JOURNAL OF
THE TRANSACTIONS
OF
The Victoria Institute,
or
Philosophical Society of Great Britain.

EDITED BY THE HONORARY SECRETARY,
CAPTAIN FRANCIS W. H. PETRIE, F.G.S., &c.

VOL. XXIII.

LONDON:
(Published by the Institute).
INDIA: W. THACKER & Co. UNITED STATES: G. T. PUTNAM'S SONS, N.Y.
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: G. ROBERTSON & Co., Lim.
CANADA: DAWSON BROS., Montreal.
PARIS: GALIGNANI.
1890.

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ORDINARY MEETING.*

The President, Sir George G. Stokes, Bart., M.P., P.R.S.,
in the Chair.

The Minutes of the last Meeting were read and confirmed.

The following Paper was then read by the Author:—

THE MEANING AND HISTORY OF THE LOGOS OF PHILOSOPHY. By the Rev. H. J. Clarke.†

Efforts, made in times remote, to discover some fundamental principle which should account for all things but itself, thus unifying the sum total of facts and phenomena and harmonising their inter-relations, originated an intellectual pursuit which, if defined with reference to its purely scientific aim, and apart from ethical considerations, may be called Aetiology, but which the ancient Greeks significantly named Philosophy; that is to say, the study of Wisdom undertaken lovingly, and therefore with the intention of following it up as far as the utmost attainable limit. Not, however, at the fundamental principle did the votary of Wisdom propose to himself to rest from his labours: the ultimate truth, if he believed he had reached it, established itself in his intellect as a germinating principle, a prolific seed of thought, pregnant, as it seemed to him, with innumerable interpretations of

* March 4, 1889.
† Vicar of Great Barr, author of The Fundamental Science.
phenomena and developments of theory. With it no less comprehensive answer to philosophic inquiry could in his judgment bear comparison: it was at once an absolutely conclusive and an endlessly suggestive word; it was pre-eminently the Logos.

These preliminary remarks may suffice to elucidate the significance which this well-known term, destined to hold for ever an imperial rank in philosophic terminology, assumed when first utilised in the most notable of the early and necessarily rude attempts to construct on a stable foundation, and in place of poetic myths, a scientific cosmogony.

Heracleitus, a native of Ephesus, who flourished towards the end of the sixth or early in the fifth century before the Christian era, in figuring to himself the primordial condition of the universe, conceived a notion which, although conjectural and loosely formed, foreshadows,—dimly, it is true, yet still perceptibly in certain salient features,—theories that date from modern astronomical and chemical discoveries. Thales had imagined Water to be the primal element; by Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaximenes this rank was assigned to Air; but, according to Heracleitus, cosmic evolution has for its point of departure something which may be represented as Fire.* The object I have in view has left me free from the obligation to give a systematic and complete exposition of his philosophy. Indeed, to attempt this would be to undertake a by no means easy task; for the extant sayings ascribed to him, being few and fragmentary, and having probably, in the process of citation, been to some extent accommodated to doctrines either held or repudiated by the writers in whose works they appear, and, moreover, not being always perspicuously worded, may be compared to pieces belonging to a difficult Chinese puzzle, some of which have been mutilated, while other pieces are altogether wanting. He seems, however, to have conceived of the Cosmos as having been evolved out of an ethereal kind of igneous vapour.† How the condensation was effected which is necessarily assumed to have taken place in the process, namely in the transformation of the igneous vapour into the liquid and solid materials that constitute the earth, and into the atmosphere which covers it, and how, on the other hand, the rarefaction which is observable in numberless phenomena may likewise be accounted for,

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* Clem. Alex., Cohort., 43: "τοῦτο τοι καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ τῶν Ἡράκλειτον, τὸ πῦρ ὡς ἄρχεινον σέβοντες, πιπόνθαιν."  
† Aristot., De Anim., i. 2, 19.
consistently with a theory which presupposes an original
tendency to condensation,—these are questions with which,
apparently, he did not see his way to deal.* But respecting
the transformation, considered as a fact, he entertains no
doubt; and, indeed, he takes for granted that even those
substances which yield no sensible evidence of an igneous
nature are not only of igneous origin, but reducible to their
original form. Each has its equivalent in the igneous element,
its price, so to speak, just as goods may be exchanged for
gold and gold for goods.† Thus, putting sensible manifesta-
tion out of view, and limiting his conception to a certain
constitutive principle, operative in all things and imperishable,
he applies to the Fire the epithet ever-living. The sensible
flame, it is true, at one time flashes up, at another dies down;
and this, we must of course presume, is what he means when
he represents the Fire as both kindling and extinguishing
itself. Accordingly, in these phenomenal changes he sees no
fluctuations of energy in the fundamental element, but, on
the contrary, illustrations of punctual conformity to settled
laws: in every igneous flow and ebb, as it appears to him,
strict measure is observed.‡

Further, he makes it evident that he imagines the material
whence the Cosmos derives its existence to be not only an
essence of extreme tenuity, but even of a psychic nature. This,
in fact, he plainly teaches, terming the First principle “the
Evaporation,” and at the same time identifying it with Soul,§
a representation which implies that, in evolving psychic life
it exhales its pure substance into material more remotely
derived from its original self, and in which its proper attributes
come into association with such as are comparatively ignoble.
Such, apparently, is the force of the word evaporation, as
Heracleitus used it. We may be sure it was not suggested by
a belief that aqueous vapour was present in the original igneous
and gaseous element; for he expressly taught that water is the
death of the soul,|| and that the absence of moisture is indis-
pensable to psychical perfection, and its excess, as in intoxica-
tion,* destructive to reason. But, as presupposing mobility in an all-pervading essence, it has an important significance; it suggests incessant movement and activity, the uncontrollable restlessness of a ubiquitous energy, in presence of which there is no possibility of an existing state, nowhere permission to enjoy one moment's absolute repose, and no condition can be named as that which is. The term, indeed, is one that science cannot recognise; and philosophy knows it no more, but it may remind us that the doctrine which adopted it gave prominence to the truth that all nature is, as it were, an ever-flowing stream, or, as we might represent it, a perpetually dissolving view. Heracleitus, however, in his philosophical contemplation of the changing scene, could not but discern more than can at any time be the object of sensuous perception; could not but perceive that Being must somehow underlie Becoming; Order, endless strife; and Harmony, the seeming coincidence of incompatibilities. Imagining an ever-living Fire, he was under the impression he had now discovered the object of his search; and this, regarded as containing potentially all those orderly developments and activities which, as he believed, constitute the universe, he named the Logos.†

But obviously the name, as thus applied, denotes no property or function which belongs to intellect; nor can it signify an individual subject to which intellect may be ascribed. Rather, it indicates a materialistic conception of the source of intellectual energy, an inability to perceive that the nature and attributes of Mind of necessity transcend the conditions of existence to which all such things are subject as have extension in space. In this point of view the Logos of Heracleitus claims attention as being a very ancient import into a species of philosophy not yet antiquated, but still held in considerable repute, whose cardinal doctrine has found memorable expression in the following words:—"Matter may be regarded as a form of thought; thought may be regarded as a property of matter. Each statement has a certain relative truth; but, with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is in every way to be preferred."‡ Here I am forcibly reminded of the cosmogony of Heracleitus,

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‡ Huxley, "Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews," p. 160.
which I regard as a striking type of systematised materialism. To him the Logos represented no over-ruling Mind; it simply denoted material subject to certain dynamic tendencies, exhibiting Unity, Law, and Order. It signified, not intellect, properly speaking, but merely the fundamental principle of the intelligible. Thus conceived it was termed common (κοινός),* as being relative to common apprehension. By the Logos, Heracleitus appears to have meant the comprehensive rationale of all things; with this word, in effect, as a title he published that account of itself which, as he believed, the universe, considered simply as an object of investigation, renders to the enlightened and successful philosophical inquirer.

