THE 622ND ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING,
HELDB IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, JUNE 14TH, 1920,
AT 4.30 P.M.

A. T. SCHOFIELD, ESQ., M.D., IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the previous Meeting were read, confirmed and signed, and the Hon. Secretary announced the following elections:—

Member: James Steel, Esq.

Life Associate: The Rev. Dr. E. D. Lucas, Principal of Forman Christian College, Lahore.

Associate: Mrs. Frederick Henlé.

The Hon. Secretary read a letter from Lady Halsbury apologizing for the inability of Lord Halsbury to take the Chair as promised owing to illness.

In the regretted absence of Lord Halsbury through illness, Dr. Schofield took the chair, and introduced the Very Rev. Dean of St. Paul’s.


The Germans said that the late war was a trial of strength between Discipline and Liberalism. This is perhaps the truest statement of the issue that has yet been made. Our opponents prided themselves on having evolved, for the first time in history, a scientific State—a polity in which all the forces of the community are or can be mobilized for a common end, so that there is no waste, no confusion, no hesitation, and no division. The management was in the hands of experts, who can act without talking. They are not obliged to persuade anybody; they demand and receive implicit obedience. Under such a system the whole nation submits for the most part willingly to an invisible drill-sergeant. There is no right of private judgment; right and wrong have lost their usual meanings. Right for the individual means doing what he is told; for the State it is the interest of the political aggregate. We do not need to be convinced of the terrible efficiency of a nation so organized; we know it to our cost. It is less obvious, though probably true, that such a polity can only be developed as a military empire, in which the effective force is not in the hands of a mass of voters, nor of class-organizations such as
trade unions, but of the army and its chiefs. Further, it is unlikely that a nation will long submit to military rule unless the people can be induced to believe that they are threatened by other nations, and unless the army is periodically used for conquest and plunder. Thus the whole system hangs together, and the chief danger which menaces it lies in the probability of provoking a powerful coalition. We, on the contrary, represent the democratic principle in its strength and weakness. Our organization is loose and slovenly; we can only mobilize our resources slowly and at enormous cost; our policy is vacillating and inconsistent, and constantly interfered with by the necessity of considering public opinion, and buying off recalcitrant sectional interests. On the other hand, we are perhaps less likely to commit great national crimes; and our neighbours know that they have nothing to fear from us.

The more we reflect on this tremendous struggle, between the ideals of Discipline and Liberty, the more convinced we shall be that it is only one phase of a universal conflict, which in myriad shapes pervades all human relations. It is the issue at stake between Patriotism and Humanitarianism; between Socialism and Syndicalism; between Catholicism and Protestantism—the religion of authority and the religion of personal inspiration (we ought not to be surprised that the Vatican was backing Germany all over the world); between faith in average human nature and the aristocratic ideal. It is one of the fundamental antinomies of life, a part of the Yes and No in which, as Jacob Böhme says, all things consist.

There are some who would state this otherwise. It is, they would say, part of the eternal struggle between good and evil, between light and darkness, between grace and law, between spiritual freedom and bondage. Such is not my position in this paper. I must confess, indeed, that in my own mind the balance inclines less decidedly on the side of liberty than it would have done had I written this paper a few years ago. I have not lost my faith in religious liberty, or my horror of priestly domination, the worst of all forms of tyranny. But I have been disillusioned by recent developments of democracy in England, France, and America. I am no more a pro-German than Plato was a pro-Spartan; but I sympathise with his distaste for Athenian democracy as he knew it, and with his dream of a highly organized State in which those should rule who have learned to rule, and in which each citizen shall have
his work assigned to him. Order is not better than freedom; but anarchy may destroy freedom more effectually than a habit of obedience. So perhaps my prejudice in favour of discipline in political and social life may counterbalance my prejudice in favour of liberty in the world of thought. But I want to speak without prejudice, as one ought to try to do in dealing with a great and serious problem. And I know, in spite of what I have just said, that the difficulty cannot be solved by leaving thought free and subjecting all the outward life to authority. For all discipline requires some kind of intellectual and moral sanction; and no repressive government has been able to enforce itself without curtailing free thought and free speech. In Germany a pastor who ventured to say that God is not the special God of the German nation was likely to be deprived of his cure of souls.

