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1937

807TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING.

HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, S.W.1, ON MONDAY, MARCH 8TH, 1937,
AT 4.30 P.M.

BRIG.-GENERAL W. BAKER BROWN, C.B., LATE R.E., IN THE
CHAIR.

The Minutes of the previous Meeting were read, confirmed and signed, and the HON. SECRETARY announced the election of Miss Francis Mary Kent and Mr. Albert Eagle, B.S., as Associates.

The CHAIRMAN then called on Major H. C. Corlette, O.B.E., F.R.I.B.A., to read his paper entitled "The Crown in England. Its Significance among other Political and Constitutional Ideas."

THE CROWN IN ENGLAND.

Its Significance Among Other Political and Constitutional Ideas.

An Essay on the Architecture of Freedom.

By Major HUBERT C. CORLETTE, O.B.E., F.R.I.B.A.

INTRODUCTORY.

THERE is a cure for all the political diseases of to-day. It is Monarchy Limited, but not unlimited. And it is not democracy. But as politics are very human affairs, said to be civil but now become somewhat uncivil, this monarchy, as among men, must be limited. It must be also constitutional. And, being so, it should proceed by counsel so as to decide by consent. There will be some divine right in this method. It merely indicates a right to do the right thing in the right way. But it establishes no right to override any personal or public, corporate, right, obligation, or duty as between man and man or men and men. If this were not so, despotism is enthroned and a dictator rides in state. And for this there is no

right, divine or human, whether in things civil, clerical, or personal, except by presumption.

But we must not look at these ideas of despotism as if they were only single-handed tyrannies. Every single unit, every man of a whole community, becomes a dictator if he, by association, tries to claim, as a right, to enforce, by the force of numbers alone, by ballot boxes, secret or not, some special privilege for himself or his class at the cost of others unjustly. A combination to represent the need for a redress of wrong may become necessary. It is a right of appeal, of petition, and a recognition by constitutional means of a lawful measure of recognised procedure. But if law is made to bend out of the line of justice by some kind of vote force, or money force, the mob becomes the tyrant, a monster of many heads from among whom one will emerge as the leader.

And there is no more inherent right divine in a domineering mass of men as machines than there is in one dominant, and equally ungovernable, man as a rod of iron scything his way through blood to power.

In the older forms of despotism the war for control was between man and man, each with his armed fighting force, paid or bribed. Now it is between party and party, people and people, nation and nation, fighting by the use of gilded force, money against money, or no money. Men are armed with gold, poisoned by propaganda, killed with gas, de-civilised by economic enterprise, deprived by competing industry, bought, body and soul, by monopolies of power, industrial and political.

These may be called persuasive forces. And such forces may be criminal in aim, and therefore not very civil proceedings. They are used as arguments of compulsion, not of free persuasion.

The first thing we observe as a significance in the Crown is this : it is above Party. If this is so, as it is, we cannot descend to Party levels in discussing its significance. But, this being so, we may claim a liberty to use illustrations to be drawn from the pictures of Party differences.

THE CROWN.

Maitland saw the Crown as a piece of metal in the Tower. And he warned us against too much traditional regard for it, as more than a legal form, a useful piece of political mechanism. Lord Balfour, with more of the philosophic insight of a vitalist,

observed in it a human bond of sympathies, a binding sentiment of personal kinship—kingship. To him the King is everybody's king, the link in a chain. Without the Crown, as he has said, the experiment of our Empire as we know it would have been impossible. It, and it alone, makes a brotherhood, a comradeship, of what must otherwise be a system of political philosophy, a written instrument of some policy of an Aristotelian kind to be analysed, dissected, or destroyed. But this Crown, as a living thing, is vital. It does not die. It may suffer decay, partial eclipse. But it may and does revive. And if the King dies the Crown does not. It is merely in demise.

And so in history it has become perpetual. And the very name, or word, of king, is significant of much. He was rex, rag, raj, roi, könig, king: the steersman. And the word meant merely father, the father of a family, his kin, his clan, his people.

And so, in effect, every president of a republic holds a form of kingship. But in England it is the Constitution alone that defines his office and function as something more: the Crown a sign or symbol of an invisible authority. It is the office, the function, and its performance that matters more than the name. And it is this the English Constitution shews. The Crown is not an institution. It is a relationship. The King is not the head of a state but the father of a corporate body—the body politic. And this is the real difference to be seen between a state which is a political institution, an operating engine of policy, a machine, and a living body of personal and political relations in the family. And so it is that a man who detests the name of king should be careful to distinguish between the person, who may be his objection, and the office which deserves respect. For if the family is destroyed the people die.

KINGSHIP.

In England we regard the office of kingship as a trust, held by a man responsible for what he does in it and with it.

That this office has been abused, not once, but many times, does not destroy the office. It demeans the King. And when we say the King can do no wrong we mean the Crown, the undying office, in a King. As a man, in his personal capacity, he is flesh and blood, like any one of us. But as King, as the Crown, he is a representative of something more than man. It is Authority.

And it is this same Authority, seen in the man, as King, that we revere. This thing, Authority, is no strange god before whom we bow the knee—one knee—not the knees. We bend on both, but not to men.

In this we distinguish between a deputy and one who is supreme. The King is supreme, with a limit to his supremacy. But in the body politic, in the things of civil order, he stands supreme. We speak of the supremacy of Parliament. But this is also limited. The Crown is supreme in Parliament as it is also in the Council, the supreme Council, of the Realm. And if a bishop is, or should be, a speaker in God's Parliament, so also is the King, but for civil and not for other affairs. Take Shakespeare and you will see his perception of the holder, the wearer, of the Crown as God's deputy, as an anointed temple, God's substitute. And this man, unlike another, does not wear the Crown immortally. He may die. But the Crown imperial does not.

And if bishops can forget the Constitution of that Parliament in which they should act, so, too, can kings. The English Constitution for civil affairs is an unwritten thing. So also was the other Constitution for different affairs. But because it is not written we cannot say it is not known. And whatever we may think is the source, the origin, of the peculiarities to be seen in the civil Constitution we use, and sometimes abuse, in England it has some curious, some strange, parallels in its invisible unwritten structure. We may trace it back through history. And we can see that the whole scheme of Parliament, in its threefold form, is built on an early Council, the Curia Regis, the Privy Council, also of a threefold form. And as all executive authority, all civil power, descends from the Crown, through the Council, to Parliament, we perceive another curious parallel.

Authority comes down. It does not rise up as if from the streets. In effect, put in a phrase, not mine, all authority is of God. There is no power not so given.

Let me try briefly to suggest this parallel. For if, as we were told, by me king's reign and princes decree justice, so, also, by the same Authority should bishops act, as subordinate ministers, under a superior Privy Council some forget to see. And if the Church is militant, it has a battle to fight to-day. But it cannot, as once it did, use the sword of state for such a purpose. It must use another Sword, invisible. And in the use of it superior direction is required.

And no Constantine, though they called him Isapostolos, equal to an apostle, as they did, also, the Russian Czars, and set him up supreme, could be a substitute for this Council under the Crown. So, too, no Hildebrand, using a Justinian's earlier support, could assume this place, as if supreme, to make his chair a superior throne as Boniface declared it was.

And this parallel, in its constitutional form! What was it? And where? In an upper room once twelve men waited expecting to receive a power promised them. The giver was absent but living. He was a Man who alone could wear the crown immortally as Shakespeare has said. Of this twelve, one had proved useless and another took his place. They were a privy council. And when they received the expected power, by the authority of which they could act, what did they do? They applied a constitutional principle. Debate arose about some widow's affairs. It had to be settled by a recognised, orderly, procedure. So they said choose, that is select, elect, seven men of some repute among you whom we—they were not to be merely elected, and self-set, in office—but, whom we may appoint over this business. This they did with good results. But where can we see any parallel in English constitutional origins?

Take this as an instance, possibly an example, perhaps a derivation; we cannot say more. Early in the fifteenth century, under Henry IV, we see a Council composed of what were then the three "Estates." Twelve of this Council under the Crown were representatives of the peers and of the clergy: nine being peers and three bishops. But the Commons were represented, too, and by seven men. And the business of the Council was to advise, inform, the King. In this form of it we see the early structure of Parliament: King, Lords, and Commons; the genesis of our Parliamentary and constitutional system in a body politic. And, as if to carry the Executive authority of this Council into Parliament, we see to-day what is called the Cabinet. Though unknown to the Constitution, or to the law, it is, as Dicey says, nothing but a committee of the Privy Council. But the fact of a relationship is seen. And we can also see, in this fact, that the Crown in Council is, by this means, transferred. And, thus transferred, it becomes the Crown in Parliament for purposes of consultation and debate.

Petitions as Bills proposed may be sent up to be considered as well as Bills sent down, as from the Crown in Council, to be

discussed, to seek counsel, before the Royal Consent is given. May we not perceive in this a method of limiting, restraining, any risk of the use of arbitrary powers? The Crown in Council appears as a brake on procedure in Parliament. And the Crown in Parliament supplies a check on the proposals of the Crown in Council until they can be considered by debate. And for the purposes of free discussion we see the need for action by His Majesty's Opposition, not any Party Opposition, equally with the necessity that His Majesty's Government should deal with proposals of Executive policy by his ministers of the Crown in Parliament.

But this is not democracy. It is Monarchy: the government of the body politic by means of one representative head of his united people among their selected, or elected, and representative men—freely elected, as Edward I himself insisted they must be.

These seem to be some of the methods by which we see authority sit at peace with liberty; and liberty stands secure in the presence of authority. Both are free because the truth, in the true use of them, is also free. We are not responsible if we are not free. We cannot be free if we are not responsible.

Responsible government means responsible men. But men who think they have a mandate from the people never can be free because they are not, and cannot be held, responsible for anything democracy dictates to them of what they shall think, or say, or do.

And so, if we wish to see the unwisdom of democracy, let us count heads, and decide by arithmetic, instead of by deliberate, responsible, intelligent, and intelligible sense. Take one instance in our chequered history. Go back to the year 1641. It may be thought of as history though it was, almost exactly, repeated, with the same purpose, by the Parliament-destroying Act of 1911. Pym's Resolution then said, referring to the House of Commons: "We are the representative body of the whole Kingdom; your Lordships are but particular persons: if you do not pass the laws we think necessary, then this House with such of the Peers as are more sensible of the safety of the Kingdom may join together and represent the same to His Majesty." This means that the House of Commons claimed to be, alone, and by itself, the whole of Parliament! It was claiming, really, to get rid of the Constitution, the Council, and the Crown. It claimed to be a

substitute for the Royal prerogative and to act, alone, as the Supreme Council of the Realm!

At this distance of time this looks, even now, as a somewhat arbitrary, dictatorial and despotic procedure. But this was not enough. They must have a Grand Remonstrance before they can get rid of every obstacle to their vaulting ambition before they fall. They are not satisfied with a civil political war, they must resort to swords. So they debate, by threat, their Grand Remonstrance.

And counting heads, not sense in them, they decide. Nine men, and only nine, plunge England into civil war. And politically the Nation was condemned to death. The body politic was consigned to dust. That was how this wisdom was reached by that vast majority with a dictator's power as an exalted democrat.