Passing on from this physical conception of the Logos we come to a system of philosophy in which materialism assumed a form still more pronounced, but in which, if for a moment we limit our view to the material universe, we shall not fail to perceive in one important respect, I venture to think, a further and unmistakable step in the direction of a truly scientific conception of the constitution of nature. I allude to the theory originated by Leucippus and elaborated by Democritus, which resolves all space-occupying bodies into ultimate atoms, and postulates a void wherein these may find room for the movements they must needs execute in effecting their manifold combinations. In the immense region of physical exploration these last-named theorists have distinguished themselves not a little as pioneers. Physics, however, are but a subject realm in the imperial domain of philosophy. If then, pursuing the course of investigation on which we have started, we look about for some advance in philosophic thought, our attention is now claimed by a doctrine which, so far as it differs as a philosophy from those which preceded it, will, although associated with a loosely speculative and utterly untenable physical theory, commend itself to all earnest thinkers, except such as prefer the materialistic to the spiritualistic terminology.

The Pythagoreans had been inculcating the doctrine that the First Principle, which they appear to have conceived as a cause at once material, formal, and efficient, is Number. In its fundamental conception this was their God. But the fundamental conception of Number is not reached until the

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*Sextus adv. Mathemat., vii. 133.
object of thought has become something absolutely unconditioned, save in respect to the conceivableness of repetition. In the perception of relativity in this solitary particular the Unit as such is recognised, and thereby is opened up a way for the intellectual representation of an unlimited diversity of arithmetical complications. Thus it will be evident that, in the process of philosophic analysis which these teachers adopted, the universe resolves itself ultimately into the emptiest of all conceivable abstractions. Upon this they had lighted in their laborious inquiry after a cause which should account for all things, and, believing they had found the object of their search, they had gone no farther afield. But in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, the lurid fog, in which conjectures both inanely metaphysical and grossly materialistic, as it were cold vapour charged with heavy clouds of smoke, had veiled in deep obscurity the Fundamental Cause, begins to roll away. A gleam of sunny, but still chilly, light is visible in the distinction he expressly draws between Mind and Matter, and, in his assumption, that the former gives the impetus from which proceeds all movement, and at the same time knows what it is doing.* His doctrine is, as will be seen, not that matter is a form of thought, or that out of it, in process of molecular development, degrees and kinds of psychic energy evolve themselves, and therefore were potentially inherent in it, but that it is essentially inert, that its inertia is overcome by something of a nature higher than its own, and that here is to be found the ultimate account of every indication of design, method, and arrangement which may be discovered in the universe. Accordingly, his Logos, although not like that of Heracleitus, undistinguishable from matter; virtually comprises the supposition that it exists. But seeing that the term, if comprehensively applied in strict conformity with the requirements of his speculations, would not have been sufficiently explicit for his purpose, he avails himself of another in naming the Psychic Essence, and one which brings out clearly into view the chief distinctive feature of his system: he calls it Nous (νοῦς),† that is, Mind or Intellect.

Now, things, considered as significant, thereby admit of being designated words. But if, in sober earnest and with philosophical intent, an intellect applies its own distinctive

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* Aristot., De Anim., i. 2, 17.
† Plato, Cratylus, 400 A: "τὴν τῶν άλλων ἀπάντων φύσιν οὐ πιστεύεις Ἀναξαγόρη νόον τε καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι τῆν διακοσμοῦσαν καὶ ἔχουσαν."
title to anything objective to itself, it proves indisputably that in that object it perceives a person. The conception of personality may even, it is true, in such a case be feeble and loosely formed, and it may be quickly crowded out by notions amid which it cannot find a place; but, respecting the thought which deliberately selected and appropriated the term, no doubt can be entertained. I therefore hold it idle to discuss the question whether the assumption, otherwise obviously reasonable, that the Nous, as conceived by Anaxagoras, denotes a personal Being, is warranted by the general tenor of his speculations. Physics, however, having engrossed his attention to the virtual exclusion of Ethics and the absorption of energies that might have been more usefully employed, his nascent theism remained undeveloped, and in the elaboration of a system of philosophy it availed him nothing. The region he essayed to cultivate he left, as he had found it, for the most part a desert. He had opened a mine without being aware of it; he had picked up and utilised a lump of precious ore, and, having unconsciously facilitated future explorations, had departed, to be followed, in due time, by seekers destined to prove somewhat more successful in extracting treasure from the vein of hidden wisdom.

Indeed, after no long interval; for in Greece a fruitful and ever-memorable development of the theistic conception soon began to manifest itself in philosophic thought. It received, however, its originating impulse, not from physical but from ethical investigations. Preceding inquirers, in so far as they experimented in metaphysical analysis, had, for want of due knowledge of the conditions of thought, unwittingly constructed, for the bewilderment of themselves and of succeeding thinkers, labyrinths out of the terms they used, chiefly such words as represented elementary conceptions; they had failed to see their way to recognise philosophically both being and becoming, and had lost their road amid such antitheses as rest and motion. In these wearisome mazes some minds wandered idly, aimlessly, and without seeking to escape; and here, moreover, charlatans professing the dialectical art exhibited their ingenuity in bringing to confusion earnest efforts to arrive at truth. The aim of Socrates was thoroughly honest, intensely earnest, and profoundly practical. That he himself and his hearers might be sufficiently enlightened to perceive, and effectually moved by the desire to become, what it was, in the nature of things, fitting they should be,—this was the worthy object, this was the noble ideal which gave consistency, authority, and force to his words and to his actions. Hence,
not only had he at command, for the exposure of puzzle-headed sophistry, the resources of a clear and imperial intellect, but philosophy, to the extent to which it thenceforth bore the impress of his mind, was characterised by a splendour and a sublimity such as it had never manifested before.

