ORDINARY MEETING.

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IN THE CHAIR.

The following Paper was read by the Author:—*

DEONTOLOGY. By the REV. H. J. CLARKE.†

THAT the psychic affections to which human nature is subject include a sense of duty, we may affirm without fear of contradiction; and without binding ourselves to determine at what stage in the process of their evolution it first becomes apparent. In ordinary cases it is found to constitute one among sundry characteristics which manifest themselves gradually, in various measures, and under conditions more or less favourable, prominent among the latter being education and hereditary tendencies. When in individual cases no trace of it can be discerned, its absence arrests attention, and, just in proportion as in those instances growth and culture have developed the rest, is accounted abnormal. A man of rare intellect and exquisitely refined tastes, if his conscience own no law superior to what may chance to be his passing inclination, if his conduct be determined by no considerations which presuppose reverential regard for truth and uprightness, is, when contemplated from the ethical point of view, looked upon as a monster. No one expects to find a sense of moral obligation in an infant; if imperceptible in an idiot, it is never missed, nor, however rudimentary and

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feeble its manifestations may be in a savage, does short-
coming in such a case surprise intelligent observers: they
would be astonished were they to find it highly developed.
But the ordinary phenomena of human life, according as the
development of human characteristics progresses, together
with those phenomena which have the appearance of being
exceptional, render more and more evident that this signally
honourable psychic affection is an essential attribute of man.

Now the word duty implies that in the matter with respect
to which it is used something is conceived as being due
(debitum). If, however, for due we substitute wanting (s̄ēor),
we get a concept which is preferable, as involving no other
assumption than is ultimately reached in the process of
analysing the notion which the noun in question represents;
and thus, on the supposition that the experiences which
originated and have perpetuated the notion afford materials
available for the elaboration of a science, Deontology may
claim to be accepted as its most appropriate name.

But although duty implies that something is wanting, the
sense of duty is not an intellectual perception of the deficiency,
but a kind of feeling which virtually acknowledges an
authoritative command to supply it, to fill up, so to speak,
the discovered void. It may, indeed, occur to me to say to
myself "I ought," when I am simply taking account of the
fact that an object which I have in view, but which, as it
may seem to me, is, so far as concerns my intervention,
without moral significance, presupposes in the chain of its
conditioning antecedents some possible act of mine. My
wish, for instance, being to ensure accuracy in some arith-
metical calculation I have made for my amusement, my
thought perhaps may be "I ought to proceed now by some
other method, and then compare the second result with the
first." Phrases which, strictly speaking, point to duty are
frequently employed in reference to acts wherein, rightly or
wrongly, the only laws whereof cognizance is taken are but
delimitations of what is practicable, together with such rules
as define what the agent imagines to be conducive to his
profit, pleasure, or convenience. Although, however, meta-
phorical applications may render words equivocal, and in the
habitual and unstudied use of conventional phraseology their
proper meanings are liable to escape attention, the genuine
sense of duty has a character peculiar to itself, and, where it
has once found place, admits of no guileless confusion with
any other kind of experience. The nature of the case, I need
hardly remark, forbids that, having made this assertion, I
should be challenged to support it by adducing more conclusive evidence than is to be found in an indeterminate aggregate of confirmatory testimonies and of seemingly accordant ethical phenomena. Everyone who perceives it to be indisputably true has discovered in himself its only sure, its absolutely certain ground. In some such cases as I thus assume, a sentiment of reverence for a fellow man may cause in others, subjects or disciples, or profound admirers, the impression that obedience, partial or complete, is due to him. On this supposition there may be those whose sense of duty recognizes no authority superior to his will; but if, apart from, or in the absence of, reverence for the man himself, he is obeyed, and still from an imperative, that is a real, sense of duty, a higher will is, not indeed distinctly, or even consciously, recognized as a matter of course, but, it would seem, virtually acknowledged.

To confirm this yet unproved assertion, and from it, proceeding to others more precise and definite, to arrive at the full truth to which it points, there needs some investigation of phenomena that indicate in certain of the lower animals a psychic affection, which, perhaps, in common opinion simulates, but, as it appears to me, may properly be called, a sense of duty. No one at all observant of the habits of dogs can fail to have remarked how any of these creatures, if adequately intelligent and duly trained, invariably behave when detected in acts of disobedience to such authority as they have learned to recognize. The manifestation of fear may possibly in such a case be insignificant, or even nil; but if that be so, another kind of feeling becomes the more evident, betraying itself by various symptoms, which human observers, even children, taught by their sympathetic moral sense, instinctively interpret. The indications of a sense of shame are unmistakable. But a sense of shame implies a sense of duty; and in a dog the sense of duty is the sort of feeling under the impulse of which, after he has attached himself to an owner, he in effect submits to hold the position of a bondservant, and, if trained in congruity with the possibilities of his nature, instinctively slides into the habit of subordinating in some measure his natural appetites to commands, which, in this assumed position, it is his nature to recognize as having for himself the might and urgency of a supreme authority. This sense of duty underlies the distinction he makes between his master's right to be obeyed, and any claim a stranger may seem bent upon enforcing by an aggressive manifestation of formidable
power. The latter he furiously resents and obstinately with­stands, to the former he submissively yields, even when the tone of voice in which the word is uttered and the accom­panying gestures are not adapted to excite a sympathetically responsive affection likely to prove stronger than opposing inclinations. This, he does, plainly, in many a case, from no fear of measuring the brute strength he feels in himself against his master's ability to resist it, but from what, unless some designation more appropriate can be found, may, I think, be fitly named a sense of duty.

But sense is not consciousness, nor does it by any means presuppose this in its operation as a motive. That such is the case, the actions of the lower animals render evident. To all appearance the most intelligent among them exercise no discernment whatsoever of an introspective kind; an inferior nature subject, it would seem, in this respect to rigid conditions, hides from them entirely the springs of intellectual and emotional movement, and their mental activity is, in its very restricted range, exclusively objective. That the restrictive conditions to which I allude are as rigid as they seem to be, I do not take for granted, nor do I hold myself at liberty to assume that they will never give way in the process of a continuous evolution. At present, I am simply describing phenomena, and what I have just asserted is the experienced impossibility of awakening in the mind of any creature on earth, below the rank of man, the faintest perception of the fact that it has a mind, and that there the motives are to be found from which it acts. To condense into a brief and comprehensive statement the substance of what, as it appears to me, I have shown sufficient warrant for affirming in respect to animals of the inferior races, I would say, that some are gifted with a sense of duty, but none with what may properly be called a conscience.

