THE 609th ORDINARY MEETING,

HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, MAY 5TH, 1919,
AT 4.30 P.M.

LIEUT.-COLONEL GEORGE MACKINLAY IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the previous Meeting were read, confirmed and signed.

The SECRETARY announced the election of seven Associates:—Mr. J. Harvey, Miss E. A. Everett, the Rev. C. Neill, M.A., M.B., the Rev. Principal Samuel Chadwick, the Rev. G. H. Johnson, M.A., Mr. Thomas Fox, and Mr. Albert Close.

The CHAIRMAN, in calling on Professor Langhorne Orchard to read his Paper, reminded his hearers that he was one of the four winners of the Gunning Prize, his subject having been “The Attitude of Science towards Miracles,” in 1910.

THE ONE IN THE MANY, AND THE MANY IN THE ONE. By Professor H. LANGHORNE ORCHARD, M.A., B.Sc.

WHEN, introduced into the universe, we look out upon it and then look into it, among our first thoughts is the idea of association and content. We associate Unity with Plurality, Plurality with Unity, and each as contained in the other. We note that our body is one, containing many members; that the universe is one, containing things and persons, many parts constituting the whole of which each is one part. We note that things and persons possess qualities, many of them possessing one and the same quality,—e.g., stone, iron, wood (under ordinary conditions), have the common quality of solidity; mercury, water, milk that of fluidity; all have besides the common quality of weight; the common quality of gaseity belongs to oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen. Turning our attention to persons, in Plato, St. Paul, Hamilton, we recognise the common quality of philosophy; in Homer, Virgil, Solomon, Schiller, Milton, Shakespeare, that of poetry; in Daniel, Pericles, Bismarck, Lord Burleigh, that of statesmanship; and so on.

The one common quality is in the many possessors. If we
group them together, we obtain a class—the many being in this one class, included in its membership.

Although men's thoughts have from their beginning been conversant with Number, few subjects have at once so attracted and baffled inquiry as the relation between Unity and Plurality—how The One is in The Many, and The Many are in The One. For the acutest and profoundest ancient philosophers, and some of the most gifted minds in our own time, the problem has proved exceedingly perplexing, yet of fascinating interest, leading tireless investigation up a mountain path, steep indeed, but which rewards the climber with a purer, more bracing air, and a wider, clearer view. The far-famed Samian sage held that the ultimate principle of all Being was to be found in Number. Plato, greatest of non-Christian philosophers, agreed to a large extent with Pythagoras and, in conjunction with his great master, Socrates, brought forward his famous theory of the "Ideas," with that of "The One in The Many, and The Many in The One." This theory, justly regarded as one of the supreme achievements of human intellect, may be collected from his Dialogues—"Theaetetus," "Parmenides," "Phaedo," "Timæus," "Republic," and others.

Taking survey of the universe, Plato recognised its divisibility into two worlds or spheres,—the visible, consisting of our bodies and other objects perceived by our senses, the invisible, containing our souls and thoughts and moral and other qualities of a general kind. He saw that sense objects are transitory, in a state of flux and change, passing away, to be succeeded by others passing away in their turn; whilst general (or common) qualities, such as justice, courage, beauty, have permanence, remaining unchangeable through successive generations. Drawing therefrom the conclusion that the invisible sphere is higher and more important than the visible, he urged that we should especially consider and attend to it,—not to "the things which are seen" and "temporal." This led him to construct his theory: The "Ideas" are ideas of general qualities arrived at by generalization and abstraction from sense objects which suggest them through Reminiscence of a knowledge of them divinely given to the soul when it was in a pre-natal state of existence. Sense objects remind us of certain ideal archetypes according to which they were formed by the Divine-and-Human Architect of the universe; these archetypes, having been present as thoughts and purposes (νοηματα) in the mind of the
Creator when HE created, causing visible things to be what these things actually are. Sense objects offer likenesses—reflections and shadows—of the archetypal Ideas, but, owing to association with matter, these likenesses are imperfect and obscure. We compare them with their archetypes (παραδείγματα), and judge that they fall short; whence it follows that we must at some time have known the archetypes. Therefore, as this knowledge has not been obtained by us since our birth, we must have had it before. Originating in the Divine mind, the Ideas have Divine character and unity; pre-existent to things created, they are certain, unchangeable, true, and everlastingly stable, independent beings. They are the objects of knowledge; sense objects, because of their fluctuating unstable* character, cannot be known, for there is no certainty on which the intellectual anchor can take hold—they are objects of opinion. The Ideas are intellectual objects† with which the pure intuitive reason is conversant and, as like goes to like, they can be known by the soul which is itself pure reason or intellection. Their home is in the Divine mind—the pure absolute universal intellection (νοῦς) where they originated, and they make habitation in souls all finite intelligences being manifestations, or modes of existence of the universal Noûs. An Idea has three aspects—(1) A Divine thought, (2) The imperfect image of this thought presented in the sense world, (3) The mental concept which is the reflection in our mind of this image.‡ Calderwood has pointed out that Plato gives to the general conceptions of Socrates the character of Ideas which constitute the fundamental ideas of Reason and are at the same time regarded by him as the perfect essences of things—the eternal laws of being. They belong to a supersensible state—"a world or sphere of ideas." Intelligence is at first confused by the shadows of the sense state, striving to rise into the "upper world" of higher knowledge, where The Good, which he ultimately identifies with GOD, is supreme. We are reminded by Whewell that the "Reason" conversant with the Ideas is not Reasoning, with its dialectic, but is that intuitive Reason§ which apprehends the truth of First Principles.