Upon the specific characteristics of the philosophy of his illustrious disciple, Plato, I need not dwell: it may suffice if I call attention to the significance of his conception of an original and eternal Being, whose attributes he sums up in the designation "the Good," and in whose existence he finds an ultimate ground and unifying principle for those ideas which constitute the intelligible, and for their manifestations under the conditions of space and time. He thereby furnishes a weighty testimony to the immense superiority of the ethical method of carrying an investigation up to the Fundamental Cause. Yet it must not be overlooked that the epithet he thus applies does but reflect the notion he himself had formed of goodness,—a notion which had been, doubtless, in a measure stunted and distorted in the process of development by conventional maxims, and had not been determined by adequately expanded views of moral obligation and a proportionably deep sense of the need of inward purity, and which, therefore, left much to be desired. To what extent it may, in the range of indeterminate desire and aspiration, have transcended the ethical teaching on which it sheds a lustre cannot be known; but beyond that limit it offers to the grasp of thought, and as the characteristic of a philosophy, nothing but shadow.

Further, it must be remarked that ideas and metaphysical conceits can never satisfy the demands of the rigorously inquisitive searcher after causes. But Plato has nothing better to offer, his inventive intellect having played him the common trick of forcing him to take unwittingly the subjective for the objective, a species of dialectical legerdemain which has often proved successful, but cannot in the end, when scrutinised attentively, and with due knowledge of the laws of thought, escape detection. But while to Ideas he ascribes reality, this his philosophy forbids him to concede to the vehicle of their sensible manifestation, which, as he conceives it, is ever becoming, never is. The intellect, however, of his pre-eminently famous pupil could not be satisfied without some definite conception of a really existent, although passively concurrent, material cause for all things of which the senses take account. Aristotle, accordingly, assumed the existence of something which he
designated λη. In this nondescript stuff or substratum the several specific things which are to arise out of it exist in the way of δύναμις, that is potentially, until their respective εἶδος, namely, their constitutive principles, which in themselves are purely intelligible forms, develop actual forms (μορφαί); and then, to the extent to which this change or movement has proceeded, they exist in the way of ἐνέργεια; that is to say, they have an effectual existence; and, in so far as anything has passed from the stage of the potential, which was one of privation (στέρησις), to that of the actual, the change which has taken place is its ἐνεργεία. For thus it has its due completion (τὸ ἐνεργεῖα), it has attained the end (τὸ τέλος) with a view to which it was designed. The originating intellect (νοῦς), which has determined the τέλος, and whose purpose, therefore, is the Final Cause, finds its sphere of operation in the formative process alone: it is not the author of the material in which it works.

Now this intellectual system, which, as we perceive, has been ingrafted on a defective theism, is without doubt ingeniously elaborate, its most conspicuous feature being a terminology which, like that of legal documents, shows a mind habituated to punctilious exactness in specification. Yet, after all, it does but represent a certain way of looking upon the phenomena of nature; it is the profound analysis of a superficial speculation; it accounts for nothing. And for a still more cogent reason it cannot be accepted, for it is committed to an assumption void of meaning. Manifestations which presuppose space are to be accounted for. If, then, it is to be assumed that suitable material exists, this must needs be conceived as occupying space; otherwise, the assumption is plainly gratuitous; the supposed material possesses no relevant property, and is in effect undistinguishable from the essence of the purely intelligible forms. But has it limits in space? The answer is, and of course must be, in the negative; otherwise, it contradicts the assertion that the material is absolutely formless. Again, if we propose to consider by what contrivance a boundless space-occupying medium may be so disintegrated as to allow mobility within itself, or how, even on the supposition that movement is possible, the system happens to have been so constituted as to prove available for the production of all natural phenomena,—a definition which, virtually excluding from the thing defined all indications of design, precludes the discussion, moves, in fact, the previous question; and then we learn that we are asked to yield assent to the unthinkable hypothesis that there is a kind of
substance which has no attributes whatever, something for which, whether we look below, within, or above ourselves, boundless possibilities can find no place.

Such, however, is the strictly logical representation of a hypothesis which obtained a secure and a very conspicuous position in that species of theistic philosophy which comprehends in an eternal duality the antithetical principles, Mind and Matter. The object I have in view requires that I should direct attention to this hypothesis only in so far as its association with the word Logos may help us to determine the philosophic import of the latter. Of all the schools of thought which arose under the spreading influence of outgrowths from Socratic teaching, or in which older philosophies, Socratically modified, made their appearance, the most pronounced in its ostensible repudiation of pure materialism is that which was founded by Zeno, of Citium, whose disciples, from the fact that they recalled to the public mind the porch in which he used to lecture, came to be known as Stoics. Unlike his earlier namesake, Zeno, of Elea, he seems to have had a profoundly earnest, practical aim, and, as was natural, the philosophy which took its rise from his teaching shaped itself into a rigidly-exacting ethical system. It was, in one point of view, antipodal to materialism; for its dominant ethical principle was contemptuous indifference to the conditions to which the experiences and operations of the spiritual element in man are subjected by its sensible environment. Man, as connatural with that Being who pervades and governs all things, was assumed to have within himself a sufficiency that may be found in acquiescent submission to the laws which his reason, duly exercised, acknowledges, and in apathetic inattention to all solicitations of opposing appetite, and all counsels of dissuasive fear. Now, I venture to think we shall be doing no injustice to the virtues of such Stoics as Epictetus if we take for granted, as assuredly we must, that the sort of apathy affected by the members of this school was, in its relation to life's busy cares and pleasures, a flattering ideal, much more largely productive of elevated moral precepts and choice aphorisms, and a transparently self-conscious dignity of deportment, than of "truth in the inward parts," or even of veritable illustrations of sublime indifference to surroundings. But what it immediately concerns me to remark is this, that a philosophy which referred the weary seeker after inward rest and peace to resources assumed to be discoverable in himself, and which thus, to all practical intents and purposes, assured him that he was potentially a god, allowed no place whatever for a worthy conception of the Almighty and Eternal Being.
Hence the inability of the Stoics to liberate effectually their theistic views from the traditional dualistic conception of origination, is sufficiently accounted for; it was congenial with the spirit of their religious teaching to continue to posit as first principles, Mind and Matter; the one the active and formative, the other the passive and receptive. And, by an admission they are constrained to make, still more evident is it rendered that the Logos, as it appears in their cosmogony, has not yet acquired that thoroughly comprehensive and absolute significance which could not be wanting if the application of the term were truly philosophical. The best reply they can make, when challenged to reconcile the existence of seeming blemishes and anomalies in the sensible world with the supremacy of perfect Reason, is the following unmistakably materialistic apology: “The artificer cannot change the nature of the material.”

To urge this plea is virtually to admit that the so-called Logos alone does not fully account for all phenomena. Further tendencies in the direction of materialism likewise find their interpretation in that ethical kind of egoism which constitutes the distinctive feature of the Stoic philosophy. A so-called God, who, regarded as a sovereign, was practically synonymous with Fate and universal Law in operation, and whose love, like that of Spinoza’s deity, was neither looked for nor desired, lacked those attributes which, from a practical point of view, may be considered indispensable to personality. Thus, the conception of such a being would naturally tend towards pantheism, and might easily degenerate into notions in which materialism would be developed and pronounced. In point of fact, a distinctly materialistic pantheism may be discovered at a glance, through the transparent language of the Stoics. The Deity, as conceived by Zeno, is Ether; that is to say, a kind of Fire which, reaching upwards and outwards in all directions beyond all bounds, is “circumfused from every quarter, girding and encompassing the universe.”

