THE 664TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING,
HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, S.W., ON MONDAY, APRIL 7TH, 1924,
AT 4.30 P.M.

JAMES W. THIRTLE, Esq., LL.D., M.R.A.S., F.R.G.S.,
in the Chair.

The Minutes of the previous Meeting were read, confirmed, and
signed, and the Chairman then introduced Professor F. F. Roget, of the
University of Geneva, to read his paper on "The Influence of John
Calvin down the Centuries on the Religious and Political Development
of the Protestant Nations."

THE INFLUENCE OF JOHN CALVIN DOWN THE
CENTURIES ON THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTESTANT NATIONS.
By Professor F. F. Roget.

The general history of the Christian Church falls roughly
into three periods. Leaving primitive Christianity out
of count, there is:—

1. The formative period, from the Emperor Constantine the
   Great (324 A.D.) to Pope Gregory the Great (590 A.D.).
2. Roman Catholic Church Christianity, from Gregory to the
days of Dissolution and Reformation.
3. And, for the purpose of this paper, the establishment of
   Protestantism in Church and State as a form of Christian worship,
and a source of policy in civil government, forming together, in
Geneva, a single polity. We set aside Lutheranism, as having
shown itself, in the course of time, to be developing upon a line
distinct from Protestantism in both those respects, from the
moment when Protestantism found its one leader in Calvin.

So, definition brings within the pale of these considerations
the Protestant Church, in Geneva; in England, whether con-
formed or not; in the Low Countries; and hence in all parts of
the world, wherever the Anglo-Saxon race has rooted itself in, bringing with itself its own sense for Church, School and State.

We have, unfortunately, to leave France out of count, for the French, as a nation, show no Protestant essentials answering those tests.

It is difficult to say when began anything, for we know no beginning that has not a past, and is not apparent at least in a scattered form in the past. But history has erected fixed landmarks along the stream of the ages and divided it in reaches, by means of buoys.

The test of Protestantism is that it binds together in its essentials Church, School and State consistently, throughout centuries of national life up to the present, and prospectively including the future.

The countries mentioned above and some of the limbs of other nations moving in the wake of them answer this description. They are Protestant, and their civil polity bears a common impress from that spirit derived. So all we have to do is to follow dates in their order.

In 1536, by a decision of the citizens met together legally under the public Constitution, State and Protestant Church were united in Geneva. Thereafter none but those qualifying as Protestants possessed citizenship in the Republic, in which office could be held only by public selection based upon Church membership. So understood, Church membership was a civil act, the Church the civil bond and the clergy a civil body attendant on State and School, as expounders of Scripture, this being the root of the moral identity since held in common by the Protestant-minded Commonwealths of the world. If you go and look under the porch of the Geneva College you will see that the Scripture verses carved in the cartouches are Hebrew, Greek and German when not French. No Latin when quoting Scripture. Here we find in its very cradle the new spirit, the Protestant strain in civilisation. Thereby I do not mean the gentle arts, but the government of man by himself with the leading strings of the Bible to move in, and the self-government of the Commonwealth under the moral law arising therefrom, while it is the office of the school to gather the young round the fountain head, and that of the Church to maintain the thus acquired discipline among citizens and magistrates alike.

To sum up these preliminaries, there were founded in Geneva in 1536, by the people assembled, the public School, the public
Church, the public State, all compulsory. Do not read into this the word Democracy: it is the rule of conscience innerly comp­ulsive, made compulsory outwardly.

It cannot be too often repeated that the first Protestants anywhere became such by a personal, independent, free act. They broke away singly, and when they conglom erated into States, they did so by means of a form of oath to God and a mutual pledge quite novel, placing the public good in a public goodness, to be acquired and then shown by each of them to all.

Public education of the young people as a public duty is made compulsory upon the State, without removing the pupils from the family hearth if possible, and under the guidance of the Bible men. There is not a Protestant Anglo-Saxon author living who will not tell me that he feels this principle to have been as true in his country and to be as much bred in his heart-consciousness as if he had voted that law in 1536 at Geneva, in the spirit, and his ancestors had observed it ever since while in the body.

That condition of mind has and had nothing whatever to do with nationality. There is duty there and the human touch, which suffices for any right-doing in the world men and women are set over. So we may now behold Protestantism in its inter-national aspect.

Two months after the men of Geneva had sworn each other in after that fashion, a young French traveller, aged 27, well trained in the humanities, laws and Divinity as understood in the French schools of the time, and bent upon going to Strasburg to study further, entered Geneva for the night, a Protestant. When death removed him 28 years later, his stamp was firmly impressed upon the town: Geneva civitas libera Academia ac Ecclesia, a free City, a free School, and a free Church.

What meaning should we attach to this threefold claim to freedom? Did it simply mean self-constituted freedom? We must define it by its opposite: principatus, principality, or, more closely, we must qualify this verbal opposition as follows: the limitation of principality to its legitimate object by seeking consent from those subject to it, as parties to its authority by common reference to that of Scripture.

Authority has two mainsprings, a double source. It must be contractual, it is an arch resting on two pillars, and if we add the School to the Church and to the State, as Geneva did, we may say that every human Commonwealth, in the Protestant idea thereof,
rests on three columns, and that from this treble support proceeds the maximum of public good.

This doctrine Calvin based on Scripture. It comes very near proclaiming the infallibility of conscience. This certainly marks it as an optimistic doctrine, and as branding that of an autocratic authority in Church, State and School as pessimistic. But let us not forget that Calvin surrounded his doctrine with a statute of limitations. For all that, he put trust in the free working of the Christian mind as the true estate into which men and women should grow: liberty respecting and bounding authority; and authority instructing and protecting liberty. And this throughout, in all the callings of man, spiritual, moral, social. When we add political, we mean all these respects put together, for the Church and the State, humanly speaking, are ever the reflex image of the common conscience, an optimist's or pessimist's presentment thereof in the fruits therefrom grown, and their effect when partaken of. The conscience of man and woman raised and trained through Church and School for the good of the State; conscience winning from liberty an acknowledgment of authority; conscience enforcing respect of liberty upon authority; such is the instrument Calvin seems to have conferred upon Protestant peoples, for the achievement of their contribution to the history of nations, even beyond the pale of Christianity, for who will deny that the Anglo-Saxon race, steeped in Protestantism, is also the race whose impress upon the world is now quite the most wide-spread, the deepest, the broadest in character, and the race the most respectful of its inferiors?

