518TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING.

MONDAY, MAY 8TH, 1911, 4.30 P.M.

DAVID HOWARD, ESQ., D.L., IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the previous meeting were read and confirmed.
The following elections of Associates were announced:—

William Weller, Esq.; Bishop Hassé; Dr. H. M. Bishop.

The Chairman, in introducing Professor Roget, Member of the Institute, to the Meeting, said how cordially the English members welcomed the presence of a foreign Member. So many of the works on science and religion by French-speaking students were held in admiration by Englishmen, and they rejoiced to have one amongst them to-day representing the exquisite clearness of French thought and the French language.

Professor Roget then read his paper on

A LIFE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE HARMONY OF CHRISTIANITY, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.

ERNEST NAVILLE, an honorary member of this Institute, was born in 1816, and left this world in 1909, being nearer five score than four score years of age. He was the son of François Naville, a pastor descended from the most ancient Geneva stock, and well known in the history of education by his Institute at Vernier. With Father Girard at Fribourg, Madame Necker de Saussure in Geneva, and Fellenberg of Berne, François Naville ranks high among Swiss educational leaders, after Rousseau and Pestalozzi.

In this, as in other lines of thought and kinds of work, Ernest Naville was to follow in the footsteps of his father. If such a figure of speech were allowable, we might say of him that while following the parental footsteps in every direction they went, he broadened and deepened them.

He was brought up in the country, attended courses of Arts and Divinity in the world-renowned Academy of Calvin, which now, under the style of University of Geneva, throws forth a notable, but lesser light. At that early time he struck the attitude which was to be that of his whole life: that morals
and divinity do in themselves dominate the intellectual and scientific activity of men, and should formally be allowed the supremacy which is theirs intrinsically. To his mind, Geneva, which had been the earthly station of Calvin, and the cradle of Rousseau, was bound by her past to fulfil, in Naville's time, and to the utmost of her power, a mission: that of striking at materialism under its pseudo-philosophic cloak, and of scattering abroad the seeds of civil and religious liberty. For the defence of national liberty, in 1838, he stood clothed in a soldier's uniform. Militant to his very last breath, his motto might well be this modestly-proud phrase of his:

"Et moi je fus aussi sergent en Helvétique."

In fact, he was but little seen, though most widely known, out of his own country. He spent but little time in any European town, except Florence and Paris.

In 1844, he was appointed Professor of the history of philosophy in the Faculty of Arts. Unfortunately, in 1846, the political headship of Geneva passed from the Conservatives to another class, much impregnated with French ideas of a type abhorrent to the ancient church of Geneva, and inconsistent with the ancient forms of the Republic. Naville resigned his ministry in the Church, but continued his activity as an educator, a writer and an orator. He gave at Geneva and Lausanne a series of addresses under the title La vie éternelle, and, in 1860, accepted conditionally an appointment in the Faculty of Divinity in the renovated Academy of Geneva. But, under the new régime, such official posts proved untenable for men of the old way of thinking. He had been dismissed from the chair of philosophy—at the same time that my grandfather François Roget was compelled to vacate that of political history. Now he resigned his connection with the Faculty of Divinity. Yet he continued to teach in an unofficial capacity. He remained Professor Naville for all, and ultimately the disqualification was removed. He was elected an honorary member of the University, when it was realised how many universities and learned societies in Europe had honoured him.

His later discourses on Le Père céleste (1863), Le problème du mal (1867), Le Christ (1877), were delivered before audiences of 3,000 men. They were translated into eight languages.

His first large philosophical work consisted in editing the manuscripts of Maine de Biran. He was for twelve years engaged upon this task. The recondite but admirable philosopher of France (1766-1824) was neither an idealist in the
Cartesian sense, nor a sensationalist in the eighteenth century fashion, which agreed well with the spiritual unconcern of Naville for pure rationalism. As an editor of Maine de Biran, Naville completed and improved upon Cousin’s contribution to the exposition of his doctrine.

