536TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING.

HELD IN THE ROOMS OF THE INSTITUTE, DECEMBER 9th, 1912, AT 4.30 P.M.

GENERAL J. G. HALLIDAY IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the preceding Meeting were read and signed.

The Secretary announced that since the last Meeting Mr. A. W. Oke and the Rev. David Baron had been elected Members, and Mr. George Cartwright, Sir Andrew Wingate, K.C.I.E., Mr. J. B. Karslake, Mr. John Scott, J.P., the Rev. J. U. N. Bardsley, Miss F. A. Yeldham, B.Sc., the Rev. John Ridley, Mr. H. P. Rudd, the Master of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, and Mr. W. Duncan White, Associates.

The Chairman then called upon the Rev. Dr. Whately to read his paper.

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IMMORTALITY.

By the Rev. A. R. Whately, D.D.

It seems hardly possible that the doctrine of Immortality will always occupy the comparatively subordinate position to which it is usually relegated by religious thought. God, the world, and the individual give us the ultimate terms of all our highest thinking. And the last is in a special way privileged: for the thinker himself is an individual, whereas he is neither God nor the world. In the long run, if he is ignored, the very meaning of his religion will shrivel to nothing. If self-renunciation is made the one ground-principle of the religious life—if we are taught to regard the permanence of our very existence as secondary and unessential—then self, taught to despise its own selfhood, may with consistency despise all that that selfhood contains or bears: its growth, its aspirations, its conscience, its religion. Nothing can claim an eternal significance for a being that is not eternal. If we ignore the self-regarding impulses, we cannot consecrate them. And if we do not ignore them, then they can have but one goal, a personal standing in the eternal Kingdom of God.

Let me endeavour first to set before you exactly the position which I believe this doctrine to hold in the totality of human thought, so far as I can do so in a few words. To all of us who
are assured that the belief in Immortality is thus central and essential, it cannot remain mere belief, but must, like our belief in God, be found to rest upon experience and intuition. That means that we must cultivate a sense of our own imperishable essence; and that we can only do in the light of our relations with God. Just as our ordinary self-consciousness is evoked and sustained by intercourse with an external world, so we must develop a higher self-consciousness correlated in like manner with our personal knowledge of God. Then only will immortality appear to us not as a mere future fact which we can infer, but as an actual quality of our selfhood. Annihilation will be not only incredible, but unthinkable. This must be the ideal. But if we consider how difficult it is for most people to realize what is meant by a direct consciousness even of God—how ready they are to confuse it with feeling—then we shall not be surprised if such a consciousness of immortality seems peculiarly difficult to make good. For God, at least, is present; but everlastingness is future. I have stated the problem in a form which partly meets this difficulty. The soul may be conscious of itself as an eternal entity, and if eternal then necessarily everlasting. But even so, to some people "eternal" does not directly imply "everlasting." We need to see eternity in time; to view our own personal lives in the light of ultimate cosmic purpose. This leads to the crux of our problem.

In some sense, at least, the soul is in time, and death is in time. If we fail to do more than grasp our eternity by abstracting from time (as in more or less ecstatic conditions) then when we resume the ordinary time-thread our direct experience of our eternal being is left behind. We may still value the remembrance of it as evidence; we may even be able in some degree to reproduce it at will whenever we turn our thoughts in that direction: but, for all that, the mind may still oscillate between two mutually exclusive attitudes towards reality. The ordinary consciousness of self, as carried along with the general flow of things in this perishable world, cannot as such retain a sense of immortality which has been reached merely by rising above time and space. So it may become easy to explain away these exalted experiences, or, if not to explain them away, at least to think that they are satisfied by some theory of absorption into the universal life, with extinction of our individual being.

What we need is to fuse the two spheres of self-consciousness, the higher and the lower, self as in God and self as in the world. For each of us is one self, not two. Just as the one God is
both transcendent and immanent, above the world yet in the world, so it is with the spiritual man. Our regenerated self-consciousness—born anew in God—should show us that the higher self is one with the lower, embraces the spheres of common experience, and is the final arbiter in our reasonings on human destiny. For Reason itself must be its servant. Self-consciousness is essentially intellectual. It is not mere self-envisagement, but self-understanding. It is intuition; but all our intuitions are ideas, though something more, and as such they must take their place in the general system of our ideas. Note, for instance, how Mr. A. C. Benson, in his latest book, "Thy Rod and Thy Staff," takes intellectual hold of his newly won intuition of an imperishable selfhood, and makes it at home in the structure of his thought. Immortality will not be wholly rational to us unless the Immortal in us captures the machinery of Reason.

Various conditions are required for this. At present I merely want to insist that the belief in immortality need not be merely secondary and inferential, nor yet rest upon mere external authority: that it may, like our belief in God, become an inward possession; and that the reason of this is that the fear of extinction in or after death pre-supposes the quality of mortality—a question of present fact—and that this quality of mortality is directly excluded from the higher self-consciousness that sees self in God.