They thought, as others think, you cannot question the correctness of arithmetic if it, and only it, condemns men to death. It was democracy by numbers. Despotism is a simpler sum with only one poor digit in it. But monarchy, in its limited form, is not so easily used to defeat the common sense of men, whether they rule as a Kingly Crown, debate as Peers, or dispute among themselves the merits or demerits of measures they may lawfully oppose or approve.

And, when all this is done, it is, say what we will, the Crown in Council who decides to do, to enact, what the Crown in Parliament has very carefully considered can or should be done. That is unless the Whips have prevented a free, full, and fair discussion by worrying some too-obedient sheep.

THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT.

There are three Members of Parliament. And the Crown is in each one of them. It, or he, presides in all, personally or by deputy. And if he is not present in person the symbol of that presence always is. If the Mace, the Crown, is not seen Parliament does not sit, for the House of Windsor, the House of Lords, or the House of Commons is no part, or member, of the one body of three Members we call Parliament without the evident presence of the Crown in each of these three Houses of one constituent family, one single Constitutional structure. And these are the simple facts of every-day experiences. And they make, as they show, the Crown supreme. The supremacy of

Parliament is the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament as it is, also, supreme in the Council.

And it is thus by these means we are governed by the Crown in Council. Measures of suggested legislation are proposed, with, or by, the Crown in Parliament. Any or all of these may lawfully be opposed, debated, or revised, while under consideration and before they are, by counsel and by consent, approved by the Crown as Acts and issue as enactments of, and by, the Crown. The Act of one is, so, the Act of all.

But again this is not Democracy : Government of the people, by the people, for the people. An alien and a perverting phrase. It is Monarchy : Limited, it is true, but constitutional.

It is government with the people, for the people, by the King who is the Crown, through his Majesty's Government. It is government by the Crown in Council and by the Crown in Parliament. Parliamentary government by His Majesty, the King. But not without counsel, and by consent.

From this what follows ? There is not one man, among all the Prime Ministers and Cabinets of the Empire, among all the Parliaments of the Dominions, who is a member of Parliament. They may be one, or all, members of the House of Lords, or of the Commons House : of some Legislative Council or Assembly. But there is one man who is, and is alone, a Member of Parliament. And he, too, is a Member of every Parliament in the whole Empire. He is a member of the House of Windsor. And he sits, by deputy, in every other House because he occupies the Throne. And that Throne is no mere Chair of State. He is enthroned in the hearts of all his people. And if he were not he could not keep his throne. He sits by consent, he sits by law, by custom. But he stands by the hearth in every home as a man, a friend, the father of his people, the brother of all his subjects. And he knows them as they all know him and his family. Can any democrat fill this position if he is displaced ? Can any republic be a substitute we could accept for such a Monarchy or such a conception of the Crown as this ? And it is not my conception ; it is the conception of the English Constitution. Not written, but not to be gainsaid. We prefer the style and title—A Royal Throne of Kings.

THE MACE.

The Mace may be a "bauble." But so is the Crown if you do not see the significance in it as in any sign. Cromwell spurned

the one because he was blind. He tried to destroy the other because he could not see its power still to live even though he cut the throat of a misled King. The King's advisers were the criminals who should have been impeached but not the Crown. You cannot impeach the Crown. And that the false advisers of the King must be held responsible for the counsel they give, or the acts they do, as Ministers, was seen when Strafford died. But if the Crown is ill-advised to-day would any Minister be impeached, could he be held responsible, while a rigid Party discipline makes sheep of men and drives them into Lobbies, like a pen, to vote at the dictation of the dogs called Whips? These are the servants of an under-shepherd but not of the King. They use a usurped authority he cannot, does not, and could not use if he would. And when they dictate to men, in the House or out of it, the way they are to think, or not to think, and vote, they menace free debate, they stultify free election.

Ministers and Members are in, and of, either House, below the House of Kings or of Windsor. That is, they are in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons. Parliament is an Assembly of the Nation but not of partisans. And in that Assembly the King sits. He always presides. He is the President of our National Assembly. But we call him His Majesty the King. His office is called the Crown. And the English monarchy is a hereditary, a perpetual, Republic. But it is alterable if it needs repair. He is a selected, but not an elected representative, man. He represents the whole Empire. We speak to him, he speaks to us and for us. His power is limited by law, regulated by a customary procedure, and confined by Constitutional precedents. But all these leave the Prerogative intact, a necessary reserve of power for use, but not abuse, in any national emergency. And he can do no wrong if he uses it against ill-timed, or ill-considered, or false, Ministerial advice to suppress revolt, to resist attack, or to restrain reform, if it is revolutionary in its proved aim. He must do so, for he cannot do otherwise, unless he resigns a trust, flees from the risk of a necessary exercise of his, and only his, responsibility. He must preserve the Constitution. It is not his to use or to abuse. It is the political life-blood of the Nation, the body politic.

For this reason he must be always on the watch. And, present or absent, he does preside, if by deputy, in every assembly where this body can be seen. And so, in fact, His Majesty's

Government is, and should always be, and remain, a National Government. No mixture of Party companies by discipline can make a civil regiment think and act as one in political affairs. A military body must be drilled. But drill in politics leads to a war between despotism on one side and democracy on the other.

Any man must have liberty, at will, to speak, oppose, advise, refute, approve, unless he is to surrender his independence and responsibilities into the hands of those who will dictate to him as to an item of no more use politically than a slave in chains. In war, with an army, there must always be command. In a body politic there must be no command until an Act is passed. Then it becomes a command of law in a rule of law.

And so it is that if, or when, a Member of the one or other of these assemblies speaks he addresses the Crown, in the person of the Chancellor, in one House and Mr. Speaker in another. And the fact that the Mace, that is the Crown, is seen present, and not covered, is proof that the King presides. The Speaker of the Commons House is elected by the House. But until his election is approved by the Crown he does not act. And when approved he becomes the representative of the Crown, not in Parliament, but, in the House of Commons. And he approaches the Chair preceded by the Crown, the Mace, which remains on the table to signify the presence of the King, by deputy. The Lord Mayor of London, in the sphere of Local Government, though elected, is also similarly confirmed in office by the King. The Mace, the Crown, precedes him too. It carries the rule of law down to the levels of the street from its position of a limited supremacy in the King, and from an unlimited Supremacy above the Crown.

And, as if to impress us with the value of its significance, this symbol we call the Mace has been much in evidence in recent days. Cromwell's ignorance concerning it is well known. But not long since a Speaker in an Australian House removed the Mace from the House in which he sat as a useless relic of the past. He forgot it was the present sign of his own office and authority. And by removing it he meddled with the function of the Crown and deposed himself. Again, in the House of Commons, a little while ago, a Member, not of Parliament but of the Commons House, thought he could remove the Mace. By his attempt he tried to exclude the King as President of the body politic, the English Royal Republic, and a Royal Monarchy.

When his late Majesty King George V with the Queen met the whole body of his people, as one, by their representatives, in Westminster Hall in 1935 there were two Maces present: one was the Mace of the Lord Chancellor, as Speaker of the House of Lords, the other was that of the Speaker of the House of Commons. They were present but not to be seen in the presence of the Crown. They were covered because the King himself, in person, was present, and, presiding. No deputy, and no symbol of his capacity to act was then required. The Crown, the reality, was there. And then, later, in the same Hall the King had passed away. The Crown had suffered a demise, a new King reigned, and the Mace was present again, covered, but this time draped for the King who died.

HIS MAJESTY'S OPPOSITION.

The idea of a lawful Opposition embodies a political and a constitutional principle of the utmost value and importance. It puts into the public debating assembly we call Parliament a capacity to use, in a corporate way, the only rational method by which to analyse ideas.

In Germany to-day, as in the times of Frederick, misnamed the Great, opposition in any political sense of deliberate, legal, discussion of differences is now, as it was then, impossible. There was, as there is, no middle way between rebellion or surrender.

His Majesty's Opposition is as important a part of our Constitutional structure and procedure as His Majesty's Government. The main difference between these two essentials is that the one may use executive and administrative authority but not the other. Both should be constructive. His Majesty's Opposition does not exist merely to end His Majesty's Government, but to mend or amend its measures before they become Acts.

But of what use is any Opposition if it is always drilled to oppose? An Opposition is not meant to be a tool of revolution.

An executive Government, acting as His Majesty's subordinate Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council, must submit to, even invite, critical opposition by debate or it can seldom, if ever, succeed in a necessary process of selection and elimination among its several proposals. If such a Government forces its supporters to become its obedient followers it defeats liberty by

enthroning a despotism. If its supporters may never be its opposers for fear of earning its displeasure the reign of liberty is ended, freedom is already dead and buried, and the dry bones of Cæsar are alive again ranging for revenge and ready, eager, to use his dogs of war as his snarling, yet cringing, curs.

The Bill for the misgovernment of India has become an Act of despotism by this sort of procedure. The strains of democracy are seen in it as the realities of despotism.

THE GREAT CHARTER.

After the Great Charter was secured by the barons with the aid of the bishops, it was a king who declared that election ought to be free—nearly seven hundred years ago. If the Commons destroy the Lords by the exercise of the provisions of the Parliament Act their liberties which, under Charter, are also ours, must disappear. For in that Charter there is a provision to secure its continuation, and its observance. But the barons, and the barons alone have any right, in law, to guarantee this security against the possible, if now improbable, encroachments of the Crown. And there is, in it, a guarantee for a similar security against the arrogance of a House of Commons which usurps to itself the functions of an uncontrollable Council of State as a substitute for the Crown in Council as well as for the Crown in Parliament.

This means that an aristocracy, as it is understood in the English Constitution, is a safeguard and a defence. It is not money. It is not nobility. It is our security. But if its dignities are surrendered or wrecked, its capacity for independence assailed, by a political robbery of its position, or its necessary wealth, to be used for the welfare of the body politic, then we are at the mercy of any rich adventurers who can handle gold to reduce our wealth at will for their own purposes. And to bribe, disrupt, and destroy, King, Lords, or Commons as they choose. And all this can be done by taxing them out of existence so as to make us the helpless slaves of those who wish to be their substitutes and to use an arbitrary power.

But if this English King insisted that freedom of election was the essence of free institutions, if liberty is to be preserved by constitutional defences, we have cause to think. We think of those who were called a King's friends as the enemies of the

people, of the Nation, because they used intrigue. They interfered with the right of free election and, in the case of Wilkes, expelled a Member duly elected for Middlesex. And we have lately seen the Party system apply its engine before a poll to secure the election of its nominee as Member for Ross and Cromarty.

If such things are done, such things permitted, we can see the truth Hobbes saw that the State is a great Leviathan. But the English body politic is not. The abstract image called the State is the breeder of impolitic despotism. The body politic is a living Constitution and should be, as it can be, a very happy family. Democracy is the parent of such dictation. But kingship, monarchy, as it might live in England, is the father of one united family.

CHURCH AND STATE.

It has been suggested that kings are as much the authorised, the appointed, and anointed, temples and ministers of a superior Crown as any bishop, parson, priest, presbyter, or what name you like. But as for bishops attempting to govern kings, government, in this aspect, is not their legitimate business. For, in any case, they are to be concerned only with local affairs, within their proper province. They are under a Crown in Council, not the Crown of State with a Sword of State. But they are under that invisible Crown Who was present, with His Privy Council of the Twelve, in an upper room many years ago. And they, by this governing of theirs, administer—they do not make, they have no authority to make—any law.

