(Hear, hear.) Indeed, this Society is becoming well known in all the four quarters of the globe, and we may congratulate ourselves that our hopes for it are being realised. Its importance is shown in many ways; for instance, in India we see the natives drifting away from their old faith. Their old religion is slowly, very slowly, quitting them, and the question is, what they are to accept instead of it. They are willing to part with their old faith because of its want of suitableness to rational minds, but they must have something presented to them suitable to reasoning beings. We, of this Institute, say their alternative is very simple. They must either take refuge in scepticism, which will be most emphatically an atheistic scepticism, or they must, in some way or other, find a haven of refuge in the Christian Church. It must be one thing or the other. This Institute can, without the slightest narrow-mindedness or sectarianism, point out that the more rational way is belief in the truths of Christianity, instead of an acceptance of the unsatisfactory theories offered to them by the various forms of scepticism which even now have begun to show themselves among the natives of India. I think that this Institute may congratulate itself on having been marked out for a very important work, and I only trust that it will be able to go on with that work and prosper. (Hear, hear.) I have now to call on Mr. Blencowe to read his paper.

The following paper was then read by the author:—

THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION AS EXPOUNDED BY F. MAX MÜLLER IN THE “HIBBERT LECTURE” OF 1878, AND IN “CHIPS FROM A GERMAN WORKSHOP, 1867.” By THE REV. G. BLENCOWE.

THE subject I have now to bring before you is the Science of Religion as expounded by Max Müller in his Hibbert Lecture and in his Chips from a German Workshop. In these books we have some of the results of many years’ labour by one of the most profound students of language, who has unveiled many of the mysteries of Grecian mythology, and dug up the roots of a kindred mythology among the Aryans of India. We are greatly indebted to their learned author for the enlargement of our field of view, and for the ability he has given us of beholding our ancient relations, not as
they made war upon one another and carried on a process of mutual destruction, but as they were in themselves, in their thoughts and emotions; and especially as those thoughts and emotions were employed on the momentous question of religion.

We are glad to have the testimony of such an independent witness as language in proof of the primary dignity of man. Mr. Müller assures us that all the most ancient languages indicate a high degree of intelligence and culture, and that the most barbarous contain evidence of a much higher state from which they have fallen. By a parallel line of proof he shows that Fetishism has not been, and cannot have been, a primitive form of religion; but that, on the contrary, it is the lowest condition of degradation to which a religion can sink.

After clearing the way for his description of the Growth of Religion among the Aryans of India, by removing the false opinions which have been expressed concerning the origin of man and his advance from fetishism to the spiritual worship of the Living God, he proceeds to unfold his own opinions as to how, and in what form, religion began and grew among the people whose religious history he especially discusses. The sources of this history are the Vedas, which are “four collections of hymns respectively known by the names Rig-veda, Yagur-veda, Shâma-veda, Atharva-veda.” The quotations, however, are principally from the Rig-veda, because, “for tracing the earliest growth of religious ideas in India, it is the only important, the only real Veda. The Yagur-veda and the Shâma-veda may be described as prayer-books, arranged according to the order of certain sacrifices, and intended to be used by a certain class of priests.” The Rig-veda consists of ten books, and contains altogether 1,028 hymns, for which, on sufficient historic data, Mr. Müller claims an antiquity reaching up from 1200 to 1500 B.C., or from the time of Moses to Samuel. They are in ancient Sanskrit, which from several centuries before the Christian era has been an unknown language to the priests who used them; they have, nevertheless, carefully learned every word, every syllable, and every accent, according to the original form, although the whole is sound without meaning. To Western ideas and habits this seems to be a most precarious mode of preservation, but we are informed by Mr. Müller and other authorities that no syllable or accent has been lost.

In our author’s opinion the genesis of Aryan religion was on this wise. The fathers of the race saw the wide earth, the all-embracing sky, the bright and vivifying sun, the huge mountains, the brilliant day and sombre night; they heard
the thunder and felt the tempest; and in these physical objects and conditions they beheld a splendour, a magnitude, and a power, in the presence of which they became conscious of their own insignificance, and were consequently impressed by their grandeur with feelings of fear and awe. But, as they continued to observe and think, they learned that this which impressed them was only varying phenomena, which must have some real and permanent basis. Thus they attained to the persuasion that, beyond the tangible, semi-tangible, and intangible objects of sense, there was a superior being from whom all their excellence sprang. But they did not carry their generalisation so far as to conceive of one all-pervading substance or essence, manifested in the varied phenomena; nor were they able to construct a graduated hierarchy of gods, as did the Greeks, but for the time being gave to each one supreme honour and worship. Thus their religion became Henotheism, which, "after trying in vain to grow into Polytheism on the one side, or Monotheism on the other, ended by necessity in Atheism, or the denial of all the Gods."*

The work which Mr. Müller undertook was to trace the first signs of religious thought, and to mark its progress up to the consummation just expressed. And the importance of this work he thus declares:

"To my mind the great epochs in the world's history are marked, not by the foundation or destruction of empires, by the migrations of races, or by French revolutions. All this is outward history, made up of events that seem gigantic and overpowering to those only who cannot see beyond, or beneath. The real history of man is the history of religion: the wonderful ways by which the different families of the human race advanced towards a truer knowledge and a deeper love of God. This is the foundation that underlies all profane history: it is the light, the soul, and the life of history, and without it all history would indeed be profane."†

This we most fully believe, because the capacity for religion is the distinguishing peculiarity of man. But we are unable to follow Mr. Müller in his history for several reasons. First, we have no evidence from the Vedas of any commencement of religion—no proof that in the earliest times the writers of these hymns were without a god. He says:

"When man has once arrived at a stage of thought where he can call anything, be it one or many, God, he has achieved half his journey. He has found the predicate God, and he has henceforth to look for the subjects only to which that predicate is truly applicable."‡

But not only do we find the predicate, but numerous appli-

* Hibbert Lecture, p. 302. † Chips, pp. 20-1. ‡ Hibbert Lecture, p. 258.
cations of it all through the Vedic hymns. Secondly, we are unable to trace any chronological succession. Although he speaks of a diverse age, yet he seems only able to judge of the age by the contents, which, in a case like the present, is a mode of judgment utterly inadequate to the establishment of succession. The most diverse doctrines may have been propounded simultaneously, or in an order the reverse of that which is supposed. We have a much wider range of difference in doctrines at the present time, propounded by men all of whom claim to be Christian, than Mr. Müller has presented to us from the Vedas. Thirdly, we find a still greater difficulty, in that the Vedic worshippers are assumed to have started without the predicate God, and to have proceeded onward to a truer knowledge and deeper love of God, until they had perfected their elaborate ceremonial, fully evolved their doctrine, and thus had accomplished the whole journey. And yet the reformers, Zoroaster and the Buddha, made great strides in advance, by destroying the work of the Vedic singers, and bringing back the people from the regions into which they had wandered to the point from which they started—a simple worship of the one living God. That this was really the point from which they started will be seen from what follows:—

"I shall read you a few Vedic verses, in which the religious sentiment predominates, and in which we perceive a yearning after truth, and after the true God, untrammelled as yet by any names or any traditions."

Therefore, before a subject for the predicate, God, was found:—

"1. In the beginning there arose the golden Child—He was the one born lord of all that is. He established the earth and this sky;—Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

"2. He who gives life, He who gives strength; whose command all the bright gods revere, whose shadow is immortality, whose shadow is death;—Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

"3. He who through His power is the one King of the breathing and awakening world; He who governs man and beast;—Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

"4. He whose greatness these snowy mountains, whose greatness the sea proclaims, with the distant river—He whose these regions are, as it were, His two arms;—Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

"5. He through whom the sky is bright and the earth firm—He through whom the heaven was established, nay, the highest heaven—He who measured out the light in the air;—Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

"6. He to whom heaven and earth, standing firm by His will, look up, trembling inwardly—He over whom the rising sun shines forth;—Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

"7. Wherever the mighty water-clouds went, where they placed the seed
and lit the fire, thence arose He who is the sole life of the bright gods;—
Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

“8. He who by His might looked over the water-clouds, the clouds which
gave strength and lit the sacrifice; He who alone is God above all gods;—
Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

“9. May He not destroy us—He the creator of the earth; or He the
righteous, who created the heaven; He also created the bright and mighty
waters;—Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?” *

According to Mr. Müller, the Aryans at the beginning thus
knew God. But, although this was before they had given a
name to the Deity, they had a clear idea of the necessity
of sacrifice, and of the manner in which, on some occasions
certainly, and presumably in others, the Lord signified His
acceptance of sacrifice. There is also a distinct recognition
of the Creator as the righteous ruler, while several of the
verses can be best understood by a reference to facts recorded
in the first book of the Pentateuch, traditions of which were
preserved by all the ancient nations. The opening sentence,
as it seems to us, can only be explained by a reference to the
first promise, which Eve supposed to have been fulfilled when
she had “gotten the man from the Lord.” The prayer of the
ninth verse also is in harmony with the conditions of a people
whose fathers had been saved in the ark, and whose less
remote ancestors had witnessed, and in some sort experienced,
the chastisement of the dispersion.

We have another hymn addressed to the Creator under the
name of Varuna, of which Mr. Müller says:—

“We should look in vain in late Sanskrit works for hymns like the
following:—

“1. Wise and mighty are the works of Him who stemmed asunder the
wide firmaments (heaven and earth). He lifted on high the bright and
glorious heaven; He stretched out the starry sky and earth.

“2. Do I say this to my own self? How can I get unto Varuna? Will
He accept my offering without displeasure? When shall I, with a quiet
mind, see Him propitiated?

