining the mind, by the discipline of the body, for the purpose of ensuring the safety of society. No nation can ever have existed as an organized body without mental discipline. Human laws alone, the keeping of which depends upon the punishment of those found breaking them, cannot possibly keep a nation in order alone, as the individual will only act up to them as long as he thinks he will be found out.

Natural religion consisted of ritual observances which were part of the tribal organization, and which each person was bound to perform or be denationalized. The god was local, belonging to the land where the people dwelt, and was one with the people.

There are several interesting questions to consider. How did Palestine come to be considered as the land of Jehovah, when it was already occupied by the gods of the tribes dwelling there. Was it handed over to the seed of Abraham at the Call of Abraham, and were the Canaanites looked upon as usurpers; or was it rendered taboo to the Canaanites in later times owing to the idolatries practised there? Were the Israelites aware that the God of Abraham differed from the gods of the surrounding people whilst they were in Egypt? Our historical accounts recognize that God was supreme over the whole earth, but the rank and file of the Israelites may not have been aware of it. Again, what form of worship did Israel have in Egypt? To what extent were they given up to the gods of Egypt? As the whole organization of the people must have depended upon what they knew about themselves, I have, in considering their condition at the Exodus, assumed that there was in Egypt a tradition current that they were a Chosen Race under God, and that the Land of Canaan was their rightful heritage, wrongfully held by the Canaanites; but this did not prevent their holding at the same time to their natural religion, making their God local to the land where they dwell.
The existence of a Nemesis in one form or another seems to pervade the minds of all mankind, whether of old or at the present day. Probably Nemesis was originally the local god in his early form, and was a beneficent character like our present notion of Providence. But through the wiliness of man the character of Nemesis has profoundly deteriorated amongst primitive tribes at the present day, and at the hands of wizards and sorcerers the lives of savages are rendered miserable.

With the early Greeks, Nemesis was the personification of justice (moral and divine), and was the distributor of fortune, good and bad, and she seems to differ very slightly from Providence. Whether as beneficent or malignant, Nemesis is found over all the world, and brings the punishments that are to be meted out for offences against the moral law planted in the breasts of people.

Owing to the power of Nemesis, there is as much law and order in the desert as there is in the most civilized states of Europe, but you must know the customs of the people to be able to find it.

I give some instances of the power of Nemesis:—

Whilst investigating the circumstances of the murder of Professor Palmer, I was able to make use of Bedouin customs. I knew that if a Bedouin, under examination, once stated the truth, he could not again depart from it; and consequently when in reply to a question he said "I have said," it was a sign that it was the truth he had spoken. I then marked all the passages where he would give only one reply, and by putting all these answers together I arrived at a narrative of the circumstances of the murder, and eventually at the confession of the principal murderers. When the murderers were arrested and tried, having once admitted their guilt, they could not swerve from it, and to the surprise of the Turkish (Egyptian) Court, which tried them, they all confessed their guilt and were executed.

A few years after this, about 1887, when Commissioner of Police for London, I was in Ireland for a holiday, and staying on the Lake of Killarney. I received a mysterious message requesting me to go across the lake to interview some persons who were wishful to talk to me about the murder of Professor Palmer. I was strongly advised not to assent, but the ayes had it, because I was impressed with the idea that Arab laws of hospitality to strangers would hold good in Ireland, if I followed them out; and I committed myself to the care of an Unseen
Hand and was rowed across the lake, and taken up to a barn above the lake, where I found some twenty to twenty-five men assembled. After a cordial greeting, the spokesman told me that they had heard of my success in unravelling the intricacies of the Palmer murder, and they wished to ascertain if the same methods would be successful in Ireland. I said that I was quite willing to give them any information on the subject, but that as I was a stranger in their country they must first carry out the ancient customs of Ireland, and give me food, and eat with me. They quite jumped to this idea, and we had a hasty meal of what they had on the premises, and some good whisky.

They then proceeded to question me on the methods which I had adopted; and when they found that it was owing to my knowledge of Bedouin customs and laws of hospitality, which had enabled me to bring the murderers to justice, they said the system would be of no use in Ireland, because there were no traditional usages prevalent amongst them of so binding a nature as to afford evidence of a man's guilt in a court of law, and their laws of hospitality might not be relied upon in all circumstances to afford protection to the stranger. To this I entirely demurred, as in that case they would not be bound to give me a safe escort back across the lake. I asserted that in my case they were bound by old tribal laws which they dare not break, for fear of the enmity of some Unknown Power. They did not deny this, and we parted in amity.

The domination of the human mind by a Nemesis forces some persons to speak the truth. When I was in Singapore in 1893, amongst my servants, of many nationalities, there was one incapable of telling a lie, and his value as a servant was not as a worker but as a truth-teller. When a difficulty occurred amongst the servants, and the truth was not in them, I had only to say I shall ask Tola, and they would say, "Then we must tell you all about it."

Now these men took no exception to the truth-teller; they had no animosity against him for always upsetting their machinations, recognizing that he was acting under a higher power.

At first I could not understand why Tola was a truth-teller, as in other matters he did not particularly shine as a Christian, but subsequently I came to the conclusion that he was better versed in natural religion than as a Christian, and that on his primitive side he was a law unto himself. I think that this was recognized by the other servants, who were Buddhists, Hindoos, Moslem, and what not, who would not have submitted
so readily to a Christian marplot. If one attempts to go back into the past beyond the local gods, or Baalim, one is met with proposals of animism and other links in the development of religion in the changes from the savage to the civilized state; but my impression is that, in the Semitic races and in the old Eastern civilizations of Asia, the natural religion belongs to people who have once known the true God, and that they have joined together the service of God and devils. I therefore look upon these old heathen customs which make for good, as being old duties to God run wild.

The Land and the Covenant.

The geography of Palestine has at all times been intimately connected with the history of Israel, and cannot be separated from it.

The Land of Canaan is still held by Israel under a contract which cannot be broken, an everlasting Covenant between Jehovah and the seed of Abraham: "and I will be their God . . . Thou shalt keep my Covenant therefore, thou, and thy seed after thee in their generations. This is my Covenant . . . Every man child among you shall be circumcised" (Gen. xvii, 8–10).

This Covenant is still in operation, the Deeds are intact, but the land is withheld from the heritors because, though the outward sign of the Covenant has in a great measure been faithfully kept, the spiritual grace has been lacking. But the world is looking forward to the completion of the Covenant in the near future.

This Covenant has been developed and expanded in detail as history has progressed, but its substance has not been altered; the God of the whole earth is still the God of Abraham and His seed for ever, and the Covenant has still to be fulfilled in its entirety, and the Promised Land has to be occupied by Israel.

We on our parts have a part to perform. If we are to do our duty in assisting Israel, we must learn to comprehend more fully their ancient history, and must attune our minds to the conditions under which the people lived in those early days. "Unless we can look upon ancient customs with the eyes of the ancients, unless we can transport ourselves in the spirit to other lands and other times, and sun ourselves in the clear light of bygone days, all our conceptions of what has been done by the men who have long ceased to be must be dim, uncertain, and unsatisfactory, and all our reproductions as soulless and
uninstructive as the scattered fragments of a broken statue” (Niebuhr, Kleine Schaften, p. 92).

In thinking over early days, two leading ideas are dominant. The people who lived in those days, whether followers of God or of Baal, lived more in the presence of God than we do in Europe at the present day; God, or God’s substitute, was everywhere and in everything. The second idea is that the high value set upon human life amongst European Christians of to-day is entirely a value set up in recent times owing to abnormal security in life and property, and does not exist now in the East; and was unknown in early days, or even, in a measure, a hundred years ago; and at the present time, under stress of circumstances, it is rapidly dwindling away.

At the present day in China we may meet with a Chinaman who for £10 will substitute himself for a felon condemned to death, ruling that his life is a fair sacrifice for the welfare of his family, to whom the £10 will be handed over.

It is less than a hundred years ago that our countrymen in England were hanged for offences which are now treated much more leniently. Unless the value set on life is reduced in due proportion to that of honour and duty, it is impossible to read the sentences passed on the inhabitants of Canaan without some kind of shock to our feelings. The utter extermination of every creature that breathed in Canaan, men, women, children, cattle and herds, cannot fail to strike us as a very difficult task to be allotted to a God-fearing people. With our views of to-day it would seem that it could only be carried out effectually by a people nearly perfect, or else by a people in the same condition as the Canaanites themselves. In those days the god of each tribe was part of the tribe, and local to the land; so that, short of joining with them in their idolatry, their extermination was a necessity, yet as the bulk of Israel could see very little difference between the two religions, there could be no real enthusiasm in exterminating the people so completely.

There was one matter, however, in which the Israelites must have noticed a marked difference between the two religions, and which probably influenced them greatly.

During their Personal guidance they were brought to realize that their God punished them for disobedience as severely as He punished the heathen. This must have given Jehovah, in their eyes, a distinct position, as apart from the position of the gods of the surrounding nations, who were assumed to wink at the transgressions of their followers.

The man found picking up sticks on the Sabbath day was
brought before Moses by divine command and stoned to
death (Num. xv, 32–36).
The rebellious Korah, Dathan, and Abiram were swallowed
in an earthquake for their contumacy, and of the congregation
that murmured in the matter of Korah, no less than 14,700
died of the plague (Num. xvi, 49).
The Israelites as the Chosen Race had to take the bitter and
the sweet together, and if they were to expect the help of the
Almighty they must be prepared for strenuous and uncongenial
work and rigid punishments for disobedience—all in this life.
We may ask ourselves, then, what was the driving power
that impelled them? Was it training, or habit, or fear, or
religious awe?
The view in the Pentateuch, attributed to the Almighty, is
that they were a stiff-necked, backsliding people, but would not
this be the character of all races?
For the benefit of mankind a small portion of the ruling of
the universe has been unveiled, and we are permitted to see in
the Pentateuch how the Almighty dealt with the Chosen Race,
making it His instrument for chastising other races. We do
not know but that this may not be the constant method of the
Almighty; and in all our doings as a nation we may be acting
under direct interposition of Providence, with the same stiff
necks as Israel of old. Israel was threatened with the sword
without and terror within, if God's Will was not done; but some
greater force than this must have kept the people in the right
way so often.
I take it that the people actually were impressed with the
desire to serve God, and were attracted by the Majesty of the
Almighty, and during a great part of their lives gave a willing
service to God. If we can take an impartial view of Israel at
work, we must realize that they were given a task beyond their
powers, because it was necessary that they should recognize
that they were agents of the Almighty and not fighting only
for themselves.
As we know them after their forty years in the desert, we
may say that with such stuff and a year's training we should be
glad to welcome the whole 600,000 of them as our allies at the
present day.

Training—the Exodus.
The account given in the Pentateuch of the Exodus is the
most remarkable lesson recorded in history of the effect of
training on a nation, changing it in a few months from a rabble
of discontented slaves into an organized army of warriors. This was done under the enormous pressure of dire necessity, but on the other hand it was carried out in spite of the inclinations of a large section of the people, especially the older ones, whose enervated habits led them to hunger after the flesh-pots of Egypt. The enfeebled Israelites, after generations of abject slavery under the iron rule of the Pharaohs, had been reduced to the lowest depths of serfdom and submission to their human rulers, but to God they only turned at rare intervals.

Even the destruction of all their male children by Pharaoh was not enough to stir them up to active resistance, and it was necessary that a leader from amongst themselves should be trained up as a free man in the royal household of Pharaoh of Egypt.

This leader was Moses, the younger of the children of Amram, a highly gifted family; Miriam and Aaron possessing the prophetic gifts, and Moses being potentially gifted with the ability to become versed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and to take his place as a personage of influence in the royal household. These three were chosen to act as ambassadors of the Almighty, to release their brethren from the thraldom of the Egyptians, and to train them to fight against and exterminate the possessors of Canaan. Their task was to control and educate a nation, now physically and mentally unfit—to do more than murmur and groan under the lash of the taskmasters—and whose thoughts could not rise above the contemplation of the flesh-pots of Egypt; and, further, to change them into an army of conquerors.

At the present crisis in our history the lesson as to how this change was brought about cannot fail to be of interest to us all.

The method of procedure adopted in educating the Israelites to carry out their task of conquest was all planned out beforehand by the Almighty, as we are permitted to know, from the instructions given to Moses at Horeb, where he was watching the flocks of Jethro the Midianite (Ex. iii, 12): "When thou hast brought forth the people out of Egypt, ye shall serve God upon this mountain." And again (Ex. xiii, 17): "God led them not through the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt: but God led the people about, through the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea."

There were in ancient times two roads leading from Egypt into Southern Palestine: (1) The way of the land of the
Philistines, leading northward from Goshen to the sea shore, and thence along the coast by Al Arish and Gaza; and (2) the way of Shur, leading due east from Goshen and thence into the south country towards Beer Sheba. In either of these cases, as the crow flies, the distance across the desert was not more than sixty miles, and with depôts for food and water in time of peace the multitude could have accomplished the journey, at the vernal equinox, when there is water and herbage, in six days' journey of ten miles each. But with a hostile force in front in Palestine, and a hostile force behind in Egypt, they would have to leave their women, children, and old men and herds on the confines of Egypt, under guard of one army, whilst another army crossed the desert to attack the giant Sons of Anak of Southern Palestine, with the certainty that they must either conquer them or suffer a very disastrous defeat. Such a proceeding could only be attempted with any chance of success by an experienced army of trained soldiers, and was an absolute impossibility for the Israelites of that period, without organization, weapons, and skill in fighting, without warlike spirit, enthusiasm, and powers of endurance, without a single trait in their character which goes to make a fighting man, and apparently with a desire at the bottom of their hearts to avoid the perils of the desert and to return to their life of slavery in Egypt. For people in such a plight there was only one possible solution of the difficulty, namely, the destruction of Pharaoh's host and a sojourn in the Sinai peninsula till they were organized, armed, and skilled in fighting; and there was also to be induced in them a martial ardour sufficient to carry them over the discomforts and perils of active military operations.

The term wilderness in the Bible does not mean a desert where there is no vegetation or food for man or beast, and the Wilderness of the Wanderings about Sinai at the present time supports a large population of Bedouin with their flocks, and bears evidence on its surface of having, at a remote period, been far more fertile than it is at present; but it is certain that at no time in its history could it have supported the vast influx of Israelites and their followers, numbering at least 3,000,000 human beings, with herds and flocks.

We do not read in the Bible of the people subsisting on any other food but manna and occasionally quails, any more than we read of what the cattle and sheep subsisted on, but we may take it that all the food growing in the wilderness for man and beast was duly consumed, and that the milk of the flocks was not wasted. The song of Moses implies this. No doubt they
bad many acres under the plough, as have the Bedouin at present, and had both wheat and barley, but not sufficient for their vast multitudes.

In the year 1883, when in the desert, east of Suez, I climbed up a mountain to get a view, and on the flat top I found ploughing going on by slaves in the employ of a Bedouin tribe, and though little rain ever falls on this part, yet there was no lack of water for irrigation, as the humid wind from the Red Sea struck against the side of the mountain, and being driven upwards was forced to deposit its moisture on the land in the form of vapour or mist. It was an exemplification of what is stated to have taken place in another part of Arabia: "There went up a mist from the earth and watered the whole face of the ground." We may assume that there was food in the desert, but not enough, and the manna was required to eke it out.

Now, the scheme was first to destroy Pharaoh's army so completely that it would take a long time to organize another adequate force, and in the meantime to bring the Israelites into the Sinai Wilderness and rapidly train them into fighting men but little by little, so as not to frighten them at their task and drive them back into Egypt. This scheme was not divulged to the people at first, and all that Moses let out to them and Pharaoh was that they would go three days' journey into the wilderness to sacrifice there. It was not until the die was cast and the people had spoiled the Egyptians, and were sensibly under the immediate protection of the cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night, that they were entrusted with the information that they were on their way to the Promised Land, on a mission of exterminating the Canaanites: and the night of the Passover was to be a memorial to them (Ex. xviii). At this time they had advanced as far as Etham, on the verge of the desert, north-west of the Bitter Lakes. The events of the last days in Egypt appear to have rendered the Israelites docile for a while, and when the order came to them to turn about again and move towards Egypt, to a most hazardous position on the inner side of the Bitter Lakes, they obeyed without a murmur. Pharaoh at once grasped the situation, and saw that there was, humanly speaking, no escape for Israel, and that they were in his power. He exclaimed, "They are entangled in the land, the wilderness hath shut them in." Thus was the strategy accomplished for the destruction of Pharaoh's host. Israel, enclosed between Egypt and the sea, was a bait too tempting for Pharaoh to resist. And he made ready his chariots and took his people with him—all the chariots of Egypt. And a passage was
opened across the sea for the Israelites, and they passed over dry-shod, but the Egyptians following after were overthrown in the midst of the sea, chariots and horsemen.

The Israelites were now free to move at leisure, and Moses led them south by the shore of the Red Sea into the Wilderness of the Wanderings about Sinai to the foot of the Holy Mountain. They were now put into training for the simple life which was to fit them for their work of conquest.

But the people, now that the danger from Pharaoh was eliminated, became dissatisfied with their lot, and rather than undergo the hardships of training they recalled the fleshpots of Egypt, and said that they would rather have died in Egypt. Then the Lord rained manna from heaven, and also sent them quails. We have no idea at the present day what kind of food manna was, but the descent of the quails, as described, is a complete account of what takes place in the desert at the present day: with certain winds they descend on the desert near the Suez Canal and are captured in numbers by the Canal warders, who put out bottles with the bottoms knocked out, into which the birds creep in the heat of the day, and are thus captured. Quails are a delicacy when eaten sparingly, but you soon get fed up with them in the desert.

After the second month of their wanderings the Israelites had fully entered into their training: (1) They led the simple life with their limited amount of food, eked out by manna. (2) They supplied themselves with warlike implements, and learnt how to use them and how to drill, and fought successfully against the Amalekites. (3) Whilst resting at the foot of Sinai, they were organized in their thousands and hundreds under military judges and leaders, and the law was promulgated, and they were made subject to it.

How far there was any previous organization we do not know, but it seems clear that in Egypt they must have had an organization for the performance of their daily tasks. The Egyptians, we know from their monuments, were highly organized, horse, foot and chariots, but as they were jealous of the growing numbers of Israel, they may have restricted their organization to reduce their power of rebellion. After training for little over one year, the Israelites were considered fit as to their military organization, and were sent up from Sinai on their way to the conquest of the Land of Canaan (Deut. ix, 23). They were told: “Go up and possess the land which I have given you,” and they marched direct on Kadesh Barnea. Bewildered with the reports of the spies, they refused to go on to conquest, having
no faith in themselves or in the Lord's arm, and then when told to go back they rebelliously went forward and were punished by the Amalekites. The whole position seems clear. Their training was complete. Physically they were fit; mentally they were untrained; and they were sentenced to remain for forty years in the wilderness until all the generation that had done evil was consumed.

This decision gives us much cause for reflection; one year for training of the body, forty years for training of the mind, when the heart is not in the matter. Now the question must present itself to us, "Was it possible for the Israelites to be stirred up to this war of conquest so as to have their hearts in the matter?" It seems to me that you can only fight with enthusiasm if you feel a strong consciousness and indignation at the perpetration of wrong and injustice on the part of your enemies, or else if you form part of a great army established for conquest. As neither of these applied to the Israelites, they had to fall back until their children were educated up to the mark. The reason why Israel did not respond to the call of the Almighty is well explained in Robertson Smith's account of the religion of the Semites. Israel was only in a degree better prepared than the surrounding heathen to accept a God of righteousness, and the bulk of the people saw very little difference between their religion and that of their heathen neighbours. The bulk of them did not look upon the God of Israel as the God of the whole earth, and did not recognize that all other gods were as nothing.

Israel in Canaan,

Forty years had now passed away, and Israel was on the way to the conquest of Canaan. But not the same Israel that jibbed on facing the defenders of Southern Palestine. The memory of the flesh-pots of Egypt was now merely a survival; every fighting man was now a trained soldier from his youth, and the habit of obedience outwardly to God's commands, received through their leader, had been inculcated. The Israelites were embarked on the first Jihad, or Holy War, waged in the name of the Almighty. We have some knowledge of such wars in recent times waged by Mahomet and his successors, and we know how they stirred and animated the Semitic races, and indeed all races who attached themselves to the Moslem religion. There was, however, a vast gulf between the two classes of Jihad. In the case of Israel, it was a Jihad of extermination of all living creatures in the land, men, women, children, and animals:
nothing could be spared that fire would destroy. Israel was to commence with a new sheet. With the Moslem successful Jihads, the terms were essentially different. It was merely the destruction of idolatry in the country. If the idolatrous inhabitants were not submissive they were to be destroyed, but if they submitted they had two alternatives, either to embrace the Moslem faith, or to pay a capitation tax. The comparison between the Moslem and Israelite Jihads cannot be carried very far because of the rise of Judaism and Christianity in the meantime. It is apparent, however, that whilst that of the Moslems was congenial to the instincts of the people, that of the Israelites could never be acceptable, even if the people were wholly devoted to the service of God, and could only be carried out as a painful duty imposed by the Almighty.

We may consider, then, why this duty (bound to fail) was imposed upon Israel. I may suggest that it was a test similar to that imposed upon Abraham in regard to his son Isaac. It was to be on record that Israel could not be trained as a perfect people, even when set apart in the desert under the most favourable circumstances, and that a Redeemer was required after they had passed through a few more vicissitudes.

I can see no difficulty in the Israelites killing the Pagan races when once they were domiciled in Canaan, and were attacked by them in their homes, but to wage a war of extermination against people living quietly under their gods, without having given offence, seems to me contrary to the instincts of the people unless ordered to do so by a higher power.

It seems, therefore, that we want a new conception of these people of Israel. Instead of looking on them as a nation of backsliders we ought to see in them a people who were set a task only possible for a perfect people, and that probably what they did do would stand very high by the side of the exploits of any other nation. Here we must draw the line between the individual and a nation. The former may do what the latter cannot.

David in his combat with Goliath relied on three sources of strength: (1) His expertness in the art of war. (2) His confidence in the righteousness of his cause. (3) His trust in the help of the Almighty. Now, in taking the nation as a whole, I do not think it probable that the bulk of the people could fully rely on more than their expertness as soldiers. The righteousness of their cause could only appeal to them, in this act of aggression, in proportion as they had detached themselves from the current Semitic view, and accepted the ruling of the Almighty as their only guide.
WHAT THE WORLD OWES TO THE CHOSEN RACE.

We are so apt only to dwell on the failure of the Chosen Race to act up to the high standard allotted to them, that we are not inclined to recognize the enormous benefits we have derived from the position they maintained in the world as a bulwark on the side of the freedom of mankind.

So far as the physical effects of Palestine are concerned, I do not think that they can have had any appreciable effect on the mind or actions of the people, beyond influencing the imagery used in their writings.

I take it that if the lot of the Chosen People had been cast in Holland or Switzerland, the sentiments expressed in the Psalms would have been the same, but the imagery used would have been tempered by the physical features of the surroundings.

We must, then, look upon the Chosen Race as having been entirely responsible for bringing down to us what has been entrusted to them. It seems to be admitted that the capacity of man, morally and intellectually, has not increased since the beginning of history, but his moral knowledge has had several additions by revelation; and the Chosen Race has been the vehicle by which they have been brought down to us. I mention the following:

(1) Personal purity.
(2) Love to God and mankind.
(3) The importance of the freedom of man, physically and intellectually.

On the other hand, man has advanced on his own account in civilization, and amongst his assets are the following:

(1) Wealth: fertility of the land, buildings, works derived from former generations.
(2) Experience handed down.
(3) Economy of time and labour in use of machinery and by means of water and steam power and electricity.
(4) Increased accuracy of work owing to improved tools and the study and application of the natural sciences.

Then the question arises, "Does civilization with natural religion alone make for the benefit of mankind? How does it compare with the new culture impressed on the Israelites at Sinai?"

Civilization, as defined by Guizot, is the development of mankind socially and morally. From this arises the question, "Is
the individual to serve society, or is society to serve the individual?" Under the civilization of the ancients (Babylonians, Assyrians, and Egyptians), society was everything and man was nothing. But under the Hebrew dispensation society was made for man. We find, then, at Sinai, a rival system was set up in the world, which if carried out in accordance with the will of God, was to control civilization, and secure the freedom of man mentally and physically, through the example of the Chosen People.

But from their actions the world learnt that even under the most favourable circumstances "man is not able of his own natural strength to do works pleasant and acceptable to God," and they failed utterly. But yet for fifteen centuries the sceptre did not depart from Judah until Shiloh came, and completed the freedom of mankind.

During all these centuries Israel kept the flag flying, and can never have been wholly unrepentant, and put a brave face on it up till the last. During those fifteen centuries, and on to the present day, the Hebrews have been a sign to the Gentiles of the Covenant made on Sinai.

This Covenant has yet to be fulfilled, and we have still to learn the effect which the physical features of Palestine will have in the important part that country is to play in the near future.

DISCUSSION.

The CHAIRMAN: We have listened this evening to a very graphic lecture. Sir Charles Warren has brought home to us the reality of the conditions through which the Israelites passed, and we have learnt to understand something of the necessity for the training which they underwent. One little phrase that is often applied in the Scriptures to the Israelites shows, I think, the kind of change that took place when they were being developed from the slaves that they had been in Egypt to the free men that they became in the desert and in Palestine. They are spoken of as "stiff-necked." That is just the characteristic of a race which has been given freedom, but has not attained to the character which would enable them to use it aright. God desires men to be free, but He also desires that they should exercise their freedom in willing obedience. Yet although the nation as a whole was stiff-necked and rebellious, there was always a faithful remnant, and through them the Lord gave us the inestimable gift of the Holy Scriptures.
Lieut.-Colonel Mackinlay: I feel sure I speak for all members of the Institute when I express our grateful thanks for the excellent paper which Sir Charles Warren has given us; it is particularly interesting to us during this time of war.

On pages 185 and 186 he tells us of roads from Egypt to Palestine. May I ask what was the probable route of the Magi just after the Nativity, supposing they came from Babylon? Was there a route, say, down the Valley of the Jabbok, coming more directly to Jerusalem, than the road through Damascus? What were the means of crossing the Jordan? Were there any bridges in Bible times? How many fords are there in the part between the Lake of Galilee and the Dead Sea? Are these fords impassable during the annual overflow? If so, for about how long? Do caravans cross the Syrian desert at all seasons of the year, or do they stop during the hot weather?

Referring to page 177 of the paper, there can be no doubt that the star Smaiyeh, seen in September, 1882, to be approaching the Moon, was the planet Venus. It is known from the Nautical Almanac, 1882, that Venus was at its nearest to the Moon (1° 48' distant) on the 16th September in that year. As the planet was then very brilliant, this near approach would certainly attract attention. Had Jupiter been in a like position it would also have been noticeable, but it was distant from the Moon at that time, and no fixed star is sufficiently bright to call for general remark under similar conditions.

Sir Charles tells us that Smaiyeh is the star within the crescent in the Turkish ensign. This device is not to be found in other Mohammedan countries, but it was adopted by the Turks when they took Constantinople. It had previously been the symbol of that city for many hundreds of years, the crescent and the star appearing in the coinage of Byzantium; the crescent (crescens) of the waxing Moon indicating increasing light, and the planet, as Morning Star, heralding the rising of the Sun—both inspiring ideas. The Byzantines, in their turn, had adopted these symbols from the Babylonians.

In the British Museum are Babylonian boundary stones with figures of the Sun, Moon, and Istar (the planet Venus) cut on them. It is noteworthy that the Moon is represented by a crescent, and that Istar is made as large as the chief luminaries, thus shewing
the great importance which was attached to her. The curses of these three divinities are also inscribed on the stones against anyone who should move them. It thus appears that superstitious belief in the power of Smayeh in 1882 protected the cairn, in just the same way as a similar belief in the same star, then called Istar, had protected the boundaries of the Babylonian farmers of thousands of years ago.

Dr. Withers Green: I should like to ask a simple question. What is the geography of Palestine? Is the River of Egypt the southern boundary of the land of Palestine? Then the question arises: What is the River of Egypt? I asked a friend and he said the Nile. It seems to me that the River of Egypt was the little wadi, or rivulet dividing the land of Palestine from the land of Egypt. That seems to me likely to be so because, in Isai. xix, Egypt, Palestine, and Assyria are spoken of as distinct countries. If you take the Nile to be the southern boundary of the promised portion of Palestine, you are really going into Egypt. If one asks an ordinary Christian what is the River of Egypt, he generally replies, The Nile. But I fancy that is wrong.

