ORDINARY MEETING.*

PROF. LIONEL S. BEALE, F.R.C.P., F.R.S., IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the previous Meeting were read and confirmed.

The following candidates were put forward by the Council for election:

LIFE MEMBER:—Rev. Dr. Cushing, President of the Baptist College, Rangoon.

MEMBERS:—Professor William Galloway, F.G.S.; Alexander Finn, Esq., H.B.M. Consul, Chicago.


The following paper was read by the Author:

THE RIGHT WAY IN PSYCHOLOGY. By Rev. F. STORRS TURNER, B.A.

1. Definitions.—What is psychology? Different answers are given. To Hume it meant the "science of Man," "of human nature itself." Some living psychologists think that the subject-matter of the science is "the phenomena of mind" (Sully); "the phenomena of consciousness" (Baldwin); "mental process" (Stout); "psychical events" (Bosanquet). These definitions are equivalent, or nearly so. They suggest fundamental questions—such as, a phenomenon of what and to whom? is mind identical with consciousness? is there any known being called mind? Wundt considers that the whole of experience, that is, according to his notion of experience, all being of every kind, is the province of psychology—although immediate experience is its special subject-matter. Külpe takes psychology to be "the adequate description of those properties of the data of experience which are dependent upon experiencing individuals." Herbert Spencer's definition stands apart. His psychology studies "the connexion between two connexions"—these being "the connexion between the internal phenomena and the connexion between the external phenomena." In another place we find it described

* Monday, December 5th, 1904.
as "an inquiry concerning the nature of the human mind, and an inquiry concerning the nature of human knowledge."

2. Our definition. In this essay, psychology is to have only one meaning. Verbally, it is Hume's—with the exception that instead of "science" I prefer the word "study." Practically Hume's psychology is a study of the human mind. In this essay, not mind but man is the subject-matter: man the embodied mind, or the ensouled body—in popular speech, man as body and soul. We are to consider the whole real man, the living unity, as we know him in experience. We desire to understand ourselves—not only each one of us himself; but each one: himself and his fellow-men. It is essential for the subsequent discussion, that this definition shall be held fast in its integrity.

3. The inquiry proposed. Although their definitions vary, I assume that psychologists all have before their minds the same or similar given facts, which they try to understand. We have not time to review the history of psychology and to describe existing psychologies. I propose to begin an independent inquiry. Can we discover by examination of the given facts, indications of the methods which psychology ought to take? If we succeed, the right way will be known: or, at least a right way. Whether there can be more than one right way, may be a subsequent inquiry.

4. The first step. The fact that there are different definitions obliges the psychologist to begin by explaining and defending his own definition. Physical science is not troubled in this way. The astronomer, the chemist, the geologist, and the rest all take their given facts as they find them, and being unanimous, go to work without any preamble. Why cannot we set to work as easily and confidently as they? Because the propriety of our definition may be challenged. This compels us to justify it, before we proceed. To do this we must consider given facts generally, what they are, and how they come to us; and then, whether the given facts of psychology are found among them.

5. The meaning of "the given." Why do we speak of some things as given facts? We mean that the given things, sometimes called "immediate psychical facts," are present to our consciousness, before the exercise of our thinking powers upon them. It is somewhat difficult to draw the line sharply between the before and after; for in the first perception of anything, or any event, the mind has its part. Still there are cases in which this part seems to be passive rather than active,
When the mind receives, the things are given to it. Such reception, by repetition, becomes recognition—a kind of knowledge; but for the most part we do not understand things until after we have thought about them. Our thinking, except in cases where it leads to some physical action upon the thing: or some mental action, if the thing is a mind; does not alter the thing. Nevertheless the thing is different to us because now we understand it; that is, we attribute to it characters of which we were not at first aware; and in some cases, characters which never come within the range of direct perception. For example, the sun, moon, and five planets are visible in the sky: they are given facts; also their motions are visible facts. But the solar system is not a given fact: it is an inferred fact, which cannot be seen by human eyes. In this case the distinction is evident. In innumerable cases it is not so. The given fact and our subsequent understanding of it become welded in a concept; and we come to imagine that we perceive what in reality we do not perceive, but conceive. No practical harm would ensue, if our understanding were always correct. But we make mistakes. Once there was to human thinking no solar system but a geocentric system. The case stands thus: human knowledge is a product of given facts and human reasoning. Experience has taught us that our reasoning is liable to err; whereas we have no ground for suspecting the given facts to be capable of error. Consequently, it is of fundamental importance that we should know what facts are given.

