THE BEARING OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

By

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SYNOPSIS

1. The Limitations of Science. The psychology of religion, like all science, yields the kind of knowledge gained from detached investigation of experience. Religion gives the kind of knowledge gained from immediate living experience.

2. Freud's Analysis of Religion did not go beyond a destructive study of its neurotic forms, which has a practical value. It is rather his psychobiological instinct theory of man which needs to be challenged, for it is a sub-personal theory which leaves the cultural life with no ultimate intrinsic value.

3. Neo-Freudian "Object-Relations" theory (Klein and Fairbairn) restores the "person" and "personal relations" to the central place for psychology, and has far-reaching implications, especially in Fairbairn's work.

4. Motivation. Libido is not pleasure-seeking but object-seeking. Sex is only one among other (including cultural) pathways to good-object relations.

5. Psychotherapy. Since bad-object relations make people ill, it is good-object relations which must cure them. This approach links psychotherapy with religion.

6. Science and Religion. Science is a schizoid activity detached from immediate emotional living. It destroys values and symbols and dehumanizes life, in return for giving us useful knowledge about things. Unanalysed symbolic activity is necessary for mental health and for creative and productive living. This points us back from science to the need for religion.

1. We find little difficulty to-day in accepting the view that there is nothing that science cannot study. It is not so generally recognized that there is nothing about which science can tell us all we want to know. The danger of confused thinking on the matter is not unconnected with the tendency to hypostatize Science, dignify it with a capital "S" and regard it as a mysteriously potent "thing-in-itself," the modern substitute for the deity and the new Saviour of mankind. This earlier tendency to personify and deify Science is perhaps intellectually, but not yet emotionally, on the wane. It still finds a stronghold in the minds of some political ideologists who believe it is possible to plan and run both the state and the individual on efficient and purely scientific lines, and make and remake human nature at will by scientific procedures. There are also
those who believe that "mind" and "person" are unnecessary hypotheses, and that the mechanism of the brain as revealed by Cybernetics on the analogy of the electronic calculating machine will explain and give us power to control all things.

Such modes of thinking surely lose their force the moment we remember that science is nothing but our own human selves making a certain kind of approach to phenomena, examining selected aspects of our experience of reality from a limited and basically utilitarian, practical point of view. Scientific study therefore will only find the kind of thing it looks for, and rightly ignores all else as a distraction from its own proper purpose. It is a pity if we should then forget the limited scope of scientific enquiry, and mistake the part for the whole.

There are many ways of expressing the fact that there are two ways of knowing and two sorts of knowledge. There is a knowledge of sherry to be gained from drinking it that is different from chemically analysing it. There is a knowledge of another human being to be gained by falling in love which is different from that of physiological and psychological analysis. There is a knowledge of God to be gained from having a religious experience which is different from that gained by theological, philosophical, and psychological investigation. There is a knowledge contained in immediate living experience which is different from that of detached intellectual investigation. It may be called the difference between intrinsic and utilitarian knowledge, for it is the difference between knowing something as an end in itself, and knowing something as a means to further ends: i.e. knowing as an experience of immediate intrinsic satisfaction, and knowing in order to be able to use something for a purpose beyond itself. It is the difference between knowledge of and knowledge about.

Science has to do with useful knowledge gained by intellectually detached study unhampered by questions of urgent emotional satisfaction. Scientific knowledge is not the knowledge that comes from living, from plunging into the basic activities and human relationships that constitute our living. Scientific knowledge comes by standing aside from the urgencies of living, detaching ourselves from the flowing stream of life and love and lack of love, and abstracting certain aspects of reality, not to enjoy it, but only to understand it—even though later, armed with that understanding, we may be able to plunge back into the stream of life and live and enjoy living all the better for our scientific knowledge. In fact it is only at the points where satisfactory living breaks down that we feel the urge to stand back and investigate to find out why.

Thus it is with religion and the psychology of religion: perhaps first I will say with love and the psychology of love. When love is successful no one bothers to analyse it to find out what it is and how it works. But when irrational infatuations lead to ruinous marriage choices, and useful marriages degenerate into dog-fights, then we need to look into the matter in a detached scientific way to find out why.