To sum up, the fundamental unity of Calvinistic influence was, as a keynote, struck at Geneva in the sixteenth century, whence Calvin's doctrine was carried to Britain, engrafted upon the native stock the graftsmen being John Knox, assisted by a host of other helpers sprung spontaneously from the British soil. Indeed there is no doubt that the British soul was inwardly Protestant, both in the secular and spiritual import of the word, before the connection with Geneva and Calvin became a fact in the history of the British public mind.

That Calvin conceived man as a responsible being whose independent conscience bore a relation to God rather than to such Establishments as the Church and the State were then in Christian countries, rather than to Philosophy and Science even, the twin lamps which were then claiming to shed their fresh light upon the Christian intellect, appears from many passages in his
works which were epoch making in this respect. But what has
to be quoted here is the sum, as he called it, of his political doc-
trine.

This appears as a commentary to Matt. xxii, 21, in his
"Harmony of the Gospels": "Render unto Cæsar the things
which are Cæsar's; and unto God the things that are God's."

"Moreover," he writes, "this doctrine extends further, namely,
that each and every one, according to his calling, shall do his
duty to another: children shall voluntarily subject them-
selves to father and mother, servants to their masters; and they
shall comply with one another and gratify each other according
to the rule of charity, provided that God's sovereign rule thereby
obtain among them all their days, and so that thereon may be
dependent all that may be due to men, the sum of this injunction
being thus: because any who disturb the order of the State are
rebellious against God, the obedience rendered to princes and
magistrates accords well with the fear and service of God; but
if, to the contrary, princes should commit an outrage in some
part upon the authority of God, then they must not be obeyed,
except in so much as may be possible without offending God."

Now see the sequel. When Mary, Queen of France and of
Scotland; returned to the Kingdom of her forefathers (1561),
after the sudden death of her spouse Francis II, King of France,
John Knox was the most popular man in the kingdom of Scot-
land. She summoned the disciple of Calvin to Holyrood, and,
during their first interview, asked him this question:—

"Think you that subjects, having power, may resist their
princes?"

"If princes do exceed their bounds," quoth he, "and do
against that wherefore they should be obeyed, then I do not
doubt that they may be resisted even by power."

If we asked Knox further by whom they may be resisted, the
political conditions under which he spoke make it clear that,
by subjects, he meant God-fearing individuals, acting together or
singly.

The Protestant test of right and wrong in the Establishments
of Church and State appears to be this: whatever injures there
the conscience of man is wrong religion and wrong politics.
Whatever follows the ruling of conscience is right religion and
right politics.

Now, this law is subject to enlightenment by the instituting
of schools, free under the guidance of God, acknowledgment of
which belongs to the relatedness of man’s moral endowments to God, the only subjection he need carry into his membership of Church, State and School.

No need to add that this conception, realised among the Anglo-Saxons to an extraordinary extent, is still discountenanced in many Christian countries and denied by many a system of thought, political government, scientific research, ecclesiastic teaching and action.

In 1901, M. Ferdinand Brunetière, then the leading lay publicist upholding the Roman Catholic doctrine against the Protestant, came to Geneva to challenge it. Enlarging upon the world-wide work of Calvin, he distinguished between the scholar, the divine and the political reformer. Speaking of the latter, he said:

"In the measure, gentlemen, in which the political work of Calvin is bound up with the history of your Republic, you are better acquainted with it than I could be. One oration, moreover, would not suffice, but a whole book would have to be written if, from a more general point of view, one wished to examine Calvin’s principle, which was the confusion of politics and of morals."

No doubt the orator wished his hearers to put a depreciatory construction on his words. But what could illuminate more strikingly the public work of Protestantism than this reproach of mixing up morals with public life? And how dreadful the implication that under another form of Christianity the voice of morals is not heard in politics! That right and wrong are unknown epithets there! That the forces of logic and materialism are alone competent in the determination of means and ends!

So we have it: The Protestant citizen confuses in his conscience politics and morals. In other words, he would guide the State, administrate the body politic according to morals. The vastness of the abyss yawning between Brunetière and Calvin in those words may be measured by the greatest apparition in the world of politics these recent years: the personality of President Wilson of the United States and that, second to him alone, but hopelessly obfuscated, of the great Hungarian Calvinist, Count Tisza.

The complexion of Protestantism is one that justifies its very name. Starting from the laying bare of a mutual relation, it aims at inhibiting its extreme aberrancies. It is not prohibition
of either submission and freedom, but of the excess, the over reaching of either over the other. They both protest alternately and make each other fit in with the greatest possible number of men and women by broadening out for them a middle course.

The whole course of the mind history of England in Church and State offers an unbroken illustration thereof. The confusion of religion, morals, philosophies, as M. Brunetière would resent it, is perpetually recurrent, is an endemic feature in British public life, and nowhere is it more evident that Church, State, School are the proper arena for the fights of free minds about right and wrong. English Churchism is free: it knows neither Syllabus nor Pope. English Dissent is free. It does not raise a finger against anybody except in argument, and none is raised against it otherwise. There is a kingship and imperialism serving strictly the civic commonwealth, which is republican quite. And most of all, the School is free: the free mainspring of every freedom in Church and State, and the common foundation for that confusion of politics and morals which is the safeguard of the world leadership devolving upon the Anglo-Saxon nations.

