ORDINARY MEETING, MARCH 6, 1871.

JAMES REDDIE,* Esq., HONORARY SECRETARY, IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the last Meeting were read and confirmed, and the following elections were announced:—


Also the presentation to the Library of the following works:—

"Ancient Pillar Stones." From Dr. E. Haughton.


The Chairman, in the absence of the author, then read the following paper:—

ON BIBLICAL PNEUMATOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

By the Rev. W. W. English, M.A.

1. THERE is an obvious connection between the philosophy of human nature and the professed objects of Revelation, and the enlightened Christian would expect to find agreement between them; he would expect to find in Holy Scripture a correct statement of psychological and ethical facts. But why discourse on the spiritual part of man's nature should so generally be called psychology rather than pneumatology is not apparent, unless indeed it be assumed that Pneuma and Psyche are different names for one and the same thing, the point I shall feel it necessary in this paper to controvert. Sir W. Hamilton thought no competent objection could be made to the general adoption of the term psychology, while

* The late.
it affords, what the various clumsy periphrases do not, a convenient adjective. This may be so, but truth must not be sacrificed for the sake of convenience. Taking the New Testament as a text-book in regard to the science of Pneumatology and Psychology, I find that Spirit, the immortal part, whether as referring to God, to man, or to demons, is there Pneuma, never Psyche. Discourse, therefore, on man's spiritual part, strictly speaking, should be called Pneumatology.

2. Delitzsch supposes the soul to be the outward expression of spirit: the view is Platonic, but not Biblical, and it is to this confusion of thought that we owe the confusion of terms in common use. But Holy Scripture distinguishes between spirit, and soul, and body, and I venture to think it has a consistency and philosophical accuracy in its use of terms that we fail to meet with elsewhere.

3. The Old Testament stands, however, upon a different footing to the New. It was composed by men unknown to each other, and living at different and widely separated periods of the Church's history. They were in a sense compelled to use the language of their times. And, moreover, we find in their writings an obvious adaptation of language to the wants of the age in which they lived. I will here give an illustration of this from the different names applied to God. In the Pentateuch, in Joshua and Judges, we never meet with the title "the Lord of Hosts," but in the books of Samuel, Chronicles, and throughout the rest of the books of the Old Testament, it occurs frequently. Here we find in the introduction of a new title the adaptation of Church teaching to the wants of the age. When the "hosts of heaven" came to be worshipped, the Church of that age rebuked the idolatry by connecting God's name with that which was worshipped. And were it not that I should be digressing, I might here point out that those who assume that the title Jehovah belongs to the times of Samuel, and that therefore the Pentateuch which contains that title is not older than the times of Samuel, would do well to set themselves to work and explain how, upon their own principles of criticism, it comes to pass that the book of Samuel contains the name "Lord of Hosts" not less than seven times, while the Pentateuch, which has been fathered upon his times, is wholly silent as to the existence of such a title. But I proceed. This adaptation of terminology in the Old Testament, of which I am speaking, bends itself in another direction. Natural religion was anterior to that which is revealed, and it is of wider extension; it belongs to the world, while revelation is peculiar to the Church. But just as the Church came in contact with what remained that was good of the world's
religion, she took up, as wisdom itself would have directed, the terms of that remnant, and made them her own. Thus another name "the Most High God," which embodied the simple, original, primeval thought of man as he looked above him and saw one far off, was incorporated into sacred phraseology. Melchisedek, the Priest of the older religion, was "Priest of the Most High God." The earlier Canaanites were of course familiar with this title, and hence as they came upon the scene it re-appears. And so throughout the Old Testament we find variety and adaptation in the use of terms. There is unity of thought and sentiment, but with this a conformity with historical law and usage in the employment of terms.

4. The New Testament writers were differently situated; they belonged to the same generation, were personally known to each other, and they had most of them been with that great inspiring Master who promised to guide them into all truth. Baptized into one body, they were inspired by one feeling and sentiment, and spoke the same thoughts, in a wonderfully strict and philosophical language.