* Like the waters at any point of a river.
† Incorporeal and without parts.
‡ I.e., the reflection of (1) by a finite intelligence subject through limitation to conditions of space and time.
§ GOD, the Soul, the World, are Ideas of the Reason (Noûs).
Reason and discerns truths deduced from First Principles. This is the 
Reason which deals with knowledge, controlling and governing
those emotions and appetites that are impulses to human action,
and so producing virtue—a harmony of the soul. Pure Reason,
as well as Reasoning, makes use of hypotheses (which are tenta-
tive conceptions of the Idea that is being sought); but
Reasoning never gets further than hypotheses, whereas Pure
Reason arrives at direct apprehension of the first principle or
Idea. Thus the conclusions of Reasoning—mere Reasoning—
ever rise higher than Opinion (which, true or false, is a matter
of persuasion only), whereas those of Pure Reason, avouched
by logical demonstration with direct intuition, present the
certainty belonging to Knowledge. If Ideas were not realities,
cognition would be impossible.

Opinion, even though true, is comparable to artificial light
which shows us but indistinctly the reflections and shadows of
the Ideas as perceived in sense objects which, by reminiscence,
suggest and recall them. But Knowledge resembles the light
of the sun which shows things perspicuously and plainly. True
opinion may belong to any man, but intellection is the privilege
of only a few men. A Definition (λόγος) of a class is the image
(εἰκόν) of its Idea, and includes all we can discover about the
class from observation; the Idea includes all there is to be
known about it. Hamilton ("Discussions") remarks that the
word, as employed by Plato, expresses "the real forms of the
intelligible world, in lofty contrast to the unreal images of the
sensible." Tiberghien says that "according to the Platonic
sense, adopted by Kant and Cousin, ideas are, as it were, the
essence and matter of our intelligence, they are its primitive
elements, and at the same time the immediate objects of its
activity. They are the primary anticipations which the mind
brings to all its cognitions, the principles and laws by reason of
which it conceives of beings and things. The mind does not
create ideas, it creates by means of ideas." (Essai des Connaiss,
p. 33.)

Socrates and Plato at first restricted their theory to such
ideas as they judged to be "worthy." Moral and intellectual
ideas, e.g., justice, courage, beauty, were "worthy"; but
many other ideas were "unworthy." Socrates being asked
(in "Parmenides") whether he admits ideas of physical things
such as man, fire, water, answers: "There I have often felt a
difficulty." And to the further inquiry: "And of such things
as hair, mud, filth?” his answer is: “By no means. Indeed
the case of such makes me sometimes tremble even for the
others. At present I devote my attention to those” (i.e., moral
and intellectual) “just admitted.” Here Socrates probably
represents Plato in his early immature philosophising days.
Parmenides pointed to him that his theory would be incomplete
unless it admitted the ideas in every branch of knowledge, and
Plato appears to have been convinced by the argument of the
Eleatic, and to have become “a consistent idealist.” The
mature philosopher may have believed that ideas of “unworthy”
things were in the mind of the good Creator when He created
them, and being Divine thoughts they could not be really
unworthy according to any accurate definition.

Qualities may combine to form composite ideas, the number of
qualities varying, e.g., the idea of “man” comprises a greater
number of combined qualities than does that of “beauty,” and
the idea of “you” more than that of “man.” Opposite (or
contrary) qualities may coexist in the same subject, but will
not combine*; neither will qualities combine with contained
contraries—e.g., hot and cold are contraries, and, though hot
water can become cold, hot cannot become cold, i.e., heat
cannot become coldness—even and odd are contraries, there­
fore two and three, which always contain them, can never
combine respectively with odd and even.

Plato affirms that the objects of the visible world must be
accepted as existing, and that they are Many and One. They
“participate” in the archetypal ideas after which they were
created, and resemble them, the resemblance of any sense object
to its idea being proportionate to the extent of its participation,
and the relation between them like that between a man’s features
and the expression of his face. In the Idea theory Plato saw a
simple-unifying principle. The Ideas, although incorporeal,
were supposed by Plato to be substances to which parts could
be added and from which parts could be taken. He was the
first philosopher to affirm the doctrine of Realism as a primary
postulate of cognition, the Ideas being the only true and know­
able objective realities, self-existent and unchangeable, and one
of them correlating with each general term. Their genesis was
the result of a combination of two factors—“1. The One, the
essentially One; 2. The essentially Plural—the Indeterminate

* But on approach, one or both will perish or withdraw.
Dyad, the Great and Little." The One* has no parts, and is supreme over everything, whether in the visible or in the invisible world: The One is also The Good and Absolute Eternal Truth, Source of all Life and Beauty. In "Parmenides," with a dialectic ability always acute and generally profound, the important question: "Does The One exist?" receives, after rigorous investigation, the answer: "If One is not, nothing is." Since then something certainly exists, One exists. Plato's scheme of investigation may be formulated thus:—

1. If The One is, what consequences follow to The One and that which is not The One?
2. If The One is not, what consequences follow to The One and that which is not The One?
3. If The Not One is, what consequences follow to The Not One and that which is The One?
4. If The Not One is not, what consequences follow to The Not One and that which is The One?