Colonel Alves: I will ask a question or two, and make a remark or two. The first question is: When, through Abraham, Israel was chosen to be the race to bear witness that Jehovah was the all-powerful and only true God of the whole earth, from Whom should spring the Life-giver and Deliverer from sin, why was Palestine specially chosen for that nation? For of that country the spies said: “A land that eateth up the inhabitants thereof.” Secondly, what is the nature of its strategic importance in the present day, seeing that the greatest trouble is to fall on the Jews when settled in this land as a nation—a thing impossible without the consent of the Gentile powers? Thirdly, what was likely to be the effect of the presence of the mixed multitude in inciting the Israelites to rebellion?

As to training (page 170), the Kaffir may display brilliant intellectual qualities, but will he make the use of them that a white man will? Our Lord and Peter (see John vii, 17, and II Peter i, 5-7) put the attitude of doing before that of knowing. Here, with all respect to the reader of the paper, unless it is simply a matter of terminology, I must differ from him on one or two points. On page 183, line 25,
Israel, on leaving Canaan, is described as "now physically and mentally unfit"; and on page 189, lines 4, 5, "Physically they were fit; mentally they were untrained," after a year’s discipline in the wilderness. In the first of these cases their bodies were all right: "there was not one feeble person among their tribes." Moreover, less than two months after leaving Egypt, they put up a good fight with Amalek. Physically, therefore, they were all right though mentally they were unequipped.

In the second case, after a year's training, they were right mentally, for the mind is physical and not spiritual—I mean in the sense that men and beasts are all sharers of the same spirit (see Genesis vii, 21-22). Apart from the spirit the mind cannot think, but neither can the body move. When we read of all the wonderful ways in which Jehovah had shown His mastery over the gods of Egypt, and of His miraculous care and protection during the first two months of the wanderings, the only conclusion at which I can arrive is that the moral and spiritual elements alone were at fault, and that ancient Israel must be awarded the palm for perversity. I find no difficulty in the command to exterminate certain races. When depravity is in the very bones, it is the most merciful thing to do. Why, in some cases, cattle were also to be destroyed, and in others virgins alone amongst humanity were to be preserved alive, is at present somewhat of a mystery which, when solved, may prove to be the clue to important truth.

Dr. Schofield: May I be allowed to suggest an additional explanation to Sir Charles Warren's solution on page 190, that the duty of destroying nations in this extraordinary way may be a test similar to that imposed by Abraham on his son Isaac. I should like to suggest that there is a very sinister reason beyond that which is hinted at in Genesis vi, where it says: "There were giants in the earth in those days, and also after that." To my mind this is a reference to the race of Anak, and the special reason for the extraordinary command to exterminate this particular race was to carry out the word: "I will destroy man, because he has corrupted his way on the earth." That is to say, the preservation of the clean race in a pure state was dependent upon the destruction of the unclean in a defiled state. That, I think, is the possible clue to the extraordinary commands given with regard to the nations of Canaan.
Mr. Sidney Collett: Towards the foot of page 179, Sir Charles Warren suggests, in the form of a question, the extent to which the Israelites were given up to the gods of Egypt. I have always felt that we might safely conclude that they were largely addicted to idolatry. The proof of that seems to be the readiness with which the people made the golden calf and worshipped it. What strikes me in this paper, with all its profound interest, is that too much stress has been laid on the human element. We read much about the training of the Israelites and their military fitness, but surely the predominant thing in connection with the whole subject, from the Scriptural point of view, is the power of God—the miraculous. Everything was miraculous: nothing depended on the natural. It seems to me, we shall never arrive at a wise and correct conclusion on these matters unless we give God and His almighty power the right place in speaking of these things.

Then I notice that, on the last page (192), the lecturer says: "During all these centuries Israel kept the flag flying." I think we can scarcely say that. "This my covenant they broke," God said over and over again; and because they did not "keep the flag flying" they were disintegrated, and are now scattered all over the earth for the same reason.

Rev. J. Tuckwell, M.R.A.S.: When considering the mysterious commands given by God to the people, I think we must allow of remote purposes which we are not able to fathom. I have one example in my mind. We all remember the command given to Saul to exterminate the Amalekites. It seems a brutal thing to do. But what is the historic view? Consider the Book of Esther. What took place there? Amalek had a descendant, Haman, whose plot was the extermination of the whole of the Israelites—to blot out the line from which the Messiah was to come. In order that the plot might be frustrated, Esther did the work which should have been done by Saul. It had to be done, and as Saul did not do it, it was reserved for Esther in later times. How much folly might be avoided if all of us carried out a distasteful duty, for some purpose not known to us, but assuredly known to God!

Mr. J. O. Corrie, B.A., F.R.A.S.: There is certain subsidiary evidence in Mosaic legislation of the hold which Egyptian ideas had on the children of Israel. In the whole of the Pentateuch you do
not see any distinct mention of a future life, yet future life is bound up with the ideas of Egypt.

Colonel Mackinlay: May I ask one question more? Have you ever seen the planet Venus shining in the day-time in Palestine?

Sir Charles Warren: No, I have never seen it, nor have I heard of anyone who has seen it.

Rev. Martin Anstey, M.A.: Is it a fact with regard to the doctrine of immortality and the Old Testament, that the reason why it was not mentioned more precisely is because it is everywhere assumed, everywhere taken for granted, just as the pressure of the atmosphere is not felt by us because it is the same everywhere? It was assumed and taken for granted, and therefore not mentioned.

Colonel Alves: I submit that this subject, though worthy of discussion, is not one that can be decided by mere assertion, or be conveniently debated in connection with another subject which is entirely different.

The Chairman, in reply to Dr. Withers Green, said he believed that there was general agreement that the present boundary of Egypt and Palestine, at El Arish, was intended by "the River of Egypt," and not the Nile. The Nile, of course, was the very centre of Egypt, and not its boundary. Egypt was the whole river-basin of the Nile, not merely its western bank.

General Sir Charles Warren: My ears are not young enough to catch all the remarks that have been made. I can only answer a few of the questions. There are one or two rather interesting points. With regard to the fords of the Jordan. The valley of the Jordan is all volcanic, and there are lines, 10, 15, or 20 feet wide, running east and west, right across the Jordan. When the water is worked up, they are just below the surface. When the water goes down, there is mud, but level mud, and these trap-fords are just like hard roads. If you know where they are, and know the level of the Jordan, you can go across. There are about thirty or forty of these trap-fords, and there are five or six main passages across the Jordan.

With regard to the harvest, the harvest is at different times in Palestine. I think the harvest in the Jordan—the barley harvest
—is quite early. The water floods, I think, in February. It comes from the snow melting on Hermon, and descends with a rush. The water not only floods the Jordan, but floods the whole valley for about three miles. The valley is about three miles wide, and goes on gentle slopes. The flooded portion is sown with barley by the Bedouin people, and this comes up very early in the year. As you go higher, you have different times for different harvests. In Assam you have people coming down from the hills for the harvest in the lowlands and people from the lowlands going to the hills when the harvest is high up.

I suppose it is the same all over the world. Even in England we have a variation of two or three weeks in different parts. I do not remember any other particular points I can answer.

The Meeting returned a hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer, and adjourned at 6 p.m.
The Minutes of the preceding Meeting were read and confirmed.

The Secretary announced that Mr. Patrick Morgan, Mr. Charles Stuart Thorpe, and the Rev. H. Oxland had been elected Associates of the Institute.

The Chairman regretted that the Rev. J. Iverach Munro, M.A., author of the paper to be read, on "The Witness of Philology to the Truth of the Old Testament," was unable to be present. In his absence, he would ask the Secretary, Mr. E. J. Sewell, to read the Paper on Mr. Munro's behalf.

THE WITNESS OF PHILOLOGY TO THE TRUTH OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By the Rev. J. IVERACH MUNRO, M.A.

In the preface to an account of a research into the origin of a pronoun imbedded in the five books attributed to Moses, published by the Oxford University Press in 1912,* I remarked: "As the Rosetta Stone was the means by which scholars deciphered the Hieroglyphic writing of ancient Egypt, so נַא, הָי', used in the Pentateuch for both masculine and feminine, has been the means of opening up the primitive structure of all Semitic languages, and not only so, but also of establishing the essential unity of primitive Semitic-Indo-European speech.

"With regard to the Pentateuch, this pronoun, with the light it throws on the structure of Semitic speech, is like the invisible ink which shows on exposure to heat, or the water-mark in paper. Its evidential value is greater than if Moses had signed every page of the Pentateuch—infinitely greater, because a forger might have done that. But no forger that ever lived

* Research into the Origin of . . . נַאָה. Oxford University Press. 1912. 1s. 6d. net.
could have devised anything so simple yet so efficacious as this נננ, מv', 3rd sing. epicene pronoun. Hebrew, it is now certain, compared with Arabic, is like an old mediæval building partly in ruins. Arabic is like the same building restored by a modern architect, many of the original lines and tracery being obliterated in the process."

Every item of relevant knowledge which I have gathered in the interval, and all well-informed criticism on the subject, have confirmed these statements.

Let me remark that no criticism which asserts that I regard נננ, מv', as the root of the pronoun is worth consideration, because I bring many items of proof, which in combination make it certain that the root was √מv or √שv, sh being one letter. Not only so, but the whole research goes to show that this pronoun, as well as the main stock of primitive Semitic-Indo-European speech, was biliteral in its consonants, while between these the diphthongs aw and ai were used, expressing active and passive respectively. Hence criticism of that description convicts the critic of failure in the most elementary duty of fidelity to what is stated, as well as of lack of apprehension of the bearing of philological facts.

Now, with regard to my comparison of נננ, מv', to the Rosetta Stone, this comparison lies in the importance revealed by the research and analysis of the one as establishing the fundamental unity of primitive Semitic-Indo-European languages, with the importance revealed by the decipherment of the other, which led to the opening up of ancient Egyptian inscriptions and literature.

The detection of the real cause of the change which universally took place in Semitic languages in the feminine form of the 3rd sing. personal pronoun from e to y opened up the whole structure of the primitive speech, while the method of expressing active and passive with the biliteral consonantal roots, and the shedding of the feminine ending t which was so extensively developed in Indo-European in the formation of neuter pronouns, in addition to establishing the essential unity of pre-Semitic-Indo-European language, reveals to us the interesting and important fact that, just as to the child everything is living and acting upon it, so to man, in his advent upon this earth, everything was alive, and his speech could as yet only distinguish, grammatically, masculine and feminine, the feminine form of the personal pronoun agreeing with the old passive.

What had prevented Semitic speech from developing a neuter pronoun and neuter nominal inflexion, was the peculiar idiom
by which, when two nouns, the second of which was in the
genitive, combined to form one phrase, the first, if it had shed
the original feminine ending \( t \) and become \( a \), as in primitive
Indo-European, always resumed the old feminine ending \( t \), thus
retaining the feeling of its being feminine. For example,
\( \text{Susäh} \), is “mare,” but “the mare of the king” is
\( \text{sásath hammelekh} \), where the \( t \), another form of
\( t \), is resumed because of this idiom.

Indo-European, on the other hand, when once the \( t \) had gone
from the feminine, never resumed it.

On such apparent trifles does the development of language
depend. The scientific philologist cannot be too careful in
avoiding question-begging epithets, statements, and comparisons
which close investigations that ought to be left open. For
example, by way of warning, Hebraists were accustomed to
speak of Piel and Hiphil, the intensive and causative parts of
the Hebrew verb, as though the language had been constructed
intentionally, like Esperanto. In fact, one gentleman, in an
edition of a standard Hebrew grammar from which he has
expunged every valuable philological note by the original
author, actually cites Esperanto in illustration of the Hiphil! A
more effective way of stifling real investigation could not easily
be conceived. Neither of these parts of the verb had originally
anything to do with intensive or causative. They were passives,
and the Piel of hollow verbs, which are the most primitive in all
languages, in Assyrian remained passive in meaning (see Pro-
fessor Sayce’s Assyrian Grammars, in loc.). Many of their
peculiar uses can only be properly understood when their
historical development is ascertained.

The users of the language simply developed the materials
they had.

The old diphthongs of \( au \) and \( ai \) can be traced throughout
the ablauts of Indo-European nouns and verbs, and these
correspond in a remarkable degree with primitive nouns and
verbs in Semitic, that is, with nouns and verbs, with two
consonants and a vowel sound between. Those interested will
find illustrations in my essay on \( \text{ṣērū}, \text{ḥw'} \), and, as is there
pointed out, the original materials of the extensive pronominal
systems have been the same.

Then philologists will also find that the pronominal root
\( \sqrt{ḥw'} \sqrt{ṣērū} \) has remarkable affinities, not only with pronouns in
Semitic and Indo-European, but just as remarkable affinities to
the groups in these languages with the verbs for being and for
making. Along these lines they will see that the former developed out of the latter. The original material was the same, and the ablauts *au* and *ai* with their modifications run through the whole development. They answer such questions as—Why is *fio* the passive of *facio*? What is the connection between *sum* and *fui*? What is the derivation of *ποιέω*? Why is there no perfect of *εύμη*? What is the philological connection between *θεός* and *Deus*?

*νῦν*, *he*, epicene in the Pentateuch, has opened up the original structure of these languages, and to the philologist the traces occur just like fossils in the rock or knots or grain in wood, revealing their original identity quite unmistakably. *He*, *she*, *it*, *qui*, *quae*, *quod*, *δ*, *ἡ*, *το*, are derived from the same source as *νῦν*, *he*’, with its discarded feminine ending to express the neuter.

Now the evidential value of such a pronoun in the Pentateuch is exactly as I have said, for it fixes the latest possible date of its authorship.

There is only one instance of the epicene use of *νῦν*, *he’*, outside the Pentateuch. It occurs in the eighth chapter of 1 Kings, and if genuine, and not a mere copyist’s slip, may have been used in this instance from the Pentateuch.

This pronoun does not say Moses wrote the Pentateuch. It does infinitely better than that. It proves that the Pentateuch was contemporary with him. And, if so, then the unity that pervades it, and proves it to have been the production of a single author, also proves that author to have been, substantially, Moses. No other is ever even mentioned between the boards of the Old Testament. It is true that some other must have written the account of his death in the last chapter of Deuteronomy. It is also true that Moses must have used materials for his work: it is an historical work. Again and yet again there is the express statement that he was commanded to write in "the" book or in "a" book. It comes to very much the same thing. Written materials prove to have existed, and are expressly stated to have been put by Moses in "the" or "a" book, which would be required for the production of just such a work as this. The essential point is that *νῦν*, *he’*, proves the materials to be not later than Moses’ time.

There are many other philological evidences of the antiquity of the Pentateuch. Any who would like to see them may be referred to the late Principal Douglas’s translation of Keil’s "Introduction to the Old Testament" (T. and T. Clark, Vol. I, pp. 44–52), a work of much merit, not a mere translation. One may say that cutting off these in detail is a hopeless task. The
favourite device of cutting off the heads of opponents does not succeed when these opponents are facts written in a book. They arise and face scholars in unbroken array.

I may mention that the feminine form of נָשָׁה, שָׁה', occurs in the Pentateuch eleven times in all. I have found that in every instance it could be explained, either by its having been inserted from the margin as a gloss, for example, Genesis xiv, 2, "Which is Zoar"; or נָשָׁה, שָׁה', may have been omitted by a copyist, supplied in the margin by a later hand as נְשָׁה, שָׁה', and then transferred to the text. This may have been the case with Genesis xx, 5, where the Samaritan Pentateuch omits one נָשָׁה, שָׁה', and, as its invariable custom is for the feminine, changes another נָשָׁה, שָׁה', into, נְשָׁה שָׁה'. Great weight must be attached to these exceptions, because they show that there was no prejudice against writing נָשָׁה, שָׁה', wherever it might occur.

The evidence shows, then, that when Jacob and his family went down into Egypt the old sounds of the pronoun were still used in Canaan, חַי-וָא for the masculine, חַי-וָא for the feminine. During the sojourn in Egypt, by a well-known phonetic law the change in נָשָׁה, שָׁה', had taken place in Canaan of the v or w into y after the i-sound. Israel in its detached position in Goshen had kept the old pronunciation. On their coming into contact with the highly civilized though morally corrupt Canaanites, the old-fashioned pronunciation was given up.

Then the structure of the Hebrew language itself confirms the Mosaic date of the Pentateuch, as well as the original unity of Semitic-Indo-European. This is a far-reaching argument. Its force can only be appreciated when the analogous case of the Koran is considered. What has rejuvenated, developed, and unified Arabic? Without a doubt the Koran. It is the religious book of the Mohammedan world. It is accepted universally among Mohammedans both for religion and as the standard of Arabic. Now what the Koran did philologically for Arabic, preserving the language of the Koraish tribe of a particular date for use and comparison, the Pentateuch did for Hebrew. It fixed the language. The archaisms which undoubtedly exist are as nothing to the established grammatical uniformity which the influence of some standard work accepted by Northern Israel as well as Judah could alone have secured. There exists no other work that could have done this but the Pentateuch. Now the kind of Semitic which is used in that book is indeed in an advanced stage of, what may be called for want of better terms, philological decay. But it bears the marks of being a very
ancient stage, for, not to speak of מֵּינָה, הָו', the Hebrew verb has preserved proofs of its origin which do not exist elsewhere, and which have ruled the language in all that remains of the literature.

A concrete example will perhaps be the most interesting method of exposition, and will afford the opportunity of indicating various points of similarity and contrast in the development of the languages. Take the second part of the first verse of the fourth chapter of Genesis: ותָּלְדוּ אֵת יָהָוָה וַתְּלֹּם וַתִּקְרִית אֵת אֱלֹהִים literally—"And she bare Cain, and said I have gotten a man, even Jehovah." The proper name קָיִין, Cain, here, is in the old passive form of the verbal noun, viz. two consonants with the diphthong ai between, marking the passive. Not only so, the narrator distinctly traces the verb קָרַּית, "I have gotten," back to its biliteral form qn, and gives קָיִין, the passive meaning "gotten." This takes us back to the time preceding the division of languages, when the verbal noun was fluid, and the pronoun, another verbal noun, could precede or follow it.

In this instance, the perfect of the verb, the pronoun in the form of thî, follows the verbal noun. In the imperfect the pronoun would come first in the form of נ, e. In the development of the Indo-European verb the pronominal part always came last, for example, λῶ, "I loose," λυ, the verbal noun, ω expressing the pronoun. There is also another fact to be noticed, namely, that the Indo-European verb has always a reference to time, present, past, or future, the Semitic only to action, finished or unfinished. By putting the verbal noun first, the completion of the action was emphasized by the Semite; by putting it second, its incompleteness was shown.

We may note also that because the Semites prefixed as well as affixed the pronouns to their verbs, they virtually made it impossible for them to employ prepositions, etc., to modify the meaning of the stem, but apart from this there was nothing inherently different from Indo-European. Hence its expansion took the form of triliteralism. Let me indicate how: New words had to be formed to express new ideas, but just as in Old Edinburgh, because the city walls prevented expansion in horizontal directions, that expansion took place vertically, so in Semitic the pronominal suffix shut off syllabic additions to the end of the verbal noun, and pronominal prefixes in like manner.
forbade syllabic additions at the beginning. We can trace the process from biliteral into doubling of the last consonant, then the use of the old case-ending, as in the verb יִנָּה, qā-nāh, with which we are dealing, the 3rd perf. masc., the ā of which may well be the old accusative ending, and there is always the possibility of the transference of the significant vowel-sound from between the biliterals to the end of the stem. Then came the bold introduction of the third consonant which became so popular as to be adopted by the Semitic-speaking world.

With this in mind, let us now return to our Verb יִנָּה qā-nī-thī, from which we separated the pronominal element יִנָּה thī or thī. This first pers. sing. pronoun is represented in Ethiopic by יִנָה ku, and the k is that of יִנָּה, 'ā-nō-khī, I in Hebrew, represented by the γ of ἐγώ in Greek, ego in Latin, etc. The q of qui, quae, quod is from the same source; and as Mr. Sewell pointed out in his interesting paper on Pompeii, this Latin q is found in Oscan (but is not confined to Oscan) under the form of p. See "Transactions of the Victoria Institute," 1913, p. 122. So that philologists will see from this one instance how widely extended are the sounds springing from יִנָּה, for the q is simply the h-sound pronounced further back in the mouth until it has reached the guttural q, while the p is the result of a journey by small stages in the opposite direction, forward in the mouth, until finally the closed lips are brought into operation in the Oscan p. יִנָּה, 'ānō, the first part of 'ā-nō-khī, is evidently an old nominative form ending in ō=u. It also is widely distributed in Semitic and Indo-European.

Take now what is left of the verb, יִנָּה qā-nī, and if we compare this with the two forms of the proper noun יִנָּה Pēnī-ēl, יִנָּה Pēnū-ēl, which we find in Genesis xxxii, 31–32, we find that the ending י, ī, agrees with the first form. Now the first is the form of the genitive case which ends in ī and the second יִנָּה, Pēnū, has the old nominative ending in ā. As has been mentioned, there was also in Semitic a case-ending for the accusative in ā. These old case-endings u, i, and a, for nominative, genitive, and accusative, were part of the common stock of the parent speech of Semitic-Indo-European, and with the endings m and n, along with the original feminine t ending, play a most important part in the development of verbs, nouns, and participles in Indo-European. Even the ā of the feminine
pre-Semitic-Indo-European may be the $\bar{a}$ of the accusative used to compensate for the loss of the $t$.

If the $i$ of $\text{qā-nī}$ be the genitive form of the verbal noun it is particularly interesting, because Hebrew adopted the genitive form of ending for plural masculine nouns, and does not now distinguish cases by their endings. But there is another explanation, as we shall see.

Here, in this particular type of verb, while the old passive meaning of $\text{Cain}$ is distinctly remembered by the writer of Genesis, and the noun used accordingly, the verbal noun contained in the verb itself has changed the old nominative ending $\bar{a}$ into $i$; and this is true in Hebrew of all this class of verbs which end in a vowel. But this $i$ may have been originally the $ai$ of the passive transferred to the end of the stem, as in Sanscrit. If this were so, it would prove a very ancient date for the original expression.

Along with this change there also arose a shifting of the accent, as is seen in the imperative $\text{qēnēh}$, so that the long $\bar{a}$ before the $u$ becomes a very short, indistinct vowel.

All these phenomena are present in Indo-European.

Here I may say that the discovery of the original vowels in the parent language of Indo-European by the philologists engaged in these studies has proved of the greatest value. It laid a scientific basis for the comparison of the vowel-sounds in Semitic and Indo-European. What in the latter has hitherto been a meaningless array of interconnected sounds yields up its original forms with meanings in the light of Semitic.

Observe also that Sanscrit, with its $\text{guna}$ and $\text{vy ādhi}$ or vowel-strengthening—at and $\bar{a}$ prefixed to $i$ and $u$ with their modifications—is an invaluable witness, along with the preservation in Arabic of the original forms of the verbal nouns in $ai$ and $au$, to the feeling in all these languages that the $ai$ and $au$ sounds belonged to the words. The meaning passed out of mind, the feeling remained; hence such curious forms as $\lambda\varepsilon\lambda\nu\theta\alpha$, where the $ai$ combines active and passive together. The philological value, then, of such a statement as is before us in Genesis iv, where the original passive form in Cain is preserved, and its passive meaning remembered, along with the later development of the verb, cannot be over-emphasized. That transitional stage is such as corresponds with that of Sanscrit, when it transferred the $i$ of the passive from the middle of the stem to the end, and this holds whether we regard the $i$ of $\text{qā-nī-thī}$ as the old genitive form or the transferred passive.
To elucidate the matter, take away the ı in the middle of qa-ni-thi, as well as the pronoun at the end. We are then left with qān. Now the a here is movable as the tone is shifted. Contrast this with the older type of verb having two consonants and a vowel-sound between; for example, qâm, "to arise." Whereas qā-nāh, has qeneh as the sec. per. sing. mas. imperative, the same part of qâm has qim, in which the original ın, of au active is resumed.

Take yet another type of the older verbal noun, this time one which has retained the ı of au which originally marked the passive, sim, "to place." Here we have sim, for the same part of the imperative. The sec. per. plur. mas. imper. of qā-nāh does not occur, but would be qenū, where the accent is at the end. The same part of qâm and sim are qim and sim, the accent being retained on the stem syllable. These are just examples. The very same changes present themselves as meet us in the ablauts of Indo-European. The a-sound may take the place of both au and ai—that is to say, may be used for an original active or passive, or, in the later forms of the verb, may disappear, leaving a very short, indistinct vowel-sound. Here again Semitic throws its light upon these changes.

Did time permit, it would be interesting to trace the historical development of Hebrew. Much material is available for this purpose. Let me point out how a derived meaning may monopolize the original verbal noun, while the original physical meaning passed on with its development to the secondary form of the word.

Take the verb bin, "to be wise." This was the passive of the biliteral verb "to build." The active form was baun. A discussion of this verb and some of its derivatives will be found by those interested, in my Research into the p. 29 ff. The metaphorical meaning of being "built" in understanding—that is, "to be wise"—here took possession, while the original meaning "to build" passed on with the later form, bā-nāh. The original passive form of the verbal noun was exactly what we have in Cain.

Now we have in these most ancient forms of the verb—biliterals enclosing au or ai—what justifies one in saying, "Hebrew, it is now certain, compared with Arabic, is like an old mediæval building partly in ruins. Arabic is like the same
building restored by a modern architect, many of the original lines and tracery being obliterated in the process."

In tracking נָדָנ, הָו', in its epicene use with its subsequent development of נָדַנ, הָו', for the feminine, I found an ancient form of verbal noun corresponding to the verbal noun which Indo-European scholars had found to be the most ancient forms of those languages, but with the definite evidences of a meaning in the original system of vowel-sounds which they had proved to exist in the parent speech. Arabic, by its preservation of case-endings and its wealth of noun forms, some of which enshrine philological treasures of the utmost value, has preserved for us invaluable aids for the understanding of Hebrew, but it has also preserved evidences of its having built up its verbal system from a later stage of phonetic decay than that preserved in Hebrew. For some of these evidences those interested may be referred to my essay on נָדָנ, הָו', pp. 12, 13, 15, 16. In this connection, when we compare Hebrew verbs having two consonants and a vowel between, with verbs having two consonants which double the second, we find these classes to be very closely allied. When, further, we compare these with the corresponding verbs in other Semitic languages, we find that the language in the Pentateuch has preserved evidences of the most ancient forms of the verbal nouns which lay at the root of Semitic as well as Indo-European.

The two allied verbs mentioned have in the so-called "connecting vowels" in the perfect and imperfect, evidences of the original structure of pre-Semitic Indo-European which are quite unmistakable. We find that the early speech already possessed a nominative, genitive, and accusative in ו, י, and א, as well as the diphthongs au, ai between the consonants. Arabic and other Semitic speeches had lost them.

Verbs like נָדָנ, הָאָנ (נָל), "to give graciously," נָנָנ, qal, "to be swift," were at first formed from the ordinary biliteral verbs, like נָנ, qum, "to arise," by the union of the i-sound or the u-sound contained in the passive and active respectively, being combined with the last consonant, just as the Piel or intensive, which was originally passive, doubled the second letter when it eliminated the i or y. There is no mystery about the process whatever. The development of sonants, liquid and nasal, in Indo-European arose from the same source, au and ai, but instead of doubling the consonant the nasal or liquid sound was introduced or emphasized.

The Hiphil, or causative, which also was originally passive, did not double the second, and has preserved for us a curious
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but convincing alternation; when one has the key, of a- and i-sounds in the ordinary verb, while in vowel-Ayin verbs it has long i from the original passive throughout, except in a few shut syllables. Note, too, the nomen verbi of the second or intensive form in Arabic, تَقَنُّي، tag-ši-lun. The long i here is a remnant of the original passive form. Now take the first person sing. perfect of these verbs. The verbal noun here precedes the pronoun, and must therefore have been in the nominative case before the pronominal noun, which in turn must have been in the genitive. This is what we would expect, and when we come to make the investigation we actually have חַלַח, han-nó-thî, the verbal noun hannó ends in ó, a common modification of the old nominative in ú. Now, when in the perfect, the noun preceded the pronoun, and was therefore in the nominative, then in like manner in the imperfect, where the verbal noun followed the pronoun, we would expect that noun to be in the genitive, which it actually is, modified to é. The “connecting vowel” in the fem. plural of בַּבַּב, sâ-bhabh, “to turn,” רַסִּיבָה, tesubbénah is é, the genitive.