With Naville, metaphysics became a principal but not the principal pursuit. In his mind, metaphysics were, on the one hand, second to the relationship of man to God, and, on the other, he beheld in the sciences a primary object for the exercise of the metaphysical faculty.

From this height he surveyed all sciences. “There can be no contradiction between the particular sciences and philosophy,” he writes, “since the results yielded by every particular science are the *pabulum* of philosophic thought. Such thought would be purposeless that did not formulate its statements in full view of the sum total of the data of experience, observation and experiment.” Consequently, he launched upon the world, from 1883, *La physique moderne, La logique de l’hypothèse, Les philosophies négatives*, and lastly, for the book bears the imprint 1909, *Les philosophies affirmatives*. For Naville, the *principium* of the universe is an everlasting spirit, a creative essence free from Determinism—which he condemns in the book, *Le libre arbitre*. Thus, the philosophy of Naville comes throughout into contact with the mighty doctrine of the Evangelists and Apostles.

He defined philosophy—the share of reason in the search after God. For him, faith and reason could not fairly be considered to oppose each other: a philosophy, and a religion might be mutually exclusive, but religion and philosophy could not. When once the human mind comes to the conclusion that the traditional data of Christianity offer the best solution of philosophic problems, it must follow that philosophy and religion are in harmony, though distinct.

The dictates of the moral conscience Naville applied also to the attainment of justice in politics. This he held to consist in the representation of ideas—consequently of the parties holding them—in political assemblies, but not in governments. He thus became identified with what is called proportional representation—or representation of minorities and majorities in proportion to the suffrages polled by each and every party. His proposals found much favour in Switzerland, falling into line as they did with those put forward by my uncle, the historian Amédée Roget, and by Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff, of Bâle. Many imitators and disciples have, in this work too,
been born to Naville in many places of the world. His sense of political justice rested on the abstract and ideal truths which he held should pervade the institutions of States, and which proceeded from the same ordaining forces he saw at work in science and philosophy. In a stronghold of Protestantism, such as Geneva was till 1846, and still is in the eyes of the world, he had many opportunities in which to show to the Roman Catholic Church his sovereign sense of righteous justice.

I beg now to bestow the remainder of my time upon a general review of the contents and subjects of Naville’s books—which are many more than are mentioned here—his philosophy and Christian discourses.

The psychology of Maine de Biran dominated the early progress of Naville in philosophy. He found another mainstay in a profound acquaintance with the method of physical science. The researches which Naville instituted in this subject are probably the most original part in all his work. The processes or procedure of the mind in scientific enquiry he transferred to philosophy. Stimulated by the vigorous scientific achievements which then made Geneva as famous as, for instance, Edinburgh in its day, he had an example before him set by living men. He was fortunate in their personal advice, even in the criticism of such authorities in physical science as De la Rive, De Candolle and Pictet. Under this guidance he tried hard to master the inwardness of modern physical science by studying the history of its beginnings, by scrutinising the leading principles of its founders, from Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo to Newton, without neglecting the contributions of his contemporaries. From these studies he had acquired in the scientific domains a most uncommon learning, and an exceptional standing.

It is rare indeed that scientific men have a philosophic mastery over their craft and are able, either to connect their special department with others, or to view it in relation to the laws of the mind and the universal findings of reason. As near his end as 1908, Ernest Naville’s reputation was still so unique in the matter of the relation of science to philosophy, that the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques (Paris) asked for a mémoire from him on the essence of matter, which the old man sent, being unable to go and read it himself. The fruit of his researches upon scientific method was to supply him with a clear and well grounded conviction that in every scientific process of mind, hypothesis is a principal structural element and hence flowed for him a general conception of science which
enabled him to build up on a solid foundation the rights of philosophy to scientific rank and the rights of science to philosophic treatment.