5. But before entering upon a particular analysis of New Testament language, I would observe that mind is not strictly synonymous with spirit. The attributes usually ascribed to mind connect it very closely with our bodily organization. Most writers, as Morell, and the Germans, as Beneke, adopt a triple division when speaking of the attributes of mind. Sir W. Hamilton arranged the phenomena of mind under the three heads of knowledge or cognition, feeling, and conation or desire and will. The intellect has been regarded as the thinking portion of mind, including memory, abstraction, reason, judgment, &c., as modes or varieties of intellect. The sensitivity has been regarded as the feeling portion of mind, including all such modes or affections as arise from external action and internal reflection. And the will has been called the moving portion of mind, the faculty of spontaneous power. Almost all writers have included, in modern times, thought, feeling, and will, in their classifications of mental phenomena. But it is obvious that in all this there is cross division. Body, soul, and spirit are included in these phenomena. And I wish to mark that spirit, strictly speaking, is not synonymous with mind as thus understood, and that what is called psychology, but ought rather to be termed pneumatology, despite Sir W. Hamilton's difficulty about finding a "convenient" adjective, should be kept clear of these modern classifications of the mind's powers and affections. Spirit, soul, and body, in the New Testament, are prime factors in human nature.
Mind, on the contrary, is a complex term, in common usage, involving a complex notion.

6. Biblical Pneumatology and Psychology are with us faulty, partly on account of our deficiency of terms accurately to represent the facts which lie at the foundation of these sciences. To translate the thoughts of inspired Scripture accurately requires a fuller and nicer terminology than we possess. "Sensual, (psychical) having not the spirit," is a difficult sentence to grasp in thought. Yet to improve the translation by substituting another word for sensual would seem to involve the necessity of inventing one. The term "natural" would agree with the rendering elsewhere, but it would still fail to bring out the real psychological idea involved in the sacred text.

7. Nevertheless thought endures while words change and language varies, and the idea of a triple division in man's nature has been retained since creation. Alike in the writings of Moses, of Homer, of Plato, of Aristotle, of Josephus, and of the New Testament, we find a similar trichonomy. There is necessarily a considerable variation in the expression of the underlying thought even in the Old Testament, and for reasons already given, but the variation is the inevitable consequence of historical law and usage. The earlier and later writers were separated by whole centuries, and nothing but the most rigid mechanical verbal inspiration could have saved them from variation of expression. They agree in fundamental thought, but follow, necessarily, to be understood by men of their own generation, the law of change which affects all language. "Nephesh" soul, is not uniformly employed in the same sense, but the soul is not therefore confounded with either the spirit or the body of man. "Nephesh" means in the earlier books a bodily organism, a living frame; sometimes, as in Numbers, a dead corpse; but in the Psalms it is applied rather to the living animal principle. It is never, like "neshama" and "ruach," applied to God, who is pure Spirit. "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground (his body) and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (spirit), and man became a living soul;" that is, having Psyche, a bodily frame with life in it. (Gen. ii. 7.)

8. In the New Testament S. Paul speaks of "your whole spirit (Pneuma), and soul (Psyche), and body." This tripartite division corresponds with that of Moses, and it is referred to by writers, profane as well as sacred, from earliest times: the notion being primeval, it has been handed down, more or less clearly, by tradition, inspired and uninspired. I say tradition, because Holy Scripture itself is but the handing
down through different dialects and languages of those original thoughts which we believe to have been communicated by God; it is therefore, itself, but one form of tradition, the safest because written. The case of Jannes and Jambres, who withstood Moses, was handed down in some fashion till it found its way into the Jewish targums; and the twenty or more accounts of the Deluge have all come down from one original true story. Even so Plato and Aristotle and Josephus have all the primeval thought of man's tripartite nature interwoven with their writings. Plato makes Timaeus, the Pythagorean, in his long and learned discourse on the origin of the universe and the formation of man, to speak of intellect in soul, and of soul in body; the soul being made to occupy an intermediate position between the perishable body and the immortal principle of intelligence. The body is represented as the vehicle of the soul, the soul as holding the immortal principle. Thus the soul is represented in three lights, in regard to its own nature, and in regard to its operations upon the spirit and body. In itself it was considered mortal or immortal according as it was viewed in its connection with the sensuous body or the intellectual faculties. The Gods, fearing to defile the Divine nature more than was necessary, lodged the immortal principle in the head, and separated it from the perishable body by the neck, as a sort of isthmus coming between. And Delitzsch has simply adopted in outline this Platonic view of the soul and made it the basis of his "Biblical" (?) Psychology. Aristotle separated the powers of the soul into two parts, the rational and the irrational—the rational part having to do with abstract and practical truths, the irrational part comprising the bodily appetites and passions. And Josephus also has the same primeval thought. He says "God took dust from the ground and formed man, and inserted in him a spirit and a soul." And in speaking of the Jewish festivals and purifications, "Moses forbade the use of blood for food, and esteemed it to contain the soul and spirit." Thus from Creation, with more or less accuracy, this idea of man's tripartite nature seems to have been handed down. S. Paul did but utter a truth universally received and believed, though necessarily expressed with varying accuracy, when he spoke of "your whole spirit, and soul, and body."