These peculiarities, and others which are too numerous to discuss, in these two classes of verbs, run right through the Hebrew Bible from the Pentateuch to Malachi, or rather, taking the Hebrew order, to 11 Chronicles. In Daniel there seems to be a revival of the most ancient type in בָּנָה, bénóthî, “I understood,” which is not Hiphil, but the old passive form of the verbal noun with the pronominal suffix, Dan. ix, 2. The two classes of verb run into one another, and were originally one. The so-called “connecting vowels” occur also in the derived forms of the verb, but were disappearing from the first. In fact, the Pentateuch secured them just when they were about to disappear from Hebrew, as from Arabic and other Semitic languages.

Turn now to primitive Indo-European verbs, and you find from their endings that they too had the u, i, and a, the u and i often modified to ó and é; but, with the exception of the nominative u, these were not required in the strict formation of the verb, as the pronominal element invariably followed the verbal noun. Accordingly, you find them there but put to new uses. They are the vowels of the so-called Thematic Stems in Greek. These are the old case-endings put to new uses.

They are also found in the “conjugations” in Indo-European. Verbs ending in a have just the old accusative ending, in e the
genitive, in u or o the old nominative. Perhaps more interesting and convincing still, you will find the old genitive in one part of the verb and the nominative in another. The language had lost all idea of their origin, but there they are side by side. Take the e in Latin, for example, of moneo. The e is none other than our old friend the genitive. But why should the perfect of moneo be monui, u taking the place of e? The answer is that they built their wall with the stones they had, and took the u of the old nominative as their perfect. The form domui perfect of domare, rare as the perfect of a verb in a, is probably a survival of what was once much more extensively used. Indeed, the vi itself may have developed out of the u with the pronominal i affixed.

These facts illustrate one set of a s, i s (e s), and u s (o s) in Indo-European, and some of their uses. Professor Sayce says, Preface to the second edition of Introduction to the Science of Language, p. x: “But as de Saussure was the first to notice, there was more than one e and more than one o in the parent speech. There was, on the one hand, an e and an o which interchanged with one another, as in λέγετε and λέγομεν, the e, as Fick has discovered, marking an originally accented syllable, and the o an unaccented; while on the other hand we find traces of another and independent o as in πόσις, potis, as well as of another and independent e.”

The facts do not appear to warrant mere accent as the cause of interchange of e and o, but the two sets undoubtedly exist. We have already illustrated one, the other is found between the biliteral roots—for example, πόσις, to use Professor Sayce’s instance. These roots themselves form a most important part of the proof of the original identity of Semitic-Indo-European, which I can do no more than refer to here. Colonel Conder has, however, laid us under an obligation in this respect by his valuable paper “On the Comparison of Asiatic Languages,” Vol. 27 of the “Transactions of the Victoria Institute.”

These vowels play an important part in the development of Semitic, and the philologist cannot be too careful in making sure whether the u is that of the old nominative ending or the active u of the primitive stem; or to speak more exactly as well as more comprehensively, to which set of vowels any ablaut belongs.

To show how far-reaching and important the distinction is: There is in the Hebrew triliteral verb of the first form, or Qal, a passive participle of the form qa-tul, that is with a in the first syllable and u in the second. The u in the second syllable is
merely the ā of the nominative of the biliteral noun. To explain this: only one other Semitic language, Ethiopic, has developed this form in the Lamedh-vowel verbs, cf. דָּבָא, bā-nui, “built.” This form, accordingly, served as a model for a passive participle of the first form of the verb in Hebrew and Ethiopic, but the ā in it was just the old nominative ā with the pronominal i suffix. The real passive had lain in the first syllable in which ā had in course of time become treated as tone-long. Hebrew, therefore, never lost a first-form passive in ā, as has been assumed by Hebraists, because it never developed one, and the forms of passive participle in ā of biliteral verbs were a later development on the analogy of bā-nui, qā-tal. But in many cases the old passive in i is in the written text, kēṭīb, as it is called, the later ā being recommended to be read. The real ā active of the old biliteral stem was preserved in the ā of the active form of the participle רָמָא, bō-nēh and this ā = au active. Here, too, Hebrew has preserved the more ancient sounds. The old passive of Hebrew and every other Semitic-Indo-European verbal noun was in ai.

Now when our passage, “And she bare Cain, and said, I have gotten a man, even Jehovah,” is more narrowly scrutinized, we see that the writer has no doubt about the connection between גָּאָה, qa-an, and יָאָה, qa-ni-thi. This suggests to us, we have already noted the possibility, that the verbal noun qa-nāh was at the time of the writer (and I wish to emphasize this in the name of science, because any indication of the writer’s opinion is extremely valuable, he being a contemporary witness) at the stage of being passive in meaning, and the i at the end of the stem may, to him, have marked the transference of the passive i, represented in Cain to the end of the stem. In this case, the original pronunciation would have been qa-nai-thi, the Hebrew unpointed text, דְּהָלָא, remaining unchanged. Compare Arabic دُرَةَت, “I have thrown,” and גָּאָה, qā-zau-tu, “I have attacked,” the latter representing the transference of the old active, the former the old passive, to the end of the stem.

The construction of the passive noun with the pronoun, which constitutes the verb, now becomes plain, which literally would be “gotten of me.” Then יָאָה, ʾeth, which is used before Cain and Jehovah, and which is just the old discarded feminine ending of the pronoun hai-wath, hai-wōth, later hai-yath, hai-yoth, yath occurring in Aramaic, iyya in Arabic, Hebrew ʾeth and ēth, should in these early writings have its full deictic
significance. In this passage we can only do so with the name Cain by emphasizing it. Then if we take 'eth-Jehovah as a case of the extremely common constructio praegnans, as I think we should, we have the translation, "even the promise of Jehovah, that is the seed of the woman who was to bruise the serpent's head." The full passage would be then: "And she bare Cain (gotten) and said I have gotten a man, even the promise of Jehovah," which thoroughly agrees with the context.

Having illustrated in a very imperfect way these phenomena of the old verbal system, I may point out that we have two instances of perfects in ḫ representing the old active vowel in spite of the doubling of the second consonant, one in Genesis xlix,23, וֹ רֹבְדָה, "and they kept shooting," and Job xxiv, 24, רֹמְמָה, "they raised" (Davidson's Hebrew Grammar, 10th to 18th Editions, p. 106). These mark a very ancient stage of the language, when even the doubling of the last consonant had only modified the au to ə.

This word רֹמְמָה, römmah, in Job, contains an excellent illustration of what was included under the old active—action proceeding from the agent himself, which here seems to have a reflexive meaning, not "to be exalted" but "exalt themselves"; compare רָעַס, raus, "to run," active, but not grammatically transitive. Indeed, Renan turns out to be right after all in regard to the early date of the book of Job. The language in that book bears marks of the most ancient forms we have in Hebrew. The evidential as well as philological value of these can hardly be over-estimated. There may be a perfect mine in a single word. Take, for example, the word for God which occurs so often in Job, יְהֹוָה, 'Yāwāh. This is a word whose derivation has been a standing puzzle to philologists. That it has been so, arises from the fact that the book of Job has preserved for us a form of derivation which had become obsolete. Every derivative elsewhere with the name, יְהֹוָ, 'Yāh in the first part, has Yāh either prefixed without a connecting vowel as יְהֹוהַ, 'Yāh, Eldad, or the connecting vowel is ə, יְהֹוהֵל, Elīdād. Now 'Yāwāh goes back to an older stage of language—the stage when יְהֹוהֵל, Penīül, was the recognized form for combining parts of names, where, as we have already seen, ə is the vowel of the old nominative ending. Hence we have in 'Yāwāh, an old nominative form of combination, ə being
equivalent to ־—so old that but for the book of Job it would have been lost—so old that, whereas it has kept the old nominative in its formation, its plural, which in use has completely supplanted it, has taken the form of the genitive, and with very rare exceptions is used with a singular verb. ־Elôah was already old when the book of Job was written, but not so old as to have become obsolete. When we use the same key which opened the way into the understanding of נים, ה', epicene, and the make of the old verbal nouns, it opens the way here also for the analysis and derivation of this word. Take ה, ־El, the first part of the word. This is another word for God, and occurs in the book of Job, as Spurrell points out in his valuable Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis, p. 370, in the proportion of about a quarter of all its occurrences in the Old Testament. No other word for God occurs so frequently in Job, although ־Elôah comes very near it, fifty-five of the one, forty-one of the other.

The problem in ־Elôah, as has been indicated, is in some respects like that of the epicene third sing. pronoun in the Pentateuch, with this difficulty added, that there is no נים, ה', to guide in the search. But we have the now-ascertained old nominative ־= ־ at the end of ־El=God. Then we are left with נ, ה. It is evident that ה cannot have been alone. The next point is, ה was probably final, because any addition would have affected the plural form, ־Elôhim. Hence our problem is solved if we can find the fitting word or name ending in ה, but beginning with a letter or letters which would disappear or be absorbed in the ־ of ־Elôah. Now in the name נ, יاه, we have such a word, and just as, in the pronoun, ה, with the i-sound coming before v or w in ה,ו changed the v or w into y, so here the ־-sound coming before a y has caused it to disappear in its own sound ה, and the full name was originally נ, יא, or נ, יא, ־Elô-yah or ־Elô-yah, both nominative endings. The y-sound between the ־, later ה, and ־, disappeared. The ־ of ־El was treated as tone-long like the ־ in נ, בן, “a son,” נ, ־ayil, later נ, ־, “strong” or “mighty,” a passive form; a term including stative, was at the root of both, and both נ, יא and נ in course of time were treated as tone-long, hence נ, יא the sing. of ־Elôhim, the most frequently used word for God in the Old Testament.
In the paper which I had the honour of reading before the Victoria Institute in 1913, I gave my reasons for concluding that Jehovah is the correct pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton יְהֹוָה, YHVH, but that יָהּ, Yah, was not derived from it, but from the same root, יָהָ, הוהי, the same source as that of Zeus, Jove, Theos, Deus, etc., and that the meaning when first used was that of "Maker."

It is remarkable that both elements of יִהוָה should be in the singular number, that the name for God should be in the stative or passive form of the primitive noun, while יָהּ was originally active in meaning.

Does philology bring us here to see a state of things in that far-off time when men had come to regard God as the "Mighty One" indeed, but as indifferent to the sufferings, the sorrows, and the sins of man, and some great religious reformer had come forward with the good news that the "Mighty One" was the "Maker," and could not from His very nature be indifferent? There is no sign of belief in a plurality of gods in this, the oldest Revelation embodied in a composite name. The plurality lies in the later development, when, in spite of the very assertion of the unity, might, and ownership of the "Maker" in the name 'Eloah, men turned away from that Revelation, and fashioned out of their own imaginations such a plurality, using, strange to say, the very word containing the truth to express their error. We are on firm ground here from the teaching of philology itself.

It is legitimate to ask—indeed, necessary, for science is never a mere recording of facts—Have we any evidence as to when this name for God was developed? It seems to me we have. In the latter part of the name, as we saw, we have יָהּ. When this can be traced to the same source as that of Jehovah, Zeus, and Jove, etc., we are certified that the languages in which they occur were originally one. Have we not, then, in this name the record of a great religious crisis, when mankind was riven, as it has been so often since, by opposing spiritual forces; as when the Homoousians and the Homoeousians, which to superficial thinking represents the difference of a letter, but really represents the contents of a faith which can save the chief of sinners, and one which can save no one, were striving for the mastery? Or, may it have formed the centre of the preaching of Noah, that the "Mighty One" was the "Maker," and that men should turn to Him and live? We cannot with certainty tell; but this we do know, that the message was accepted so
completely that the words in which it was expressed became the accepted name of God. The plural form into which it developed is a standing evidence of fact that man has fallen, and ever tends to fall, but for the grace of God, from a purer to a lower conception of Him.

Then another element philology teaches us, apart from sentiment, namely, that language must be prepared to receive and conserve the Revelation, and not until the vast conception of "Being" as the source of all being and action had been conceived and expressed in human speech, could the later development of the knowledge of His manifold working, as we have it from Exodus to the end of Deuteronomy, be given. The sounds of the letters of Jehovah and Jah were ancient with an ancient meaning, the new meaning which had in the interval been developed was the meaning in the verb יְהֹוָה, "to be." This gives light to Exodus iii, 14; vi, 3.

Jehovah Himself takes the new meaning to express Himself; with that Revelation, and taking up all that lay in Genesis, He proceeds to reveal Himself in all that is recorded from Exodus to the end of Deuteronomy.

Philology now, by its confirmation of the truth of the Record, bids us interpret the further Revelation throughout the history of Israel and Judah. The evidence of philology confirms the truth of the narrative, and therefore the reality of the Revelation. The Book of the Law of Jehovah ruled the language, as it ought to have ruled the conduct, of the Chosen People right on to Malachi. Wherever the Hebrew language as distinct from Aramaic is used, the Pentateuch governs the whole, yet in such a way that one could not possibly put the Hebrew of, say, Ezekiel, Daniel, Ezra, the Chronicles, or Nehemiah into the Pentateuch without showing an incongruency which would at once be detected. What is said of the Pentateuch can with equal truth be said of, for example, Isaiah. Philology says of the supposition that the numerous Isaiahs, by theory scattered up and down the book of Isaiah, spoke in the Exile, is a sheer impossibility. They could not possibly have avoided the peculiarities of the language they and their contemporaries spoke. Their genius, supposing them to have existed then, would certainly have found expression, yet as certainly, not by using with a pathos and passion that even yet carry us away, the language so like that of a man who lived a hundred and twenty years before, hundreds of miles distant, and under vastly different conditions, so like that even those who were familiar
with them put them all in one book, but that of those among whom they found themselves. There is no truer dictum of criticism than that the prophet addressed himself primarily to those among whom he lived, and spoke therefore the contemporary language. I waive here the argument from style as not strictly in the sphere of philology, but the consummate ease with which every resource of the Hebrew of Isaiah's time is everywhere brought to bear on the subject in hand, is unique.

**DISCUSSION.**

The **CHAIRMAN** :-We have frequently had the Higher Criticism and its supposed results brought to the bar of theology, philosophy, archaeology, and history; and now we have had it brought to the bar of philology. The paper to which we have listened would probably be over the heads of many of us, for we should require more than a smattering of Hebrew to follow all its abstruse reasoning. One could only wish the writer had been present to answer a few questions which might be put to him.

The reference to the two words **JEHOVAH** and **ELOHIM** was of course particularly interesting. It will be well to remember that **JEHOVAH** is a proper name, but **Elohim** a common noun. We find this latter word not only used for the Divine Being but for other beings also. It is the more interesting to observe this because from these two words the Higher Criticism started on its career.

The word **Elohim** is used as many as 2500 times in the Old Testament Scriptures, sometimes with the article but more frequently without. In Genesis it occurs 216 times and only 19 with the article; in Exodus 138 times, and only 29 with the article; in Leviticus 53 times, and never with the article; in Deuteronomy 371 times, and only 5 times with the article—in 4 of which it is simply used for emphasis; in Joshua 73 times, and only 3 times with the article; in Judges 73 times, and only 15 with the article.

Now those who believe that inspired writers were under the guidance of the Spirit of God in regard to the words which they chose, cannot but think that there must have been some intention
in this different use of the word. I should like to call your attention to a few passages which I am sure will interest you. In Genesis, for instance, in the story of the Creation, and right on up to ch. v, Elohim is used without the article, and undoubtedly refers to the Almighty Creator; but in ch. v, verses 22 and 24, it is used for the first time with the article. It is very striking, verse 22, "And Enoch walked with the Elohim after he begat Methuselah . . . ." verse 24, "And Enoch walked with the Elohim, and he was not, for Elohim took him" (without the article). In ch. vi, 2, we read: "The sons of the Elohim saw the daughters of the Adam that they were fair . . . . ." Who were the sons of the Elohim? And who were the Elohim? Read verse 4: "The Nephilim (giants) were in the earth in those days (they were not there when the spies brought up their lying report about Canaan), and also after that, when the sons of the Elohim came in unto the daughters of the Adam and they bare children to them the same became the Gibborim which were of old, men of renown." Again let us ask who were the Nephilim, the Elohim, the Adam, and the Gibborim? Then in verse 9 we read of Noah, that he "was a just man and perfect in his generations, and Noah walked with the Elohim." And in verse 11, "The earth also was corrupt before the Elohim . . . . and Elohim looked upon the earth, and behold it was corrupt."

Now from these passages it does not appear that the two expressions "Elohim" and "the Elohim" were used to designate the same personalities. And this use is still more evident in Exodus xxii, 6: "Then his master shall bring him unto the Elohim" ("judges"). On the other hand, in verse 13, we read: "If a man lie not in wait, but the Elohim deliver him into his hand." But the verb is in the singular and the reference is undoubtedly to God. In ch. xxii, 8, again we read: "If the thief be not found, the master of the house shall be brought unto the Elohim" ("judges"—not God). In verse 9: "The cause of both parties shall be brought before the Elohim (judges) and whom Elohim (judges) shall condemn (verb in plural) he shall pay double."

So you will see that this word is used, not only for the Divine Being, but for other persons also. It is a nut for the Higher Criticism to crack when it cuts up the Old Testament into "J" and "E" ("P") documents. Now the only definition of the word that I know of when used of beings inferior to the Deity is given by us
our Lord, and is based upon Psalm lxxxii. In verses 6 and 7 we read: "I have said ye are Elohim, and all of you are sons of Elyon: but as Adam ye shall die, and as one of the Sarim ye shall fall." Our Lord quotes the first part of this verse in John x. Some years ago I listened to a lecture by a Unitarian scholar from Oxford, on the Epistle to the Ephesians, and I asked him afterwards whether we were to understand that he intended that our Lord never claimed to be Divine. He said "Yes, certainly." I said, "Surely in John x He makes that claim," and I referred him to verses 34-36. Of course Greek was not the language usually spoken by our Lord, but Aramaic or "Hebrew"; for "gods" we must therefore read "Elohim." Our Lord's argument is briefly this: "If He called them Elohim unto whom the word of Elohim came, do you mean to say that I blaspheme, I who am indeed the Son of Elohim, and thus so much above those who were merely persons unto whom the word of Elohim came?" Here then our Lord not only rebuts the accusation of blasphemy, but gives us also the only definition of the word "Elohim" that I know anywhere, and I think it is a satisfactory definition. They were persons "unto whom the word of the Lord came." Who they were as personalities in antediluvian times may still be a mystery, but in later times they were "judges."

I offer these remarks as bearing upon one point of the paper only, which is now open for discussion. I must ask every speaker to be as brief as possible.

Mr. M. L. Rouse, B.A., B.L.—The writer of the paper refers several times to the Semitic Indo-European Speech. The Bible—to take the Bible evidence first—after enumerating each family of Noah—Shem, Ham, and Japheth—distinctly says: These were their descendants "by their families, by their languages"; and in the case of the sons of Japheth it says: "By these were the isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands." In a paper which I had the honour to read here some twelve years ago, I showed that Hebrew was the first language of all. Why should the Indo-European be singled out? The languages were never all one, according to our investigations.

The lecturer's attempt to show a genitive in the Hebrew of Genesis is certainly a failure; for the i of Peniel belongs, not to the governed but to the governing word: it is not pāneh, face, Ēlī, of God, but pānīm, a plural word reduced to its construct form pēnī,
face of, and El, God. If Mr. Munro sees the ego of Greek and Latin, and even the kwr of Ethiopic imbedded in the Hebrew ōnōkhī (I), he will surely allow that the Chinese first personal pronoun ngo lies hidden there also; and to the Hebrew suffixes k, kah (masculine), and k, ki (feminine) for thy, he will perceive a strong relationship in the Egyptian suffix k for thy, and the Ojibway Indian kit for thy.

If languages outside the Semitic and Indo-European groups were investigated they would, I am sure, yield a multitude of resemblances to Hebrew just as the rest have—developed roots, inverted words, and words applied to different or even opposite uses, just such as we should expect to find through the confusion of tongues. (The changing of q or k into p is of course the result of that confusion; for no one now turns p into k or k into p, as little children often turn t into k.)

Professor Langhorne Orchard, M.A., B.Sc.:—I should take the meaning of Elohim to be the Mighty, specially applied to God as being supremely mighty, and it is applied in the Psalms to all strong angels. The idea is of strength. I think we ought to thank the author of this erudite and skilful paper very warmly for the light thrown upon the Pentateuch. I cannot see with the Author, in regard to the title of “Jehovah,” that the earliest conception and title of God by man would be Maker or Creator. I connect Jah with “I am that I am” in Exodus iii, 14, “I am,” meaning Jehovah. I think it should be translated as God tells Moses. I do not think there is in the word any idea of making or creating; I think it is rather connected with God’s being eternal, and therefore with His unchangeableness.

Rev. A. Graham-Barton:—There is considerable divergence of opinion in the educated world as to the first language, but I have a shrewd suspicion that the language spoken in Paradise was Hebrew. We may take history as we please, but we have to sum up the whole of the past in forming our calculations; and I think that God, who inspired Moses to give his Report, had a ripe language ready for him a thousand years at least after the first man. It is well to note that it would be at least a thousand years from the time when the first man appeared, even from a Biblical standpoint, to the time when Moses appeared, and when he wrote his history.
The Chairman:—As to the antiquity of the Hebrew language, I am surprised that neither in the paper nor in the discussion has any notice been taken of the oldest language of the Babylonian nation known as Sumerian; but how we can regard a Semitic language as existing before the Deluge and before the existence of Shem I do not know. That has always been a puzzle to me. But if the antediluvian language was Sumerian, or some other unknown tongue, then in the Hebrew we have translations of the language spoken in Eden and at other antediluvian times.

The meeting adjourned at 5.45.
590TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING.

HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, MAY 7TH, 1917,
AT 4.30 P.M.

THE REV. H. J. R. MARSTON, M.A., TOOK THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the preceding Meeting were read and confirmed.

The Secretary announced the election of Arthur K. Grimsdale, Esq.,
as an Associate of the Institute.

The Chairman said: It now becomes my duty, and is my pleasure, to
invite a very dear friend and distinguished thinker to read a paper
entitled "The Pre-Requisites of a Christian Philosophy." Dr. Whately
is a real and accepted master of this very difficult and rather abstruse
subject, and everything that he says deserves, and I have no doubt will
receive, the most careful attention.

THE PRE-REQUISITES OF A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

By the Rev. A. R. Whately, M.A., D.D.

A FEW years ago I had the privilege of reading a paper
before the Victoria Institute on "The Demand for a
Christian Philosophy." This present paper is, as
requested, a sort of sequel to it, and I hope to suggest briefly
what seems to me the orientation of mind required from the
Christian Philosopher if he is to do real justice to his subject-
matter. As it will be necessary to deal chiefly with the ideas
that point to the importance and possibility of such philosophy,
and to indicate how it should proceed, it might perhaps have
been as well if the title of this paper had contained the word
"Pre-suppositions" instead of "Pre-requisites." But the latter
word, on the other hand, includes the whole equipment neces-
sary, and this is not merely intellectual.

The justification of a Christian Philosophy and the exposition
of its fundamental axioms are aspects of the same task. Let us begin,
therefore, by answering the question, "What is Philosophy?" That
answer should justify Philosophy in the best and only true
way—by showing what it really is. And, at the same time, we
are inevitably led to discuss its connection with Religion.

Philosophy, in the restricted sense in which the term is now
applied, is nothing else than Thought carried as far as it will go
—Thought seeking for its own basis and its own limits. Those
who object to it as merely cloudy speculation that tries to
comprehend the incomprehensible are, in raising this objection, only doing what the philosopher does, namely, making an assertion about the boundaries of human knowledge. The main difference is that the philosopher makes his assertions with reflection, the objector without reflection. If he does reflect he becomes thereby a philosopher, however bad a one, and therefore cannot consistently attack philosophy as such. Philosophy, then, is simply Thought. We all reflect upon our naïve impressions, more or less, and the philosopher simply reflects upon this reflection. He thinks about Thought. If he were to announce the discovery that Thought—or Being, which is its object—could not as such be understood by reflecting upon it, he would—like Herbert Spencer—be making an assertion about that which he has declared unknowable.

So much for our first question about Philosophy. Now let us ask: "What is its Procedure?" Certainly, if it understands its quest, and walks with a firm tread, it will not proceed by vague surmise and nebulous hypothesis, but by careful analysis of our fundamental ideas; and the object of this analysis is the Unification of Thought. To understand is to bring ideas into relation with one another. To understand a writing in a foreign language is to be able to relate the particular combination of letters before us with the corresponding combinations in our own language, and with the particular objects and principles that they refer to.

Some of us come to find Philosophy a necessity of our being, because, without our asking, it has already begun its analytic work, its disintegration of our naïve assumptions, its scrutiny of our working-hypotheses: and we cannot allow it to stop halfway; we cannot allow it to leave us stranded on scepticism, or to show us mere distant visions of the higher level without guiding us up the path, both steep and winding, that leads there. I call it the higher level, for such it is for all who need to seek it. Simple religious faith, with or without Philosophy, is the highest level upon which our feet can rest; and reflection upon first principles has its dangers and weaknesses as well as its strength and resources. But at least it must be admitted that chaos and scepticism at the very root of our thoughts cannot be safely cured by an attempted return to the old naïveté: we must work through to the other side.

So this unification of which I have spoken is simply the re-ordering of our thoughts when the discrepancies and incoherences they contain become no longer latent and unconscious, but really threaten our faith in the ground of things. Perhaps
it is better to speak of a "deeper" rather than a "higher" level. The quest of this deeper intellectual foundation may not always be the result of pressure from within. Many men, I believe, who have done good work in Philosophy have—without this pressure—courted the disorganization for the sake of ultimate intellectual gain. The Moral Science Tripos has no doubt made, as well as attracted, philosophers. Let it not be assumed that this sense of intellectual necessity, however valuable, is a wholly indispensable qualification. But, looking at the matter broadly, I am sure that Philosophy rests on, and responds to, a radical need of cultured human society, and that without it, in any form, our principles would become dead dogmas and our watchwords shibboleths.

Some minds require to think closely and connectedly and to get back to first principles. The mental worlds of other people may hang together without that, but not theirs. It is no use telling them to settle their doubts by "common sense." That only means bluff. Common sense was given to us for our dealings in the common things of life, and not to intrude upon Philosophy any more than upon Geology or Physics.

Now let us ask our third question: "What is the Material of Philosophy and the nature of its task?" What is that range of ideas that it must order and unify? Clearly, the broadest and most comprehensive, such as Life, Spirit, Personality, Cause, the Universe, Matter, Necessity, Freedom, and so forth. Such ideas are full of difficulties and apparent contradictions when we begin to scrutinize them: for instance, there is the well-known antithesis of Freedom and Law; there are the apparently rival claims of Reason and Intuition, and of Soul and Body. And there are countless more, when we dig deeper.

All these terms clearly have a close bearing upon Religion. And here we can see how Philosophy, so far from properly resting on abstractions, has before it the task of abolishing them as abstractions: the task of uniting them together in their true unity. Theistic Philosophy has to maintain that mechanism without Will behind it is a meaningless abstraction: that so is Spirit or Will without Personality, as against various forms of quasi-Theism. Berkeley attacked the Materialists by seeking to prove that Matter is an empty fiction, and that Spirit is the sole reality. He partly failed, because he went too far, but he has shown the fallacy of confusing Matter with Material. If, instead of denying the reality of Matter, and regarding sensations per se as the stuff of material objects, he had set out to prove that Matter is but an abstract idea, real only as an element in our analysis of the
concrete visible world, he would have rendered a greater service.
But the main point is that, as he clearly saw, Religion does not
rest upon an abstract philosophy, but upon one that exposes
the emptiness of abstract ideas except in their proper sub­
ordination to those larger and higher ideas that involve them.

Philosophy, then, has to free us from abstractions, not to bind us
to them. It has to seek the concrete. Even the philosophy of
Hegel was devoted to that search, however unsuccessfully pursued.
But do we need to be freed from abstractions? Does not the
ordinary unsophisticated mind, whatever its failings, live and move
in a solid world and pay unreserved homage to hard fact? Now if
all minds were unsophisticated: if we all lived by plain common
sense on the one hand and simple faith on the other, there might
be no more to be said. But, as we have already seen, Philosophy
often enters at the back-door uninvited, and when it has entered,
we can never be the same as before. We try our old catch-words,
we work our working-hypotheses for all they are worth, and we
find that the old instruments break and bend against the new
material. So especially when questions arise about the truth of our
religious beliefs. Let us take one prominent example.