Since The One has no parts (by reason of oneness), it results that The One is without beginning, middle, or end; therefore, in regard to space, is infinite, and, in regard to time, is self-existent and eternal. Also The One is unchangeable; for if it changed it would be no longer the same as before, and therefore would cease to be The One. We conclude then that The One is Supreme, Good, Absolute Eternal Truth, Source of all Life and Beauty;† and is Infinite, Eternal, without beginning or end, Unchangeable, and Self-existent. By Him the universe was created, the efficient cause being His will, according to purpose and plan embodied in the archetypal Ideas. (The One is, therefore, a Person.)

Since The One exists, The One is identical with The One Being. The One Being (idea) contains two ideas, or (in Platonic phrase) "two parts," namely, oneness and being. Each of these two parts has itself two parts, for it partakes of oneness (because contained in The One), and of existence (because contained in Being). Similarly, each of these last two parts has two parts, and whatever becomes a part, however small, possesses the two parts—oneness and being—perpetually. The successive

* Aristotle recognised four modes of Oneness, viz., those of an Individual, a Universal, a Whole, a Continuity. Waddell remarks that to say "One" involves the mental act of numeration, i.e., of reckoning Plurality. "One" and "Many" involve each other.
† Of Whom the beneficent Sun is a type.
stages may be exhibited thus:—(1) (The) O(ne), B(eing);
(2) \( O + B \);
(3) \( \frac{O}{2} + \frac{B}{2} + \frac{O}{2} \), \( i.e., 2 \left( \frac{O}{2} + \frac{B}{2} \right) \);
(4) \( \left( \frac{O}{4} + \frac{B}{4} \right) + \left( \frac{B}{4} + \frac{O}{4} \right) + \left( \frac{O}{4} + \frac{B}{4} \right) \),
\( i.e., 4 \left( \frac{O}{4} + \frac{B}{4} \right) \), and so on perpetually.

Also, since The One and Being differ from each other, but
the difference is not owing to The One's existence as The One,
not to Being's existence as Being, that which makes them differ
must be a third thing, different from both of them. Thus, there
are three things, each of which is one, viz., The One, Being, and
the Third. Now, since The One and Being are two, \( i.e., \) twice
one, "is it not necessary"* for twice to be? And, since there are
two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice
two? Similarly, since there are three things, that there should
be three and thrice and thrice three? And, since there are
three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not necessary that
there should be thrice two and twice three? Hence there
would be the evenly even, the oddly odd, the oddly even, and
the evenly odd. If, then, this is the case, do you think that any
number is left that is not necessarily there? If, then, One exists,
it is necessary for Number to exist likewise. But if Number
exist, the Many would exist. As all existing things are parts of
Being, very many, therefore, are its parts. What, then? Is
there any one of these which is a part of Being and yet is not
one part? It must be a certain one thing (since it cannot
possibly be nothing). The One, therefore, is present to all and
each part of Being, deficient in neither a less or a greater part,
or in anything else. The One, then, is divided into parts equal
in number to those of Being; and neither is Being wanting to
The One nor The One to Being, but these two are always equalized
through all things—The One† is in The Many. The One in
itself is One only, but when distributed by Being is Many,—
The Many are in The One.‡

* Parmenides is speaker.
† Oneness is a property of Being. If anything is, it is one and not
many. Omne ens est unum.
‡ \( i.e., \) in The One as existing, The One Being. The One, as One abso-
lute and simple, has no parts.
Plato identified the pre-existent and self-existent One with GOD, and the Ideas with HIS purposive thoughts (νοηματα) after which as archetypes HE created the various objects of the visible world in which the Ideas are reflected or are shadowed. These reflections and shadows suggest their Ideas to the soul, recalling them through reminiscence of knowledge of them in its pre-natal state. But, on account of association with matter, they are presented in an obscure confused manner which cannot satisfy the soul. For the soul being an emanation from GOD Who is the Pure Reason, partakes of HIS character, knowing the Ideas as Like knows Like by direct intercourse, because akin to them, loving them, seeks to know them more and more, finding its delight in the pure pleasure* of their contemplation.

The aim of the philosopher is to keep aloof (as far as possible) from the influence of matter and the entanglements of the body. The pleasures and pains, weaknesses, maladies, appetites and passions, of the body, greatly hamper and hinder the movements of the soul's activity.