The best proof of—and result of—the balancing effect of that happy confusion is seen in the voluntary and free aspect of military service in Anglo-Saxon nations. There can be no doubt that it was the Anglo-Saxon spirit (the spirit of Protestantism in aggregate form) that rose against its contrary in 1914 throughout the British Empire; in 1917, too, the same spirit flamed forth from the United States of America—rose in arms and then—laid its weapons, and was dissolved again as into thin air, when the unholy evil that had provoked it had ceased from its provocation. Of the protesting spirit nothing was left. There was no other reason, no other excuse or explanation of its insurrection and lightning-like effectiveness in striking and then vanishing, except that the moral values of Protestantism were challenged in politics by means intolerable to humanity, and immediately, force of the same order sprang up to restore fair conditions of battle to those holding for the right in the contention of forces. And it is somewhat peculiar that the alarm was sounded as early as 1905 by two Genevans, who, stout opponents of Imperialism in any form, and of so-called National Armies in permanent service, urged the passing of a terminable Military Act for the enrolment of British manhood in general preparation for War. Both these advisers were Calvinist Protestants of the
earliest observance by descent direct, their families having lived uninterruptedly at Geneva.

This brings the next question within sight. Are Protestants moved to action by national passions? Have they the national spirit? Do they form nationalities?

We may best examine this by looking to the missionary spirit which is most at home among Anglo-Saxons as an individual characteristic of the Protestant. It is among them that the sense of a missionary duty is most prevalent and colours the colonising instinct so deeply embedded in the moral features of the race. They could not lay the plan of a Colony except as a project of Commonwealth, bearing a moral and religious impression profoundly Protestant. Dutch Calvinism, too, was conveyed to South Africa. There was a contradiction in the terms in which war broke out between the South African Dutch and the English Government, as the course of political history has shown since the 1906 reconciliation. This brought in its wake the agreement of such minds as those of Botha and Smuts with the League of Nations' scheme: President Wilson, for instance, would have set up world-wide politics on the purely moral foundations dear to Protestantism, a proposal which rang true to the "confused" Anglo-Saxon mind, as Brunetière would define it, on that very account. A French or Belgian Colony is indescribable, except as purely administrative, commercial and military. It is selfless and an official appendage of the Home Government. A new France beyond the seas, in the sense of the New England on the American coast, was historically impossible. The French political soul is not communicable in segments suited to emigration, and its religion was a set framework, bound with steel hoops, cast in Rome. The doctrine of the Excommunication of outbranching forms of the Faith has been fatal to the activity of religious "plasma," and the interdiction of dissent in finding one's own way to the Throne of Righteousness has unnerved the creative spirit springing from the root consciousness in man, that every conformity must be as free an act as a heresy is, and that a common heresy becomes the foundation of a sectional Church as a common moral standard is the cornerstone of public action on behalf of morals through the State. Those who signed the Covenant of the Mayflower were, each of them as a Christian, a moralist and a citizen, in a state of perfect conscious unity. The same unity stamped their plurality and is visibly perpetuated all along the line of American
Presidents, from Washington to Lincoln, on to Wilson and the present Coolidge, if we view them as the impersonation which their public action and private tenets entitle us to, as well as in their Presidential utterances in morals and religion.

The ethical duty of the State rests upon individual conscience and religion more than ever now. It is in the front of American politics, and engrosses everyone among the people, as any one may see who looks at the wet or dry dinner-table, round which the American family sits, a liberty which the Protestant confusion of morals and politics alone enables us to take. This confusion it is that makes of the Protestant an ardent, often turbulent missionary, and an ethical pioneer who is not a mere planter, or counting-house agent.

I am inclined to think that the United States bond of nationality is nothing else.

The Americans are bound together neither by a National Church, nor by a National Name, or National School System; they have no distinct bond of language or laws. They have nationalised nothing. They are in a condition of absolute confusionism, they are Protestant and with the British Empire stand in the van of Christian lay activities.

It must be confessed that Britain lagged long behind New England in building up firmly its own commonwealth on the Protestant principle of mutual restraint, and in divesting Church, State, and Law of all power which divides men, so as to set all men free from force and officialdom in matters personal and voluntary, while assuring protection to property, life, and mind in all sectional institutions, without nationalizing them.

The story of toleration, particularly, is more easily written from American history books than from English, though the leave given to the 
Mayflower people to be free heretics beyond the seas, under the English flag, was a distinctly Protestant compromise.

Proceeding on these lines, at once inhibitory and liberal, there grew in England a commonwealth fit to spread until it included races more numerous and diverse than ever obeyed Rome, and which cost nothing like the same quantity of blood, treasure and tears, including, too, specimens of civilisation of all levels. This Britain owes to the universal application of civil government, to the forsaking of militarism, to the slowly acquired habit of valuing land for the people's good and not for a conqueror's sake. That is the Protestant root idea; that City
and School are the social hinges upon which the State moves free. So the success of the British Empire is due to institutions, not force; to the home institutions of which civil servants abroad and colonists carried with them the sense and which they restored among themselves. No French colonist could carry, as a home-good, with him the sense of French law, because it is an exoteric written law, not a habit of the mind embodied in public customs.

A very good example of this arose lately in the Saar. The French prefect trained to apply codified police law, having to deal with "picketing" in a strike, called in the French Military to stop it, because there was no article in the German law-books forbidding "picketing." He did not realise that "peaceful picketing" came under the common rights of the individual, so long as no violence was offered, which violence the ordinary powers of the local policemen would be quite sufficient to meet.

"The British Empire has held together in so far as Britain has discovered principles, and evolved a system, which is not British, but human, and can only endure in so far as it grows more human still," wrote E. A. Sonnenschein in July, 1915, prophetically and, we may add, with the insight of a Protestant. A strange approximation to that idea may be seen in the present Government of Great Britain, foreboding a greater socialisation of morals, school and government than has been attempted hitherto with the consent of the politically-expressed will of the people; clearly Protestant in this, that this object shall be attained by mutual inhibition of contrasted extremes, answering the curb set by morals and religious regard upon the dealings of man with man. The proof that this evolution is of Protestant origin would have to be sought (or taken from the event) in this commonwealth of an Empire whose political growth has been in the Protestant line for four uninterrupted centuries. During these, the process of religious expansion as the population grew in numbers has been dispersive rather than disruptive, and, under the law of liberty, an ever greater number of consciences have been promoted to being politically alive.