Paley, like many others, set out to prove that the world exhibits
many marks of design, and must therefore have an intelligent
Creator. This was a simple—hardly even philosophical—argu­
ment, and it has served—and in some form will no doubt continue
to serve—an important purpose as against various forms of un­
belief. But the controversy was bound to become more complex.
The Nineteenth Century saw the rise of Evolutionism, which
entered the human mind in Europe just as philosophical ideas
enter individual minds—by the back-door. By this I mean that
we are greatly mistaken when we speak of Evolution as a mere
theory, something that as it were presented itself definitely to
thinking men of the century for acceptance or rejection. It
was a deep-lying tendency of thought which made itself felt
when the time was ripe. The theory of Darwin was un­
doubtedly based on definite data, and very wide data indeed,
but even as a scientific proposition its discovery was due, surely
not by chance, to two independent investigators at the same
time. And it was preceded by the comprehensive philosophical
Evolutionism of Hegel.

Behind all the theories and investigations there was the great
movement of the human mind towards continuity. As we
become more conscious of the laws of our own minds, and the
dependence of our ideas upon one another, we are the more com­
pelled to demand an ordered universe, a universe which, however
little we know of it, is at least bound together by certain
great principles recognizable even by our finite minds.
Indeed, the Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century had gone
further than to proclaim the close reciprocity of Thought and
Being. Passing over Berkeley and Hume, let us note how Kant
explicitly maintained that the object must conform to the subject,
and also that the subject, the thinking mind, draws the multi­
plicity of objects into its own unity, the unity of self-conscious­
ness.
If this is a little too obscure and technical for the present
occasion, it will suffice to glance at the main point upon which,
as I think, it throws light. The doctrine of Evolution—taking
this term in a wide sense—entered by way of Philosophy, not
only by way of scientific investigation. It had become a
necessity of thought. It satisfied in part that demand for the
unity of the universe as known to us, a unity answering to that
unity of our own self-consciousness which, as Kant rightly
taught, is behind all our mental processes.
Well, this new doctrine had an inevitable effect upon the old
Teleological Argument, commonly known as the Argument from
Design. I need not pause to explain how it was criticized by
Kant himself, for we are dealing with a broad tendency of
thought rather than with individual thinkers. Clearly it was no
longer possible to rest upon the primâ facie evidence of design,
that is to say, the coincidence between the effects in Nature and
the effects visibly following from the efforts of human intelligence.
The weakness of Huxley's reply to Paley's celebrated argument
about the watch may even tend to blind us to the greatness of
the mental revolution which divided these two writers. But
indeed the very fact that the Evolutionists had their own way
of accounting for design made the Paleyan position, for the time
being at least, no longer so much a defence as a point to be
defended. It might be successfully defended, but it had to be
defended. Plenty of apparent designs are the result of chance,
and, given an indefinite material of variations, an indefinite time,
and the operation of a principle to eliminate the irrelevant and
obstructive elements, what need to postulate a directing Will?
It is true (let me remark parenthetically) that not Chance, but
Necessity, or Law, is the general watchword of the anti­
teleologists. But I believe it can be shown that, as against
intelligent free-will, blind Necessity and blind Chance are not
contradictories, but the same principle viewed from different
sides.
However, let us return to Philosophy. Let us note how much
more satisfying Evolutionism appears, than the old Paleyan, or Thomaskan, position. The latter bids us regard the Almighty as the supreme Mechanic. So far, quite allowably; for if skilful mechanism is an element in perfection, and if all perfections are summed up in God, then we must count it among His attributes. But if we rest in such a conception we place ourselves at a great disadvantage in face of Modern Thought—the Modern Thought, I mean, not only that is around us, but that stirs, whether we will or no, in our own breasts. A mechanic is alien from his material: he is not, except in a very relative sense, a creator. We have to pass beyond mechanism to that view of a God in Whom His universe lives and moves and has its being, the Creator Whose power dwells in the deepest roots of the being of His creatures—that modern view of God which so transcends mechanism that it almost seems to contradict it.

Most assuredly this revised Teleology, as I have just stated it, is itself one-sided. But it is at least philosophical, and it makes an appeal to the sense of continuity, the demand for an organically unified world of Thought and Being, from which we shall never escape.

We must, therefore, restate our doctrine of the Being and Attributes of God, so as to settle its relations with Modern Thought. A mere polemic against Modernism as such would at least be a confession that the old defences, if not the old expositions, are not sufficient. But a mere polemic is futile. It places us between the horns of a dilemma. If our polemic is unsympathetic, it cannot possibly show that Modernism does not meet deep-lying needs of our nature and answer to a really progressive movement of human mind—cannot show this because we do not try to penetrate into its true inwardness and appreciate its ideals. On the other hand, if sympathetic, it becomes in spirit modern itself—that is to say, liberal—and aims to adjust the old and the new together. But then it is practically transformed from mere polemic. In adjusting the old to the new, intelligently and adequately, it cannot but also adjust the new to the old. This need not mean mere compromise. True Evangelical Liberalism seeks, under the wholesome pressure of new ideas, not to tamper with the definiteness of its faith in a personal God and an historic revelation, but to find and intensify the focus of its faith. If it discards some old formulas, that is not because the enemy has captured outposts, but because an invigorated vitality has of itself shed the encumbrances.

We must, then, in this sense, restate our doctrine of God:
not confessionally, I mean, but intellectually. From what has been said it should now appear that the Argument from Design, or (to give it its positive character) the Doctrine of Design, needs such restatement.

For consider how the whole intellectual situation is transformed, even if we try to meet unbelieving Evolutionism with a direct attack. I do not refer to controversy that is primarily scientific. This must be unsatisfying, for, as I have tried to show, Evolutionism is more than a scientific theory.* But if we tackle it, as we ought to do, on the basis of its major premiss—its application—we shall find that we are plunged into the heart of Philosophy—that we are led into regions where, having gone so far, we cannot hold back without an arbitrary arrest of thought.

This is not to say that we have not a strong and clear position. Let us take stock of it as briefly as possible. We can reply that, whatever Science has or has not proved, it cannot in any case account, either for the origin of variations at large, or for the broad fact of a mutually adaptive universe. We can thus take our stand upon order, as an essential aspect of the universe: we can maintain that rationality is implied in a state of things that has issued in the production of rational beings, and that responds to their interpretative efforts. We can assert that “mechanism,” the very term that is used against Teleology, implies a mind behind it and a purpose in front. But our reply is different from that which prevailed against the old materialists. The old Design Argument was essentially cumulative. It dealt with the contrivances of Nature as separate events. Evolutionism reduced them all to one principle: in the hands of the materialist it was aimed at the major rather than the minor premiss of the Design argument. Apparent designs might be piled mountains high upon one another by the teleologist. It made no difference: the facts belonged to both theories alike; they were indeed all one great fact. The evolutionist could go even further than the old-fashioned theist, on the theist’s own principles: he could demand order and coherence, so bridging all possible interstices that the separate instances

* "That the different species were bred one from the other is not merely a deduction based on a few facts, for facts can be either disputed or interpreted differently, but a conception which imposes itself on our mind as the only acceptable one, as soon as we reject the doctrine of a supernatural act of creation." Delage and Goldsmith, *The Theories of Evolution*, p. 8.
became separate no longer, and the unity of the Divine action—for those who held it to be Divine—was vindicated beyond the dreams of the apologist.

But the modern theist's assertion of the rationality of Nature is essentially philosophical, and therefore links up, directly or indirectly, with the whole range of Philosophy. The simple empiricism of Paley's argument is left behind—I do not say wholly and forever, but certainly to be resumed only under new conditions and in a larger context of thought. The question of the one ordered universe, and whether or no we are obliged to think of it as rational at the core, and what this further implies as to personality, purpose, love, redemption, and revelation—all this takes us into a different region of thought.

When the Neo-Darwinian emphasizes the elimination of the unfit and the Neo-Lamarckian the direct effect of the environment upon the organism, it is obvious that, however we can meet them, we cannot meet them by any facile argument—any that has not indefinite implications in many directions. Even if the reply is scientific, this must surely be so. But I have tried to suggest that a merely scientific reply, even if possible, is unsatisfactory. The mind that must come to an understanding, if not of, at least with, first principles, will always ask itself if anti-theistic Evolutionism not merely happens to be untrue, but is unthinkable.

When the new theistic philosopher takes the place of the old apologist, he abandons the empirical argument from coincidence, expressed or implied by the other, I mean the coincidence between the products of Nature and the products of human art. Rather he sees in both the different stages of one great creative principle, which, as it produces man, so produces through man.

Certainly all depends upon the form Evolutionism takes. But that is most certainly not a mere question for science. Obviously the form harmonious with Christian Theism is that called Epigenesis, or the creation of the new on the basis of the old. That is not Evolution according to the etymology of the word, but it is Evolution in a sense that answers to that craving for the unification of thought to which I have already referred. Now it should certainly be clear that Epigenesis cannot be refuted by science. We may accept the Transformist doctrine of the origin of species; yet new species are none the less new. To assert the opposite—to affirm that Evolution is literally the unfolding of the previously existent—is not science but a particularly transcendental philosophy. This is the doctrine which Bergson describes by the formula "Tout est
"donné." And, as he justly points out, this formula applies even to the materialists, for, to them—virtually, if not admittedly—the true realities are mass and energy, not their subsequent combinations as such. But that an electron should be more real than a horse is surely a philosophical paradox, not a scientific. To the creationist this is not so; and that, not because he has found evidence of gaps in the geological evidences of Evolution—though he may find them—but because his universe has Mind behind it and a goal in front, and, in between, the presence of a Divine Love that is interested in all its creatures.

Metaphysics, in short, lies behind Evolution as a theory of origins—whether the scientific sceptic likes it or not. And it cannot therefore be met without Metaphysics,—whether the apologist likes it or not. Again, Metaphysics—or Philosophy—cannot possibly be only negative and defensive. All its denials are also affirmations, and affirmations that involve us in further affirmations indefinitely.

This is one side of what I have to say respecting the pre-requisites of a Christian Philosophy. Taken alone, it would be disheartening and also misleading. But it is not to be taken alone; and I hope, when we have briefly reviewed the ground we have reached, to conclude with a few words on the complementary truth.

Heraclitus and Parmenides stood for the two opposite sides of a truth which Plato and subsequent philosophers have endeavoured to discover in its completeness. The one said "All is flux"; the other, "All is one eternal and stable Reality." We have so far followed, as it were, the Heraclitean path. The old familiar saying, "Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis," here claims our attention, and claims it particularly in the second clause, which we must not, as so often, pass lightly over. We change in and with the times. We might try our best to be conservative—and there is a right way of so doing—but a mere resistance to new ideas because they cannot at once be fitted into old formulas—this means intellectual, and perhaps even spiritual, torpor. And in the long run the human mind does and will move—conservatives and progressives alike. In other words—to repeat what I have said more than once before—Philosophy enters at the back-door. Our modes of thinking change while we think: old ideas, once welded into the continuity of our thought, are left high and dry: a new sensitiveness to aspects of truth once unimpressive, develops unsuspected within us. If reflexion is but half-awakened, it
must awaken fully. We must meet the contemporary mind in the spirit that seeks to penetrate to its inwardness. We cannot merely attack Modernism, for to handle it effectually we must understand it, and to understand it is to be modern.

One supreme pre-requisite, therefore, of the Christian philosopher is that his mind should go forth to meet the mind of his age: that he should seek not only to keep up with it but even to help its advance: that he should take an interest in many of its problems, even apart from their bearings on religion: that in religion itself he should so hold on to the old that he need fear no flood of light from the new.

This last remark brings us to the other side of the matter: we pass from Heraclitus to Parmenides. So far our main point has been almost a commonplace, though I have tried to set it in a new light and to illustrate the law of mental progress by a definite example. But the complementary proposition provokes more subtle questions, because we are now faced with the need of adjusting it to the former. If we pursued this topic, it would of course take us over a wide field. All balanced religious thinkers admit, in some form or another, that there is a principle of stability to be set against the principle of flux. Even the strange theory that religion is concerned only with feeling implies that there are certain steady currents of feeling underlying the changes, and expressive of what is highest and most lasting in man. Others again—the rationalists in the strict sense—for whom religion is essentially based on philosophical ideas, would admit, or even press, the authority of certain supreme axioms of thought as eternal truths.

But we need more than all this. If religion is, as the Christian holds, not mere theory, or feeling, or moral rules, but the citizenship of the Heavenly City—a sphere of life and thought, a point of vantage from which the world can be surveyed with all its aims, its ideas, its meaning, in the light of God—if so, then the Christian must think as such. He must hold, with a grip that is not merely intellectual, but moral, spiritual, vital in the deepest biological sense, those great realities for which he lives. He must know those realities, and to know means not merely to feel but, in some measure, to understand.

But to understand means to bring into relation with our ideas in general. How can this be done if our creed is not to run the risk of being caught—as it is with so many—in the flux, and drifting helpless down stream, perhaps even to be wrecked in the cataract? Now to answer his question, let us begin with an affirmation which to me, I confess, is axiomatic. Religious
knowledge is, at the root, experiential. Even the religious man may not always recognize this; for even our moments of direct contact with reality so often elude us when we attempt introspection; but he must come to recognize it if he is to be a sound Christian philosopher. The truth that he must accept is that to know about God we must know God.

But this is not, of course, a complete answer to the question. How shall we bridge the gap between direct knowledge—acquaintance—and theoretical, or doctrinal, knowledge? How can we express the inwardness of our communion with God in human language, even to ourselves, and, if we cannot, how can we put it into the form of ideas and bring these ideas into connexion with our ideas in general?

We shall get near the answer to this question if we consider the relation of our thoughts to our feelings. Not that I admit that intuition is mere feeling, but we can call it so for the present. Now let us apply this statement of the problem directly to religion. What is the relation of our theology to our worship, of our doctrines about God to our sense of His reality, presence, and dealings with us? Surely the one feeds the other. Surely the worship of a Christian differs as such from that of a Pantheist. Surely the shocks our theology receive, however wholesome in the end, are at the time harmful to our devotions; and does not fresh light upon Divine truth make more vivid the Divine presence?

Then conversely. We shall probably agree that direct devotions stimulate devout thought. But I think that there is more than stimulation: that the personal revelation of God is not merely a glow of light before the eyes of the soul, but an illumination that penetrates within. It may not directly take the form of expressible thought, but it works as it were at the back of our thoughts; feeds and directs them, enlarges their scope, deepens their insight. It is not easy to express, in a form that will escape criticism, how our gains in worship become intellectual gains, but the main point should not be obscure. It is simply this: that however hard it may be to utilize God's self-revelation to our souls in the form of explicit teaching, or even clear thought, there is a passage to and fro between worship on the one hand and theology on the other. This does not, of course, make our theology infallible, but it tends towards truth—the truth that we need individuality for ourselves and for our work.

And this consideration both justifies doctrine and helps us to see how it may be kept living and fresh. If it be really true—and
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central truth—it must have unfathomable depths. The spiritual life that vitalizes it also needs it. Without it communion with God would dissolve into cosmic ecstasies or sentimental apostrophes of the Infinite. If a specific Atonement is a real fact, we must know the fact as a fact before we can enjoy it as an experience. If Christ indeed is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, we must know the position He holds in relation to man and to the Father.

This may be stated baldly, because we are assuming the essential truths of the Christian religion. And when we do accept it, there need be no timid obscurantism. God's truth is too vigorous, too vital, too rich in resources, to fear the fullest daylight and the strongest pressure. Only if nursed in the darkness does it shrivel and harden.

And, on the other hand, we do no true homage to its intellectual vitality if we cheapen or minimize its specific message: if we reduce it to generalities, however lofty: if we treat its doctrines as mere provisional accommodations to the mental attitude of cultured men at the moment.

If, then, the first great requisite for the effective pursuit of Christian Philosophy is a real appreciation of the movement of the human mind, the second—not second in importance—is the vital adherence to a specific and social confession of belief. Social, both because thought is social and because the Christian religion is social. A private creed is not only contrary to that Church fellowship without which there could be no Gospel of redeemed manhood, but also undervalues the relation between thought and intercourse. Definite thought, before we even intend to express it to others, shapes itself on the lines of common language. Expression, even to ourselves, is only, as it were, suppressed communication. Our very minds, in their inner workings, are not merely private, but elements in the social organism.

This will never, in its application to Christian truth, carry conviction, so long as the Creeds are regarded as mere petrified opinion. But let us be sure there can be no Gospel—in the true sense of that grossly abused word—without a creed. For a Gospel is the announcement of an historical occurrence, and as that occurrence is ex hypothesi a Divine and super historical, as well as an historical, event, then we must know its meaning in terms of theology.

Here we see the need of Biblical Study. There is no time, and on this occasion no need, to dwell on this point; but I do not wish to pass it over without allusion, lest it should seem to
be ignored. But of course the study of the Biblical revelation means not only careful reading, criticism, comparison of texts, but reflexion upon the substance of the message in itself. And the result of this reflexion, to my mind, helps us to see how Biblical Study and Philosophy can go hand in hand. For the great feature of the Bible, which gives it its impress of inspiration, is the convergence of different minds and different lines of teaching to the one centre.

Christian doctrine is, I think, essentially one rather than many, and it is just this organic unity which makes it a fruitful subject of philosophical understanding no less than of exegetical study. That is why, in the course of my remarks, I have passed freely between Theism pure and simple and the Christian Faith as a whole. The position maintained by Thomas Aquinas, and accepted officially—or quasi-officially—by the Roman Catholic Church, is that whereas distinctive Christian truth is a matter of special Divine revelation, the doctrine of God is accessible to the natural mind. There is no doubt an element of truth in this, but only an element. We cannot possibly draw this sharp line of demarcation between the doctrine of God and the doctrine of Christ. Theism as such is indefinitely enriched by Christianity. The new revelation of the Father which Christ brought extends into Philosophy itself—such is my conviction. The fact of the Incarnation is not an appendage to Philosophy. When once its truth is accepted, Theism without it is an unfinished structure, a broken pillar, an arrested process of thought. And as to all the main doctrines of the Christian creed, I am prepared to affirm that not one could be excluded without, at the last analysis, destroying the whole structure.

This is the unity of truth that Philosophy itself demands,—the unity of Christian belief within itself, of Christianity with Theism, of Theism with the broad principles of Thought in general. And by unity is here meant more than harmony, more than mutual complement: nothing less than organic wholeness and interpenetration. I cannot think that a really satisfactory Christian Philosophy can arise without at least the recognition of this as the ideal.

Yet we must not blink the fact that we are up against a most difficult question, made indeed more acute, on the face of it, by the claims here made for Christian Philosophy. What is the relation of general truth to historic truth? Is not the coming of Christ, whatever else it may be, an empirical occurrence, involved in an historical context, committed to certain conclusions
—however sure as historical conclusions—which depend on inductive study? Does that not dislocate this neat structure of unified truth, resting ultimately on direct experience, for which I have pleaded?

If there were the necessary time at our disposal I should be prepared to deal somewhat fully with this question. There are certain things to be said about it which, I think, remove the difficulty so far as it can be called an objection. And we need to face it, because it is used, and logically so, not only against Christian Philosophy but against Christianity. It is really one form of the fallacious assumption, which I have criticized before this Society on a previous occasion, that the eternal cannot enter time-conditions.

Here I would simply say that, in the form in which I have brought it forward to-day, it is, to my mind, a question which we must each settle for ourselves. The historical and critical liabilities of the Gospel are of much wider range in the opinion of some than in that of others: we dispute about "the seat of authority in religion." But however this may be, the man who has personal experience of access to God through Christ has actual empirical evidence of the truth of his faith which he can set against empirical difficulties raised by his studies. He is so far not hit by the objection, so often pressed, that inductive research is not to be prejudiced by mere a priori considerations. The faith of the devout Christian does not rest upon a mere a priori but upon experience. Evidence for evidence.

And when we have added that, if he is a thinker also, his experience is the germ of a new view of self and life and the universe, we have gone far to reconcile the elements of empiricism with those of a priori in the Christian creed.

In conclusion, one thing stands out when we view the subject as I have viewed it throughout this paper. Christian Philosophy, though it may be Metaphysics, is not speculation. It is the effort of certain minds to adjust themselves to the larger reality that looms around them, to save the very coherence of thought, to give to their faith the mastery of a mass of material, otherwise alien, instead of leaving it to be overwhelmed. "This is the victory that overcometh the world"—the world of rival thought as well as the world of rival pleasures and ambitions—"even our faith." Yet, if our Philosophy is truly Christian, it does not claim the exclusive privilege of a true ground of assurance. For it appeals to the same ultimate criterion as the faith of the simplest believer, the response of God Himself to the soul that diligently seeks Him.
DISCUSSION.

The Chairman: The Lecture to which we have listened, with profound attention and indisputable profit, is now open for discussion. I should prefer to reserve my remarks for a later stage, because I do not wish to abridge the discussion. The first three speakers may be allowed six minutes each, and subsequent speakers five minutes each.

Mr. M. L. Rouse, B.A., B.L.: I am heartily in agreement with the last part—and in a measure with the whole—of the paper, which I think admirable; but I do not see that we are bound to accept Evolution in order to perceive an ordered creation. I would say that Evolutionism is not necessary in order to prove that all created things live and move and have their being in God. Surely Reproduction is enough for that. If Paley found the watch, or a savage finds the watch, he says: "If this has been made by some wonderful being, with all its interlocking checks and balances, and so on, how much more wonderful must be the God who created that being!" Yes, but God has not only created a tree, but put in the tree a seed, which contains within itself another, and that another, for ten thousand generations. How would it then be with the watch if within it was another, and within that another, and so on? Here we see the living and moving of God in Creation, namely, in the reproducing, the putting of reproductive life into that first tree.

Again I would say—to take the old argument—you have one animal made for another, and that one for another, and so on. The tarantula kills the humming-bird, a kind of lizard kills and eats the tarantula, a larger bird kills and eats the lizard, and so on. These creatures were meant to be preyed upon by one another. I do not hold with the prevalent idea—which I do not believe prevails much among scientific people—that when death entered the world to Adam there was not previously death, or a devouring of one animal by another. We distinctly read in the Psalms that "the young lions seek their meat from God," and therefore that must have been the case from the beginning.

If ordinary creatures were allowed to multiply freely, they would fill the earth to the exclusion of others. It has been found
by calculation that two pheasants would, by their extraordinary multiplication, fill the earth in ten years; therefore it is an absolute necessity that one animal, say a fox, should devour the pheasant, and a larger animal, in turn, should kill the fox. Again take another view. Supposing the animals did not multiply to such a degree, yet if they die—and if they did not, the earth would again be over-full—then the earth would be filled with their carcasses, which would be exceedingly unwholesome for all other creatures. Therefore, there is in that again an adaptation of the creature to the universe. The contention that Evolutionism has discovered the mutual adaptation of the universe, is not necessarily true.

Colonel Alves: In my judgment, the two great pre-requisites of Philosophy are: Knowledge of all the relevant facts, and (if in possession of insufficient or wrong knowledge) a readiness to learn all truth and to renounce all error.

There are two ways of obtaining knowledge, Observation and Revelation. In worldly matters, whilst we should observe all that we can, we are largely dependent on revelation, which is the recorded result of the observations of others.

The same holds good in spiritual matters. The Apostle Paul teaches us that much may be learned of God through Nature, as does also the 19th Psalm. Nature is sufficient to reveal to us that “the wages of sin is [i.e., sin leads to] death”; but Nature cannot tell us that “the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.” For that, revelation is necessary; and such revelation we possess in those writings which we call the Bible.

We are dealing with pre-requisites. We cannot force men to receive truth; but we can make them responsible for willing ignorance. A most important pre-requisite is, to my mind, a knowledge of what man is, and what he is not. We can see that, like the lower animate creation, man is male and female, with animal instincts, affections, and passions. But between him and them, the lowest of him, and the highest of them, there is a great gulf fixed. Is this gulf spiritual and moral? or is it bodily and mental? I maintain that it is the latter, not the former.

In Genesis i, 20, 21, 24, 30, and ii, 19, we are told that the lower conscious beings are “living souls” [so in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin] as well as man in Genesis ii, 7. According to Genesis vii, 21, 22, man has, by nature, the same kind of energizing spirit as
have fowl, cattle, beast, and creeping thing. Again, Genesis i, 27 and v, 1, 2, clearly mark out the male as the direct image of God; and the Apostle Paul teaches the same thing (see I Cor. xi, 3 ff.). The same lesson is taught in Genesis iii, man’s weakness and disobedience shewing that the likeness to God was not spiritual and moral. That man is a fallen being, Nature tells us; and Nature tells us also that no degraded race is ever raised without help from outside. St. Paul, moreover, tells us that this depraved inward nature cannot be changed; and he, and the doctrine of the immaculate conception of our Lord, alike teach us that our depravity comes from our fathers, not from our mothers. Nature tells us, moreover, also that the body can be destroyed.

As regards humanity, I submit that the Christian Philosophy—in action—consists in the implanting of a new Divine, immortal, and incorruptible spirit of life, affecting his character here, but not entirely replacing the old tainted animal spirit until death, when the latter is destroyed for ever, and the new spirit in fullness, of which an earnest only is given here, joins the body in resurrection and makes it perfect and glorious through eternity.

I should like to move a vote of thanks to the reader of this paper which I did not discuss in detail, because I thought, the most important thing was a sound basis of Philosophy.

Dr. Schofield: On page 230 of the paper there is a remark that to know about God we must know God. We must accept the truth; and to know about God is to know God. This is not true in every sphere of knowledge; that is to say, to use the word “know” in the Bible sense, in which it is familiar to us. We may know a great deal about any subject or person without being personally acquainted with it or him. With regard to page 231, it seems to me that this personal knowledge of God is one which cannot very well be put into words—that it lies at the back of all our thoughts and influences, the whole character and attitude of our minds. This is, I think, profoundly true, and it is known to be true by everyone who has a personal knowledge of God.

In page 233 the position of Thomas Aquinas seems to be put quite rightly; and I would suggest that, after all, there is a sharp demarcation between Theism and Christianity, although Theism does not necessarily lead to Christianity. It does not foreshadow the atoning death and resurrection of Christ. Theism in the light of Christianity
means an unfinished product, but I do not think the word is foreign to those who accept a First Cause. God as Creator is a necessity of scientific thought; but Christianity is a Divine revelation, and must be revealed to the soul by the Spirit of God.

Rev. A. Graham-Barton: The question arises, "Can you have a Christian Philosophy?" I question very much, when you have to deal with the authorities of the Christian faith, upon which we very much depend, if you can in any way resort to system or even Creed. I think Philosophy stands out separately from some of the Christian truths, and faith or love are surely over and above the ken of any systematization. They are unthinkable, and to talk of a Philosophy of Christianity is to speak of something which must leave out many great central truths which are properly Christian. With regard to Philosophy, then, what is it but a searching after truth, the sense of reality which you cannot reach simply through Philosophy?

Prof. Langhorne Orchard, M.A., B.Sc.: May I be allowed to second the vote of thanks which has been moved to Dr. Whately for his exceptionally suggestive paper? The subject is, to my mind, one of the most fascinating that can engage human thought. To myself I confess there is no difficulty in accepting the term "Christian Philosophy." By it I should understand a philosophy which is coloured and permeated by Christianity. I am afraid I cannot quite concur in the definition of Philosophy on page 222. Philosophy is simply thought; the philosopher thinks about thought. But on the next page, page 223, Geology and Physics are mentioned as distinguished from Philosophy, which is considered as a science; but surely a man of science has thought, and I should myself prefer to look upon Philosophy as the study of first origins and first principles and causes. Science has to do with those things which are secondary: it investigates the flow and cause of various kinds of thought and of Divine attributes, whereas Philosophy concerns itself rather with the great ocean into which all the rivers of science flow, and which Philosophy itself explains.

With regard to Paley's argument, I confess that the mere fact that Evolution reduces all the separate cases of design in Nature to one principle does not at all seem to invalidate Paley's argument, but rather to strengthen it. The argument of Paley was directed
simply to shewing that the world of Nature had an intelligent Creator, and the argument of Theistic Evolution would rather tend to strengthen that. What does the Evolutionist mean by the principle of the elimination of the unfit? How is it that Nature knows what is unfit and can eliminate it? How is it that Nature is so constituted that it can discriminate between the fit and the unfit? Surely there is a purpose in the elimination of the unfit.

I am not an Evolutionist, but Theistic Evolutionism is rather on the side of Paley’s argument, than against it.

Most cordially do I concur with what the able author says on pages 232 and 233. The first great requisite for the effective pursuit of Christian Philosophy is a real appreciation of the movement of the human mind. He does not say a real agreement with the human mind, and I do not infer that he himself is an Evolutionist, but an appreciator. You must be able to appreciate the thought of the day. That is very important indeed, so as to be quite fair to it in your judgment. The second great requisite, as he well says, is the Creed. It is most important in the pursuit of the investigation of new truths that we should hold fast to the old ones, and not kick away the old rungs of the ladder up which we are climbing until we have proved the new ones to be strong.