Hence, we cannot wonder at Plato's counsel (in Republic, vii), that those undergoing careful preparation to fit them to be guardians of the city should be led, when they reached the age of fifty, to devote themselves to contemplation of the Ideas and especially of Goodness, that alone being Good which is like the Idea of The Good—The Good One, The Summum Bonum, which is GOD. In the apprehension of HIM as the Self-existent Source of the Ideas and as The Chief Good is involved the obligation of making it our aim to know HIM and be like HIM, as Truth of every kind involves the evidence of its own eternal stability. The Platonic doctrine of Ideas was an attempt to explain the possibility of such stable eternal truth. We are taught that such truth cannot be derived from objects of sense, they being themselves transient and unstable. But such truth can be had respecting Ideas, which are themselves stable and eternal. As there is thus stable, eternal Truth, so is there stable, eternal Good, "which true philosophy aspires to realise and to participate in."

Socrates and Plato bid us find in the doctrine an antidote to the fear of death. To the philosopher, aspiring after the supreme Source of all Truth and Good, death comes as a friend and deliverer.

* Cf. Rom. vii, 22.
On account of our being in the Body, in this life the perfect fruition of Intelligence (the full knowledge of The Ideas and of GOD) can never be attained, although the philosopher accustoms his soul to be as independent of the body as is possible, to withdraw from communion with it and to act by herself—by processes of pure thought, without aid of the senses; Death is to be welcomed by him as the realisation of the philosopher’s dream, the fulfilment of that intellectual enfranchisement which by a life-long struggle he has in only scanty measure attained. How, then, can he fail to be of good cheer when the hour arrives of his release from the close confines of his bodily prison into the wide pure air of free intellectual life? The virtuous philosopher is sure of his well-being. In his life, and in the manner of his death, Socrates himself exemplified the virtuous philosopher.

Our consideration of the remarkable theory which I have been bringing before you may well lead us to marvel that Plato’s idea of GOD, although falling far short, should be so free from error, and to so great an extent approximate to the Biblical revelation; and that he should have believed the architect and artificer of the universe to be a Person at once Divine and human. Very noticeable also is his insistence that the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. We ask: How did he gain knowledge of these truths? Something is attributable to the circumstance that, after the death of his master Socrates, Plato left Athens and travelled for some years, visiting Egypt and other countries. He would thus probably come in contact with Jews, by whom his attention (that of an earnest truth-seeker) might be directed to the Old Testament Scriptures. Without doubt, however, a fuller explanation is in the fact, which centuries afterwards was to be preached to Plato’s keen-witted countrymen by the great Apostle, that The Good One, looking down from Heaven, has in HIS Providence arranged things with the purpose and desire that men should seek HIM if haply they might feel after HIM in Whom they live and move and have their being, and find HIM. Plato was such a seeker and feeler-after; to him, as to all others, the result followed the inflexible law—“He that seeketh findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened.”

Plato’s wonderful theory, although enriched with so much that is true and beautiful, appears to me to suffer from a mistaken supposition as to what really constitutes an Idea or...
Quality. To Plato the Ideas were Substances, incorporeal it is
ture, but yet Substances, which can be added together* after
the fashion of material objects, the resulting substance being
greater than any of the component substances. Aristotle seems
to have detected this error. To his keen insight, the affirmation
"that motion, or that smallness, is a thing in itself, set up in
nature, is a hard saying." This will also be our opinion. It is
easy to see that the doctrine of Realism may lead to absurdity:—
Let A and B be two equals, and let smallness be taken from A
and added to B. Then, since smallness is a "substance," B
plus smallness is greater than A minus smallness; whereas
it is really less, for smallness has been added to it. Similarly,
let A, B, be two equal truths, each containing also some error;
and let the error be taken from A and added to B. Then, since
error is a "substance," B is now greater than A; whereas it is
really less, for error has been added to it. Other cases can
be examined in the same way. Plato's knowledge of Algebraic
ideas appears to have been but slight. He saw that contrary
ideas refuse to combine, but apparently assumed that they could
peacefully coexist, e.g., that greatness and smallness are not
irreconcilable opponents. Had he been acquainted with the
meaning and use of the symbols + and −, he might have steered
his theory clear of this Scylla of Realism.

Where Plato's profound and keen intellect has failed of success,
it may be thought presumption in me to attempt. Yet, encourag-
ing myself with the adage "Fortune favours the bold," I am
wishful to submit to the intelligent criticism of this philosophical
Society a theory of my own which, in my judgment, avoids the
difficulties connected with that which we have been investigating.