The case for Discipline and Authority against Liberty rests partly on the continuity and value of racial experience, and partly on the natural inequality of human beings. There is a strong presumption that any custom, whether of acting or thinking, which has survived for a long period, meets some actual human need, and tends to promote the survival or the happiness of the species. The gains of knowledge and experience which have lifted human societies out of savagery are mainly empirical, sometimes almost accidental; and they are precarious. They may be and sometimes are lost. Hence arises the necessity of placing them under the protection of consecrated authority, which it is impious to defy or even to criticize. Almost all barbarous societies are held together in this way. The whole system of tabu has no other foundation. Some of its prohibitions are or once have been useful, the majority palpably absurd. There is no possibility of separating the wheat from the chaff, because criticism is strictly forbidden. The more we know of primitive societies, the more astonished we shall be at the mass of vexatious and ridiculous rules which a savage has to obey. If an inventive barbarian makes the door of his hut a little wider than is customary, he does so at his peril. More things are verboten to the savage than to the Prussian. And yet a strong case may be made out for keeping society under this kind of discipline. The most stable and indestructible polities have been held in chains by tradition. And those nations which have shown unusual intellectual courage and readiness to try new experiments of all kinds, such as the
City States of ancient Greece and mediaeval Italy, have had a short life and a merry one. A thoughtful writer, H. R. Marshall, argues that Reason, the experimental, innovating spirit, is the social form of the tendency to variation, instinct, the conservative, disciplined spirit, of the tendency to persistence. Most variations fail to establish themselves, and therefore it is safer to follow instinct. "Common practice and normal beliefs," he says, "are closely related to instinctive capacities, and to some extent represent the effective experience of the race. If, then, we displace them, we should use the greatest care not to displace their resultants in the life of action." History seems to show—and this is to me a very interesting fact—that the evil consequences of rash liberty are exhibited neither in the routine of ordinary life, which has become so deeply rooted in habit as to be almost a matter of instinct, and is therefore to a large extent immune to the innovating temper, nor in the highest spiritual life, which is so recent and insecure an acquisition that its tender growth is stifled by repression and requires freedom for its development, but in the intermediate field of morality, where the protection of consecrated custom seems to be almost necessary. The moral consciousness has not had a long enough racial history to act automatically; it has to struggle against various impulses and instincts which are older than itself. It is based largely on racial experience of comparatively recent date, and the independent judgment of the individual can by no means always be trusted to coincide with the stored experience of society at large. Therefore adventurous, free-thinking societies, which have rejected the trammels of authority, generally come to grief because their intellectual development far outstrips their moral practice. The Romans knew that they were intellectually inferior to the Greeks; but they also perceived that the Greeks were "too clever by half" even for their own interests, and they despised them for their untrustworthiness and moral levity. Quite rightly they recognized the greater survival-value of their own reverence for custom: Moribus antiquis stat res Romana virisque.

Even more startling than the obliquities of Hellenic morality are the viciousness and criminality of the Italian republics of the Renaissance, during the period of their most brilliant achievements in art and literature. The same tendency to moral shipwreck is sometimes seen in the boldest and freest individual characters; though many courageous navigators
in strange seas of thought instinctively feel the danger of making experiments in conduct, and choose deliberately to live quite conventionally on this side. This is especially the case in our own country, where the fear of logic is almost instinctive. Some of our most emancipated free-thinkers have been, to their own great advantage, almost philistines in their acceptance of traditional ideas in morality. Experience certainly seems to indicate that in morals authority is indispensable. The individual is not only an incompetent judge in some matters of right and wrong, but his judgment is likely to be warped by his temperament precisely in those questions where he is in most need of sound guidance. Now it is obvious that authority is much more efficacious in overcoming temptation when it is regarded as absolute. This is why religion has so much more potent an influence upon conduct than mere ethics. For religious authority is always a guidance which is conceived of as external to ourselves, and infallible. To accept authority means to submit voluntarily and without question to the dictation of a will or wisdom which is not our own. It is necessary to insist on this, because some writers, like Mr. Balfour, have lumped together all non-rational processes by which men come to assent to propositions, and have called them authority. This would even cover the "will to believe" of the experimental pragmatist. But the essence of authority as a source of belief and a guide to conduct is that it issues absolute commands which must not be questioned, and which are supposed to emanate from some power, not ourselves, who has the right to issue them. It is the negation of private judgment. Belief in such an absolute authority has a great influence upon external conduct, and there is no doubt that the form of moral habits modifies the character itself.