Here we may observe a parallel illustrated by the other unwritten Constitution already mentioned. They are concerned with spiritual affairs. This is a scheme of Monarchy but not democracy. It is most certainly no despotism because it is concerned with a faith that is meant to make, and to keep, us free.

We appear to have stumbled, as if by accident, upon two parallels of unwritten constitutional relationships, for such they seem to be. On one side we find a Crown in Council and a Crown in Parliament. On the other we perceive the Crown, superior, in Council, and also this Crown in consultation with a subject people. The idea of family, as of father, brother, son, is seen in both. And each appears as a somewhat vital thing and no

abstract philosophy. One is a body politic. The other a spiritua body. But both are composed of living, active, thinking men and women. It suggests that the physical, intellectual, and spiritual constitution of man can be, in fact appears to be, reflected in his political, as it is in his other, affairs of corporate action. And, as men were not produced by pen and ink, we may suppose that the really essential qualities of being in any body corporate of their concern should in some way follow precedent. But it is not a despotism, and it cannot be democracy. It is a Monarchy, and, Constitutional.

LIBERTY : A LAW.

Some correspondence appeared a week or two ago. It dealt with Theology and Science. Why these two bosom friends should be supposed antagonists it is difficult to see. And why Theology and Politics should be made a mingled, a mongrel, breed in things of the science of government it is equally hard to discover. Government, like a few other things, begins at home on the hearth, in your house, or in the House of Windsor. It is, first, a personal affair. Self-government, if it means anything, means govern yourself, be your own governor, before you try to govern others. And in governing yourself govern by law, not by pretty opinions not given as law. Don't lay down the law ; take it up and use it. Don't argue about it too much before applying it. Try it. See if it fits your case. If it challenges your liberty, your freedom to do the right thing, the true thing, and lets you do a dirty thing, something has gone wrong in it or else in you. But don't govern others before you do some governing nearer home. Self-determination means determine to do something about yourself before you try to get busy with a self-assertion in matters not your business. Any government that pretends to interfere with the liberty of the subject must be wrong. For all government exists for no other purpose than to preserve liberty as a possession, as a thing provided by, and subjected to, law. There is no liberty without a law. And that particular law is called the Law of Liberty. The object of it is to make and to keep men free. But without this law they are not, cannot be, never were, nor will they ever be, free. This law, like so much else, begins as a personal concern. It rises upwards through the applications of private experiences. And you cannot know its uses, or understand its value, until you try it in

the simple business of your own individual affairs. It begins on fact—yourself. Proceeds to grow by facts. And there is no end of the fact of the superiority of law, the supremacy of law, the rule of law, this Law of Liberty under which no licence is allowed for the very simple, and the only, reason that licence is the enemy of this liberty. The liberty of you and me to observe, in freedom, a law of subjection, is the liberty of the subject. This is a personal matter. And it is not a philosophic theory of politics. The strict logic of fact, in action, is stronger, deeper, far than the logic of thought that proceeds without regard for the law of the Mind of Life, that enables you to think.

All this looks like reducing the English Constitution to its simple elements. It is just like a living man, and nothing else. One body, politic of course, with a head, the Crown. Many members whom the Crown consults and who advise the Crown, sometimes rebel against the Crown. Paralysis of the brain, or of the hands and arms, means constitutional derangement or decay. Health depends on all functions operating in their place. The mind can be over-fed and the body too. And there is no doubt, in fact, that this life must be derived from a Crown that does not die and is never in demise. It is everywhere present, by deputy, or by some symbol, or a sign. It needs no argument to prove its existence because it is an active fact, a personal, and a living, simple, fact: A Man: The Man.

TAXATION.

To-day the use, the abuse, of taxation as an engine of party policy is being exploited as a crushing implement. It is excused as a necessity. It is as daily bread to the nation and people, that is the Crown, the King, as representing them. But to use it as a weapon by which to coerce any particular section of the community, any one Estate more than another, is to abuse its use and aim. The possibility of such misuse need not be discussed. We should by now be able to see that if it is a virtue to defend the poor it is vice to rob the rich. The virtue of it is defeated by the vicious intention. Speech and action too often show plainly it is there as policy. Money is made an irresistible persuasive force by reducing our capacity for Constitutional resistances. It has been, and is, used to buy support by a Party seeking power. Men sell themselves to buy this support. They make

an unworthy trade of professing insincerities. The Party in office, and the other, or others, out of it, bids in the auction against another, the prices rise, and the people are compelled by such politicians to pay their competing bills. As a free grant in aid to the Crown, to the nation, such proceedings have no warrant. They should be impossible.

The days are past when appropriation by the Crown, alone, as an incipient, or actual, dictatorship was possible. And ministerial responsibility can no longer escape the rule to render an account. But the account does not, as it cannot, hide the appropriations by Party to pay for votes in its own support. One Party for the benefit of its own supporters and the strengthening of its own position proposed a Bill and carried an Act to pay its members. It bought support, and favour, by paying all. And it did so without reference to the people who, at the Party bidding, are compelled to pay. And this because the "other House" by a false and unsupported plea of "privilege," as Maitland shows, are deprived of any right, or power, to revise, or to reject, such Bills permitting this impolitic robbery. And now, by financial measures, and by administrative decisions, members of the Commons House support themselves, secure their political positions, by neglecting the defence of those they are supposed to represent.

In those days when each "Estate" of the Realm was separately represented, and taxed itself, there was some reason for the defence of a "privilege" that claimed freedom from the influence, or decisions, of another. But now when all are taxed together, as one, and many are taxed vindictively, things are different. The Lords, as a House, an "Estate," are taxed by the Commons House, another "Estate," to pay for the support, the need, the vagaries of, and the votes secured by, the Commons. But as this is done by Money Bills the Lords, as a House, or the rich as members of the one commonalty of the Realm, have now no redress. They are compelled without consideration, without consent, to provide exorbitant "Supply" demands not exclusively for the use and benefit of the Crown, the Nation, as above Party, but for the advantage, the benefit, of those who paid themselves by "privilege" out of the public purse, and now buy votes to secure a seat, by policies invented to create popular, and Party, division on which to rest Party power.

Cromwell, our early democrat, climbed, not too easily, the

ladder of dictation and reached the top. And there he sat : a despotism. There was then no money in the business of professional politics except, possibly, this : Members were sometimes paid to serve when there was little or no competition to secure a seat and to gain a salary. But if, or when, they were paid to serve the body politic, the "Estate" of it, in which they lived, they were paid, not by themselves, voting themselves the money, out of the public purse ; they were paid by those who respected them, knew them personally, well, as reliable and responsible representative men. Their services being worth securing were worth paying for. And because it was a costly affair to leave a shop or farm, or any business, they owned and used as a stake in the responsibilities of life beyond mere talk, their constituents themselves, out of their private purse, paid the bill. They gave them as much as two shillings a day until, in Cambridge, one shilling was considered quite enough. These people taxed themselves, by their own consent. They were not taxed by their Members, without consent. We see these huntsmen now running before the hounds of democracy to win their spurs, and eat their words, afraid of the pack, and without the courage of a decent fox.

The purpose of taxation, in its origin, was to defend the nation. Now it is used to spoil the people, despoil the rich, pauperise the poor, and to debase, if possible, the paid politician. Once it was a free grant in aid of the King's purposes and necessities. Often it became an arbitrary exaction. Sometimes it has supplied, and properly supplied, the needy poor with a sustenance of which they were deprived by the incapacity of their paid representatives in the House of Commons or their hirelings in office. And ever since a member of the House of Commons advised a modern Pym to use it to destroy the Constitution, by confiscation in a People's Budget, by weakening the powers of resistance secured in the House of Lords, by depriving the landed proprietors of their possessions, and the villages of their best friends, the power to threaten our liberties has grown as the bulk of budgets has risen. The word wealth does not spell iniquity. A tax should be demanded, as it should be paid, to preserve and to defend our liberties, not to make it serve as a means of robbing us of these, and depriving us of all freedom to resist a political tyranny in taxation designed to support a new despotism.

A NEW COUNCIL OF STATE !

If, as we were told a few short weeks ago, the House of Commons is becoming, has, in fact, become, a new Council of State the Nation must be in danger of disruption. This new arrival can be no welcome visitor. It must be another of those good intentions paving the way for some policy and leading where none of us desire to go. Councils of State suggest executive authority. But is this one, as others have been, likely to remain subordinate ? Or is it to suppress the Council now supreme—the Crown in Council ? It might talk reform. But if it attempts to touch the structure of the Constitution its remedies would mean revolution. And, as we now stand, such remedies may be tried by, as they are invited from, any Party adventurers who hope to use the provisions of the instrument miscalled the Parliament Act. It is the ghost of a resurgent Pym in another Denmark. Its aim was, and is, to remove a safeguard and to reduce the Crown so as to provide a Commons substitute for both. It was not, and is not, a true Parliament Act but a House of Commons Act, the result of threat and force. A new Remonstrance Bill. Adopted, not approved : and not by nine Commons but by seventeen surrendered Peers. But its terms defeat its own provisions, for though it is, itself, an Act of Parliament, no Act, by its operation, can be an Act of Parliament under the Constitution. Parliament is destroyed, as it must be, by it, if its procedure is to be followed. If Parliament is King, Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled, then an Act without the counsel of all, the consent of all, and the assent of all, confirmed by the Crown, cannot be enacted as an Act of Parliament. The House of Commons is not Parliament. It cannot usurp either the name or the functions of Parliament again, as it did in Cromwell's day. Then it was revolution with civil war in its wake, an unpopular affront to every national interest and security. Do we ask here for Spain's experiences ?

Under the Stuarts, as under some at least of the Tudors, the Crown was abused, misused, for despotic purposes. Such purposes, in England, have been always of foreign origin, not native, not natural, to this island soil political. Henrietta Maria, in her person and derivation, was sufficient evidence. She came from Versailles, like other importations. And she was born a Medici extract with a Jesuit following. And, a little earlier, Mary, the mother of James, carried a similar influence and strain to

Scotland. Cromwell had reason enough to resist the King. The mistake he made was in trying to remove the Constitution by destroying the Crown. If the Crown is ill-advised the King's ministers do wrong. The dictum that the King can do no wrong means, not that a man cannot make mistakes but that his ministers are held responsible for bad advice in Constitutional affairs. And the purpose of these methods is to save the King and to preserve the Crown. But they provide no reason or excuse for a revolution, in the name of reform, that would allow a Rump of the House of Commons to call itself Parliament by excluding the Lords and executing the King in an attempt to remove the Crown. The King died in Whitehall. But not the Crown. It does not die. It suffers a demise. It is perpetual. It is the single permanent executive, the sole safeguard, if all the rest of the Constitutional structure is shattered. And in it, by it, the whole may be, can be, has been, revived.

The Prerogative remains a power. It may rest unused. But it is in reserve for any and every purpose in emergency. Why? Because if Parties lose their heads the head of them cannot lose his. They may go; he remains. He is above Party. He is not concerned with ideas of Party but with the welfare, of the Nation, the Empire, as one constituent structure, indestructible as a living body politic. It is thus that in the Crown and, ultimately, in the Crown alone our liberties and our freedom can be held secure. It is thus that from the Crown in Council, the Privy Council, all Executive authority still flows.