Mr. E. Walter Maunder, F.R.A.S., said that there was one point that had come up to which he would like to refer, viz. the meaning of the term “Evolution.” The word covered, in common use, a great number of different ideas, and it was well that they should be kept distinct. We had a paper some time ago by Professor Fowler on “Stellar Evolution,” in which it was clear that “Evolution” meant to him and to other astronomers simply the changes in condition and spectrum of a star, consequent upon its decline of temperature. These were parallel to the changes seen in a poker that had been made white hot and then left to cool. The word “Evolution” was used in quite a different sense in speaking of the evolution of a machine—say a bicycle. A hundred years ago it was the fashion for young men to ride upon two wheels with a bar between them—a dandy horse; and little by little that very simple machine was improved until the invention of the motor-bicycle, which was far more powerful and convenient. That development was referred to as the “evolution” of the motor-bicycle. There was also organic or Darwinian Evolution, by which we were given to understand that
once upon a time there were numbers of living cells of the utmost simplicity of structure floating in the ocean. Some of them changed in form and became more and more complex, and so through vast periods of time the forms of life changed in many directions until there resulted the present infinite variety of the living population of this planet. This was a third form of Evolution, which had hardly a single point in common with the other two, and many others might be mentioned if time would permit. Really the only idea common to all the meanings attached to the term “Evolution” was that of change of form in an ordered sequence. We ought to be more precise in our use of a word which is capable of so many applications.

The Chairman: It now becomes my duty to sum up the applications to which I feel I may venture to give expression before asking Dr. Whately to reply, by putting from the Chair—with my very cordial support—the vote of thanks which has been moved by Colonel Alves and seconded by Professor Orchard. I may say that I concur with Dr. Whately in the paper, and thoroughly agree with the rights of a Christian Philosophy. I think that, for an Institute such as we claim to be, established on Philosophy, it would be an act of suicide, or committing what the Japanese call an “act of despatch,” to do anything but welcome such a paper as we have had this afternoon from a distinguished and acknowledged master of Christian Philosophy. Further, I concur in the delineation of the subject which Dr. Whately expressed: “Philosophy is a radical need of cultured human society”; that is to say, he admits that as men grow together in the progress of social change, they are driven back upon the necessity of finding justification in their own reason and common sense, in the things they believe, and why they do or do not do, or prohibit, others from doing, certain things, or urge upon others the necessity of doing other things.

The world looks to teachers, and the teachers look to philosophers. There is really no difference between Socrates and Solomon. The difference lies in the Divine inspiration which rested upon their message; but the men were moved by human impulses, and we claim that just because Philosophy is a real, a human asset, a human necessity, so society must smile upon every genuine philosopher. You must remember St. Peter’s great dictum when he
took Cornelius by the hand, and said: "Stand up, I also am a
man." Christianity must find a place for human Philosophy. When St. Paul says: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things," he looks into the categories of Christian Philosophy.

The real crux lies in adjusting the relations between Philosophy and Christianity. I think we are fortunate in possessing a sober, safe, and competent guide in Dr. Whately; and although, as he himself confesses, it is not possible for us to lay down what Lord Beaconsfield called "a scientific frontier," or succeed in finding a "scientific frontier," we are sure there is a scientific frontier which is within the realms of that great Governor of all things, Who is known to us, not only as our Judge and Redeemer, but also as the Creator, Whose very last intention it must be that His rational creatures should find their reason playing them false when exercised upon the objects around them, and the consciousness of that inner right to think which is one of the most priceless prerogatives of humanity. With these words I beg to offer to you the vote of thanks to Dr. Whately.

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

LECTURER'S REPLY.

Dr. Whately: I have to thank Mr. Marston for his remarks, which have their source in his own kind feeling, and also I much appreciate those of the mover and seconder of the Resolution, and the way it has been received. I certainly think the discussion has been full of interesting matter, and it is only necessary for me to touch upon certain points which have direct reference to the paper. As to whether Evolution is necessary for continuity of thought, which is in close connection with what Mr. Maunder said as to being clear about what we mean by Evolution. Whatever we may say about Reproduction, the fact remains that there are changes and divergences. It is that which raises the philosophical question of Evolution; and what I said might be very much more worked out, but it was impossible so to argue it as to give definite expression to all that is in the minds of many of us.
Let me put it in this way. The mind that has been laid hold of by the philosophical tendency of the present day does seek to see God as—to use the now familiar word—"immanent," and aims to assign to Him as close a connection with His Universe as the old simple believers always assigned to Him, but to carry it out to its full conclusion. When once one has that conception of God, and of all things as having their being in God—of Him as the Creator and Sustainer of His creatures—one must then have some doctrine of the Universe which presents it to one's mind as a unity answering to one's sense of the unity of the Divine Being with it. That is really my point. It is not solely a matter of argument, but rather of an intellectual atmosphere in which Evolution in some form or other presses itself upon the mind of the Theist.

Nothing has been said about Epigenesis, and I think this links Creation and Evolution. Professor Ward's lectures are a great classical work upon the subject. Then I do not think we can regard God as performing a great many separate acts of will, as though He had to think out separate problems separately. That does not coincide with our idea of the Divine Mind. Allusion has been made to what I said about a mutually adaptive Universe. I was not thinking of any particular scientific theories. I emphasized the broad fact of a mutually adaptive Universe. That is where it touches Philosophy,—when the many facts become one broad fact. I cannot agree that Christianity is cut off from Philosophy because it is a matter of Divine revelation. The Christian Gospel has to be expressed in human words which involve no end of pre-suppositions. It does not mean that we have to systematize the ideas of faith and love, but rather to bring our thoughts about God and Christianity into relation with our other thoughts. That is all Philosophy means. I think it was Professor Orchard who criticized my definition of Philosophy with reference to first principles. But we must get back to the roots of thought in order to discover what are the facts of reality upon which we first lay hold. It is true that the scientist thinks about thought, but the philosopher thinks about thought as such, and the first principles of all thought and being.

The Meeting adjourned at 6.5 p.m.
THE EMPHASIS OF ST. LUKE.

A STUDY.

By Lieut.-Colonel G. Mackinlay, late R.A.

CONSIDERED simply as literary productions, the writings of St. Luke in his Gospel, and in the Acts (Luke i, 3, Acts i, 1), are very attractive.

The charm of his language has long been recognized; even Renan pronounced the Third Gospel to be the most beautiful book that has ever been written. His historical groupings are realistic and harmonious; his style is classical, resembling that of Thucydides.

In recent years systematic and scientific archaeological research by Professor Sir William Ramsay and others has produced many long-buried evidences, which bear incontestable witness to our author’s marvellous historical accuracy in the whole of the Acts and in part of his Gospel; his smallest details have been found to be true to life in all cases in which verification was possible.

The arrangement of the central chapters of his Gospel, however, has long been a puzzle to the historian, and the more so because of his special statement at the beginning that he writes “in order” (i, 3).

But in this study it will be shewn that these chapters are arranged in a most orderly and methodical manner, and that the chronology is accurate; and as a further and
more important result it will be demonstrated (it is trusted) that this inspired evangelist lays greater stress upon the glorious spiritual truths which he proclaims, than has previously been supposed to be the case.

St. Luke's two books are linked together in many ways; at the end of his Gospel he quotes the words of our Risen Lord: "Thus it is written, that the Christ should suffer, and rise again from the dead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in His Name unto all the nations, beginning from Jerusalem" (xxiv, 46-47). The first half of this paragraph epitomises the climax to which all the Gospel of Luke leads up—the Death and Resurrection of our Lord; the second half of the paragraph sums up the purport of the Acts, in which Christ Crucified and Risen is the constant theme preached far and wide to the nations of the earth. Luke has thus happily chosen the subjects for his two books, which our Lord Himself had joined together in one sentence.

Luke uses many skilful devices to secure the attention of his reader. One of his chief methods is to employ triple iteration in order to give great emphasis to some important subject. We shall confine ourselves in this paper to the consideration of some examples of this habit.

Threefold repetition is occasionally employed in Scripture for this purpose; for instance, the three denials of Peter, told by all the Evangelists, emphasize the greatness of his fall; the three questions of our risen Lord to that Apostle, asking him if he loved his Master, shew a depth of faithful, yet gracious rebuke (John xxi, 15-17); and the thrice-repeated prayer of Paul for the removal of the thorn in the flesh (2 Corinthians, xii, 8), demonstrates the earnestness of his pleading. But it is in the writings of St. Luke that we find the greatest use of this method of giving emphasis. Each triplication is generally easy to recognize, and its object is generally evident at once; but in one case, at least, its existence is not apparent without some little study; we must not be astonished that it is so, because cryptic methods and omissions, without explanation or remark, were not uncommon among the ancients. For instance, hidden anagrams were at times embedded in the poems of antiquity, giving the name of the writer, and other information. They were probably employed in order to provide proof of the true authorship, in case it were disputed at some subsequent date, or to please a patron, to whom alone the secret may have been entrusted. A most striking example of such cryptic writing has recently been discovered by the patient skill of
Professor D. S. Margoliouth, D.Litt., in the Iliad and in the Odyssey, which both contain two-letter anagrams in iambic verse, giving the name of Homer as author of each poem; they also contain a dedicatory prayer, and in one case a date.*

An interesting fact about the Homeric anagrams is the hint of their existence furnished by the inevitable presence of some words, which are not so appropriate as those used elsewhere by this poet; thus, the very first word in the Iliad μῆνιν, anger, is not nearly so suitable as κόσμος, glory, which has been suggested instead of it; but this inauspicious word μῆνιν has evidently been employed because it furnishes two of the letters required for Homer's name in the anagram.

Cryptic writings occur in Scripture, as for instance in the book of Revelation. Many puzzling omissions are to be found in other parts; the name of God does not appear in the book of Esther, except in acrostic form. There are omissions in all the synoptic Gospels, of the interval of time, about six months, between the end of the Temptation and our Lord's return to Galilee, when John was imprisoned; the account of the raising of Lazarus is also omitted by all the first three Evangelists; we should know nothing of these events, except for John (i, 29–iv, 54, xi, 1–44). The Gospel of Luke contains at least two other important omissions without remark, the most noticeable being the well-known "Great Omission," between verses 17 and 18 of Luke ix, of all the events related in Mark vi, 45–viii, 26, during a period of about six months.

This being so, we must not be surprised if every Lukan tripli­cation cannot be discovered at once; we must not hastily deny its existence, because its components are not always close together, or even if there is a retrogression in narrative; and we must not expect our Evangelist to point out plainly what he has done. A good writer, especially among the ancients, not infrequently leaves his meaning in some obscurity, so that a little thought and trouble must be expended by the reader in finding out the meaning, which, when once grasped, is thus impressed upon the attention and memory. This is certainly true of the Scriptural writers, whose full meanings are not to be found by the casual reader, but only by him who ponders carefully and prayerfully.

Triplications abound in the Gospel of Luke and in the Acts,

but we shall only consider a few of those in the second book, which we may compare with those in the first.

The scope of the Acts may be said to comprise two main subjects:—

1. The proclamation of a Person of the Holy Trinity.
   (a) The Risen Christ.
   (b) The Holy Spirit.

2. The Work of witnessing to Christ Crucified and Risen, performed by Spirit-filled men.

1 (a). The proclamation of the Risen Christ is enforced by a triplication, and also by numerous statements.

1 (b). The proclamation of the Holy Spirit is emphasized by two important triplications, supported by other minor ones, and by many allusions.

2. The work of witnessing is brought prominently forward by two important triplications, supported by several others, and also by a mass of historical records.

The emphasis of the whole book is therefore divided.

Let us briefly consider these five principal triplications in the Acts; see Table I (in which the necessary Scripture references will be found).

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<td>The Risen Christ</td>
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<td>Introductory chapters.</td>
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<td>ii, 32.</td>
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<td>ii, 36.</td>
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<td>The Holy Spirit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>i, 2.</td>
<td>Central chapters.</td>
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<td>Proclamation of Two Persons of the</td>
<td></td>
<td>l, 4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holy Trinity.</td>
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<td>i, 5, 8.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ii, 16-21.</td>
<td>Central and later chapters.</td>
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<td>ii, 23.</td>
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<td>ii, 34-39.</td>
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<td>The Work performed by</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>x, 1-48.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter's commission and his</td>
<td></td>
<td>xi, 1-18.</td>
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<td>obedience.</td>
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<td>xv, 1-29.</td>
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<tr>
<td>performed by Spirit-filled men</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>lx, 1-22.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(witnessing).</td>
<td></td>
<td>xxii, 4-21.</td>
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<td>xxvi, 9-20.</td>
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The first triplication (No. 1) which we investigate draws attention to the first of the above main subjects, and emphatically proclaims "This Jesus," crucified by the Jews, raised up
from the dead by God, received up into heaven, and coming again, as stated by the angelic messengers at the Ascension, and by Peter on the day of Pentecost. The parts of this triplication are connected with each other by the use of the Greek words ὁμοιούμενος ὡς Ἰησοῦς in each (the accusative case being used in the last two passages), an expression occurring nowhere else in the Acts. This triple iteration forms a fitting prelude to the Work of witnessing to Jew and Gentile, then about to begin.

In the Revised Version the same term "This Jesus" is used in each case; uniformity has also been observed in several, at least, of the other European translations, e.g., in French, Spanish, German, and Dutch.

But the existence of this beautiful triplication is not apparent to those who only read the Authorized English Version, because uniformity has not been observed in it; the same Greek expression being differently translated each time; thus in the first passage it is rendered "This same Jesus," in the second it is "This Jesus," while in the last it is "That same Jesus."

The coming of the Holy Spirit is emphatically proclaimed by two principal triplications, the first of them (No. 2) is entirely contained in the very brief record of the deeds and words of our Risen Lord in the opening verses of the Acts. Luke thus takes the opportunity of the departure of One Person of the Holy Trinity to draw emphatic attention to the coming of the Third Person of the Godhead. Luke tells us, in this triplication, firstly, that in the past our Lord had given commandment unto His Apostles through the Holy Spirit; secondly, that our Risen Lord then ordered His disciples to wait at Jerusalem for the Promise of the Father; and, lastly, that He prophesied that in the near future they would be baptized in, and receive power from, the Holy Ghost.

Just after the gift of the Promise of the Father, on the very same day of Pentecost, Luke records a triplication (No. 3) emphatically announcing that the Holy Spirit had indeed come. We are told that Peter quoted at the time Joel ii, 28–32, given in the past, referring to the pouring out of the Spirit; then he appealed to the spiritual manifestation which the people saw and heard; and lastly he told his hearers to repent and be baptized, and "Ye shall receive," he said, "the gift of the Holy Ghost." Past, present, and future were again alluded to in this emphatic proclamation of the descent of the Holy Spirit. There are also other triplications in the Acts, still further emphasizing the influence of the Third Person of the Trinity, but we have not space to allude to them.
We now proceed to consider briefly the second main subject in the Acts: the Work of witnessing to Christ Crucified and Risen, by Spirit-filled men, chiefly by Peter and Paul.

A triplicate account is recorded of the Divine commission given to each of these selected agents. Emphatic attention is thus drawn to the subject which fills the greater part of the Acts.

The commission to St. Peter to preach the Gospel to the heathen Cornelius and his household, together with the Apostle’s compliance, is emphasized by being told three times (No. 4), and the importance of this triplication is further reinforced by a minor one (twice recorded) of the sheet being let down three times from heaven (x, 11–16; xi, 5–10), which doubtless served to impress the command very deeply on Peter himself.

The commissioning of St. Paul to proclaim the Gospel, and his obedience to the command, are also emphasized by threefold repetition (No. 5). The importance of this triplication is also reinforced by a minor one, which Luke records, of the blindness of the Apostle for three days (ix, 9); this affliction doubtless served to impress the command very deeply on Paul himself.

It is true that the components of these important triplications are separated from each other, but that fact does not militate against the emphasis given by triple repetition. Some may think that each account of these two events comes naturally in the main narrative; but if Luke had only recorded the commission to Peter once and to Paul once, he would have had room in the Acts for further interesting historical information, which he must certainly have had at his disposal. This plan, however, he did not adopt, doubtless because he wished to concentrate attention on the commissioning of Peter and Paul and on their obedience.

There are several other triplications in the Acts emphasizing the Work of witnessing, but we shall not consider them.

Turning now to the Gospel of St. Luke, we find a general correspondence with the arrangement in the Acts; for in both of them there is one set of triplications which proclaims a Divine Person (or Persons) of the Holy Trinity, and another set, which emphasizes the performance of a grand Work.

In the Acts, as we have seen, both Christ and the Holy Spirit are proclaimed; in the Gospel we shall find that only our Saviour is emphatically announced.

In the Acts, the Work of witnessing by the Spirit-filled Peter and Paul, representatives of all preachers of the Gospel, is emphasized by the triple repetition of the stories of their com-
missioning; in the Gospel we shall find that only the Atoning Work of the Lord Jesus is enforced by similar means.

There is thus far greater unity of design in the arrangement of the triplications in the Gospel of Luke than in the Acts, the emphasis being all concentrated upon the Person and Work of the Lord Jesus Christ.

We now proceed to consider the triplications in the Gospel of Luke. See Table II (in which the necessary Scripture references will be found).

We begin with an important triplication (No.1), in which our Evangelist records the satisfaction of God the Father with His Son, expressed at three striking epochs in the Ministry, widely separated from each other. On the first occasion, at our Lord's Baptism, Luke records that “A voice came out of heaven, Thou art My beloved Son; in Thee I am well pleased,” the Holy Spirit descending in a bodily form as a dove upon Him at the time. Secondly, at the Transfiguration, “A voice came out of the cloud, saying, This is My Son, My Chosen.” And, thirdly, at the very end of the Ministry, the Father, in the Parable of the wicked husbandmen, said, “I will send My beloved Son,” words which undoubtedly indicated our Lord, as the One sent by the Father (Luke xx, 19).

It is noticeable that in each of these three instances the subject of Death is closely linked with the words of Divine approbation; for Baptism figures Death and Resurrection (Rom. vi, 4); the subject of converse at the Transfiguration was the coming decease of our Lord at Jerusalem (Luke ix, 31); and the wicked husbandmen, in the Parable, cast forth the Son out of the vineyard and killed Him (xx, 15).

We may notice a growing clearness in these references to Death as that great event draws nearer: in the first case it is only referred to in type in Baptism; in the second case it is called exodus, which means going out or departure. Hence decease or death is only indicated in a somewhat indirect manner; but in the last instance the Son is stated, in the plainest terms, to be killed.

The next triplication (No. 2), in which our Lord proclaimed Himself to the Jews as the Messiah, may be regarded as complementary to the first, though in fearful contrast to it; for the Jews as a body shewed the bitterest antagonism to recognizing our Lord as the Son of God.

This triplication is all contained in the first five and a half, or introductory chapters, of the Gospel. On the first occasion, at Nazareth, when our Lord quoted the prophecy of Isaiah lxi,
### Table II.—Triplications in the Gospel of St. Luke.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects of Triplications</th>
<th>Ref. Nos.</th>
<th>Reference texts</th>
<th>Where recorded</th>
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<tr>
<td>By God the Father</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>i, 1-xxi, 38.</td>
<td>Introductory and central chapters.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>i, 1-xxi, 38.</td>
<td>Introductory chapters.</td>
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<td>Proclamation of our Lord as the Messiah.</td>
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<td>By Himself...</td>
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<td>v, 18-21.</td>
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<td>vi, 1-11.</td>
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<td>Luke (A),</td>
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<td>vi, 20-xxi, 38.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Three long narratives.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>vi, 20-x, 42.</td>
<td>Central</td>
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<td></td>
<td>xi, 1-xiv, 24.</td>
<td>chapters.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>xiv, 25-xxi, 38</td>
<td>(Looking forward to the Work.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A triplication of triplications of our Lord's Death.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>See No. 7.</td>
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<td>No. 9.</td>
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<td>No. 11.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A triplication of triplications (doctrinal).</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No. 8.</td>
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<td>No. 10.</td>
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<td>No. 12.</td>
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<td>Only ones ...</td>
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<td>vii, 12-15.</td>
<td>Luke (A),</td>
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<td>viii, 43, 54, 55</td>
<td>vi, 20-x, 42.</td>
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<td>ix, 38, 42.</td>
<td>Central</td>
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<td>chapters.</td>
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<td>(Looking forward to the Work.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prophecies of our Lord's Death.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>ix, 22.</td>
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<td>ix, 31.</td>
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<td>ix, 44.</td>
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<td>vii, 57, 58.</td>
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<td>ix, 59, 60.</td>
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<td>ix, 61, 62.</td>
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<td>Prophecies of our Lord's Death.</td>
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<td>ix, 57, 58.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(Looking forward to the Work.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hesitating ones (doctrinal).</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>xii, 29, 30.</td>
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<td>xii, 32.</td>
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1, 2, about Himself, and blessing to the Gentiles, His hearers endeavoured to kill Him. Our Lord's next demonstration of His Divine power in forgiving a man's sins was met by the impious protest of the Scribes and Pharisees that He was blaspheming. As they said, "Who can forgive sins, but God alone?" they evidently understood the greatness of His claim (Exodus xxxiv, 6, 7). On the third occasion our Saviour declared Himself to be the Lord of the Sabbath; His hearers well knew that this was an assertion of His Godhead, because the Sabbath belongs to Jehovah (Exodus xx, 10). Again he encountered intense opposition (Luke vi, 11).

It will be noticed that these two triplications, proclaiming the Lord Jesus, correspond to the three at the beginning of the Acts, which announce two of the Divine Persons of the Holy Trinity.

We now proceed to demonstrate the existence of the most important triplication (No. 3) in the Gospel of Luke, which powerfully emphasizes the grand Work which our Lord came to do—to die upon the Cross for our sins.

In reading through the synoptic Gospels we are struck by the fact that the arrival at Bethany (Luke x, 38, c. with John xii, 1), toward the close of the last journey to Jerusalem (Luke ix, 51), is told at less than half-way through the Gospel of Luke; but the same point is not reached in the other two Gospels until two-thirds of each have been read through. It is, however, evidently the same arrival at Bethany or its neighbourhood which is recorded, because the events which preceded it are told in the same order by all three Evangelists.

But in Luke xix, 29, an arrival at Bethphage and Bethany is mentioned; the context after this passage agrees exactly with the records after the corresponding accounts in the other synoptists. Hence we must conclude, in this case also, that the same arrival is referred to by all three Evangelists.

Consequently Luke x, 38, and xix, 29, must both tell of the same arrival. If we suppose the long intervening passage between these two texts to be cut out pro tem. we should find that the arrival at Bethany would then come at two-thirds of the way through this Gospel also. The thought at once occurs that a retrogression must have been made; this supposition is fully confirmed by further evidence.

Let us now consider the chapters between these two accounts of the same arrival. At first sight they look like historical confusion, and it is generally supposed that chronological order has been quite given up, some think for the sake
of teaching a spiritual truth, but what that truth may be is not generally agreed. Other explanations have been given, as, for instance, that Luke describes, throughout this long passage, nothing but the last journey; but this explanation will not bear investigation. The arrangement of these chapters has hitherto been an unsolved puzzle, all the greater because Luke distinctly states in his opening sentence that he writes "in order" (i, 3).

We noticed that the employment of the awkward word µίσσα at the beginning of the Iliad, so unlike Homer's usual diction, gave a clue to the discovery of his hidden anagram. Is it not likely, therefore, that the departure of Luke from his usual method of ordinary historical narrative may also furnish a clue to some cryptic plan which our Evangelist may have employed?

If we can find that these chapters contain two historical retrogressions, making, with the account given before the end of chapter x, three historical narratives, which all include a common period, then we shall find that orderly chronology is maintained, and that Luke has arranged his materials in his characteristic fashion, as in the Acts, to give great emphasis, by threefold repetition, to the prominent themes of his Gospel—the Death and Resurrection of our Lord.

We now proceed to adduce a few of the many evidences of the existence of the three parallel narratives.

We find when reading Luke xi and xii that the chapters contain very much of the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew v-vii); Luke vi, 20-49, also contains many quotations from it. In fact, these two passages taken together contain practically the whole of the Lukian reproductions of the Matthäan discourse (91.5 p.c. of the verses); the remainder (8.5 p.c.) consists of several short sentences recorded by Luke as spoken at other times; these may well have been uttered, more than once, by our Lord. Hence it appears that Luke has split up the Matthäan Sermon into two parts; he has placed one fragment in chapters xi and xii, and the other in chapter vi. In other words, there appears to be a retrogression at Luke xi, 1, to the time of Luke vi. This supposition is supported by many considerations; for instance, Luke vi, 20-49, was spoken at summer time, because ears of corn had just been plucked (vi, 1); consistently with this fact we have references in this passage to the products of summer, to fruit, figs and grapes (vi, 43, 44). Luke xii also contains references to products of the same season, to fruits, corn, lilies, and grass (16-19, 24-28). Hence we conclude that the second Lukian account of the Sermon was spoken at the same season of the year. Now there was no summer in the Ministry
after the start for the last journey (ix, 51) in the last winter; hence any reference to a summer in a subsequent chapter must involve a retrogression, in this case to the time of the Sermon on the Mount.

We find this supposition of retrogression greatly strengthened by the records of the succeeding events and discourses, which come in the same chronological order after each Lukan part of the Sermon; for instance, a Parable on sowing (xiii, 19) comes after the second Lukan fragment, just as a Parable on sowing (viii, 4–15) came after the first Lukan part of the Sermon. These Parables were both spoken at the same time.*

Other events in the two Lukan narratives are also arranged in the same order, e.g., the start for the last journey to Jerusalem (ix, 51, 52, and xiii, 22); and the discourse with the man who wished to know what to do to inherit eternal life (x, 25–37; xiii, 23–30; c. with Matthew xix, 16–30; Mark x, 17–31). The Parable of the great supper at the end of this second Lukan narrative (xiv, 16–24) contains our Lord's teaching about His coming judgments on the Jews, and also the call of the Gentiles; these truths are elsewhere only recorded as spoken at the very end of the Ministry, as, for instance, in the cognate Parables of the wicked husbandmen, and the marriage of the king's son (Matthew xxi, 33–45; Mark xii, 1–12; Luke xx, 9–19; Matthew xxii, 1–14). Hence we conclude that Luke has placed the Parable of the great supper in its correct chronological position, and that all the material in his second narrative is arranged in correct chronological sequence.

At Luke xiv, 25, we come to another retrogression, to a time about a week before the Transfiguration, not so far back as before. This second recommencement is indicated by the quotation of our Lord's saying about cross-bearing, in xiv, 27, which also occurs, in practically the same words (ix, 23), a few days before the account of the vision on the Holy Mount in the first Lukan narrative (ix, 28–36). We infer, therefore, that Luke xiv, 25 (the beginning of the sentence which contains xiv, 27), goes back to a time just before the Transfiguration. We are confirmed in this supposition, because, from thence onwards, this third narrative also progresses in regular chronological order. Soon afterwards comes a fragment of the discourse about a child and humility, etc. (xvii, 1–6); the remainder of our Lord's teaching on

* The Greek Testament. Notes on Matthew xiii, 1, and Mark iv, 35 (Dean Alford).
this subject is to be found in the first Lukan narrative (ix, 46–50), just after the Transfiguration. That these sentences really belong together is proved by the fact, that if both are combined, we have practically the full discourse on the same subject to be found in Matthew xvii, 20, 24, xviii, 1–7, 15, 21, 22, and Mark ix, 33–42, in the same chronological position. Thus we have another interesting example of a discourse divided into halves by Luke each part being placed in a distinct narrative. It may be that he has done this in order to let his readers know that he had made separate parallel narratives.

The start for the last journey is likewise recorded in the third narrative (xvii, 11), and also a considerable part of the discourse with the man who wished to know how to inherit eternal life (xviii, 18–30); this conversation is thus split up by Luke into no less than three parts, each narrative containing a fragment. Bethphage and Bethany are reached (xix, 29), and then Jerusalem (xix, 41, 45). All the material in this third narrative is also arranged in correct chronological order.

It is thus evident that Luke’s history is perfectly accurate in the central chapters of his Gospel, and that they contain three parallel narratives, which constitute the longest and most important of all his triplications (No. 3), very emphatically pointing forward to the coming great work of our Lord’s Atoning Death. We may conveniently call the three narratives Luke (A), (vi, 20–x, 42); Luke (B) (xi, 1–xiv, 24); and Luke (C) (xiv, 25–xxi, 38). The line indicating No. 3 triplication in Table II is printed in heavy type in order to draw special attention, on account of its great importance.