Similarly with religion: when religion flourishes in ages of faith and provides the great mass of the people with a secure defence against anxieties and a powerful, constructive inspiration for living, no one feels much of an impulse to pull it to pieces to find out how it works. We to-day
live in an age of cultural revolution and disintegration when religious and other faiths have broken down for great masses. Into the gap step dangerous fanaticisms, and we feel impelled to investigate coolly and find out what is going on and why.

So we come to the psychology of religion, which is no more a substitute for religion that the psychology of love is a substitute for falling in love. When people cannot be religious or cannot fall in love, psychology may throw valuable light on the matter.

The psychology of religion investigates the nature and functioning of religion as a mental experience of human beings so as to discover what needs it meets, how it meets them or fails to meet them, and by what mental processes religious experience goes on. This is clearly a possible and legitimate study. The devout sometimes accuse the psychologist of explaining religion away. How much truth there could be in such a charge may be assessed by drawing a parallel. Would we say that the psychological study of sexual attraction and affectionate relationships would destroy the love life and make people incapable of falling in love? Such a criticism would be absurd. What I think is true is that psychological insight into the love-life may make people less liable to fall victims in blind ways to irrational infatuations, infantile dependencies and neurotic, compulsive needs for affection as a defence against gross anxiety. A psychological approach may well prove destructive to immature forms of the love life, but will in fact make people more capable of mature love relationships, provided we recognize that scientific understanding is a servant of, and not a substitute for, living.

I believe that is also the truth about the psychological study of religion. It will unmask immature and neurotic forms of religion, and will doubtless prove destructive to some forms of religious fanaticism, morbid emotionalism, authoritarian dogmatism or what not. But no scientific, and no psychological, investigation can undermine the reality of what is indisputably real and valid, and the psychological study of religion may be expected to increase our understanding of whatever is the religious experience of the mature and mentally healthy person, again provided we do not think that science is the only proper approach to living.

2. How then shall we approach the psychological study of religion? Academic psychology takes us some part of the way. Three excellent books, Introduction to the Psychology of Religion by R. H. Thouless, The Individual and His Religion by G. W. Allport, and The Psychology of Religion by L. W. Grensted, give us as much as academic psychology can contribute. It is primarily of a descriptive order, and certainly aids us in gaining clear ideas of what a reasonable and healthy religion is like. But we need something more penetrative and explanatory of the dynamic processes that make up religious experience.

What then of psycho-analysis? Classic Freudianism was almost entirely destructive in its approach. Freud was more obviously hostile and emotionally biased in his handling of religion than with any other subject. Religion was infantile phantasy and illusion, the projection of an idealized (and therefore unreal) father-image on to the universe as a source of
security and protection for frightened grown-up children scared by dangers both from without and within.

Yet I cannot feel that that is the real point at which it is necessary to take issue with Freud. What he said by way of a critical psychological analysis of forms of religion as he came across them may be disturbing, but is now recognized to contain a great deal of truth. Whether his conclusions can be pushed as far as he wished to push them, to the total destruction of all religion, is another matter. My own personal opinion is that Freud gave a substantially accurate first analysis of neurotic and immature forms of religious experience, but that there was a limitation in his own personality which made him unable to perceive the nature and validity of a mature religious experience. We can learn much from his destructive criticism, but he has no positive contribution to make.

I want to join issue with Freud on a much more fundamental level—namely that of the whole type or orientation of his theory of human nature. Classical psycho-analysis is a general psychological theory of human personality which is struggling but failing to emancipate itself from a psycho-biology of non-personal organic man. Freud’s theory is an unrepentant instinct theory.

Instinctive drives are the ultimate motivational forces determining all human behaviour. The instincts are primarily organic tensions, chemico-physical tensions of which hunger and sex are the basic types. They are physiologically created forms of tension which can be relieved by the appropriate objects, the biological substrate of the love life in the broadest sense, the life of need and desire (libido). When, later on, Freud recognized that aggression also was an ultimate factor and appeared to be as primary as the “libidinal drives,” he constructed a highly speculative and controversial theory of a death-instinct to account for it. The biological fact that organisms die and the psychological fact of a compulsion to repeat injurious experiences was made evidence for the hypothetical existence of a positive drive towards death, destruction and relapse into the inorganic state, which is supposed to be as innate in the organism as the life-urge. Aggression is the turning outwards, away from the self, of the death instinct. Freud had to assume this because he had to find a biological basis for aggression comparable to those for hunger and love.