6. First view. Things in General.—We perceive innumerable things as different, and yet among them are like things. This is a practical certainty, and it seems to be also a logical certainty. For if there were no differences, if all things were exactly alike, there would be nothing to think about; and if there were no likenesses, the infinite multiplicity of unlike things would baffle all attempts to think. But I will not insist upon the logical necessity. It is enough that in our plain common sense apprehension of things, they are given to us as many, and diverse, and some of them alike. Taken together, these things are to us the given reality, which we have to understand as best we can. This given reality is the source and the basis of all our understanding; the standard and criterion of reality and truth. Whatsoever cannot be traced back to this is without sure guarantee, it may be mere fiction. Whatsoever is undoubtedly included within or can be certainly deduced from this, is truth.

7. Second view. Ourselves and our environment.—Having got
a firm grip of the original datum, we proceed to examine this more closely. As it appears to us at first sight, it is a vast and indefinite multitude, in which, by degrees, classes of like things are discerned. But on attentive consideration the multitude is seen to consist of a duality, ourselves and our environment. Inasmuch as this fact is the justification of our definition, it behoves us to consider it with the closest attention. In the first place it is obvious and self-evident that we ourselves as a class of animals are a part of things in general. We are visible and tangible things, to ourselves, and to each other. We are like one another, and we are different from other animals. We indubitably are a kind of beings, forming one small fraction of the innumerable whole. On this ground alone, our right to select ourselves as the subject-matter of a special study could not reasonably be disputed. But the case is much stronger than this. We are not given merely as a single kind on a level with countless other kinds; the whole given fact comes to us, as a whole or multiplicity consisting of ourselves and other things; a natural division is given in and along with the original datum. For the being given is only one-half of the fact, the being received is the other half. Without the receiving there could be no giving. We are not only visible and tangible things; we are also conscious, intelligent observers of things; we are able to receive the data; and so far as we know, we are the only creatures in this globe on which we live who are able thus to receive the given. Consequently, the distinction is recognized as fundamental in philosophy, under the name of subject and object; but unfortunately there is much confusion of thought covered by this phrase; so that we had better keep to plain language: ourselves, on the one hand, and everything else, on the other. It is important to note that what is given is a plurality of selves; or perhaps it is still better to describe the datum as a triad rather than a duality; the self, other selves, and the environment. I may mention here that Der menschliche Weltbegriff by Avenarius is an important contribution to the study of the original datum.

9. Objections.—In metaphysics the dual or trinal character of the given has been and is disputed. Solipsism, the assertion that I alone am the whole real given fact, and that besides me there is nothing else, is not worth notice. The opinion that the environments are as distinct as the individuals is more specious; but I think the question really is this—is our certainty that we all live in the same world immediately given or is it an inference? We must not discuss this point. I make no
pretence to a complete criticism of the original datum; my purpose is accomplished if I have shown that some attention must be paid to it, in order that our psychology may start securely.

But I may just point out that the philosopher, equally with the physicist and the psychologist, is powerless without some given fact or facts. He cannot reason upon nothing. And his first premiss must precede his reasoning; he cannot create it by reasoning. If he does not really believe and hold as certain truth, the threefold reality, the individual self, other selves, and the common environment, he must find some other standing ground. How can he even try to find this, without relying upon the threefold reality? It seems to me that he is stale-mated, he cannot move. Meantime, I think that we may truthfully say, that our given reality receives universal assent—the assent expressed in more than words—the assent of all human activity in every direction; not in ordinary life only, but in the more exact and systematic work of the sciences; and even in metaphysics also, for the philosopher, however he may speculate, really builds upon the three certitudes just like the rest of us.