We may compare this long triplication in the Gospel, emphasizing the great Work of our Lord, with the two in the Acts which draw attention to the Apostles’ Work of witnessing. A similar literary arrangement of triplications is thus adopted in each of Luke’s books, to emphasize the chief Work described in each. The Work of Redemption was performed by the Son of God alone; the humbler but very honourable Work of publishing the good tidings was committed to Spirit-filled men: two were very probably selected, in order to avoid giving undue prominence to an individual.

In the Acts, witnessing continued for a long time: in fact, it still continues. In the Gospel, on the other hand, the Atoning Work of Christ was finished on the Cross, the long triplication Luke (A), Luke (B), Luke (C), emphatically leading up to that crisis. Although its components are close together, it has not been so easy to recognize the existence of this historical triplication
as it was to find those in the Acts, which emphasized the commissioning and the obedience of Peter and Paul. In the Gospel triplication, it is not stated that the story is retold, and comparatively few of the same events and discourses are repeated in such component.

One event, however, the start for the last journey—(ix, 51) in Luke (A), (xiii, 22) in Luke (B), and xvii, 11 in Luke (C)—is clearly told in each of the three Lukan narratives. Now a journey has a destination and an object; in this case the destination was Jerusalem, and the object was the Death of our Lord there (ix, 31; xviii, 31–33); consequently, the prominence given to the account of this journey is most appropriate, because it conducts to the climax of the Gospel.

In the Acts we noticed that the triplications, emphasizing the commissioning of Peter and Paul for their Work of evangelization, are supported by the minor ones of the sheet let down three times, and of the three days of blindness respectively; while the Work of St. Paul is further emphasized by several other threefold iterations.

It is natural, therefore, to expect that we may find triplications in the Gospel of Luke, supporting the long, thrice-repeated narrative, which emphasizes the Atoning Death of our Lord. This expectation is abundantly realized: Luke (A) contains a striking special triplication (No. 6) pointing to our Lord’s Death, and especially to His Resurrection; it also points to God the Father’s very great love for Him. In it loved “only” ones are raised up by Christ: the first, the only son of a widow; the second, an only daughter, these both from death; and the third, an only child, from a living death. A gradation is here apparent: with an only son taken, there might be daughters left; with an only daughter dead, there might be sons alive; with an only child practically dead, there might be the hope of another being born. This leads us to think of a further step, of the beloved only-begotten Son of God, Who could never be replaced, but Who was nevertheless given by God the Father to die for our sins. Our conclusion, that this triplication refers to our Lord, is strengthened by the fact that the Greek word for only son, daughter, and child in each of these three components is ὅνομογενής, a word which is only applied elsewhere in the New Testament to our Lord (John i, 14, 18; iii, 16, 18; I John iv, 9), or to Isaac, who was a type of Christ (Hebrews xi, 17).

Luke (A), Luke (B), and Luke (C) resemble each other because each contains a similar triplication of prophecies by our Lord of
His coming Death, sometimes associated with the mention of His Resurrection.

Luke (A) contains the striking record of three such prophecies (No. 7); they were all uttered at about the time of the Transfiguration, some six months before the Crucifixion, and all at times of glory and success. The first was spoken at Caesarea Philippi, when Peter confessed that Jesus was the Christ; our Lord then took the opportunity to tell His disciples that “The Son of Man must suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and the third day be raised up.” The next occasion was at the Transfiguration itself, when the subject of discourse with Moses and Elijah was the coming exodus of our Lord at Jerusalem. And lastly, on the next day, when our Saviour had successfully cured the demon-possessed boy after His disciples had failed to do so, He again foretold the same grand event, by stating that “The Son of Man shall be delivered up into the hands of men.”

Luke (B) also contains three prophecies by our Lord (No. 9) emphasizing His coming Death; they are in more veiled terms than the triplication to the same effect, which we have just noticed in Luke (A), and they were uttered at different and less striking times. The first, which Luke gives in this narrative, was spoken by our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount, nearly two years before the Crucifixion: “Even as Jonah became a sign unto the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of Man be to this generation.” Matthew (xii, 40) adds the reason for this similitude, but Luke does not do so. In the same Sermon Luke records our Lord’s words: “I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!” Mark (x, 38, 39), assigning this utterance to a different time, implies that it refers to our Lord’s approaching Death (see also Matthew xx, 22), but again Luke does not do so. Our Evangelist records a third prophetic utterance in Luke (B) by our Lord toward the end of His Ministry, which is also in veiled terms: “Behold, I cast out devils and perform cures to-day and to-morrow, and the third day I am perfected.” These words refer to Death, for they furnished a reply to Herod’s threat to kill our Lord.

Luke (C) also contains a triplication of prophecies (No. 11) by our Lord of His coming Death. These were all spoken near the end of the Ministry, and they are impressive because they give plain details of the shortly impending event. Thus the first component tells of suffering and rejection; the second
of delivery up to the Gentiles, of mockery, shameful spitting, and scourging, of killing and rising again; and the third prophecy adds the detail that our Lord was to be cast out before He was killed.

It will thus be seen that we have no less than nine prophecies of the Death of our Lord in Luke (A), Luke (B), and Luke (C), three in each, no more and no less, or a triplication of triplications (No. 4). We have noticed that the first in Luke (A), and the third in Luke (C), are both more striking than that in Luke (B); this is to be expected under the circumstances, because the first triplication draws great attention, and the last one is emphatic, because it immediately heralds the climax; the intermediate one, in Luke (B), serving as a link between the two, is more suppressed.

Luke (A), Luke (B), and Luke (C) also each contain another triplication, emphasizing a main doctrine of the Christian faith. In Luke (A) man's failure is emphasized by the account of three men who, one after another, hesitated to obey our Lord's command to follow Him (No. 8); their action is in strong contrast with the spiritual teaching of this section of the Gospel, which may be summed up in the words contained in it: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself" (x, 27).

In Luke (B) God's certain judgment on sinners is emphasized by the sentence on the fig-tree unfruitful for three years (No. 10). This agrees with the doctrinal teaching of this section, which may be summed up by our Lord's words contained in it: "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish" (xiii, 5).

In Luke (C) Christ seeking to save the lost by His Atoning Death is emphasized by the three Parables of the lost sheep, the lost piece of silver, and the lost son (No. 12). This is a fuller doctrinal triplication than either of the others, and its force is increased by the fact that in each case only one lost one is sought for and found. In the Parable of the lost son, a very personal touch is given in the subsidiary triplication (No. 13) by the use of the Greek word ὅτος, translated by the word "this" in the passages, "this My son," "this Thy son," "this thy brother." These triplications emphasize the doctrinal teaching of this section of the Gospel, which may be summed up by the words of our Lord contained in it: "The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost" (xix, 10).

It is interesting to notice the resemblance between the verbal construction of this last triplication and the first one which
we considered in the Acts (see p. 4) proclaiming the Risen Lord. The word ὁ θεός is used in both: in the one case it points to the triumphant Saviour, and in the other to the saved sinner. A hint is thus given of the intimate personal relationship between the two, which is plainly stated by St. Paul, when he wrote of "the Son of God, Who loved me, and gave Himself for me" (Galatians ii, 20).

We now find that we have a triplication of doctrinal triplications (No. 5); the first (No. 8) shews man's failure and guilt, the second (No. 10) God's judgment on unpardoned sinners, and the third (No. 12) (reinforced by No. 13) demonstrates the salvation of God to anyone who trusts in the Atoning Work of Christ. We thus have a summary of the relationship between God and man.

As we have found so many triplications in the narratives leading up to the Death and Resurrection of our Lord, we may naturally expect to find others when those events themselves are described.

Let us first consider the section containing the Betrayal and Crucifixion of our Lord. The failure of human love to help Him in His time of trial, when He indeed suffered alone, is emphasized by the record of Peter's thrice-repeated denial of his Master (No. 14). St. Luke has arranged this triplication in a manner similar to his long one, Luke (A), Luke (B), Luke (C). In both cases, the crisis coming immediately afterwards, he makes the first and last components more striking than the intermediate one. In our present instance (No. 14) Luke records that the first questioner looked steadfastly on Peter and said: "This man also was with Him. But he denied, saying, woman, I know Him not." The last one "confidently affirmed" that the Apostle had been with our Lord, for he was a Galilæan, but Peter said: "Man, I know not what thou sayest." The intermediate questioner is recorded simply as saying: "Thou also art one of them," without any mention of steadfast looking or confident affirmation. Peter's reply on the second occasion is recorded in only three Greek words, while his first denial is in four, and his last in five words.

The powerlessness of human authority to rescue our Lord in His time of crisis is emphasized by the record of the failure of Pilate's thrice-repeated efforts (No. 15), though "he had determined to release Him" (Acts iii, 13). The proud Roman ruler sank deeper and deeper into shame at each attempt, while each time confessing our Lord's faultlessness. At first the Governor simply said: "I find no fault in this Man." This should have been
sufficient; Pilate's plain duty was then to release and protect, but instead of doing so he sent our Lord to Herod. When our Saviour came back, there was more reason for release than before, for Herod also vouched that no fault could be laid to the charge of the Divine Prisoner.

Nevertheless, Pilate, fearing the Jews, wickedly tried to compromise, and said he would chastise our Lord and then release Him. But the Jews then raised their bloodthirsty shout, and though Pilate still desired to release our Lord, he weakly descended to argue with his subjects, and at last, coward as he was, basely gave way to their evil desires.

Our Lord's obedience to human laws is still further emphasized by a triplication (No. 16) of testimony from Herod, from the penitent thief, and from the centurion at the Cross.

In the last section of St. Luke's Gospel, which contains the account of the Resurrection, we find a triplication (No. 17) which emphasizes that great event as well as the Death of Christ. The memory of former prophecies is brought before the disciples in an ascending scale: on the first occasion, the two men in dazzling apparel at the empty tomb reminded the women of our Lord's own predictions of His sufferings and Resurrection; afterwards the Risen Christ referred the two on the way to Emmaus to the prophecies of Moses and of all the Prophets about Himself, suffering and entering into His glory; while, later on, our Lord reminded the assembled believers of His own words, and He also referred to the prophecies in the Law of Moses, in the Prophets, and in the Psalms concerning Himself, His Death, and His Resurrection.

Finally, comes a triplication (No. 18) complementary to the last; it demonstrates how fully the disciples received and understood the meaning of our Lord's Death and Resurrection in fulfilment of prophecy. We are told that their eyes were opened, and they knew the Lord; their heart burned within them when He opened to them the Scriptures, and again we read that our Lord opened their mind that they might understand the Scriptures. It is noteworthy that the Greek word to open in each component of this triplication is διανοιγω, a word seldom used in the New Testament, and only in one other place in the Gospel of Luke (ii, 23), where the meaning is evidently to open fully, which is the true meaning of the word. In both the Authorized and Revised Versions, however, this emphatic compound word and also the simple διανοιγω, from which it is derived, are always translated by the same English word.
to open; the full emphasis of this triplication is therefore lost in both our English translations.

A glance at Table II informs us that the triplications in the Gospel of Luke have been arranged in a very systematic and orderly manner. No. 1 triplication, unlike the others, is distributed in different parts of the introductory and central chapters, doubtless because it emphasizes the continued approval which God the Father bestowed upon His Son during the whole period of the Ministry, for the grand work of His Atoning Death to be carried out at the close. No. 2 triplication, which is all contained in the introductory chapters, emphasizes the fact that the Jews early shewed the bitterest opposition to recognizing our Lord as the Messiah.

All the remaining triplications draw marked attention to the Atoning Work which our Lord came to do; they are in three groups in the Central, Crucifixion, and Resurrection chapters respectively. The first group looks forward to the Cross; the second group emphasizes the sinlessness and the isolation of our Lord when He suffered; and the Resurrection triplications look back triumphantly on Christ's finished Work.

As further evidence of the careful arrangement of details, it may be noted that all the simple triplications, Nos. 6–13, are each entirely contained in Luke (A), Luke (B), or Luke (C). There is no instance, for example, of any with one component in Luke (A) and another in Luke (B); and we may further notice the symmetrical arrangement by which the double triplications (Nos. 4 and 5) have a component in each of the three parallel narratives.

The deductions made in this paper enable us intelligently to accept Luke's claim that he writes his Gospel "in order" (i, 3); for we have seen that he is most methodical in both his historical and literary arrangements.

It is trusted that a threefold advantage may result from this study of St. Luke's writings: that the historian may recognize that the chronology of the central chapters of his Gospel is perfectly accurate; that the student of literature may appreciate the beauty of the variously constructed triplications with which both his books are enriched; and that the devout Christian may more fully grasp the intense emphasis which this Evangelist has laid upon the central facts of Redemption,—on the Atoning Death and the glorious Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ.
The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we are very grateful to Col. Mackinlay for the immense labour he has had in preparing this paper and for his kindness in reading it.

Mr. M. L. ROUSE, B.A., B.L.: I have looked through Col. Mackinlay's instances, and he certainly has made out an exceedingly good case. But I would say that it is a mistake to suppose that the arrival of the Lord Jesus at Bethany in Luke x, 38, is the same as the arrival for His last Passover (Luke xix, 29, John xii, 1), because in the first place St. Luke states "A certain woman named Martha received Him into her house," language describing a first visit; secondly, Martha is gently chidden for making extensive preparations, whereas at His last visit He accepted the Supper at which Martha served; and lastly and more potently the Lord Jesus had, after the raising of Lazarus, retired to a city called Ephraim, in the wilderness of Judæa, therefore He would not have gone through Samaria to get to Jerusalem, as we find that He did from the closing words of Luke ix.

On the other hand, if you take three successive journeys during this period, you get the chronology you desire, for they correspond with Christ's three visits recorded in John, to keep the feast of Tabernacles, the feast of Dedication, and the last Passover.

Again, Col. Mackinlay speaks of a certain narrative of a man who sought the way of eternal life, but these are not all one, but three. First, in Luke x, 25–37, a lawyer asked, "Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" In Luke xiii, 23–30, there is no question of eternal life. The real story is found in Luke xviii, 18–30; this clearly corresponds with the parallel account in Mark.

Dr. A. T. SCHOFIELD: I should like to point out that in my opinion the order of St. Luke is anything but cryptic. It seems psychologically not unreasonable to present a thing three times over. I must join the last speaker in taking exception to the statement that Luke x, 38, is the same as xix, 29. It would appear that Luke x, 38, corresponds with John vii, 2, 10, which refers to the feast of Tabernacles, six months before the visit referred to in Luke xix.

I think exception must be taken to the statement that the order is historical or chronological, although it is moral and literary.
There is a remarkable instance, in Luke xiii, 31–34, on our Lord's journey to the feast of the Dedication, when Herod tried to drive Him out, and sought to kill Him, and our Lord replied, "Go, tell that fox," etc. Luke then proceeds to put in our Lord's words, spoken three months later, in the Mount of Olives, as if they were spoken here: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen doth gather her brood under her wings." Of course, the conjunction of the two is remarkable, and you have a picture of the fox after the hen, and the hen protecting the chickens, which would be lost if you did not couple together events which are really separated by three months' time, but here you get the whole scene. Surely the order is not chronological.

In Luke xxii, 14, Judas is spoken of as being at the Lord's Supper, whereas earlier it is stated that he left before. These are some illustrations which show that the order to which Luke refers is literary rather than historical.

The Rev. A. H. Finn: Is it quite safe to conclude that the passage in Luke xii must have been spoken in summer, because it mentions fruits, corn, lilies and grass? The allusions are perfectly general, and I think could have been uttered at any season; and moreover, in Palestine, these things do not all belong to any particular season. Lilies and grass would belong to the Passover time, the corn to Pentecost, and the fruits to late summer or early autumn.

However, I think the main subject of the paper is triplications, which interested me specially, because in my studies in the Old Testament I have come across triplications of triplications in Genesis, in relation both to the Deluge and to the destruction of souls, and the decrease of the waters. We must not suppose that Luke chose three, just to emphasize the subject. Does it not suggest the idea that triplication is not a question of the author's arrangement, but lies further back in the Providence of God, in arranging history to enforce attention?

The Chairman: This is a paper rather to study than discuss, and it is very difficult indeed even to enter into any considerable argument about it offhand, at a meeting like this. Colonel Mackinlay has contributed such valuable investigations on other parts of the
Scriptures, and particularly the Gospels, that anything he writes like this deserves the most careful study, and I should not like to give any definite opinion upon it without more time than I can bestow just now.

I must quarrel with one statement in which he says that the style of St. Luke is like that of Thucydides, because I think St. Luke is so much more simple; and I have a little quarrel with his statement about the word μῆν, and his suggestion that it should have been κόλως, the glory instead of the wrath of Achilles, for the whole account of the *Iliad* depends on “wrath” and not on “glory.” Therefore the word “wrath” appears to be correct.

I sympathise with Professor Stanton (who has sent a letter on the paper) in thinking that it is very difficult to suppose that St. Luke or any other writer composed a narrative on a system so very elaborate as that indicated to-day. It seems to me that if the retrogressions spoken of in the paper are accepted, the historic thread is broken in the Gospel of St. Luke. I join most cordially in the expression of thanks to Colonel Mackinlay for the infinite labour he has bestowed on the production of the paper, and I am sure it will be a benefit to us to study, at greater leisure, the truths laid before us.

**Written Communications.**

The following written communications were received:—

The Rev. Professor V. H. STANTON, D.D.: “All study of the Gospels is valuable, and theories as to the arrangement of the matter, even if greatly mistaken, may yet help to direct attention to the main themes. I do not doubt that the great *themes* on which you lay stress are the themes which most occupied the mind of St. Luke. But whether he intended to emphasize those themes by a system of triplications, extending through large portions of his two works, is far more questionable.

“When one looks into instances that are offered of some such cryptic plans, one often finds that there has been something arbitrary in the selection of cases, e.g., in the very first of yours. I do not know by what right you omit Acts ii, 23, 24, ‘τοῦτον . . . ὅπως ὁ Θεὸς,’ where then is the triplet?”
Again, there are two mentions of the Holy Spirit in Peter's sermon, and you take in one after it, but why not also that before it, the event of Pentecost itself, or others that occur soon after in the course of the narrative of the Acts? There is surely no triplet here of a kind to lend emphasis.

"I cannot follow your argument as to three parallel sections, A, B and C, in Luke vi, 20–xxi, 38. I can discover no indication of intentional retrogression at the points you indicate, and the fact that the narratives within the sections hang together fairly well does not make the treatments of his subject as a whole chronological, and prove the Evangelist's chronology to be accurate, when they are thus pieced together.

"Cryptic arrangements such as that discovered in Homer by Margoliouth, or some of the 'Baconians' in Shakespeare's works, do not appeal to me. It may be difficult sometimes to disprove them, but also they cannot be proved. But that a writer like St. Luke, who was composing a Gospel for the instruction of all and everyone, should employ cryptic methods for emphasizing his message is to me incredible."

The Rev. H. E. Gausen, M.A., wrote questioning whether the Greek word for "in order" (Luke i, 3) is necessarily chronological; he also adds: "There is a very special interest and originality in what is said on p. 13 as regards the word μονογενής."

The Rev. E. A. Abbott, D.D.: "I have read your paper with much interest, and feel sure that there is a great deal of truth in your theory of triplications."

A large number of other communications were received expressing interest in the paper, but hardly any of them entered into the arguments brought forward. Among them were letters from Professor Margoliouth, Professor Nairne, Canon Robinson, Dr. A. C. Dixon, and Dr. W. St. Clair Tisdall. Also from Sir William Archibald, the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Clarke, Professor Flinders Petrie, and Professor Turner.

Lecturer's Reply.

Mr. Rouse contends that the arrivals at Bethany (Luke x, 38, xix, 29, and John xii, 1) are not the same. But attention is directed to the following: — (1) John xii, 1, of course, tells of a visit at the end of the Ministry, and the journey whose ending is recorded in Luke x, 38, must have been the very last one, because at its
beginning "the days were well-nigh come that He should be received up" (Luke ix, 51). (2) In both accounts of the visit to the house of Martha and Mary, we have the statement that Martha served, and that Mary was at our Lord's feet, and was commended—very suggestive that both accounts refer to the same visit. (3) The last journey from Galilee to Jerusalem was taken on the eastern side of the Jordan (Matt. xix, 1, Mark x, 1). It is fully in accord with Luke ix, 51-56, that the journey there described was also on the eastern side of the river. Our Lord was not received in a village of the Samaritans, Samaria being on the direct route; consequently He went to another, most probably not to another Samaritan one. If so, a glance at the map assures us that he must have crossed the Jordan in order to reach Jerusalem.

Bearing in mind the literary methods of the Evangelists, who dwell vividly on separate events, but do not always connect them together, and remembering their frequent omissions without remark, it must be allowed that after the tarrying at Ephraim (John xi, 54) Jerusalem could have been reached by a circuitous route via Samaria, Galilee, the eastern side of the Jordan, and Jericho. This route must have been followed, in order to fulfil the three foregoing conditions.

It is to be remembered also that the synoptic Gospels record our Lord's Ministry in Galilee fully, while they omit the record of all visits to Jerusalem, except the last. St. John, on the other hand, writing in a supplementary manner, describes many visits to the Holy City, but he had no need to mention the last visit to Galilee, nor the last journey from thence to Jerusalem, because they had both been fully described by the synoptists. It is concluded, therefore, that Luke x, 38, xix, 29, and John xii, 1, all refer to the same visit to Bethany.

Mr. Rouse contends that three separate conversations are reported in Luke x, 25-37; xiii, 23-30; and xviii, 18-30. He maintains that only the last passage corresponds with Mark x, 17-31. But all refer to the same discourse, for in Luke x, 25-37, these subjects are discussed: (1) The question how to inherit eternal life. (2) The keeping of the Commandments in general. (3) The command to love our neighbour. In Luke xiii, 23-30, these subjects are considered: (1) The question about the number of the saved—of the inheritors of eternal life. (2) The command, "Strive
to enter in." (3) The striking closing statement, "The last shall be first."

These subjects are all referred to directly, or indirectly, in the parallel passages in Matthew and Mark. Hence we conclude that all the five records refer to one and the same conversation, made on the same final journey to Jerusalem.

Dr. Schofield states that Lukan triplications are apparent, but it is evident that the long one, Luke (A), Luke (B), Luke (C), is cryptic to him. Otherwise he would conclude that the sentence about the fox, the hen and her brood (Luke xiii, 31–35) was spoken on the very last journey, and most probably near to Jerusalem. For it came just after the conversation with the man about the saved—the inheritors of eternal life, which we judge from the reference to the Jerusalem–Jericho road in the parallel passage in Luke (A) (x, 25–37), containing the Parable of the Good Samaritan, was uttered on that route. The latter half of the sentence about the hen and her brood was repeated at Jerusalem, according to Matthew xxiii, 37, only a few days afterwards.

Now it was in accord with our Lord's practice to speak on the same subject on days near together, as for instance when He referred to Himself as the Bread of Life on the day after the miracle of feeding the five thousand (John vi, 11, 22, 51). Hence, if the long threefold narrative is accepted, we must judge that Luke is historical and accurate in the passage under consideration. But Dr. Schofield thinks that the sentence in question was spoken just before the feast of Dedication, more than three months before the Crucifixion; if so, all unity of time is lost and Luke's historicity must be given up; for it is most unlikely that our Lord would have repeated the same sentence about the hen and her brood at times so far separated from each other.

There are difficult questions connected with the presence of Judas at the Lord's Supper, but St. Luke's history of what took place is quite consistent with itself. We are told in chapter xxii, 4, 5, that the traitor was away plotting with the chief priests. But he was afterwards present at the eating of the Passover (xxii, 21). Later on he must have left, because he met our Lord in the garden, and guided the multitude to apprehend Him (xxii, 47).

In reply to the Rev. A. H. Finn, it is, of course, true that fruits, corn, lilies and grass ripen at different times, but all are growing
during early summer, and they can then appropriately be alluded to. Triplications are doubtless employed for purposes other than emphasis; but we must keep to our subject in this paper.

Our Chairman says it is very difficult to suppose that Luke or any other writer composed a narrative on a system so very elaborate as that indicated in the paper. On the other hand, the Rev. Harrington Lees writes with regard to the paper: "The elaborateness of St. Luke's style makes the theory possible, though certainly startling." May we not expect methodical arrangement in St. Luke's Gospel, particularly when it is remembered that the Greek word καθεξής in Luke i, 3, probably refers to literary as well as to chronological order.

The Dean's criticism that if there are two retrogressions in the Gospel of St. Luke, the historic thread must be broken, merits attention. It may truly be said that there is a retrogression on each of the two occasions when St. Paul narrated his conversion and commissioning in Acts xxii and xxvi, but there was no break in the historic thread, because it is very evident that the Apostle referred to past events.

It is maintained that, when all the evidences have been carefully examined, and when it is fully recognized that St. Luke has made two retrogressions in his Gospel, then also the historic thread is unbroken. The arrangements in the Gospel and in the Acts are parallel to each other: in both it is clearly understood that an old story is being repeated. The plan adopted in the Gospel of St. Luke is not one with which we are familiar, but it is a reasonable one to adopt.

In reply to Professor Stanton's criticism (second paragraph) it should be remembered that it is stated, on p. 5 of the paper, that the connecting thread of No. 1 triplication in the Acts is the use of the three Greek words, οὕτως ἵνα ἵνα. By what right, therefore, should τοῦτον, etc., in Acts ii, 23, be admitted, as the Professor suggests? οὕτως, alone, occurs frequently; but the components of this triplication are defined by the combination of the three words, which do not occur elsewhere in the Acts, as pointed out in the paper.

With regard to the third paragraph of the Professor's letter, the triplication here referred to (No. 3 in Table I) is not simply a mention of the Holy Spirit, but it is a proclamation; His actual arriva
is not included, because an arrival is not a proclamation. This triplication is confined to Peter’s words on the day of Pentecost as stated in the paper. The next mention of the Holy Spirit (iv, 8) is on a later day (ii, 46; iv, 5), and cannot therefore be included. Professor Stanton writes about this triplication, "there are two mentions of the Holy Spirit in Peter’s sermon, you take one after it." The simple inference from these words is that the third proclamation was not by Peter. But it was, according to Acts ii, 38, and on the same day. Where is the mistake in the paper?

In his fourth paragraph, the Professor raises a general objection; the evidences of retrogression in the paper are considerable, but all have not been given, as mentioned on p. 252. A book is now being written on The Emphasis of St. Luke, in which all the arguments will be fully set out.

Professor Stanton refers to the Homeric anagrams. The author of this paper examined them, and came to the conclusion, which he still holds, that they really exist. But he referred to them simply as illustrations of the well-known fact that ancient writers occasionally veiled some of their arrangements. It was not contended that Luke adopted the same method as did Homer; but both wrote in a cryptic manner.

Whether Professor Margoliouth’s discovery is true or not, makes no difference to the existence of the long-hidden triplication Luke (A), Luke (B), Luke (C), because attention was drawn to the latter in an article published in The Interpreter in 1911, and the Homeric anagrams were not heard of until 1915.

The Gospels contain instruction for all and everyone, but surely it is not incredible that diligent seekers may find that well-known facts and spiritual truths are emphasized in striking ways, hidden from the casual reader?

The author thanks the Dean of Canterbury for his kindness in presiding, and for his encouraging remarks. He also thanks all who have contributed to the discussion, including the large number whose letters, it is regretted, are not published, for want of space.

It is trusted that the interest in this subject will be maintained, and that students and scholars will carefully examine the arguments adduced in favour of the very methodical and orderly arrangement of St. Luke’s books.
592nd Ordinary General Meeting,

Held in Committee Room B, The Central Hall, Westminster, on Monday, June 4th, 1917, at 4.30 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel G. Mackinlay, Chairman of Council, in the Chair.

The Minutes of the last Meeting were read and signed.

The Chairman: I am sure we are very happy in the subject of the paper chosen this afternoon, and more happy still in the one who is to deliver it. He himself is one who has greatly shaped the course of modern thought during the years under review, and the Victoria Institute is most fortunate in having a paper from him on this subject. I have great pleasure in asking Dean Wace to read his paper.

Some of the Relations Between Science and Religion as Affected by the Work of the Last Fifty Years. By the Very Rev. H. Wace, D.D., Dean of Canterbury.