“3. I ask, O Varuna, wishing to know my sin, I go to ask the wise. The
sages all tell me the same: Varuna it is who is angry with thee.

“4. Was it an old sin, O Varuna, that thou wishest to destroy thy friend,
who always praises thee? Tell me, thou unconquerable lord, and I will
quickly turn to Thee with praise, freed from sin.

“5. Absolve us from the sins of our fathers, and from those which we
committed with our own bodies.” †

Of other hymns to Varuna, we are told:—

“The poet believes it; he not only believes, but he knows it, that all
good things come from above.

“Without thee, O Varuna! I am not master even of a twinkling of the

* Chips, i. pp. 29, 30. † Ibid. ii. p. 310.
eye. Do not deliver us unto death, though we have offended against Thy commandment day by day. Accept our sacrifice, forgive our offences, let us speak together again, like old friends.

"Hear this my calling, O Varuna, and bless me now; I call upon Thee, desirous of Thy help.

"Thou, O wise God, art the king of all, of heaven and earth; hear me on my path." *

These hymns Mr. Müller considers as among the earliest of the Veda, and we think, from their correspondence in substance and tone with their contemporaries, that his judgment is correct. By Abraham and his descendants we are able to trace the existence of similar knowledge of God through five preceding centuries. Abraham knew the Lord and worshipped Him before he was bidden by Him to go from his country. He found the King of Salem also to be a worshipper of the one living God, although called by a name which especially proclaimed His supremacy. In his sojourn in Gerar he saw another king who feared the Lord and wrought righteousness. And, about a hundred years afterwards, Isaac found king and people of similar character. And as late as the end of the life of Moses we find Balaam, although holding the truth in unrighteousness, yet knowing the Lord, acknowledging His supreme authority, having access to Him, and, however unwillingly, feeling himself bound to obey His word. During this period, in the cases above cited, the common idea of religion was "speaking together like old friends." The connection of sacrifice with forgiveness of sin is in full harmony with the Mosaic record, and is much more distinct than in the later hymns. All this looks like a common source, although the repudiation of such a common source is declared by Mr. Müller as a necessary qualification for the study of the science of religion.† We do not see how sacrifice can be accounted for as an act of worship but as coming from Divine appointment, and it is equally impossible to explain its prevalence but from the fact that it was a primitive institution, established before the various tribes commenced their wanderings. It is in this evidence of Aryan connexion with the one source of all true knowledge of God that we see no difficulty in accounting for the above doctrines at the beginning of their national life. And in the same way we account for so explicit a hope of personal immortality as that found in the following passages:—

"Where there is eternal light, in the world where the sun is placed, in that immortal, imperishable world place me, O Soma!  

* Chips, ii. p. 326.  
† Hibbert Lecture, p. 258.
"Where life is free, in the third heaven of heavens, where the worlds are radiant, there make me immortal!

"Where there is happiness and delight, where joy and pleasure reside, where the desires of our desire are attained, there make me immortal!"*

We agree with Mr. Müller in that "we can hardly think of Abraham or Moses as without a belief in life and immortality." But, if they had this hope, then their contemporaries and predecessors also had it; and we regard the evidence of its existence in the earliest generations of men as being equally full with that of many other important truths. We must remember that it can only be accounted for, at all, as a revealed truth. It is incapable of demonstration, and if philosophical speculation were able to present many reasons for human immortality, yet, as they would, after all, be only probabilities, so they could never lead to anything higher than a probable conclusion; from which we cannot account for the universal existence of this doctrine up to the first records of human thought. The absence of an explicit statement of this doctrine in the early chapters of Genesis has never seemed to us a proof of the absence or of the obscurity of this truth in the earliest times. For we cannot suppose that the brief record we have in the first five chapters of Genesis is all that was known of God and of His government of man till the time of Noah. What has been written has been written, not for their instruction but for ours, and, so far as we can see, with the special purpose of showing the continuous action of the Creator and Ruler with the earth and man from the beginning, and of establishing the identity and continuity of the race. Yet in this brief and specific record we have these three facts, which plainly imply this knowledge from the first: Adam was made in the image of God, which necessarily carried his immortality. The first death occurred under circumstances which, in the absence of immortality and of the knowledge of it as the birthright of every man, must have shaken to its foundation the Divine government, as revealing His impotence to protect His obedient servants. Then, the translation of Enoch, taking place, as it did, at a time when men generally were falling under the power of sensuality, and, as a consequence, were losing sight of the better life to come, was specially calculated to call them back to spirituality and God, by forcing the future life on their attention. And that, in the days of the Israelitish patriarchs, this was a fundamental truth is unquestionable from the simple and every-day mode of recording their deaths. They are not represented as ceasing

* Chips, i. p. 46.
to be, nor is there a grand flourish of some wonderful elevation which is to compensate for the loss of the wealth and honour they were leaving, but it is simply said “they were gathered to their people”—a record which satisfied their own hope and the desire of their mourning friends. Immortality, therefore, although more ostentatiously expressed by the Aryans, is not an advance beyond the Hebrew original, but shows an identity of source.

In the early times of Vedic religion, so far as diversity of time can be fixed, we find these facts in religious operation:—there is a Creator of the universe; He also upholds it, and He is the King under whose rule man is continually. Man has broken His law and is under His anger, but he can obtain forgiveness by means of sacrifice, and thus communion may be restored. That communion is such as exists between “old friends,” and may result in immediate blessing to the man while praying; and this prayer is so direct and personal, that he may offer it on his journey, and, after enjoying the blessing of God on earth, he may be raised by Him to immortality, in an abode of happiness and delight, where the “desires of our desire” are attained. It was from this knowledge that the Indian Aryans “advanced to their truer knowledge and deeper love of God,” by paying worship to the sun, the sky, fire, and sundry other material objects and forces. What this worship was may be learned by the following selections from “hymns addressed to individual deities whose names have become centres of religious thought and legendary traditions—deities, in fact, like Jupiter, Apollo, Mars, or Minerva—no longer mere germs, but fully developed forms of early thought and language.” Here, therefore, the other half of the journey has been achieved. Not only the predicate but the subject has been found.

"HYMN TO INDRA. Rv. i. 53."

"1. Keep silence well! we offer praise to the great Indra in the house of the sacrificer. Does he find pleasure for those who are like sleepers? Mean praise is not valued among the munificent.

"2. Thou art the giver of horses, Indra; thou art the giver of cows, the giver of corn, the strong lord of wealth; the old guide of man, disappointing no desires, a friend of friends:—to him we address this song.

"3. 0 powerful Indra, achiever of many works, most brilliant god—all this wealth around here is known to be thine alone: take from it, conqueror! bring it hither! Do not stint the desire of the worshipper who longs for thee!

"5. Let us rejoice, Indra, in treasure and food, in wealth of manifold delight and splendour. Let us rejoice in the blessing of the gods, which gives us the strength of offspring, gives us cows first and horses.

"6. These draughts inspired thee, O lord of the brave! these were vigour,
these libations in battles, when for the sake of the poet, the sacrificer, thou
struckest down irresistibly ten thousands of enemies.

"The next hymn is one of many addressed to Agni as the god of fire,
not only the fire as a powerful element, but likewise the fire of the hearth
and the altar, the guardian of the house and the minister of the sacrifice,
the messenger between gods and men:—*

"1. Agni, accept this log which I offer thee, accept this my service:
listen well to these my songs.

"2. With this log, O Agni, may we worship thee, thou son of strength,
conqueror of horses! and with this hymn, thou high-born!

"3. May we thy servants serve thee with songs, O thou granter of riches,
thou wholovessongs and delightest in riches.

"8. Thou art wise, and thou hast been pleased; perform thou, intelligent
Agni, the sacrifice without interruption, sit down on this sacred grass!"†

We confess that we are unable to see a truer knowledge of
God, or a deeper love to Him, in these hymns, which might
be multiplied if space permitted. All desire of friendly
relations is sunk in desire of cows, horses, and all other kinds
of wealth and splendour, while the god to whom these prayers
are addressed is degraded into one who is inspired with bravery
and strength for battle by the libations he had drunk. So
that, if the chronological order which is supposed were fully
established, yet the Veda would not exhibit the growth, but
the decay, of religion.

We are sorry that Mr. Müller at the beginning of the
Hibbert Lecture came to the conclusion that no definition of
religion could be given. After examining the definitions
given by Kant, Fichte, Schliermacher, Hegel, Comte, and
Feuerbach, he says:—

"There seem to be almost as many definitions of religion as there are
religions in the world, and there is almost the same hostility between those
who maintain these different definitions of religion as there is between the
believers in different religions. What, then, is to be done? Is it really
impossible to give a definition of religion that should be applicable to all
that has ever been called religion, or by some similar name? I believe it is,
and you will yourselves have perceived the reason why it is so. Religion is
something which has passed, and is still passing through an historical evolu-
tion, and all we can do is to follow it up to its origin, and then try to com-
prehend it in its later historical developments."‡

Such a definition as is here described, is impossible, in any
case. The design of a definition is to shut out all that is only
called, but is not in reality the thing to be defined. The
above process is a conglomeration, not a definition. Nor do
we see an insuperable difficulty in the number of species to be
included in the genus. Disease is varied, both in locality and
kind; but for this reason a physician does not refrain from dc-

* Re. ii. 6. † Chips, i. pp. 30-4. ‡ Hibbert Lecture, p. 21.
fining its nature; nay, he finds it necessary to define, that he may have an intelligent principle of practice; and in proportion to the accuracy of his definition will be the breadth and precision of his treatment. And so with religion, or any other thing of which we are making investigation. In this case, Mr. Müller treats religion as an entity which he has to trace to its source, and then come back and look at its later developments. How can he find it if he does not know what he is looking for? If he has not the idea or definition in his mind, the first question in the investigation is, What is religion? Had this question been plainly answered at the beginning, the whole discussion would have resulted in more definite conclusions than those at which he has arrived.