The main question relating to Ideas is—What do we mean?
or, What ought we to mean? when we speak of a Quality.
Philosophers and thinkers generally have with remarkable
unanimity shirked committing themselves to a strict definition.
In the knowledge of the character of a thing or a person we
know that thing or that person—their character tells what they
are. Now character is the resultant of (all the) qualities; if we
knew all the qualities and their combination, we should know
the character, and thus the possessor of the character. There-
fore, the knowledge of one or more qualities is to that extent

* By "participation." Plato's theory is here self-contradictory, since
participation is impossible in that which has no parts.
a revelation of character, and thus of character's possessor. From this it follows that a Quality is a Mode of Manifestation of its possessor. We feel a stone, and say that it "is" solid, heavy, hard, or that it "has" solidity, heaviness, hardness; each of these qualities revealing the stone's character to some extent, and therefore being modes of the stone's manifestation, we say naturally and correctly not only that the stone "has," but that the stone "is." We observe the decisions given by a judge, and, noting their justice, we call him a just judge; his justice is a mode of manifestation of his character (to some extent), and therefore of the man. I hold that in every creature lies power, or capability, for self-manifestation, to some extent and by some mode or other, to other creatures.

The explanation of this appears involved in the Character of GOD. "The Good One" is LOVE. LOVE would create in order to bless with the highest form and mode of blessing the creatures. Its power brought into being; and the highest form of blessing would be Its own Self-manifestation. Since the creation would be according to Divine purpose and thought, creatures would in some measure participate in the Divine character, and be endowed with power or capability for some sort of self-manifestation to one another for the benefit of each and all. The universe may be compared to a body of which the various creatures are members; the members should manifest themselves to one another for the common good and be united by a common sympathy. They are "The Many in The One" (universe), and, since each is one part of this One, "The One is in The Many." And do not these phrases acquire a deeper and grander meaning as we remind ourselves that the universe with its "Many" had pre-existence in the Divine Mind, that in Christ all things consist and were created, and He fills all things; that out of GOD, The Good "One," and through HIM and unto HIM, are all things, to Whom be glory for ever. Amen!

Plato deduced all things from a Divine Triad, namely, The One, Existence, and Another united to both. He held also Three Ideas of the Reason. This would lead us to conclude that he regarded Three as the basic and fundamental Many, and is suggestive of the sublime Christian doctrine of The Trinity, The Tri-unity. This doctrine, of The One in The Three and The Three in The One, is written large in the Book of Nature. Let us glance at some of the pages.
(1) The Triune God reveals Himself to His creatures as Spirit (Source of all life and power), Light (Holy and Righteous, Source of all illumination), Love (Giver of His only-begotten Son, for the Redemption of sinners). (2) The nature of Man (made in the Divine image) as spirit, soul, body. (3) Consciousness, as Hamilton points out (in "Discussions"), is "a complex phenomenon comprehending three several terms: 1°, The idea of the ego and non-ego as Finite; 2°, The idea of Something else as Infinite; and 3°, The idea of the Relation of the finite element to the infinite." (4) Mind comprises Reason, Desire, Affection. (5) Mental Life has Thought, Feeling, Will. (6) The Christian spirit, knowledge, hope, have, each of them, three links with God. (7) The page of Space tells us of three dimensions—length, breadth, height or depth. (8) That of Time says three—past, present, future. (9) If we turn to the page of Substance, we read three—spirit, ether, matter. (10) And Matter speaks of gravity, pressure, temperature, and of the three states—solidity, liquidity, gaseity. (11) This Globe, on which we are living, shows mountain, plain, valley, points us to its triple kingdom—animal, vegetable, mineral; and reminds us every day of land, and water, and air. (12) The page of Belief is occupied by conjecture, or opinion, or knowledge, according as our minds concern themselves with (mere) possibility, probability, or certainty. (13) The page of Logic, written in the type of syllogism, exhibits two premises and a conclusion built upon them by the laws of thought. (14) Religion declares that in proportion as faith, hope, love, "these three," influence the Christian, so will the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Love of God, and the Communion of The Holy Spirit, live in his daily life. It were easy to mention yet other triads, but these may suffice to show that "The One in The Many" and "The Many in The One" have their basis in the Divine Trinity.

Did some such thought scintillate in Plato's mind when he urged knowledge of the Ideas and contemplation of them as leading to knowledge and contemplation of The Good One—The Creator, Source of all life and power, from Whom the Ideas and human Souls are emanations? It is certain that Plato regarded this knowledge, this contemplation, this intercourse with God, as the supreme aim and end of human aspiration, as the soul's fullness of satisfaction. The Ideas, being Divine Νοματα, originated from the Divine Character, and, being impressed on creation, manifested, "by the things that are
made,” the “eternal Power and Godhead,” and attested the Goodness, of the Creator.

In pursuance of our theory that Qualities are manifestations or aspects of the substance to which they belong, and that all things (including persons, a “person” being a thing possessing consciousness and will) have, as a common attribute, the power or capability of Self-manifestation, it behoves us to supply an answer to the inquiry: What is the aim and object of self-manifestation? The aim and object is Communion. The purpose and result of communion is Unification through assimilation—The One passes into The Many, and The Many are in The One.