I am very sensible of the imperfection of my equipment for venturing to offer the Society some reflections on this subject, but I possess at least one qualification which, I hope, may excuse my presumption. I have lived through those fifty years, and I was thirty years old when they began. I had been seven years in Holy Orders when they opened, and it was not long after their commencement that, as Boyle Lecturer, it was my duty to consider as thoroughly as possible the position of Theology in relation to the Science then prevalent. In those fifty years I have seen many movements and influences come and go. At their commencement Tyndall and Huxley were the reigning authorities in Science; W. R. Greg and Matthew Arnold were the most popular influences in Criticism and Religious Speculation; Colenso had startled the religious world by his popularization of Dutch Criticism of the Old Testament; and the Cambridge School of New Testament Criticism, led by Lightfoot and Westcott, were successfully upholding the authenticity of the Gospels and Epistles against the School of Baur and his
followers. Of all the influences by which the traditional Christian belief was then menaced, a great deal, to say the least, has disappeared before the discoveries and the discussions of those fifty years, while the Christian Belief still holds its own among us, and in some respects, I think, is in a still stronger position. In this survey I may claim to speak as something more than a spectator, for it was my duty and my privilege to take some responsible part in the course of the debate, and I have had some anxious experience of the difficulties involved in the struggle. I do not presume to think that I can appreciate the full bearings of the great questions raised by the recent advances of science. But it may be permissible for one who has gone through the experiences to which I refer to attempt to estimate some of the broader and more practical results of the movements of scientific thought.

To illustrate, then, the attitude of the most popular representatives of the science of the early years of this period, it will be found interesting to refer to an article in the Quarterly Review for January, 1878, entitled “Scientific Lectures—their Use and Abuse.” It was occasioned by an address given in 1877 by Professor Tyndall at the Birmingham and Midland Institute; and it is an indignant protest against the use which the Professor made of the occasion to assert some of the scientific views he entertained in opposition to current Christian beliefs. He is dwelling on the law of the Conservation of Energy, and illustrates it by the well-known example of a merchant receiving a telegram, which instantly occasions a complex series of actions, which are set in motion from the central nervous system. Some persons, he says, would reply that the impulse of all this force originated from the human soul. But he argues that this is an attempt to explain the known by the unknown. We cannot, he says, “mentally visualise the soul as an entity distinct from the body,” and the use of the very term “Soul” is therefore unscientific. “From the side of science all that we are warranted in stating is that the terror, hope, sensation and calculation of the supposed merchant are physical phenomena, produced by, or associated with, the molecular processes set up by waves of light in a previously prepared brain.” But he supposes the question asked whether the merchant’s consciousness of all these activities can be explained on this purely scientific basis. He asks, in fact, “What is the causal connection, if any, between the objective and subjective, between molecular motions and states of consciousness”? and his answer is, “I do not see the connection, nor have I as yet
met anyone who does.” “If,” he says, “we are true to the canons of
science, we must deny to subjective phenomena all influence on
physical processes.” “We have here,” he proceeds, “to deal with
facts almost as difficult to be seized mentally as the idea of a
soul. And if you are content to make your ‘soul’ a poetic
rendering of a phenomenon which refuses the yoke of ordinary
physical laws, I, for one, would not object to this exercise of
ideality.” In other words, on the basis of an assumed purely
physical causation, the Professor ridicules the notion that the
hypothesis of a human soul can afford any explanation of the
typical merchant’s movements. “On the same ground,” he
adds, “the anthropomorphic notion of a creative Architect,
endowed with manlike powers of indefinite magnitude, is to be
regarded with consideration. It marks a phase of theoretic
activity which the human race could not escape, and our
present objection to such a notion rests upon its incongruity
with our knowledge.” The reviewer passes some very just
censures upon the impropriety of this use of a scientific lecture
to disparage religious beliefs, and exposes the absurdity of the
Professor’s position. “Professor Tyndall, on a platform at
Birmingham, condescending, ‘for one,’ to allow the human race
to talk about their souls, affords a picture which is not sur­
passed in the Dunciad.” “The Soul,” the reviewer proceeds,
“is the rendering, whether poetic or not, of those lofty faculties
which are the organs of truth, of beauty, of goodness; which
are the home of faith, of hope and of love; in which the
aspiration and the conviction of immortality are enshrined,
and which are capable of trampling upon all physical sensa­
tions, whether of pleasure or of pain. Collect the passages in
literature, sacred or profane, in which the word ‘Soul’ is used,
and you will have collected a Treasury of the loftiest emotions
and the noblest thoughts which have animated human nature.
In the presence of such recollections, we refrain from character­
ising as it deserves the request that we should be content to
treat the soul as the poetic rendering of a phenomenon which
is not intelligible to Professor Tyndall.”

This example is perhaps an extreme one, but it illustrates
clearly the hard physical standards by which even
eminent men of science of that day measured human thought
and religion. Professor Huxley, indeed, endeavoured to
mitigate the rigidity of this conception by protesting against
“the fallacy that the laws of Nature are agents, instead of
being, as they really are, a mere record of experience, upon
which we base our interpretations of that which does happen,
and our anticipations of that which will happen."* But, the idea of everything being subject to "laws of nature," and of "violations" of them being incredible, became deeply fixed in popular thought. The *Reign of Law* was the title of a book by the late Duke of Argyll, and the phrase embodied the prevalent conception. We are now told, however, by Mr. Whetham, one of the most distinguished exponents of modern science, that "many brave things have been written and many capital letters expended on describing the Reign of Law. The laws of Nature, however, when the mode of their discovery is analysed, are seen to be merely the most convenient way of stating the results of experience in a form suitable for future reference. The word 'law' used in this connexion, has had an unfortunate effect. It has imparted a kind of idea of moral obligation which bids the phenomena 'obey the law,' and leads to the notion that when we have traced a law, we have discovered the ultimate cause of a series of phenomena"; and again, "we must thus look on natural laws merely as convenient shorthand statements of the organized information that at present is at our disposal."†

I must own that this sort of language seems to me to go too far, and that there are principles in natural philosophy which cannot duly be described by any other name than that of law. Observations which are of a purely inductive and probable character, such as the doctrine of Evolution, may appropriately be described as "shorthand statements of the organized information at present at our disposal," and it would be well if their provisional character in this respect were more clearly borne in mind. But the principles laid down in Newton's *Principia*, or, as he entitled his great work, the *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, do appear to bear the character of irrefragable laws. The law of gravitation rests, not merely on certain observations made by Kepler of the motions of the planets, but on mathematical propositions established by Newton which are rigidly demonstrable; and the motion of the planets is dependent upon the action of every particle in them being conformable to the mathematical principles of attraction which he established. Unless all the particles of matter in the visible universe are subject to some controlling power, which practically subjects them to a law, it would seem inconceivable that they should

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† Whetham, *Recent Development of Physical Science*, p. 31.
universally, and at all times, be found to attract one another with a force which varies in the perfectly accurate measure of the inverse square of the distance. Newton, in the grand Scholium at the end of the *Principia*, insists on the fact that the word "God" implies dominion. "Deus," he says, "est vox relativa et ad servos refertur: et deitas est dominatio Dei, non in corpus proprium, uti sentiunt quibus dens est anima mundi, sed in servos." In Newton's mind, therefore, God lays down laws which his creatures shall obey, and accordingly it was Newton himself who describes the axioms from which his reasoning starts as the three "Laws of Motion."

I venture to think, therefore, that some confusion prevails in such recent explanations of the "Laws of Nature" as I have just quoted. It is quite true it is not a Law of Nature that the sun should rise to-morrow; there is only the highest probability, and not a certainty, that it will do so. But if it does rise, it is quite certain that its movements will conform to the law of gravitation. The confusion seems to be between uniformity of occurrences and uniformity of the principles or laws in conformity with which those phenomena are produced. All the phenomena of Nature, like the leaves of a tree, are more or less irregular. It is not possible, for instance, to predict the exact spot at which a projectile will fall, although the conditions under which it is fired are exactly known, for it may be slightly deflected by some unforeseen interference, such as that of a sudden gust of wind. But it is quite possible to say where it ought to fall, because the mathematical laws by which its course is governed are known and are invariable. If we allow this justification for the use of the term Laws of Nature to be forgotten, we obscure a vital point in the argument for the Divine dominion which Newton asserts. That all particles in nature should attract one another, is a fact which may seem sufficiently described by saying, in the phrase just quoted from Mr. Whetham, that it states "the result of experience in a form suitable for future reference." But, as I have said, that this attraction should be maintained, throughout the whole universe open to our observation, in accordance with the exact mathematical rule that its force varies as the inverse square of the distance between the mutually attracting bodies—this implies a controlling force over every particle in the universe; unless, indeed, as the late Lord Grimthorpe humorously suggested, the atoms resolved unanimously, in some ethereal parliament, to attract one another in this definite proportion, and—what would be quite as surprising—have all adhered to their resolution. The
phenomena, in a word, which are the results of motion and action in accordance with the Laws of Nature may vary indefinitely; but the laws themselves are invariable.

But while maintaining this qualification of the recent softening of the idea of Laws of Nature, it certainly helped to relax the tension represented by Tyndall between Science and Religion when Huxley so positively insisted on the relaxation, and even went so far as to say that "no event is too extraordinary to be possible; and, therefore, if the term miracle means only extremely wonderful events, there can be no just ground for denying the possibility of the occurrence." The practical effect of this concession was to throw the whole question of belief in supernatural intervention in human and physical affairs upon the evidence for them. Huxley was content to say that there was no sufficient evidence for the miraculous events reported in the Bible, or even for the cardinal truths of religion, such as the Christian belief in God, and he introduced the term "agnostic" to express a simple suspension of belief. It seems to me that this challenge puts the defenders of the Christian Faith in as favourable a position as they can well occupy, and that it is one from which they are not justified in shrinking. We ought, I think, to be perfectly ready to accept Hume's statement of the case, namely, "that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish." We ought, I think, to be bold enough to say that the falsehood of the testimony of the New Testament to the miraculous events which it records would be more miraculous than the events themselves. Of course, on the basis of the old belief of the Church—not yet, let me interpolate, disproved—that the Scriptures were inspired by God, this position is impregnable; for it is obviously inconceivable that testimony inspired by God should be false.

But without assuming that supreme premise, consider only from a human point of view what is involved in the supposition of the falsity of the records of supernatural events in the Gospels. In the first place, it is not merely that the accounts of a number of particular miracles would be rejected, but that the very substance of the accounts of our Lord's actions would be invalidated. Immense ingenuity has been expended in attempting to explain away the miracles which are more particularly described, such as the feeding of the multitudes or the walking on the sea. But even if these attempts had been more endurable than they are, what is to be said of such general descriptions of our Lord's
work as that of St. Matthew, in the fourth chapter, that "Jesus went about all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and healing all manner of sickness and all manner of disease among the people. And his fame went throughout all Syria, and they brought unto him all sick people that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and those which were possessed with devils and those which were lunatic and those that had the palsy, and He healed them." What the Gospels attribute to our Lord is not merely the performance of the few miracles specifically described, but a general miraculous power, manifested in the healing of all sick people who were brought before Him. A denial of miraculous action is therefore a denial of the general trustworthiness of the Gospel narratives. This is, indeed, practically involved in a denial of the Virgin Birth; for if the first two chapters of St. Luke are not to be trusted in their solemn account of the momentous circumstances they record, the whole credit of the Evangelist is fatally shaken. But it should be realised what is the nature of the testimony which is thus rejected. It is the testimony of Books, and of the authors of Books, which are bound up indissolubly with the greatest blaze of moral truth and spiritual life which has ever been exhibited among mankind. You cannot produce, within the same compass, such a manifestation of righteousness and truth, and of witness to all that is highest and most sacred in human nature, as is comprised within the Gospels and Epistles. It is true there are some who deny this, but I think they are in a small minority, and we may confidently appeal in support of it to the general verdict of men and women in Christian countries. But so far as it is true, it gives the weight of an intensely truthful character to the general credibility of the Gospel narratives.

The evidence, in other words, is not to be coldly estimated as the bare testimony of half a dozen eye-witnesses. They are the associates, the representatives, of a community of men and women who were the actors in the greatest movement for the assertion of truth and righteousness which the world has ever seen. In point of mere historical accuracy, their narratives in other points have stood the severest tests, and in spiritual force they are unrivalled. Would not the falsity of such testimony be a more amazing thing than the wonderful events to which it testifies? I believe, as a matter of fact, that this is the ground on which the general belief in the Gospel story rests. Christians in general feel that they are confronted, in the Gospels and Epistles, by testimony which is associated with all that is truest and
best and most sacred in their consciousness, and they recoil, by a deep instinct, from suggestions that would connect this witness with illusion or falsity. Of course, this is no argument with those who do not recognize the supreme moral force of the New Testament, and the argument must always, therefore, rest, in the last resort, upon the response of the individual conscience to the moral and spiritual claim of our Lord and His Apostles. If this does not penetrate men's hearts and minds, "neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." If the Evangelists and Apostles are ordinary individuals, and they are to be regarded as simply deposing in court with no greater presumption in their favour than average witnesses, it is quite arguable that their evidence is insufficient. But if they are spokesmen of a Master and a Society who were the greatest of all witnesses to truth in the deepest moral and spiritual matters, it becomes much more difficult to reject their evidence than to believe the wonders they relate, and Hume's condition for the credibility of miracles is fulfilled. This, I repeat, is the consideration which determines the judgment of the great mass of Christian people, and it should be boldly urged. Unhappily, a tendency has arisen among Christian theologians of late to disintegrate the testimony of the Scriptures, and to depreciate the trustworthiness of the authors of the New Testament on important points. The favourable position in which men of science, like Professor Huxley, had placed us has thus been given away by our own friends, and the line of Christian defence has so far been broken. But the case still remains as he left it. There is no sufficient reason on purely scientific ground for denying any of the miraculous facts on which the Christian Creed rests; and the simple question remains, being a moral as well as an intellectual question, Is the moral and spiritual force of the New Testament sufficient to outweigh the physical improbability of the events it records? From that issue the controversy is never likely to be substantially shifted.

But since Huxley's time, Science has done more than withdraw its bar against the possibility of the supernatural basis of Christian belief. It has itself opened doors in our physical environment, which have not only impressed upon the minds of men in general the mysterious possibilities which are latent in Nature, but has led brilliant men of science themselves to recognize the reasonableness of some of the assumptions of Christian thought. Perhaps the greatest enlargement of scientific thought has been produced by the discovery of the nature and properties of the ether. Its importance was
adumbrated in the concluding paragraph of Newton's *Principia*,
which gives, perhaps, what is still the most comprehensive
description of its general character. "Something," he there says,
"might be added respecting a certain most subtle spirit pervad­ing dense bodies and latent in them, by whose force and actions the particles of bodies mutually attract one another at the
smallest distances, and when made contiguous cling together; and electrical bodies act at greater distances, both by repelling and by attracting neighbouring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted and bent, and bodies are heated; and all sensation is excited, and the members of animals are moved at will, by the vibrations, that is, of this spirit propagated through the solid capillaments of the nerves from the external organs of the senses to the brain, and from the brain to the muscles. But these things cannot be briefly explained; and there
is not at present a sufficient supply of experiments, by which the laws of the actions of this spirit can be accurately determined
and exhibited." Those words were written in 1686, and it seems strange that nearly two centuries should have had to elapse before, in the middle of the last century, the laws of the action of this subtle spirit began to be accurately determined; until science has reached the marvellous conception of an ether which pervades all space, so that, as Professor Bonney says (*Recent Advances in Physical Science*, p. 25): "in the mind of the modern physicist, the material universe and everything else in it, not excepting our own bodies, can be traced back ultimately to ether and electricity, or some special form of strain, that is, to ether and an operation of energy. This conclusion has more than realized that vision of the ancient seer, which declares that, at the beginning of the manifestations of creative power, 'the earth was without form and void, and ... the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.'" That the last result of modern science should thus be described, by a recent President of the British Association, in the opening words of the first chapter of Genesis, is perhaps the most striking illustration of the progress made in what Sir Oliver Lodge has called, in his instructive book *On Man and the Universe*, "the reconciliation of Science and Faith."

One striking instance of that reconciliation may be quoted from Sir Oliver's book, which will bring us back to the point from which we started. Professor Tyndall, starting from the Canons of Science which he expounded so brilliantly, could see nothing in the human soul but a poetic expression for an unintelligible conception. But Sir Oliver Lodge (p. 77 of the 16th
edition of the book to which I am referring) asks: "What is it that puts the body together, and keeps it active and retains it fairly constant through all the vicissitudes of climate and condition, and through all the fluctuations of atomic constitution?" "... We call it," he says, "life; we call it soul; we call it by various names, and we do not know what it is. But common sense rebels against its being 'nothing': nor has any genuine science presumed to declare that it is purely imaginary." "... The following definition may sufficiently represent my present meaning. The soul is that controlling and guiding principle which is responsible for our personal expression, and for the construction of the body, under the conditions of physical condition and ancestry. In its higher development it includes also feeling and intelligence and will, and is the storehouse of mental experience. The body is its instrument or organ, enabling it to receive and to convey physical impressions, and to affect and be affected by matter and energy. ... Moreover, in the higher organisms, the soul conspicuously has lofty potentialities; it not only includes what is meant by the term 'mind,' but it begins to acquire some of the character of 'spirit,' by which means it becomes related to the Divine being. Soul appears to be the link between 'spirit' and 'matter'; and, according to its grade, it may be chiefly associated with one or with the other of these two great aspects of the universe."

What an immense advance upon the hard material view of man and nature from which we started! I cannot follow Sir Oliver in all his theological discussions, in which I may, without disrespect, presume that he is less at home than in the natural science in which he is so eminent. But it is evident that these observations on the soul, based upon purely scientific conceptions, render intelligible and reasonable the beliefs of Christianity, and the teaching of the Scriptures, respecting those influences of the spiritual world upon the material which are cardinal elements in our Faith. If the soul has this influence upon matter and ether, what is there inconsistent with Science—as, indeed, Sir Oliver proceeds to suggest—in the predictions of St Paul of the reappearance of the soul in a spiritual body, or of the influences of spiritual power upon matter upon which the possibility of such miracles as those of the Gospel depends? A great window is opened to us in the vision of the universe, through which we discern "the promise and the potency" (in Professor Tyndall's phrase)—not of matter, as he understood it, but of influences infinitely superior to matter, and capable of modifying, by superior
powers, the results of purely material laws. The process of "reconciliation" seems to me to have gone very far in the nearly sixty years through which my ministerial life has passed, and we may entertain a confident belief in its fuller realization. There is no occasion for theologians to throw aside parts of their creed as irreconcilable with modern science, for there is every sign that science is steadily approximating to the principles which are at the foundation of the Christian Creed. Its revelations are more and more in accordance with the grand convictions respecting the Divine Nature which Newton expresses in the following passage from the concluding Scholium of the *Principia*, to which I have already referred:—

"The Supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect; but a Being, however perfect, without dominion is not the Lord God. It is the dominion of a spiritual Being which constitutes a God: true dominion a true God; the highest dominion the highest God; a feigned dominion a feigned God; and from a true dominion it follows that the true God is living, intelligent, and mighty; and from His other perfections that He is Supreme, or Supremely Perfect. . . . .

God is one and the same God always and everywhere. He is omnipresent, not merely virtually but substantially. . . . . In Him all things are contained and moved, but God is not affected by the motions of bodies, and they experience no resistance from the omnipresence of God. It is manifest that a Supreme God must necessarily exist; and by the same necessity He exists always and everywhere. Whence also He is wholly similar to Himself, wholly an eye, wholly an ear, wholly a brain, wholly an arm; one total force of feeling, of understanding, and of acting, but in a manner in no way human, in no way corporeal—a manner absolutely unknown to us. As a blind man has no idea of colours, so we have no idea of the modes in which a God of all wisdom perceives and understands all things. He is destitute of all body and corporeal figure, and therefore can neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched, and ought not to be worshipped in the form of any corporeal thing. We have ideas of His attributes; but what is the substance of anything whatever we in no way apprehend. We see only the figures and colours of bodies, we hear only sounds, we touch only external surfaces, we smell only odours, and we taste only savours; but the intimate substances we cannot recognize by any sense or any reflex action, and much less have we any idea of the substance of God. Him we only know by His properties and attributes, and by the supremely wise and good structures of
things, and final causes; and we admire Him for His perfections; but we venerate and worship Him because of His dominion. For we worship Him as servants; and a God without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing more than fate and nature. From a blind metaphysical necessity, which, of course, is the same everywhere and always, no variation of things can arise. The whole diversity of created things in space and time could only arise from the ideas and the will of a Being necessarily existing. God, however, is said by allegory to see, to hear, to speak, to laugh, to love, to hate, to desire, to give, to receive, to rejoice, to be angry, to fight, to fabricate, to construct. For all language respecting God is derived by some similitude from human things; not indeed a perfect similitude, but some similitude at all events. And so much concerning God, concerning Whom discussion on the basis of phenomena pertains to Natural Philosophy."

DISCUSSION.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we all thank the learned speaker for his most valuable paper. The historical summary leading up to the so-called reconciliation between Science and Religion is very clear and accurate, as are also the arguments about the Laws of Nature and the credibility of Miracles.

Our author only briefly alludes to the important subject of destructive criticism, which has greatly developed during the last fifty years, though it has lately received a check, beginning shortly before the War and emphasized by the War itself. The majority, rightly guided by our Lord's admonition, "by their fruits ye shall know them," have quietly put aside destructive criticism, most of which came from Germany. It seems probable that this phase of thought will never regain the influence which it formerly possessed. Perhaps our author, in his reply, would kindly add a few remarks on this subject.

One effect of the content of Science and Religion is that most critics, whether destructive or not, claim to be scientific. It is well to have this aim, if precision of thought, and justness of deduction, are meant by the expression. But surely many a critic has something still to learn from the scientist! For instance, one of the elementary principles in Science is accuracy of definition and care in the use of terms: yet we find, in the "Oxford Studies in
the Synoptic Problem” (1911), edited by Canon Sanday, and containing papers by eminent scholars, statements that the parts of St. Luke’s Gospel which resemble Matthew rather than Luke, constitute great and lesser “Interpolations,” while one of the writers generally refers to these parts as “Insertions.” Surely only one term should be applied by all. Mr. Maunder and the Rev. Sir John Hawkins have demonstrated, on good grounds, that the word “Interpolation” is unsuitable and misleading. It should therefore be abandoned for this purpose, or confusion and misapprehension will arise.

The man of science is careful about coming to conclusions from mere negative evidence. Not so, however, some biblical students. For instance, a few years ago certain writers suggested that the title, “rulers of the city” (Acts xvii, 6, 8), was coined by the author of Acts, as the word was not to be found elsewhere. But in recent years this very word has been discovered, cut in an inscription, amid the ruins of Thessalonica itself!

Moreover, others have questioned the historicity of St. Luke on similar grounds. Writing in 1903, Professor Percy Gardner doubted the accuracy of this Evangelist’s reference to the census under Cyrenius, because, he said: “No instance is known to us in antiquity—in which the citizens of a country migrated to the ancestral home of the family in order to be enrolled.” True, at the time Gardner wrote, no such instance was known, but some four years afterwards Kenyon and Bell found an old order in Egypt, dated A.D. 104, commanding all persons living at a distance to return to their homes for the then-approaching census. The analogy is obvious.

Professor E. HULL, F.R.S.: I wish to express thanks to the Dean for his admirable Essay, which I read before hearing it. I think one effect of it is to establish the right of the Victoria Institute to its second name, “Philosophical Society of Great Britain.” I venture to say that a more philosophical paper has never been produced before any audience at present in existence. I have much pleasure in moving a vote of thanks to the Dean of Canterbury for the paper just read.

Mr. E. WALTER MAUNDER, F.R.A.S.: It is with great pleasure that I rise to second the motion. I do not feel at all competent to
comment upon the Essay as a whole; for it covers so varied a
ground, and my own department in science is, as you know, a very
restricted one. But I noted one or two sentences, in reading the
paper, which seemed to me worthy of very special attention. I was
struck by the suggestive little sentence, "All the phenomena of
Nature, like the leaves of a tree, are more or less irregular." That
is exceedingly well put. It is a fact which we are always realizing
in physical science, that the phenomena of Nature are always more
or less irregular; yet it is from that very fact that we are able to
learn concerning what are termed "Laws of Nature." We have
irregular phenomena presented to us; yet when we examine into
them, we find that an underlying unity of principle is exemplified.
Consequently for the last hundred years very great importance has
been attached in physical science to what is called "the theory of
probability." A great number of observations are accumulated,
showing many apparent irregularities, and the question arises as to
how to analyse those irregularities so as to trace each to its proper
cause or combination of causes. And we find that the phenomena
of Nature do yield to such an analysis, and that the underlying
assumption upon which our analysis must rest is that of the
essential Unity of the Power behind Nature.

Another sentence which attracted me very much, referred to
the miracles of the New Testament. "The argument must always
therefore rest, in the last resort, upon the response of the individual
conscience to the moral and spiritual claim of our Lord and His
Apostles. From that issue the controversy is never likely to be sub­
stantially shifted." Miracles, at first sight, seem a violation of that
Law of Causality which is the very fundamental principle of all
physical science. But their explanation lies in the fact that the
nature of man is not confined to the merely physical plane. There
is in man, not merely physical substance, but individuality, personal­
ity; and God Who created man in His own Image, can manifest His
own Personality, and appeal to the personality which He has created.
That appeal, in the supreme case, is made in the revelation of our
Lord Jesus Christ. If the moral and spiritual claim of Christ appeals
to the conscience of the individual man, then there will be no
difficulty about the miracles which the Holy Scripture record as being
wrought by His Hand. The miracles are in harmony with their
Author.
I would like to thank the Dean of Canterbury also for the beautiful excerpt from the conclusion of the *Principia*. May I add one word more? It has been on my mind much of late that the controversy between Religion and Science—if we may use that hackneyed and misleading phrase—is likely to wear a different aspect in the near future from that which it presented fifty years ago. Then it was blank materialism claiming to be scientific which opposed itself to religion. Now if I foresee aright, we may have to face a different foe, one more subtle and difficult to defeat. There is, I fear, a tendency towards a modified Pantheism, and Pantheism is more difficult to fight than ever Materialism was, because, at one time or another, it uses many of the technicalities of Christianity, but in an absolutely opposite sense. In theory it claims to recognize one God, but, as the oldest school of Pantheist thought in existence, that of India, does not fail to admit, Pantheism and Atheism are indistinguishable, because the God of the Pantheist is not a God possessing moral qualities. However much, therefore, the terminology of Pantheism may resemble the terminology of Christianity, its spirit and its essence are fundamentally opposed to it.

The vote of thanks was heartily accorded.

Dr. A. T. Schofield: One of the most valuable points in this truly philosophic paper is the way in which truth is condensed within so few pages. Dean Wace alludes to the discovery and properties of ether, and quotes Professor Bonney's remark that "in the mind of the modern physicist, the material universe and everything else in it, not excepting our own bodies, can be traced back ultimately to ether and electricity, or some other special form of strain, that is to ether and an operation of energy." Professor Bonney adds: "This conclusion has more than realized the vision of the ancient seer, which declares that at the beginning of the manifestations of creative power 'the earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.'" I venture to suggest, however, that the ancient seer did not say that, but, on the contrary, he said that at the beginning of the manifestation of creative power God created heaven and earth, and he created nothing that was without form; but that I leave.

With regard to ether, I would suggest that it has hardly been discovered, that its very existence is still disputed by scientists. It
is a workable hypothesis as yet, and no more. There are concepts about it but no percepts. These range from regarding ether as an inner cause which is a million times lighter than hydrogen, and has a substance 480 times heavier than platinum, and is so dense that according to Sir Oliver Lodge all matter compared to it is like an imperceptible mist. When, however, we are told that this imaginary substance has an energy in every cubic millimetre equal to 1000 h.p., we do not feel inclined to dispute it, although we wonder how the estimate is arrived at.

In conclusion, I would say that Science was the undoubted son of Religion. All Christian works were conducted for the sake of Religion, but it broke loose and wandered into a far country. It is now being brought back by ways it knows not, to emphasize the Bible statement that “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” I join with Mr. Maunder in upholding the Creator and the revealed truths of the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

Rev. Chancellor LIAS, M.A.: I wish particularly to express my veneration for the reader of the paper. As a theologian, as a man of affairs, and as a man who is well acquainted with the lay mind, I do not know that he has a superior among us. In connection with this subject, the Dean got into public controversy with Professor Huxley, and as I am a year or two older, I may claim to remember him myself. He was a very capable and inspiring antagonist, but I have heard it said—and never denied—that the Dean was the only man, not even Mr. Gladstone excepted, who could face Professor Huxley without coming off second best.

With regard to the controversy with Huxley and Tyndall, I do not think that sufficient attention is paid to the fact that both these Professors very considerably modified their opinions in after life. I had some knowledge of the late years of Professor Tyndall, and I believe his antagonism to Christianity as an inspired religion was very much modified before he died.