Advocates of strong Discipline may also appeal to the diversities of human endowments. Men are born unequal. Democracy rests on a pure superstition—viz., that a large number of admittedly foolish persons, voting together, will somehow evolve political wisdom. We may say that it is a belief in the plenary inspiration of the odd man. But in reality the majority of human beings recognize their incompetence either to govern other people or to devise a religion and a philosophy for themselves. So much is this the case that the path to freedom is barred far more by the many who wish to obey than by the few who wish to rule. And there are many persons who will develop
their capacities, even their freedom, much more fully under a system of authority and discipline than if they were left to themselves. Three quotations from French writers will serve to support me here. "Weak minds," says Janet, "have an enormous need of an external affirmation. The answer does not matter much to them; provided it be clear and decisive, they are immediately comforted." Renan says: "The existence of a stable society guaranteeing the existence of a stable psychical state, the average individual finds himself personally interested in the conservation of traditional beliefs and customs in his surroundings, and innovators become his personal enemies."

Blondel, speaking of the educative force of tradition, says: "Tradition brings into distinct consciousness elements which before were retained in the depths of faith and practice, rather than expressed, placed in their true relations, and reflected on. Therefore, this conservative and preservative power is at the same time an instructive and initiating power. Even that which it discovers, it has the humble feeling of faithfully recovering. It has nothing to innovate, because it possesses its God and its all; but it can always teach us something new, because it makes something pass from the implicit that is lived (l'implicite vécu) to the explicit that is known." This last sentence contains too bold a claim; for, as I shall show presently, the tendency of tradition is to check experience and gag knowledge. But it is perfectly true that Discipline may be a safeguard of freedom. Freedom is not an original endowment of human nature. A fool cannot be free; and a man who cannot control himself cannot be free. "Qui sibi servit servo servit; qui se regit regem regit." The independence of the ignorant merely liberates him from the experience of the past. Examples may be found in the downright silliness of many religious sects which have sprung up since the Reformation, and in the recrudescence of superstition which marks the emancipation of the half-educated in a free country. The experience of the United States shows how little democracy has to do with real liberty. In many ways the dweller in a small censorious New England town is more interfered with, if his tastes are at all unusual, than if he lived at Petrograd before Lenin. In matters of thought, the American is "free" to be a Christian Scientist, or to believe that Bacon wrote Shakespeare's plays. In a Catholic country these and many other aberrations hardly exist; thought in the Latin countries acknowledges some authority, though not
always the same authority; and a man is not encouraged to make a fool of himself "at his own risk," as William James, that most characteristic American philosopher, would have us do.

Again, the supporters of Discipline often lay stress upon the organic unity of mankind. The voice of authority is, they say, the voice of the racial self, or of the national self, or of the Body of Christ. I have already indicated a very limited sense in which this claim may be admitted. No sensible man will under-value the importance of racial experience. But, as I shall show presently, when tradition is artificially exempted from criticism, and still more when it is employed to promote the interests of a corporation, whether secular or religious, it may easily become the most formidable of obstacles in the way of progress. The metaphor of a social organism is often abused. The analogy between society and the human body is not to be pressed too closely. The members of a social organism have a value as individuals; they have indefeasible rights against the organization of which they are parts; and above all, every human being is a member of several social organizations, no one of which can claim absolute rights over him. To make any one social organism absolute is destructive not only of freedom, but of morality, and of the purposes for which moral freedom and moral judgment exist.

We will now consider the case for Freedom. The first and most obvious consideration is that repressive Discipline always involves a curtailment of that self-determination which is one of the highest attributes of humanity. It is, as Lucan says, only the shadow of Liberty which we preserve if we resolve to will whatever we are ordered to do. Zeus, says Homer, takes away half a man's manhood when he makes him a slave. We can illustrate this truth by the effects of domestication upon the lower animals. Sir Samuel Baker considered that the wild-boar, in a state of nature, is the bravest and most intelligent of all animals. We have turned him into the tame pig, a proverb for all the qualities that we despise. It is the same, in various degrees, with the other animals which we have tamed. It seems to be impossible to preserve any nobility of character in a population which has been drilled and disciplined for generations. Treat men as machines, and you will turn them into evil-minded machines, for man was not meant to be a machine. For here also, as in the other extreme case of unchecked licence,
to innovate, it is in the moral sphere that the evil effects of a bad system are most manifest. I do not wish to abuse the Germans, but as regards humanity and chivalry in war they have put back the clock several hundred years. Discipline turns the pupil of the Jesuits into a pliant and serviceable tool for any iniquity which may be prescribed to him in the name of obedience, and for "the greater glory of God." The conscience, which was intended to be an inward monitor on every question of right and wrong, is forbidden to act. Under this treatment it soon atrophies. Whatever progress takes place in a severely disciplined society must come from above—from the rulers. But the rulers are generally opposed to all innovation, when once they think that their machine is in working order. They regard society as a mechanism rather than as a changing organism; they look backward rather than forward for their inspiration; they particularly dislike that uncertainty about the goal which is part of the free man's outlook upon life. There is a spirit of adventure in the free man, in the Protestant, such as finds expression in these fine lines of Browning's Rabbi ben Ezra:—