10. Guiding rules.—We come out of our preliminary reflection with clear right to take ourselves as the given facts of our psychology. And I think we have gained something more than this. We seem now to be able to lay down two rules for our procedure—(1) Our study must keep close to the given facts; and (2) we must take the facts as they are given; we must not remove them from their context. These rules seem to shut us up to one method. The first forbids us to substitute anything else in the place of ourselves, as the subject-matter of psychology. The second forbids us to separate the self from its environment. In other words, we have to renounce, or to subordinate, the processes of abstraction, dissection, or analysis; and to study the real living self in his actual life in connection with his fellows and in connection with the external world. It will not be a breach of these rules, if we attend to some part or aspect of the self at one time, and another part at another time: but it will be violation of the rules if we attend to them as having an independent existence. The parts or aspects whatever they may be—sensations, presentations, ideas, emotions, faculties—exist only in the self; apart from it they are nothing real, nothing intelligible.

11. The concept of the Self.—Bearing these rules in mind, we ask—what is the Self? We have no complete answer—else
our study would be unnecessary. But we have some knowledge of the self: he is a complex being, a unity containing diversities: he is a developing being: not fixed, but changing. What we must seek for, is not a perfect definition, which is unattainable; but a conception which shall be certainly true so far as it goes, and which shall express not one or another of the self’s diverse qualities; but his unity, and his diversities as included in the unity. Moreover, in accordance with the rule that the self must not be abstracted from, but studied in, the environment, our conception must include his relation to other selves, and to what we call the external world. Consideration of this relation gives the clue we are seeking. Things and people hurt or benefit us according to our position and behaviour in reference to them. It is our interest to avoid the injury and to secure the benefit. This brings to light one of the deepest and most important characteristics of human nature—self-interest. We are to some extent able to re-act against the environment so as to make it our servant, and to thwart it when it appears to be our enemy. In relation to sentient beings and especially to other selves, we have to do with beings who also have their interests. In such cases, our self-interest is not displaced, but supplemented by a larger interest, which we call duty. Duty brings with it responsibility: we call ourselves, and our fellow-men call us, to account for the neglect of duty. These three relations, self-interest, duty, and responsibility, affect all our dealings with the environment, and at the same time employ all the various capacities and powers of human nature. The sensations and all bodily functions are included in this conception of the self as a being who has interests; and likewise all mental emotions and powers—especially the intelligence and the will. I think we may express the concept thus—the human self is a being who takes an intelligent interest in his own welfare, and also in his duties, and responsibilities, because he can choose his own ends, and devise means for their attainment. This description does not pretend to be a perfect definition, but I submit that it is in accordance with the given facts. Our psychology would have to verify it in detail; but it is hardly rash to assume that experience has already verified it.

12. Ideology.—This concept of the self serves as a guide to further study. When once we have clearly apprehended that we are in a measure in charge of our own being, that we help to make or mar our own happiness, that beyond this, we either help to mend or to corrupt society, and have therefore duties and responsibilities towards others—we want to understand the
self in order that we may achieve our ends and fulfil our duties. For this purpose, what kind of knowledge is most urgently needed? Plainly, the first need is to know what are the right ends, that we may choose these; and inasmuch as ends are often conflicting, we need to know the order of their importance, and whether there is one supreme end which can curb the lower desires, and bring each of our various purposes into its right relation to the rest. I would call this branch of psychology, human teleology. This is usually omitted from psychologies, I suppose, because it is dealt with by ethics and religion. I cannot think that the omission is justifiable. It is like the tragedy of Hamlet, with Hamlet cut out. Moreover, ethics and religion would gain by being put in their rightful place. At present, many people regard these as optional subjects, inferior in value and in certainty to physical science. When human teleology is recognised as an indispensable part of the scientific study of human nature, these errors will be dispelled.

13. Epistemology.—After the study of ends the study of means, and the first of these is knowledge. Indeed, so universally necessary and of such fundamental importance is this means, that to some epistemology has been the first task of psychology, if not its only task. Locke and Hume are instances of this. So great is human interest in knowledge that, although this interest is at first, and even at all times, chiefly for the sake of other things, knowledge becomes also an end in itself, pursued for its own sake. And from this the next step is to give the primacy to knowledge, exalting it to the highest rank in dignity and in power. It cannot then be questioned that in any serious attempt to understand ourselves we must undertake the usually neglected task of trying to ascertain the nature and value of that thinking which we call knowing or believing.