We must add that psycho-analysts generally have not taken to this idea of a death-instinct, apart from the school of Melanie Klein. As Dr. Clara Thompson says, there is no evidence at all for the assumption that aggression has its roots in the biological tendency of organisms to die. So far as we can observe, aggression is always a vital reaction against frustration, and expresses a determination not to die. It is a secondary thing that when aggression is bottled up inside it undermines its owner from within.

However, that is Freud’s view: that organic tensions of the hunger or sex type, and of the supposed death instinct, create psychic equivalents of themselves which we experience as impulses of a libidinal and aggressive order. These impulses are, on this theory, produced by internal and basically organic conditions, and are neat and complete before ever they drive us out in search of objects, in the shape of food and other human beings, to satisfy them with or to vent them on. Life is a striving to
achieve the reduction of biological tensions. It all comes down to that and nothing else in the end.

In its application to practical social and individual problems this theory has curious consequences, which Freud himself did not shrink from following up. In his paper in 1908 on "Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness, he works out the view that man is bedevilled by two innate and "mighty" instinctual drives, sex and aggression, which are fundamentally anti-social, so that culture and civilization can only be achieved at the price of instinctual renunciation. Culture and instinct are sworn foes. Culture enforces repression and so breeds neurosis. Instinct, if it is strong enough, enforces rebellion and so breeds criminality. Only a few innately superior natures have enough capacity for sublimation, for diverting instinctual energy to social and moral ends, to escape the dilemma. The rest of us are doomed to be, in varying degrees, either neurotically ill or morally bad. Instinct and our moral ideals and social values must strike a compromise short of our finest cultural aims.

We cannot of course criticize this theory on the ground that we do not like it: but only on the ground of whether the instinct theory on which it rests is scientifically validated or not. I think there is little doubt now that academic psychological theory, clinical evidence and recent developments in psycho-analysis itself are turning decisively against the Freudian psycho-biology.

It is unnecessary here to elaborate the whole controversy about instincts. It is sufficient to mention that in academic psychology "instincts" of the McDougall type are falling out of favour so far as human psychology is concerned. Human beings are not hereditarily equipped with specific drives prior to experience. G. W. Allport holds that our actual motivations are post-instinctual phenomena. Myers, Burt and Thouless hold a theory of instincts as innate, directional, determining tendencies of a general type, potentialities of action which wait on actual experience of the environment and of object-relations to be called out in definite forms.

We are born with certain basic needs, both organic and psychic, but the actual ways in which we experience them, and the specific emotions and impulses that arise, are functions of our life-in-relationship-with-other-human-beings. Thus Fairbairn holds that the term "instinct" is only admissible in its adjetival form and never denotes a "psychic entity" existing prior to our actual experience.

In America Sullivan holds strongly the view that instincts, those remnants of the old faculty psychology, do not exist, and we have no definable impulses outside of our "interpersonal" relationship situations. Karen Horney and Erich Fromm regard human sexuality and aggressiveness, in any forms in which they are troublesome, not as natural instincts but as neurotic trends developed as a result of bad human relationships primarily in early life. Horney was probably the first in psycho-analytical circles to point out that the need for love and sexual union is not necessarily an expression of strong innate instinct but may itself be an exaggerated, neurotic, i.e. anxiety-dICTated compulsion.

We are not shut up to Freud's view that our trouble is the mighty force of innate biological drives which we can do nothing to eradicate and not
much to sublimate. If that were true we would have to accept his view that neurosis, or mental ill-health, is the price we must pay for cultural advance, and that to safeguard our mental health we must lower our cultural, i.e. moral and social values.