9. But it is time to come to a more particular analysis of New Testament language, which I believe to be consistent throughout, and to exhibit a philosophical accuracy that we fail to meet with elsewhere.

10. Spirit (Pneuma) occurs about three hundred and fifty
times in the New Testament. In each case it is applied, in a literal or figurative sense, to the highest powers of being, the immortal part of nature. In about two hundred and thirty instances the reference is to the person and work of the Spirit of God the Father, the Spirit of Christ, and the Holy Spirit. About sixty instances are references to the spirit of man, in a few cases in its disembodied condition. Some forty passages refer to created intelligences, as devils, unclean or evil spirits, spirits not said to be either good or bad, and angels. And the rest are figurative uses of Pneuma, either in opposition to the flesh, the letter of the law, or the world—or else under such forms of speech as the "spirit of holiness," the "spirit of meekness," the "spirit of promise," the "spirit of wisdom," and the "spirit of adoption." The application of Pneuma to the highest powers of man's being is also forcibly shown in the use of the adjective and adverb. The gifts of God, the Great Spirit, are "spiritual" gifts. The things of the Spirit are "spiritually" discerned—spirit working in and through spirit. The creature holds communion with the Creator through or by means of the "spiritual" part of created nature. Thus it is that in one passage the "spiritually" minded man (πνεύματικός) is opposed to the "natural" man (ψυχικός), and in another to the "carnal" man (σαρκικός).

11. Soul (Psyche) occurs about one hundred times in the New Testament, and is almost as often translated "life" as "soul." There are no passages where "life" would not be the correct rendering, for it uniformly implies life as combining soul and body; it never refers to life, or pure spirit, in the intermediate state. In the Old Testament loss of life is called the "pouring out of the soul." (Is. liii. 12; Job xi. 20; xxxi. 39, &c.) In the New Testament the idea of mortality is often associated with soul because of this implied combination of soul and body,—a combination, that is, which is liable to cease. To gain the whole world is put against the loss of the soul,—its death, figuratively speaking, in the eternal world. We are to fear Him who has power to destroy both soul and body in hell—ἐν γενεωτησι—the place allotted to the wicked after the resurrection—not in Hades, where the spirit, Pneuma, goes in its disembodied state. It is temporal gain and eternal destruction or loss of divine favour that are placed against each other. Matt. x. 39, and parallel passages refer to life here and life after the resurrection, passing over the intermediate state, which is peopled with "spirits," not "souls" or lives. The eight souls saved in the ark became "spirits" in Hades, and our Lord went in "spirit" (not in life or soul) to preach to the "spirits in prison." Matt. x. 38, 39, com-
pared with Luke xii. 4, 5, shows that it is life in the resurrection state that is there spoken of, for it is life not in Hades, but in Gehenna. The participles used also indicate this prolepsis. The words "kill the body and are not able to kill the soul." (Psyche), might seem at first sight to favour the view that soul survives the body, and lives independently of it; but a little consideration will show this not to be the sense. For the same Teacher cannot mean in one passage that Psyche survives the body, and in another that Psyche may be lost even in this life. He means that Psyche is to be understood of life in two senses and under two conditions, the one of a temporal, the other of an eternal kind.

12. There are half a dozen or more passages that might seem not to square with the view that Soul or Psyche never means spirit in the intermediate state, and were it not that I should have to trespass too far upon pure exegesis I should be glad here to examine them. But I must content myself with simply pointing to one or two.