How? the sceptic may ask, looking to a procedure universal and abstract for such an operation as Church and Empire building. But forces are never universal and abstract; that belongs to philosophy, mathematics, physics and their principles. Forces are actual, concrete and applied. But, again, the sceptic
will say: How did the ancient Romans unite the civilised world into one international State? Did they not abandon the commonwealth idea which had been effective 700 years? Did they not set up their international empire on the basis of autocracy? Now, the civil fabric of the British Empire, just as international and vast as the Roman, under and after Augustus, does not rest upon autocracy. It was an immense step in the history of the world, the greatest ever made, that a quarter of its inhabitants, and that quarter standing at every level in human progress, should have been united into an international State, without that State abandoning, as did Rome, the commonwealth life-principle for the passive discipline of autocratic institutions.

When Rome secured its second primacy of the world through the Christian religion and Church, it fell into the same rut, now by ecclesiasticism, as by its late political imperialism. But here, too, the Anglo-Saxon spirit carried into practice the principle of free religious commonwealths, without unity, or rather leaving that unexpressed which might the more firmly so be rooted in each part, and, working freely therein, send forth all its strength from its place into the general structure. That is the contribution of Protestantism to Church and State. Deepest foundations are least seen, and, with a perpetual flow, there is little flood. It is in the sixteenth century that we find the deep-lying streams breaking away from the underground. That redoubled life-force set upon its course and moulded another society, dividing sharply between Romanism and Protestantism the allegiance of the Christian world. Conformity is not an Anglo-Saxon virtue, but aggregation is.

Those who, in freedom, joined together in their politics religion and morals obtained the best cement for binding together the forces of social life, achieving a system whereby, not a mere island, nor classes, but whole peoples, sundered by all the width of the world to which they belong only by a local root, to put it clearly, may by means of this local tie be made safe and happy under the rule of a common law, that law itself being that of a public opinion which is neither British nor national, but human in its scopè, and, consequently, both familiar and dear to any human being, or, as we might even say, to any animal with a home, a family and neighbours, on whose behalf he may protest when not on his own behalf.

The defensive and protective effects of social inhibition are
immense upon the Protestant commonwealth. One cannot imagine a better purifier of the air and disinfectant of the body politic. Without it the atmosphere which a civilised people breathes ceases to be sweet. It becomes stagnant and foul.

What is then that inter-State and inter-Church bond amid the plurality of States and Churches forming the Protestant Commonwealth of Nations, so undeniably distinct from the Latin or Romanist?

We said that Protestantism meant order, peace, growth and social welfare by mutual inhibition and joint respect for the same human fundamentals in any difference exhibited. This respect we may call comity in its social aspect; piety being a spiritual feeling of man for man, as a fellow-creature and brother.

Hence the mutual bridging over of contrasts by contract. To the Protestant mind it must be so. The whole political history of Protestant peoples shows that the political tie is by them (and somehow, quite instinctively) conceived and formulated as a contract, a binding enactment on a free basis, a bond, not a bondage; a covenant, not an obligation; in fine, an internal agreement laid bare.

Thus is placed beyond question the paramountcy of nature-born affections and the implicit voidness in morals and religion of any political supremacy obtained by compression of, or pressure upon, the legitimate expression of feelings.

Why should sensibility be used as a means of enforcing an obedience which then becomes a compliance as unreliable as it is unrighteously claimed by compulsion?

The case of righteousness, as between ruler and ruled, has been magnificently put by Shakespeare in the very days of Calvin and Knox.

First, the majesty of rule, the object of a spontaneous, childlike piety:

"There's such divinity doth hedge a king,
That treason can but peep to what it would,
Acts little of its will."

Chettle, of the same date, writing of Queen Elizabeth, says:

"She was, as all princes are or should be, so full of divine fullnesse that guilty mortalitie durst not beholde her but with dazeled eyes."

Then, Shakespeare again, on the justice of revolt when an
outrage upon the heart releases conscience. Laertes, laying the murder of his father at the door of royalty, feels his loyalty melting away:—

"... I'll not be juggled with.
To hell, allegiance! Vows, to the blackest devil!
Conscience and grace, to the profoundest pit!
I dare damnation. To this point I stand
That both the worlds I give to negligence,
Let come what comes; only I'll be revenged
Most thoroughly for my father."

With the Protestant social bond holding good within the national life (international compacts are no longer concluded upon the base of common faith); there is easily mixed up something more devout, thanks to that peculiar confusion of politics and morals that marks the Protestant temperament. A spiritual element steps in which is made visible by the persistent intrusion of the name of God in political phraseology, whether merely formal or impassioned. We have then more than a mere contract at law. We have an act of dedication, of a validity spiritually binding, and mutual; a mutuality which cannot stand if one of the parties departs from the spirit, as was well seen in the War of Secession in the United States. The common spirit could only be recovered and restored when the passionate element in the issue (which stood as between righteousness and unrighteousness, a plainly Protestant war issue) had received conscientious satisfaction. In the same way, British Imperial unity was achieved against Germany in 1914, and thence forward, only while the Protestant conscience was galled into wrath on broad, human issues. And, since then, the French Government has seen the same tide of feeling rise against its disregard of common humanity in the pursuit of political and materialistic aims. The Protestant conscience cannot approve of a political move that is not true to humane considerations, such as can be only executed by open covenating on equal political terms (by supposition equitable, if not so in reality and reason).

Both Lee and Lincoln felt deeply how wrong it was to reach the direst extremities: "A union in which strife and civil war are to take the place of brotherly love and kindness has no charm for me." "The ugly point is that a government should be kept up by force when ours should be a government of fraternity." So shines forth the Protestant loadstar. Men
should restrict themselves, and so should all Governments, to securing the fundamentals of freedom by order, and of human brotherhood by human means, among men amenable to such arguments.