The moral and religious conditions for realizing this higher self-consciousness need not detain us now, but they must never be forgotten. To live the eternal life is the way to realize our deathlessness. Then the general problem of human destiny beyond the grave can be approached from that standpoint. But what concerns us now—assuming the presence of those spiritual impulses and ideals that our religion demands—is simply to consider what intellectual conditions are necessary to bring home the assured hope of immortality.

Obviously, if we are agreed so far, it will be plain that mere logic, working with definitions and abstractions, will not suffice. Nor will equally abstract discussions based on science, though they may possess a relative value. The intellect can perform two services, however. First, it can bring the idea of immortality into relation with our other religious ideas, which are also themselves not mere ideas, but objects, more or less, of appropriation and experience. Our ideas about God and our relation to Him must determine what we understand by our own selfhood. Pantheism, for instance, corresponds to an imperfect self-
consciousness, and lends itself to a denial of personal continuation after death. So, on the other hand, I believe it could be shown that the Christian religion not merely proclaims immortality, but so adjusts the focus of self-consciousness as to bring about its inward realization. We shall be able, I hope, to glance at one aspect of this most interesting question before it is necessary to close.* But the main point at present is that intellectual coherence, not merely mystic apprehension, is necessary for the stable and inward possession of an idea. The doctrine of Immortality, if it is really to hold us, must take its necessary place in the whole system of our thought. Then no one can pretend that it is a mere feeling, even though its roots lie deeper than the discursive intellect. Secondly, the intellect can rule out imperfect theories. There are many philosophic conceptions of personality which are untrue to the fullness of what we mean when in ordinary intercourse we say, "I," "he," or "you."

Is this the condemnation of Philosophy? Most assuredly not. A popular error prevails, that Philosophy is essentially abstract and seeks to transcend experience. In truth, its proper aim is to interpret and to deepen experience. Any philosophy that fails to do this, fails as a philosophy, and only Philosophy can show it its mistakes. Empirical and would-be scientific explanations of first principles offend in this way just as much as Idealism.

Following up this second line of argument it may be well to enquire why the significance of personality so readily escapes reflection when we try to reflect upon it. We may divide the theories of the soul into two main divisions, the empirical and the idealistic.

Now the word "empirical" would strictly include that direct experience of a deathless selfhood which I have maintained to be the positive basis upon which our belief in immortality should rest. Professor Royce has said that Mysticism is Empiricism carried to the furthest point. This is true, strictly speaking, but it is just when one carries a principle to its furthest point that it becomes transformed. Empiricism ordinarily means, not the actual experience of the object we want to understand, but inferences from, or combinations of, other experiences. So the "empirical self" is not the self experienced as such, but the self as supposed to be made up of a succession of psychic states. Hume treated these states as

* See paragraph near top of p. 20.
essentially distinct, however closely running into one another. There was no internal connection between them. But the late William James may be taken to represent the more modern form of Psychological Empiricism. He refuses, like Hume, to call in a soul or principle of unity to connect all our thoughts and feelings into a whole; but he considers that Hume has not done justice to the actual unity which these psychic states present.* The "Thought" of the moment makes its own connections with past thoughts. If I recognize an object as a rose, that recognition itself connects the phenomenon with the other similar phenomena. If I recall a past experience, my thought of it appropriates it as my own, because the revival of that experience is characterized by a sense of "warmth and intimacy" which do not belong to our thoughts of the experiences of other people. And yet all the time it is only the thought of the moment that makes these connections. James finds all he wants for the explanation of the unity of the Ego in the actual phenomena of consciousness as a temporal stream of psychic states. True he is more than an Associationist. He is not satisfied with any mere external combinations of impressions with impressions. The connection is more inward than that. Old impressions never do return unchanged. But the new bear intrinsic reference to them. The form and colour of a rose is not more essential to my apprehension of it than its resemblance to other roses.

So there is a unity and a continuity, but only among the thoughts themselves. He sees no need to postulate an underlying "pure Ego," or a radical "unity of apperception." He criticizes Hume and the Associationists on purely psychological grounds. They have merely observed the phenomenon of consciousness imperfectly. On the other hand, those who have argued for a soul substance have introduced, according to him, a superfluous reduplication which explains nothing, because it is itself unknown. All the unity that the phenomena possess is itself phenomenal, and no more needs to be explained *ab extra* than the discontinuity and diversity which reveal themselves over against it.

It will be well to comment on this position in a broad and general manner so that the commentary may apply to the empirical attitude as a whole. Also we shall, I hope, be brought nearer to a positive conception.

* Principles of Psychology, vol. i, p. 352, see ch. x, passim.
James' theory may be sound enough as a mere matter of introspective observation, though in that case it is hardly a theory. But it only raises questions as to the position, value, and even possibility, of a purely phenomenal psychology. At any rate, what concerns us here is the abstractness of the whole point of view, with all its appeal to experience. James seems to think that we are bringing self-consciousness up to its highest point when we try to fix before our minds the "pure Ego," and that because we fail to do so we may discard it as a scholastic fiction. But consider what this psychological introspection is, how narrow its significance, how limited its scope. When I set my own mind before me as a specimen of Mind as such, I have abstracted already from my individual personality. For personality is always specific; my essential nature does not consist simply in being a member of the class "person," but in being the particular person which I am. "I" is not really a particular, but a singular term; and as singular I am correlated with other persons, not merely by general links which science can classify, but by specific relationships, which are, in a measure, unique, as truly as the persons which they unite are unique. The differences, not merely the general fact of differences, are essential.