Now, the endowments of the human mind include a capacity for introspection. Man can look into his own mind and observe its operations. If they involve conflicting emotions of ethical importance, the interior action may be, and often is, more than a mere struggle, resulting in the victory of the strongest: such is his mental constitution, that he has power to arbitrate between them, and in so doing to determine for himself which of them ought to prevail. Herein, he possesses a privilege which he may be forced at times to exercise in spite of efforts of reluctant will, while still exempt from absolute constraint to carry into execution the judgment he has pronounced, though subjected to self-
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condemnation in every yet unexecuted sentence which remains, rightly or wrongly, unrevoked. The operation of the sense of duty in the mind of man, determined, as it is, by the discharge of these superior functions, discovers itself by indications which, in common opinion, but, as is obvious, not completely, find their interpretation in the term conscience. A man, in so far as, in conjunction with his sense of duty, his reflective faculty has been evolved, not only feels the obligation to control resisting inclinations, but knows that he feels it, and why he feels it, and, instructed by this experience, forms the conception of duty. That what he has conceived is no phantasy, he cannot but be well assured, since the knowledge which his firm persuasion, if well founded, presupposes is the immediate perception of relations which his mind's eye, introverted, has discerned in contemplating the phenomena it has seen within. A conscientious desire to fulfil all duties admits, and indeed from the first gives rise to, the consciousness of an undefinable amount of ignorance relatively to innumerable particulars included in this comprehensive obligation; but it precludes all doubt as to what duty itself is, considered simply as such.

How then, we may now ask, does conscience operate in those who are endowed with it in determining the scope of their sense of duty, and the various obligations which demand their recognition? This sense, as I have pointed out already, is, so far as it can be detected in any of the lower animals, a species of affection in which they feel the pull, so to speak, of an authoritative will. It does not, however, appear that they have the capacity for being thus affected immediately and directly by any higher will than is discovered to them in the actions of man, the creature whose privilege it is to exercise lordship over the brute creation, and in reference to whom the following well-known clause in a sacred charter may, I think, in this connection be cited as appropriate: "The fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea, into your hand are they delivered." (Genesis ix, 2.) But a man, if both his sense of duty and moreover his intelligence are adequately developed, is capable of perceiving that the authority to which he is ultimately responsible is not the will of a fellow creature, however eminent the station which the latter may have reached in consequence of character or talents, or may owe to fortune. Under conceivable circumstances it may become his deep conviction that he is bound to deviate from
the path of an habitual obedience to some visible authority. If so, what causes him to feel, as in the sort of case I am supposing he does feel, that he is authoritatively commanded to do this? And how is it that, in the event of his respect for the visible authority proving stronger than the conscientious feeling which had risen up against it, he has the impression of having incurred blame? It is no explanation of the state of his mind to say that he blames himself. Why should he blame himself? That is precisely what we want to know. For how can he rationally hold that it is to himself he is responsible? Why should he, with a view to self-accusation, establish a court within his conscience? And if he has absolute authority there, if he alone within that sphere of jurisdiction has the right to call for an account of his own actions, to determine what are faulty, and to visit guilt with censure, is he not entitled to forbear to exercise it? Yet if he be thoroughly conscientious, nothing is more certain than that he will not only lay no claim to such a right, but will, with all his heart and soul, reject as impious the notion that he does possess it. The more closely the phenomena of conscience are investigated, the more apparent it becomes that every act of mind in which it is brought into exercise is in effect a recognizing of the jurisdiction of a real and objective judicial authority from which there can be no appeal.

But the impressions made upon that kind of sense which may be said to hear a voice commanding with authority are unmistakably distinct from those in which there is the recognition of mere power. It is one thing to give way to force, it is quite another to submit as to authority, and to respect and reverence it as such. What, then, is it which receives submission when the characteristically human sense of duty is at work? The question, it is evident, has reference to facts: it is with these we have to deal, and not with abstract notions, nor with metaphors that overstep strict truth. Something there appears to be to which a prevalent affection of the human soul, a sense indisputably normal, and incalculably powerful among the mightiest of the agencies that sway the lives of individual men, and bear the whole world onward to its destined goal, ascribes supreme authority. I ask, “What is it?” Surely the reply need not be long in coming. Man can acknowledge no rational obligation to render an account of himself to the material universe, or indeed to any kind of being whose nature is inferior to his own. It is certain, therefore, that the attributes which
constitute the requisite authority must comprehend a will, and (for this of course is presupposed) an intellect. Exception has, indeed, been taken to the transcendental use of any names of human attributes; yet it should be evident that, having represented to our minds an Almighty and Eternal Being, we by no means nullify the concept in our application of such names to aspects of his character and power relatively to our creaturely conditions. Hence, assumed antinomies are nothing more than shadows, and they vanish from our path as we advance by any of those routes of genuine and coherent reasoning which, one and all, converge upon the truth, that whatsoever form of being is conditioned in respect to space and time owes its existence to the fiat of a Sovereign Will, under whose government the universe has been from the creation’s dawn, and will continue through all ages. Thus no room remains for doubt that the authority of that All-ruling Will is virtually acknowledged in such actions as are proper to the higher and specifically human sense of duty.

This, then, is the sense of duty which, associated in all men with the capacity for mental introspection and self-government, discharges functions that have been epitomised in the appellation conscience, and of which, as must be evident, the range and scope may be inferred from possibilities apparent in the intellectual advance that of necessity takes place along with its development, and is essentially included in the process. Further, seeing that, according as it manifests activity, the subject of it shows an aptitude to recognize, not only intellectually, but with filial reverence, that is, to trust, adore, and love, the Author of his being, it contributes argument for the belief, which is among its most conspicuous concomitants, that men are spirits, being children of a Father who himself is Spirit, and as such act through, not from, that lower nature which connects them for a season with this lower world. But now I find myself in a position to observe that psychic is no proper epithet for an affection which is shared by man with none of the inferior animals. A psychic sense of duty he does, indeed, possess, and thus, whereas it should be governed by the underlying nobler sense, the latter, when they chance to be in conflict, is in many a case oppressed and stifled; as may be seen whenever any person, influenced by a will or wills which he is wont to pay respect to, and lacks courage to withstand, betrays confusion if discovered acting in accordance with his higher sense of duty, or allows them, it may be, to shame him into doing something which his conscience disapproves. By way of
illustration, for history suggests to me no incident at once more apposite and pointed—I would instance that inglorious mental struggle which resulted in the feebly resolute command that John the Baptist should be put to death. "The King was grieved; but for the sake of his oath, and of them which sat at meat with him," (Matt. xiv, 9), he gave the order. His habitual and prevailing sense of duty, it would seem, was of that kind which can apprehend no obligations but such as have their ground in custom, fashion, and tradition. He had so neglected the Divine demand for purity and truthfulness in all the workings of his mind, as to be only fitfully, and not at any time effectually, susceptible of ethical impressions, save as a child of this world. The proverb which asserts that even thieves are wont to recognize among themselves some code of honour, broadly resting as it does, on facts, bears no uncertain witness to the possible existence of a sense of duty quite divorced from conscientiousness, or, after the extinction of the latter, still in some ways active.