We are unable to proceed in this examination without a definition; and to obtain it we pursue the course recommended above. We go to the first man and see what it was in him, and we come down the long line of his descendants, and we see nothing in the whole survey to prevent us regarding religion as the obedient, submissive communion or fellowship of man with the Creator, Upholder, and Ruler of the universe. This is the religion which the most ancient Vedic hymns exhibit, which is shown in the aspirations of all nations, but which is imperfect in all cases, in proportion to the obscurity, imperfection, or perversion of the idea of the Creator. Sometimes Mr. Müller has this idea of religion before his mind, but more generally he seems to look upon religion as an apprehension of the Infinite. Thus, the fourth lecture commences with this statement of the case:—

“Let us clearly see the place from which we start, the point which we wish to reach, and the road we have to travel. We want to reach the point where religious ideas take their first origin, but we decline to avail ourselves of the beaten tracks of the fetish theory on the left, and of the theory of a primordial revelation on the right side, in order to arrive at our goal. We want to find a road which, starting from what everybody grants, viz., the knowledge supplied by our five senses, leads us straight, though it may be slowly, to a belief in what is not, or at least not entirely, supplied us by the senses—the various disguises of the infinite, the supernatural, or the divine.”*

Pursuing this course, Mr. Müller proceeds to find evidence of the infinite in the objects of sense, thus:—

“When we speak of the earth as something complete in itself, like a stone or an apple, our senses fail us, or, at least, the senses of the early framers of language failed them. They had a name; but what corresponded to that name was not finite or surrounded by a visible horizon, but something that extended beyond that horizon.”†

* Hibbert Lecture, p. 169.  † P. 177.
We beg to remind Mr. Müller that part of this is assumed; what evidence have we that the first name for the earth expressed anything more than what was perceived by the senses? And the remainder is here irrelevant, he was to find the idea of the infinite by the five senses only, and the first step goes beyond sensation. Immediately after, he says:

"It is not by reasoning only, as is generally supposed, that we know that there is an endless view beyond;—we are actually brought in contact with it, we see and feel it . . . we have before us, before our senses, the visible and the tangible infinite."

We demur to this, as contrary to all testimony of the senses, and as a result to be attained only by a process of reasoning which can never produce demonstration. And when the difficulty, which after the strong assertion yet seems to have remained, is evaded by saying, "Infinite is not only that which has no limits, but it is to us, and it certainly was to our earliest ancestors, that also of which we cannot perceive the limits," we must again say this also is irrelevant. That which was proposed was, to find the way by which the absolutely infinite one was perceived, directly or indirectly, by the senses. And to this end we do not advance a step by such statements as the following:

"The more we advance the wider, no doubt, grows our horizon; but there never is or can be to our senses a horizon unless as standing between the visible and finite on the one side, and the invisible and infinite on the other. The infinite, therefore, instead of being merely a late abstraction, is really implied in the earliest manifestations of our sensuous knowledge."

This cannot be. Our senses tell us of nothing beyond our horizon, and Mr. Müller thinks so, in spite of his seeming assurance, for he says:

"We must begin with a man living on high mountains, or in a vast plain, or on a coral island without hills and streams, surrounded on all sides by the endless expanse of the ocean, and screened above by the unfathomable blue of the sky; and we shall then understand how, from the images thrown upon him by the senses, some idea of the infinite would arise in his mind earlier even than the concept of the finite, and would form the omnipresent background of the faintly dotted picture of his monotonous life."

But this was not the condition of the first man or of any of the men to whom appeal is here made. But, if it were, how a man living on a plain with a view of less than ten miles in every direction can get by that limited horizon, from his senses, an idea of infinite extension, it is impossible to show. And, if it could be shown, it would not help in this case,

* Hibbert Lecture, p. 38.
because what is wanted is not infinite space, or infinite linear projection, but infinite personality, or being. But, although nothing better than this is offered in proof, it is assumed that the position is established. And from the existence of "semi-tangible objects, such as trees, mountains, rivers, the sea, the earth," which are supposed to contain sensuous elements of infinitude, Mr. Muller tells us, "These objects supply the material for what I shall propose to call semi-deities;" while of "intangible objects, such as the sky, the stars, the sun, the dawn, the moon," we are told that "in these we have the germs of what hereafter we shall have to call by the name of deities."* Let us here take notice, that all these are material things of which, by hypothesis, our senses inform us, and yet they are the semi-deities and the germs of deities, which man has to find for himself, and to which he is to affix the predicate God.

Having indicated an unlimited source for the supply of gods, our lecturer proceeds to show how their names were obtained. And here we have some curious speculations as to the origin of language, on which we should make no remark but that the origin and growth of language is, in these lectures, represented as mixed up with, or travelling in lines parallel to, the origin and growth of religion. We are told that

"Language breaks out first in action. Some of the simplest acts, such as striking, rubbing, pushing, throwing, cutting, &c., were accompanied then, as they frequently are even now, by certain involuntary sounds—sounds at first very vague and varying, but gradually becoming more and more definite. At first these sounds would be connected with the acts only. Mar, for instance would accompany the act of rubbing, polishing stones, without any intention, as yet, of reminding either the speaker or others of anything else."

After showing how by change of accent mar would become an imperative verb, the speculation proceeds:—

"After a time, however, a new step would be made. Mar would be found useful, not only as an imperative, addressed in common to oneself and others (mar 'let us work!'); but, if it was found necessary to carry stones that had to be smoothed, from one place to another, from the sea-shore to a cave, from a chalk-pit to a beehive hut, mar would suffice to signify, not only the stones that were brought together to be smoothed and sharpened, but likewise the stones which were used for chipping, sharpening, and smoothing."†

This is pure theory unsustained by facts, and utterly inconsistent with the conditions supposed. First, there is no uniform involuntary sound uttered by men in the act of

rubbing, pushing, throwing, or cutting, because there are no
two of such acts precisely the same, while the great majority
of them call forth no sound from the operator, and never
could have done. The only involuntary sound which is called
forth by such acts is a grunt, when the strength is fully taxed,
and it is the same sound whether occasioned by striking,
throwing, or pushing. Then we have men able to get stones
from a chalk-pit to build a beehive hut,—which would be
beyond the skill of half the masons of England at the present
day,—so far advanced in carpentering as to be able to con­
struct and take to pieces the frame on which it was built,
with tools sufficient to sink the chalk-pit, and expert lapidaries
who polished stones, and yet so poor in words as to have only
Mar to express all their actions. He that can believe this,
let him believe it. The advancement in mechanical skill
would be impossible without a language.

Unsupported, however, as this theory is, Mr. Müller carries
it on as a certain fact, and, from the assumption of its cer­
tainty, proceeds to establish the kindred theory of religion.
In doing this, however, we do not think he fairly meets the
difficulties by which he is confronted. It is easy to state a
difficulty in such a manner that, while it contains the sub­
stance of the objection, yet contains also certain elements
which the objector would repudiate, and then, by replying to
the incongruous element, to assume a full answer. This is
what we think Mr. Müller has done in this case. He says
(page 255):

"Without any warrant, either from the Bible or from any other source,
nay, without being able to connect any clear understanding with such a
theory, many medieval and even modern writers have maintained that
language too owed its origin to a primeval revelation . . . . It is easy to
understand that, even if a complete grammar and dictionary had suddenly
come down from heaven, they would have been useless to beings that had
not themselves elaborated their percepts and concepts, and that had not
themselves discovered the relation in which one concept may stand to
another."

We have no intention of contending for language by reve­
lation, or for a grammar and dictionary from heaven; but we,
notwithstanding, hold opinions contrary to those here pro­
pounded, and which, so far as we can see, neither the theories
nor the arguments of Mr. Müller in any way remove. When
Adam, in maturity of body and intellect, came into being by
the fiat of the Creator, we must suppose him to have possessed
such powers of perception as would enable him to distinguish
between the various objects of whose existence his senses in­
formed him; but in this there was a concept from the percept,
and, as from the first he had the power of speech, there is no
difficulty in understanding that he expressed these concepts in names which to him were true, and therefore scientific. In this way all the substantives that he needed would be formed. In like manner we must suppose him capable of perceiving the operation of force. We need not claim for him intuitive perception, but suppose that, like his sons, he attained to perception and conception by examination and experience. When he had the perception, where is the difficulty in his expressing it in a word which he understood, and which Eve and their children understood? But in this expression of the concept of force in operation we have the verbs. Thus with the substantives and verbs, and their relation to each other,—carrying with more or less completeness, according to accuracy of observation and carefulness of thought, all subsidiary grammatical forms,—we have a true and sufficient language involved in the original power of speech. It is after this manner that the Bible shows language to have been used by primitive man.* Here, however, we have no dictionary or grammar, either printed or written and given in a book, or by oral revelation, but a language springing out of the nature and condition of man, adequate from the first, and one which would grow as objects multiplied, forces varied, and relations became more complex. We readily admit that “man must conquer everything by the sweat of his face,” language like everything else; but we would remind Mr. Müller that the authority whence he quotes the above aphorism shows man to have been able to use and understand language before the necessity was imposed. Words are the counters of thought, and a sufficient supply must be obtained before we can express the thought; but according to the range, the complexity, and the depth of the thought, will be the variety and richness of the forms in which it is expressed. To us there seems no difficulty in understanding the growth of language from such an origin, but we cannot understand how a community could have existed who were obliged to put the poor "mar" to a thousand uses. And we have still greater difficulty in understanding how a conference for the elaboration of the terms and structure of a language could have succeeded when only mar, mar, mar could have been uttered as the vocal sign of all work. We know that no language has thus been produced, but that its various forms have obtained currency by use. But, in the case above supposed, you have a community without a language, and consequently without a current in which thought can flow, and, as it seems to us, there is no means of

* Genesis ii. 19.
producing it after the generations which have passed without it but by expedients which Mr. Müller repudiates. And we especially feel a difficulty in understanding how language, as complete as those Vedic forms of which he especially treats, and to which alone he applies his theory of origin, could have come in the way he supposes. In the old Sanskrit we are told we have more perfect grammatical forms than the modern supplies, and these are really gems of language.