Thus is the teacher’s thought expounded by his disciple Cleanthes, who further says that “the world itself is God.” In strict conformity with this notion, human souls were represented as being parts (μέρη) of the divine essence, and portions torn off from it (ἀποσπάσματα). The term body (σῶμα) was applied indifferently to the formative power in nature and to the passive material, and it was assumed that,

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* Seneca, De Provid., 5, 9: “Non potest artifex mutare materiam.”
† Cicero, De Nat. Deor., i. 14.
‡ Ibid.
§ Epictet., Diss., i. 14, 6; and M. Aurel., ii. 4.
|| Sext. Pyrrh., iii. 38.
as "that which makes will come up close to something," namely, some material to which it is to give form, "it carries on its operations also by contact."* Body, in short, whether the term denoted the substance of the sensible world or that of its imagined soul, was understood to imply extension in space; and nothing was conceived as having real existence but such essence or material as admits of having its mode of existence in some way defined by the help of some mental picture.

But in the days when Stoic doctrine was still among the most potent of moral forces in the world of advancing thought and progressive culture, a new departure in the conception of the Logos gave a fresh stimulus to philosophic speculation. In the course of the first century of the Christian era certain notions which had been generated in the commerce that took place between Hebraic and Hellenic thought attained an exuberant development in the writings of an Alexandrian Jew of large gifts and liberal culture. A devout upholder of the authority of the oracular utterances of Moses and the Prophets, but a Greek in intellectual ethos and training, Philo sought to harmonise with his philosophic views the interpretation of those sacred Scriptures which he sincerely reverenced. The outcome of his efforts, however, it is no disparagement of his dialectical skill to compare to a mixture of oil and water. 't here was no possibility that intellectual energy and enthusiasm, together with eloquent facility in the use of a copious vocabulary, might render the product of an undertaking such as this either durable, or, indeed, profoundly lucid. He had hoped to produce a homogeneous whole, but he had attempted to combine incompatibilities; and therefore it was not to be expected that Philonism, if we may give his philosophy that name, would be a consistent and intelligible system, or would, otherwise than in his writings, long survive the mental operation by which it had been elaborated. But the majestic rank it has assigned to the Logos, and the significance of the attributes it has associated under this designation, constitute for its leading principles a claim to careful investigation.

Of the manifold effects of that bias which Philo's mind received from the fascinating study of the Greek philosophies, the most radically important in relation to his own was the deeply-rooted conception of an unoriginated substratum for all sensible existence,—a material devoid of quality and form. It is true, he in one place represents the Almighty as

being not only an Operative (δημιουργός), but also a Creator (κτίστης);* but it is easy to understand, in accordance with the tenor of his doctrine, that what he has in view is the creation, not of the material, but of the form. It would be gratuitous, therefore, to assume that here he contradicts himself. His deepest sense of what was right and fitting forbade him to conceive that, in the process of creation, God, who ranks alone in intellect and blessedness, had even touched the rude and confused material;† and therefore he dogmatically assumes the mediate operation of incorporeal powers.‡ For these a mind impregnated with Platonic notions was, of course, at no loss for a name: he called them ideas. Being Platonically conceived as having a subsistence independent of their contact with matter, they are not identical with the λόγοι εννοιας of Aristotle,§ which were, in fact, but physical properties, considered as accounting for phenomena. He does, however, name them λόγοι as well as ἰδέαι, and in their intermediate agency he finds, in his allegorical application of Scripture history, an interpretation of the angelic apparitions therein recorded. The atmosphere, however, in his imagination, contains and actually nourishes innumerable unseen beings of a psychic nature,|| some of whom may on occasions manifest themselves to mortals in dreams or visions. The materialistic tendency which in this product of his lucubrations glaringly betrays itself, crops out, moreover, in the casual utterance of a distinctly pantheistic thought no less at variance with his ordinary language; for he represents the Almighty as being Himself One and the Universe.¶ The fact is, vagueness and confusion were the inevitable result of his attempt to utilise Plato and the Stoics as expositors of Holy Scripture; and accordingly, as might have been expected, his speculations as regards the nature of the λόγοι vacillate between personal agents and forms of thought conceived as hypostatically real and objectively operative.

But it is not only in speculations which play fast and loose with archetypal ideas, and even virtually materialise them, that Philonism shows itself to have seceded from the fundamental principle of Platonism; its most striking distinctive

* De Somn., i. 13.
† De Victim. off. 13: “οὐ γὰρ ἐννοιας ἄνειρον καὶ πεφυσμένης ὦλης ψείμων τῶν ἱππευμάτων, καὶ μακάρων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀνάμμεσιν,” κ. τ. λ.
‡ Ibid.
§ De Anim., i. 1, 15. The λόγοι στηριματικοὶ of the Stoics are virtually the same dialectical abstractions, but regarded as productive energies, and at the same time as indicative of design.
|| De Somn., i. 22.
¶ Leg. Alleg. i. 14: “εἷς (sc. ὁ θεός) καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸς ὄν.”
feature is a peculiarity which remains to be noticed. We find the λόγοι subordinated to One who bears this title, and who, although himself subordinate to the Supreme Being, holds towards them the relation of Father, their existence and functions being in some way, vaguely indicated rather than scientifically defined, derived from and summed up in His. Their occupation is to minister to the souls of mortals who still suffer defilement from contact with the gross material of their bodies, and thus to promote their purification;† it is the privilege of those who have reached the highest degree of purification to hold immediate intercourse with Him. Naturally the intervention of a superior medium of illumination renders the presence of inferior media superfluous; therefore, when the Logos rises upon the mind, the light which shines from his angelic agents sets.† These, the several ideas, are of course manifold and partial: He is the Idea of the ideas,§ the archetypal Model, the archetypal Seal,‖ of which the visible Cosmos is the impress, and is thus Himself the purely intelligible Cosmos.¶ But an expressed idea may be contemplated simply as an idea, or as finding its expression: Philo, accordingly, recognises the Stoic distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός, namely the word implied in the indwelling thought and the word conceived as having its place in the vehicle of utterance, comparing the former to a spring, the latter to a stream.** Such then, briefly, is his conception of an ultimate Logos which is to account for all existent things inferior to itself, apart from nondescript material.