The late Professor Maurice, in an allusion he has made to Tennyson's Northern Farmer, in his profoundly thoughtful and instructive treatise on the Conscience,* shows, I think, a misconception of the significance of certain words of moral import, relatively to the character portrayed. According to his view, apparently, however low may be the notions which the man has formed regarding duty, his fundamental apprehension of it presupposes that he has in him at least the germ of conscientiousness, a motive principle of noble nature, and requiring only due development and culture. Now there needs no proof that any one who thinks he has a duty knows with himself the thought. Thus far, undoubtedly, the Northern Farmer manifests a conscience. What it indicates to me, however, is a sense of fitness which respects custom and prescriptive right, acquiesces in the inevitable, and in the retrospect of an ungodly and immoral life enjoys a sort of satisfaction which is unalloyed by any consciousness of being guilty, any sense of shame at all. The coarsely heathenish traits of character which, under the conditions imagined, are compatible with this inferior, this psychic sense of duty, have been depicted by the poet with consummate skill, and, in exhibiting it undiluted with the faintest signs of penitence, or of religious aspiration, they show us the more distinctly what it really is. And yet there are conditions under which it may be found alone without

* Lectures on Casuistry, Lect. ii, p. 35.
betokening depravity, for it is the form the moral sense must needs assume in its most rudimentary phase; and little else of ethical significance can be discovered in the opening mind of early childhood, or, in fact, until development admits of intellectual distinctness in perceptions of a spiritual kind.

But with strictly scientific propriety it may be affirmed that spiritual things are spiritually discerned; and therefore, seeing that in that process of ethical development which differentiates our true humanity alongside the progressive manifestation of merely psychic attributes, the authority apprehended is spiritual, this epithet, if applied to the susceptibility which is presupposed, declares its nature, and suggests that the specifically human sense of duty should be called a pneumatic rather than a psychic affection, at the same time leaving it to be assumed that, through the medium of the psychic sense, the indications of the pneumatic gather more or less of colour and complexion. The distinction I am pointing out does not necessitate the notion that the immaterial principle, which through all changes constitutes a man, is not in theory an indivisible personality, but made up of a spirit (πνεῦμα) and a soul (ψυχή); I am simply using terms respectively appropriate to certain sensible affections that are plainly diverse in regard to nature, and incapable of adequate description otherwise than by the help of words which thus essentially distinguish them. Accordingly, if I am justified in thus discriminating them, that is to say, if the distinction which necessitates a difference in denotation is essential in reality, we are of course precluded from admitting that the Psychic may become through evolution the Pneumatic, consequently from expecting to be able to detect in any actions of the most advanced among the lower animals the merest rudimentary development or promise of that sense of duty which is indispensable to a conception of the fundamental principles of Deontology.

In sketching out what seems to me to be the line along which we may trace a certain evolution of this human sense of duty, I shall avail myself of a familiar illustration to be found in Holy Scripture; not, however, as requiring for the basis of my argument events on record, or divinely sanctioned utterances, but just because I neither know nor can imagine any other illustration so exactly pertinent, so carefully adapted to prevent all misconceptions as to the fundamental truth to which it is apparently intended to give prominence, so vividly, yet so comprehensively, precise, in short so luminous and so profound.
Picture to yourselves, then, human beings who, by reason of original constitution and circumstances, have not as yet experience of any thought or wish which deviates at all from their idea of rectitude. They have potentially, of course, a human sense of duty. How is it to be evolved, that is, as a sense of duty pure and simple, and apart from any such provision as would be inconsistent with an equilibrium between their yet terrestrial, but unsophisticated, sentiments regarding what is right and fitting, and their constitution in respect to appetency? Assume it now to be experienced in the discovery, no matter how, that the Almighty Being, on whose providence and bounty they depend, has laid upon them just one obligation, which affects them in no other way than as it presupposes a privation, such as will be but ideal, should they feel it, yet cannot be so much as felt, unless misgivings take the place of thankful, unsuspecting trust in Him. In their perception of a line which He has drawn, invisible, impalpable, and one that may be passed with perfect ease, but which to step across is to transgress, they have precisely what was requisite that their experiences might be enlarged by the addition of the simplest and the purest human sense of duty, and that they might so conceive of Good and Evil as to see at once what constitutes their fundamental difference.

Now, if they keep the sacred precept, it may be presumed that the relation, which by their obedience they maintain between the Sovereign Will and theirs, allows free room for healthy intellectual growth, and such increase of moral strength as piety, if it becomes established in the way of habit, presupposes. Elevation, therefore, in the scale of being, thus facilitated, is conceivable. But since the Hand that made them has begun to lift them up, they needs must fall, if, in the exercise of moral freedom, they release themselves from its safe-guarding hold: they then will forfeit innocence. This, on the supposition that their proper sense of duty had been suffered to continue dormant, would have been impossible; for, unless the deed, in its relation to the doer, presupposes that there has been awakened in him an ability to take cognizance of its moral character in the exercise of conscience, it is as plainly innocent as any of the actions of the lower animals. It may cause mischief in one way or another, but it cannot render him a sinner.

Relatively to my argument, this rough sketch of the conditions under which we must presume man's conscience to have been evolved I freely leave to be accounted nothing
more than an idealized scheme in which I have presented certain of my inferences from facts, respecting which there can be no dispute. So far as my immediate purpose is concerned, it brings into question the authority of no historic record. In drawing it directly, so to speak, from nature, I have, as may be seen, conformed it to the outlines of the Scripture narrative. I could not have done otherwise; but the relation which the mystic story bears to the hypotheses I find suggested by phenomena is, so far as it has served my purpose, simply that of a profoundly luminous and most instructive allegory. And indeed, that nothing in the way of fiction, even were it so denominaible, could have been devised more consonant with facts and nature, will, I think, become still more apparent as, in seeking to bring fully into view the fundamental principles of human duty, we proceed with our investigation of the course of ethical development.