13. Acts ii. 27—31 is a quotation from the Septuagint, and must be understood in the light of Old Testament usage. There Nephesh means sometimes a bodily organism, sometimes the living animal principle, and sometimes a dead corpse. But it is never applied, I think, to pure spirit, as the Spirit of God, like Neshama and Ruach.

14. Delitzsch quotes two passages to show that Psyche is sometimes referred to as in the intermediate state (Rev. vi. 9, and xx. 4); but the former passage is symbolic, calling up the altar and its victim, or life in this present condition, while the latter speaks in plain terms of life in the "first resurrection." Neither passage gives the smallest colour to the view that Psyche is used in the sense of Delitzsch. He says, "The soul and spirit outlast the corruption of the body. And nevertheless it is true of the soul, in a certain sense, that it dies. It dies so far as it went to centralize itself in the natural powers of the body, and to pervade the organs of the body with its own spirit-like life. It does not die so far as it is of the spirit; but it dies so far as it becomes part of the body." This view, as I have already said, is Platonic; it is exactly that which I have given from the writings of Plato. But is it "Biblical"? Delitzsch seems to me to crown a work of labour on "Psychology" by denying the existence of "Psyche"! His trichotomy becomes under the pressure of theory dichotomy. The soul is neither itself, nor body, nor spirit! It dies, and it does not die! I do not think that the New Testament trumpet gives this uncertain sound.

15. The Word of God, as quick and powerful, would not
find the same powerful figure where it is said to “pierce”
even to the “dividing asunder of soul and spirit” (Heb. iv. 12)
if the soul and spirit were one in fact.

16. Man's threefold nature was well and truly described by
Luther when he compared it to the tabernacle which Moses
made. The sanctum sanctorum within which God dwelt, with­
out the natural light of the sun, may illustrate the spirit of
man, in which God dwells in dim faith without sight. The
sanctum with its candlestick, lamps, and pipes, may illustrate
the soul with its many avenues of light, the senses. And the
atrium in the open sky and broad daylight, may illustrate the
body, whose actions are open and manifest to all.

17. But the relations which the spirit, soul, and body bear
to each other are by far the most difficult parts of my subject to
adjust. It is here that the real difficulty begins. I think the
language of the New Testament is plain and precise, but it
gives us less help when we come to consider man, not simply
as having spirit, soul, and body, but as having parts which
must of necessity bear a certain relation to each other. If
they can be conceived, in the abstract, as separate entities,
they must of necessity stand also in some conceivable relation.
What are spirit and soul? And in what relation do they stand
to each other and to the body?

18. The spirit (Pneuma) comprises the directing, self-con­
cscious principle, the ego, that which constitutes man’s real
personality. “The flesh lusting against the spirit, and the
spirit against the flesh,” is the Pneuma in its renewed state,
struggling with old habits of the body, become so powerful as
to be almost a law unto themselves. Will and thought are
modes of spirit life. Nous is not, in the New Testament, as in
uninspired writers, identical with Pneuma. In one of the
creeds preserved by Epiphanius in his Ancorat, written A.D.
373 (Epiph. Ancorat., cc. 119, 120), the clause which speaks
of our Lord coming down from heaven and taking flesh, marks
the perfection of His human nature by adding ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα
καὶ νοῦν; but in the New Testament, Nous is regarded rather
as a modification of Pneuma than as identical with it; hence
“the mind, or nous, of the spirit.” Nous is the principal cha­
racteristic of Pneuma. In the Apocalypse, the unravelling of
enigma is the work assigned to Nous. “Here is wisdom, let
him that hath nous, count the number of the beast.” Again,
“here is the mind or nous that hath wisdom.” Compare
Rev. xiii. 8, Rom. i. 20, with Heb. xi. 3. Pneuma, therefore,
comprises not only will and self-consciousness, but discern­
ment, reason, and I may add also speech (logos); for spirit and
speech have a natural connection as substance and shadow.
Language is not of necessity articulate, but it is always the vehicle of thought, never of feeling. It belongs therefore to Pneuma, not to Psyche. It has its origin in Pneuma, though in the concrete or articulate form, of course, it is the result of man’s threefold nature.

19. Without being able, therefore, to solve the problem what spirit is in itself or in regard to its essence, we can yet see a long way into its nature by connecting those powers or faculties which are ascribed to it in the sacred volume.