Not, of course, all equally so. We do not ordinarily think of our circumstances and surroundings as if they were such that they could not be changed without the loss or weakening of our identity. But that is because we generally think of them in sections, not as a whole. It remains true that—apart from what we become through our own free will—we are what we are by virtue of heredity and environment, and that both of these imply that we are units in a world of persons—the one from the point of view of time, the other of space. And to say "I am I," is meaningless as an abstract formula. To mean anything, it must mean I am that specific person, with specific differences from others, and with such and such a record of social life and action that is indicated by the use of my name.

Now, when we rise to the religious standpoint, which is assumed in this paper (and by no means repudiated by James himself), then this conclusion is further strengthened. It is in relation to ideals that the greatness of personality appears. And our individual differences stand out all the more strongly, when we think of all awakened humanity as travelling by different paths to the same ultimate goal, living, according to their widely different capacities and opinions, for those great ideals which are the same for us all, and are all summed up
in God. The unity of the goal brings into relief the diverse nature of those who strive towards it. In other connections James might even insist on this. But if so, there is a deeper basis of personality than the succession of psychic states.

Now, if it be true that the lower in us is meant to subserve the higher, we have a right to maintain that the ideal for which we live gives the key to what we properly are. Here is the real principle of unity in our lives, and the basis of our differences. Here is the sphere of true self-consciousness, the experience of self, not as a mere flow of feelings and ideas, nor yet as a mere solid atom behind all its states, but as an eternal being in a kingdom of eternal beings, an object of the personal love of God, and everlasting because that love is everlasting.

This last sentiment is sufficiently familiar to us in itself. But you see, I hope, why I have introduced it in connection with James' treatment of self-consciousness. My object is to indicate the essentially one-sided and abstract character of psychological introspection. For it is precisely by comparing and contrasting the higher self-consciousness with the narrower and more abstract, that the higher descends from the region of mist and cloud, and becomes an object of intellectual apprehension. Otherwise, though we might be dissatisfied with the narrower conception, and find the broader and higher standpoint on the whole also a much firmer one, yet this higher standpoint might seem to lack the scientific precision of the other, and to be too dependent upon mood and temperament. But now we have met Empiricism on its own ground. It has appealed to experience and to experience it has had to go. It is true that this experience is super-psychological and even super-philosophical, but Psychology and Philosophy can both serve it by revealing the abstractness of all rival theories, even when these theories conjure with the name of Common Sense.

What I have said about Empiricism in general is emphatically true of Naturalism. But all science, psychological as well as physical, is bound to ignore, in fact studiously to eliminate, the personal equation; and to eliminate the personal equation in the search for the meaning of personality is to condemn the search to futility from the outset. The Common Sense point of view is relatively concrete, for at least it deals with real persons, not with psychic streams, phases of the Absolute, or mere counters representing the class "person." But Common Sense is not the most concrete basis, because it is not the highest. Philosophy, when it does real justice to Common Sense, is higher: Religion is the highest of all. For
the religious man sees himself in the direct light of God: sees there his sphere, his possibilities, the meaning of his life.

And here appears immortality. But his religion must be a religion adequate to the purpose, and it must be *lived*. If he is not naturally a thinker on first principles, the intellectual expression of his faith may always remain rudimentary, without hurt. But if he is, he ought to learn to define his lower experiences by the higher. He ought to refuse to admit that even for his simplest and most direct introspection he is a psychic stream. He ought to perceive that the spiritual and eternal meaning of his personality is not for him an inference or a vague inkling, but belongs to the very essence of his self-consciousness. It may come late, but when it is there it is the foundation.

We are too apt, even apart from special theories, to think of the Ego as consisting in, or at least bound to, the temporal succession of ideas. This is the opposite error to that of the unknowable soul-atom. We virtually argue thus:—Without consciousness there is no animal life. Without self-consciousness there is no personal life. But all consciousness is in time. Therefore the Ego is in time. This is the implied reasoning that leads us from one extreme to the other. But, observe, if we carry it to the utmost point which consistency demands, it would be necessary to be always saying “I am I” in order to maintain the continuity of our personality. True personality cannot exist without self-consciousness, but that does mean that it expands and shrinks according as we definitely focus our reflection upon our own selfhood, in season and out of season. Take the case of sleep, and let us call it—as it is at least—relatively a suspension of consciousness. The question is asked: if consciousness can cease for an hour, can it not even conceivably cease for all eternity? If there is a gap, might there not be a total cessation? Yes, if the mere temporal continuity, the mere succession of psychic states, is the basis of personality. But, observe, though we may regard sleep as a gap in the flow of a man’s consciousness, we do not regard it as a gap in his life-history. It does not, in normal cases, break, however slightly and negligibly, the continuity of his life-history. For that life-history, though not absolutely super-temporal, is more than merely temporal. It has also a vital, logical, and teleological continuity which is the mark of its eternity.