14. Three Grades of Thinking.—After epistemology what should be the next chapter in our study? At this point I stop—declining the attempt to forecast any further step. The purpose with which we set out was to discover, if possible, the right way in psychology. If we are satisfied that we have succeeded it is enough. Actually to work out the psychology would be a great enterprise; and only in its execution could we ascertain how far it will lead us. That we should achieve a perfect understanding of ourselves is beyond reasonable expectation. The study of the human self is evidently an immense undertaking. Already we have seen that it includes teleology and epistemology, ethics and religion; and to these, history, law,
language, political economy, anthropology, might be added. Human physiology too cannot be left out. Indeed, half or more than half of the whole range of human thought falls under our definition, leaving another area, inferior in interest and importance, for the group of sciences which may be called physics. Plainly some limits would have to be self-imposed in a psychology written on our plan; and what these would be it is not easy to anticipate.

This view of the situation exposes us to an apparently formidable objection. "Your scheme," it may be said, "breaks down under its own weight. The magnitude of its scale makes it impracticable. A way that no one can follow cannot be the right way." I am not insensible to the force of this objection. The argument of this paper requires to be supported by the production of a psychology on the lines it indicates, in order to produce full conviction. But I think that the objection is not so formidable as it looks. Before our psychology has been worked out very far, the objection may disappear, and if not before, the epistemology, I think, would dispel it. One consideration from that source may be mentioned. It has often been pointed out that our thinking and our knowledge are not all on one plane, but are on different levels, in successive stages—the common-sense or pre-scientific stage; then "science" which raises this to a higher level; and after this, the reflective or philosophical stage. Between the second and third levels there is a great difference. "Science" takes much for granted. Philosophy refuses to pass anything uncriticised, delves down to the foundations, takes into account all the facts, and all the facts together as a whole and a unity; and, lastly, seeks and will be satisfied with nothing less than truth and certainty. Psychology seems to me to belong to the third and highest level; and therefore, to be compelled to start from the given certainties and to seek for a fuller comprehension of what is given. Its result and reward may be, not the acquisition of new information; but the clearer apprehension and firmer grasp of truth already within our reach but dimly and confusedly conceived.

15. Body and soul.—If our psychology were completed only so far as to the end of the first two or three sections, subdivisions would come to light. We should have, in considering human interests, to distinguish between bodily and mental wants; in studying knowledge, the bodily organs of sense would have to be considered. I think that we can foresee the advantage which our method will have in studying these topics. Its essential character will forbid the abstraction of any part or
aspect of the self from the whole self taken in connection with its environment. It will not fall into the error of mistaking what only exists as a part of, or a mode of a given reality, for an element or phenomenon having a real existence by itself; and the consequent error of imagining the whole as consisting of a number or succession of such parts. Body and soul, for example, belong to the original datum, but as a duality in a given unity. The self is one being, not two beings; and this one being is not a body, neither is it a soul or spirit. A body without a soul is not a human self, but a corpse. A soul without a body is not a human self—but a ghost; and ghosts are not given facts. The given fact is the human self, one being consisting of soul and body, a duality in a unity. (To avoid possible misconception, permit me to point out that the cessation or annihilation of the self when the body dies is not given fact. The self may continue to exist, and to exist as a unity, and as a duality in unity after the dissolution of the earthly body. Whether it does continue or not is also not given fact; it lies beyond the range of immediate experience.) To return to the really given fact—this is the self as a unity, containing diversities called parts, powers, modes, faculties, or by other names. To study these diversities is our proper business, but it is not our business to explain how there can be such diversities in the unity. There is nothing unnatural and nothing irrational in this existence of diversities within unity. All reality, so far as we can see, is of this nature. Everywhere we find examples. The body is a unity, but in it the eyes are different from the ears; the heart and the blood are different from the brain and the nerves; there is nothing puzzling in this, nothing which detracts from the unity of the body. If we encountered eyes alone, floating in the air, not belonging to a body, but perfectly detached; nevertheless, true living eyes, able to see, that would be a puzzle. Similarly, the mind, soul, or spirit is a unity of successive times and successive experiences, of receptivity and activity, of endless diversities, in one living unity. The union of body and soul in one living self is not an exceptional fact, but in harmony with the whole universe. No difficulty, no perplexity is felt, until we make the mistake of regarding the body as a real thing by itself, and the soul as another real thing by itself. The puzzle then is to explain how the two diverse entities ever got united; and how, being united, they can act and react upon each other. But it is not within our power to take ourselves to pieces; therefore we are not required to put ourselves together.
again. When our psychology comes to consider body and soul, it will not be troubled in any way. On the contrary it will find this union of body and soul in one self quite congruous with the union of ourselves and the environments in one world. Its work will be to notice how perfectly this unity of body and soul fits into the unity of the universe. Destitute of a body, what could a human soul do or know in this world? How could it be aware of its environment? Without bodies, how could individual souls communicate their thoughts to each other? The given facts hold together and support each other, together constituting a system in which each member is essential to the whole.