We can state his position in a few words. According to him, actual or real knowledge is never gained by forming simple deductions upon the basis of a priori data of the purely rational order. But, on the other hand, sciences are not either built up, as has often been claimed, by the mere ascertainment of facts. In whatever sphere, science springs up from the moment only when an explanation of the facts is reached, and science is science in the measure in which that explanation accounts for the facts and is unfailingly borne out by their repetition. Now, the terms of this explanation, whence can they spring up, if not from the mind of which they are a spontaneous act? The mind clothes those terms in hypothetical forms. The explanation is a supposition, and this has to be scrutinised before the mind, which brought it forth, may commit itself more or less completely and more or less finally to it.

Philosophy has no other method than this. Philosophy at its barest is indistinguishable from the scientific mind process. Philosophy is in reality nothing else than the scientific mind process brought to bear no longer upon some limited or defined problem, but upon the universal problem, that is, the problem of the Universe. There is in the reason of man a craving for unity which belongs to the very kernel of reason. Philosophy is the expression, the satisfaction of this want. It formulates a general explanation of all that exists. It puts and endeavours to solve the following question: “How should the principium be conceived in order to understand that a world such as ours could proceed therefrom, our world with the diverse elements which compose it and the relations in which they stand to one another?”

Well, for Naville, only three answers are possible, and all three have been over and again put forward in the course of the centuries and their conflicts make up the history of human thought. The first, by far the most feeble, is materialism which would bring all things and beings down to mechanical effects. To defeat this system, it should be sufficient to lay bare its inability to explain the existence of the very faculties by which the mind perceives the presence of matter and recognises its properties. To quote the humorous expression which terminates the discourse addressed by Naville to the students of Switzerland on the occasion of his jubilee: “If matter existed alone, materialism could not be.”
Another system is idealism, a doctrine abstruse, but of some grandeur, which has more than once collected enthusiastic disciples.

According to this philosophy all that exists and comes into being, in the realm of history as in that of nature, is the outcome of eternal ideas, of absolute laws unfolding their consequences by a necessity which belongs to them. The fundamental error of this philosophic hypothesis is to forget that a law only formulates the regularity of a phenomenon, and is by no means its efficient cause. Ideas are but abstractions without power, unless indeed they are thoughts, the thoughts of a Spirit endowed with will.

If we leave out of court sundry deficiencies belonging in common to materialism and idealism, we find that both those doctrines concur in a complete determinism, which is out of keeping with some of the essential facts with which every philosophy has to reckon, principally with the certainty in which we are that we are morally bound to the law of duty, though not compulsorily made to obey it.

There remains a third hypothesis, or philosophy: Naville calls it spiritualism. The "spiritualistic" solution of the problem of the universe supposes that its principium is an infinite and absolutely free Spirit whose creation the universe is. In this manner only is it made intelligible that there should be in the world a multiplicity of existences, yet reciprocal harmony among elements so diverse. Thus can it be explained that beside things which, without any consciousness thereof, move in the world according to unvarying laws, other things exist which are beings endowed with real liberty, although a limited liberty and one subject to moral obligation. Thus is justified the distinction which we make between material fact and moral law, a distinction the making of which characterises all our acts and all human institutions, and which materialists themselves make perpetually in their usage and wont, regardless of the utter illogicality of their position. Thus at last and thus only does one succeed in seeing how man, as a knowing spirit, is capable of science, and why, on the other hand, science cannot extend beyond the limits of observation.

Our faculties have indeed been constructed by the maker of the world so as to apply themselves usefully to the study of things, but these too are the creation of an infinite Spirit whose scope exceeds our faculties, thus making it impossible for us to fathom His designs by an a priori process which would put us on a level with Him.
In this light the claims loudly put forward by certain atheists to being the only legitimate holders or bearers of the scientific sense, are shown to be groundless. They intellectually delude and morally wrong themselves: for if atheists could dispense with the conception of God, they would not be atheists, in the same way that if matter existed alone, this would put an end to materialists. To possess the scientific sense is to be in so far an active spirit directed by will. Thus a “spiritualistic” force is necessary to the exercise of scientific thought. Besides, if the scientific sense was atheistic by right, atheists would be able to show themselves privileged investigators of nature, which is not the case.