Still more, when the temporal life is covered by that all-embracing surrender of the will which the highest religion demands. If we live for the Christian ideal, time itself is taken up into eternity. And I urge this quite apart from all sentiment.
I maintain that the Christian self-consciousness has—to use a term which I fear may arouse prejudice—a strictly metaphysical significance—that this mistaking of mere psychic continuity for vital continuity arises from the failure to make our Christian consciousness central and determinative. All we who believe that thought is the servant of experience, must see that we do not betray our highest experiences by judging them in the light of lower categories of thought, formed to work on lower ranges of life.

It is only possible to deal very rapidly with a great rival standpoint, essentially rationalistic in the strict sense of the term, I mean the constructive monistic Idealism, associated with names of Green, the two Cairds, Bosanquet, and others. I will take, as typical, Dr. Bosanquet's recent Gifford Lectures on "The Principle of Individuality and Value." It may be possible to criticize its main position in such a manner that we may be able to grasp more firmly the positive view which I am maintaining, and secure our possession of a standard which may disclose the one-sidedness of other systems, partly though not wholly dissimilar, which we cannot now pass in review.

The modern Constructive Idealist ardently vindicates those very principles which his system is supposed to deny. Individuality, Freedom, the objectivity of nature, the real existence of things, the finality of distinctions: all this is declared to be embraced in the mighty sweep of his Absolute, and there preserved—transmuted but not obliterated. Personally, I hold that the \textit{prima facie} view of his Absolute is the truer to logic: that these pivotal ideas, so vital both in Religion and in Common Sense, are robbed of their very essence in the monist's attempt to exalt them:—"Freedom . . . dying while they shout her name."

But the special idea that concerns us here is that of Individuality. This is just that central unit of reflection that has always been asserted against Monism: but what are we to say when we find writers like Royce and Bosanquet proclaiming it as the very core of their system? What, if the Absolute is just precisely the "Individual of Individuals"? But this need not silence us. We can enquire whether Individuality has not proved safe for the absolutist to handle, only because its fangs have first been drawn.

I lay stress on this because if we can vindicate the true idea of the individual, I am sure that the question of immortality has been practically settled. If we are units of reality,
then we can never cease to be. I have already tried to vindicate this idea against a narrow psychologism; now, on the other hand, let us see whether it does not equally vindicate itself against abstract logic.

Now since writers like Dr. Bosanquet see the necessity of explaining the individual so as to do justice to his ultimate significance, all we really need to show is that he has failed. Then the true individual emerges outside his system unscathed.

A few words, out of much that might be said. Dr. Bosanquet explains the individual in terms of System,* the co-operation of parts through which the whole finds expression. We individuals are all systems, or worlds, and systems contain smaller systems and are included in larger. The Absolute is the total System, therefore the perfect Individual. So, in reply to those who object to being pooled in the Absolute, and proclaim the fundamental individuality of the Ego, which must always remain undigested by the most assimilative cosmos, the absolutist is now in the position to reply: "Yes, but what if that very selfhood, that very individuality, which you assert, is the principle that identifies it with the Whole? Every system is individual, and we know that systems can contain systems, as the bodily organism contains the digestive, respiratory, and other sub-systems. So you, not in spite of being an individual, but because you are one, are contained in the absolute Individual: and the more you intensify your individuality, the more completely are you one with the larger wholes to which you belong, and ultimately with the absolute Whole.” We need not pause to dwell upon the essential truth which this rejoinder contains. We are now concerned with the essential truth which it omits. All systems are individual: all individuals may be systems: true, but it does not follow from this that individuality is system.

Dr. Bosanquet's idea of a system is that of which the parts express the whole; and therefore, in the case of the Absolute, the parts, according to their degrees of reality, together express it perfectly, and there is nothing in them that is outside it. And that is perfect individuality. We have thus two ideas, both admittedly ultimate: that of System and that of Individuality. We are told that the latter means the former. The fact remains, however, that the two ideas are, in themselves, different. Define them as we may, we cannot get

* See especially Lect. ii.
further than to say that they are complementary or obverse. But that is no justification—indeed the reverse—for explaining the second in terms of the first, yet not the first in terms of the second. Now it is plain that we cannot think of concrete individuals as such as containing other individuals. We have to ignore them as such, and to think of them first as systems. And that only means that we have shirked the idea of individuality.

In other words, we should have to show directly that the Absolute is an Individual—not simply by trying to prove that there must be an absolute System. And we must be able to apply to it the term individual, meaning what it means in Common Sense, from which we first took it.

What is an individual? Whatever else it may be, it is certainly a unit for consciousness. We can never merely resolve it into its parts, even on the understanding that the parts “express” it, for we first received it not piecemeal, but as a whole. Like the mere psychologist, the absolutist forgets that individuality means this, that, and the other concrete individual. Not at all, he may say, they are concrete individual systems. But why not say as well “systematic individuals”? Individuality cannot be a mere predicate at the last analysis. It is a mistake to say that the parts even of any system merely “express” it. They also contribute to it. And we—free, responsible units of creation, as, for religion certainly, we are—can we not contribute—none the less freely because through God—to the fulfilment of His ends? Are we not His fellow-workers? Or is our freedom only the necessitated unwinding of what He has wound up in us? Can we not make choice even of eternal issues? Are we only phases of God?