16. Free will.—Again, our psychology will be untroubled by that insoluble problem—the relation of free will to determinism. The facts of volition, duty, and responsibility are solid certainties of the self—they are not imaginations or inferences, but immediate realities. It is as impossible to doubt these facts as it is impossible to doubt the facts of gravitation in physics. Determinism is a theory belonging to another region of thought—the attempt of the human intellect to comprehend the universe as a whole. We may feel the fascination which this theory has for the religious belief that God governs all, and for the philosophical imagination of a universe absolutely ruled by law and causation, but we need not be disquieted. No theory can undermine the certainty of given facts; while on the other hand it is easy to recognise the inability of the human mind to know everything.

17. Conclusion.—Whether there are two or more right ways in psychology is a question which must be postponed. An immense amount of useful work has been done by psychologists who have begun by analysis of consciousness, and have endeavoured to explain the self as a compound of simple elements, somewhat after the manner of physical science. Unhappily, in some cases, the result has been a doubt whether there is any self. Münsterberg in his *Psychology and Life*, and more fully, in his *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, has made an attack upon these “objective” psychologies, no reply to which, so far as I know, has appeared. I mention this to show that I am not alone in feeling that a new departure in psychology is necessary. Meanwhile I would fain hope that the arguments of this essay, now submitted to your judgments, will convince some of you that the method I have advocated is worth trying. It has the merit of keeping close to practical life. It does not promise to explain what the self *is*; but it recognises that the self
is becoming, is in process of evolution. This too is an immediate certainty. The self is becoming good or bad, wise or foolish, happy or miserable. Why do we want to understand ourselves? Surely that we may become good, wise, happy. The kind of knowledge most necessary for us is regulative knowledge—and, perhaps, for us, no other kind is possible.

Discussion.

The thanks of the meeting were voted to the author of the paper, and a discussion followed.

Dr. Schofield considered that the author by his suggestion puts us on a very high intellectual platform. He thought that the radical defect of the present psychology was its tendency to limit mind to consciousness. It was this narrow concept which limits "the psychological mind" to less than half its real extent, that called forth Prof. James' scathing description of its present condition. He says that it is a study of raw facts; a wrangle about opinions, but has not a single law; that it is in the condition of physics before Galileo, or chemistry before Lavoisier.

Colonel Alves said: It is well-known that as regards the moral character that the exercises of the soul very speedily make a great reformation in character. That is unlike mental or physical talents. For instance, a person without talents for music or painting would never make much progress.

I do not know what the practical result of a paper like this is.

What is the result? It seems to me that what we know in practical psychology is that we must first begin at both ends. There is only one thing that will reach deepest needs. It is well-known and it is a new birth. There is no doubt many people live in very good stable houses that last their time, though the foundation is only on the sand, but once the superstructure has been ruined nothing can be rebuilt except on the solid foundation of the new birth. There is a necessity for building on that foundation, and those who work with our Christian teachers have very speedily agreed as to how the same physical element can be developed and trained when we are on a solid foundation. It is not much use
endeavouring to build up a superstructure on old foundations which have given way.