Classic Freudianism is a theory of which little constructive use can be made for the study of religious experience. For Freud the business of civilization is first to enforce instinctual renunciation by repression. Biological egotism, the ruthless possessiveness of sexual and aggressive instincts, must be curbed by force and law without, and by a strong super-ego within, to stop us murdering, raping and thieving at will and breaking up the cohesion of the social groupings we need for general security’s sake. The second task of civilization has been to diminish rebellious discontent over enforced instinctual renunciations by the “compensations” afforded by art, religion and in other ways. Freudian psychology of religion reduces itself to the view that God is created as an ideal fictional lawgiver and father, first to enforce repression of instincts and second to make up for that by promising love, protection and rewards in an after-life for those who obey. God, as a concept, is a magnified version of the father-image of our childhood, projected on to the Universe, and religion therefore is a psychologically childish form of adaptation to life, and it serves to keep us childish and immature.

Now I have no doubt at all that Freud’s analysis of religion is substantially true of a great deal of popular and official religion. Neurotic forms of religion have abounded all through history, and neurotic elements are discernible even in many of the finest forms of the religious life. It is important and valuable to have an objective and critical method of assessing such phenomena as extreme asceticism, morbid religious guilt, aggressive religious fanaticism, morbid and compulsive religious devotion of a world-denying and life-denying narrowness. It is valuable to have means whereby we can detect what is wrong with intolerant moral idealism, dictatorial religious dogmatism, and such opposite manifestations as hyper-Calvinistic rigorism and puritanism on the one hand, or sentimental over-indulgence in emotionalism and mere “comfort-seeking” on the other. Such problems as formalism and externalism, credalism and heresy-hunting, revivalism and outbreaks of enthusiasm, may well call for careful psycho-analytical study. Freud has done us a service in providing a method of scientific psycho-analytical investigation for the field of religious experience. I regard this, however, as a pruning activity, and somehow Freud misses the real heart of the matter. I do not think a positive constructive psychology of mature religious experience is to be come by solely through the negative destructive analysis of immature and morbid phenomena. There are mature, and also morbid and degenerate forms of art. Politics lends itself to critical psycho-analytical investigation just as glaringly, in our generation far more glaringly, than religion.

3. When we seek to answer the question “What would be the religious experience, if any, of a mature personality?” I do not think classic Freudianism, with its psycho-biological approach, outmoded instinct theory of human nature and its rationalist and purely scientific orientation, can
help us. We need a psycho-dynamic theory of man as personal, not merely as organic, for that. Nor do I think that American developments of psycho-analysis in a sociological direction, which replaces instinct theory by a theory of culture-pattern pressures, can give us what we need. There is, however, a British development, a neo-Freudian psycho-analysis, which I believe provides us with the fundamental conceptual approach required.

It is not an easy matter to give a simple account of this. It is based on Melanie Klein's pioneering and revolutionary work in the treatment of children, and her development of the theory of "internal psychic objects." To put this in a very simple way, our past experience is preserved in our minds in two forms, memories and internal objects. If I have an experience which is satisfactory to me and leaves no problems behind, its immediate emotional intensity subsides and it remains with me as a memory of a past event, rather pleasantly tinged with feeling, to which I can look back as something over and done with but comfortable to dwell on occasionally, when I may choose to do so.

If, however, I have an upsetting experience which ends very unsatisfactorily for me I cannot leave it alone, cannot let it drop back into the past to the level of memory so easily. I shall want to keep it alive in mind, keep on worrying at it, keep on reliving it and working over it so as to make it end up in a way that is more satisfactory to me.

If I had a quarrel with someone and feel that he got the better of the argument, I shall suffer a compulsion to keep on reliving the quarrel in imagination, not only keeping alive the pain of suffering his attack, but also now giving myself the pleasure of annihilating him with the brilliant repartee and the devastating replies I could not think of at the time. This is not a memory but a living continuing experience. I have installed my enemy, my "bad-object" to give him his technical name, inside my mind, he has now become a very vigorous, living and disturbing part of "me" inside myself, and attack and counter-attack go on between us to keep me in a state of constant agitation and anxiety. If I remain fully conscious of all that, in time its intensity will subside, I shall lose interest, and it becomes mere memory. But if the internal warfare is so intense as to be too painful and disturbing, and too much of an interference with my freedom to do other things, I may automatically repress the whole situation into the unconscious. There it goes on as a never-ceasing underground warfare, often reappearing in my dreams. I have got rid of it consciously, but I pay the price of now harbouring an invisible enemy within myself and begin to feel nervous and apprehensive and develop defensive character traits and physical tensions and symptoms, without knowing why. Also I probably react at times to outer real situations and people with more fear or anger than is warranted because these emotions are always being unconsciously aroused inside me, and I must find someone or something to tack them on to. I am now mentally inhabited or "possessed" by an internal invisible bad psychic object.