THE AREOPAGUS.

The Areopagus when it was addressed by Paul was, like the present House of Lords, a mere relic of its former value. It had been reduced by republican democracy, despoiled by despotism and subdued by Rome. As the only remaining shadow of what it was, it still contained all that was left of the traditions of a Greek imperial Council as the support of an early Monarchy. From that King in Council their Assembly was derived. By the time of Pericles it was under duress. In the day of Alexander it was submerged. Philosophy, as represented then by Aristotle as his tutor and camp follower, had displaced the living, customary, sensibilities of Greek thought by Party strife or family intrigue. And the three advisers of this conquering

hero talked to him in the language of the three friends of Job. They were as useless for any real purposes of reform. The democrat despised the despot and the despot abused both the democrat and the fatalist. But when Alexander murdered Cleitus he adopted the dictator's role and put himself above all law. And then he saw decline. In Egypt they acclaimed him as a god and the birds of ill-omen pursued, or led, him along the Nile to receive the adulations of a degraded priesthood that bowed to power because they hoped to keep still longer a little of their riches, their influence and their place.

But there never was a real democracy in Greece. And when a second, a rival, Council of State was set up the Areopagus, and all it might have been, gave place to sham democracy. The insincere Philippics of Demosthenes helped decline, and then a despot put his heel on all.

INDIA.

In India to-day we see incipient democracy at work. People are being told how to vote before they are taught to read. And the difficulty is got over by voting by ballot, not as in the very wise West, now decivilised by democracy, but by bicycle. They are urged to vote as those who are told to suppose an umbrella is a man. They will soon begin to see that responsibility at the centre must be centred in the King. Responsibility cannot be dispersed. It rests in monarchy because democracy, by its nature, means irresponsibility. You cannot hold a million responsible as you can one man.

It is only by this new evidence from India that the peculiarities of Western, or very far Western, democracy can be demonstrated by proofs not even philosophers in politics can be so unwise as to repudiate. The phrase "gone west" is therefore full of meaning. In the days when, say in Egypt, it meant the sun was setting it was understood; it was the light that failed. So now we see it means decline, a political philosophy of moonshine.

The Princes of India still support the Crown because they see in it their sole security. They hold, and should hold, the word of kings to them as something they can trust. In it they see responsibility as a personal being rather than as an impersonal theory. A pledge in few words, given by a man, is worth more than a Bill of rights quite untranslatable into modern

Sanskrit, Hindu, and hundreds of other tongues as the Act of the Crown as King.

Such words have meaning. But who can unravel the mystery of policy hidden in pages by the thousand, and words by the million to explain an Act without parallel in history? Is it not a surrender of Monarchy, the repudiation of responsibility at the centre of the greatest Empire the world has seen? The heads of the Indian States may yet save that Empire from disruption. They hold from the Crown their own limited sovereignty. They look to the Crown as their superior Authority, itself limited in its turn. If they refuse to surrender they may yet prevent a greater surrender. If England resigns the Crown to the impotence of democracy it will be not a demise but the death of sovereignty. Such matters are, and should remain, like the Crown, above party.

It is a simple thing to teach people to support the Crown, the King. The symbol they can understand: the person they may know and respect. But the Constitution is in the Crown. No deep, legal document but a personal affair, a man in authority.

We can see already the Party system rapidly developing in India. It will soon show us as many political divisions as there are races, as many sectarian differences in politics as there are religions in belief, as many disputes about those differences as there are separations by caste in the social scale. There is at present no single belief that can give them a unity of co-operating thought. And into this whirlpool we have thrown a bomb. It goes by the name democracy. And it alone was the tool that forged that bulky document called the India Act. The one single, central, governing idea of that stupendous Act is this, that democracy is the only road to liberty. That major premiss has not yet been proved as truth.

In the theatre of politics this is to forget the powers, almost of an Ariel, in the Crown and to resort to the use of those faults of Caliban, derived from Sycorax, and therefore not all his.

And so, if the Princes of India value their present guarantees of security, in grants of liberty, they will save their states and preserve an Empire by refusing to be seduced from their old loyalties by a far Western, and Republican, Democracy. They will see Monarchy as it can be, and is to be, seen in the King, and in the Crown, as a living Constitution able to succour the life of their teeming millions they can and we must help.

U.S.A.

In America they have one Chief, a Monarchy, not Royal. It is limited, but rigid, not flexible as ours. Their Constitution is a written document, but ours no man can touch, because it is invisible. It is seen in the Crown but manifest in the person of a responsible, and a perpetual, man, the King.

And this Republican Monarchy of Democracy in the West is perhaps changing its coat if not its spots; they say it is not so rigid as it seemed to be.

Hamilton's theory with Washington's experience, combined some aspects of political philosophy current during the dim past of the eighteenth century.

The structure of this American Monarchy, Republican and Democratic as it is, would be an interesting comparison, an illustration, of completely different political ideas to those in England we have been considering. They are the product of political theory, ours of long political experiences. They concern the fabric of a State, a political machine. Ours is not a State but a living body politic; a very human thing. Bryce examined the American political institutions when full grown. But De Tocqueville saw them in the nursery about 1830. And he had an analytical vision, for he predicted much in what we see to-day.

His critical vision taught him, too, to see, as he said, that we should consider not only the men concerned in great affairs but study also the movements that give them power. Canning saw the need for this. And he said, in 1826, that the next war would be one not so much of armies as of opinions.

De Tocqueville said, "We live in a democratic age, and a society in which individual men, even the greatest of them, count for little. At such times it is not the man we must look at, but that which raises the man and brings him into power." Democracy, in his view, has no true love of liberty. He saw in it, as its motive power, the political philosophy of a more modern pantheism against which all who value the true greatness of man should struggle and combine.

But when we are told by a minister of the Crown, as we were not many months ago, that to fail democracy was to blaspheme the Holy Ghost, we may begin to realise the truth of De Tocqueville's words. And the time has come to combine against this new, yet old, religion of pantheism, in politics democratised.

He said that among almost all Christian nations of his day religion was in danger of falling into the hands of the government. It did so fall, under the despotism of Constantine. And, by claiming a civil supremacy, Boniface showed a change of method but not of principle. Henry the Eighth altered the locality of its application but not the idea. And it is this same concern of civil government in the affairs of a different Government, not of bishops alone, that is the root of difficulties we see all round us now. But, like many diseases, the seat of these is constitutional, not physical, and not mental so much as psychological, as philosophers might say, or spiritual.

For, as many begin to see, it is in the spirit of man, deranged and unfed, we may seek for the cause, the origin, of much paralysis of a corporate, a personal, and social, as well as a religious, or political kind. That politics has become a disturbing element in religious affairs and religion in those political none can fail to observe.

If the story of Jeroboam means anything, and it must mean much, it shows rebellion carrying religion into politics, as a serving slave, and, destroying both—by despotism—and, too, democracy. The people approved what the King proposed, those strange measures by which he secured a throne. His name means many people. He was an industrious rebel. But his rebellion was not without some reason. Dictation in the southern Kingdom bred it. And no lawful Opposition, as with us, was allowed to support a reasonable reform. Instead, there were threats—of scorpions and of whips.

Constantine, with less reason but the same purpose, copied Jeroboam when he used the consenting, and subservient, bishops to put the things of the Church under civil control. And Justinian reversed the process when he, in turn and by decree made it possible for bishops to claim as a right that kings should rule only by their consent and as their subordinates. This gave Europe Boniface, whose vain boast Bryce records: "I am Cæsar." If so, he claimed too much, for Cæsar was a pagan god.

Becket served two such masters, one after the other. First the King in a civil capacity as his Chancellor. Then he served a superior, as a bishop at Canterbury. And in this, his second capacity, he necessarily opposed the King whose servant he had been but whom, now, he regarded as the subject of his new master, a Cæsar in a prelate's robes. Wolsey was less wise.

He tried to serve both worlds and two masters at one and the same time.

But Wolsey did not fall, like another, for telling the unpleasant truth to a Herodian adulterer. He supported a debased and a degraded King, the enemy of his realm, and the enslaver of his people, the Defender of a Faith that he defied. And he built the foundations of a Star-Chamber despotism in which the Stuarts lived until Cromwell, as a dictator with an army behind his back, pulled down this instrument of a civil tyranny.

So may we not see that Cæsar disguised as a priest, or a priest on a Cæsar's parade, usurps an office and confuses two necessary aspects of one purpose. What business have priests to meddle in civil affairs? Had Cromwell any right to preach if bishops and priests, in his opinion, had none? They were at least ordained to teach. Was he anointed by nine votes in the House of Commons and sprinkled with English blood? And, again, what right have kings to interfere where priests, alone, should serve? It means confusion and destroys the truth that both are necessary in their several spheres in which it is their business to mind their own business and no other. And a king, in his civil capacity, is as much a minister for civil affairs under this supreme law as any priest in other matters. The jurisdiction is distinct. Princes may decree justice; it is for that very purpose they hold their office. And any priest, by his priesthood, without priestcraft, should be able to explain the application of truth in justice to any king and every man. He, too, is there, and for this very thing. But not for politics except as a man, a citizen, not by virtue of his office, his ministry. It is not in the Constitution of the King under whom he serves as the supreme Crown.

DE TOCQUEVILLE.

I have referred to De Tocqueville as to an authority on the inherent trend of ideas in Democracy, because he wrote of it as he saw it developing in America one hundred years ago. He therefore speaks without the bias of any more modern enquirers who seek to know its tendencies. But what he said then we see now exhibited. "The notion of a sole and central power which governs the whole community by its direct influence, is natural to a Democracy . . . To governments of this kind the nations of our age are tending. In Europe everything seems

to conduce to the indefinite expansion of the prerogatives of government." And an American examination of the same political ideas, written forty years ago, shows another perception of the inner meaning of this political notion built on philosophic theories of the State and of government. Let me quote:—"We may here note that a Democracy, looking upon its leader as its representative, willingly gives him a power even greater than the largest measure of his prerogatives. The sovereign multitude, which sees in him not so much the ruler who commands them as one who is the exponent and executor of their will, yields to him such a full and unreserved obedience as no mere despot can obtain. No Alaric or Tamerlane, at the head of his hordes, is so truly master as the recognised head of a Democracy, which sees its favourite beliefs embodied in his person; and to the power of modern discipline in its armies under his control adds the zeal of a passionate, personal devotion. Democracy, headed up in one who can sway its forces, has such elements of aggression and strength as no form of government hitherto existing has had."

It is therefore desirable that we should try to see, not the men alone, not the figure-heads, but to read the meaning in, or behind, the movements that give them power. And it is with this view in mind that we may discover the meaning of some electoral methods and results, American or English, and also enquire for the peculiar reasons of a political, or a semi-religious, and racial sort by which the more recent Italian and German notions of constitutional theory may be explained. And whatever differences in detail we may see among the conditions in Russia, France, or Spain, we discover a strange mixture of kindred elements, the foundation of which is some variation of democracy hunting for power and a usurped authority. And out of this, out of all these—as in the first French Revolution, and when Napoleon the President made himself Napoleon the Third, and an Emperor, until Sedan—the inevitable leader comes.