Dr. Bosanquet’s Absolute is no true individual, because it has no focus. It cannot be given in experience, because it is Experience. Christianity proclaims that God has focussed Himself for us in time and space: that he has revealed Himself to man and in man and as man. He is not reached as a mere idea. He is not everywhere in general and nowhere in particular.* And as we realize His individuality, so we realize our own. As we know Him through His personal approach, so in approaching Him we know ourselves. We realize our

* I think this comment is perfectly fair, though there are “degrees of reality.” For these only ascend ad indefinitum. I hope I have summarised fairly Dr. Bosanquet’s view: at any rate the logic of his general position cannot be missed.
personal relation to the Eternal, and therefore our eternal personality. In that communion, death is already left behind.

And as our relation to God excludes all fear of mere absorption in nature or humanity, so our membership of the redeemed society, and our relationships with its other members, bar out all idea of absorption in God. Between God and the Church stands the individual, secured on both sides in the unalienable possession of his personal identity.

I had wished to take up the question of the relation of soul and body, but all that can be done now is to indicate the line that would be taken. If we are right in rejecting the idea of a mere soul-substance, separable from its manifestations, we certainly cannot build upon any extreme form of Interactionism, the sharp antithesis of soul and body. That the soul is largely independent of the body as we know it through ordinary science—the body that dies—seems to be proved by Dr. McDougall in his important and interesting book, "Body and Soul." But, after all, it is in accordance with sound psychology—here James has taught us well—to include the body in the idea of personality. But in what sense? Not, assuredly, the mere matter of which it is composed, which changes constantly, but the form and functions of the organism. Now it has been well pointed out that the more we explain the spiritual part of us in terms of its material vehicle, the more spiritual does that vehicle become, the more distinguished from common material objects. After all, what do we know of the body? Need we be so hasty in brushing aside the conclusions reached by occult investigation, whatever we may think of the philosophies associated with them? Why should we assume that the narrow range of vibrations that convey to us the sights and sounds of earth, embraces all physical reality?* Surely the presumption is all the other way. If the soul always requires some sort of physical vehicle, and yet proves itself too vast for the body as we know it, have we not the right to argue from the higher to lower?

To put it another way, the more exclusively narrow and mechanical the categories employed in the study of the body, the more surely do we block ab initio all pathways to broader and deeper understanding even of the body itself. The more it is cut off from the personality, the more intrusive and unmeaning

* See also article, "Mrs. Piper and the Subliminal Consciousness," by E. Bozzano: Annals of Psychical Science, September, 1906.
must appear the hypothesis of higher grades or planes of organic functioning. Witness the still common prejudice among ordinary scientists against psychical research. But, from the broadest and deepest standpoint, the higher physical sphere is more than a mere hypothesis, more even than a theory based on investigation: rather the burden of proof lies with those who deny it.

In conclusion, let me say that the arguments I have tried to put forward suffer greatly from their necessary isolation from the wider ranges of thought to which they belong. But their main drift and moral have, I hope, been made clear. "A celo descendit γυμνός σεαυτών."

DISCUSSION.

Colonel Alves said: On page 9, lines 1 to 3, is the implication, only too true, that the doctrine of Immortality is relegated by religious thought to a comparatively subordinate position.

Why should this be the case, seeing the great importance attached to it by our Lord and the Apostle Paul?

The answer is not far to seek. Immortality, or undyingness, is, to any mind, save that of a juggling schoolman, the same thing, manward, as future, eternal (or never-ending) life; and it is one of the monopolies of Deity, entrusted to the Lord Jesus, see I Tim. vi, 16.

But most of us have been brought up to believe that, will we or nill we, in grace or in wrath, we are born heirs of an immortality to be passed either in bliss or in woe. We have been taught, not by God's Word (theology) but by God's-Word-men (theologians), that life does not mean life but happiness, that death does not mean death but misery, that destruction does not mean destruction but preservation, and so on; in fact, that, in matters of Eschatology, the Bible seldom or never means what it says. Protestants and Papists alike endorse the serpent's lie—"ye shall not surely die."

When to this is added the too general Arminian teaching that for no one is future salvation a present assured certainty, can we wonder that, with people who think at all, either immortality is assumed as a matter of course, the only question being how shall I escape hell, instead of—how shall I be fit for heaven; or else the mind is revolted from the whole subject?
For all this, I believe a false psychology to be largely responsible. "Theology," save the mark, has made the natural man a spiritual and moral image of his Maker, by the "breath of lives"; but a careful study of Genesis iii, 1 Cor. xi, 7, and of 1 John iii, 9, and v, 18, must cause us to reject this idea, and to hold that the male bodily shape and corresponding mental faculties of man (*homo sapiens*) are what constitute his likeness to Deity.

After showing great mental talent in naming the animals, the first things that we hear of Adam, when he has a mate of his own kind, are moral weakness and disobedience, two witnesses that the "breath of lives" was not God's own Spirit.