Something like that happens, and goes on happening, in our infancy and early childhood, in ever more complicated ways, until, as Melanie Klein showed, we build up a hidden inner mental world in which part of us is
always living in highly disturbing relationships with bad-objects. These internal bad objects originate in the splitting off of disturbing aspects of parents and other significant people personified in our minds. Our dream life is our only direct peep into our inner world. We also build up good figures within ourselves to help and protect us against the bad ones. We live in two worlds at once, inner and outer, and the bad figures in our unconscious are the originals of the devils, ghosts, and witches of legend, and of the sinister figures, wild animals, burglars and persecutors of our dreams.

Now W. R. D. Fairbairn (Edinburgh) has realized what Melanie Klein has not seen, that this view makes the classic type of instinct theory unnecessary. Our troublesome sexual and aggressive impulses are not manifestations of healthy inborn instinct; they are disturbed reactions roused in us by depriving, rejecting, persecuting figures in our unconscious. Our instincts, whatever they may be, would not be antisocial if we lived in a peaceful world deep down within ourselves. How far our unconscious inner world is peaceful or frightening depends, largely, though not entirely, on how happy, helpful and satisfying our parental and home environment was in our formative years. A really bad home can create a hell in the unconscious of the child who grows up in it. Human personality is multi-personal, structurally constituted by internal objects and parts of the ego in relationships with them.

I will only mention one other contribution of Fairbairn, but it is absolutely fundamental. He discards Freud's hedonistic theory of instincts which strive solely for physical satisfactions experienced as relaxations of tension or pleasures; and he regards libido (i.e. need, desire) as primarily object-seeking, not pleasure-seeking. Object-relationships, not inherited tendencies, become the key to the understanding of all human experience and behaviour. This runs parallel, on the scientific level, to Professor John MacMurray's central emphasis on personal relationships at the philosophical level.

Here is a psycho-dynamic theory with which we can deal constructively with moral and religious experience. We cannot here go into Fairbairn's extensive and highly original, not to say revolutionary, rethinking of classical psycho-analytical theory as a whole. His revision of the libido theory and recasting of the id-ego-super-ego theory of endopsychic structure, his view that it is internal bad-objects primarily, and not impulses, which are repressed, that the major psychic function of morality and the super-ego is that it is our defence against our internal bad-objects and their consequences; and finally that neurosis is due, not to a conflict of impulse and conscience, but to the internal dangers emanating from bad objects which persecute us inside our unconscious, so that psychotherapy is properly an "exorcism" of these internal devils—all this can be followed in his book of collected papers, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1952).

I wish merely to indicate some of the bearings of his theory on the psychological study of religion.

4. First, and of primary importance, is his insistence that object-relationships are the fundamental thing for psychology, that the need for
good-object relations is the basic human striving, coming before aggression, which only arises as a reaction to the frustration of the striving for good-object relations. On the original Freudian theory only one concept was available for explaining all cultural phenomena, social, moral, intellectual and religious. They were sublimations, expressions of sexual energy in the narrow sense, detached from its original aims, re-directed to acceptable social ends and so disguised: but all things were at bottom direct or indirect sexual activities. For Freud the organic development of the sexual instinct determined character. For Fairbairn sexual activity is only one of several pathways to, and means of achieving, good-object relationships. Our needs for object-relations determine what we do with our sexuality, not vice versa. The mental trickery of sublimation disappears. Every activity, moral, artistic and religious no less than sexual, exists in its own right as a pathway of our libidinal needs in search of good-objects. If our cultural activities are secretly sexualized it is a sign of domination by infantile needs and immaturity of development. It is only in infancy that life is almost exclusively physical. The more mature we are, the truer it is that sexual union is only one among other means of integrating a good-object relationship. Sublimation, then, turns out to be not the normal, but the neurotic, form of higher cultural activity. The cultural life of mature persons stands in its own right as an intrinsically valuable and necessary form of experience of the all-necessary good personal relationships in which our real life is found.