Besides, against the claim which the atheists lay to a scientific monopoly, the facts lay a protest, as much as reason disallows any such pretensions. Naville says: the facts, and to prove his saying he points to the number of first class scientists now living, who are complete strangers to the materialistic creed. He points out in every particular how in setting up the fundamentals of modern science, the pioneers in modern physics were happily guided, or, at any rate, by no means impeded, by the notion they had formed, or received, of a Creator of the world, alone and all wise.

As a good citizen, Ernest Naville rejoiced in his ability to add that in the eighteenth century, at the time when other tendencies were in the fashion, the foremost Swiss scientific men, H. B. de Saussure, Albrecht von Haller and the Bâlois Leonard Euler, all resolutely sided with the theistic belief. Ernest Naville’s intellectual forerunners in his native city were of the same persuasion, and nobody can say that their “spiritualistic” convictions did in any way interfere with their scientific acumen or philosophic liberty.

Next to de Saussure there were Charles Bonnet, Abraham Trembley, Firmin Abauzit, Jean André De Luc, Georges Louis Le Sage, Théodore de Saussure, François Huber and Pierre Huber. It is remarkable how almost all these showed kinship with the English mind, and were recognised as kin by their fellow workers on this side of the Channel. Charles Bonnet was in 1741 made an associate of the Royal Society of London, Abraham Trembley began life as a tutor in the house of Earl Bentinck. He too was made a member of the Royal Society of London. The Philosophical Transactions contain much of his writing, and he was governor to the young Duke of Richmond.

Firmin Abauzit travelled in England, and was invited by
William III. to settle there in a scientific capacity. André De Luc was reader to Queen Charlotte from 1773, a member of the Royal Society of London and of that of Dublin; a part of his writing is in English, and he died in England in 1817.

Le Sage too was an associate of the Royal Society of London; the same honour befell Théodore de Sanssure. My kinsman, the late Dr. Peter Mark Roget, a citizen of Geneva by birth, and upholder of the conception of the universe which it is the aim of this Institute to help in demonstrating, not only was true to the Geneva scientific traditions, but found in this very attitude every satisfaction of mind, whether scientific or philosophic, and even the approval of the Royal Society of London, whose secretary he was for a very long period.

Spiritualistic philosophy assuredly is no novel invention. But, declares Naville, so far from being superannuated it embodies a comparatively recent doctrine, for which the ancients had no name, and for which England itself, one of its principal homes, has not yet found an extremely distinct title, for theosophists style themselves spiritualists, an ignorant usurpation which is much to be deprecated. The middle ages did not either succeed in freeing spiritualistic philosophy from alloys. In modern times, spiritualism, instead of being allowed as clear a definition as materialism, mysticism, idealism, etc., which nobody can confuse with any other set of metaphysics or with each other, has thus been somewhat loosely or promiscuously made to cover incongruous doctrines.

But much may be expected from the future, writes Naville: the history of philosophy is not a chaos in which contradictory opinions confusedly elbow each other. It is not either a circle within which the human mind turns round and round without making any progress. The history of philosophy moves in a definite direction and has its meaning. It has a logical ratio; independent from books and systems, it is a kind of syllogism in time and space. The history of philosophy shows a progressive producing and winnowing of the contents of philosophic thought which will clear away the idealistic philosophies on one hand, the materialistic on the other, free our thought from passive philosophies such as mysticism, scepticism, secularism and ultimately found victoriously the explanation of the universe upon the might of an eternal Spirit. The main current of thought, the contents of our mind, our mental legacy and moral inheritance from the past, move along towards a philosophy of the spirit, and the eddies of the stream are as retrospective moments in an onward march.
In such words as these, Ernest Naville expressed his hope, and pointed out the symptoms which seemed to him to indicate the approaching dissolution of "that metaphysical idol—determinism"—and its displacement by the recognition of a spiritualistic law.