“Now I confess that such a vocative as Dyaus, having the circumflex instead of the acute, is to my mind a perfect gem, of the most precious material and the most exquisite workmanship. Who has not wondered lately at those curious relics of pre-Hellenic art, brought to light at Hissarlik and Mykenae by the indefatigable labours of Dr. Schliemann? I am the last man to deprecate their real value, as opening to us a new world on the classical soil of Greece. But what is a polished or perforated stone, what is a drinking vessel, or a shield, or a helmet, or even a golden diadem, compared with this vocative of Dyaus? In the one case we have mute metal, rude art, and little thought; in the other a work of art of the most perfect finish and harmony, and wrought of a material more precious than gold,—human thought.”*

But how could the Vedic Sanskrit, which we are told “is full of such pyramids of human thought,” have been produced by a people who, for many generations, had only one word for all action? Therefore, either the Vedic Sanskrit is not an original language, or language did not originate in the way Mr. Müller describes.

Discussing the origin of language after the above manner, he finds our modern word Deity through the Greek Ἐσώ in the Sanskrit “Deva, a bright thing,” which came from the root div, to shine, and which, before the Aryans broke up from their original seat, was no longer used in the sense of bright, but in the special sense of God, to which it was afterwards confined (p. 5). But if, when we meet with it for the first time in the oldest literary documents, it is so far removed from its primitive etymological meaning that “there are but few passages in the Veda where we can with certainty translate it still by ‘bright,’” what proof can the Veda give us of the growth of the predicate God? We are informed, however, how fire, although visible and tangible, came to be regarded, not as a semi-deity, according to programme, but as a full deity:—

“We must forget the fire as we know it now, and try to imagine what it was to the early inhabitants of the earth. It may be that, for some time, man lived on earth, and began to form his language and his thoughts, without possessing the art of kindling fire. Even before the discovery of this art, however, which must have marked a complete revolution in his life, he

* Hibbert Lecture, p. 144.
had seen the sparks of lightning, he had seen and felt the light and warmth of the sun, he may have watched even, in utter bewilderment, the violent destruction of forests by conflagration, caused either by lightning or friction of trees in summer. In all these appearances there was something extremely perplexing. At one moment the fire was here, at another it had gone out. Whence did it come? Whither did it go? If ever there was a ghost in our sense of the word, it was fire. Did it not come from the clouds? Did it not vanish in the sea? Did it not live in the sun? Did it not travel in the stars? All these questions may sound childish to us, but were very natural before men had taught fire to obey their commands. And even after they had learnt to produce fire by friction they did not understand cause and effect. They saw the sudden appearance of what we call light and heat. They felt fascinated by it, they played with it, as children are fascinated by it even now, and will play with fire whatever we say . . . . They called him the quick or agile, in Sanskrit ag-nis, in Latin ignis. So many things were told of him, how that he was the son of two pieces of wood; how, as soon as he was born, he devoured his father and mother; how he disappeared when touched by water; how he dwelt on the earth as a friend; how he mowed down a whole forest; how at a later time he carried the sacrificial offerings from earth to heaven, and became a messenger and mediator between the gods and men; that we need not wonder at his many names and epithets; nor need we wonder at the oldest of all myths, that there was in the fire something invisible and unknown, yet undeniable— it may be the Lord.*

This wonderful genesis of a god claims a careful examination; to us it seems a grand building on the narrowest basis—a pyramid with its apex for a foundation. It starts with an unfounded hypothetical assumption. And till it can be shown that not only man might have lived and have begun to form his language, by the slow process of “mar mar,” with diverse accentuation, before he knew how to kindle a fire, but that he did live long enough to see forests burned down by lightning or friction before he found out how to light a fire for himself, the whole theory is baseless: this is its sole foundation, and it is incapable of proof. Man as yet is supposed to know nothing of fire but what he has seen in the sun, in the sparks of lightning, and in burning forests; yet these appearances and disappearances are extremely perplexing. The sparks of lightning might have perplexed them if they had seen them, but otherwise we cannot conceive of one of the questions of wonder which he supposes having been put by man before he knew how to make a fire for himself. The last they certainly did not ask; for in such ignorance of earth they had not become such good astronomers as to ask the question, Are the stars globes of fire? How could they have learned to produce fire by friction, and yet not know the relation of cause and effect in this particular case? What proof is there that they played with it, or were fascinated by it? And how could they,

in this early stage of their knowledge of fire, have travelled along the metaphysical path of abstraction to the predicate God, and have found in their new acquaintance and playfellow "something invisible and unknown,—it may be the Lord?" Could men in this condition have formed of themselves this highest conception of Divinity, which is uttered in the incom­ municable name, which man never did devise, but which was proclaimed by the Deity? If they had any knowledge of this name, it must have been by revelation, pure and simple; it has no other source. Yet we are told that it was the oldest of all myths. If this be so, then in the earliest records of human thought we have proof that men started with a knowledge of God, as pure, necessary, infinite, immediate being; but that they had so far degraded this grand conception as to ascribe that being to a plaything, the product of friction with two sticks. This was not an approach to the true idea of the infinite, but a departure from it, and it has not the semblance of a sensuous source or authority.

Unsubstantial as the entire theory is seen to be, it is, nevertheless, assumed as proven, and employed in the sixth Lecture to prove that man must have grown his religion after this manner. The lecture begins thus:—

"If you consider how natural, how intelligible, how inevitable was the origin and growth of the principal deities of the Veda, you will perhaps agree with me that the whole controversy, whether the human race began with monotheism or polytheism, hardly deserves a serious discussion."

We have seen that the origin of one at least was unnatural, unreasonable, and therefore not inevitable; we have also seen that, in making this god, they had a remnant of true mono­theism remaining, which was the only rag of divinity they could hang on the god of their own making. And we further assert, that whether they started with monotheism or polytheism is a question of the highest import, because it involves this more primary query—Did the Creator leave His immortal creatures, whom He had made in His own image, and into whom Mr. Müller says "He breathed the Spirit God," without any knowledge of Himself? and were they so unfurnished with intelligence, that it was inevitable, after they had kindled a fire by rubbing two sticks, that they should ascribe infinitude, divinity, to the sparks of their own kindling? We do not suppose Mr. Müller would give an affirmative answer to this query; but an affirmative answer is the only one possible, from the "natural, intelligible, and inevitable" origin and growth of the Vedic deities. Seeing, therefore, how entirely he has failed to establish his theory thus far, we are not de-
tered from an examination of his next position. He tells us (p. 258) that man is as incapable of receiving a revelation of religion as of a dictionary and grammar. And (p. 256) he tells us that the students of the science of religion, pursuing the only true method,—

"Have undertaken a genealogical classification of all the materials which have hitherto been collected, and they have then only approached the question of the origin of religion in a new spirit, by trying to find out how the roots of the various religions, the radical concepts which from their foundation, and, before all, the concept of the Infinite, could have been developed, taking for granted nothing but sensuous perception on one side, and the world, by which we are surrounded on the other."

Thus by implication, and directly an immediate Divine revelation is denied. And, in proof of the direct denial, he says:—

"Ask a missionary whether he can efficiently preach the mysteries of Christianity to a people who have no idea of what religion is. All he can do is to discover the few germs of religion which exist even among the lowest savages, though hidden it may be beneath deep layers of rubbish; to make them grow again by tearing up the weeds that have choked them, and then to wait patiently till the soil in which the natural seeds of religion can grow may become fit again to receive and to nurture the seeds of a higher religion."

There is difficulty in getting at the precise sense of the above. We have a people who have no idea of what religion is, and yet they have some few germs of religion, hidden under rubbish. Where is it hidden? In their individual minds or in floating tradition? But the missionary has to make these germs grow by tearing up the weeds and taking away the rubbish. This reads smoothly; but what line of action does it describe? Having got rid of the weeds and rubbish, he has to wait patiently till this soil, which can only sustain these buried germs, is able to nurture nobler seeds. How is improvement to come about? Will it be by the growth of the natural germs? This would hardly hold good either in agriculture or in psychology. The final act is to put in the seeds of a higher religion. That is, to speak without figure, by an extraneous revelation the new religion is caused to grow. But this supposed case was brought to show that man has not only not received an external revelation, but that it would have been of no use to him if he had received it.

The rule of missionary labour which Mr. Müller lays down is as wide of reality as the theory it was brought to sustain.