Democracy is a stepping-stone across the stream of civilisation in which the steppers stir the mud. Or it is a mounting-block from which some new Colossus gets astride and learns to ride rough-shod over all the fields of liberty.

GODET.

This suggests a reference to an observation by Godet of some importance, if we are to consider the different aspects of political

tendencies ; the movements that give men power, produce the particular man, and elevate him like a Cæsar. And it matters little if he is called by such a name as Kaiser, Czar, President, The Leader, or Il Duce. It is his position, the movement he represents, and the purpose, the aim, of it that is of interest to us. He may be a popular idol of a Popular Front, or he may be another kind of offshoot of the growing weed called popularity like a budding or a full-blown Democrat. But with religion, as we have seen it, getting into the hands of Government, and when a Government, of sorts, attacks a religion that deserves respect and tries to foster another, built on hate and anarchy none can approve, then we may be excused if we draw attention to what Godet wrote some forty or more years ago. He was considering some aspects of the battle of political opinions mentioned by Canning long before. He said, " Antichrist's theological system may be summed up in three theses. There is no personal God without, and above, the Universe. Man is himself his own god—the god of this world. And—I am the representative of humanity, by worshipping me humanity worships itself." And so if we are told that the result of votes on bits of paper in a tin ballot-box is the Voice of God, the Holy Ghost, and that it is blasphemy to resist Democracy, it is time not to think but to act.

The function, the purpose, the aim, the policy, behind democracy is to turn the earth upside down or the world inside out. The stomach deranged with political indigestion is to displace the head in government, to argue, by commotion, against the rule of sense. The winds of a modern Æolus, as Canning saw and said, were to be the cause of a coming storm and strain. The body corpulent was to beat the brain completely out of the body politic because its Constitution was deranged. If, in your minds, you ask me of what use is all of this, how does it concern any constitutional idea, any polity, any purpose, design, or any fixed policy that affects our personal prosperity ? Can we not reply, with truth, that so largely to-day money rules policy, cash governs votes, gold is used, and abused, to ruin kingdoms, to wreck civilisation, to support democracy, or to foster anarchy, in opposing not only human Monarchy but more—to resist the prerogatives of One who alone wears the Crown immortally. And let me say it here again that a prerogative is a reserve of power. It is necessary for many emergencies, but though it may not be used, or is seldom made to operate, it remains so that

it may be used, where it must be, for special purposes. It is a last resort in reserve to protect the commonalty from any opposite and usurping, power that claims a superior authority. It is a protector of freedom from the menace of despotism, it is the last resort for the security of liberty—our civil liberties, our personal, individual responsibilities—from the threat of some dictatorial upstart power, whether it is seen as a very superior man or as a multitude of ballot boxes filled with paper votes.

POLITICAL VISIONS.

Napoleon had used religion as his instrument, his orchestra. It is being used as an engine, an implement of public policy to-day, in ways obvious to all. And because of this it is well to try to see what difference there is between the function of those whose ministry is required in ecclesiastical or in civil matters. De Tocqueville said the notion of a sole and central power which governs the whole community by its direct influence is natural to a Democracy, to the indefinite expansion of the prerogatives of government.

With us the Crown is our last civil refuge and security. And some desire to wreck that too by a political rebellion against our liberties, the aim of which is called reform, means revolution, and is bent on smothering freedom.

Ministers of the Crown receive a mandate to carry on the Government of the King by using the powers granted them by the Crown. They receive no mandate from the people that gives them any power. And they can accept no mandate from a League that seeks peace by threats of war against the sovereignty of the nations it tries to subdue, by menace, while it carries an olive branch like a dove.

If the words we read or hear are still signs of thought most of this must be true. For the League may threaten to use force to compel obedience to its whims. But, it commands no forces. It issues mandates without a compelling power. It uses an air of authority and possesses really none. It talks democracy and devises despotism: advocates freedom and menaces liberty.

France is a member of the League and plays with it. Russia is now a member of the League and uses it. Italy is a member of the League and laughs at it. Germany was a member of the League

and keeps it still at bay. America supported it and ran away for the Senate was afraid of it. Abyssinia was a member and suffered for it. Great Britain is not, and never was, named as a member of this League. But she is made its obedient servant and pays much for supporting it. The British Empire, with the Crown in Council as its only true suzerain power, is made a member of the League. But because it receives mandates from it and reports to it, through those Dominions named by this new Covenant, it becomes a subordinate of it. And when these things were arranged by ministers of the Crown, outside Parliament, without Parliamentary debate, no man was impeached when the deed was signed, and we were duped like this.

President Wilson told us in 1919, he saw a vision. He said he saw the American spirit had conquered the world. This must have been the spirit of democracy. And that spirit must be the spirit of man in men, the spirit of pantheism. We see it ranging the world to find one only man, another Cæsar, to be its Colossus, and its god. Religion, as in Imperial Rome, will be part of his "machinery" of government. The possibility of setting up this god in England, by the grant of administrative authority for the use of present and future ministers of this coming rule, has been well examined and expressed, from its legal aspects, by the Lord Chief Justice of England in his book, *The New Despotism*.

Let me suggest a brief comparison. Consider these dreams and visions of political philosophers. They show the state of the weather or the digestion, mental and otherwise. But there seem to be more signs of health in the open-air experiences of a body politic which has been in exercise for perhaps a thousand years. It has framed a free League of Nations recently. And it interferes with the liberties and the prerogatives of none. In bulk it is but a mere fraction of the India Act. And it shows the vitality of Monarchy in contrast with the creaking heaviness of the tumbrel called Democracy. This deed, or document, is the Statute of Westminster, 1931. It removes the Dominions from the jurisdiction of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain. They are no longer subordinate to it. These Dominions are given direct relations with the Crown in Council in the same way as His Majesty's Government in England. And so the Crown in Council is now seen supreme as the sole central Executive of the Empire. But it operates, for all Executive and Legislative purposes,

through the Crown in Parliament in each different Dominion. And it does so by means of His Majesty's Government of either Dominion through the Dominion Cabinet, as being, in effect, an Executive Committee of the one central Privy Council of the Crown. There is local liberty and responsibility with a central Authority and also responsibility. There is a freedom of action in all. There is no Executive action without consultation, no decision without advice; counsel is required before consent. And so the fact stands out. The Crown in Council is supreme. It acts, and enacts, through the Crown in Parliament assembled. And it is a family affair. But it suggests that Dominion Status is this direct relationship, and, not through a Secretary of State for Dominions, or, for Indian affairs, in one Dominion Cabinet.

CHARLES AND HENRIETTA MARIA.

We may now ask ourselves whence were these ideas of despotic power in England derived? Were they a native growth on a parent English tree? Or were they imports, foreign grafts on an otherwise healthy stock? Shakespeare saw clearly they were grafted stems of a foreign idea of Monarchy aped by England. They had the Conqueror's support, were fostered by John, refused by the Barons, applied by Richard the Second, and condemned by Gaunt. But they came again, following Philip of Spain, pursued Elizabeth, and struck at the roots of the life of our civil polity at the instigation of Henrietta Maria. She was used as a more modern Jezebel by her directors to destroy a throne, delude an unstable king, and to wreck a Constitution she did not, and could not, understand, approve, or value. Daughter of a French Court, as much depraved as Tyre, like her earlier parallel she taught a King to rob his subjects of their birthright in their liberties. She did not say, in words, use your usurped authority to pauperise a Naboth. But, instead, she helped to spoil a King by other means. And she did it as a foreign adventuress not used to the common decencies of English life and custom in manners, in words, or in civil procedure. She taught a weak but powerful man to walk strange constitutional ways so as to lose his head by abusing his throne. For it was she who sent him to his doom when, in scorn at his hesitating and weak prevarications with his honour and the word, the pledges, of a King, she sent him to destruction with the words, "Go, poltroon,

and pull out those rogues by their ears." He went. And he went to eject the Commons, to ruin a King, and to debase a Crown. She fled: a French, Medici, Stuart, despot Queen. And so this King was himself the cause, as much as Cromwell, or as Pym, of an uncivil, and an unconstitutional, war among his own people. He leased a kingdom, like a predecessor and a successor, as if it were a pelting farm, or a security for foreign political usurers. He became the supporter of alien intrigue at the bidding of the secret agencies of an alien race. He caused bloodshed on our fields of peace in a war of fratricidal enmity. He was an aggressor, whose business it was to stop all transgressions in every form. And this in any sphere, economic, social, public, or personal. He did nothing to resist the rise of party strife or individual ambitions from the depths of a puritanic religious mania, or a moral and political declension, either by the people against the Constitution and the Crown, or by himself, the King, with his prerogatives against that Constitution. It was both the sole security by which his people should have been able to resist the encroachments of a threatening power and the only method which could restrain the abuse of a sovereign authority so as to keep men free from a use of it that could menace liberty. The King should do no wrong. And, if he were well-advised, in himself or by his counsellors, he could do no wrong to any men or to the Kingdom in his keeping as a sacred legacy, a confided trust, for his posterity and ours. By an abuse of his authority he fed democracy. And that democracy by usurping this authority begot, conceived, a dictator, bred by force to build a short-lived purge.

CROMWELL.

Such beginnings of democracy by Party as we experienced in England under the Commonwealth, as it was miscalled, had very little relation to any real ideas of democracy. They were built on a despotism of the House of Commons, made possible by a destruction of the House of Lords, and the ruin of a living Constitution in the Crown, caused by an attempt to dictate by a Stuart King. But they were not the result of any approach to the real essence of democracy: government of the people by the people, a substitute for government by the Crown with, and for, the people. In this revolt of the Members of the House of

Commons neither the Crown nor the Commons respected the custom of the Constitution or the provisions of the Great Charter. And the Lords, by a weak, irresolute surrender, as again in 1711, were equally at fault. In few words the whole scene was a picture of despotic power claimed by the King but used by the Commons to resist the Crown. The people, as the people, had little or nothing to do with what their representatives did. And as most of the people had no vote they were not represented, in the modern sense, at all. And, again, the movement was due to no mere resentment against unjust taxation alone. Ship money was but one cause. That was on the civil side of these events. But on the other there was the religious aspect. Religion was forced into the political scheme by the Crown as the agent of despotic ideas, by the bishops as a meddling prelacy, by the Presbyterians, the Independents, and the later Non-jurors, as an interfering laity. And, in consequence, chaos reigned, instead of a Crown, in both. In one sphere the powers of the Crown are to be limited. In the other the Authority cannot be limited by us. And, in this other, all power is exercised without despotism, and admits liberty as a means of freedom.