20. The soul (Psyche), as the vital ethical capacity in man’s moral nature, has of necessity a closer affinity with the affections of the perishable body than with Pneuma. This follows, I think, from the necessity of the case. And here again the New Testament coincides with this thought. I have no wish to disturb the calmness of any who think that “reason” is the basis of religion and morality, but I must say that such a view is wholly alien to Sacred Scripture, and I think incompatible with sound philosophy. Psyche is the vital ethical capacity in man, and its tenderest thoughts, its highest and holiest aspirations, are not seldom trodden underfoot by the dominance of that Pneuma which even devils have. I do not here say that Pneuma has nothing to do with religion and morality, any more than I say that it has nothing to do with the constitution of the human conscience; it has its part to fill in the constitution of the human conscience, and also in religion and morality, but it is not, I venture to think, upon distinct grounds, the ground of Holy Scripture, the basis of either. In this view I agree, so far as ethics are concerned, with Sir James Mackintosh in my conclusion, but I arrive at it from another and a different point of view. The basis of religion as well as of morality is to be found in man’s psychical rather than pneumatical nature, a principle well worth further development and illustration than I can here afford to give it; for it seems to me that reason and rationalism have well-nigh gone mad in these our times. Intellect has its proper sphere, but it cannot take the place of the soul without stripping morality and religion of all that is holy and tender and good. The Pneuma is a foundation, I venture to think, quite incapable of bearing the kind of superstructure which we mean when we speak of what is holy and just and good. Aristotle did not put his ἐπιστημονικόν that which has to do with abstract principles, νοῦς, or deductions from principles, ἐπιστήμη, in the place of those powers of the soul that direct us to what is religious and moral. Neither does inspired Scripture, which refers us, in religious matters, to the seat of the affections. “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul.” “In
patience possess ye your souls." "My soul doth magnify the Lord." "Fear came upon every soul." "Do it heartily as unto the Lord," literally as from the soul. "Would have imparted unto you not only the Gospel, but our own souls also, because ye were dear unto us."

21. The Greek myth rightly personified the soul in the female form of Psyche, for the relation which the soul bears to the spirit is not unlike that which the woman bears to the man. I have no wish here to break a lance with Mr. Mill, but I may observe that I could never arrive at the conclusion, from pneumatical and psychical principles, that the sexes were equal. At creation the έξωπνευσίς or breathing upon Adam was not repeated in the case of Eve; hence S. Paul says, "A man ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman, but the woman for the man." (Gen. ii. 21, 22, and 1 Cor. xi. 7—9.) There was a creatively-established dependence in the woman, and there was a creatively-established spiritual superiority in the man. Into man's nostrils God breathed the Divine breath of intelligence. But the woman had her beginning in the man. From the first she had a subordinate position, and was different in constitution of her nature. "Nature humanae vir est intellectus, qui a Græcis vocatur νοῦς, mulier sensus, qui feminino genere aὐθησίς exprimitur" (Scotus.) In man the intellect or pneumatical part is stronger, being derived directly from God; in woman the sensitivity or psychical part is stronger, as her very origin, in Adam's psychical part, was designed to show. The tempter knew this fact, to which every day's experience also testifies; he knew that Eve's psychical nature would be more easily swayed by passion and appetite than Adam's pneumatic nature, and he tempted her. Delitzsch has a passage on this point which so exactly expresses my thoughts that I must quote his words: he says, "Man and woman are distinguished as are spirit and soul, by self-conscious energy on the one hand, and resigned passivity on the other. . . . . The woman is the man inverted; in her preponderates the principle negatively active, turned from without inwards, from the circumference to the centre, living itself forth, in adopting and receiving, which corresponds to the Nephesh, i.e., the soul." All history testifies to a difference in the sexes, revelation utters the same voice, and the genius of grammar answers to this distinction which both history and revelation combine to establish. How is it that in an age of intellectual or pneumatical pride like this, when
some nations, as France, have largely cast off God and religion,—how is it, I ask that such nations yet retain a fair proportion of female worshippers? This fact is to be explained by the difference I have been insisting upon. Women, from the very constitution of their nature, are more pious, more religious, than men; they are less tempted to fall away through pneumatic pride, and more disposed to acts of devotion, which have their mainspring in the psychical part of nature.