Phenomena of moral import, traceable through ages past, and dating from the initial limit of recorded time, all point distinctly to the probability that the immediate consequence of that development, which made morality in human actions possible, was not improvement, but deterioration. When man had learned to turn his thoughts upon himself, and to discriminate his heart's desires from the behests of an All-ruling Will, the former, we may be certain, he continued to obey, or failed at any rate to subject to persistent and effectual control; the latter he acknowledged, yet remorsefully, reluctantly, and fitfully. The first man, if capacity and latent powers be ignored, "is of the earth, earthy" (1 Cor. xv, 47): as such he has no heavenly aspirations, nor could they by any possibility precede a fundamental sense of human duty. In the development of this, had they accompanied it, he might have risen: as a matter of fact he fell. And thus the naive, unselfconscious singleness of motives purely natural gave place within him to duplicity, prevarication, evasion, and every other outcome of fruitless efforts he had made to cover with the semblance of consistency the workings of a mind from which the vain attempt at dual government had banished peace.

But, in its bearing upon moral evolution, nothing more significant invites attention than that, through the operation of his conscience, man discovered that he was an animal. Reflection upon self, supposing it had come with aspirations tending heavenward and without self-condemnation, would, we may presume, have issued in the same discovery; but introspection having been the consequence of terror and
remorse, man’s eyes were opened by the consciousness of guilt, and thus ensued a further and a sympathetic sense of degradation. An acute perception of responsibility in things supernal and relations of a spiritual kind interpreted the most distinctive tokens of a nature that was animal and earthly. Hence, among the various races of mankind, according as in moral growth they have advanced beyond the state of infancy, such sentiments prevail, and such proprieties of conduct are enforced by law or custom, as exhibit in their different stages the transition from unconscious animalism to recognition more or less intelligent, of spiritual requirements, bearing thus their testimony to the truth that man is of a rank superior to the nature which maintains for him a transient and provisional dependence on this ever-changing world, and that, accordingly, his lower instincts, which are always tending to assert themselves, and to produce obtrusive proof of an inferior condition, he is bound to thrust back, each into its proper place and office and to hold in strict subjection.

These evidences of superiority constitute an unmistakably essential difference in regard to nature and destiny between man and all the lower animals. There are, indeed, comparative psychologists who think it possible that nothing hitherto has hindered the most intelligent among these creatures from conceiving abstract notions, and ascending thus to higher intellectual grades, except an inability, purely physical, to utter such sounds as might serve for names; and that, had they chanced to be in this respect as favourably qualified for fixing thought by means of vocal signs as certain species gifted with inferior intelligence, if their vocal organs had been on a par with those of talking birds, some would by this time have acquired the faculty of speech, but that, since they are structurally dumb, their psychic evolution is proportionably slow. Yet, even were there ground for the belief that herein lies the obstacle to so enormous an expansion of their reasoning powers as this endowment would imply, it was not by the process of abstraction and of generalisation from observed phenomena, nor was it through communication made to him in words, that man became aware that his condition, relatively to the thoughts which had begun to agitate his soul, was one of degradation. “Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?” (Genesis iii, 11.) Addressed to man, regarded as awakened to a moral consciousness of self, these questions
are interpreted by patent facts which leave no room for doubt
what answers should be given. The thought which the
word animal expresses can find no place within the minds of
creatures that are animals and nothing more, nor is it possible
to make them show that they are conscious of humiliating
incongruity between conditions under which they find them­selves in simply taking for their guide an earthly nature, and
any impulse or impression whatsoever which determines for
them what is fitting in their actions and their habits. Of
that kind of shame which presupposes the capacity for
aspiration towards a life superior to that of flesh and blood
they are evidently unsusceptible; and, lacking thus essentially
the needful stimulus, they cannot become subject to this sort
of aspiration, no experience can avail to make them pant and
thirst after a nobler state of being than has fallen to their lot.
But man has in his self-unveiling consciousness, and in the
sobering discoveries to which it opens up the way, the
possibility of being raised above the state which he inherits
as a creature that begins and ends a brief existence in this
transitory world, and of becoming qualified for life eternal,
and for the fulfilment of the highest hopes with which the
Eternal Father, the God of the spirits of all flesh, inspires His
children.

That discovery, however, of awaking consciousness, which,
so long as man remains an animal, is indispensable to spiritual
restoration, and to due development of spiritual perceptions,
renders also possible a deeper and a much more perilous fall.
The kind of consciousness in which, while shameful actions
are distinctly known as such, the reverential and restraining
sense of shame is wanting, of necessity tends greatly to
accelerate the process of corruption in the soul. So far as it
co-operates with sensuality, more mischief is effected than the
degradation of mere psychic tendencies, and the habitual
animalisation of the human ethos as a whole: a certain
pleasurable consciousness is what impresses a specific
character upon the preference for moral evil, adding to
animalistic pleasure, pure and simple, a peculiar zest, account­
ing thus for the depravity which shows a morbid taste for
such things as are base, impure, unseemly, morally repulsive,
and therefore unmistakably betraying spiritual wickedness.
A wisdom which is earthly (ἐπίγειος) and animal (ψυχική)
cannot but be demoniacal (δαιμονιώδης). (James iii, 15.)
Hence, in the eyes of those by whom this taste has been
acquired, to be innocent is to be unknowing, uninitiated, green
and raw. They glory in their shame.
From the foregoing considerations it may be readily inferred that in a scheme of human duties, philosophically planned, precedence will be given to those which are fulfilled directly in the act of consciously repudiating the usurped authority which has been exercised by sensual or merely psychic inclinations, and of recognizing as supreme the obligation to obey with filial trustfulness and love the Father of spirits. In the way of truly righteous action, in the only course of life and conduct which our highest reason will approve as absolutely fitting, no step whatever can be taken which has not for its starting point self-consecration to Him. "The wisdom from above is first of all pure." (James iii, 17.) In paraphrastic words, such is its character essentially, that, at the outset of enquiry touching special features, it is to be regarded as excluding everything; of course in thought and sentiment as well as outward act, but what is from the highest point of view becoming, impurity denoting the immediately subjective consequence of any species of unseemliness.