The Swiss Covenant of 1291 and that of the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620 agree in this plain statement of the commonwealth's nature and expression. The form of growth in the Protestant type is congregational, or by dissent wording a new formula in associative freedom, or by federation of proximate formulas. So in political and public life. And when the common ideal, the most fundamental precept and observance of all, namely, respect of man in his mere soul and body, is challenged, the united front of the Protestant world defies Rome and Empire in point of hardness, strength and sacrificial energy of individuals. The battle once won for right on those broadest of all imaginable lines, the Protestant hand is again stretched out in fellowship as if it had never worn the gauntlet of war. Protestantism has no enemies but those who fall away from humanity. No political oath should ever be demanded on another issue. The fundamental opposition of Romanism and Protestantism the history of Ireland has shown most acutely. There only, and perpetually there, human respect has failed to operate on either side. Elsewhere the Protestant commonwealth sense of the British was never brought up against Romanism as a bedfellow, so to speak. There they could not stand each on its own ground, nor could they formulate terms in common. There is at last some appearance that the human touch of Britain has found a way down to bedrock in Irish hearts. It has struck a note upon the stone. The stone has rung back in return. Nobody who heard and met the Irish delegates at Geneva, last autumn, could doubt it, or mistake the voice. The League of Nations, if anything, is something in and by the Protestant spirit, and Ireland is there truly at last.

On the other hand, the present French Government was there as the wolf within the flock or a thief within the fold. As one of their political spokesmen said, "The name of God is never heard and His presence never felt in contemporary French politics." Yet it were better to worship an honest pagan god than be no worshipper at all. It is well recognised at Rome that the League of Nations depends on the Protestant spirit for its life and that this spirit is not that of spiritual autocracy.

Mr. Brunetière, whom I quoted above, said at Geneva on the
same occasion that the spirit of Protestantism is one of aristocracy. The utterance was memorable and tri-partite.

He said and laboured to prove that Calvin had unduly intellectualised, then aristocratised, and finally individualised the Christian faith. This will remind every Victorian who reads these lines of Matthew Arnold’s pronouncement on the Victorian age, which was that of his lifetime. He too threw down a triple challenge at Britain as a Protestant community, saying it was vulgarised in its upper classes, materialised in the middle rank, and bestialised in the masses below. It was not so. Its striving after morals was intense. That is now apparent by contrast. The morals which have suffered from past war conditions are of the personal kind. Those of the citizens as a body proved themselves more than equal to the stress laid on them, to the appeal made to them.

Does the threefold charge which Brunetiére levelled at Protestantism hold good? When the Genevese heard it they felt honoured, not ashamed. They knew that their one merit, as servants to their fellow-men, rested on the three main props I have above mentioned:—

1. Intellectual enfranchisement of the faith by free schools: Schola libera.

2. The consciousness of having a voice and place in the State: Civitas libera.

3. A personal agreement of each believer with the tenets of the faith: Ecclesia libera; in other words, a right of choice and probation—that which the Church of England, for sincerity’s sake, would call a Statute of Ability.

The raising by education of the quality of each individual was, in the thought of Calvin, essential to the attainment of a conscientious religious life, and did both uplift men and purify the faith; let alone the value of intellect, moral excellence, and individual character as a force making for the enrichment of national life. Whencesoever Protestantism has arisen and wheresoever it has set its feet, there soul, conscience, and mind—no room here for social distinctions in the narrower applications of the word aristocracy as opposed to inferiority in mere rank—have contributed to enlarge man to the fullness of his three dimensions, exempt from fear in so doing, and humbled thereby without undergoing humiliation.
The progress of man is marked in the history of his relation to religion from the darkest, the blackest of superstitions—the word is not properly descriptive of its meaning—to the noblest (aristocratic), most personal (individualistic), purest (intellectualistic, not rationalised, but freed from impurities and impositions). This last can only be an intellectual process.

The grievous mishandling of religion by, or in, Church and State is the saddest strain in the history of humanity. The more Christianity penetrates both in the future, the better for mankind. From Calvin to Wilson, in defining the place to be filled by Christianity in the political organisation of a world fit for man to dwell in, a very long stride can be measured. Wilson is the next best exponent of Protestantism as a political and social force and of Christianity pervasive of public policy. In his wake he drew all the Protestant Churches, States, and Schools. In this, neither was he succeeded nor was he led by Papacy. Yet his demise from actual leadership gave to Romanism every chance.

When the Peoples were moved everywhere, Rome was without a Prophet; has she then rung herself out of the Councils of the world?

We still have to consider the dual influence of Protestant religion and morals upon the law in public and private, which latter topic will bring us once more to that most important item in any Protestant Commonwealth: the School.

First the law. It is generally understood that Calvin's mind was essentially that of a lawgiver and lawyer. Two branches of law, canon law and public law, bulked more largely than any others in the concerns of his mind. The establishment of Protestantism as a theory of life and a practice applicable to a new social organization depended on the re-modelling of the spirit of the law in the relations from man to man and in the constitution of the bond of State among them. That the whole should be derived directly from Scripture was self-evident, and that the hitherto accepted medium should be set aside, namely the Church of Rome, whose conception and tradition in those things appeared then as a glass darkened and a warped mirror of the "law of God," if it may be so put in clear words. The Church of Rome did evolve and attempt to impose a certain Civitas Dei upon man. What it was is still apparent in what it has left behind, in those countries which are still bound up in the Latin traditions. This appears most strikingly in the
status of women as an object of public and private law. The Romanist started from the notion that man is born an outcast from the City of God and had to be brought back to it by submission to a discipline marking him as unworthy. The Fatherhood of God, on the contrary, would look upon him as a son and allow him dignity as such, though erring. If we look to woman particularly, she suffered more severely from so much harshness than her male companion in original sin. Her sex came in for a greater animadversion, a sharper attribution of guilt. She had to be guarded against as a constant peril, and this gave her a lower station. The segregation at law of women fallen into sin is one of the social conceptions kept alive in Romanism. That idea was absent from the Genevan Commonwealth. In this Commonwealth the Latin characteristic and the Protestant strangely crossed one another, geographically and ethnically. Geneva and the remainder of Protestant French-speaking Switzerland are beset with Romanism.

If we may let that local particularity go out of sight, and resume our consideration of terms universal, a glance at the Assembly of the League of Nations when public morals come within the field of debate shows a cleavage between Latin peoples (practically all Roman) and Protestants, clearly running along that line. When French opinion on certain rules and practices in French municipal law relating to women was expressed as a national claim, consciously put forth and claiming recognition, the benches occupied by the delegates from Protestant nations were wrapped in a reprehensive silence, speaking disapproval and dissent. The Frenchman, like everybody else, felt the tension that was in the air. The reader understands that I am not alluding to women in their political position in the State, but as sharers in one moral law with men, relatively to their persons.