"And I shall thereupon
Take rest, ere I be gone
Once more on my adventure brave and new;
Fearless and unperplexed,
When I do battle next,
What weapons to select, what armour to endure."

George Meredith even says, "Spirit raves not for a goal," as if perpetual action were an end in itself. This I do not agree with. The world is a kingdom of ends: all that we do has an object, and the object is something which will have its fulfilment. But the world is in the making, and we who work in it and try to know it are in the making too. The goal is not in sight: "it doth not yet appear what we shall be." Therefore, we follow the gleam, like travellers in a strange country; even as Abraham set forth at God's command, not knowing whither he went. Evolution, for the lover of Freedom, is no mere mechanical unpacking of what was there all the time. There is a new creation always going on. "Tempora mutantur; nos et mutamur in illis."

All such thoughts are unwelcome to the disciplinarian and institutionalist. He would instinctively prefer a stable world, and a revelation completed in the past. For him the truth was implicitly communicated long ago; the function of history, of
mankind's life in time, is merely to make it explicit, to unfurl the scroll on which the law of God is written. Hence we see—I really think that there is no exception to the rule—that an institution, as soon as it has perfected itself and imposed the yoke of its discipline on those who are subject to it, begins to strangle the idea which it was intended to preserve,* and finally is immovably chained in fetters of its own forging. It perishes at last from sheer immobility and inability to adapt itself to changing conditions. If this fate has been even partially escaped by Catholicism, the classical example of a religion of authority, it is only by virtue of a saving inconsistency derived from the Christian element in its origins—an element which values inwardness and mysticism, and so keeps the mind open to receive the "fresh springs" which flow continually from the living God. But we know that the relations of mysticism and ecclesiasticism in the Roman Church have been generally uneasy and disturbed. Authority in religion always fears and distrusts the inner light, and with good reason, for it proclaims a rival authority against the voice of the Church. Both claim infallibility, though neither can substantiate the claim. Infallibility is a category which men cannot use. What guarantee can we have that any authority is infallible? It may speak in very dictatorial tones; but that is no proof of Divine inspiration. It may buttress itself with the prestige of long tradition, but error does not grow more respectable by becoming inveterate. It may claim confirmation from signs and wonders; but there is not the slightest reason to connect Divine inspiration with power to upset the normal processes of nature. When we have proved our miracle to our own satisfaction, we find that its evidential value is nothing at all. The sons of the Pharisees (we are told) cast out devils, and Charles II touched successfully for the king's evil; but we should not specially value the opinion of the former upon the grace of humility nor that of the latter upon the grace of chastity. Absolute authority is impossible, because it assumes not only absolute wisdom and goodness in Him who imparts the revelation, but a corresponding absoluteness in the wisdom and goodness of him who receives it; otherwise how can the recipient discern the voice of God from other

* Compare the wise words of Kant: "All things, even the most sublime, grow small under the hands of men, when they turn the ideas of them to their own use."
voices? When a Church claims absolute authority, it is using an instrument which is not what it pretends to be. It is really a proclamation of martial law; it gives warning that it will punish dissent and forbid criticism. Religious persecution is martial law in practice. For this reason it is quite futile to argue with a man who has accepted the principle of absolute authority. The Roman Church does not even think it worth while to discard the most irrational of its fables. It knows that a Newman will accept the liquefying blood of St. Januarius and the flying house of Loreto, as soon as he has “made his submission.” But we must remember that the authority of the inner light is not infallible either. The natural man perceiveth not the things of the Spirit of God. He cannot know them, because they are spiritually discerned. To purge the spiritual eye is no light task, but the work of a lifetime. The example of some of the Gnostics, and of the Brethren of the Free Spirit in the Middle Ages, shows how dangerous it is to trust to private inspiration. That way madness lies.