So we may say that when the *Mayflower* sailed she carried the germs of thought able to generate this confusion in the minds of all her emigrants. Religion, used as a mere political device, could, so used, make the world unsafe by democracy. It is better, therefore, to keep it out of politics and to resist those who would make it, in any sense, political. Cromwell's sincerity in his beliefs cannot be questioned. We can only say they were misplaced in his politics. And if, in those beliefs, he had been able to see the bishops as subordinates in an unwritten Constitution with its superior Council and its only Crown he might have saved another Constitution and preserved a King. He might, also, have seen the body politic maintained intact and as able, as it could be willing, to secure the rights and liberties of the people. Its office is to support the just authority of, and, if necessary, check any possible encroachments by, the Crown. We are not now concerned with the Protector's military capacities or his vision in foreign policy. But we may observe this: a Proclamation he issued in 1655, reissued in the same terms by Charles the Second, declared the residents in the English Colonies to be "free denizens of England." They were to have, and to

enjoy, all benefits, privileges, advantages, and immunities whatsoever the same as any natives or people born in England have and enjoy. The effect of this if realised and used would have made it possible, say, for Washington to sit for Virginia in Westminster. And it might have saved a consignment of good tea, prevented another civil war, and made an Empire larger than it is to-day—under the Crown and Constitution.

ITALY.

In Italy Party gave Il Duce power because another Party was wrecking the hard-won political liberties, such as they were, and national unity, such as it was, won by Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel. And by this Party process the King is supplanted by a self-made Leader-elect, but not elected.

Italy became a Corporative State, a State of Corporations. But is it a body politic? Is it truly incorporated, as a limited liability company, under the law of the Crown, either in Council or, in Parliament? We see within its boundaries a State within a State, the Vatican City, governed by Protocols, restored by sufferance, controlled in its externals by a Pact, entangled otherwise by civil alliances and restrictions, bent, again, out of a true and a better course by efforts to secure support under the political arrangements of some Napoleonic, if more modern, code, some Concordat. Does it not lose accord because it rests too much on accommodation, the respect of a human, and the insufficient regard for a superior, law?

Napoleon was quite frank. He declared his intention to direct both the religious and the political world under himself. His councils were to represent Christendom. Priests might preside. He would control. He would open and close these assemblies, approve their decisions, "as Constantine and Charlemagne had done." He saw, and he said: "The people must have a religion; and this religion must be in the hands of the government." What or which religion? And whose government is this to be? A government by God or a government of men? That was Hamlet's question, in a rotten State.

Such measures spell despotism. Elsewhere similar ideas, by different measures, are to be read as democracy used as a path to a dictator's chair if not a throne, as yet. In Germany, in the United States of America, where the states are not united, and

the Federal Government is limited in power by these, and even in England, is election free? Is it not governed by Party, influenced by the Press, coerced by propaganda, confused by antipathies, and abused by manifold ambitions of a civil sectarian sort? Such methods cannot bring peace because the body is neither politic nor corporate. Its members compete among themselves and show that they have lost their head. But the Great Charter of England provides otherwise. And, as an English King once said, as we have seen, elections must be free.

MONARCHY : LIMITED AND UNLIMITED.

For these possible extremes of a very human, if political, desire, England provides a remedy. It is a middle way. But it is not a compromise. It reconciles two opposing aims, two different methods of civil, or uncivil, ideas of government. It makes authority shake hands with liberty. It makes liberty respect its friend authority. And it lets men go free because they regard themselves as subject to a rule of law. This is the liberty of the subject, the liberty not to be found anywhere unless in subjection to a superior law. Liberties are not taken; they are given. They are a grant, a gift, perhaps a right. But, unless granted, they may so easily become a wrong. You cannot take a liberty.

All these are obvious platitudes. Yet sometimes, because they are so evident, we do not stop to see how much they mean. But when ambitious men abused the office of kingship the people suffered. Kings became despotic and made men slaves. To remedy this republics arose. They, too, held many enslaved who sought to redeem their condition by revolt. And out of this revolution the inevitable demands of leadership were satisfied by new Cæsars who made another servitude by taking granted liberties away and by subjecting freedom to the restraints of a new despotism. The dictatorship of the proletariat is no better than the dictatorship of one as President or King. The dictatorship of one is more recognisable than the dictatorship of a multitude no man can meet and none can touch. You may hold a man, possibly even a despotic one, responsible. But who, or what, is so hopelessly irresponsible as a crowd? The potential danger in millions is far worse than the threats of one.

One only man, a Colossus astride the world, a human god, put, and supported, in his position by acclamation as a self-appointed, a selected, or an elected deity, makes Brutus stir because he thinks he sees ahead this dragon in the political skies and no Hercules to tread him down, to put him under his foot, as St. George. Was not Cæsar such a god? Did he not rise by flatteries as much as by ability: as much by bribery as by useful opportunities? Did he not promote as much evil as he suppressed? The Republican Patricians in decay were no worse than the Plebeians in power. The absence of restraint on both is still to be deplored. A senate alone, or an assembly alone, cannot be checked in a wild career where every safeguard for defence has been torn down. Democracy, like a pack, will hunt despotism as a dictator will use any method to keep his unassailable authority. Such a monarchy as this can be, has been, is being, erected on, and by, democracy. Both rest on force. They rise by force to power. They stand where they are, when they arrive, by a veiled consent because none dare refuse assent for fear. A majority, because it is a majority, is not always right. A minority is not of necessity in the wrong because it cannot enforce a right. A dictator occupies a throne if he does not wear a crown. A republic is a monarchy without the name of King. Give a President sufficient power as a leader of the people and he becomes the elected representative of a despotic democracy.

AN EXCURSION.

We have been trying to run round, not England, not Europe, but the habitable, and Party-ridden, democracy-infected, globe in sixty minutes of our time, sketched out in verbs. And as we try to think, or write, or speak, such sense, restrained, as we can find, the invisible strength and swift destructiveness of thought or its building, creative, powers, can be driven, not by wind or water, not by steam, but by the vigour of wires electrified by Party-governed men through the communicating atmosphere. But this air, itself, no man or Party can control, and no King, with his limited, or Leader with his unlimited, dictatorial powers, can say to it, if it storms, "Peace, be still." Canute cannot command the tides or steady the movements in the body politic disturbed. That is the business, and it requires the capacities, the prerogatives, of a Crown, not at present sufficiently seen. But

yet it is alive and alive to our necessities. It is still ruling from an Upper Room in a Council, not of State, but, of mind, of Spirit. It is at the head of the body, not politic but affectionate, and completely filled with the spirit of liberty seeking to set us free.

THE CROWN : A MYSTERY.

Is there any doubt that the world in general is to-day suffering from some constitutional disease? If we can judge by the many drastic remedies that are proposed as cures we may, I think, assume that the political doctors do not agree. For their proposals, their differing diagnoses, from the symptoms observed by all divide the earth as a hospital into separate and antagonistic wards. The disease is admitted as a very patent fact. We have, therefore, asked ourselves for reasons in an effort to recover sanity. This globe is meant to be an asylum for healthy and agreeable folk. But some seem to regard it as an operating theatre in which surgical treatment alone, without the application of anæsthetics, can be of any use. And, as in a recent case, carbon dioxide is used by mistake for oxygen in the desire to keep the human patient still alive. We find, then, a good excuse for seeking other remedies, and for trying to discover, if we can, a better alternative that might reconcile these differences and so give us back again a healthy political mind in a sane, well-constituted, body of people.

You may not approve my attempt. In England, in this Empire, we may be excused if we suggest that it resides in Monarchy, in the Crown, and in the personality of a King rightly understood and used as essential factors in a stable constitutional structure of human polity. Both Kingship and the Crown are filled with mystery. England's ideas of Kingship are inbred. At least, if we regard our history and our literature they are. Can we suppose that Shakespeare had no thought behind his words upon which he built his images? Macduff saw confusion's masterpiece when murder destroyed the Lord's anointed temple in Duncan the King dead. But he saw also, in the great doom's image, death itself as a new Gorgon and life's enemy. And do we not also, by this context, see he knew in Perseus the son of the great King Cepheus, the betrothed of the chained Andromeda, whom he releases, and the one destroyer, the breaker, of Medusa, whose severed Gorgon head he holds in his left hand? The star

in this head is well known to all astronomers as Al Gol. They call it a variable. And its name means rolling round. But a star in the waist of Perseus is named Mirfak, meaning who helps. Another in his left foot is called Athik and signifies who breaks. Did Shakespeare also know that what the Greeks called the head of the Medusa had a Hebrew origin in a root that meant the trodden under foot? It has other names: Rosh-Satan in Hebrew is the head of the adversary: Al-Oneh is the subdued, or Al-Ghoul the evil spirit, both being Arabic names. There are in the northern hemisphere, close about the Pole, four groups of stars, which have been known through all history, and beyond its long reach, as the Royal family. They are Cepheus the great king and his bride Cassiopeia; Perseus, his son, and Andromeda, whom we have already seen as the betrothed, released from her binding chains that hold her to the rocks of earth among the raging seas.

Shakespeare's references to such things as these convey more understanding than some used by Milton to coin an effective phrase. And he is aware of the sillinesses of those who, if they are fools, think it is by heavenly compulsion; if knaves, or thieves, it is by spherical predominance; or if liars and adulterers, it is by planetary influences. They lay their dispositions to the charge of a star. They put their own guilt in every disaster on the sun, the moon, and the stars. Milton in his "Ophiuchus huge" tells us nothing of his significance. Like Achilles, and another, he is wounded in the heel by his enemy the Scorpion who is destroyed by the swift arrow from the bow of Sagittarius the Chief of the Centaurs, which pierces his heart, the star named, in Latin, Cor Scorpis, or in Arabic Antares, meaning the wounding; and, again, in Hebrew, Lesath, the perverse. But in Arabic the group we think of as Scorpio is named Al Akrab, and means wounding him that cometh. And, as we have seen elsewhere, Hercules seems to be our own St. George as he, always associated with Ophiuchus, bruises the head of the Dragon with his foot.

But let me, if you will, carry my reference to Shakespeare a little farther in its bearing on the subject we are considering together.

THE WITCHES OF MACBETH

The Witches of Macbeth are no ordinary mortal beings. They are the winds of circumstance, of debate, of passion, of

evil influence in religion, in personal actions and ambitions, and in politics. They break a kingdom, destroy families, resist the fine virtues of life, and corrupt legitimate pleasures. They use equivocation that lies like truth. And they persuade men that life is but a candle, a walking shadow, a tale told by idiots, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. They make of all things that matter an empty nihilism. Under their malign persuasions speculation and unsure hopes are a substitute for certain issues. They breed in men ambition, so that they live for unlawful profit. Their perilous stuff weighs upon a nation's heart to destroy its pristine health, and poison its anointed temple. And they cure no malady in a mind diseased. Therein the patient must minister to himself. And he can do so only by the use of those liberties which can set him free. They are Constitutional. And they rest in a Crown, and are secured by the Crown.

WHILE ENGLAND LIVES.

Those Roman matrons, in Rome's greatest days,
 Counting as gain their loss for honour's name,
 Gave fathers, husbands, sons, to valour's ways :
 All gold was dross if virtue held no fame.
 Great mother England, breeding sons of worth,
 Bought freedom by her sacrifice in ages gone :
 Her children, dying, brought a world to birth
 In daughter nations where this torch still shone
 Of Liberty ; a flame with life's new light :
 A beacon, burning, 'mid the dark realms around
 Where nations lived, submerged, in hideous night
 Of chaos, tyranny. Men work still bound
 By chains some despot forges for the free.
 While England lives man's freedom yet may be.

DISCUSSION.