The equality of all men, of whatever social station, before one another as Protestant Bible-believers, was restored in the acceptance of one and the same Bible-governance. Hence was in time evolved the Protestant notion of citizenship, drawn from that of the brotherhood of believers. This consciousness of citizenship differed in toto in spirit and performance from that which was set up through the French Revolution much later, and, as its future has shown, in total disacknowledgment of a moral law with spiritual credentials drawn from the Bible. For a time, American Protestants (improperly handled in the
political sphere by their English forbears) were dazzled by it. But they no sooner approached the question of extending their States and Schools as a spiritual Christian tie throughout their continent than Bible-religion penetrated the Federal Constitution as it had each of the contracting States. The present struggle for and against Prohibition by political legislation shows that continuity to have grown most steadily through time and to have spread over all the space accessible to the American Constitutional laws.

And where is the Anglo-Saxon country or English-ruled dependency that does not derive its administrative rules and legal powers from the same fountain head? A legality informed with morality, a morality informed with spirituality. There are more words in the English language conveying moral and religious consciousness than in any other, and nowhere else are they so constantly recurrent in poetry, literature, oratory, and common talk.

An examination of history shows that for the Protestant the leading of a moral life, the discharge of public responsibility, is a duty of double and treble import as to himself, his fellow-creatures, and his Maker. There is indeed much confusion in this . . . of the right kind.

Spiritual equality, moral equality lead to legal equality as necessary to social units, even in moral issues attaching to one’s personal life and private actions. For these we may go to, or be brought before, a common court, which, one knows, will let no ceremony, formality, or ‘principality” stand in the way of equality. In an English court the moral aspect of any contention is laid bare to the very bone; the human motive is laid bare as much in extenuation as in aggravation of a fault, and the human sense predominates in judge and jury, at once stern and kind. One of the most characteristic features of this equality and individuality in responsibility to civil society may be illustrated from the case once brought by the present King, before an ordinary court, to have some slanderous charge made against him tried as though being in that respect a plain citizen, and from the amenability of a military officer to judgment by a civil court for any wrongful obedience to his superior officer, or wrongous act of his own in his military capacity.

This “Protestant” protection of the mere man may also be seen in the right of a private individual to seek from the ordinary courts redress from abuse or injury arising in the exercise of their
powers by Civil Servants. As the body of the State was at first equally distributed among, and all over, the congregation of Protestant believers, so has the common law remained unwritten by hand, but graven in the spirit.

And so is Law, in Protestant hands, a perpetual schooling, and that a free schooling, the doctrine being reborn in, and with, every generation. It is all character building, building out a character upon an inner model.

The more one thinks of it, the more one sees that it is mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries that Protestantism has run a true course and found, or made, a natural bed along which to receive affluent streams and be enlarged. The history of Britain is that of one long social evolution, a purely internal evolution. It made no wars for conquest, and won victory in defensive wars, or for free navigation, to enlarge the commonwealth. My readers know now what that word means under my pen. The social, moral, spiritual characteristic of the nation was made sure of growth and spread all over its solid and extensible material base.

Speaking of solid and extensible State structure, the Norman invasion was certainly a military event of constitutive import (using as a standard of comparison what happened to the British occupation of Ireland). The landing of William of Normandy at Hastings turned out to be an event of the greatest magnitude as a social departure, because it brought to England elements for State, Church and School construction which grew there, from the days of Henry VIII, into a Commonwealth rooted in itself. Quite free from Latinitas in its depths, it can best be called pre-Protestant. As a State medieval England was most informal; as a civil society it was most richly endowed and quite self-contained, with remarkable powers for gemination and self-multiplication. Then Roman Church and British people began to fundamentally disagree. The word dissolution is rightly applied to what happened to Roman Church-mindedness in the island. It had out-lived itself, and the lay mind showed itself to be its supersessor and its inheritor. The Elizabethan Englishman and Scotsman showed himself extremely fervid. The intellectual fermentation was intense. Medieval passivity entirely died out. Thought, extremely fertile, sprung up everywhere, among a people endowed with an extraordinary sense for social life, joined to an untractable opinionativeness. I do not mean here the intellect that seeks and finds satisfaction in reading and writing. I mean that which finds an outlet in personal meditation on impersonal
objects. Of such dramatic thought springs the force that makes of each of us a Protestant, and individual aristocrats, even in the humblest rank, out of the most ignorant men, or the most sheep-like among gregarious creatures on two feet. And so we are brought again within sight of the *tri-unus vir* denounced by Mr. Brunetière as the typical Protestant, but, to our way of thinking, ever *primus inter pares* or *nulli secundus* in human potentiality, ideality and respectability. Those are the three stepping stones to dignity, the way to humility without humiliation, to service without subserviency, to authority without domination.

The feature of Romanism in history was this: that it taught man to hold himself for a being of small price, during his human career. The Protestant revolted, and there is perhaps in contemporary Socialism a protest of the same kind coming from the masses whose existence has been compressed by the Juggernaut of Industrialism. For all these reasons, and in obedience to all these impulses, what happened in the sixteenth century was the resolution of existing Christianity into Biblical and Evangelical first elements, so as to breathe again in the original Christian atmosphere.

What was the office of the schools in this work? It was to bridge over the gap which was then felt to separate laity from clergy. In this respect the schools and colleges in Britain, which were then formed, or whose spirit gradually changed, had a marked advantage over the Protestant schools elsewhere. They were "foundations," generally self-governing, and public in the English meaning of the word, bringing continuance to the new character which was spreading among the people under the guidance of the Reformers. These became moulders of the national spirit in its manifold progress, as time went on. The direct instruction of the young by the State is not a historical idea in England. So education remains there, in its middle and higher grades, a reflex from the particular intention attached to patronage in each school, and the choice is left to the parents according to their own proclivities in the matter of education. Thus we enter into the domain of personality in schools, and the formation of private character upon particular lines attains prominence. This specifically Protestant feature has been much obliterated elsewhere. Its preservation throughout Anglo-Saxon Christendom has been, and is, for the future maintenance of Protestant open-mindedness, one of utmost value to Christianity. Thanks
to this feature, Protestantism in its civilian garb is visibly active in the spirit which Anglo-Saxons carry anywhere they go in a national or personally responsible capacity.