In nothing is the conflict of the two ideals more intense than in education. Catholicism will surrender every other channel of influence sooner than its hold over the children. Liberalism thinks it absolutely immoral to imbue the immature mind with indelible prejudices. Contrast the Jesuit seminary with an English public school, governed very largely by the boys themselves; or, to give a stronger instance, with such remarkably successful experiments as the “Ford Junior Republic,” for young criminals, near Detroit.

Before the end of this lecture I hope to consider briefly what to a Christian must be the conclusion of the whole matter—the attitude of Christ towards the conflicting claims of Freedom and Discipline. But first I should like to say something of the allegiance which the two ideals severally command in our own time.

There can be no greater mistake, in my opinion, than to suppose that the trend of our age before the war and in Britain was towards socialism. State-socialism is the apotheosis of discipline and the negation of freedom. It is the hardest of all hard forms of government. It ruthlessly suppresses the inclinations of the individual, subordinating him entirely to the interests of the State. It regulates every detail of his life—if it ever establishes itself it will certainly be obliged to regulate marriage and the number of births. It will crush all revolts, whether of individuals
or of classes, by simply condemning the rebels to exclusion from its organization—that is to say, to banishment or starvation. It would be a tremendous tyranny, but it might be a magnificently ordered scientific State. Now this ideal does not appeal to our contemporaries for its own sake. To the masses it is abhorrent, not only in England, but to a less extent even in Germany. It is interesting, and a little surprising to us who regard Germany as wholly Prussianized, to read statements like the following from Rudolf Eucken: "Hard and soft periods are apt to alternate. To-day softness is undoubtedly predominant and tends to give rise to the idea that the weak are good and the strong bad, and that it is the duty of the latter to give way to the former the moment there is a conflict of interests. Thus there is a widespread modern tendency to take sides with the child against the parent, with the pupil against the teacher, and in general with those in subordination against those in authority; as if all order and all discipline were a mere demonstration of selfishness and brutality." This might well have been written by an Englishman—we should recognize its truth at once if it were said of our own country. That it is possible for a very clear-sighted German observer to say it of his countrymen proves that we have to deal, not with an idiosyncrasy of English sentimentalism, but with a tendency which is common to the whole of the European world. This "softness" is, quite plainly, the ethical sentiment of the proletariat, which has become articulate as soon as this class succeeded to political power. Eucken, who regards the vogue of Nietzsche as a violent protest against the flaccidity and colourlessness which must pervade social life if this sentimental equalization of the unequal should carry the day, goes on to deprecate not less strongly what he calls politicism—the undue increase in the power of the State, in consequence of which, he says, "the whole of spiritual life tends to fall more and more under the power of the State, and to receive as it were an official stamp." This is an evil to which we are entirely strangers. It has come upon Germany not because it is part of the spirit of the age, but as a necessary result of bitter national rivalries. If we become a socialistic State, it will be because we feel our existence threatened by another nation, or by sectional anarchism at home. It may be that the spirit of nationalism will end in a victory for State-socialism everywhere—such a form of government is the logical outcome of fierce and aggressive patriotism in any
country—and of the conditions imposed by it upon its neighbours. But it is not the ideal of the masses anywhere, and would only be accepted by them after a hard struggle. What we usually call socialism is more like individualism run mad. It is anarchic and antinomian, sentimental and emotional, a sort of completely secularized and materialized primitive Christianity. For it is strong in “love of the brethren,” and in discountenancing private ambition. It resents all discipline, except that of the trade unions, which is submitted to for the same reason which makes the German democrat submit to military rule—viz., because he has enemies whom he wants to conquer or against whom he wants to protect himself. The aspirations of our age in Great Britain have been for a fuller and freer life for the individual. Nationalism, is, for the revolution, the real enemy; and it is the enemy because it logically leads to a hierarchical State-socialism, in which the individual is sacrificed to the State, the form of government which above all he dreads. I will not attempt to judge between these rival tendencies. Personally, I would rather be governed by a strong bureaucracy—honest, economical and efficient—than be a prey to the sectional fanaticisms of trade unionists, syndicalists, and what not. But I believe that an omnipotent socialist government would soon throttle all the life out of the people, and I should dread inexpressibly the perhaps inevitable alliance between the bureaucracy and a priesthood.