This being granted, various weighty questions readily suggest themselves. It may occur to us to ask, "How is the inward cleansing, which entire self-consecration presupposes, to be wrought?" Anyone who asks this question with a view of ascertaining what he ought to do, will doubtless act unwisely if he takes no pains to find out whether there be some authentic and distinct communication from above which gives the answer. But to point out what should come of such investigation does not fall within the scope of my enquiry, which must necessarily pass over not a little that is otherwise quite pertinent, and may with reason be believed. However, dealing simply from my standpoint with possibilities of sentiment respecting what man ought to be, I hold myself at liberty to say that anyone may be securely challenged to portray a worthier ideal than that which takes the form of an immaculate and willing victim, who by some unutterably awful sacrifice of self procures for the unworthy, at whose hands he suffers, and whose scorn and hatred he endures without complaint, the greatest blessings that can be conceived. The evolution of man's proper sense of duty, plainly the effect of supra-sensuous knowledge, tells us of some revelation of the Will of God: what, then, is that grand ideal, higher still, and by innumerable degrees, above conceptions formed by psychic effort, but a revelation of His Character? In exercising a transforming influence upon the characters of creatures of high rank and noble faculties, but
corrupted and defiled in mind through the injurious operation of a privilege abused, it vindicates the goodness and the wisdom which bestowed that privilege, it justifies the evolution of man's conscience; and, moreover, in the eyes of those who doubt not that it has been realised on earth, and in the person of a man, the sacrifice of self inseparable from this needful revelation, this comprehensive agency for the fulfilment of a work transcending the conceptions and the strength of guilty men, is of necessity vicarious.

In reference to this last remark, I would remind you that the realization of the ideal is, relatively to my line of argument, no more than a possibility which it was proper for me to take account of. Not, indeed, that I can help perceiving strictly philosophical and luminous congruity between such relevant considerations as, in my opinion, it suggests, and the conclusions which, as I believe, I have established. Still, although I take for granted nothing more than the conception of a character that cannot be conceived except as morally ideal, namely one in which the spirit of self-sacrificing zeal in doing good, and thereby overcoming evil, rules in steadfast singleness of purpose, what I now affirm is, that to apprehend it morally is to discern in it a standard which discovers to us what we ought to be. Two kinds of movement, then, distinguishable without difficulty, and bearing witness to the action of a directing Providence, may be observed along the course of moral evolution. The beginning of the earlier leaves to be inferred a simple intimation of something men ought not to do; the later, in disclosing what they are required to be, has opened up immeasurably the scope of duty and the evidences of shortcoming. Deontology, it thus appears, should take account of everything which is involved in this most comprehensive and complete requirement; and as not a single duty can, apart from it, be thoroughly and radically understood, the principles which guide us rightly in determining the conditions of objective duty must needs presuppose that the condition of the subject, the created spirit whom it binds, has been investigated relatively to the fundamental obligation.

Ethical philosophy, so far as it knows nothing of responsibility to an all-ruling and absolutely righteous Spirit, is, and cannot but be, in the main objective; and accordingly, among the thinkers of pre-Christian heathendom, however keen, inquisitive, and serious, none succeeded in being otherwise than superficial in their efforts to reduce to system and expound man's various duties, none had power to free their
intellects from the control of custom and tradition. Relatively to the exigencies of the sort of work they undertook, what light they had within them was but darkness. They perceived, indeed, that such relations between man and man as seemed to have their ground in nature, or to find their warrant in imperious necessities, implied a reciprocity of obligations, and that to fulfil such expectations as might thus become legitimate was to discharge a duty. Their sense of rectitude required subordination of all private aims to public interests, conformity to practices prescribed by law or custom, and, in the adjustment of disputed claims, fair distribution and equivalence. The conduct of the individual, regarded in its reflex aspects, they certainly did not ignore; for they were fully sensible of the advantages of temperance, and culture, and psychic equilibrium. Nevertheless, the crudeness of their teaching in respect to duty under both these heads is ample proof that, in the absence of a knowledge of the true God, and with moral tastes unsharpened by a vigorous sense and by a clear perception of what constitutes man's proper duty, all endeavours to establish or expound a science which shall fitly bear the title Deontology are fore-ordained to failure.

Modern Utilitarianism, in elaborating and applying its ethical conceptions, has not failed to profit by those discoveries of truth and those corrections of error, throughout the range of secular investigation, which have largely benefited all civilized nations in these latter days. The requisite conditions, psychic and material, of human happiness, so far as they can be discovered from its point of view, it specifies with scientific clearness and incisiveness. But how is it adapted to repress that spirit of licentiousness which has infused itself into the human mind through the knowledge of good and evil, and, as a deadly poison, vitiates the springs of human life? Not only is it ineffectual as a remedy for moral evil of the kind that lurks in deeds of darkness which Divorce Courts, for example, bring to light and blaze abroad, but the facility with which it lends its aid to specious pleas for the removal of restrictions that have been established on religious grounds betrays an ever threatening readiness to sanction fresh developments of animalism, and to claim liberty for new departures in the direction of its most debasing forms. Utilitarianism cannot but disown the madness of such expectations as the possibility of winning stakes and ventures simply by good luck excites in fools. But failing to exhibit truly in their moral character the acts which evidence
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this kind of folly, it exerts no adequate deterring influence. Indeed, whatever be the sins, and the avenging tribulations that may be reasonably expected in their wake, it has in this respect but little power, still less to rescue victims from whom hope has fled. Utilitarianism classifies with the virtues it acknowledges charity, as well as prudence, moderation, and the like; it may, for instance, give attention to the horrifying fact that in congested centres of population there are many homes which overcrowding has converted into teeming hotbeds, reeking with all kinds of moral abominations. But if it should utter what it knows, it speaks not with a voice that can disturb the blissful apathy which has been exempted from such dire experiences; it has no burning words which may arouse in those who live in decency and comfort the conviction that the inmates of the dens of misery are their brothers and their sisters. Evils and miseries innumerable, and ever bearing witness to resistance on the part of an antagonistic world, still tax the patient and enduring energy of a world-conquering Love. But this can never dwell apart from Faith and Hope. The obligations which it recognizes are imperceptible, unless regarded from the highest point of view which human thought has power to reach; nor can they be fulfilled, except by those who seek persistently the needful help from Him who, speaking in our consciousness of duty, thereby plainly tells us that it is to Him we have to render our account.