Fertilised, however, by the study of the Scriptures and of expository lore, it grew apace and spread out into speculations more luxuriantly fanciful than philosophically compact. Very remarkable, therefore, are the coincidences that may be observed in respect to certain titles and functions of the Logos between Philonism and a philosophy of which it knew nothing, but in which alone is to be found the true Wisdom. In the former the Logos appears as the Firstborn †† and the Image of God,‡‡ the Image after which man was created.§§

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* De Somn., ii. 28: "πατήρ λόγων ἵππων.
† De Somn., i. 12.
‡ De Somn., i. 13.
§ De Migr. Ab., 18.
¶ De Opif. Mund., 4; and De Somn., i. 32: the Logos is the κόσμος νοητός.
** De Migr. Abr., 13.
†† De Confus. Ling., 28.
‡‡ De Monarch., ii. 5; and De Opif. Mund., 8.
.§§ Quis Rer. div. haer., 48; and De Opif. Mund., 6.
Imitating the ways of his Father, he formed such and such species, looking to his archetypal patterns.* His titles include also Mediator,† Advocate,‡ and High Priest;§ and he is ever the Suppliant|| to the Immortal on behalf of the mortal creation, the Ruler’s Ambassador to the subject people. Such is the language of a thinker who was evidently very much in earnest, but quite unconscious of the real import of those words and phrases in which he was anticipating a revelation of truths that were far beyond the range of his speculations. If it be accounted prophetic, and I see no reason why it should not, it may remind us of the saying of a certain high priest who, in expressing his opinion that it was expedient that one man should die for the people, uttered, as we are well assured, a prophecy,¶ but unquestionably was far from being aware of the true drift and bearing of his words. That Philo, however strikingly his language may have touched the truth at certain points, knew not what he was saying, is made apparent by a passage in which, after representing the Divine Word as delighting in and priding himself upon the work of mediation which has been assigned to him, he puts into his mouth the following remarkable words:** “And I stood between the Lord and you, being neither unoriginated as God, nor yet originated as you are, but midway between the two extremes, as hostage to both; to the Progenitor, for security that the race shall never wholly fall away and revolt, having chosen disorder instead of order; to the offspring, for a warranty of hope that the merciful God will never overlook his own work. For I am about to proclaim the conditions of peace from God, who has decreed to put an end to wars, being ever the guardian of peace.”

In this philosophy the Mediator finds his place and occupation in a chasm over which no human mind can pass; and thus, although his functions render possible communication between God and man, his person separates the one from the other, and cannot properly be designated by either title. He is not God and man, he is neither God nor man. The truth is, the Philonic Logos is the personification, or quasi personification, of the sum-total of the purely intelligible under a

† Quest. in Ex., ii. 68: “Dei Verbum . . . mediator,” etc.
‡ De Vit. Mos., iii. 14: παράκλητος.
§ De Gigant., 11: ἀρχηγός.
|| Quis Rer. div. hær., 42: κρίτης.
¶ John xi. 49-52.
** Quis Rer. div. hær., 42.
limited aspect. In it the conception of a universe conditioned by time and space is converted into an objectively real idea, and then credited with a certain ministerial and subordinate power of expressing itself in pre-existent material. Its farthest confine is a limit beyond which nothing can be known, except that something exists which admits of no intellectual representation. Excluding from the conception of the Deity everything but being, Philo affirms that God, namely, *That which is,* considered as being, is not to be reckoned among the things which have *relation to something,* and even goes so far as expressly to deny that He has any *quality.* Thus, as in that conception of matter which he had adopted from earlier speculations, he shows himself unaware that the separation of substance and attribute can only have place in the way of logical distinction; and, indeed, he lays himself open to the charge of inconsistency in characterising the Almighty as good, wise, and so forth. This error, however, determined his conception of the Logos, whom, accordingly, he regards as an inferior being, qualified by limitations and conditions to hold relations with the finite and changeable; in some sense God, it is true, yet not essentially one with the Father, but *a second God.* In short, his philosophy betrays,—although it thereby shows a sort of hesitating feebleness in its inevitable collision with his religious ethos,—a tendency to Agnosticism.

But while philosophers still found absorbing occupation in the task of intellectual world-production, and for the needful agencies and material went on drawing *ad libitum* from the copiously supplied store of intellectual abstractions, a few unlettered men, predestined to take the lead in introducing a novel culture of the highest kind for both head and heart, were, as the event has proved, more profitably employed. One among them Who, by His words and deeds, had acquired dominion over their spirits, and Whom they followed as disciples in wondering awe, was directing their aspirations to eternal life and glory by teaching them to humble and deny themselves. His bearing was that of a King of men; but, as a subject, He ministered and served. At length His patient endurance of an excruciating death, followed by an astonishing revival, and not long afterwards by a marvellous disappearance of unmistakable significance, having completely

* De Mutat. Nom., 4: "τὸ γὰρ ὃν ᾧ ὃν ἐστιν οὐχὶ τῶν πρὸς τι." 
† Leg. Alleg., i. 13 and 15. 
‡ Quest. in Gen., ii. 62.
opened the eyes of His faithful adherents to the meaning of His transient apparchion in this visible world, they became fully conscious that the life they now realised in their magnificent hopes,—a life incomparably more exalted than that of flesh and blood,—had been imparted to them by the self-sacrificing Love which had revealed itself through Him, and was the fundamental principle of His unique authority over all flesh. Had they not, then, sufficing reason for the belief that they owed to it also their lower and provisional life,—that, in short, this same self-sacrificing Love is the Author of life in its several grades and stages, and of the manifold conditions of its manifestation,—is the Energy whereby the universe was originated, and has been, and ever will be, governed and preserved? This was their firm belief; and, as will easily appear, if the facts which warrant it are once admitted, they reached it by a route much more direct than any upon which philosophers had ever lighted in their endeavours to arrive at stable conclusions: it was involved in their intuition of the essential attributes of Him in whom they perceived the Life; they came to it, or rather it came to them, by revelation.

A revelation, however, which, as this did, quickly spreads, and a spiritual power which brings beneath its sway, as time goes on, innumerable varieties of intellect and culture, must soon invade the realms of philosophic thought, and there effect at length a world-wide revolution. Near the end of the first century, if not before, the inevitable invasion commenced, and its progress from that time to this has been a continued illustration of the well-known Scripture saying, "The foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men" (1 Cor. i. 25, R.V.).

In the appointment of a visible leader of the expedition the Divine choice fell upon a man who had been prepared for the task by no dialectical training and no literary culture: his special qualification was the soul of a philosopher, but this he possessed in a superlative degree. In the original band of select disciples there was one whose habit and tone of mind were such as rendered him, above the rest, susceptible of sympathetic touch with the unfathomable thoughts and boundless purposes of the mysterious Teacher; in which respect, perhaps, though not in others, he may be likened to the Apostle who was "born out of due time." For the specific work in question, however, the chosen instrument was the disciple whom Jesus loved, the Apostle John, in whose writings we find statements virtually challenging for
the doctrine they propound a comparison with all speculative efforts to discover first principles, and implicitly asserting that it is the true Philosophy.