I pass to the concluding section of my enquiry. What can we learn from Christ about the relative merits of Freedom and Discipline? Fundamentally, He was on the side of Freedom. Tertullian says truly and forcibly: “Dominus noster veritatem se, non consuetudinem cognominavit.” He sets Himself decidedly against “the tradition of the elders,” wherever it comes in conflict with humility, charity, and spiritual sincerity. He must be held to have maintained the rights of the pure and enlightened conscience, not only against the Jewish hierarchy, but against all consecrated tradition and priestly casuistry, not least (by anticipation) against that which came to shelter itself under His own name. He deliberately placed Himself in the prophetic succession, appearing before His contemporaries as “the prophet of Nazareth in Galilee.” He was, therefore, in the eyes of the Jews, a lay-teacher, whose credentials were personal inspiration. “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me to speak good tidings.” It was the champions of authority who declared war to the knife
against Him. They were right from their point of view. His teaching was subversive, not of the law, but of legalism. So St. Paul saw clearly, and St. Paul understood what the Gospel meant. "Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made you free," is his exhortation. "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed," says the last and greatest of the inspired interpreters of the Divine message.

But Christian freedom, like all other Christian rights, duties, and virtues, contains a paradox, and needs a good deal of analysis. Christianity is a simple creed, but its simplicity is that kind of simplicity which consists in ultimate harmony and perfection, and not in poverty of content or shallow obviousness. The ancient collect which addresses the Deity as "O God who art the author of peace and lover of concord, in knowledge of whom standeth our eternal life, whose service is perfect freedom": or in the splendid terseness of the Latin original, borrowed from St. Augustine, Deus auctor pacis et amator, quem nosse vivere, cui servire regnare est: expresses with more dignity the same truth as the modern epigram, "The Christian is the Lord's servant, the world's master, and his own man." The way to Christian freedom is "to bring into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." It has in it an element of fear, fear of God—an unpopular doctrine which we forget at our peril. Modern Europe does forget it. Heine in his mocking vein says that the German appropriates the Deity ("unser Gott"); the Frenchman patronizes Him ("le Bon Dieu"—the good-natured, easily propitiated God of the French Catholic); the Italian insults Him (by mixing Him up with the definite article); the Englishman ignores Him (by never mentioning Him in conversation). The old Puritan ideal of living always under "our great Taskmaster's eye," though harshly expressed, is Christian. "Yea, I say unto you, fear Him," our Lord said. And we cannot overstate the rigour of the self-discipline with which the Christian must purchase his right to be free. Outward liberty without inner self-control, self-development without self-sacrifice, are ruinous. It is because men do not rule themselves that it is often salutary for them to bear an external yoke. An arbitrary government, a tyrannical Church, may in some cases be schoolmasters to bring men to Christ, though it is a sad pity that such methods should ever be necessary. There are many, on the other hand, who never rise in this life from the fear of God to the love of God. We must not blame them.
If they live in obedience, they will have their reward hereafter. Tauler says very well, “He who serveth God with fear, it is good. He who serveth Him with love, it is better. But he who in fear can love, serveth Him best of all.” It is only perfect love that casteth out fear; and perfect love is, even for the holiest saint, an unrealized ideal.

Further, though the Founder of our religion was certainly no institutionalist, neither was He an individualist. Among all the brotherhood worketh one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will. We are members one of another, bound to bear others’ burdens, and to allow others to bear ours. Christianity promises to make us free; it never promises to make us independent. That is the fundamental difference between Christianity and Stoicism; and for minds of a strong and self-reliant temper it is a very important difference indeed. Christian humility largely consists in willingness to depend on others, and to receive from them what they are able to give. This applies to the intellectual life as much as to the social life. Pride isolates a man; and an isolated man is a very small and cramped man, a poor creature. Personality only reaches its true nature, that is to say, its true end, by free giving and receiving, by wide and deep sympathy. Ultimately, we are what we understand and what we love. No man can really march to heaven alone. Thus, however much we hug the idea of freedom, we must not deny our interdependence on each other.