All things belong to one great family, they are members of one body, The Many in The One. And The Good Creator has tempered this body together so that the members should have the same care one for another and show a common sympathy. The One in the Many implies Self-manifestation in thus going out to others. This leads us to see that the necessary condition for communion is receptivity, or apprehension, which in a person involves will and willingness. Since “Like goes out to Like,” it follows that, in order to communion between A and B, there must be, as the one goes out to the other, a receptivity (or an apprehension) based on some likeness, i.e., A and B must have something in common. This, therefore, is a sine qua non for communion. In the case of a person there is the added condition of willingness. The reason why “Like goes out to Like” is to be found in the attraction of the something which is common to both. Between two persons, and between a person and an impersonal, this attractive force can be increased or decreased at the choice of the will; thus personal communion is dependent on personal will. The will is itself acted on by those two springs of human conduct—the heart and the head, the desires and affections and the reason. The heart asks: “Is it pleasant?” the head asks: “Is it beneficial?” The heart says: “I like it”; the head says: “I will think it over, and consider whether it is wise.” The heart desires; the head considers. In the decisions of wisdom the two should be unanimous.

Especially is such unanimity important in regard to communion with GOD. HE laments, over HIS People’s apostasy, “Israel doth not know, MY People doth not consider” (Isaiah i, 3); and, when they return to HIM, wonderful blessing is promised in order “that they may see, and know, and consider.
and understand together” (Isaiah xli, 20). We have a supreme reason for loving GOD in the fact that HE first loved us; HIS LOVE is the attraction to our love and our “reasonable service.”

GOD has spoken, and out of Zion, the perfection of Beauty, GOD has shined. HE has manifested HIMSELF to men in Jesus Christ our Redeemer and Lord, Whose Name is The Word of GOD, Who is the Forth-shining of HIS glory (Hebrews i, 3), and is also the Mercy-seat (Romans iii, 25), where GOD meets with man for communion (Exodus xxv, 22). It is at the Mercy-seat especially that attraction between HIS Love and ours grows stronger as, under The Holy Spirit’s teaching, communion increases communion, as increasingly we come to know that triad—the eternal harmony of three notes of a common chord—the breadth, and length, and depth and height, of the Love of Christ. There, in the fulfilling of His prayer to The Father, for all believers on Him, that they all may be One even as The Father and The Son are One, “I in them and THOU in Me, that they may be made perfect in One,” we recognise the perfect ideal of The One in The Many, and The Many in The One, that GOD may be All in All. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ!

DISCUSSION.

The Chairman (Col. Mackinlay): There is much of value in this careful paper on a difficult subject. One naturally turns to find what the Professor has to say about the meeting of the Christian philosopher St. Paul with the heathen philosophers at Athens as recorded in Acts xvii. It looks as if our author, on p. 123, referred to this incident as showing the Apostle’s approval of heathen philosophy. Of course he did approve of it to a certain extent. But has not the Professor somewhat missed the point in the scriptural record? This seems to be that St. Paul agreed with his hearers, as far as he could, in order to attract their attention; but he only did so in order to tell them of their ignorance, thus showing that their philosophy had failed to be of any real use.

That being the case, the Apostle told them that God had revealed the way, and had attested His Divine Message by raising up the Son of God from the dead. But again heathen philosophy failed: it did not even prompt its votaries to investigate the credibility of the evidence of the Grand Miracle of the Resurrection, and consequently no progress was made.
Philosophy has had its uses in the past, much more than in the present day; when the worldly man, in this materialistic age, admires the man of action rather than the dreamy speculative philosopher; and the earnest spiritually-minded man finds far better guidance in revealed Scripture than in any system of philosophy.

Our author tells us how easily a philosopher may involve himself in contradictions (see p. 124). St. Paul warns us against philosophy, linking it with vain deceptions (Col. ii, 8). Although a philosophic wise man himself, he admonishes his hearers of the dangerous effects of mere worldly wisdom (Rom. i, 22; i Cor. i, 22, etc.).

It is recorded that in the Early Christian days when numbers joined the Church, that even philosophers were converted, as if they were the most difficult of all to be reached. At the present day the Mahomedans, who have much truth derived from the Bible, are most inaccessible, being satisfied with what they have: another hindrance is their great tendency to disputations. Philo, the Jew, a believer in revelation, was correct when he wrote: "The mind that is to be led forth and set at liberty must be withdrawn from... sophistical reasonings and from plausible arguments."

The Professor has done good service by directing our attention to this intricate subject.

At the conclusion of the discussion the Chairman proposed a hearty vote of thanks to Professor Langhorne Orchard for his carefully thought out paper: this was carried by acclamation.

Miss Maynard: It has been said that all philosophers since the time of Plato look at the universe through his eyes, and I suppose that is in the main true. He has been quoted to-day as excluding "unworthy" ideas from the Divine Mind, but our Lecturer appears to take the opposite view, and I should be very glad of a little further explanation. It seems that Professor Orchard embraces all things in the One, who is God. In the old days the "unworthy" ideas are spoken of as "hair, mud, filth," but to the Christian they also comprise the spiritual evils, illusion, wrong-doing, sin. If these ideas are in the Mind of God, we have Pantheism, and Pantheism is not Christianity. That evil is, as Browning says, "a shadow implying light, a silence implying sound," may be
an attractive view to the world, but it is not that of our Lord, who whenever He spoke of evil treated it as a living and acting force against which the powers of Heaven were arrayed, a battle that demanded the enlistment of our whole will and force if we would be among those "who overcome." I am sure our Lecturer would not deny this, and I should be glad to know whether his "all things" includes no moral ideas, but those intellectual only. Pantheism creates an atmosphere in which Christianity cannot breathe or live at all.