Thus is made apparent perhaps the greatest service ever rendered to the world by the infusion of Protestantism into the blood and marrow of the Anglo-Saxon in his primitive island home.

The force of the Protestant principle, its social and moral momentum, may be judged by its work in the Assembly of the League of Nations. It is the rallying point, the radiating centre. It would be utterly victorious had it the help of the United States in the political guidance of the Assembly. That it is there religiously alive in the privacy of the soul is no less made visible by personal converse. That the Assembly should sit only a few hundred yards removed from the pulpit of John Calvin is historically justifiable. That an American President descended from Calvinists fathered the Covenant of the League is no unfit event.

The strength of Protestantism as a social force is seen in the variety of forms which are, together, the constituent bond of its unity. It breaks up into nuclei each of which testifies to the diversity in which active faith finds as many instruments suitable for the human mind to work with. The Christian spirit is free from uniformity in apprehending the objects of faith and in Protestantism it finds the liberty it requires to be happy in its religion. It gets as many focusing spots for the outpouring of faith, as many supporting points for a moral energy derived from Christian belief, as there are groups of men and women who seek a free relation to God—which is his will—upon which to build up a congregational religious life, and who help one another by communing with the sacred law of righteousness in His sight. Faith flowing from the fountain-head, divides itself out in as many streams as there are channels opening to receive it. Then each stream percolates through some particular area of common Christian ground. This faculty marks out Protestantism as a public good: Christus per liberas communitates effulgens. Christ shining upon the world through free companies of men.

Among legislators or reformers inspired by religion Calvin is the greatest civilian. He sought in the Bible rules for the reconstitution of the life of mankind in the forms of a society with an inherent Church. The expression of this inherency has since been seen in the infinite variety of organs in which the consciousness of grouped Christians has found utterance. No shunning of,
or withdrawal from, the world. Each collectivity of believers elects its ministers or follows its prophet. The height of confusion, says Romanism. But what a bringing home of responsibility and what a confident acceptance of it! How ennobling that appeal to the intellect in the fixation of belief! How full of dignity that aristocratic preference for the personal use of judgment in determining upon the best!

Equality and community within the Protestant bond bring up for discussion here—our final point—the whole question of personal allegiance and fealty, as compared with the collective covenanted oath, based on the equality of persons before God, and thereby implicitly extensible to, or reversionarily claimable by, the whole of human kind, as a compromise among, or contract between, all men, under Christ, whether high or low otherwise.

It results very plainly from all we have written in the preceding pages that a Protestant pledging himself to a superior "temporal" or secular power does so under two reservations implied in his conception of Christian duty, or explicitly allowed for in the wording of the oath: namely, a reservation in favour of his conscience, and another in favour of his spiritual tenets. On the contrary, when the same Protestant covenants freely with his like (such as the Pilgrim Fathers, or, in pre-Reformation days, the political Protestants who formulated the first Swiss Covenant), there is no encroachment upon the private conscience and spirit to be guarded against, but rather conformity thereto is, by a mutual guarantee, granted from like to like and, by equal and equal, is made specific and binding. Here, again, we come very near the notion of dedication as a binding clause good in public law, illustrative of, or merely exteriorising (the persons being spiritually alike) the feeling of a common vow, among equals as more cogent than one given to, or extracted by authority. The Protestant puts his religion in common. It is a Society, a Republic. Priesthood and Magistracy are merged therein. For him they are not derived from Jesus Christus noster Imperator et Rex, but from the Jesus Christ, Son of God and Saviour of Men, who is familiar to him in his own vernacular.

The religious sanction of, and penal clauses attaching to, a political oath of allegiance show, by their frequent misuse as an instrument of domination (and a successful one in spite of innumerable individual revolts), what a snare Authority has therein instituted for itself. How often, by the skilful wording of such a pledge, or by handling its implications in bad faith, it has found
formal justification for committing an evil deed offending in one individual the whole of mankind!

From the first the innermost proposition of Protestantism, in political matters, was that which it claimed in matters spiritual for itself. No arms, no violence, no compelling force of the materialistic order. Peace is the one social good amid many social evils. The public good is best understood as limited to the enforcement upon individuals of undertakings on behalf of undenominational welfare only in every sense of the word and the same rule holds good to justify international intervention on broadly human grounds, and on no other.

Unfortunately, there is in man an ever renascent rabid strain towards crushing spirit under matter. To curb that native wildness by sheer persuasiveness and education has ever been the goal of Protestantism; whence it has its name and raison d'être. Round this immanent ideality have revolved its cause and purpose throughout its history, a long course of self-education and an unceasing outward effort, not free from martyrdom.

The first edition of John Calvin’s *Christianae Religionis Institutio* was issued in 1536, the year in which the commoners of Geneva proclaimed Protestantism to be a public good and virtue, and also the year in which Calvin formed a life-long connection with that people, setting up in a Latin cradle an apostolic mission which was to bear its fruits among the non-Latin races, once under Roman domination, and thereafter in the grasp of a stifling Romanism.

**DISCUSSION.**

The Chairman, in moving a vote of thanks to the lecturer, acknowledged the weighty language in which a subject of profound interest had been unfolded before the Institute. Whereas with us the name of Calvin and his principles are associated with a theological point of view—and indeed have furnished a theological catchword—on the Continent other aspects of the man and his influence have prevailed during the centuries. A striking aspect had been developed by Prof. Roget, whose paper should at least send us back to the biographies of Calvin and the great works which he gave to the world.

The resolution of thanks was accorded with much heartiness.

Lieut.-Col. Mackinlay said:—Prof. Roget’s paper comes at an opportune time when the kingdoms of the world have all been
shaken and disturbed by the great war, and now when the tendencies in modern successful government are plainly apparent. Autocratic rule has given place to a more democratic sway, while the aims of rulers are of a more sympathetic type than formerly, being founded on the teaching of the Bible, as our lecturer tersely puts it in his phrase of "a happy confusion of morals and politics."