That Christianity is at bottom a religion of freedom is shown by the prominent place which it gives to love and joy. Love is essentially free service, rendered willingly and gladly. It is to the credit of human nature that a slave may love his master; but in loving him he ceases to be a slave, except externally. Augustine’s “ama, et fac quod vis” is one of those Christian paradoxes which may be dangerous to non-Christians, but not to anyone who understands what Christianity is. The perfect law, the law of liberty, is not tolerant of antinomianism. Freedom begins with posse non peccare; it is consummated only in non posse peccare. It is the Apostle of love who says curtly “Sin is lawlessness.” As for joy, which no one before St. Paul had erected into a moral virtue, it is the fine flower of the Christian life, and its disappearance is the surest token that we have lost our way. It was an unmistakable attribute of the Christian character, through all the ages of persecution. It was one of the
things which attracted Augustine to the Church of Christ. And we need not prove by argument that joy is the consciousness of inner freedom, the consciousness that, as someone has lately put it, "the universe is friendly." Joy and love go hand in hand. "He who loveth, runneth, flieth and rejoiceth," as Thomas à Kempis says. Joy produces love, and love joy.

We are thus, as usual when we turn to the New Testament in our difficulties, confronted by an apparent paradox which turns out to be a real reconciliation of opposites. It solves no particular political and social problems; but it convinces us that the rival ideals which we see struggling for supremacy in the world around us are not absolutely opposed to each other, each containing an element of truth. We cannot put the two ideals on the same level, and we may hope that the old historical forms of disciplinary repression have nearly had their day. The ideal of the priest and the drill-sergeant are still a danger, and will long be a nuisance, but few suppose that the future is theirs. Neither Rome nor Berlin will be the spiritual capital of the new world. Still, spiritual freedom must be "purchased with a great sum"; and we shall not have it unless we are worthy of it, which I am afraid we are not at present.

Dr. Schofield (Chairman) said how very much the Institute was indebted to Dr. Inge for such an able and closely-reasoned paper. It was full of thought, and thought for the times of extreme value. In accordance with custom there would be no discussion, and he esteemed himself highly privileged in being allowed to make a few remarks on what they had just heard.

He would offer nothing by way of criticism, which would be entirely out of place, and also because he agreed with the paper; and felt that with profound insight the root of the matter had been reached.

All he would venture to do was to underline and emphasize some of the beauties of the paper which he would greatly regret if they were overlooked by the audience. He could, of course, only point out what struck him, and no doubt, each one will have additions to make.

By comparing page 244 we learn that under real discipline (as in
Germany), “right and wrong lose their usual meaning,” and on page 245 we find that England, standing for freedom, is less “likely to commit great national crimes”: two remarkable statements, clearly pointing out the drift of the two principles when humanly carried to their logical conclusion.

I admire the courage of the Dean (which indeed has never been in question) when he voices what so many of us think, but so few of us like to utter, that “we ought not to be surprised that the Vatican was backing Germany all over the world.” Some, he adds (amongst whom the Dean was not to be included), who regarded the war as part of the eternal struggle between evil and good, darkness and light, bondage and spiritual liberty.

On page 247 the Dean quotes an interesting statement from H. R. Marshall to the effect that Reason represents the tendency to variation in evolution, instinct the tendency to persistence.

A little lower down I am much pleased to see that Dean Inge emphasizes a difference which Modernism either fails to discern, or denies outright. He speaks of “the intermediate field of morality” as entirely distinct and below the spiritual life—a position of great value at the present time.

On page 248 Democracy is unveiled in all its nakedness: the Dean declaring it “rests on a pure superstition—viz., that a large number of admittedly foolish persons, voting together, will somehow evolve political wisdom.”

The paper contains more profound truths than I can enumerate. I will quote one or two.

“A fool cannot be free: and a man who cannot control himself cannot be free.”

“Authority in religion always fears and distrusts the inner light.”

“There is not the slightest reason to connect Divine inspiration with the power to upset the normal processes of nature. When we have proved the miracle to our own satisfaction, we find that its evidential value is nothing at all. The sons of the Pharisees (we are told) cast out devils: and Charles II touched successfully for the King’s evil, but we should not specially value the opinion of the former upon the grace of humility, nor that of the latter upon the grace of chastity.”

“What we usually call socialism is more like individualism run mad. It is anarchic and antinomian, sentimental and emotional,
a sort of completely secularized and materialized primitive Christianity.”

"The way to Christian freedom is to bring into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ.”

And lastly:—

"An arbitrary government, a tyrannical Church, may in some cases be schoolmasters to bring men to Christ, though it is a sad pity that such methods should ever be necessary.”