I. Here are the theses of Ernest Naville's spiritualism:

1. Spiritualism supposes that the principle of the universe is an eternal Spirit.
2. Spiritualism is a philosophic or scientific position, that is, an hypothesis.
3. The eternal Spirit constitutes an object to which may be legitimately applied the notions derived from reason which transcend experience.
4. It is fully consistent with the transcendental character of the notions grounded in reason that the object to which they are applied should be a reality.
5. It is the characteristic of spiritualism that it teaches the creation of the world to be a free act coming from one Being.
6. The liberty of that Creator is infinite.
7. The spiritualistic doctrine of creation stands in no opposition to scientific research or its results.
8. The spiritualistic doctrine does not admit of any assertion as to preliminaries to creation.
9. The laws to which the will and the mind of man are subjected are derived from the will of the Creator.
10. The laws of nature are constant, but are not necessarily such as we perceive them.
11. The goodness of the Creator is the determining cause of creation.
12. Spiritual philosophy affirms that the principle of the world is single, and alone at work in the world.
13. Spiritualism explains by what force from one and single principle of the world there could and did proceed the multitude of things and the multiplicity of beings.
14. The notion of the infinite may legitimately be applied only to the Cause of the world.
15. Infinite liberty in the Creator is alone able to produce comparative liberty in the creature.
16. Spiritualism supplies a force linking up facts and "ideals."
17. Spiritualism can alone formulate an explanation of Evil in keeping with the demands of conscience, to which evil is abhorrent.
18. Spiritualism sets us free from the problem of determinism, by recognising in the constancy of nature conditions, general or particular, imposed by the original Will.

19. Spiritualism is parent to the scientific sense and method.

To make Ernest Naville's philosophy quite clear, there should be added to the above theses those which he conceives to be characteristic of materialism, idealism, and determinism, which he naturally rejects.

II. Materialism.

1. Materialism is the system which affirms that the objects of sense-perceptions are the only reality. 2. Materialism presents itself under two aspects: mechanism and transformism. 3. Transformistic materialism resolves itself by analysis into mechanistic materialism. 4. Materialism is an hypothesis. 5. Materialism does not show a unifying principle. 6. Materialism does not succeed in unifying physical and psychic phenomena. 7. Materialism does not succeed in unifying force and matter. 8. Materialism does not succeed in explaining the origin of multiplicity in beings. 9. Materialism is self-contradictory in using the notions of reason which transcend experience. 10. Materialism would reject as a surplusage some of the most important data of mental analysis. 11. Materialism is the result of an incomplete exercise of the faculty of thought.

III. Idealism.

1. Idealism rests on the external existence of Ideas. 2. Idealism presents itself under two aspects: the idealistic origin (Spinoza), or the idealistic end (Hegel) of beings and things. 3. The absolute existence of Ideas is not germane to reason. 4. Ideas are relations demanding, simultaneously with or previously to themselves, the existence of beings or things. 5. The fixed and rigid moulds of an idealistic conception of nature (types) leave the transition from simplicity to multiplicity without means of effect. 6. The Idées-types leave no room for the notion of the infinite, for they are fixed. 7. Idealism favours the doctrine of inert causes. 8. Idealism in the end admits the identity of opposites and is indifferent to the force of contraries. 9. Idealism begets the false method of rationalism. 10. Idealism denies the freedom of voluntary choice. 11. Idealism cancels the ordinary distinction of right
and wrong. 12. Idealism cancels the ordinary distinction between truth and error. 13. Idealism may lead to positivism, a philosophising negative of philosophy. 14. Idealism in thought may lead to nihilism in effect. 15. Idealism narrowed down to a philosophy of evolution might supply an intelligible doctrine in biology.