* Hibbert Lecture, p. 258.
In the Zulu tribes of South Africa we have just such a people as he supposes. They have no god and no worship, and the only idea of beings different from themselves which they possess is that the spirits of their ancestors survive their death, and enter the bodies of snakes, of which, as a consequence, they have a superstitious fear. But among these people the missionaries do not discuss the question of ancestry, or bring back and illuminate the shadowy tradition of "the Great Great One," whom they only know as the author of death; but they relate the facts of Holy Scripture, and state the obligations and blessings which those facts guarantee and enforce. And, although this statement contains the most perfect revelation the Creator has made of Himself, yet the Zulu, who had no idea of what religion is, finds no greater difficulty in receiving it than a well-educated Englishman. He so receives this testimony as to become conscious of a Divine joy; of a righteous, pure, true, and benevolent direction or inclination to his mind, and of a superhuman power, enabling him to embody in his practice the virtues of his mind.* The missionaries among these tribes are able to point to many who began life without any idea of what religion is, who not only have lived for many years a blameless, useful life as the fruit of the religion which came to them by revelation; but the renewed natives have become the teachers of their equally ignorant fellow-countrymen, whom they have led into the light, and joy, and power of the true religion. A dozen years since, Abantwana, the uncle and general-in-chief of Tshaka, who followed the terrible Zulu king in all his battles, and commanded when he was absent, who was an old man before he heard anything of the Gospel, who had never before had any conception of a being superior to Tshaka, might have been seen, as an example of the ability of the most ignorant to receive the perfect revelation, and of its transforming power when received. Nor did those who knew him doubt but that, by his acceptance of this revelation, he had been "made meet to be a partaker of the inheritance of the saints in light."

Cases like the above, which might be multiplied indefinitely, show that man is capable of receiving religion by revelation. To them it came in a declaration from another man, accompanied by a Divine demonstration of its reality to each individual. And this ought not to be a difficulty to Mr. Müller, for he tells us:—

"No doubt there existed in the human mind, from the very beginning, something, whether we call it a suspicion, an innate idea, an intuition, or a sense of the Divine. What distinguishes man from the rest of the animal

* Psalm cxix. 130.
creation is that ineradicable feeling of dependence and reliance upon some higher power, a consciousness of bondage from which the very name of 'religion' was derived.\*\*

It is in this "true Light, which lighteth every man which cometh into the world," that the Zulu and every other man to whom the Gospel comes beholds the glorious revelation of Divinity in "the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world." It is this original endowment of our nature, confirmed and enlarged by the Divine Incarnation, which constitutes what Mr. Müller calls the religious faculty, but which, after all, he denies to man. He denies it because he supposes it to be unnecessary. But is it so? We have the faculty of sensation and of reason; by the one, we are able to certify ourselves of physical phenomena; and, by the other, of certain relations between the several objects of sense and of supersensuous qualities which underlie them. But in religion I, a person, am seeking communion with a spiritual and infinite person, without which communion my religious need cannot be met. Now, although my reason may conduct me, as conclusively as it conducted Kant, to the necessity of such an existence, yet it cannot conduct me a step further. My reason will not enable me to come into His presence, to lay hold on His strength, and plead with Him; but this direct intercourse is what I need, and it is evident that this is what has been enjoyed by men from the beginning. Enoch walked with God, Abraham was His friend, and millions of intelligent, sober-minded men in the present day are able to testify that the exercise of this faculty, which is in harmony with reason, which uses all its deductions, but goes far beyond it, is the most profound and thorough exercise of their consciousness day by day. Without ability to go beyond reason and to attain an individual consciousness of the Divine presence, and of our real relations to Him, we cannot conceive of religion, which is essentially individual. Worship is offered by a congregation, by a community; but in this form it is the worship of a collective unity, and in all cases is the worship of individuals, although many are assembled in one place. The failure in remembering this has, we think, led to the primary error in this history of the growth of religion. Religion can only grow by the more perfect communion of the individual, and by an increase in the number of those who possess it.

But, while we require this natural power of direct and individual personal contact with God, this by no means supersedes the necessity of outward revelation, any more than reason removes the necessity of sensation. But let us from

\* Chips, vol. i. p. 238.
the beginning understand that there has been no revelation of the infinite. In the case Mr. Müller brings the search for the infinite led to atheism, and, although Kant required the idea as the keystone of his philosophy, yet he could not predicate it. Man has never found the infinite, and it must not be assumed that he ever will. And, if he did, it could only be a grand abstraction with which we finite persons could have no fellowship. In the Bible we have a revelation by which we can know God. But he is revealed, not as an unlimited negation, but as the Creator and Upholder of all things, and as the Redeemer, Saviour, and King of man. The revelation is entirely a record of facts, sometimes reported, more frequently done, but all within our ability to understand, and all within sensuous perception. All difficulty in the way of revelation vanishes before such a method. For we cannot suppose a difficulty in the way of the Creator at any time in revealing Himself to our senses, when we can convey the operations of our intellect by sensible means to our fellow-creatures. The mode of Divine operation we may not be able to understand; but the fact itself, as accomplished, is as easy to know as any we witness or receive on human testimony. This mode of revelation is in harmony with our nature; and we know it by the same process by which we obtain our knowledge in every line of science. It has so fully answered its purpose, that by it we may become wise unto salvation. But we must remember that this revelation is given to show our relations to our Creator and our fellow-creatures, with the obligations and duties springing out of them. And we think we have strong scientific reasons for expecting such a revelation of Himself by the great Ruler, so far as is necessary to the establishment of religion—that is, of an obedient fellowship with Him.

Man is the evident head of creation, the earth by a long process has been fitted for his habitation, and the work and the wreck of former ages furnish his support and wealth, while the limitless storehouse only opens its treasuries as he himself acquires the skill to discover and use them. Recent investigation and discovery have shown a wealth of structure and of ability to use it, which remove to an indefinite boundary the limits of improvement to man and his condition, thus revealing more fully the grandeur of the scheme of which man is the crown. But it all shows that the design can only be adequately realised by a natural, that is, a high moral character in man. The history of man shows he has a tendency to deterioration. All Mr. Müller's facts show this tendency in operation. Now, as this tendency, unchecked, must render abortive the grand design of the Creator, and
as He must have known this tendency from the beginning, so we cannot suppose that means were not used to prevent its development, and thus secure the accomplishment of the design. But by necessity of nature man cannot be ruled by physical force, but by appeals to his understanding and conscience. There must, therefore, be some way by which those appeals may come from a supreme source. Less than this, plainly, will not meet the case; and less than a remembrance of the constant presence of the Divine King who inspects human action that "He may give to every man according to his ways and according to the fruit of his doings," has never yet produced a true and consistent morality. But such a motive is sufficient to prompt to and maintain all good works. But this involves a revelation of the existence and character of the great God, "in whom we live, and move, and have our being."

It must also be remembered, that man by nature is under law. Not only do we find Adam formally placed under law at the beginning, and all his children reminded of this condition by repeated commands and precepts of government, but we see that this condition corresponds with the profoundest principles of our nature, and requires to be reproduced by ourselves, in all our associations with each other; so that it is impossible for human society to exist without law, even in a state of barbarism. But this condition of things has been instituted by the Creator, as it all springs out of the nature, and is only now maintained by an appeal to the Supreme Ruler. All kings of old claimed Divine authority for their position and laws, and the only attempts which have been made in modern times to rule without God have speedily and totally failed. But we have only to practise a little introspection to find, even in lawless practice, in the earlier stages at any rate, that we are unable to debauch the nature itself. When a man violates his obligations to his neighbour, he not only regrets the discovery of his misdeed, because of its immediate consequences of shame, suffering, or loss; but, independent of all discovery, he is conscious that he is blameworthy, and that he is condemned by a higher tribunal than any human court. And, when a human court passes sentence contrary to the principles of righteousness which are involved in our mutual relations, the inward and higher tribunal overrules and reverses the judgment, and enables the condemned to triumph in the condemnation. But this could not be unless men were conscious of being under superhuman, that is, Divine, rule. And it is equally impossible that man can have commenced his existence under such a sense of subjection, and yet have
been left without any knowledge of the Creator, on whom he feels he must depend, and to whom he must appeal for help and approval; or without any knowledge of His will. But the possession of such knowledge involves a primary revelation.

This expectation of an adequate revelation is confirmed and strengthened by a consideration of what the law of the Creator must be. We cannot think of Him imposing arbitrary laws, out of harmony with the nature of man, or unadapted to the conditions of his earthly existence, but such as should develop and improve both to the utmost limit. And we may further expect, that much of human duty would be learned from the nature itself, so that we should be unable to escape entirely from a sense of obligation. But as human history shows that just and influential ideas of obligation and duty are impossible with degraded views of Deity, and as only a remembrance of the presence of the Supreme Ruler is an adequate motive for human duty, therefore, unless the Creator from the first intended man to be a failure, He must have revealed Himself so as to have furnished an adequate motive for a true and natural life. And further, as the tendency to deterioration is unquestionable, and as there cannot be deterioration without a proportionate loss of moral perception, so, to prevent total and universal degradation, we must suppose the Ruler to be able, within the scope of the nature, so to reveal Himself as to call back the individual or the nation to an acknowledgment of His own authority and to the fulfilment of duty. Such have been the nature and design of many individual and national corrections recorded in the Bible, and we have no difficulty in admitting that there has been similar Divine correction and recovery in other nations than those of whom we have information in the Old Testament. But all this implies, not only a primary, but a continuous revelation.