In his visits to Ephesus, where he must have had opportunities of conversing with philosophers, both Hellenic and Hellenistic, including probably not a few Alexandrian Jews, St. John could not have failed to become familiar with the term Logos in its philosophic application. With a thorough grasp of its significance, and, may we not also say? with some presentiment of the immeasurably important consequences of its evangelical appropriation, he took, so to speak, possession of it for the service of that Truth which he had been commissioned to proclaim, and to which it rightfully belonged. Thus, then, we may imagine him to be speaking, as the bearer of a message to the multitude of wandering seekers after Truth, "That which, in your search for an intelligible originating principle, you fancy in your ignorance you have discovered, that which under this impression you have named the Logos, that Being whom you have long been groping after in the dark, Him declare I unto you."

The Logos having been reclaimed from fruitless speculations and installed in its proper place, the exposition of the term distinctly meets each of the four queries which etiological inquiry had devised in formulating its demands. For if it be asked what are respectively the efficient, formal, material, and final causes of all things conditioned by time or space, St. John replies, "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things had their origin through Him, and apart from Him not even one thing originated that has had an origin" (John i. 1-3*). And St. Paul, who, if the term Logos had found a place in his philosophy, would, it is evident, have made it the subject of similar predicates, virtually amplifies and completes the answer in the words, "In Him was the universe created, namely, the things in the heavens, and the things upon the earth, the visible and the invisible, whether thrones, whether dominions, whether principalities, whether authorities, through Him, and with a view to Him, the universe has been created, and He Himself is before all, and in Him the universe subsists" (Coloss. i. 16, 17*). In these philosophically-worded

* I have given, as I believe, a close and exact translation of these passages, but have substituted philosophically significant equivalents for certain words which appear in the A.V.
Meaning and History of the Logos of Philosophy.

Expositions of the only cosmogony that is entitled to be called profound, the Cosmos, now at length ascribed to the true Logos, is in all respects accounted for. It is the effect of His eternal power and divinity. Its form is the unfolding of His mind. Its material is equally His creation, for until creative energy began to operate through Him nothing was in existence but the Godhead. Lastly, the purpose for which it exists is the endless revelation of the glory that was latent in His ineffable goodness and grace. Therefore, as will now be seen, the revealed Logos, assumed to be the last word that may be hoped for by the aetiological inquirer, leaves nothing unaccounted for, save that for which, it is evident, no cause can ever be assigned, namely, the existence of the One Cause that had no beginning, the Being Who is because He is.

In the course of this historical sketch I have found occasion to draw attention to the comparative value of the ethical method of getting at a conception of the First Cause: what we have now under contemplation is such an illustration of the superiority of this method as, I may be permitted to say, leaves nothing to be desired. You will see, therefore, what I mean when I ask you to observe the philosophic import of the statement that "the Logos became flesh" (John i. 14: "ὁ λόγος σάρκις ἐγένετο"). It is assumed that a type of character, whose nature and property, as manifested in the life of an individual Man, is to sacrifice self in well-doing, has been from everlasting, and that, through the operation of a power inherent in it, all origination and movement are effected. The philosophy which the revelation of the Logos teaches we truly understand when our hearts confess the immediate influence of this fundamental and all-sufficing Power, the primal and indissoluble Life. In life-giving, hope-inspiring, regenerative experiences is made known the true secret of that authority to which unconscious nature yields a never-waverering obedience, and which, as time goes on, is overthrowing and demolishing those baseless speculations wherein Creator and creation are confounded, and is absorbing, slowly indeed, but surely, every realm of thought into the Kingdom which shall have no end.

The President (Sir G. G. Stokes, Bart., M.P.).—I am sure all will join in thanking Mr Clarke for his interesting paper (cheers). It is now open for any one to offer remarks thereon.
Mr. R. Niven.—May I ask for information (I am not wishing to take a hostile view) on what grounds you would justify the reassuring statement which occurs in the last sentence of the lecture, "the true secret of that authority to which unconscious nature yields a never-wavering obedience, and which, as time goes on, is overthrowing and demolishing those baseless speculations wherein Creator and creation are confounded, and is absorbing, slowly indeed, but surely, every realm of thought into the kingdom which shall have no end"? Does not that, in view of the state of modern thought, whatever it is called, or modern science, seem rather at variance with the actual fact?

The Author.—I admit, of course, that in the progress of that absorption there are fluctuations,—the progress is not steady; yet still I cannot myself but believe that the process of absorption is going on,—that fundamental Christian principles are gradually transforming scientific conception.

Mr. Niven.—Does not it rather seem as if Christian apologists, as I suppose they would still be called, have been obliged, in view of recent supposed discoveries, to form new theories, and theories that would not have been held by old Christian authorities, to govern supposed new facts, and that you can hardly say, that being the state of things, that the Christian position is actually at this moment (whatever it may do ultimately) absorbing these new schools?

The Author.—By the Christian conception I mean the fundamental Christian conception; but it seems to me to be embodied in the word "Logos." Of course, so long as philosophy is infected by materialism, there remains something which still has to be transformed into the Christian conception; but I believe myself that the Logos (that is to say, the true conception of the first principle of all things) is so transforming scientific conception that in the end materialism will be abandoned,—it will be a thing of the past. I think that change has gone on to some extent already in this country and in Germany, where, I think, the spiritual view of origination is powerful.

Mr. Niven.—I suppose you admit that the great representatives of scientific thought, or at least three of the greatest representatives, have been Darwin, Tyndall, and Huxley. Would you kindly show me in what degree this conception has transformed or even affected their conception?
The Author.—I admit that it has not produced any sensible effect upon their conception. No doubt there are scientific men who call themselves agnostics, and who do not, perhaps, hesitate to admit that they are materialists, or adopt materialistic language. That I admit; but I think there is not in it so much of what is called scientific thought as there is philosophic thought.

Mr. Niven.—I thought you implied rather the reverse.

The Author.—I believe Christian thought will transform philosophic thought and render it fundamentally Christian in the end; but the process is going on slowly.