Not so very long ago it was said that kings could do no wrong, but that idea was shattered in England by the legal death of Charles I, who had grievously broken our laws; but though the feeling of intense subservience to royalty still survives in some countries, we find that nowadays the ruler of a prosperous country freely acknowledges that he is himself subject to law.

England and the United States are pointed out by Prof. Roget as the leading examples of this modern trend in government, and Calvin is held to be the one who has largely led to the present state of things by his appeals to Scripture in reference to earthly rule.

The modern leading State is not one in which militarism occupies a prominent place, and wars of aggression and conquest are not to be aimed at; but, at the same time, a vigorous State must be ready to engage in a war in which it takes part from a sense of justice with enthusiasm, and as quickly as possible. Prof. Roget in past years came to tell us how England (on the Swiss model) could mobilize her immense forces in man and material with order and some rapidity.

When a war is over, the extra armies which have been raised should vanish as soon as possible, the arts of peace should be at once returned to and conciliation with former enemies should be actively sought for. Our own country affords happy examples of this adaptability to circumstances. For instance, after the Punjaub War the conquered Sikhs became our most loyal supporters in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny; and after the Boer War Briton and Boer have happily joined together in the government of the Cape. It is to be hoped that Briton and German will also combine together in the pursuits of commerce, trade, and science with mutual good will and with much less suspicion of each other than in pre-war days.

As Prof. Roget helped us before the war by impressing on us the duty that all should train and be ready to mobilize, so we trust
that this present lecture may help to cause to vanish the bitterness between us and the German nation, so closely connected with us by ties of religion and of kindred.

Doubtless immense difficulties will remain in all governments, in our own included. Wars, perhaps worse and worse in character, will remain with us to the close of the age; but the broad features of present-day rule and success have been plainly put before us by our gifted lecturer, and we warmly thank him for his clearly worded and illuminating paper.

Mr. Theodore Roberts pointed out that the province of Quebec, Canada, showed the lecturer was mistaken in saying that a new France beyond the seas in the sense of the New England on the American Coast was historically impossible. He also disagreed with the lecturer's statement that the progress of man in relation to religion was from the darkest superstition, for he believed the Book of Genesis showed that a very pure religion was known in early days and became corrupted.

He thought that France's being on the Allies' side in the late war was due to the accident of her proximity to Germany on the Rhine, and pointed out that the other two great Latin races, Italy and Spain, had lately gone over to autocracy, which he believed France would ultimately do.

He instanced Benjamin Kidd's latest book entitled *Principles of Western Civilisation* as maintaining a thesis somewhat analogous to that of the lecturer, particularly with regard to the primacy of the ideals of the Anglo-Saxon race on each side of the Atlantic.

He regarded Calvin as the most powerful mind since Augustine that had been brought under the sway of the Christian revelation, and pointed out that Augustine's teaching in his City of God had moulded the Christian Church for centuries. Augustine had insisted on original sin and the total depravity of man; and Calvin, while accepting this, brought in the new principle of the individual conscience being wrought upon by Scripture.

He would have liked more from the lecturer as to the religious aspect of Calvinism, as he believed that this was at the root of its political importance, for Calvin stood above all else for the great truth of redemption through Christ.

Remarks of W. Hoste on Prof. Roget's paper:—I am thankful
for Prof. Roget’s reminder that the first Protestants anywhere became such by a personal, independent, free act (i.e. by individual conversion to God). One could wish they had been satisfied with God’s order and come together into churches rather than conglomerate into States. Political Protestantism is verily a dead business. How can we ask for “voluntary subjection (p. 160) in the home or State unless the nature be renewed”? Surely Calvin meant this, but does it not need affirming? Did M. Brunetière really mean (p. 161) that politics may be divorced from moral principles when he speaks of Calvin’s “confusion of politics and morals”? An R.C. lecturer would scarcely admit such a thing before a Protestant audience. Did he not, perhaps, rather mean that politics are not carried on strictly on Christian principles, but on principles proper to it (i.e. of righteous government), and that any attempt to set up a Christian government must either spoil your government or your Christianity. Christianity acts in grace; Government “beareth not the sword in vain.”

It may seem a shocking heresy, but take the French action in the Ruhr. It is not Christian, nor does it claim to be; nor is it Christian to demand reparations, but governmentally it is perfectly justifiable and righteous. The Ruhr adventure may not turn out to be “good business,” and it was on this principle that Bonar Law kept out, and he seems to have been right. But politically the French are within their rights. They have put the brokers in. I do not see how any government can be carried on on principles of “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity,” though the French carve these words even on their prisons, and it sounds something good. “On se paie de mots.” Government must have its sanctions; the policeman is as necessary as the preacher. “Righteousness exalteth a nation.” Anything more fatal to good government than spasms of sentimentalism can scarcely be conceived. The plane of Christianity is incomparably higher. To demand a profession of Christianity before the vote, is to confound things that differ and infringe on the liberty of the subject.

Remarks by Dr. A. T. Schofield, V.P.:—This masterly paper approaches Calvinism from a standpoint that is new to most people.

It is in its theological rather than its political aspect that Calvinism
is most generally known. Prof. Roget’s paper is, however, an argument that the union of morals and politics is the essence of Calvinism, and largely the prerogative of the Anglo-Saxon race.

In theology Calvinism appears to most to represent one-half of Divine truth and Arminius the other half, the misfortune being the extent to which each half denies the other. And this for the obvious reason that to man the two are irreconcilable. But in Divine things only opposites can be true, and the two become one.

For example:—
Light and love in God. Election and freewill in Protestantism.
Law and liberty in love. Slavery and freedom in Christianity.
Sovereignty and responsibility in Gospel.

In most religious disputes each side has part of the truth; and the needless conflict is not due to error in the word of God, but is rather a demonstration of the limitations of the human intellect.

The combination of politics and morals here asserted to be the essential quality of Protestantism is a Bible principle. The close of several epistles is full of it, and law and morals are there not confused but combined. The late war was a real conflict between brute force and morals, and was most remarkable for the union on behalf of the latter of the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races, which was indeed surprising, if we accept Prof. Roget’s view of French principles as set forth on pp. 163 and 169.