Rev. Chancellor Lias writes (abbreviated): Plato's teaching about God is a great deal based on Oriental mysticism and its strange vagaries and follies; nevertheless he approaches more nearly to Christianity than any other philosopher.

I will ask you to note that Moses, who must be regarded as the forerunner of the greatest and most successful Teacher the world has ever seen, and who is still widely recognised as having been sent by God as such a forerunner, commences his work with the direct contradiction of the principle affirmed by all the heathen philosophers, Plato included, that man's sin was the result of the impurity of matter. Moses insists on the fact that man, so far from being endowed by his Creator with an impure body, was created by God, and as such was pronounced by Him "very good." Neither does Moses describe him as falling from his original innocence by any innate impurity of his material body, but from a disbelief, insinuated by a tempter from without, that God had (not) given the commands, which He had given.

Chancellor Lias adds: German metaphysicians have persuaded some of us to believe in a God of our own manufacture, not a God revealed by Himself alone, through intermediate phases of His Being, commonly called Persons—German metaphysicians tell us to think of God as "The Infinite," "The Absolute," "The Unconditioned." The Bible tells us to believe in a Living God, revealed by a Revealer, and communicated to the human spirit by the Divine Breath—German metaphysicians have bidden us to conceive of God as the moral order of the universe and nothing more.

Dr. Bridges thanked the Lecturer for his highly philosophical paper, and recalled with pleasure his student days with Professor Langhorne Orchard. It was generally agreed that all the wisdom
of the world did not belong to modern times—we had continually to guard against the narrowing of our ideals. No one could deny that in the philosophy of the old teachers we had the essence of right living. That of Socrates and Plato might be summed up in two words, "Know thyself." The philosophy of Marcus Aurelius could be briefly expressed by the phrase "Control thyself," which he extended in his Meditations—to stay impulse, efface impression and quench inclination—the doctrine of a typical stoic. The marvellous teachings of Jesus Christ were built up on the basis of an unmistakable altruism—"Deny thyself"—and thus we had the philosophical trinity, "Know thyself, control thyself, and deny thyself." But, on the other hand, much of the more profound early teaching was too speculative, too imaginative and theoretical, and little progress could be made on Thought alone. Nor was Experience without careful thought a sure factor of progress. The two must ever be combined; there must be a perfect reciprocity between them, and right Action would be the result. Hence we had another trinity—Thought, Experience, and Action.

The doctrine of the One in Many and the Many in One was as much a scientific axiom as a philosophical truth. The Lecturer had made out a good case for the latter, but both psychologically and physiologically each individual was an example of the Many in One, and the One in Many. It was indeed a marvel of science that after the fusion of the human spermatozoon with the ovum, a cell division was begun that did not end with the individual but passed on through generations of beings, so that each cell in our living frame contained some infinitesimal part of the entire race of our progenitors, and we passed on the living "Atoms" to posterity.

The Many in One was expressed by what we called personality, intuition, hereditary tendency; the one to be in many was nurtured by our ideals, which reflected upon our emotions or, in other words, gave the individual "the emotion of the ideal," as Benjamin Kidd would say.

There was thus an impelling force, the vis a tergo, and the attractive force, both moving in what might be styled Plato's "Invisible Sphere." Such should make for the betterment of the race.

Plato's theory of the search for the beautiful might be tested by modern standards—it was the doctrine of the Good Angel which had a reforming grace of first importance. This was the philosophy of
Jerome K. Jerome’s play entitled “The passing of the Third Floor Back”—such was his idea of the essence of Christianity.

Like the old alchemists we still sought the “Essence of one thing.” Dr. Bridges said that this one thing was God. Tyndal remarked when he beheld the resurrection of the Spring-time, that “The Kingdom of Heaven was at hand” and the World’s greatest Teacher had said the Kingdom of God was within us. God was the One in Many, and in the fullness of time we should return to the bosom of our Father and be the Many in One.

Mr. Rouse said: Professor Orchard has given us a far better definition of a quality than Plato’s; but I venture to amend the new definition a little. The Professor says that quality is that which manifests the character of a person or a thing. But suppose that an unsuspecting stranger in passing over a moor fell into a deep bog, and that a native of the district, before there was even a cry for help, rushed up, lifted him out and guided him on to firm ground, this action would help to manifest the native’s thoughtful, kindly character, yet it would not be a quality. Therefore we must [in any case] add an adjective to the definition and say that a quality is that which permanently manifests character.