There is one period of such religious revival which is so remarkable, that it cannot possibly be passed by in any general history of religion. So far as it comes within the line of Mr. Müller, he discusses it, and gives as much as we can now know both of the Buddha and of Confucius. But not only within a few years of 500 B.C. did the Buddha in India, and Confucius in China, call men to repentance and righteousness, but at the same time Pythagoras was doing the like in Greece, and more especially in Sicily; while Daniel and his three friends were employed in a similar work in Babylon and Persia. We thus have these remarkable facts. First, in all the great centres of population and authority, we have at one time men raised up to effect a religious reformation. Secondly,
they were in each case successful. Grote describes the entrance of Pythagoras into Crotona, in Sicily, thus:

"His preaching and his conduct produced an effect almost electric upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women hastened to change their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less than two thousand persons were converted at his first preaching. Nor was his influence confined to Crotona; other towns in Italy and Sicily—Sybaris, Metapontum, Rhegium, Catana, Himera, &c. —all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery."*

Yet wider and more permanent reformation was effected by the Buddha and Confucius, as shown by Mr. Müller, and as proved by the extent and power of their influence to the present day. The fidelity of the three Hebrews caused a decree to be published to the princes, the governors, and the captains, the judges, the treasurers, the counsellors, the sheriffs, and all the rulers of the Babylonian empire,—who had been assembled to inaugurate a new hero-god,—which acknowledged that the idol was nothing, and that there was no God who could save like Jehovah. But the devotion and the deliverance of Daniel caused a decree to go through the hundred and twenty-seven provinces of the Median empire in which Darius said:

"I make a decree that in every dominion of my kingdom men tremble and fear before the God of Daniel: for He is the living God, and stedfast for ever, and His kingdom that shall not be destroyed, and His dominion shall be unto the end. He delivereth and rescueth, and He worketh signs and wonders in heaven and in earth, Who hath delivered Daniel from the power of the lions."†

Thirdly, we have this special interposition at a time when the knowledge of God had greatly declined, when religion had become greatly debased, and when new elements of degradation were being introduced. This is seen to be the case in Babylon and Persia, and abundantly testified by Mr. Müller as to India; of China we know not so much, but, so far as we do know, it was an equally opportune deliverance. And the condition of many Grecian cities is seen in that they had not the perception of their fall or the power to profit from their visitation. We confess we are unable to explain this wonderful page of human history on any theory of chance, but we find no difficulty on the admission that the Creator is able to reveal Himself to man, and that, as the Upholder and Ruler He has done so. And the condition of the world then sinking

into deeper degradation, and in danger of altogether "corrupting their way," and so of removing that and the succeeding generations beyond the possibility of recovery, was a sufficient reason for this special Divine intervention. We regard these cases as illustrious examples of the way in which "the God of the spirits of all flesh" shows his readiness to use any man, who will submit to His inward leading, as the means of enlightenment and salvation: because we believe that with Him is no respect of persons; "but in every nation he that feareth Him and worketh righteousness is accepted with Him." They brought back men to juster views of God, and in the bonds of a true morality united them to each other. Not only did they break the bonds of a tyrannical priesthood, but destroyed the elaborate hierarchy of gods which had grown to such large dimensions, and which our author delineates as the growth of religion. As soon, however, as these reforms had passed beyond their authors, they were submitted to a similar system of development, and they also became effete and powerless for good, like their predecessors. It is, however, important that we should remember that these reforms were accompanied by no speculations as to the Divine essence, but they more distinctly proclaimed the Creator and Ruler, and called to a simple and individual worship, as the means by which power for righteousness might be obtained. But this was only an appeal to "the feeling of dependence and reliance which has been in us from the beginning." Thus within the scope of the nature, and by means of primary revelations, the Creator in these cases brought back His creatures to Himself, and into the way in which He from the first intended them to walk.

In the form in which we suppose all Divine revelation to be made, it follows that when any enlargement takes place, that is, when any new facts concerning the Divine government are declared, and especially when these facts are out of the range of human observation, the declaration must be accompanied by such unquestionable marks of the presence of the Creator and Upholder of all things, that we shall have indubitable proof that the communication has been made with His authority. On the authority of another man's thought, no man would feel himself authorised to draw nigh to God, or to offer any work to Him as an act of service. This we see in the only two cases which the Bible furnishes. Moses and the Lord Jesus both wrought works which required the power and authority of the Supreme Ruler; not ostentatiously, but as they were required by the exigencies of their ministry, severally; with this marked distinction, that Moses as a
servant only, did his work at the bidding of the Master; while Jesus, as the Son and therefore lord of the household, by His own direct volition. The importance of this principle is seen in the uniformity with which the Lord associated Moses with Himself in all the works He wrought in Egypt and in the Wilderness. All were done by the ministry of Moses, that the servant might have the authority of his Master. In both these cases there was a declaration of new facts—a new and fuller revelation. But there was no difficulty in understanding the facts, nor can we suppose any greater difficulty at the first. All that we can learn of the Creator and Ruler from our nature and the relations which are involved in it, we are left to learn by ourselves, but all that concerns us in these relations, which is beyond our power of discovery, can only be known by direct Divine instruction.

We started with the assumption that, regarding man as the king of the earth, we had reason to expect such Divine instruction as would remove him from the necessity of spoiling his own life, and rendering inoperative all past Divine work. And, with no wider horizon than the present life, we think we have given sufficient reasons for this expectation. But it is plain, from the teaching of Scripture and from the testimony of the various religions of the East of which Mr. Müller treats, that the life of man on the earth is only preparatory to another and enduring state of life. We cannot fail, therefore, to see, that every reason for a Divine revelation has much greater force from the fact that the present life of man is only preparatory to an endless existence.

Passing from Mr. Müller's view of the origin to his description of the growth of religion, we would suggest, that what he presents to us is not the growth, but the decay of religion. Religion, by common consent, is such communion with our Maker as shall result in the fulfilment of our duty to Him and to our neighbour. But, in the progress of the Vedic religion there grew up a dominant priesthood, who stood between the worshipper and His God, preventing all access to him, and who substituted a complicated and tedious ceremonial, in which their own service was necessary, for the truth, righteousness, and benevolence they owed to their neighbour. This Mr. Müller has fully shown in his paper on Caste. And this condition of priestly usurpation and tyranny had gained ground in India before the first collection of Vedic hymns was accomplished. These very hymns were the chief strength on which the priests relied, they were handed down from father to son as a most precious heirloom . . . . But the priests only were allowed to chant these songs, they only were able to teach them; and they impressed the people with the
belief that the slightest mistake in the words, or in the pronunciation of the words, would arouse the anger of the gods. Thus they became the masters of all religious ceremonies, the teachers of the people, the ministers of kings. Their favour was courted, their anger was dreaded by a pious but credulous race." *

With such a beginning we are not surprised that they ended in claiming a share in the honour, authority, and power of the gods to whom they alone might approach.

"There are two kinds of gods: first the gods, then those who are Brahmins and who have learnt the Veda and repeat it. With oblations he appeaseth the gods, with gifts the human gods, the Brahmins who have learnt the Veda and repeat it. Both gods when they are pleased place him in bliss." †

And that this was no esoteric doctrine of mere speculation appears from the manner in which the Buddha was met when he commenced his ministry of emancipation from this priestly despotism. He was of the Kshatriya, or kingly caste, which for a long time had been able to preserve its equality with the Brahmins, or priests. But of him they said, "How can a Kshatriya take upon himself the office of priest? He breaks the most sacred law by attempting to interfere with religious matters." Thus it is plain that the true idea of religion was lost, and that this priesthood was a human device to prevent access to God, and to place men in the unnatural and unwarrantable position of deity or semi-deity over their fellow-men. And, when the true idea of brotherhood and consequent equality before God was so grossly outraged, it was no wonder that the preaching of the Buddha was eagerly followed by multitudes, who found in his doctrine deliverance from abject mental and spiritual bondage.

Half of the fifth lecture is devoted to an examination of the origin of the idea of law, which is supposed to have come from the observation of order and regularity in the motion of the sun, the recurrence of the seasons, and "the rhythmic dances of the stars." But this came only after a long period of "unconscious cerebration," and "was expressed vaguely and with difficulty." How could men have so considered the phenomena of the universe as to be able to detect an unvarying order in their appearance, and to rise to a perception of law as governing them, without at the same time seeing that the law was an imposition of their Maker, and not a quality in themselves? At the same time men who had proceeded so far in speculation must have known that they themselves,

possessed of an independent will, were incapable of such regulation; law, as they saw it in "the rhythmic dances of the stars," could never be law to them. From the way in which the theory is stated, and from the testimonies quoted—which do not carry the conclusion—ages of settled national life must have passed before the idea of law was excogitated. But with law embodied in their mode of life during many preceding generations, and never long absent from their consciousness, the late discovery of stellar order cannot have been the source of the idea of law.

In the concluding lecture Mr. Müller pleads for the futile, inoperative, and degrading systems of religion and philosophy, as if they were as pleasing to the Creator as the imperfect lisplings of the babe are to the human father (p. 369). But the resemblance here supposed does not exist in man. He has not been left to make for himself a Divine name, nor to discover for Himself the Divine presence and will. And further, when such degradation of the idea of Godhead has taken place as permits a man to look for an all-sufficient helper and friend in a fire which he has himself kindled, and to pray to it, such prayer is no more addressed to the Heavenly Father than similar petitions to a beast or a stone are addressed to a human father. We do not presume to pass judgment on the ignorant heathen, or to define the precise relation in which they stand to the Supreme King and His government. We rest in the assurance that "the Judge of all the earth will do right," and "that many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down in the kingdom of heaven." But it must at the same time be remembered, that in the measure in which man loses the true idea of God, or forgets Him, he also loses the idea of virtue and the most powerful motives to its practice; because all virtue is merely a fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the relations in which we stand to our Creator and fellow-creatures. In ignorance of these relations, and more especially with erroneous and degraded conceptions of them, there can be no just sense of duty, and the true end of man is neither seen nor realised. All such persons as, under the perverting influence of ignorance and idolatry, live to themselves are incapable of the favour of the Supreme Ruler. The prayers also of a man who has fallen from God and from righteousness are not likely to be such as the Lord can answer, nor will they ever be such as a man who knows the Lord would present. Unless, therefore, we merge every Divine attribute in a weak and thoughtless fatherhood, we can see no hope of special favour to the worshippers of idols, which are nothing in the world.
I have not omitted any important doctrine in Mr. Müller's statement of the Science of Religion, as illustrated in the Origin and Growth of the Religion of the Indian Aryans. But I have not been able to agree with him in many of his positions. We have seen, partly from evidence which he himself furnishes, that from the beginning man has possessed a knowledge of the existence, character, and claims of his Creator and King; that all through human life on earth this knowledge has been preserved, and men have had individual intercourse with Him; and that therefore man has never been left to discover the existence or the name of God. We have also seen in cases which Mr. Müller brings evidences of the retention of original revelation, which, in times of general degradation, have been sufficient to lead men back to God and righteousness. But all this is opposed to the theory of Mr. Müller, who, so far as we have been able to understand him, supposes that man has the power and the right to manufacture gods and worship for himself and by himself, without any reference to his Creator; and who seems to think that men are experiencing growth in religion as they become more gross and material in their worship, and more unrighteous in their lives. It is surprising that it did not appear to Mr. Müller that a process which necessarily ends in Atheism cannot properly be described as the Growth of Religion.