I believe that the anti-scriptural idea of never-ending torment has taken away men's minds from the revelation of a glorious and never-ending, because a Divine, life. But for this false notion, which has debased the motives for preaching the Gospel from Divine to Humanitarian, viz., the baling "immortal souls" out of an endless hell, Immortality, with all the glory and blessing which Scripture connects with it, would probably have laid a much greater hold on Christian minds, and caused them to proclaim a more scriptural gospel than has generally been the case since the second century A.D., when the heresy of natural immortality appears to have first crept into the professing Church.

Rev. J. J. B. Coles said: "God, Man, and the Universe" are ultimate terms for Philosophy, Science, and Religion—but when we consider the union of God and man in the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ, and see how inscrutable a subject we have before us, when we speak of Him as an *individual* man—we see that the Metaphysics and Psychology of Holy Scripture must necessarily transcend that of all merely human systems of Philosophy.

The Bible deals with both Oriental and Western processes of thought. Take the question of personality.

The "Whosoever" of the Pauline Epistles is an individual doubtless, but not the "unique existence" of the Scottish philosopher, which is "perfectly impervious to other selves"—such is not the individual of the New Testament, for the words of John xvii, 23—"I in them and Thou in Me that they may be made perfect in One"—sets aside the exclusively Western idea of "impervious spiritual atoms," as being contrary to Christianity and psychologically false.
“It is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me” reveals a Divine mysticism that transcends both Western and Oriental systems of psychology.

Dr. Whately has read a most interesting and suggestive paper, which calls for very careful and thoughtful perusal.

Professor Langhorne Orchard said: The key-line of the Paper is, I think, that near the beginning of p. 11—“Our regenerated self-consciousness—born anew in God.” The Author’s aim seems to be the showing that, to those who, through their personal faith in Christ, are spiritually regenerate, the strongest evidence, indeed the complete proof, of their immortality is given by a spiritual intuition—this spiritual intuition being an affirmation of the highest consciousness when in communion with God. This is a perfectly intelligible proposition, and reminds me of the words of the Lord Jesus Christ—“This is life eternal, to know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.” It also reminds me of the belief of our late President, Sir G. G. Stokes, that all life proceeds from the action of Spirit, and therefore eternal life has its author in the Eternal Spirit. Professor Schäfer’s assertion, in his Dundee Address, that by a process of “gradual evolution” life may have originated from that which itself had not life, is a mere assertion devoid of proof, indefensible as a scientific statement.

In criticizing James’s Empirical theory of personality, the Author points out that “there is a deeper basis of personality than the succession of psychic states.” And, with all respect to one of greatest psychologists, the Empirical theory is absurd, for it contradicts the idea which it seeks to explain. Personality is not the sum or the product of a multitude of conscious states, for the personal idea, or notion, is there from the first. The first state of my consciousness is as truly mine as is the hundredth. Nor is personality explained by Bosanquet’s System theory, for (as shown at the beginning of p. 19), the two words—“personality” and “system”—express different ideas. In fact, to have a system is not the same as to be a system.

Further, the notion of Personality is with us from the first. It is innate; but the idea of System is acquired through experience. Sleep does not make a gap in our consciousness of our existence.

Mr. Martin L. Rouse, B.A., said: Although the individuality of the soul is specially dwelt upon in Dr. Whately’s paper, he
advises us to reflect upon the way in which a soul and a body together form a distinct person acting in unison. Now it has often struck me that, however young and inexperienced a person may be, or however dim may be his eyesight, he can always bring his thumb and forefinger straight to his mouth, or touch with his forefinger any particular part of his body that he chooses to think of. This he always has done without measurement or calculation, and with equal precision, doing it instantaneously. Definite thinking of the part to be touched certainly causes, by nervous telegraphy, a sensation in that part, and the sensation is instantly transmitted to the brain, whence again, as rapidly, the directive power goes forth to the hand and the finger-tip, making this touch the part. Yet this is not mechanism, unique as such mechanism would in any case be, for the movement to touch may be restrained by the will. Therefore the complete and unerring co-operation just described can arise only from an absolute unity of a non-material co-operating system—the soul.

A strong argument for the immortality of the soul is that which I first learnt from the late Joseph Cook of Boston, a famous Christian Evidence lecturer in the States. The Creator, said he, has implanted no instinct for which he has not provided a satisfaction. Now the Creator has given to every man an instinctive longing for immortality—for a happy and endless after-life; so we conclude that He has graciously provided for men this supreme satisfaction, or has planned and told them of a way by which they may obtain it. It was this consideration, said the same lecturer, that led Professor Romanes of Oxford to abandon scepticism and become a Christian, as he himself stated in the preface to his latest book.

Mr. ARTHUR W. SUTTON said: The subject chosen by the reader of the paper, "Immortality," is one that appeals to us all and concerns us all very deeply, and I should like to join with others in thanking Dr. Whately for the able manner in which he has dealt with it.

I must confess, however, to some degree of difficulty in following the closely reasoned arguments of the paper, and should like to ask Dr. Whately to explain to whom he refers when using the word "we" on page 10, lines 4 and 5. In the preceding sentence Dr. Whately speaks of "us" as those whose belief in Immortality is "central and assured," and "must, like our belief in God, rest upon
experience and intuition." It would therefore seem that my
question is already answered, and that the "we" in the succeeding
sentence refers exclusively to those who possess a living and
experimental faith in God.