Rev. John Tuckwell, M.R.A.S.—If psychology is what this paper seems to indicate, it appears to me that it comprehends all philosophy, all metaphysics, all science, the whole universe, the human self and its environment. If this be so, then there is no such thing as psychology, and we have simply to drop the word and go on with our study of the other branches of science as we do now. But there is a limitation generally understood within the wider subject of metaphysics that comes under the title of psychology. As I understand it, the term psychology is intended more especially to refer to the human soul or spirit in its own personal consciousness and in its experiences as known and taught by that consciousness. There are some sentences in the paper which need correction, and others which I think the writer could hardly have meant at all. The author says, "the mind, soul, or spirit is a unity of successive times." What can a unity of successive times mean? There is an entity which is conscious of successive times, but the times are not a portion of that entity. Then he adds, "and successive experiences." But still that entity is not a series of successive experiences, but something that passes through successive experiences. Nor is it a unity "of receptivity and activity" and "of endless diversities." Receptivity and activity may be contemplated by themselves in an abstract way, but psychology is supposed to deal with the conscious substance which displays these phenomena. He tells us also, that "no difficulty, no perplexity, is felt until we make the mistake of regarding the body as a real thing by itself, and the soul as another real thing by itself." But surely if there is a body it is a real thing, and by and by it will be a real thing by itself, and when that soul will have left, it is a real thing and will also be a real thing by itself. What is that real thing? It is the business of psychology to tell us something about it, and something about its moral relations to its fellow souls around it, and to that Divine Creator under whose laws it has been made and whose laws it must obey.
Communications.

From Professor Stackpool E. O'Dell:

I read with interest "The Right Way in Psychology," by the Rev. F. Storrs Turner, B.A.

I am thankful to the author for such enlightenment as his paper gives, especially for his definition—"Study," as preferable to science. We know so little about the soul or spirit, except in relation to mind, that probably "mental philosophy" might well take the place of "psychology."

All our knowledge of psychology is strictly confined to mental manifestations. But this knowledge is extensive. The history of nations, science, religion and art, with all that has ever been made or manufactured, is the result of the unseen powers we call mind. From ancient pyramids or temples to modern London we see the manifestations of the spirit or mind of man. This is what psychologists should study. Mental manifestations, for the purpose of developing them in the formation of character, in the maintenance of mental health, in the alleviation or curing of the insane, in the education of children, in the government of nations, and the general well-being of all peoples morally, mentally and socially. If in some measure psychology does not lead to such desirable ends, it is not justified in its existence as either a science or study. At the same time I would like to state that my knowledge of psychology or mental philosophy, leads me to the belief that it is capable of all I here mention and more, much more.

Remarks by D. Biddle, Esq., M.R.C.S.E.:

I trust I may be allowed to supplement the discussion on Mr. Storrs Turner's interesting paper, by expressing the pleasure I feel in finding that views, which I have held in almost the same form for forty years, have been independently arrived at by so skilled a logician as Mr. Turner. My "Post-mortem Examination, or What is the Condition of the Disembodied Human Spirit?" (Williams and Norgate), was published in 1867, and was followed in two years by "The Spirit Controversy," an expansion of the former.

In these I tried to show that memory, an essential factor of thought, belonged entirely to the body, upon which the human spirit was dependent for the reception of all impressions, internal
as well as external, the chief function of the spirit being Feeling (more or less complex and of various kinds) and Will; the one receptive, the other re-active. Hence the importance of the Christian doctrine of "the redemption of the body," and comfort also to those who fear ghosts.

Remarks by Professor H. Langhorne Orchard:—

There is much in this thoughtful and ingenious paper with which I have the satisfaction of agreeing. Especially valuable seem to me the author's observations upon free will and the regulative character of our knowledge.

I cannot, however, assent to his definition of psychology as the study of man (page 26). Psychology is the study of soul; the study of man concerns itself with anthropology. Nothing is gained by using terms in a sense different from their accepted meaning. I also wish to point out that the author speaks of "that thinking which we call knowing or believing." Does this mean that (a) there is no third form of thinking (e.g., doubting); or that (b) knowing or believing are one particular form of thinking, and both are one and the same thing? The correlation of the sciences is an important truth, which, to my mind, is obscured by calling everything psychology that is not physics. And does not the study of man necessarily connect itself with that study of physics from which it is proposed to separate it? The theory that the self consists of a human soul and a human body in union may appear to have some historical support in Leibnitz's supposition that a person consists of soul and body together. But, if the theory be sound, the self of to-day is not the self of yesterday, for one of the constituent parts, viz., the body, has changed. Further, if the self is constituted by a human soul in union with a human body, it certainly follows that when this union is dissolved at death, the self is dissolved also, and ceases to exist.