The CHAIRMAN (Brig.-General W. BAKER BROWN, C.B.) said : The paper we have just heard covers a very large range, and the thesis is supported with such a wealth of illustration and argument that it is impossible in the short time at my disposal to cover all the points raised. I can only attempt to refer to one or two aspects

which seem to me to be vital to his argument. His main contention, as I understand it, is that the Crown in England, that is our system of Government by a King in Council, assisted by two Houses of Parliament, provides a system so complete and perfect that it can be and should be adopted by all countries. He justifies this by a claim that this system is of divine origin.

Now while all members of the Victoria Institute will agree that there is a divine guidance in all human affairs, I would venture to suggest some doubt as to whether the exact stage which we have reached in this country at the present date represents the absolute best, or can be considered in any way as final. In all the affairs of this life we seem to find a general law of check and countercheck, of rise and fall, under which any excess of development in one direction is balanced in the long run by some development in the opposite direction, while all the time the sum of human knowledge and intelligence increases. Thus the excessive development of the dictatorship of the people in one country in Europe has been balanced by the rise of two other autocratic dictatorships in other countries. I therefore put forward this point: Can we expect that the present system of government in this country will continue indefinitely, and, if not, in what direction may we expect it to change?

A second point on which I do not agree with the lecturer is his use of the word democracy which he applies in its debased sense of government by a group of the less educated classes at the bottom of what we call the social scale. Properly, democracy means government by the people as a whole in opposition to the form of government by a dictator. Every member of the people has a right to a voice in such a government, and the test of whether any form of government is a good one is not only whether it is government of the people by the people, but whether it is "for" the people and is working for their good and future development.

With a complex society such as ours, it is necessary to recognise many schools of thought, and in order to get the best results there must be found a working "compromise" between the different opinions.

This is another word which is disliked by our lecturer, but it is capable of more than one meaning. A compromise between parties in which each party laid aside its own principles and in which the

parties only unite for the purpose of obtaining office is a bad thing. A compromise in which parties agree on certain vital principles but agree to differ on details may be a very good thing. Let me give you an example of what I mean. If you take a pot of white paint, and another of black, and mix them together, you will get a uniform grey, which may be ugly, and will certainly be monotonous. But if you apply the paints separately so as to produce a pattern, you can get the most striking effects. The ladies will, I think, agree that a costume carried out in black and white can be most effective, while nature itself shows us the same combination. What is more beautiful than a picture of a wood in winter with the black stumps of trees showing through a coating of snow.

May I carry the simile a little further, and suggest a pattern for our future form of government, in which the white ground is decorated with patterns in black—not too much of it—blue, royal blue, as a middle colour, and—again not too much of it—some touches of red.

The Rev. C. W. COOPER said: The writer of this paper rightly says that “There is a cure for all political diseases of to-day,” and that that cure is *Monarchy*, and not democracy. He then proceeds to prove his thesis by stating that Monarchy must act constitutionally—decisions being by consent—and that in this method there is some divine right, which indicates a right to do the right thing in the right way. The thesis seeks to establish the Divine Right of Kings, and applies this truth to the Crown of England.

What I could have wished to see in this paper is some evidence to prove the Divine Right of the Crown of England. We ask, at what date, or period, did this Divine Right come to the Crown of England, also at what date or period did the Crown of England originate, for a Crown with an inherent Divine Right could not be set up by any human caprice or authority? Surely, if we cannot establish that the Throne of England was founded by Divine authority, then there is no authority for saying that it has any inherent divine right.

Why is it that the genealogy of the British Throne (as contained in the British Office of Heraldry) which traces the British Throne

back to King David, to be appointed by God "for ever" (2 Samuel vii) is not a more generally accepted truth? Over and over again our Bible states that "David shall never want a man to sit upon his Throne." In the Books of Chronicles, God speaks of David's throne as "My throne." Psalm lxxxix and its 52 verses speaks of this same throne, the promises, and the seed, as "enduring for ever"—all as part of God's covenant, which can never fail.

If these things be true, where is that Throne in the world to-day, if it be not the Throne which is established over our Empire? Our Empire not only dominates the world but has a set purpose, to uphold and to set forth the Kingdom of God, of which Jehovah and Jesus Christ is still King, the laws of which are the laws of God (Exodus xx), Israel, the redeemed-servant-nation, to be used as an instrument for the fulfilling of the Divine purpose of God for the righteousness of the whole world.

The Rev. ARTHUR W. PAYNE said: I am very grateful to the writer of the Paper for his most informing and interesting contribution to our ideas of the importance of the Crown of England. I am unable, however, to agree with the previous speaker (Rev. C. W. Cooper) that it represents the Kingdom of David. When the doctrine of evolution first came up, the celebrated Hebrew Christian, Benjamin D'Israeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, said, "My Lord, I see this as a question of apes or angels. I am on the side of the angels." In the same way the speaker asserted that he too was on the side of the angels in this matter of the Throne of David. Such a statement seems to be hard to reconcile with the message of the angel to Mary, recorded in Luke i, 30-33. This is how it runs: "And the angel said unto her, Fear not, Mary: for thou has found favour with God. And, behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his name Jesus. And he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end." To my thinking, anybody who claims the right to the throne of David challenges the Crown Rights of the Lord Jesus Christ, Who is both God, and man Immanuel, the King of the Jews.

There was a plan for the redemption of the world, already revealed by Jehovah. In the first place, the Tabernacle period

may be distinguished, extending from the time of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob up to the reign of David. It is followed by the Temple period, covering the centuries from Solomon until Christ. That has been succeeded by the present Intermediary period, fast drawing to a close, as the sons of Abraham are being rapidly gathered to their Homeland in Palestine. In the near future lies the triumphant period when the Jews will universally recognise Jehovah Jesus as their Messiah, and the prophecy of Zechariah viii, 23 will be fulfilled. "Thus saith Jehovah of hosts: In those days shall it come to pass, that ten men shall take hold out of all languages of the nations, even shall take hold of the skirt of him that is a Jew, saying, We will go with you; for we have heard that God is with you." The Jew can never expect to have Immanuel's land apart from recognition and acceptance of Immanuel Himself.

Mr. GEORGE BREWER said: While there is doubtless much truth in what Major Corlette claims for the Crown in England, and that the Limited Monarchy, as at present constituted, is probably the best that can be devised, the claim that it is a cure for all the political diseases of to-day is, I fear, excessive.

When the Kingdom was removed from Israel in the reign of Zedekiah on account of their long-continued disobedience and idolatry, Nebuchadnezzar was appointed by God to be the first Gentile Monarch to carry out the Divine will. This Head of Gold was to be succeeded by inferior metals, culminating in Iron and Clay, thus symbolising gradual descent from Absolute Monarchy through successive stages of wider distribution of power until it rested on representatives elected by the common people, which we term Democracy. While each of these has in turn failed to fulfil the purpose of good government, the fault does not lie with the power bestowed, but with the human instrument which has failed to exercise the power aright. This failure is inevitable until He comes, Who will destroy all oppression and rule in perfect righteousness and equity. Meantime, in the fallible condition of human nature, a combination of Monarchy, Aristocracy (of intellect as well as birth) and Democracy would appear to be less liable to failure, which has hitherto been mainly due to the absence of recognition of God and

the Divine authority of government, combined with the tendency to regard power as a right, rather than a responsibility.

The British Monarchy as at present limited by the Constitution, and the neutral attitude of the Crown, free from political bias, provides a balance steadying the clash of opposing interests, and preventing the too constant and sometimes violent changes, which we see in some republican states, thus ensuring stability and permanence in the midst of conflicting policies and encouraging the exercise of patience and toleration among all classes.

To the Christian the exhortation in 1 Peter ii, 17 is a sufficient guide, "Honour all men, Love the brotherhood, Fear God, Honour the King."

That God's blessing has rested upon our Country since the Reformation, when the ecclesiastical tyranny of Rome was thrown off, and the Bible became an open book for all, is plainly evident; and I think few, whatever their theoretical opinions may be, would be willing to exchange our present constitution for any other form of human government.

While the Divine authority of the Crown in Council and in Parliament remains intact, irrespective of the character of the wearer, the personal integrity and moral influence of the sovereign as exemplified in recent reigns is an inestimable boon.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS.

Lieut.-Colonel L. MERSON DAVIES wrote: I agree with very much that Major Corlette says in his interesting and instructive paper; but I would like to recall some facts about Cromwell, to whom I think he sometimes does less than justice. The statement on page 5, that Cromwell "cut the throat of a misled King," seems peculiarly unfortunate.

When Charles began to fear for his life, he appealed to Cromwell for help; and Cromwell gave it. Even Mrs. Hutchinson—no friend to Cromwell—believed in the sincerity of his efforts to save Charles. So, it seems, did Charles himself, who put the lowest construction upon Cromwell's response to his appeal. "Cromwell thinks," he wrote to his Queen, "that I may confer upon him the *Garter* . . . but I shall know . . . how to fit his neck to a *halter*!" The idea

that Cromwell, who was in a position to make himself King, was extending his aid in hopes of obtaining a decoration has its humour. But the private messenger was arrested in Holborn, the Royal letters read, Charles' duplicity again exposed, and the futility of hoping to reach an understanding with such a person finally realised. It was, therefore, no "misleading," but Charles' own self-revelations, which finally sealed his fate.

So far from possessing the spirit of an assassin, Cromwell, like William the Silent, was long before his time in desiring tolerance for all who would live peaceable and orderly lives. An Independent himself, he allowed full freedom of worship after their own fashion to the Covenanters who had tried to force Presbyterianism upon all other parties. Quakers and Anabaptists were countenanced by him, when most Independents would have put them in the stocks—or worse. He honoured a Churchman and Royalist like Archbishop Ussher enough to order that his remains should be buried in Westminster Abbey. Even Roman Catholics were so effectively protected by him that, as Macaulay said, Cromwell "was denounced as a Papist in disguise." He similarly gave asylum to the Jews, against the will of Parliament. His sympathies could hardly have been more general. While shielding Roman Catholics in England, he peremptorily stopped the butchery of Protestants by Roman Catholics abroad. (Compare this with the action of Charles, who sent English ships and guns—whose English crews deserted in horror—to arm Cardinal Richelieu against the Protestants of La Rochelle; these English weapons subsequently "mowing down the Huguenots like grass.")

How could such a man, with clear conscience, permit a Parliament to govern on worse lines, while knowing his own ability to govern on better ones? He gave Parliament its chance, and Parliament failed. To blame him for assuming control himself, is to complain because he willed to protect minorities which inevitably suffered under other forms of contemporary government. "I undertook," said he, "the place I am now in . . . out of a desire to prevent mischief . . . to serve, not as a King, but . . . as before God . . . a good constable, set to keep the peace of the parish." "Lord Protector" was the title he assumed, and no man ever justified his title more thoroughly.

AUTHOR'S REPLY.

To the CHAIRMAN (Brig.-General W. BAKER BROWN, C.B.): That the English Constitution has in it principles of some permanent and general value may perhaps be agreed. It has long been the pattern to many who have tried, and failed, to reproduce it. But it is not yet so perfect that we can say it should be adopted by all others. It is not for us to suggest so much. My effort was to show, not that it is of Divine origin, but, that in it we may find a resemblance to some principles of constitutional structure and government of surpassing value. It is a human instrument built by, and for, the use of men. But because it is this are we wrong if we suppose it may be related, if distantly, to some deeper, universal, principles of Divine origin which we should do well to see more clearly so as to apply them for the general benefit of all ?