IV. Determinism.

1. Absolute determinism is a common effect from materialism and idealism. 2. The concatenation of facts is the realisation of a conditional determinism. 3. One may admit a general determinism which does not exclude contingencies. 4. Determinism is a legitimate postulate with the sciences whose subjects obey the law of inertia. 5. The extension of determinism to facts of all and any order is the consequence of an extremist's conception of science. 6. Determinism has no place for the heart. 7. Determinism has no place for conscience. 8. Determinism may degrade reason. 9. Determinism leads to passivity.

The perusal of the foregoing tables or summary brings out very plainly that, for Naville, philosophy is cumulative, a synthesis of moral, intellectual and religious predicates. He finds that spiritualism brings with itself the means of taking into account every honest desideratum of the heart, of conscience and of reason, reconciling the mind of man to the knowledge which it can obtain about the making of the world. According to him, in every and any other philosophy that may be attempted or adopted, there is a lacuna, an absentia. In such philosophies obvious deficiencies in the physical, intellectual or moral departments of doctrine point to one addendum as indispensable to bring the sum right; a creative Spirit, or in the other, but equivalent poetic form—God. Our best knowledge of God is the Christian. So the adding together of our religion, of our philosophy and of our science must bring out the correct total. Until this happens, some figures, as it were, must have been wrongly put down by us, for we write under dictation, and must listen hard, till we hear right.

That those figures are a harmony rather than a sum, must follow, a harmony in which several instruments are attuned to each other. The leaving out of any one of them would mean an imperfect concert. An imperfect tuning of any one would mar its contribution to the whole. So Naville singles out in each instrument its discordant notes and tunes them out
of existence. The result is, or in his intention would be, a
symphony of the moral cravings, philosophic tendencies and
scientific pursuits of man. In Naville, the most complete
harmony did subsist between Christian, philosopher and scientist.
He felt that his calling lay in formulating for the acceptance of
others the harmony which he perceived, in which he found
moral strength, philosophic repose and intellectual vigour. His
lifetime was spent in thinking the matter out, simultaneously, and
in turns, as a Christian, for the philosopher and the scientific man,
as a philosopher, for the Christian and the student of nature, as
a scientific man, for Christian and philosopher alike. He pro­
claimed before them what might guide all three to his harbour.
This brings us to consider more closely Naville's philosophic
method. His way was to seek out, in every question, that
which reason, fairly consulted, admits of itself or cannot decline
to admit, provided it be an ordinary, healthily constituted
reasoning faculty. For this, he begins by simplifying every
question. Why? because anything that raises a doubt must be
of a confusing character, else there would be no question about
it. A first simplification imposes itself: it consists in extricat-
ing the object of the question from alien complications. It is
thus disentangled from what is foreign to itself. But, reduced
to itself, the object of the question still appears complex.
Investigation of the complexities shows that some are the
result of inattention, others are dictated by prejudice, by
scholastic subtleties, by intrusions of ill-digested learning from
another province or by rash anticipatory philosophisings. The
issue is thus at last reduced to simple terms, terms simple in
the actual sense of the word. There are now placed before our
eyes, notions which are free from that which an imperfect vision
had mixed up with them, notions in short which an attentive
mind, a healthy faculty, a firm reason may grasp at once, by
means of that spontaneously obvious reflecting power without
which reason has no function, for the function of reason does
not presuppose some initiation, before it can be exercised.
Naville is a master in the art of bringing out in full relief
those notions which are beneath and before every system, every
discussion, every imaginable study. Those notions are a common
substratum. A thinker who would limit himself to them could
not grow into a philosopher, but should he decline to stand
upon them, his philosophy would be sand-built. A thinker may
neither shut himself up in those fundamentals, nor dare he
dispense with them. They are the minimum of philosophic
substance, the element of every thought.
This is an unpretending manner of philosophising, a manner free from subtlety, unrefined in the best sense of the word, ringing forth the note of healthy intellectuality, betokening a strong docile nature. The sight of such competent workmanship is beneficial to the onlooker and gives an extremely favourable opinion of the workman. The earnestness, the sincerity, the straightness of Naville, clothe him with the authority of good sense, and show that common sense in a region infested with sophisms may be one man's originality. This wisdom of Naville's is no timidity, no disability, no ignoring of the temptations, of the difficulties with which the exercise of thought is beset. Naville knows his times and is a man of his day. Any objections that may have been cast up by contemporary critique against time-honoured truths, he has tested and probed. Any new ideas, dashing hypotheses, any entrancingly bold strokes of "second sight" the contemporary scientific movement may have attempted, he has witnessed with a quiet mind and sympathetically regarded. He consorts with them whom he fights. He does not admit that science may be right within a domain allowed to be her own, and said to be wrong in another sphere. He does not admit that truths of the moral order, when challenged by science, should be considered to be above accepting the challenge. He is a "gentleman" to whom high-handed doings are repugnant. In philosophy, he holds violence to be contrary to the fundamental instinct—the belief of reason in peace and unity. He mistrusts dogma as producing a division in the very place where a symbol of union should appear.