The Chairman (Philip Vernon Smith, Esq., M.A., LL.M.).—I am sure all will agree that our heartiest thanks are due to Mr. Clarke, for his valuable paper. Perhaps you will excuse me if, in my position as Chairman, I venture to begin the discussion myself. I do not suppose it is possible to imagine a more comprehensive and abstract idea than that of duty. In the words of, perhaps, the most eloquent of present orators,* "Duty is a power which rises with us in the morning and goes to rest with us at night. It is co-extensive with the action of our intelligence. It is the shadow which cleaves to us, go where we will, and which only leaves us when we leave the light of

But in reference to the point of view in which Mr. Clarke has brought the subject before us, it is to be observed that the word for duty, which he has given as the heading of his Paper, and which he stated to be the Greek equivalent for the Latin debitum, or due, is δέον. I was struck with his explanation of this word as meaning wanting, implying a deficiency which requires to be made up. Now, no doubt, debts are very often bad ones and in that way they are deficiencies which sometimes are not made up; but I would suggest to him whether this word δέον, in connection with duty, has not another meaning besides mere want. It seems to me that it is just as much connected with binding, which is also a sense of the Greek word δεοω and in that respect it corresponds not with the Latin debitum but with the Latin opus and obligatio; and I think Mr. Clarke himself has recognised this in the latter part of his paper, where he speaks of the sense of duty on the part of animals as a feeling that they were drawn or pulled by a higher will. It is rather remarkable that this view, which I have suggested, appears to be borne out by the etymology of the Greek word for debt, which is used, for instance, in the Lord's Prayer—I allude to the word ὑπελημμα. That word is connected with ὑπέλλω, which has two meanings, viz., that of requirement, and also that of growth or increase or prosperity. So that in the Greek the idea of duty is connected with utility; and in Philosophy, as we know, and, as we have been reminded in the course of the Paper this evening, duty is sometimes placed on the ground of utility. I quite agree with Mr. Clarke that this is not the highest ground on which to place it, nor a safe rock on which to build it; but I have no doubt that the two things are connected in language as well as in thought. There is another word of a less solemn meaning connected with duty, and that is the word τρέπων or decorum. That also enters into the idea of it, but I cannot help thinking that obligation is the real meaning, as, for instance, when our Saviour said εἰς τόις τοῦ Πατρὸς μοι δὲν εἶναι με, "I must be about my Father's business," or "in my Father's house." That is not a sense of debt, but of obligation, and that sense of obligation is shown in St. Paul's Epistles, and is put even higher in 1 Cor. ix, 16. "For though I preach the Gospel I have nothing to glory of: for necessity is laid upon me; yea, woe is unto me, if I preach not the Gospel." The Apostle there looks upon duty as being an absolutely binding force from which he cannot possibly become free.
A very interesting part of the Paper was that which traced the sense of duty in animals and compared it with the sense of duty in man. I did not feel that I was quite able to follow Mr. Clarke in the distinction he made between the sense of duty in man as a pneumatic idea, whereas in animals he affirmed it to be only a psychic idea. The great difference between animals and man is, of course, that animals do not and cannot recognise duty in the abstract, but they only recognise concrete duties when trained to do so. They can be taught to recognise a number of duties, but those duties will be independent of the general idea of duty, and will vary according to the impulse that is given to the animals by a higher will. A poacher's dog will recognise it as his duty to poach. A sheep-stealer's dog will recognise it as his duty to worry the sheep and kill them and carry them off. A shepherd's dog recognises it as his duty to guard the sheep, and on no account to injure them. But the difference between the cultivated and Christian sense of duty and the sense of duty in animals is not merely that. Man can form an abstract idea of duty whether he has a perception of the Supreme Being or not. He can generalise his ideas of duty in all systems of philosophy, whether Stoic or Utilitarian. When his duty is generalised, it to that extent becomes crystallised and fixed. In order, however, to get the highest standard of duty you must not only generalise the duties into one sense of duty but you must perceive that the duty is owed not to a changeful and uncertain will or a number of changeful or uncertain wills, as in the case of the lower animals to man, when they come in contact with him, but to the one Infinite and Changeless Will. When we get that idea, we get the idea of duty not merely generalised as far as ourselves are concerned, but also, so to speak, generalised at the other end of the cord, and it is then absolutely changeless and fixed. I think, however, upon the whole, that perhaps the most interesting part of the Paper, if I may be allowed to draw a comparison, was that which referred to man's consciousness of the degradation involved in his fall—his aspirations after something higher, and his demoniacal downfall, if in spite of this consciousness he allows himself to become the slave of his animal passions. If he falls, when he has the power of rising higher, he falls lower than the animals!

Rev. C. R. Pantler, M.A., LL.D.—Although I agree with the Author of this Paper in his arguments, I am not quite
satisfied in regard to one or two of his deductions. On his second page he says, "Now the word duty implies that in the matter with respect to which it is used, something is conceived as being due (debitum)." That is perfectly true on one condition, that the matter the duty relates to is our sense of responsibility which springs from moral obligation, and which belongs more to the sense of rectitude than to that of Deontology. The Author says in the next instance, "If, however, for 'due' we substitute 'wanting,' we get a concept which is preferable," and further down he continues:—"And thus on the supposition that the experiences which originated and have perpetuated the notion afford materials available for the elaboration of a science, Deontology may claim to be accepted as its most appropriate name." I confess I know them not, nor can I see how substituting a word for "due," which the Chairman explained clearly, can make those experiences known to us. We know very well from our experiences of a sense of duty what they are. We have, through them, the knowledge of a consciousness of rectitude. Again, the Author draws the distinction between psychic and pneumatic affection, and he draws the comparison between man and the lower animals, in reference to the psychic and pneumatic affections. I deny that the lower animals display to human intellect a knowledge of duty, but the Author again assumes what I cannot agree with, and that is that the lower animals have a psychic affection that may be called a sense of duty. We are asked on the third page to observe how the lower animals behave when detected in an act of disobedience. "The manifestation of fear may possibly in such a case be insignificant, or even nil." And we are told this psychic affection arises from a sense of shame, and he says, "But a sense of shame implies a sense of duty." I do not agree with that. I say that a sense of shame implies a sense of something wrong being done, or guilt, and a sense of wrong implies—at least, an abstract thought in the individual, and that comes from ourselves being cognisant of a moral obligation, and that again arises from our consciousness of rectitude. [It is due to Dr. Panter to say that by reason of illness he could not correct the report of his speech. —Ed.]