Mr. P. V. Smith, LL.M.—Whatever opinion we may have of the justice or correctness, or immediate relation of the prophecy with which the writer has concluded the paper, we must all feel grateful to him for the very able and interesting way in which he has traced the difficulty of the idea of the Logos and the ultimate completion of a system of Christian philosophy given us by the writings of St. John. He has alluded to the two distinct meanings of the word Logos in the original Greek, which are expressed by the epithets αὐτοθεος and προφητικός; the former meaning corresponding to our word reason or intellect, and the latter to speech or utterance. Now, it is quite clear that those two meanings are, to a certain extent, distinct. On the other hand, they are naturally combined, and are almost necessarily united in some way, or other in thought. I think that natural and necessary union is shown by the mere circumstance that in so clear and precise a language as Greek the same word is used with both meanings. At the same time, however, I think on the whole we must come to the conclusion that in philosophic thought the word is very rarely, if ever, used in both senses in an equal degree or intended to express both meanings together, or, at any rate, in the same proportion, and I think we shall see from a study of Greek philosophy (and this paper has shown it) that the Greek philosophers formed their conception of Logos almost entirely in connexion with the former meaning—viz., the meaning of intelligence or reason, and that they did not regard it as involving the idea of utterance, or the revelation of the Divine Being. On the other hand, amongst the Jewish writers we find this latter idea prevailing to the exclusion of the former. "By the word of Jehovah" (lxx., τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου), says the Psalmist, "were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth"; and again, in the eighteenth chapter of the Book of
Wisdom, v. 15, there are these remarkable words: “Thine Almighty Word (ὁ παντοδυναμός σου λόγος) leaped down from Heaven out of Thy royal throne as a fierce man-of-war” (πολεμιστής). It is clear in both passages that the Logos is depicted as the exponent of the will of God. We find the same idea in the Targums, in which the Word (Heb. Memra) of God frequently stands almost for God Himself. It is said that “the Lord protected Noah by His Word when he entered the Ark”; that He made a covenant between Abraham and his Word”; that at Bethel, Jacob made a covenant “that the Word of the Lord should be his God”; and that Moses, at Sinai, “brought forth the people to meet the Word of God.” In the passage from the Psalms which I have quoted, there is clearly no impersonation of the word, and in the passage from Wisdom the language is probably to be taken as metaphorical, and not implying a personal Logos. Opinions, however, may vary as to this, as they may on the question whether wisdom, in Prov. i. and ix. and the λόγος in Heb. iv. 12, are intended to be personal or impersonal. The same doubt arises as to the Logos of Philo Judæus; but it is perfectly clear, when we come to his writings, that the Logos is now invested with the two meanings of Intelligence and Utterance. His Logos is, at the same time, an embodiment of Wisdom and Reason, and also an exponent of the will and power of God. The Jewish and Greek ideas are, in short, found united in him; but it was reserved for the inspired Christian writers to set forth the complete fusion of these two meanings in the only way in which such fusion was logically possible,—namely, by asserting the Logos to be an inherent portion or person of the Deity.

Mr. Niven.—I should like to make a few remarks in regard to some of the suggestions which the author of the paper has considered, which, if they should lead him in any instance to make a correction, may, I think, be of service. It seems to me, if I may say so, that one of the defects in the paper is this,—that it is couched too much in the words of an honest Christian advocate, who, from his point of view, really is hardly in a position to do justice to those ancient schools of thought; and if it would not occupy too much time, I would like just to refer to a few points, which it appears to me he has either not completely seen, or which, having seen, he has not done full justice to. The first remark I will make refers to page 255. I do not think that he does complete justice to Anaxagoras when he repre-
sents him as abandoning the moral line of reasoning which he introduced for the physical, and that in this he lost the opportunity of doing the good which he might have done by following up the ethical line of teaching. The author says:—"I, therefore, hold it idle to discuss the question whether the assumption, otherwise obviously reasonable, that the Nous, as conceived by Anaxagoras, denotes a personal being, is warranted by the general tenor of his speculations. Physics, however, having engrossed his attention to the virtual exclusion of ethics, and the absorption of energies that might have been more usefully employed, his nascent Theism remained undeveloped, and in the elaboration of a system of philosophy it availed him nothing. The region he essayed to cultivate he left, as he had found it, for the most part a desert." It is very remarkable that we can put our finger on a statement of Plutarch's that the celebrated statesman, Pericles, owed a great deal of his influence over the people to his acquaintance with and study of Anaxagoras. Plutarch distinctly states that he meditated on the teaching of Anaxagoras on the absolute reason, and that in that way he was able to bring his ideas before the people with such impressiveness and dignity in speaking that he was said to lighten and thunder like Jupiter. It, therefore, had its influence on this great statesman, and, through him, on the people, this philosophy of Anaxagoras, which, according to the author of the paper, was so fruitless of practical results. Then, at the foot of the same page, the author says, "The aim of Socrates was thoroughly honest, intensely earnest, and profoundly practical." I am glad to see that he does something like justice to Socrates. I think Carlyle, in dealing with Socrates, does not quite do him justice. He does not blame Socrates, but he seems to think that he did harm by attempting to break down old religious notions; but he could not avoid such a result. A man such as he was, when he spoke at all, must speak according to his own view, and I think the author, in what he has said of Socrates, has done him no more than justice. Speaking of Plato, he says, at p. 256, "He thereby furnishes a weighty testimony to the immense superiority of the ethical method of carrying an investigation up to the fundamental cause. Yet it must not be overlooked that the epithet he thus applies does but reflect the notion he himself had formed of goodness." Of course no one can apply that epithet, "the good," except in such a way as would but reflect the notion he himself had formed of
goodness. All a man can be expected to do is to be well in advance of, or in harmony with, the best ideas of his day. Plato had not got to the stand-point of people who consider the interests of the lower animals or slaves. That, of course, he was defective in; but I do not think that he is to be blamed for that; and I want to point out that his idea of goodness was really, to a very great extent, nearly the same as our own, and surely, to a great extent, the same as that of Christianity. The author explains that philosophers prior to Plato had all been explaining the origin of the universe on physical grounds. He himself says, "Let us declare the cause which led the Supreme Ordainer to produce and compose the universe. He was good; and He who is good has no kind of envy. Exempt from envy, He wished that all things should be as much as possible like Himself." That is surely a central attribute of the Divine Being—goodness. I think the words of the author, on page 256, admit of some modification: "Aristotle, accordingly, assumed the existence of something which he designated \( \delta \lambda \eta \)." But surely the author does not seek to distinguish Aristotle from Plato on that ground, for they both assumed that. One point the author omitted, I think, as regards Plato and Aristotle, is, that they both regarded matter as eternal; even Milton did this. I will pass over all I could say, for it would take me far too long to express my opinions on those matters in which I agree with the author in his admirable paper. I will next speak of the Stoics, to whom I think the author of the paper has not done justice. No doubt there was a great deal of, I will not say false profession, among the Stoics, but a great deal of inconsistency among them, as the author will admit there is among Christians and all religionists; but I think that the remark he makes towards the close of page 258 is too sweeping, viz.:—"Now, I venture to think we shall be doing no injustice to the virtues of such Stoics as Epictetus, if we take for granted, as assuredly we must, that the sort of apathy affected by the members of this school was, in its relation to life's busy cares and pleasures, a flattering ideal, much more largely productive of elevated moral precepts and choice aphorisms, and a transparently self-conscious dignity of deportment, than of 'truth in the inward parts,' or even of veritable illustrations of sublime indifference to surroundings." I maintain that Stoic philosophy is not fairly represented by Milton, it having produced some of the greatest men we have had on the face of
the earth. I say, too, not that Stoicism is equal to Christianity, but in some respects superior to some Christian types of character. The Christian can look forward, and does look forward, of course, if he is, in the true sense of the word, a Christian, to beatification, when he shall see God and shall have commune with Him in perfect bliss. He is certain of a hereafter. I do not say that the \textit{true} Christian is influenced by the desire of the attainment of any pleasure, however refined it may be. The best Christians, even humble people, have got into a much higher stage than that; but I say the prospect of future happiness is contained in the Christian conception, and I say it seems to me a higher revelation of the Divine nature in a man which enables him to say, like the Stoic Epictetus, “What can I, a poor lame old man, do but sing praises to God?”—looking to no future whatever,—to no such future as the Christian would; it seems to me to resemble the attitude taken by the author of the Book of Job, and that is about the highest conception of the moral position which is attainable by the human mind,—boundless submission to God for his own sake, without any reference to any sort of enjoyment, physical, moral, or spiritual. I do hope, if he can, that the author will reconsider what he says on the Stoics; I am greatly indebted to them myself, and if he can see his way to modify his statement about them, I shall be glad. The next point to which I will refer is half-way down page 259, where the author says, “A so-called God, who, regarded as a Sovereign, was practically synonymous with Fate and universal Law in operation, and whose love, like that of Spinoza’s deity, was neither looked for nor desired, lacked those attributes which, from a practical point of view, may be considered indispensable to \textit{personality}.” I should like to say that I had the same opinion, until within the last year and a half, of Spinoza, and of what he says of the attitude of a “true lover of God towards God,” as the author has; but I believe now that Dr. Caird was correct in saying, “I think Spinoza was not rightly understood,” and I do not know that he was rightly understood even by Goethe, when he considered that Spinoza’s “lover of God” did not really wish for love from God. I do not wish to go into that, but simply to invite the author, before he publishes this, to reconsider what he says on the subject of Spinoza.