The CHAIRMAN.—I am quite sure, without putting it to the vote, that I may present the thanks of the meeting to Mr. Blencowe for his important and valuable paper.

The following communication from the Rev. Canon W. Saumarez Smith, D.D., Principal of St. Aidan's College, Birkenhead, was then read:—

23rd Nov., 1880.

I consider Mr. Blencowe's paper to be a very useful and opportune critique on Professor Max Müller's "Science of Religion."

The writer has shown that the Professor's assumption of a "godless" period, in which men were searching after God, is illogical, and involves him in inconsistencies of statement; that the alleged growth into better religious notions is, really, a corruption of simpler truth; that the practice of "sacrifice" among the Aryans implies an idea of God and of worship consonant with the earlier Mosaic record; that the Mar mar theory of language is ludicrous and inadequate; that the question of "monotheism" is an important one; and that external Revelation is needed by, and has been given to, men, both at first and (to a certain extent) continuously.

The gist of the argument is,—Was man, primarily, in possession of some
religious knowledge as well as of what we may call instinctive religious sentiment?

Max Müller admits a “sense of the Divine” as an ultimate fact in the analysis of human nature. In his preface to “Chips,” &c., he enumerates “the radical elements of all religions,” as “an intuition of God, a sense of human weakness and dependence, a belief in a Divine government of the world, a distinction between good and evil, and a hope of a better life.” And yet he seems strangely averse to start with any definite idea of God in his history of religions. These Aryans, e.g. would seem to be a reasonable (?) religious kind of animals, with no name for God, and no definite language; who, from a sense of infinite surrounding space, imagined supra-mundane powers, and gradually shaped an idea of God, and devise for their idea a Name!

Credo ut intelligam is, doubtless, the reasonable process of all knowledge; but the “belief” is not a vague, objectless, sentiment. Its foundation is a revealed knowledge (partial and elementary, but real) of a Personal God, mysteriously complex, yet eternally one; a revelation made at the commencement of human history by the Creator to the first created man. I cannot but think that we should reasonably prefer the statements of Moses to the “it may be” of Max Müller (p. 137). The Bible record is not sufficiently esteemed or used as historical material by philosophisers concerning man’s origin and progress. Were it so, we should see them more ready to admit that a religion of Nature-worship is a declension from, rather than an ascent to, the knowledge of God.

Mr. Blencowe’s paper is an able contribution towards the controversy which, I believe, Christian philosophers have to wage with three erroneous tendencies of the present day, viz.:

(1.) The prevalent reference of all things to a merely natural evolution. The common and universal fact of deterioration ought to warn us against a philosophy which advocates a continuous natural order of things, without reference to God as the Anterior of all things, and the supra-mundane Ruler of the universe.

(2.) The tendency to equalise all religions, as being so many fairly parallel forms of “religion.” By the extension of the term “religion,” its intension is diminished, until we have connoted by it only a thin residuum of vague sentiment, which is called Divine, but does not rest on God.

(3.) The tendency to leave unduly out of consideration the “traditional” and “historical” phenomena of the Bible record concerning the earlier development of the human race.

To the Hon. Secretary,

Victoria Institute.
The CHAIRMAN.—I would call attention to one of the three paragraphs with which the Principal of St. Aidan's College concludes his remarks. He says that Mr. Blencowe’s paper protests against three erroneous tendencies of the present day; and the second of these, to which I wish to call attention, is “The tendency to equalise all religions as being so many fairly parallel forms of religion.” This is the grand fallacy against which I want to protest—the assumption that Christianity is one of many religions. That is a πρᾶγμα παραπληκτικόν to set out with, and against it we must take our stand at once. It is of no use arguing how far this or that form of development may have gone from the original truth; we must first of all lay down that Christianity is the truth, and that, in proportion as other religions resemble Christianity, they approach the truth; while, in proportion as they depart from pure Christianity, in the same proportion they depart from the truth. We know very well that the earlier people of God did what they could to corrupt the truth revealed to them, but that, having the written law, they could not do so, as they were unable to falsify it. So also, after receiving the later Christian Revelation, men have done a good deal towards corrupting it; but, there being a written and lively oracle of God, they could not succeed in perverting it. Let us, then, protest against the assumption that Christianity is anything but the one assertion of the truth.

Admiral E. G. Fishbourne, R.N., C.B.—I can quite understand the growth of infidelity when such doctrines as those noticed in the paper are set forth by certain learned professors, and I think we are very much indebted to Mr. Blencowe for having overturned Dr. Max Müller’s arguments with his own weapons. There can be no comparison between Christianity and any other form of religion. There is this one principle that separates Christianity from all other forms of faith, and it is one which is denied by Dr. Max Müller, namely, that Christianity is essentially experimental. The doctrine must be put to each individual, and be a revelation to that individual soul; yet the communication between that individual soul and its Maker Dr. Max Müller denies. Now, there is really no other religion but this, because it is the only one which has God behind it to give that response which the individual worshipper seeks for. Yet we know that wherever we find man, throughout the world, he is a worshipping animal; he may be degraded, but he recognises a superior Being, to whom he feels himself responsible, and when he fails to obey his inward sense of duty and obligation he is condemned in himself, and feels that he is liable to the severer condemnation of his God. With regard to language, Dr. Max Müller throws the Bible over altogether as an historic record. It is distinctly stated in Scripture that “the Lord God brought every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, unto Adam, to see what he would call them; and whoever Adam called every living creature that was the name thereof.” There, therefore, we have language from the beginning, even before a helper was found.

Rev. J. James.—More than one President of the "British Association
for the Advancement of Science" has said something to this effect,—that men who discovered facts in science were not always the men to theorise upon them. At all events, this appears to me to be true in the case of Dr. Max Müller. Notwithstanding that he has brought before us, in his "Chips from a German Workshop," so many facts of great importance, and in thorough accordance with Holy Scripture, nevertheless, when he begins to theorise upon those facts in his "Hibbert Lecture," he proves himself unequal to the task. In my humble opinion, and to my great sorrow, there seldom was in the case of one man so great a fall from a high degree of orthodoxy to so low a depth of heterodoxy, as these works show. I think it well to inform the meeting that the book called "Chips from a German Workshop" was published fifteen or twenty years ago, whereas the "Hibbert Lecture" was published only two years since. Also, I should like to call attention to the fact that every extract from the "Chips," given in the valuable paper which has been read before us this evening, was of an orthodox character in tendency and design, whereas every passage cited by Mr. Blencowe, which went against the first principles held by the members of this Institute, was taken from the "Hibbert Lecture." Therefore, I venture to ask the meeting not to look on the Dr. Max Müller of the present day as the same Max Müller who wrote the "Chips from a German Workshop." If we take his facts, we may; find pleasure in, and take profit from, them, as there is much in them to encourage and satisfy the mind; but let us repudiate his "Hibbert Lecture." I should like to quote one passage from the "Chips," which, to me, was most encouraging; it refers to the state of men's minds in India. Dr. Max Müller, in his preface to that work, says:—"A Hindoo, of Benares, in a lecture delivered before an English and native audience, said, 'We really lament the ignorance of those who charge us with polytheism, in the teeth of thousands of texts in the Purānas declaring, in clear and unmistakable terms, that there is but one God, who manifests himself as Brahma, Vishnu, and Rudra (Siva), in his functions of creation, protection, and destruction;' and he summed up his view in the words of their great poet, Kalidāsa, as translated by Mr. Griffith:—

"In these three persons
The one true God was shown,
Each first in place,
Each last,—not one alone.
Of Siva, Vishnu, Brahma,
Each may be
First, second, third,
Among the blessed three!"

True,—Christianity is the one revealed religion; but we gladly recognise in any other form of religion any traces of the original Revelation. Therefore, we may well rejoice in these and similar lively traces of it; because our missionaries, knowing them, will be able, amid a civilised people like the
Hindoos, to profit by such passages in their reasoning with them, and so, by God's blessing, to save them hereafter from the atheism into which so many of them are in danger of falling. And I think we may say the same of the earlier evidence of the Vedas; for the Purānas were probably of a date some time after these. Were not, let me ask, the extracts from the early Vedas, cited from "Chips" in Mr. Blencowe's paper, very wonderful in respect of the touching sense they express of the blessedness of being at peace with God, of their touching prayers for forgiveness, and of their touching petitions to God that he would receive them back to friendship and to peace?