Professor H. Langhorne Orchard, M.A., B.Sc.—If I were to say what part of this Paper has most charmed me I should select the latter portion on Utilitarianism. I must, however, agree with
the strictures of the Chairman with regard to the substitution of something wanting, as being worse than the idea of obligation, and I think the Author himself virtually admits that the idea of duty is obligation. I notice on the second page the Author says this—"The sense of duty is not an intellectual perception of the deficiency, but a kind of feeling which virtually acknowledges an authoritative command to supply it." But what is that but saying that the sense of duty is a kind of feeling which virtually acknowledges a duty to supply it? The idea of duty is apparently a consciousness of the supremacy of law, or, to put it rather more clearly, the consciousness of the supremacy of the supreme law. If I defined duty in that way, I should be disposed to define conscience in some such way as this,—"Conscience, or the moral faculty, is that which approves or disapproves actions, according as they agree or disagree with the supreme law." The Author thinks, as I understand him, that there is in brutes a psychic sense of duty which leads them to avoid doing certain actions. Their sense of duty, if it may be so called, is not, however, natural to the brute, as you do not find it in wild animals. It is, whatever it be, the result of some training, and does not seem to rise higher than man. The sense of duty in man, is, I apprehend, innate,—existing as thoroughly in the infant and the savage. What is developed is not, I think, a sense of duty—that is the consciousness of the supremacy of the supreme law—but the intellectual discernment and judgment with regard to which that sense of duty is frequently and commonly exercised. The conviction that robbery is wrong, that injustice is wrong, is as thoroughly perfect in a child as it is in a cultured man. The difference between them is not, I think, in that, but in the intellectual discernment of what is robbery, and what is injustice. Once seen that the thing is a robbery, the conscience rebukes that just as much in a child or a savage as in a cultured man, but the cultured man would be able to say to such action, "It is wrong," whereas perhaps the child would not be able to say this, for want of intellectual perception or judgment. Taking this view of duty, I cannot agree with the Author that there are two kinds of sense of duty in man, viz., the psychic and pneumatic, which may be in conflict with one another. It appears to me if duty says we ought to do a thing it is impossible that there should be a conflict of duties. Whatever I ought to do is supreme, and it is quite impossible that I ought to do
two different things in opposition to each other. I must differ from the Author as to the use of the terms "evolved," "developed," and "grown," with regard to this pneumatic sense of duty. If it be not innate, where does it come from? If it is evolved, what is evolved. It is not a psychic sense of duty, as the Author points out. If it is not evolved from that, it could not be evolved from anything whatever. I must contend that the sense of duty is from law, and is essentially innate. In fact, the Author says in one place that duty is essentially innate in man and yet he appears to say that infants may be without it, and there may be some human beings that do not possess it. As to Herod and John the Baptist, I do not think there was any conflict of duty, but it was simply that Herod preferred to please man—the daughter of Herodias—rather than God. That is, to my mind, the interpretation.

With regard to feeling the consequent sense of shame, surely the command implied, first, the possession by Adam of the sense of duty. Had there been no sense of duty already existing in him, I do not see how there would have been any guilt in breaking the command. It was because he did what he knew he ought not to do—in other words, because he went against his sense of duty—that he sinned. The sense of duty would not be evolved by the sin, but existed at first.

The Author has made a most valuable distinction between man and the brutes with regard to the sense of duty. If they be allowed to have any at all, it is certainly very different indeed to that possessed by man; and I thank the Author for so well and ably bringing out that distinction.

Mr. Charles Browne.—I am entirely in accord with the remarks made at the beginning as to the etymology of the word. No doubt the word "Deon" is used in respect of duty in the sense of tying together, the idea of duality being very generally implied by the use of the D (Delta) in those words which represent the dealing in any way with two things; either as in words compounded of Dis and De representing severance of one thing into two; or, as in "duo," "duplex," etc., representing the connection of two things together. Thus in the words Dei, Deon, Duty, etc., the notion conveyed is the tying together of two things, namely the person who is bound to do a thing and the supreme authority that compels him to do it; and thus there is a very plain connection or correspondence in sense between the words "Duty,"
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derived from “deo” to tie, and “obligation” derived from “obligare” to bind together.

I am not only satisfied of the identity of the reasoning faculty in the lower animals, but I am also satisfied that there is in some of them at least the indication of an inchoate sense of morality. I would refer to the notion that dogs have of property and its rights, for that involves in itself the notion of their being obliged by some authority or principle that they recognise to restrain themselves from something they would much like to have appropriated to their own use.

The latter part of the Author's most interesting Paper refers to a subject which lies at the bottom of it all, that is the sense of moral obligation. We look at a treatise on moral philosophy of Socrates or Plato, and we see that that is the real difficulty with which they feel they have to contend. A man who is not disposed to do what he should do says “Why should I do so?” In the Platonic dialogues, reporting the discourses of Socrates, there is a higher notion presented, for he has a knowledge of higher obligations which impose on man higher duties; but when you come to Stoicism all you find is simply the didactic statement that he must do it; and you again ask, Why? and then a most valuable part of this Paper comes in. We all know the great distinction that is drawn by writers on jurisprudence, which has been so much threshed out lately—that, as a fundamental notion, law is nothing. You say “obey the law”; but unless the law has an executive power to compel its performance, it is no more powerful than a mere expression of opinion; but when you bring it, as the Author has so ably done, to a Christian system, you are carried to something higher than the mere existence of an abstract law—you are brought to the knowledge of that which keeps alive the conscience, so that in everything you do you have the abiding consciousness of the will of a Personal Being who is above you, to whom you are tied and bound so that you cannot shake yourself loose from the bond, and then you find a sanction that is wanting to all the heathen ethical precepts. A very common error is committed by persons who derive their notions on moral subjects from French writers, owing to a mistranslation of the word “conscience.” The word “conscience” in French means merely “consciousness,” and yet you constantly find it treated as meaning “conscience” in our English use of that word, and all that “conscience” with us...
implies—that is, not only the mere recognition of the facts, but the reflection upon them, the submission of them to the criticism of the moral sense and the pronunciation of the judgment upon them formed by that sense, whether they are right or wrong, with all the consequences that follow on that judgment; none of which processes beyond the mere "consciousness" of the facts are implied in the French word "conscience."

The Chairman.—I will now call upon the Author to reply.

The Author.—The first remark I have to make is in regard to the explanation I have given of the word &view. I traced the meaning of that word as far as I could and in so doing I had in my mind the various senses in which it is employed, and it seemed to me that the prevailing one is that which is expressed by the word wanting. Whether I reached an absolute limit in my investigation it is impossible for me to say. But I appeared to arrive at a simple conception of the meaning of the word which I could assert as the basis of the conception of duty. Now, I will explain why it is that I have found it necessary to distinguish between a psychic and a pneumatic sense of duty. I think it must be admitted by all who know anything of the habits of intelligent animals that they really have a sense of shame. It is my theory of mine, and I took for granted that it would be generally admitted. I think Dr. Panter denied that animals had a sense of shame. It is no theory of mine, and I took for granted that it would be generally admitted. I think Dr. Panter denied that animals had a sense of shame.

Dr. Panter.—I said they had not a sense of duty.