22. I forbear to enter here upon the relation of Psyche to the blood, though it is written: “Flesh with the life or soul thereof, which is the blood thereof, ye shall not eat.” (Gen. ix. 4, 5.) It appears to have pleased God to give to the soul a very close and a very peculiar relation to the blood; indeed this thought is by no means confined to sacred Scripture.

Purpuream vomit ille animam, et cum sanguine mista
Vina refert moriens.

23. Passing over the question of the relation of Psyche to the blood, I would point out, that what I have said in regard to the difference between Pneuma and Psyche is very similar to that which Professor Stokes, in his address before the British Association, guided by considerations wholly independent of the Bible, hinted at. He said: “While admitting that the organic substance of which plant or animal is composed was built up by the laws of chemical affinity, he still thought that these laws were far from giving any adequate account of life. (Psyche ?) Behind and above these laws, working mysteriously through them, lies another force, whose mysteries are still impenetrable; and beyond the phenomena of life (Psyche ?) itself, lie those of mind (Pneuma ?) transcending the former as much as those of life transcend chemistry,” &c.

24. To speak generally, then, I would say, that the relation which spirit, soul, and body in man bear to each other is a relation that is incidental to the present condition of things. As the hand presents the food for the mouth, and the mouth gives sustenance to the body, so the body brings the spirit into immediate contact with this terrene state of things, that it may exercise itself upon the world's wonders, while the soul's softening energies were intended to consecrate all with feelings of justice, holiness, and love. The spirit's powers and capacities have their sphere in the wide fields of abstraction and generalization, the soul's in the enjoyments which life and religion give, and the body's in such things as perish in the using. Take away the present condition of things, and the relation which spirit, soul, and body bear to each other would cease. Hence there is nothing of a foolish philosophy
in believing in the spirit’s separate existence. We may con­
ceive of the relations between spirit, soul, and body being
greatly altered in the eternal world. Delitzsch views the soul
simply as a connecting medium between spirit and body; but
this is a very imperfect view of the relation. It has far more
than this. It supplies man with an ethical basis, a religious
nature. Moral probation is possible on earth because man
has a human soul.

25. The inspired Scriptures, I think, explain nothing as to
the manner of union between spirit, soul, and body. These
parts of man’s nature are mentioned, like the different persons
in the sacred Trinity, but there is left as much mystery as to
the precise nature of the union of these parts in our manhood
as there is in regard to the nature of that union which subsists
between the three persons in the Godhead. Yet there are
many inferences to be drawn from the pneumatology and
psychology of the New Testament which go far to settle many
deep and interesting questions that have troubled this and
past ages,—questions which do not, and never did, take their
rise in any difference of Scripture interpretation; they are
questions which originate purely in philosophy, the philosophy
of human nature, and are imported from what is subjective
into what is objective, from the thinking feeling person into the
written Word of God. I will close with a few hints as to
what I mean, showing how very many and important are the
questions that lie for settlement at the foundation of a correct
pneumatology and psychology.

26. Take first the question of the relation of religion to
superstition and infidelity. It is no mere affair of Scripture
interpretation. Men range themselves on the one side and
on the other quite independently of any settled views of Holy
Scripture. The principles which guide them are from within;
they are either pneumatological or psychological; but seldom,
if ever, Biblical. The tendency of this age, in a large number
of educated men, is to infidelity (I use the term in no offensive
sense; I mean by it simply unbelief in regard to the funda­
mentals of the Christian religion), and this unbelief is openly
proclaimed in respectable daily papers; but no person would
ever think of accusing the writers of these papers of a know­
ledge of Holy Scripture. Their principles are drawn wholly
from within, from a subjective source; they are pneumato­
logical in an exaggerated degree, the humanizing elements of
psychology being not simply misnamed, but displaced or left
out in their exercises of thought. The exclusive study of
physical science has a deadening tendency so far as morality
and religion are concerned. The nous is strengthened by in-
tellectual exercise, but the soul is dried up for lack of proper food. On the other hand, the tendency with some is in the direction of superstition (and here again I use the term in no offensive sense; I mean by it simply what S. Paul meant when he said to the worshippers of an "Unknown God" that they were religious overmuch); but no one would think of accusing persons with this tendency of drawing their views from the Bible: they are led by feeling, deep religious feeling, which it is impossible for any pious mind not to respect. Their principles are also drawn wholly from within, from a subjective source; but they are not pneumatological, but psychological in an exaggerated degree. And thus, as the balance of man's threefold nature is disturbed, and as it swings to the one side or the other, will the result be an imperious self-satisfied spirit of unbelief in all that cannot be reduced to the dimensions of reason, or a readiness to believe and worship whatever touches the heart and affections. The man who puts "reason" for the basis of religion starts upon an incline whose bottom is infidelity. He cannot receive the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Resurrection, or the Ascension, with all that belongs to each, as any consequence following logically from his first principles; those first principles therefore must be false if Christianity be true. I must here, I know, differ from some statements made by members of this Institute, particularly by Mr. Row, and I think Dr. Irons, on the subject of "reason," and I do so upon strictly philosophical grounds. Faith is not the product of reason, it has a closer affinity with what is psychological than with what is pneumatological. In any case it has not "reason" for its basis. Reason gives us knowledge, not faith.