Mr. Enmore Jones.—I do not think that we, or Professor Max Müller, whilst looking further and further into the future, have sufficiently sought after evidences in the past. Taking the evidence we have, we find that the Vedas only go back 2,380 years; whereas the Book of Job, that great book,—the statements in which we neglect too much,—which acknowledges the Creator in the fulness of His mighty power, and the creation He has formed, and gives so much information as to geography and astronomy, and the whole mechanism of the Universe,—dates back 3,400 years; and we find that Abraham came from Egypt 3,798 years ago, which is considerably beyond the time referred to by Professor Max Müller.

Mr. D. Howard.—It is one of the boasts of modern science that it accurately records facts and draws conclusions therefrom; but I must confess that I have seldom seen a more unscientific statement than that which sets up, or lays down as a law, that we are to "take for granted nothing but sensuous perception on one side, and the world by which we are surrounded on the other." It is almost worth while to study that sentence in order to try and arrive at some conception of what it means. I am afraid it means that facts are to be put on one side if they do not fit in with the theory. I must say that I am surprised at the immense contrast which has been already noticed between the "Chips from a German Workshop" and the "Hibbert Lecture," and I have been sometimes inclined to draw a distinction between the first and second volumes of the "Chips." Certainly the progress has not been upwards even in that book. But what are the facts by which we are to judge of what the state of the early religions was? The paper that has been read to-night brings before us, most interestingly and ably, the state of religion at the Vedic period. If we compare the knowledge we thus obtain of the religious ideas of India with those of the Zendavesta, and with those investigated by M. Renouf in the "Hibbert Lecture" of last year, we have strong evidence that in all parts of the world—the thinking world—at the period referred to, there was one particular stage of religious thought which, by the introduction of a new word into the language, is now called henotheism, which used to be called nature-worship. The question is, Is this a progress upward, or is it a deterioration from a previous state? What are the facts? Is there the smallest proof that any human beings or tribes ever worked upward from that stage to a knowledge of the true God?
There is no such evidence whatever, and the facts appear to be thrown overboard because they cannot be made to fit the theory. But, I would ask, why should the facts be crushed in order to fit a theory which they can fit so little? I would advise any one who wants the strongest evidence against Mr. Max Müller’s “Hibbert Lecture,” to read M. Renouf’s “Hibbert Lecture.” A more interesting study of the evidence of the early deterioration of religion from a higher standard could hardly be obtained. We have not the record of the earliest state, but we have evidence everywhere of the religion as it was deteriorating, and we have records of a growth downwards from the Vedic period—from the period which the early Vedic hymns give us. I am afraid I am almost inclined to challenge the high character given to Buddha. He did what reformers are too apt to do—he swept away too much, and, in point of fact, left a sort of philosophical nihilism, so that the marvel is that it should have had so much power. Thus you have the history of a great decadence of religion. Does not this point, as plainly as anything could, to the fact that before these records there must have been a higher stage? If you have progress in one direction, you may assume that progress has previously been in the same direction, unless there is evidence to the contrary. There is no terminus a quo in these early histories; but in the earlier books of the Bible we have a starting-point. Why should we, simply because the Bible is believed by Christian men to be the Word of God, throw it overboard as a record? Why should we throw deliberately what, as a mere history, would be invaluable on the subject in dispute? We may very well believe that the intellectual perceptions of man have enlarged and changed, but, perhaps, not always improved. We do not, for instance, suppose that Abraham’s intellectual attainments were equal to those of Dr. Max Müller: probably Abraham* troubled himself little about the study of the words he spoke, and probably his logical premises were not those of Dr. Max Müller; but surely that does not show that Abraham’s religious conceptions were not all that the religious power of any man now can require. I would appeal from Dr. Max Müller’s “Hibbert Lecture” to the experience of any man who has watched the progress of religion in the human mind; and I would ask him, not only as to the progress of savage races, but also as to the progress of religious thought in an English child; whether religious perceptions come before intellectual ones, or whether the intellectual perceptions come before religious ones, and then, I would ask you to say if you believe the religious perceptions are merely intellectual? I confess I cannot. It does appear to me that in the experience of any one who will watch the progress of the mind, whether in the savage or in the child, it will be found that the intellectual perception is a different thing from the religious perception, and I might say, for the sake of argument, putting

* The position held by Abraham is discussed in vol. xii. p. 110.
aside revelation, experience itself teaches us that we are not left in this world alone with sensuous perceptions and our own intellectual perceptions, but that there is a spiritual perception which is entirely ignored by Dr. Max Müller, and which, after all, is as certain, according to the evidence we can produce, as is the evidence of our intellectual perceptions. Where is the force of gravity? where are the theories of Newton? where is the differential calculus, if we are left alone with sensuous perceptions and the world? I fail to perceive why then, if we admit intellectual perceptions, which certainly are not sensuous, should we be false to the testimony of our own nature, and refuse to admit religious perceptions, of which there is as much evidence as of the intellectual perceptions? I heartily thank the lecturer for the paper he has given us on a most interesting subject, and one which is most admirable, profound, and well adapted to the needs of this Institute. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. BLENCOWE.—I do not know that I need reply at any length after what has been said. I was going to refer to M. Renouf's "Hibbert Lecture," and to have suggested to one of the earlier speakers that he mentions what he calls the oldest book in the world, a copy of which is now in Paris, and which, he says, was written centuries before the Exodus, and that that is only a copy; that the author of that book, Ptahhotep, lived in the Fifth Dynasty, and that he did not propound a new religion, but was a reformer, bringing back his people to that knowledge of God from which they had departed. Mr. Renouf, in that lecture, also quotes the testimony of an eminent Frenchman, whose name I forget just now, and to whom he refers as of all other persons most competent to speak upon such a question; who says that the earliest doctrine of Egypt was one, sole, only God,—a most precise and definite expression,—not Gods, but one, only, sole God. This is the oldest testimony I know except that of the Bible, and, as the gentleman who last spoke says, both from the Zendavesta and those early records of Egypt, we have the sameness of doctrine at that period, most clearly established.

The meeting was then adjourned.

FURTHER COMMUNICATION RECEIVED.

The Rev. J. Fisher, D.D., sends the following remarks:

This paper was much needed, and, though I highly approve of it, I would venture to remark upon a few passages.

On page 140 we read "The Zulus have no God and no worship." But the paper corrects itself and adds, "They know the Great Great One as the author of death." It is sometimes difficult to find out what ideas of God and worship the mere savage has. We hold, however, with Cicero, that "there is
Page 145 gives us a quotation from Grote's History, telling of the effect of the visit of Pythagoras to Sicily. We may allow that beneficial results followed his visit. When, however, we read that "no less than 2,000 persons were converted at his first preaching," we submit that Pythagoras had not the good news whose preaching is followed by conversion; and that, using the word conversion in its ordinary religious sense, there were no conversions under Pythagoras. Cicero knew more of the Old Philosophers, of the Pantheist Pythagoras, and of his labours in Sicily than Grote, and he confessed that "not even in a single instance did philosophy reform either the philosophers or their disciples."

The best of them mourned over virtue and shame alike departed, and their cry was that of Ajax in Homer, "Give us light, O Jove." Plato, perhaps the best of them, said, "We have fallen into this miserable plight, from which we know not how to extricate ourselves, unless God send us a teacher."

God has done a great deal to keep this earth from total darkness and pollution, by raising up, in different places, great moralists, philosophers, poets, and legislators to teach mankind. But, as the late Dr. Duncan said, "the best pagan philosophy was only God's scavengery to keep his prison-house somewhat clean till He would come who was to proclaim liberty to the captives."

THE AUTHOR'S REPLY.

To the foregoing the Author of the Paper replies:—

With respect to Dr. Fisher's criticisms, I wish to make the following remarks:—

1. I am not surprised at the objection raised with respect to the Zulus. It is what any one who does not know them would naturally think. Yet both my statements are strictly and literally true. They have no God, and they have no worship, but they have a tradition that Unkulunkulu, the Great Great One, appointed death; and some of the tribes have a further tradition that he first made men out of reeds, or maize-stalks. The full tradition concerning the appointment of death is as follows:—Whenever any word is received from Unkulunkulu it cannot be changed. He sent the Chameleon to say to men that they must live and not die. Afterwards he sent the Salamander to tell men that they must die. The Chameleon, as usual, loitered on his way, and at best moved but slowly, so that the Salamander, who always runs, got to the end of his journey first, and delivered his message long before the Chameleon arrived; and, having had word already that they must die, his word was of no avail. But of Unkulunkulu the Zulus now know nothing not even his existence. He is not in their thoughts. The tribes which live in the Zulu country know nothing higher than the spirit of Tshaka.
2. I do not think that any explanation of the quotation from Grote is necessary. Alteration, of course, is impossible in a quotation. It fully established my position, that Pythagoras was successful in his mission of reformation; and although I should not have used the word “converted” had I been writing the description, yet I cannot blame Grote for using it. It simply means changed, and what he described was not only a great change, but a great moral improvement. If one set of men use a word in a much narrower sense than its etymology requires, they have no authority to forbid the rest of the world using it in its purity, especially when, as in the present case, their narrower use of the word is indefinite and equivocal.

3. I am quite ready to admit that the best of the ancient heathen had very imperfect knowledge of God and of Divine things, in comparison with those to whom were given the Oracles of God. But I should be sorry to regard Ptahhotep and Zoroaster as no better than “prison scavengers.” And I cannot fully receive the second part of Dr. Duncan’s doctrine; because, although all who lived B.C. were without that full revelation which could only come from “God manifest in the flesh,” yet not a man has been born into the world beyond the scope and influence of redemption. Further, if the doctrine of Dr. Duncan be correct, then all the Old Testament saints were in bondage as well as the rest of the world. Like nearly all smart sayings, its smartness is the measure of its inaccuracy.