But from the title of the paper it would not appear that the
Author intended to treat of "Immortality" as the possession of
those only who have this faith in God, but rather of "Immortality"
in a far more general and extended sense and as that which concerns
mankind as a whole.

If Dr. Whately merely intended by philosophical reasonings to
adduce external evidences for the hope, or consciousness, of
Immortality which, later in his paper, he rightly argues is insepar­
able from such faith in God as leads to a knowledge of personal
relation to God, we should all be very grateful to him; but we
should feel a certain sense of disappointment that in dealing with
so wide a subject as "Immortality" he had not attempted to
indicate whether "Immortality" was the birthright enjoyed by
every member of the human family or only by those who possessed
a living faith in God.

On page 11, Dr. Whately says that "the moral and religious-
conditions for realizing this higher self-consciousness need not detain
us now, but must never be forgotten. To live the eternal life is the
way to realize our deathlessness." This again seems to indicate
that the author of the paper is dealing only with Immortality in a
very restricted sense and as possessed only by those who fulfil "the
moral and religious conditions" to which he refers. But on the
other hand it may be that Dr. Whately is arguing that "Immor­
tality" is the possession of every man but enjoyed consciously only by
those who fulfil certain conditions.

Those who by the Grace of God have received the gift of faith
will find in the closing words of the last paragraph on page 19
perhaps the grandest and most profound expression of their own
experience that has ever been penned. "As we realize His
individuality, we realize our own. As we know Him through His
personal approach, so in approaching Him we know ourselves. We
realize our personal relation to the Eternal, and therefore our
eternal personality. In that communion, death is already left
behind." But again the question demands an answer: Is the
"Immortality" discussed by the author a "conditional" Immortality
possessed only by those who enjoy this "communion," or is it the property of every son of Adam?

The next paragraph (p. 20) would seem to limit the Immortality under discussion to those in conscious "relation to God," and to "membership of the redeemed society," but I hesitate to think that Dr. Whately intended this, for if so, he would scarcely have chosen for his title the word "Immortality" with all its infinity of application, but rather such a title as "The Immortality of the Christian Believer."

After a few words from Colonel Van Someren, who emphasized the importance of Christ alone being regarded as the Source of Immortality to those who trust in Him—

The Rev. H. J. R. Marston said: The Paper has proved that there is a natural capacity of deathlessness in man; and that proof has been strictly of a philosophical nature; and a demonstration resulting from the facts of human consciousness. It has not been a Scriptural proof; the Lecturer has kept to his proper ground, merely assuming the fundamental postulates of Biblical Religion without establishing them. Any objection to that mode of proof is merely prejudice; and an offence against the majesty of Truth which has its rights as such.

The alleged argument of Dr. Whately's critics, drawn from the supposed meaning of the Bible, are worthless because those who allege them do not understand the Greek Testament; in the Greek Testament the word Immortality occurs, I believe, only twice; that is to say, the Greek Testament is practically silent about the point; and leaves the area of discussion open.

Mr. H. de Vismes said: God created man "very good" yet mortal; and with His life gave him in likeness to Himself free-will, in the exercise of which by eating of the "Tree of Life" he had "the power of an endless life."

The Scriptures say:—

"Whatsoever God doeth it shall be for ever," and "the thing that hath been it is that which shall be." Ecc. iii, 14, 15; i, 9.

All that man ever lost has been redeemed; a paradise lost in Genesis is the same with its "Tree of Life" regained in the Revelation, but with the life and immortality of that paradise brought to light through the Gospel (2 Tim. i, 10). God gave man life, and since His gifts and calling are without repentance (Rom. xi,
We can never cross the same river twice, for it is continuously passing away and as continuously being renewed. Likewise man is for ever passing away, so far as that which is human of him, in body, soul, and spirit, is concerned. The river passes away and dies in the sea, being swallowed up of the life of the sea.

Though apparently it meets with death yet it does not die but adds fresh life to the sea, and mortality is swallowed up of life and death in victory of the living sea.

Dr. Thirtle said: We are indebted to Dr. Whately for a paper that is rich in thought. If, at the end, we do not seem to have attained a firm foothold—if we have, after all, a fear that immortality is hardly secure as a natural expectation and a universal heritage—then that is the misfortune of the philosopher, and not the fault of the Christian theologian. Our minds have been stimulated by the paper, though the interest, in the precise sense of the word, has been negative rather than positive. As people of feeling as well as thought, as moralists as well as intellectual beings, must we not say that, on the grounds of philosophy, the assurance of a life to come is essentially weak and halting?

There were in the paper several points on which I should have liked to ask questions; but they may pass. I will content myself with the expression of my own conviction, after many years of close thought on the theme, that while philosophy may yield some measure of encouragement to the hope of a future life, it can do no more. Can we, for instance, imagine a man or woman, for the reasons given by the learned lecturer, becoming strong in hope, assured in faith, enthusiastic in devotion to the service of God? Assuredly not! If philosophy had been able, in any conceivable development, to make clear the way to God, then there would have been no need for the coming of Him Who, in the fullness of time, brought life and incorruption (i.e., incorruptible life) to light through the Gospel.