What Naville demands is that for the collective word science should be substituted the plural sciences, and that two kinds of sciences should be distinguished: on the one hand physical and physiological sciences, on the other hand psychological and moral sciences. Now on the threshold of both categories figure facts, that is to say, a something against which and without which our mind can avail nothing. "Facts," he says, "in any seriously meant science, are the foundation and the criterion of theories, and that is true anywhere and in everything. Thus, without any diffidence, he writes that determinism is the postulate in the study of matter, and why should one be disturbed thereby? If there are facts of another order which cannot be brought down to determinism, these facts will prevail. Against what will they prevail? will it be against every kind of determinism? Not at all; but against an unfair or excessive application of determinism. From facts transcending deter-
minism, the physical and physiological sciences can receive no injury, and such facts in their turn need fear nothing from those sciences, for such facts are of a nature of which the objects of the "natural" sciences are not. In this fashion, determinism may be a fair postulate with those sciences, without becoming, as is claimed by some indiscreet enthusiasts of materialism, the supreme rule of the world. Indeed, it is contrary to sound method in science to pretend to apply determinism to everything, since, in order to do that, it is necessary to ignore facts that are certain, for the sake of a materialistic or idealistic conception of science which is by no means sure. But it would be just as unsound to endeavour, for the sake of psychologic and moral facts, to ignore the postulates on which rests the "study of matter."

In that wise the domains of the sciences are distinct, though that of one is not closed to another, and _vice versa_. Reason has its place in all. By means of sciences of all orders, reason is in pursuit of unity, for which purpose alone reason exists. Reason entertains the idea of a supreme cause which, by its power, brings about the diversity of elements and brings them into harmony by the unity of its plan. A mind guided throughout to the _principia_ of thought, but ever careful to submit to the control of facts its hypothetical developments from those _principia_, combines in a just measure the self-confidence which is strength with the moderation which brings security.

In proposing a vote of thanks to the Lecturer the Chairman said we had had a most interesting account of the work of one great thinker by another great thinker. It was a fine summing up of the work of a very long and very useful life. Professor Naville's views as set forth may well be said to be in accord with the objects of the Institute. It had been a great pleasure to hear such a clear exposition of those views, and that in spite of the difficulty of expression in what to the Lecturer was a foreign language. He wished to add one word of warning as to the bad company into which the word "spiritualism" had fallen, but he thought the Lecturer had carefully safeguarded it in his paper.

Colonel Mackinlay seconded the vote of thanks, which was carried with acclamation.

Professor Roget, in expressing his grateful thanks, said he looked upon the paper as a pious act to the memory of a great and good man, an act in the performance of which he had gained every assistance from those who before him had written upon Naville.