5. At this point, stressing the basic importance of the good-object relationship and of the multiple paths to it, as that in which the very essence of human living is found, we must take up the problem of psychotherapy. Briefly, the various personality-ills from which human beings suffer, known to us now under the headings of psychosis, psychoneurosis, perversion, criminality and character-disorder, all find a common root in bad-object relationships as their cause. A human being, whether child or adult, is secure, happy, creative and active, and free from fears, angers and conflicts, so long as his important human relationships are good and satisfying to all his primary personality needs. These needs are briefly to be loved, to return love, and to be free to develop his own proper individuality and be creative. Personality ills arise out of deprivation of love and frustration of active development and creativity; i.e. out of the breakdown of good human relationships.

Now if it is bad-object relations which make people ill, clearly it must be good-object relationships which alone will cure and make them well. Thus psychotherapy resolves itself into providing for the patient a good-object relationship with his psychotherapist, on the basis of which he can grow out of the results of bad-object relationships with parents and others encountered in the formative childhood years. Since the bad-objects of early years have been internalized, where they continue their disturbing activities as devils hidden in the unconscious, psychotherapy becomes an exorcism of internal bad-objects and their replacement by a good-object relationship in which the patient can grow mature. (Fairbairn, op. cit., ch. 3.)
Now this links psychotherapy closely with religion. It is not scientific knowledge and technique as such that have saving power, but scientific knowledge and technique used as instruments of a good-object relationship. Religion is primarily a matter of good-object relations. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbour as thyself." In fact all down the ages religion as opposed to science has been man's therapy for personality ills. Religion is the form under which, historically, the psychotherapeutic factor for mental and spiritual distress has been recognized and cultivated. Modern neo-Freudian psycho-analysis is rediscovering this on a scientific level. R. Money-Kyrle says: "religion is a form of psychotherapy which promotes a belief in the existence of idealized good-objects as a defence against persecutory and depressive guilt" (Psycho-Analysis and Politics, p. 84 n.). There is much more to be said than that; but I leave the definition as a challenge to further psychological, philosophical and theological study.

6. I will only raise one other issue, but that is a tremendous one, the relationship of religion and science. With the development of modern psychology and psycho-analysis, science invaded the sacred domain of religion, the inner life of the soul of man. The result was a furthering of the process set going by science elsewhere, a debunking of superstition. But along with this goes the destruction of values and symbols, which is why science has always aroused many misgivings in sensitive minds. Science has no values but utilitarian ones, except the value of truth in the limited sense of scientific truth. To put it differently, science is not concerned with emotional, personal, values; only with intellectual, impersonal values. It destroyed religious values and had nothing to put in their place.

When science began to be turned into a philosophy of life, as a substitute for the religion it was supposed to have destroyed, the scientific outlook led to a steady dehumanization of life. The nemesis of a purely scientific outlook is the Communist totalitarian state machine in politics and a general scepticism and emotional incapacity to believe in anything or live by any positive faith except the impersonal devotion to science and scientific techniques. The nemesis of the scientific outlook is the dehumanizing of the human being, his treatment on a sub-personal level, and official psychology carries on the bad work. A patient is someone to be investigated with batteries of psychological tests, personality inventories, intelligence tests, aptitude tests which cull out useful information no doubt. But the subsequent task of psychotherapy is made harder because the patient always resents, as a person, what he feels is the indignity of being put through this impersonal scientific sorting machine so that he can be labelled and pigeon-holed for future reference. He produces the same emotional reaction as people produce to being caught up and "shoved around" by the vast impersonal bureaucratic machine of the modern welfare, or centralized, or totalitarian state. A world run on purely scientific principles has no regard for personality and no respect for human dignity.

Psycho-analysis itself, due in part to Freud's particular personality
type, grew up in this scientific orientation and turned its scientific system into a secular religion, with an orthodoxy, heresies and veneration of the founder. But its weakness was betrayed by the misgivings continually felt about psychotherapy. *Freud seems to have concluded that psycho-analysis has more power as a scientific technique to understand, than power as a therapeutic technique to heal.* No special criticism can be levelled at psycho-analysis for this orientation. Such a movement was bound to originate in the scientific, not the religious, world, and it is being true to science. The important thing is that, in its later developments, psycho-analysis is giving us the means of transcending the narrow scientific point of view.