Remarks by Mr. Martin Rouse:—

The mind is a unity in a different sense from what the body is; or what the body and mind in combination are. For, firstly, there are portions of our body that we are continually rubbing off or cutting off; but whoever heard of one's taking off a piece from one's mind (although figuratively we may speak of "giving a man a piece of one's mind"); and, secondly, the
body can be stretched so as to touch at one moment two points that it would otherwise not extend to—for example, by spreading apart one's two arms or two legs; but the mind cannot thus be stretched, since it is impossible by any efforts to think of two objects at the same instant—they must be thought of by turns.

Also the mind can work quite independently of the body, dispensing with the bodily organs through which it usually works altogether. Children who were born blind learn to weave baskets and bird-cages, preserving the shapes round and true, which it is impossible they should do without having images of them in their minds; while men who have become blind (like the poet Milton) can conjure up with the keenest vividness images of all the scenes and incidents that their eyes have witnessed, representing them anew upon the mirror or illumined screen of memory and even reflecting fresh forms upon the kaleidoscope of the imagination. Again, before children are able to speak, they certainly think, as can be proved by many instances; and conversely, when men have ceased to be able to speak upon their dying beds, their signs prove that they think still, while an instance is on record of a Christian man writing a dying exhortation after speech had thus left him.*

And lastly, whereas they who are dumb through having been born deaf can actually be taught to speak with lips and tongue; some who have become stone-deaf through old age (like the late Sir Arthur Cotton) have shown themselves to possess memories as clear and intellects as vivacious as the ablest of their contemporaries, who have every organ of sense perfect.

Now, if the absence of each of these faculties separately leaves the mind intact, the absence of any two or all three of them must equally leave it so;—an inference confirmed by the recent case of a girl born both deaf, dumb and blind, and yet rising to scholarly attainments through the unwearied patience of her teachers. And it is further evident that if the absence of bodily sight, speech, and hearing does not cause the mind to lose any of its soundness or wholeness, the superadded absence of the inferior faculties of smell, taste, and touch cannot possibly make it less sound or whole. The mind is therefore a unity independent of the body.

* Mr. Edward Read of Tasmania, father-in-law of Dr. Harry Guinness.
REPLY OF THE AUTHOR.

I meant no offence to science, and do not understand how my sentence can have been so misinterpreted. Science is not metaphysical; and glories in its abstinence from metaphysics.

To question (a) I answer that *doubting* is a kind of thinking; so is *inquiry*, etc. I cannot answer (b) in a sentence, the questions require at least a whole paper to themselves. In *Knowledge, Belief and Certitude*, published by Sonnenschein in 1900, the results of years of thought and research are contained; and there, too, will be found a full statement of my view of science.

Limits of space forbid my discussing other criticisms. I cannot, however, refrain from expressing my dissent from Professor Orchard's arguments against the union of soul and body. The soul also changes, and far more than the body. In some cases, it is "born again," it becomes "a new creature." Change is not incompatible with identity. That the dissolution of the body involves the annihilation of the soul is an argument which rests upon the assumption that the visible and tangible body is real; and the soul only a dependent phenomenon. We do not know the ultimate nature of matter, nor the ultimate nature of spirit. An argument which is based on ignorance is worthless. The soul is the life of the body; it is more than that, but it is that. If the body is disintegrated why should not the life continue, and acquire a new body? St. Paul says "it is sown a natural (psychical) body; it is raised a spiritual body." Death is an event of which we have no experience. When we have passed through it, and look back upon it, we shall know something about it. I do not pretend that our present conjectures as to what is possible are proofs of resurrection and immortality; I am only contending that the alleged argument from the dissolution of the body is not valid.

I thank my critics for their kind compliments, and for their criticisms, which shall receive careful consideration.