But the gem of the paper is in its final remarks on the last page, when the Dean reaches the pregnant conclusion that after all Discipline and Liberty “are not absolutely opposed to each other,” thus adding one more to the marvellous list of things that even two made one in the Cross of Christ. For here we see Jew and Gentile, bond and free, rich and poor, as well as mercy and truth, righteousness and peace, and now discipline and freedom, made one in the Great Sacrifice, the sole key to the redemption of mankind, and the only solution to the world’s great problems to-day.

Prof. H. Langhorne Orchard said he was sure they would all wish to express their appreciation of an address marked by that profound thought, acute analysis, felicitous diction, which had long been recognized in the able author. That address will, to a great extent, have enlisted cordial assent. Especially valuable are pages 255-257.

But “there are spots in the sun”: and there is lacking clear definition of the terms “Freedom” and “Discipline,” and of self-discipline as distinguished from what is imposed from without. The statement, on page 249, that “Discipline may be a safeguard of freedom” seems inconsistent with that, on the next page, that “repressive Discipline” (and all Discipline is repressive) “always involves a curtailment of “that self-determination which is one of the highest attributes of humanity.”

As a matter of fact, man, in his present condition, is always a servant to one of the two principles, or forces, perpetually operating: he is yielding himself to obey either the Sin force or the force of Righteousness. These “two masters” are irreconcilable with each other. A man cannot be servant (or slave) to both at once, and he must serve one. His will is free to make the choice, the service of either necessarily involving Freedom from the service of the other.
The service of GOD, being obedience unto Him, involves Freedom from disobedience, i.e., from sin—cause of death and all evil. This Freedom which is offered in the Gospel is that wherewith the Truth makes free, is that wherewith the Son of GOD—Revealer of the Father—makes free: in it is contained man’s highest glory—the Freedom of the Service of Love. It cannot be attained without Self-discipline—the ἐγκράτεια of Aristotle. “And we cannot overstate the rigour of the self-discipline with which the Christian must purchase his right to be free.”

But man is not an isolated individual: he is a member of a social community, his personality is realizable through the personality of other men. There must be helpful co-operation for the good of each and all. The fabric of social well-being rests upon three pillars—Order (impossible without), Discipline (impossible without), Authority. And the right order flows from the Discipline imposed by the supreme Authority of GOD.

Lieut. Colonel MACKINLAY said:—It is my pleasant duty to propose a hearty vote of thanks to Dr. Schofield for his able conduct of the chair at this our Annual Meeting.

I gladly support his remarks on the paper we have just heard read. When some months ago the Dean of St. Paul’s proposed the title, we all thought it a most excellent one, particularly at the present time. We all now agree, I am sure, that the Annual Address is as good as its title. It is packed full of pithy and happy epigrams, deduced from history and from keen observation of present-day conditions, as it deals with human nature and with the changing conditions of efficient government.

As our Chairman well remarks, it leads up to a grand climax, to the teachings of our Lord about Freedom and Discipline. Although the Scriptures have primarily a spiritual purpose in the salvation of individuals, and although, as our Author tells us, the New Testament solves no practical political or social problems, nevertheless the Bible has been, and is, most useful in human government. As an instance, I remember when, a few years ago, a disastrous fire had occurred in a coal mine in the North of England, and when all efforts to extinguish it and to rescue the miners had failed, it was determined to block up one of the shafts and so cut off the supply of air, and thus put out the fire in order to save further damage.
Cutting off the air meant, of course, death to anyone in the mine, but it had been concluded by the experts that no one could be any longer alive underground.

The families of the entombed miners would not, however, accept this verdict, and a tumultuous crowd assembled to prevent the blocking up of the shaft. The few police present were unable to restrain the people, and it looked as if a serious riot would take place with probable loss of life.

Just then an open-air preacher happened to be present, and he began to speak to the excited crowd; he did not tell them to obey the authorities, but he dwelt on the love of God and on the offer of salvation through trusting to the Lord Jesus Christ.

Soon the people were eagerly listening to his message, and all risk of a riot was at an end, and the chief constable heartily thanked the preacher. Other similar instances of the effect of the proclamation of Gospel truths will probably occur to all of us.

I now conclude as I began, by asking you to accord, by acclamation, our sincere thanks to our Chairman of to-day. He is also the esteemed Chairman of our Council, and the Editor of our annual volume. (Applause.)