It is bringing us back once more in the neo-Freudian developments to the centrality of the person and personal object-relations. We are finding that *not scientific knowledge but good human relationship is the real key to human health, happiness and productivity.* To analyse a human mind to the bitter end may merely destroy whatever a patient had to live by. A motor car may be taken to pieces but that by itself does not enable it to go anywhere. Scientific analysis and the knowledge it gives can be a good servant in the hands of a positive and loving personality, but is a bad master.

*Our great problem, now we have become explicitly aware of the unconscious, is to know what to do with it.* Before we knew it was there, we took care of it by means of art, religion, and symbolic experience and activity in general. How has our scientific knowledge of the unconscious affected this question? Possibly it has made us more helpless in face of the unconscious than we used to be. Pure analysis does not necessarily solve its problems, and in any case only the tiny few can be analysed; but purely scientific psycho-analysis as part of our conscious educational equipment may make us simply unable to use art and religion, because having exposed all "the works," we become too self-conscious and "in the know" to be artistically and religiously simple and spontaneous. We take our clock to pieces and find it no longer tells the time.

It appears now that the unconscious, with all its secret hidden life of infantile phantasy, and of emotion which to some extent, even in the most mature and normal, operates on infantile levels, is a natural, inevitable and permanent part of our personality. It cannot be analysed out of existence. Kleinians tell us that unconscious phantasy has a positive part to play in all normal conscious mental activity. But if we were to analyse all conscious activities back into unconscious primitive phantasies we would paralyse the conscious cultural ego. *Unanalysed symbolic activity is necessary to mental health and to creative and productive living.* Our main business with a motor car is not to be looking at the works but driving somewhere. Our main business with our personalities is, not to be probing our unconscious phantasies, but living creatively in relationship with the outer world. Living is primarily an extravert, not an introvert, activity. Naturally when the "works" go wrong and we become unable to relate ourselves properly to our outer world, then we must take up the introvert task of looking inside. But if that should then become our major interest we shall have lost the capacity to "live" in the real sense, in external object relationships, and in symbolic experiences.

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This is what happens when we try to make science "a way of life," and it becomes particularly deadly if we should try to make psychological science a way of life. Fairbairn has shown the real nature of scientific activity to be a schizoid pursuit, the activity of the detached person who has stopped living in order to stand aside and investigate life. It is remarkable how often schizoid persons enter into their own dreams as merely an onlooker or observer who does not feel anything. The reason why intellectuals are often dangerous and misleading guides is that they are basically schizoid personalities who value systems, ideologies and techniques, more than the personal relationships they feel too much unconscious anxiety about to enter into. Fairbairn writes:

"Schizoid characteristics, usually in a less pronounced form, are also common among members of the intelligentsia ... intellectual pursuits as such, whether literary, artistic, scientific, or otherwise, appear to exercise a special attraction for individuals possessing schizoid characteristics to one degree or another. Where scientific pursuits are concerned, the attraction would appear to depend upon the schizoid individual's attitude of detachment no less than upon his over-valuation of the thought-processes" (op. cit., p. 6).

What then is this scientifically-minded generation to do with the Unconscious viewed as a normal part of our personality, which needs symbolic expression in our outer life? The schizoid scientific intellectual tries to do without it, becomes first emotionally unreal and then a prey to irrational compulsions. "Nature's way" has been to neutralize and inhibit it, so far as direct uncontrolled expression is concerned, by means of repression and the whole system of ego-defences; but at the same time to express it by means of art, religion and symbolic experience and activity in general. It has to be recognized that there is a hidden symbolic activity and a disguised expression of unconscious phantasy life in even the most practical, prosaic and utilitarian pursuits, including science and even, or perhaps especially, money-making and economic activity. But love and friendships in our object-relationships, and sport, and especially art and religion in our cultural life, provide more personal satisfactions for our unconscious emotional needs.