Remarks by Rev. J. J. B. Coles: It is interesting to note that intuition is connected with the soul and emotions, as well as with the intellect—hence an intuitive judgment is often superior to a merely intellectual one.

As to the Greeks and their philosophies, we remember the words of the Apostle Paul: “The Jews require a sign and the Greeks seek after wisdom—but we preach Christ crucified—unto the Jews a stumbling-block and unto the Greeks foolishness—but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks—Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.” The philosophers of Athens did not receive this wisdom—and no inspired epistle was written to the Athenians.

Mr. W. Hoste said: Our thanks are due to the Lecturer for his suggestive lecture, especially for introducing or reintroducing us to Plato, a seeker after God, who found indeed some golden grains of truth; but what a contrast between what he found and the solid gold of the Professor’s closing page: the full revelation
of the Glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. To go back now from Him to philosophy is like forsaking the meridian sun for a rushlight. Plato's conception that all sense-objects are but the reflection of Spiritual Ideas in the Mind of God is striking. Whether true of all sense-objects it would be hard to say, but the Levitical economy of types and shadows is a remarkable illustration. The tabernacle was, we know, the pattern of a heavenly reality. The difficulty of translating sense-objects into their corresponding ideas is shown by the fact that the major part of Christendom has failed to translate the sense-objects of the old dispensation, and we see them around us in all their crudity instead of the spiritual ideas they represent—the shadows instead of the substance: for the ideas are not less solid than the sense-objects (e.g., the resurrection body of Christ; tangible though spiritual), but infinitely more real and lasting. Why this difficulty? Plato ascribes it to the transitory and fluctuating character of the sense-objects that they are associated with matter. But this is the Buddhist, Gnostic, Theosophist concept. There is nothing evil in matter per se. The difficulty is in our spiritual being. One of the direct results of sin is to deprive us of the capacity to translate sense-objects into their corresponding Ideas. I think the suggestion of the Lecturer that a "quality is a mode of self-manifestation" valuable, leading to communion and unity: the many thus becoming one. But if spiritual unity is to be effected, the self, the ego must be indwelt by the Spirit of God. Sin is a disintegrating force, and though evil may unite temporarily for common ends, such unity cannot last, for the tendency of selfishness is to create as many centres as there are individuals. Poets may sing in their armchairs "All's right with the world!"; but it is only by ignoring that terrible fact which the Bible calls sin and which can only be met by Divine Power on the ground of the Atoning work of Christ.

Remarks sent by Dr. Schofield: It is a most luminous presentation of Plato, and the criticism of his views seems well warranted if we are to attach its ordinary meaning to the word "Substance," and what the Professor adds seems to a learner like myself on Quality and Character, most admirable.

The dictum, on p. 118, "The mind does not create ideas," of Tiberghien might perhaps be better expressed "does not create all
ideas,” and must not be taken absolutely with regard to the whole paper, as, with the conclusions of Socrates, they are so numerous, and so absolute on such abstruse questions which depend entirely on the meanings we attach to the words we use that it is difficult to avoid contradictions.

Compare, for example, the first line on p. 120, repeated half-way down the page, and p. 125 (15 lines from bottom), “each is one part of this one.” Also p. 121 (6 lines from bottom) and p. 120 (8 lines from bottom) states this one which is divided into parts is identical with the one that is not (line 1).

This beautiful paper ends naturally with line 3, p. 128. What follows is extraneous to it, though very true, and does honour to the Christian instincts of the distinguished author.

Author’s Reply.

My many thanks are due to this philosophical audience, especially to those who have joined in the discussion, for the patient attention and cordial appreciation with which they have received my paper. Some of the remarks in the discussion invite a brief reply: The Chairman, if he takes account of the whole verse, Col. ii, 8, will see that what is there censured is not philosophy as such, but only that kind of philosophy which is “not after Christ.” Miss Maynard: Is there not what may be called Christian Pantheism? All things are of GOD, and the day is coming when GOD will be All in All. Very reverently we may say that when HE created Satan, and when HE created Man, HE fore-knew every sinful thought and action. Even we ourselves may have ideas in our mind which we do not regard with sympathy but with abhorrence. Perhaps we have an analogy in the ether which, though present in “hair, mud, filth,” is undefiled by them; and in the beautiful sunlight shining upon a cesspool, but retaining its own purity. The Lord Jesus touched the leper, yet contracted no defilement. I warmly thank my whilom student, Dr. Bridges, for his valuable triads. Mr. Rouse can surely not intend to tell us that all qualities are permanent. The remarks of Dr. Schofield are, as always, most thoughtful and luminous. He refers to some difficulties or supposed contradictions. These seem soluble by
noting that my theory is not necessarily the same as Plato's on every point considered; and also that the simple abstract idea of The One (as Oneness) is not identical with the idea of The One Being (where the idea of Existence is added). We are much indebted to Mr. Hoste for the way in which he has pointed out the connection between "the invisible things" and "the things which are made," and how Matter is properly subservient to Spirit. He will, I hope, take frequent part in our discussions.