The \textbf{Author}.—First of all in reference to the remarks which fell from the last speaker but one, I may say that in treating
the meaning of the Logos. I limited myself to an exposition of the philosophical import of the word. Of course I could not, having imposed that limitation on myself, say much in reference to the Logos Prophorikos; in fact, I could do no more than just allude to it, and I could not deal with the application of the word that might have been made had I enlarged upon the Alexandrian conception of a sort of person,—a quasi person,—named the Word of God as the instrument by which he had acted, and upon the fact that Philo had, in fact, identified the Logos under that conception with the Logos of the Stoics; that is to say, in so far as his philosophy was that of the Stoics. The word Logos, in its philosophical import, as it seems to me, is suggested by the derivation of the word. It comes from the Greek term meaning “to lay,” and that is used in the sense of to arrange with order and method. It implies, therefore, the rational arrangement of thought, and hence it comes to mean the account of a thing, or the rationale of it. In its first philosophical use it certainly did not imply the rationality of the Being to which the word is applied. The Logos of Heracleitus was not a rational being,—was not a person. That, I think, must be quite clear from various expressions which he has applied to it, which show that his conception of the Logos was thoroughly materialistic,—was not that it is itself possessed of reason, though it was the originator of psychic properties. It seems to me, therefore, that the word, in so far as it is to be treated as a term in philosophy, may be rendered “the account of the universe.” The object of all philosophers seems to be to account for phenomena which constitute the universe, and for all other things which they might conceive as existing, though not objective to the senses. In respect to the remarks of the last speaker, I may say I did not intend to depreciate Plato’s conception of goodness in my assertion that it was by no means a perfect conception. Of course it is not to be supposed that his conception could be perfect. It was determined in a considerable measure by the immorality which prevailed in his age and nation. It was a very noble conception indeed,—a wonderful conception,—if we bear in mind the time at which, and the circumstances under which, he lived. I was disposed to do full justice to him; I regard him as having been not only a large-minded man, but a true philosopher; but I could not help bearing in mind, at the time I was speaking of him, how far
his conception of goodness necessarily falls below that which we have acquired through the higher teaching that has come to us from above. I hope I did no injustice to the Stoics in the remarks I made in reference to their apathy. I called it an "affected apathy." I did not mean by that that the apathy was pure affectation. I rather intended to imply that their flattering ideal is, after all, above the reach of every human being—that no one can be absolutely indifferent to his surroundings, whatever he may profess to be. At this late hour, I think, I shall not be expected to enter into all the particulars to which my attention has been called, in respect of which explanations were asked.—indeed, it would be impossible for me to go over the ground in detail. If I have omitted anything to which my attention was called by either of the two speakers, I should be glad if they would mention it now; but I cannot think that I do, in any material respect, differ from either of them in regard to the statements I have made in my paper. My object was to show that we are indebted to the Christian Faith for the noblest conceivable conception, and for the noblest conceivable representation of the character of the First Cause; that we have a conception now, as we understand it, which is truly philosophical; and we may challenge, I think, any persons who have adopted any system of philosophy which does not fall in with the Christian system, to produce, in their exposition, a Logos which may be compared with ours (cheers).

The meeting then adjourned.

FURTHER REPLY BY THE AUTHOR.

In reference to matters touched upon in the course of the discussion which followed the reading of my paper, a few supplementary words from me will, I hope, suffice to justify the statements I have made and the opinions I have expressed.

My allusion to Spinoza was suggested partly by the tenor of his philosophy, and partly by reminiscences of explicit assertions which I had met with in his works.*

* As samples I may instance the following:—"Deus proprie loquendo neminem amat" (Eth., part v., prop. 17, coroll.). "Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amat" (Id., prop. 19). "Si rogæs : An Deus hunc non odio habeat, illum vero diligat ?... respondeo Quod non" (Epist. xxxvi.).
That the teaching of Anaxagoras had an ethical value I would not be understood to deny, nor do I doubt that in the words and actions of religiously disposed disciples it bore wholesome fruit. But I still hold it probable that the immediate product of his speculations would have been an intellectual system more truly philosophical and more extensively fruitful than he succeeded in elaborating, if his theistic conception had been determined by a deeper insight into ethical necessity than we are warranted in ascribing to him.

The writings of Plato not only give evidence of mental qualifications, both dialectical and literary, of a very superior order, but also, as it seems to me, bear witness to the introduction of an improved method of investigating the fundamental truth. His intellect, indeed, even thus aided, was doubtless hindered by an impenetrable veil from finding entrance into the Holy of Holies and beholding face to face the glory which is there revealed. It was given to him virtually to foretell what would befall the ideally Righteous Man, were He to appear; how, after suffering all kinds of outrages, He would be crucified.* But Plato comes far short of conceiving adequately either the character of such a man or the significance of his manifestation.

Among the Stoics were men who, with unquestionably honest purpose and nobly persistent courage, sought to realise the ideal in their own persons; but their conception of it was incompatible with that unselfconscious spirit of trustfulness in which souls, when quickened from above, wake up from the death of sin to the life of righteousness, and thankfully discover that their sins are forgiven. The righteousness aimed at by those dimly-enlightened votaries of wisdom was essentially inhuman; for the cost of acquiring apathy must needs be the extinction of sympathy. But this was not easily perceived when the choice appeared to lie between apathy and despair. Given a world in which to live is to suffer: how is its existence to be accounted for on the supposition that death ends all? To deal with this repulsive problem the Stoics resolutely braced their minds, and their Logos was the outcome of a desperate attempt to solve it. But the advent of the true Logos is the revelation of an eternal plan for opening up beyond the seeming final limit an endless life, and for making all things new.

* Repub., b. ii, ch. 5.