Our dilemma is that science and purely rationalist, intellectual and investigatory pursuits, concerned with understanding only and not with living satisfactions and personal relationships, have ruthlessly undermined our traditional symbolism. Just as there is a neurotic form of religious experience, so there is a neurotic form of scientific activity, when investigation is pursued not primarily to solve problems but to escape from emotional realities into an intellectualist's paradise. Under this kind of thing Religion has suffered more than Art because it always sought to give its symbols an intellectual basis and justification in a creed and combine the values of truth and love, of intellectual and emotional goals, of communion and of theological and philosophical comprehension. So it was vulnerable on its credal side to the results of factual scientific research, and science has undermined its credibility in popular estimation. Many scientists took the propositions of religion, not as emotional and symbolic, but as purely intellectual and factual and set about disproving them. The result is the destruction of symbolism and the drift into arid rationalism in European history, both religious and secular, with the ultimate out-
break of irrationalism in politics, and the collapse of the normal repressions of the civilized order, to produce the devilries of concentration camps and political torture. The unconscious, finding no proper symbolic provision for its expression, has avenged itself by crude outbreaks which in the individual we call psychosis.

Religion, in the advanced Liberal Modernist schools, has been drifting away from the symbolizing of our unconscious emotional life and needs, by moving ever closer to a compromise with scientific rationalism. This process could only end by science and philosophy swallowing religion and leaving us with nothing to help us to achieve emotional stabilization at deep unconscious levels.

Art seems to have moved in the opposite direction. It was immune to the impact of science because it made no attempt to compete with science on science’s own ground. It has usually abhorred “the scientific spirit” and dealt with science only as a movement of our times. But Art too has drifted away from symbolization of the unconscious emotional life in the opposite direction from the religious drift towards ever more crudely undisguised and unsymbolized expressions of the unconscious. Fairbairn, in a paper entitled The Ultimate Basis of Aesthetic Experience, says: “The comparative poverty of the art-work in Surrealism is evidence of a relative failure of repression. Thus in Surrealism the ‘found object’ represents the demands of the unconscious urges with an unusual poverty of disguise” (Brit. Journal of Psych., General Section, vol. XXI, Pt. 2, Oct. 1938, p. 173).

We seem, therefore, to be driven to one of two extremes, either to be schizoid scientific intellectuals with no mature and overt feeling-life, or else emotional primitives in art, politics and sexuality, who no longer feel any need to clothe the unconscious in decent dress or control its infantile impulses out of respect for the personality of other people. The second extreme is often a rebound from the first.

What we need to save us from this dilemma is a new development of religion which takes account of modern science and is not intellectually incredible to us, and yet conserves and expresses the values of the personal and especially unconscious emotional life. It must be much more than an attempt at a rational and scientific philosophy of life. In his New Introductory Lectures, in the closing chapter on “A Philosophy of Life,” and in The Future of an Illusion, Freud pins his faith on science and the still small voice of reason as a substitute for religion. If Fairbairn’s view of the schizoid nature of intellectual and scientific activity is correct, this attempt to shift the foundations of life off the emotional on to the intellectual functions can only condemn us ultimately to an arid rationalism in which we do more analysing than living. As Wordsworth says “We murder to dissect.” The new religious development must enable us not only to think but to feel. It must be, not merely a scientifically credible belief about the universe and our place in it, but a dynamic faith in it and an emotional relationship to it. It would not offend our conscious intelligence but it would provide satisfaction for the deep unconscious dynamics of our personality. Freud had no vision of the need for, and possibility of, such a religion of mature minds. We may venture to predict, on the basis
of all that we know of human history, that the future will see the rebirth of religion in such a new and vital form.

It is not my business qua psychologist to say what this religion of the future will be, though we may observe that in our day scientific philosophy and political ideologies are manifestly unsatisfactory and even dangerous substitutes for it, as a basis of healthy emotional living. Some think, or hope, that Christianity has in it the living resources for such a rebirth. The future will decide. One thing is certain that the living religion of the future will not be one of the highly rational attempts at a synthesis of "the best" taken from all religions that scholars often attempt. Its founder or reformer, if it has one, will not be a scholar or a scientist or a psycho-analyst. The one thing we can say of it is that its basic truth will be a truth of "object-relations," it will give men an experience of living relationship to one another and to their world.