I should like to emphasize what the Dean says about the inspiration of Scripture. In spite of all said against it (and very much has been said lately which I regret), yet such inspiration is not by any means disproved, and, if I may say so, it never will be. As to the difficulties under which we are labouring at the present time, these have been anticipated in the Scriptures. We have a
gathering of all mankind against the deniers of the teachings of Christ's Church, and breaches of laws and morals that no Christians have ever been capable of in the past.

Rev. J. J. B. Coles, M.A.: I think we ought to be bold enough to say that the falsehood of the testimony of the New Testament in regard to miraculous events would be more miraculous than the events themselves. In the admirable summary of the Dean, and the way in which he has shewn how the truth of statements in Scripture have been withheld, could we not carry the thought a little further, in connection with what Mr. Maunder has suggested, and recognize that we are now face to face with Pantheistic ideas and Mysticism, from which even such bold men as Sir Oliver Lodge are not free? May I illustrate? We read: "Without faith it is impossible to please God." It does not say without faith in miracles. As a matter of fact, many believed in Christ when they saw the miracles He wrought, but you can believe in the truth of the miracles and yet leave out much more important forms of belief, and I think this is the case at the present time.

Then we are face to face with a further deeper grasp of the universe as a vast whole—the wonders of the heavens. We are looking forward to a paper upon the "Distances of the Stars." We cannot grasp these things: we stop short. When you come to truths set out in Colossians in regard to God's purpose in Christ, to believe such statements is even more wonderful than to believe the miracles. "By Him were all things created . . . . . all things were created by Him and for Him." The most glorious possession of the whole crowded universe is distinctly said to belong to Christ. It is well for us to hold fast to these truths, so ably rehearsed by the Dean, and take the exact statements of Scripture about the more wonderful things which are therein recorded.

Mr. M. L. Rouse, B.A., B.L.: I am deeply in sympathy with this admirable paper. As to ether, I thought it was proved by the discovery of the X-rays. When you reduce the quantity of air down to an infinitesimal point, a millionth part or something of that sort, by admixture, as well as exhaustive dumping, you have got the effect of these X-rays, which hitherto you did not get. Whence did it come? No longer was the electric flash propagated as in the air,
but instead of that you got some mysterious radiation from end to end of the tube, surely propagated by this mysterious ether.

Mr. S. Collett suggested that the paper should have been entitled "Science and Revelation" instead of "Science and Religion," because Revelation implies a revealing God, whereas there are many religions which have no relation to God. What is meant by "Science," very few people know; we really mean what man knows of Science, and as we know only in part, our knowledge is very limited and imperfect. Should we speak, however, of Science and Revelation agreeing, that is impossible, because Science is subject to change, whereas Divine Revelation cannot change.

Professor Langhorne Orchard, M.A., B.Sc.: The Institute is under great obligation for the paper to which we have had the privilege of listening. We have been taken over a most interesting and comprehensive survey of the battlefield during the last fifty years, not only between God's Written Word and Science, but between God's Written Word and certain scientific conjectures. The pleasure and satisfaction which we have experienced has been the greater in that our guide and conductor in this survey has been one who has worthily borne his part as champion of the truth. We congratulate him and ourselves on seeing what has been called "the reconciliation," in other words, the acknowledged accuracy of God's Word, "the Bible." We hope that the Dean may yet be spared for many years to see the crown put upon the victory of the truth.

I must say that the expression "reconciliation" of Science and Religion does not attract me as a happy one. Science means knowledge; it does not mean guesswork. Professor Tyndall, when he stated that certain phenomena, which he could not bring under the ordinary Laws of Nature, were attributable to physical processes, was disguising himself as a scientist. Science says you have no right to make such assumptions. Professor Tyndall said he saw no connection between the two, although he says there must be a connection. That was almost the statement of a prejudiced partisan. Law is uniformity of force, which, so far as we can trace it, is the action of spirit; in other words, the action of will. Natural phenomena always attend the laws of nature. There can be no reconciliation between the Word of God and Science, because the Word of God is truth and true Science is knowledge and
fore truth. There is, of course, room for reconciliation between scientists' opinions and the Word of God, and we are very glad to welcome that reconciliation in the name of Science as well as in the name of true Theology.

THE DEAN'S REPLY.

I do not feel that I have anything to which to reply, except to acknowledge the very great generosity with which the audience has been kind enough to listen to my observations, and to acknowledge the vote of thanks. I am very thankful indeed that what I have said commends itself to the mature judgment of an audience like this.

With respect to the Chairman's observation about criticism, I should like to say that, all through these discussions, I have felt that since the disappearance of those great men Lightfoot and Westcott, criticism has been altogether on the wrong basis, and simply because it has departed from the rules which they as members of the great scientific University of Cambridge learned from their rulers who in Newton's *Principia* are strict adherents to facts. It is not my business to frame hypotheses, but that has been, I may say, the sole business of German critics. If you begin that process, there is really no end to it. I have never been opposed to criticism in any way whatever, because criticism is the legitimate province of the human mind; critical theories, however, are another thing. You are bound to criticise, but you must do it upon the basis of facts. The predominant theory with respect to the Old Testament involves the supposition that the Jews were a people ignorant and mistaken with regard to their own religion, and to suppose that one of the ablest and most tenacious nations in the world had a false account of their religion imposed upon them, seems to me to be preposterous.

There is one observation of Lord Bacon's which seems to me to apply to a great deal of criticism. Lord Bacon says: "The faster runner a man is, the further he goes wrong if he once gets off the course." One observation has, I confess, amused me, and that was Mr. Maunder's deprecation of his sphere as a limited one. I was under the impression at Greenwich that his sphere was the stellar universe, and I think that must be large enough for anyone. I am very grateful for his observations, because he is living among the
Laws of Nature in the highest development down at Greenwich, and I am glad that my views commend themselves to his train of thought. I was sorry to hear that he concluded by thinking that there is danger of a great recrudescence of Pantheism, which I regard as a very serious thing. I think those interested in that observation could be referred to a very great book, which is far too much forgotten in these days, Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection*, the conclusion of which is one of the most beautiful and powerful hypotheses to be found anywhere. Perhaps I may relieve the strain of this audience, if they will forgive me, by quoting some extremely beautiful lines on Philosophy in a poem which he addressed to his wife:—

And what if all of animated nature  
Be but organic harps diversely framed,  
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps  
Plastic, vast, one intellectual breeze  
At once the soul of each and God of all?  
But thy more serious eye a mild reproof  
Darts, O beloved woman! Now such thoughts  
Die unhallowed dost thou not reject  
An' biddest me walk humbly with my God,  
Meek daughter in the family of Christ!  
Well hast thou said—holily, dispraised  
These shapings of the unregenerate mind;  
Bubbles that glitter as they rise and break  
On vain Philosophy's aye-babbling spring,  
For never guiltless may I speak of Him,  
The Incomprehensible! save when with awe  
I praise Him, and with Faith that inly feels  
Who with His saving mercies healed me,  
A sinful and most miserable man,  
Wilderened and dark, and gave me to possess  
Peace, and this cot, and thee, heart-honoured Maid!

These, ladies and gentlemen, I think are the sentiments to which we should always come back.

The Chairman: We have to thank the Dean very much for his lecture, and also for his remarks on the Discussion.
593rd ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING,

HELD IN THE CONFERENCE HALL, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, JUNE 18TH, 1917,
AT 4.30 P.M.

THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF HALSBURY, F.R.S., PRESIDENT
OF THE INSTITUTE, TOOK THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the preceding Meeting were read and confirmed.

The Secretary announced the election of Mr. J. Gilbert Dale,
F.R.G.S., as a Member of the Institute.

The President introduced Sir Frank W. Dyson, the Astronomer Royal, and asked him to deliver the Annual Address.

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ANNUAL ADDRESS.

THE DISTANCES OF THE STARS. By Sir Frank W.
Dyson, M.A., F.R.S., Astronomer Royal.

The American astronomer, Simon Newcomb, places at the head of a chapter of his book on the stars a quotation from Kant: "Two things ever fill my mind with new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and longer I reflect on them—the star-strewn sky above me and the moral law within me." A parallel passage might be taken from the Psalmist, "The heavens declare the glory of God," and later in the same psalm, "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul." A being who could look at the stars without awe and wonder would surely be of extraordinarily limited intelligence. But he who watches them in their courses from night to night cannot fail to be struck by a sense of the mystery which surrounds them. This is increased with the increase of our knowledge, and therefore I think it fitting for me to take as the subject for my address to-night "The Distances of the Stars," for the distance is one of the most important facts we can discover about a star, and is the key to the discovery of several others.

Now the stars are bodies like the sun; the sun is, in fact, the star about which we know most. We know how large it is, that it has a diameter of 865,000 miles—we know how dense
it is, that its density is, in the mean, something like that of water—we know how hot it is, say 7000° C. near the surface and increasing greatly as we penetrate inwards—we know that it consists, at any rate near the surface, of many chemical elements with which we are familiar on the earth, all in a gaseous condition owing to the high temperature—we know that it rotates on its axis in twenty-five days, that a number of planets, including the earth, revolve around it, and that it is moving through space at the rate of twelve miles a second.

Now when we look at the stars they are simply points of light in the sky: we have no notion whatever of their distances. They are all so small that they have no perceptible disc, such as the sun has. When we look at them with a telescope, however large, they still remain the merest points. If you will admit that they are bodies like the sun and comparable with it in size, you will see that they must be at a very much greater distance. I suppose that our largest telescopes would show the sun with a disc of sensible size if it were twenty or thirty thousand times as far away. But it is begging the question to begin by assuming that the stars are like the sun, and we will show how their distances are found with no assumptions except those of elementary geometry.

I dare say you are familiar with the method used by surveyors in finding the distances of inaccessible objects. They take two points, A and B, and measure carefully the distance from A to B, and then measure, by an instrument called a theodolite, the two angles, O A B and O B A. When this is done it is easy to calculate the distances O A and O B by a branch of elementary mathematics called trigonometry. There is nothing at all mysterious or difficult about it; suppose that A B is 1 mile, and on a sheet of paper we put down a b = 1 inch and draw the angles at a and b equal to those at A and B, then a a, a b will give us the distances we require in the scale of an inch to a mile.

This same method can be easily applied to determine the distance of the moon. If the moon is observed simultaneously from two places on the earth, let us say the observatories at Greenwich and the Cape, one angle corresponding to that at A is measured at Greenwich, another corresponding to B is measured at the Cape, and the distance A B represents the length of the straight line joining Greenwich to the Cape. In practice, if one wishes to obtain an accurate result there are a number of minutiae to be attended to, but the general principle is simplicity itself.
If we try to measure the distance of the sun in this way, we can do it, but not very accurately, for the distance of the sun is so great compared to the distance between Greenwich and the Cape that the unavoidable errors in measuring our angles would seriously vitiate the results; we might get a result within perhaps 5 per cent. of the truth.

But if we tried to measure the distance of a star in this way we should come to grief entirely, for the unavoidable errors in measuring the angles would be a million times as great as the small angle $A_0B$ on which the distance essentially depends. The fact is that the base-line between Greenwich and the Cape is so short compared with the distance of the star that the star appears to be in the same direction as seen from both places.

Thus we cannot measure the distance of a star by using two places on the earth as the ends of a base line, the earth is so incomparably small compared with the distance we wish to determine.

The problem of measuring the distances of the stars took on a new aspect when it was shown that the earth moved round the sun. Copernicus, in his book, *De Revolutionibus*, published in 1543, showed that the movements of the planets in the sky and the annual recurrence of the seasons were more simply explained if it were admitted that the earth travelled round the sun each year. It was of course a great effort of imagination to conceive of the earth moving in this way, and his views were not readily admitted. They were, however, reinforced very powerfully by Galileo after the discovery of the telescope; among other things he actually saw Jupiter's moons revolving around Jupiter. He removed many of the difficulties in the way of accepting the Copernican system, and in 1632 established the fact that the earth moved round the sun. There was, however, one real difficulty which he did not remove, and that was one connected with the distances of the stars. His opponents said: If the earth moves round the sun, then at opposite times of the year, say in January and July, it will be in such widely different
positions that the stars ought to have quite different aspects. You can illustrate this for yourselves very easily from any point where you have a view of objects at different distances. If you change your position by a few yards the nearer objects are seen projected differently against the more distant landscape. In the slide on the screen, for example, there are shown two rough views of Edinburgh from different parts of the grounds of the observatory, which is, say, about two miles away. For example, in the picture on top the chimney in front is shown to the right of the spire of St. Giles' Cathedral and in the picture below it appears to the left. Again the Grange Church spire appears to the right of the Castle in one picture, and to the left in the other. Surely, said the opponents of the Copernican system, we ought to see similar effects among the stars: the stars nearest to us ought to shift their positions relatively to more distant ones. This was perfectly sound argument: it admitted of only one reply, namely, that the stars are at such great distances that these changes of position are too small to be perceived by us. We have all grown up with the idea of the great distances of the stars, and perhaps do not fully perceive how great this difficulty was to the astronomers of the 17th century. They were convinced that Galileo and Copernicus were right, but for two centuries they looked in vain before they found the changes for which they were in search. This is not surprising, for the nearest star, we know now, is more than 250,000 times as far away as the sun. Suppose ourselves at King's Cross Station, and let us represent the distance from the earth to the sun by half of the distance between the railway lines. That is, supposing we are looking northwards, in January we look along the line nearer to the platform and in July along the line further from the platform. If instead of being parallel the lines met somewhere between Grantham and Doncaster, we should have drawn to scale the lines from the earth to the nearest star as seen by us from two opposite sides of the sun. Perhaps it is not surprising that it took astronomers and instrument makers two centuries before they could measure angles with sufficient accuracy.

Another way of looking at the matter may show you what a difficult task was in front of astronomers. The diameter of the sun is 30°. The nearest star to us is at such a great distance that the change of its position amounts to only \( \frac{1}{12000} \) part of this. Before any attempt could be successful, it was necessary that astronomical instruments should be improved to such an extent that this small angle could be appreciated and measured.
Before the invention of the telescope, such a thing was quite impossible. The greatest of astronomical observers before its invention, Tycho Brahe, could measure angles of about 1'. Of course, he did not know how very distant the stars were. He tried, but could find no trace of movement, and even concluded that the earth did not go round the sun. But the telescope has increased our faculty of vision in at least three ways. It not only enables us to see fainter objects, but it also magnifies the small angles we have to measure, and thus makes it possible to measure with far greater accuracy. Further, it made possible a method of sighting vastly superior to anything that had been available before its invention. And so after the time of Galileo, when astronomers were convinced that the earth did travel round the sun, they tried with more and more persistence to discover the movement in the stars which would be a consequence of such a movement. Hooke, a contemporary of Newton and Wren, fixed a long telescope, 36 feet long, in a vertical position and examined a star called $\gamma$ Draconis, which passes near the zenith in the latitude of London. The idea was excellent, because it got rid of the troublesome, and at that time uncertain, effect of the refraction of light by our atmosphere. But Hooke did not succeed.

A great Danish astronomer, Römer of Copenhagen, made an attempt to find the distances of the two night stars, Sirius and Vega. He found a change in the relative positions of these stars in the spring and the autumn amounting to 1' of arc. He was delighted with his success and published it in a dissertation called "Copernicus Triumphans." But he was wrong, and probably the error arose from small irregularities of his clock, which was not compensated for changes of temperature. Consequently he made errors in his determination of the times at which Sirius and Vega were observed to be due south.

The next attempt to which I will refer was made by Bradley at Wanstead about 1750. He fixed his telescope in a vertical position as Hooke had done, and observed $\gamma$ Draconis at the times when it passed the meridian. By means of a plumb line he determined the vertical, and with his long telescope measured how far $\gamma$ Draconis was south of the zenith. The instrument he used, called a zenith section, is still preserved at Greenwich. He watched $\gamma$ Draconis from day to day for a year, and found a real movement. But it was in the opposite direction to what he anticipated. However, he succeeded in explaining the movement. It was due to the fact that though light travels very fast, it is only 10,000 times as fast as the earth's velocity round the
sun. As a consequence of this the light of a star does not seem to come to us always from exactly the same direction. This is easily illustrated by the familiar example of how an umbrella is held in a shower of rain. Suppose the rain to be coming straight down but if you are walking north you point your umbrella a little to the north, if east a little to the east, because your movement in combination with that of the raindrops makes them appear to come in a direction slightly diverted from their true one. Thus a star is not seen in its true direction, but in one slightly diverted towards that in which the earth is moving. This was not the discovery for which Bradley was working, but it gave a method of measuring the velocity of light, and more than that, it vindicated the Copernican theory in another manner, for it showed that the earth was moving round the sun.

Another great astronomer, William Herschel, made a systematic search for the evidence of the nearness of some of the stars. With his great telescope he searched for stars which seemed to be near together; he then used the following argument: here are two stars which appear to be close together, but one may be much further away than the other; it is in fact very likely that the brighter star will be nearer to us than the fainter star. If I have both these stars in my telescope at the same time, and measure the angular distance between them, I may hope to find that the nearer star changes its distance slightly from the further star, due to the fact that the movement of the earth round the sun sometimes brings the near star more into line with the further star than at others. And with my big telescope the matter would not be desperate, even if the nearer star were as much as 200,000 times the distance of the sun from us. The argument was perfectly sound, but he did not find any stars so near. He was rewarded by finding in the sky double stars, which circulated round one another. For example, Castor consists of two close stars which revolve round one another, though it takes hundreds of years for them to complete a revolution. Many other attempts were made by astronomers, and, curiously enough, success was achieved almost simultaneously about the year 1833 by Henderson at the Cape Observatory, Struve at the National Observatory of Russia at Pulkowa, and Bessel at the Observatory at Königsberg. Henderson found the distance of the star \(a\) Centauri, one of the brightest stars in the southern constellations. This star is 250,000 times as far away as the sun. Struve found the distance of the bright star Vega. This star is about 600,000 times as far as the sun.
Bessel found the distance of 61 Cygni, a star which is not very bright, but which was known to be moving rapidly across the sky, and therefore presumably near. In many ways the most interesting of these observations was that made by Bessel, because he devised a specially delicate instrument, which was very suitable for these refined measurements. This instrument, called a heliometer, was used with marked success by other astronomers, and notably by Sir David Gill, a former Hon. Correspondent of the Victoria Institute. It would be out of place for me to enter into the numerous precautions which have to be taken if reliable results are to be obtained. Industry and skill and a real genius for avoiding the many errors which instruments are heir to, must be combined in the person of one astronomer. Perhaps I may tell you a story about Sir David Gill. He had been lecturing on this subject, and in order to explain the small angles we had to measure, compared them to the angle which a threepenny bit would subtend at the distance of a mile. A brother Scot, in proposing a vote of thanks to the lecturer, said there could be no doubt of his nationality, for no one but a Scotsman would take any notice of a threepenny bit a mile distant.

A great simplification in measuring the distances of stars was brought about by the introduction of photography to astronomical observations, but it must not be supposed that the task is easy: great care is necessary to avoid small errors which would vitiate the results. Nevertheless, there are at the present time seven or eight observatories with large photographic telescopes where this work is successfully carried on. It is quite possible with a dozen good photographs taken at suitable times to measure the distance of a star if it is nearer to us than 5 million times the sun’s distance—that is to say, between 400 and 500 million million miles away from us.

I have gone into this at length because it seems to me important to give an idea of the methods employed, as well as of the results obtained. The principle underlying the method is simplicity itself, but the successful application of the principle has been beset by many difficulties. The measurement of these small angles has been made possible by the genius of the engineers who have designed and executed the delicate movements of the telescopes, the opticians who have made the large and perfect lenses, and the chemists who have shown us how to obtain by photography a permanent impression of the light sent us by the stars. In these different ways our human faculties have been so greatly extended that we are able to measure
these great distances in the same way as an artillery officer in France can locate and range an enemy position.

It is, however, only a few of the nearer stars whose distances have been measured by astronomers: the number does not amount to more than a few hundreds. No doubt there are still many stars—say one or two thousand—within measurable distance of us, that is to say, within 500 million million miles, whose distances will probably be, but have not yet been determined. But these are only a few of the myriads of the stars we see with our telescopes. Other methods are being employed, and very successfully, for determining their distances. I shall not speak about these, but will rather tell you something more about the stars which are nearest to us. I will confine myself to the stars which are not further than a million times the distance of the sun from us—that is, roughly, stars within 100 million million miles of us. There are about twenty stars known to be within this limit of distance, and if we consider only those stars which are not less than 100 times as faint as can be seen with the naked eye, it is probable that there are still ten or fifteen more to be discovered. Let us consider, then, a huge sphere whose radius is one million times the distance from us to the sun. Suppose we make a model of this sphere and let us take a globe the size of the earth for our model. On this scale a star of the same diameter as the sun would be as big as a tennis ball. Imagine, then, from 30 to 40 tennis balls equally scattered inside the earth; this gives a picture of how near the stars are to one another. This gives us a good idea of the great distances between the stars.

These stars which are nearest to the earth differ a great deal in their magnitudes or brightness as seen by us. Thus Sirius, the brightest star in the sky, is one of them, and the very bright star Procyon is another, and α Centauri, the nearest of all the stars to us, is one of the brightest in the southern constellations. Others are fairly bright stars visible to the naked eye, but, on the other hand, a large proportion are faint and only visible with telescopic aid. From some of these stars we receive only $\frac{1}{100}$ of the light which Sirius gives us, and from some less than $\frac{1}{10000}$. These great differences are partly caused by difference of distances, but to a greater extent by intrinsic differences in the amount of light given out by the stars.

When the distances of stars are known we are able to tell how far the difference in their apparent magnitude is due to differences of distance and how far to real differences in intrinsic brightness.
The principle is very simple. If a body is moved to twice the distance, we receive a quarter as much light from it. If one candle at a distance of one foot gives one just sufficient light to read by, then a 100 candle-power lamp at a distance of 10 feet will be needed—and a 10,000 candle-power lamp at a distance of 100 feet would be equally serviceable. If the distance of a star is known, and the amount of light it gives us is also known, an easy calculation tells how much light it would give if it were no further away than the sun. We call this the luminosity of the star, and just as a candle is taken as a standard for comparing terrestrial lights, so the sun is taken as a standard of luminosity, and a luminosity of 5, say, means that a star gives out 5 times as much light as the sun.

Calculation shows us that Sirius is 48 times as luminous as the sun, Procyon about 10 times, and $\alpha$ Centauri about twice as luminous. Some of the stars are relatively very faint and give out only $\frac{1}{100}$ or less of the light emitted by the sun.

There is one very interesting feature apparent among the nearer stars, that the blue stars in our list are more luminous than the red ones. If the stars—I mean those twenty near ones and not all the stars in the sky—are arranged according to colour, the luminosity progressively diminishes as we go from blue to red.

Now the colour of a star is a very important feature. Most stars are so faint that we can hardly detect their colour. But if we look at the brighter stars we see that Sirius is blue, Arcturus yellow, Aldebaran red. These differences of colour mean differences of temperature. I will not enter into the proof of this. It depends on the knowledge derived from spectroscopic observations of the stars. The blue stars are at a temperature of, say, 10,000° Centigrade, the yellow ones, like the sun, at a temperature of 7500°, and the red ones, like Aldebaran, at a temperature of 4000°. We all know what a difference there is in the brightness of an electric light when it is over-incandesced and when it only has enough current to make the filament at red heat. We attribute the differences in the luminosities of these stars very largely to the fact that they are at a different temperature. No doubt there may be a considerable difference in size, but perhaps the most important difference is the difference in the brightness of their surfaces consequent on the difference of their temperatures.

One remarkable feature in these near stars is that no less than 8 out of 20 are double stars; for example, Sirius is a double star. The bright star we see has a very faint companion which can only be detected by a very large
telescope. These two stars revolve round one another in about 50 years. Procyon has a faint companion which gives only $\frac{1}{4000}$ as much light, and these go round one another in 40 years. η Cassiopeiae has a companion about 60 times as faint as itself, and they go round one another in 230 years. The companion of ζ Centauri is very bright, and they revolve about one another in 81 years.

When we know the distances of these stars from us we are able to calculate their distances from their companions, and we find that the distance of Sirius from its companion is 21 times the distance of the earth from the sun, that of Procyon 15, of ζ Centauri 23 times, and so on. We can use this knowledge to find out another very important fact about the stars, for the time which stars take to revolve about one another depends on their distance apart and the strength of the pull which their mutual gravitation exercises. This pull is proportional to the masses of the stars, and in this way we find that the mass of Sirius is 3½ times that of the sun, that of ζ Centauri twice, and of some of the other stars something at least as great as $\frac{1}{5}$ of the mass of the sun, and so we establish the fact that these stars, at any rate, are not very different from the sun in the quantity of matter that they contain.

When we know the distance we can also determine something about the rate at which the stars are moving. If we know the distance of an aeroplane which is flying perpendicularly to the line joining us to it, the measurement of its change of angular position at once enables its velocity to be determined. In the same way the knowledge of the distance of a star gives us means to find in part the star's velocity. As the spectroscope enables us to determine how fast a star is approaching or receding from us, we are enabled to determine completely the velocities of a number of stars. We find, then, that these are quite comparable with the velocity of the sun, which is moving with a velocity of 11 or 12 miles per second in the direction of the bright star ζ Lyrae.

These are various particulars in which the stars resemble the sun. They are, roughly speaking, of the same kind of mass, their luminosity varies a good deal, and the velocities with which they travel are quite comparable with that of the sun, may be a little more or a little less. One other thing in which they resemble the sun, though I shall give you no detail of this, is that they consist of the same chemical elements. I have gone through these particulars in order that you may see the general lines of argument of the proof that the stars are bodies like the
sun. The sun is bright and presents a disc of measurable size to us. If these stars of which we have spoken could be brought to the same distance they would present measurable discs, in some cases a little larger and in some a little smaller than the sun, but we should not find any enormous disparity. And so we conclude that the sun is just one of the stars of quite average dimensions, bigger and brighter than some but less and fainter than others. We have only found, as you perceive, a very limited number of things about the stars, their sizes, masses, surface temperatures and luminosities. There are many other things we should like to find: for instance, "Have these suns systems of planets revolving round them?" To this we can at present give no answer; but we should presume that they may have. You may ask, "Are we to suppose that these planets have life upon them?" The answer is, that we do not know, and can only guess by the analogy of our own earth and the sun.

I have confined myself to what we can discover about the nearest of the stars. There are means, partly depending on what we learn in this way, and partly on somewhat more complicated applications of geometry and physics, but still simple in principle, by which our knowledge is extended to great distances in space. We find that there are many millions of bodies which are in the main like the sun. Most of the stars we see form a great assembly which extends to two or three hundred times the distance of which I have been speaking in the direction perpendicular to the Milky Way, and to 1000 times this distance when we come to the plane of the Milky Way. We can even go beyond this, and we find clusters of stars far removed from that continuous assemblage of which our sun is a unit. Recent work by Hertzsprung, Shapley and others places the small Magellanic cloud at a distance 3000, the cluster of $\omega$ Centauri 700, and the cluster in Hercules 7000—if we take one million times the distance of the earth from the sun as our unit. This last cluster probably contains 50,000 stars brighter than the sun and many more less brilliant.

My lecture has been devoted to the attempt to give in general terms some idea of the principles which guide astronomers and the methods they employ rather than a statement of the results they have obtained. It seems to me that the mere statement of a scientific discovery is of little value without some idea of the means which have been employed to obtain it. It is, of course, quite impossible for anyone but an expert to follow all the details, just as it is only the expert who
has studied a problem in all its bearings who will be able to surmount the difficulties and find the true solution. But it is possible to follow the general lines of a scientist's thought. In astronomy, and particularly the part with which I have been dealing to-night, only very simple principles of geometry and physics are necessary. The difficulty is in the application, the great accuracy necessary because of the smallness of the quantities to be measured. There is nothing at all mysterious about the methods employed.

The results are indeed such as to fill thoughtful minds with wonder. We find myriads of bodies essentially like the sun in constitution, scattered about in space at wide distances from one another. The few things we know about them are merely their sizes, temperatures, densities, and some other general features of their physical constitution. A wide region for speculation is opened; but on this I will not enter.

We have been told that "the undevout astronomer is mad." Whatever his religious beliefs may be, he cannot fail to look at the skies with wonder and awe, and the more so as little by little a few facts are gleaned about the stars around us.

The Conference Hall was filled by a large audience that followed the Address, which was illustrated by numerous lantern slides, with deep attention.

At its close the President expressed the great obligation under which the Astronomer Royal had placed the Institute, and a vote of thanks, proposed by Mr. Maunder and seconded by the Rev. Prebendary Fox, was carried by acclamation.

Dr. Schofield then moved a vote of thanks to the Chairman, which was seconded and put to the Meeting by Professor Langhorn Orchard, and the Meeting adjourned at 6 p.m.