To the Rev. C. W. COOPER: Is it really necessary to prove the Divine right of any man in authority ? We are told—"all authority is of God, and, by me Kings reign and princes decree justice." Further, Render to Cæsar the things that are his, and not those that are not. Also, the Divine Right of the Crown is by, and within the limits of, the law of the land, by succession, by consecration, by coronation. The date on which a priest is ordained is the day on which he receives a Divine authority to do certain things a layman cannot do. But he receives no authority, or right, to trespass on the province of those who have authority to act as ministers in civil affairs, masters in their own businesses, or parents as heads of families. Kings are, or should be, ministers-in-chief for this very thing, to do justice, support civil order, secure liberty for the people, sustain their freedom, accept responsibility in receiving authority and support all other authority by holding men, as civil ministers, responsible for what they say or do. In other words, a king should support law and order, by counsel and by consent.

The Throne of God does not exist in the world, not yet. If it did, or when it does, as it will, we shall hear a benediction. What we see round us now is its opposite, its opposer, the last phase of mingled elements in decay. By the use of these some are trying to set up a rival kingdom by democracy, or by some Fifth Monarchy of a mammoth despotism as a spurious substitute.

To the Rev. A. W. PAYNE : Mr. Payne has expressed my view that the Crown of England is no substitute for the Kingdom of David. How could it be so when, as a previous speaker has reminded us, God speaks of David's Throne as "My Throne"? The doctrine of evolution, as it has been understood by some, is, as it must be, a complete denial of the possibility of such a Throne. It is now more clearly seen as a doctrine of apes, not men. Men are men, and neither angels nor disembodied spirits, but living beings of body, mind and spirit. And their future is here, on this substantial earth. We may leave all theosophistry to the many philosophies of pantheism. It still holds sway in Tibet, with its early sign and symbol the Swastika, in parts of India and Ceylon, in China and Japan, in modern Europe, and in America. It is a plausible fiction of the mind opposed to known facts both physical and spiritual. It is, to-day, but the physical polytheism of ancient Egypt applied to mankind as a substitute of human faculties, working hypotheses, plausible theories, abstract qualities, for the living reality of One Self-existing Triune God. And this new polytheism is to be deciphered in the various aspects of the philosophy of humanism which is being translated into political form and language as democracy.

To Mr. GEORGE BREWER : My suggestion was that a Limited Monarchy is a safe means between those two opposite extremes, unlimited monarchy as a dictatorship and democracy as the despotism of many. There is no desire on my part to impose our particular form of Limited Monarchy on others; but that it has built into it much of value as an illustration of how to avoid the dangers of extremes seems evident. The political diseases of to-day are the result of these two extremities—the desire, by grasping power, to throttle freedom, and the effort to deny all superior authority and to seize unchartered liberties so as to indulge in a licence of riot miscalled liberty.

Can we say that Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy is a combination at all possible or not liable to failure? In a Limited Monarchy a subordinated Aristocracy supplies a need and a defence for, as well as a support to, the people. And the people are an equally essential part of the body politic in such Monarchy. In it they must be represented by their selected, or elected, representa-

tives. But to regard representatives as delegates is to stifle thought, to strangle government. If Democracy is government of the people, by the people, for the people then any other government becomes impossible since it cannot be responsible if it is itself governed by dictation from below. A government if it is to govern must be free. A people will submit to be governed if it is free, and, in that freedom, has liberty to select, or elect, its own chosen representatives. And a Monarchy so Limited can govern and be responsible, but only by counsel and by consent. It is the opposite of Democracy in this that it has a central and a governing authority. And that authority we see in the Crown. But instead of being government of, by and for the people it is the direct reverse of this. For it is government by the Crown for and with the people by consent. The Act of one becomes the Act of all because there can and must be counsel before there is consent.

To suggest that the latter form of this image in iron and clay symbolises a descent from Absolute Monarchy by stages of wider distribution of power till it rested on representatives elected by the people, or Democracy, seems apt. But it is a descent that means a decadence.

Reply to written communication by Lieut.-Colonel L. MERSON DAVIES: That Charles was a misled king appears to be the fact. He was ill-advised, as we express it, in using prevarications, abusing trust, betraying loyalties, offending justice, debasing sovereignty, and threatening liberty. He was misled by his own peculiarities because his character was unstable, his temper mercurial, and his aim confused. Yet in person he was not without attractions, in manner, in dignity, and in his resignation at the end. But as no tribunal known to the law could try, much less condemn, him, and authorise his execution, Cromwell was responsible before all others for his death by the axe and block. Duplicity in Charles could not excuse or palliate such revenge. Cromwell's tolerance permitted him to tolerate a breach of law. He tolerated and used an intolerant military and political despotism to support his own intolerant ideas of an intolerable religious and secular dictatorship. He might well be denounced as a Papist in disguise. For while he resented a despotism of prelates he was aided by a despotism of presbyters, and he destroyed, or tried to remove, all opposition by the dictatorial

support of his own following. He had, like Charles, his virtues and his merits. But the State Trials quoted by Lord Tweedsmuir show that in securing the necessary signatures to an illegal instrument, "his inflexible will coerced the waverers, and it is said that in the signing of the death-warrant he guided some of their pens." And if in his effort to protect minorities he allowed a minority of the House of Commons to take command of the whole of Parliament, King, Lords and Commons, and set itself on a pedestal of despotism, in unassailable command of the nation, then his "protectorate" was not a "commonwealth" but a dictatorship. And as such it stands condemned in any and every test of constitutional principle by the whole English body politic. Lord Tweedsmuir indicates that Cromwell's policy towards the Jews, against Parliamentary and municipal advice, was a commercial and government financial measure to buttress aggressive policy rather than a matter of tolerance or religion.

AUTHOR'S GENERAL REPLY.

My aim was to invite the consideration of some of those elementary ideas that may be supposed to reside in any kind of a sane political philosophy. This discussion, if it has strayed, shows a trend of thought but little critical attack. Montrose in his short essay on Sovereignty, with the Crown, the King, as a Central Royal executive, says much of real value. Cromwell's ideas of a political or a constitutional structure were as hazy as those of the Scottish marauders who supported a new Covenant and a revolting Kirk with their despotic intolerant presbyterian tyranny of dictation by a half-fledged democracy. At least, it was no better than that sort of prelacy it properly derided and detested. But if the English or the Scotch bishops had realised they were, or should have been, subordinates in a wider sphere, and the local representatives only of a Superior Authority, neither Greek nor Latin, they could not have earned this vicious if well-placed spleen. The contending bishops, of East or West, before the abortive Reformations and Counter-Reformations, which spelt as much revolution as real reform, had already long forgotten the use of a college of presbyters as a permanent, but local, body of advisers, a diocesan privy council, assisted, no doubt, by a diaconate, also permanent, as the elected

representatives of the people. The relic of such a constitution is suggested by the seats in the apse of the Cathedral at Torcello even now. And such a scheme, alone, could calm the rancour of debate between the contentious supporters of a too ambitious Prelacy, an encroaching Presbyterianism, and an unruly body of self-asserting Independents. So, and so only could a necessary individuality be secured within the order of one corporate body, not politic but spiritual. My reference to a Constitution, and a Crown in Council, seen long since in conference in an Upper Room in Palestine was no idle allusion. In it might be seen the institution of a model structure, in its beginnings, which contained, in essential principle, a suggestion not without use if applied to civil affairs. But it was not my desire to indicate any approval of such confusing notions as many have held, and still hold, namely that an ecclesiastical order should rule in the civil realm or that the secular order should regulate spiritual proceedings in an ecclesiastical sphere. They are separate. They may be related. But, as both the Commonwealth and the Kirk showed in Civil War, they are not identical, they cannot be confused, they must not intermeddle. Kings are ministers in a civil order for that very thing. Priests or presbyters, bishops or prelates, and deacons too, are equally necessary as ministers in another order, but all of these are under the supremacy of that Privy Council, and its Supreme Crown, in the Upper Room. And, let it be clearly seen, these are constitutional matters of the highest moment if we would avoid a future confusion even worse, and more far-reaching, than any experienced in the past. And that past covers not merely English history but the story of a mangled and a distorted Christendom, more, a perplexed and a very hungry world looking for the signs of peace in the dark clouds of disillusion both ecclesiastical and political.

Montrose once warned the King against the methods of Rehoboam. His opposition to the Kirk hypocrisies, the Covenant dictation, and to Cromwell's military despotism and sham democracy rested on a sincere desire to offer every resistance possible to the corrupting imitators of Jeroboam's policy in Edinburgh and in London. He lived up to the responsibilities of his position and "Estate." He died to rescue from political and ecclesiastical slavery those who could not, alone, protect themselves. And for his magnanimity

he was destroyed to satisfy Party strife and faction, and hanged, drawn and quartered by a Kirk to satisfy a vindictive Covenant. He was a sacrifice offered to save the Crown, preserve a constitution, and secure the sovereignty, the prerogative, of an executive central power for two kings by whom he was betrayed through an abuse of sovereign powers, a misuse of authority, a philosophy of deceit, a parody of truth.

In England and in Scotland we were warned in advance during the partizan confusions, compromises and animosities, supported, and resisted, by civil war that these provided no solution of the difficulties and distresses of the time. The same perplexities now threaten a wider area of disaffection. And the same questions are in dispute. It therefore becomes necessary to examine them if we are to find a method that may heal this confused debate and provide a remedy. Strafford supported Monarchy unlimited by any Parliamentary advice or conference. Cromwell thought a usurping House of Commons as an oligarchy not yet democratised should dictate to the Crown and suffer no check by the Peers. He destroyed a parliamentary structure in which an aristocracy was provided and was meant to serve as the security of the people against any excesses by the Crown. A House of Peers was also meant to stand as a restraint upon the Commons or the King in any effort they might make to restrict legitimate popular liberties, the use of a just prerogative, or encroach upon the responsibilities conferred by the essential freedom of the whole commonalty of the Realm. Of this freedom the Crown was to be and must be, the chief guarantee. That is the prime value of the Royal prerogative and the reason for its sovereignty, in a sovereign Parliament. It is this that makes the Crown responsible and confers on the king a semblance of a Divine right, a right to act and enact that can do no wrong if, and only if, it is well advised. But if any advice is partizan it is biassed. Therefore party, as party, in a body politic dismembers it. The right to differ, to oppose, is and must be legally secured and sustained. But organised opposition for the service of party purposes is a different thing from His Majesty's Opposition. His Majesty's Opposition should exist, be free to act, so as to be sure His Majesty's Government shall do no wrong, while it may suffer correction and benefit by criticism.

Lord Balfour perceived, like Burke and Junius, what he called "inner verities" within the frame of the English Constitution. Paul of Tarsus speaks of the renewing of the spirit of our mind, or, as he puts it, of the inner man. What is this inner man not visible but evident by physical action? As in man so in the English polity, as a body politic, we observe a threefold constitution. But also in both the single and the larger corporate being we find that a temperate will, a restrained imagination, a guided reason, and controlled affections are some of those inner qualities of being without the use of which nothing can exist and little may be done.