The Author.—I thought you denied that they had a sense of shame, and that you resolved the appearance of a sense of shame into a mere manifestation of fear. That appears to me to be your argument and it seems to me that if there is a natural sense of shame, that sense of shame implies a sense of duty. What you assert is that they have a sense of disobedience and yet not a sense of duty; but how can anyone have a sense of disobedience without having a sense of duty? What does it mean? A failure to discharge a duty is a breach of duty. Any person who has a sense that he has violated an obligation certainly must have a sense of duty. Sense of duty has a prospective significance in relation to the consciousness of disobedience, so to speak. I do not maintain that animals have a consciousness of duty. I draw a clear distinction between sense and consciousness. But animals appear to have, as we have, a moral sense—a sense of justice. I think the last speaker allowed that
animals have a moral sense—that they have, I think he said, not a sense of justice—perhaps you will kindly tell me.

Mr. CHARLES BROWNE.—On the contrary, I should say that they had a sense of justice. I said property—that they have a sense of property.

The Author.—Yes, they most certainly have, and that implies a sense of justice. Now if animals, in those respects, are constituted as human beings; in what respects, so far as duty is concerned, do they differ from men? I maintain it is in this; an animal can be pulled or drawn only by some outward and visible manifestation of authority—something which is in its nature changeable. The animal has, as its master, a person whom he recognises as a master—somebody who belongs to this world of sense and time; but the human being, in so far as he exercises his conscience, recognises an authority that is Eternal and Unchangeable and shows himself to be the child of the Father of Spirits and therefore maintains a sense of duty which I say is properly called not psychic but pneumatic. At the same time, I maintain that he has also a psychic sense of duty, and of this I think there is no doubt. Professor Maurice, after commenting on the use of the word, thought that its significance as used in the *Northern Farmer* lay in the word “ought.” I cannot accept that statement without qualification. “That which is born of the flesh is flesh”; but if that which is born of the flesh is but flesh, then no racial prerogative can constitute a spiritual distinction. What I take the truth to be is this: that the so-called Anglo-Saxon sense of duty is a mere psychic affection—purely psychic—and that it has comparatively little in it of reverence—comparatively little of the religious sentiment; that, on the contrary, it is somewhat given to push aside, contemptuously, and to sweep out of its path all obstructions that may have been placed against it by religious scruples. It seems to me, therefore, that if we are to attribute to some nation a peculiar sense of duty or sensitiveness to moral obligation, we must admit that it is of a psychic—of an animal nature, as distinguished from what I maintain is a pneumatic or spiritual sense of duty. I do not see how it is possible to explain the various phenomena of the workings of the mind of man unless we make this distinction. I find it made in the Scriptures, i.e., in the use of the term “psychic” (*ψυχικός* in the original), as applicable to the man who acts simply from a psychic
sense of duty. The pneumatic man is one who, recognising the Father of his spirit, acts from the highest sense of duty—he is the spiritual man. He is able to discern spiritual things—the spiritual faculty is in him more highly developed than in the case of the psychic man, in whom perhaps it manifests itself only occasionally and fitfully. I think now, having pointed out the necessity for making a distinction between those two words, it is not necessary that I should comment on every remark that has been made in reference to this Paper; it would take me too long a time. There is one more remark that I must notice. It is the objection that was made to my use of the word “evolved.” I spoke of the sense of duty, whether psychic or pneumatic, being evolved. I meant what was evolved was a potential sense of duty. The sense, unless its exercise be called forth, is latent, and the calling forth of that sense into some kind of action is what I mean by its being evolved. The sense of duty being evolved (that is, a peculiarly human sense of duty), in the exercise of that we arrive at an ever-widening conception of the scope of duty, and that which develops our views on that subject, that which brings out and unfolds the true principles of Deontology, is a reverential conception of the ideally perfect character. (Applause.)

The Meeting then adjourned.

FURTHER REPLY BY THE AUTHOR.

The interpretation I have given of the title of my Paper is based on the assumption, not that the conception of duty is separable from that of binding or obligation, but that the latter presupposes something in regard to which deficiency would be predicable on the supposition of its being unfulfilled. In short, in contemplating any requirement, be it moral or physical, I perceive a concept which, as it seems to me, necessarily underlies the notion of constraint. Between needs and binds there is no obvious relation in respect to meaning, and although in Greek they are represented by the same sound and the same combination of letters, no such coincidence as this would justify the assumption of etymological identity. Yet, if an etymological connection between the two concepts were established, I should hold that the former is the primary signification of the impersonal έτι. In any case I classify the word with oportet (opus), il faut, &c. Thus
interpreted, it embodies what I take to be the fundamental con-
ception of the science which has been named Deontology.

In the course of the discussion it was argued that if any animals
have what may appear to be a sense of duty, it cannot be natural
to them, but must be a result of some training, seeing that it is
never found in wild animals. But the assumption on which this
objection rests is not generally admitted by those who have made
animal intelligence their study, and it is unquestionable that there
are creatures which in their natural state, birds, for instance, and
even insects, notably ants, make it evident in actions which display
some degree of intelligence, oftentimes in strikingly ingenious
adaptation of means to ends, that they are sensible of obligation
to conform to a constituted social order, and that measures are
adopted by the experienced and orderly among them for enforcing
conformity on the part of the untrained and the contumacious. A
social impression of what is fitting largely controls individualistic
impulses and tendencies, and renders prosperity and safety com-
patible with a comparatively low degree of individual ability to
foresee the consequences of irregular action. Such phenomena as
I am alluding to disclose what I have ventured to term, not indeed
a reflective perception, but a sense of duty, that is to say, of what
is due to the community.

I have intimated my belief that the psychic sense is essentially
distinct from the pneumatic, and I have pointed out conceivable
cases in which they may conflict with one another, but I beg
leave to observe that I have not therefore asserted the possibility
of a conflict of duties. For human beings, such law as psychic
intelligence has capacity for apprehending is subordinate to
that, which, as children of the Father of Spirits, they are bound
to obey. The psychic man's perception of the latter is limited to
dim, confused, and inconsistent notions. And I should think it
will not be denied that, as compared with enlightened Christians,
children who are just old enough to be taught to believe in God
have a feeble conception of a Being who requires truth in the in-
ward parts. In their case, and in that of savages also, the
desideratum is no mere intellectual development; they need, what
all adult believers need more or less, spiritual advance, and there-
fore, on the supposition that the spiritual sense has been awakened,
increased activity in that innate aptitude truly to respond to the
demands of the Author of their existence. In making this supposi-

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tion I have used a word which, for those who read these remarks, will, I trust, obviate any possible misapprehension of the meaning of the term evolve as applied by me to the sense of duty. In accounting for the first manifestation of this sense in human beings, what I have asserted is, not that it was generated by the consciousness of sin, but that it was awakened by the perception of a divine commandment, that incipience in moral activity, thereby brought about, not only preceded their transgression but rendered it possible, and that accordingly the tree of whose fruit they ate was to them from the first the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.