A doctrine of immortality can only be considered to profit in the light of what man is in his present state and what the immortal Saviour of man has undertaken on behalf of His people. For a mortal to "realize" selfhood cannot lead to immortality; but for
such a one to "realize" the Deathless Christ is entirely different. Thus immortality is attained, not by mental process but by spiritual endowment and inheritance. In so far as philosophy sets this aside, it must yield a barren result. Philosophy deals with Time—"the things that are"; it has nothing to do with Eternity—"the things that shall be hereafter."

Communication from Rev. A. Irving, D.Sc., B.A.:

I have much enjoyed the perusal of Dr. Whately's able and valuable paper, and beg to offer a few remarks suggested by it.

The author rightly emphasizes individuality as the crux of the whole question. He meets effectually on its own ground the philosophy which would explain away the God-consciousness of the soul—that faculty in man which belongs to the depths of individual experience. It may lie dormant until the "venture of faith" is made, by which we understand that conscious effort of the whole personality, which, as a "tentative probation," a testing (Heb. xi, 1), is in reality a "struggling and fluctuating effort in man to win for himself a valid hold upon things that exist under the conditions of eternity." It "grounds itself solely and wholly on an inner and vital relation of the soul to its source."* It is "an elemental energy of the soul," which is beyond the ken of science, since no surgeon's knife nor the most refined investigations of the chemical laboratory can detect the immaterial and spiritual in us, any more than the sweeping of the heavens with the telescope can find a Being, who is Himself immaterial and spiritual. It is realized in the individual experience, as those in whom it finds exercise have that "witness borne to them through their faith" (Heb. xi, 39), which marks the stage of steady "conviction," and in this the individuality of the soul emerges—outside any philosophical system (p. 18), and still further outside the range of what is dealt with in Professor Schäfer's Address at Dundee—as something in consciousness which is "complementary," being neither contradictory to, nor a constituent part of, any "system" to which belong those states of consciousness which may be operated upon by the "machinery of Reason" (p. 11), and are of an inferior order to itself. Such states of consciousness (enormously increased in number and variety in a highly complex civilization) are correlated through sensory impressions and

* Prof. Scott-Holland in Lux Mundi.
perceptivity with the outer sphere of reality; but though they furnish elementary material for the action of volitionally controlled evolutionary law in developing the character (all that makes for the expression of the individual per se), it is to be borne in mind that "each man is a soul, not has one, and he expresses his being in his activity, his thinking, and his feeling. . . . Behind the rich variety even of a Shakespeare or a Goethe there was an unmeasured personality still unexpressed. All that psychology can do is to take account of so much of personality as finds manifestation in different men. But no science can penetrate into the inner self, for no man can know another's mind." (Dr. Caldecott.)*

So it seems to come to this—that any science or philosophy which makes the assumption that the individual man or woman (as such) is but a synthesis of those elementary factors which belong to states of consciousness of the inferior order, is discredited at the outset, even as Bergson has (on similar lines) discredited what he calls the "false evolutionism" of Herbert Spencer.

To the Christian believer, as his Easter Faith realizes itself in the spiritual environment of the sacramental life of the Church, with the experience of nineteen centuries of Christendom behind him, "Immortality" emerges, not as a dogma, but as a central fact of his consciousness, while the student of science, who is not enslaved by a materialistic philosophy, can follow the reasoning of the great Apostle, as with wonderful truthfulness to nature and language he illustrates from the processes of nature the doctrine of the continuity of soul and soul-function beyond the limits of its present relation to the material body, in that magnificent fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, in which he discusses the transcendent fact, which, for the Christian man, has transmuted a philosophical probability into the "sure and certain hope."

**THE LECTURER'S REPLY.**

There is not much that need be said. I am sorry that Mr. Sutton should have been disappointed because I have not met directly the question of universal immortality, but that would have left me too little time for the discussion of the central question.

* Introduction to *The Inner Light*, by A. R. Whately, D.D.*
That the Immortality of the godly person is the essential point, and that the other should be subordinated to it, is a view that I think not only sound philosophically, but in strict accordance with the perspective and movement of thought in the New Testament itself. I have therefore not even used any expression intended to indicate my views on the wider question. That I have taken "Immortality" in a "very restricted sense" is entirely a mistake. I have taken it in its deepest and fullest sense, just because in its narrower application. I do not say, for a moment, that we cannot reason from my conclusions towards the solution of wider problems. That would still have been inevitable, however I had expanded or contracted the scope of my argument.

Dr. Thirtle seems to hold the current narrow view of philosophy to which I referred in my paper. Therefore, of course, he finds that philosophical support to faith is "essentially weak and halting." For brevity, it must suffice to refer him to the paragraph on pp. 11–12, but I am afraid he has misconceived the general attitude and main point of the paper.

In conclusion, the doubt expressed, in the discussion, as to whether the present realization of our Immortality is regarded as applicable to spiritual persons only, or to the unspiritual also, is truly astonishing. The whole paper is to prove that the key to that realization lies in personal communion with God.