27. Another point is moral probation after death. Is moral probation possible in Hades? I mean, of course, upon the view taken in this essay of man's tripartite nature. The principles here stated would lead me to conclude in the negative—it is not possible. Without Psyche I could not conceive of moral fall or moral elevation in man. Angels no doubt have fallen, but man's nature, if threefold, cannot rise or fall in a state of disintegration. The spirit may exist, but man cannot improve. He may be pardoned: this is another and a different question, and in no sense dependent upon the view here taken of his threefold nature. What I wish to notice is, that probation is impossible in the spiritual world, because man's ethical and religious nature is, in the view here taken, as it were in abeyance. If I had to accept the doctrine of moral probation after death, I must therefore postpone it till after the resurrection.
Another question of inference is that of the sleep of death. I should, upon the views here enunciated, infer from the New Testament that it is as true of Pneuma in our case as in the case of the great God, that it “slumbereth not nor sleepeth,” for there is nothing to require sleep in Hades, the outer senses are cut away, there is no perception of material objects, no origin of ideas from outward material things, no bodily pulsation, nothing that causeth man to faint or grow weary. Those Scriptures which speak of death as a sleep must therefore refer to the absence of perception through loss of body and soul, not to the absence of self-consciousness. Spirit may see and hold converse with spirit, in the spiritual world, and for aught we can tell in this world also, though perhaps at such times only as those spirits, yet in the flesh, withdraw themselves, so to speak, from the material world and become absorbed in spiritual contemplation. Samuel was at first invisible to Saul, but the spirit of the witch saw him, and he saw the witch.

Another point of inference is one in regard to space and time. The view taken in this paper would lead to the inference that the idea of space and time does not enter into the consciousness of spirits in Hades. The clockwork of the material world is there not only never seen, but even the gauge which the moral or psychical affections supply, is wanting. There is therefore nothing so far as we can conceive to measure space or time with. Hence the dead, though conscious and active in the spirit-world, may find it true in their experience that a “thousand years are as one day,” and that to them the coming of the Lord, ever represented in the New Testament as near, will literally appear to have been so when it shall happen, there being to each but the conscious lapse of the time spent here between the announcement and the event itself. Between death and the consummation I should infer that there is no conception of time. How far this may remove the difficulty which some have felt in regard to some words of S. Paul, about the Second Advent, will depend, perhaps, very much upon their ability to accept this inference as a valid one. To my own mind there is no difficulty in receiving S. Paul’s words in their most literal acceptation.

These thoughts may serve as an illustration as to what I meant when I said that there are many inferences to be drawn from the pneumatology and psychology of the New Testament that go far to settle many deep and interesting questions which do not take their rise in Scripture interpretation so much as in the subjective views of persons themselves who discuss them. I will close with repeating a
statement made in my opening remarks, that the language of
the New Testament, though penned in many of its parts by un-
learned men, has yet a consistency and philosophical accuracy
about it, that we do not find elsewhere, in regard to man's
nature. The Fathers stand high with me as theologians and
guardians of the faith, but in their use of the terms Pneuma
and Psyche they fall much below the New Testament in point
of consistency and accuracy. With us we have come to speak
of man in a twofold sense, as having soul and body; and the
common people would not very readily understand an accurate
preacher or writer who should speak of the soul as mortal and
perishable, yet as a matter of Scripture statement, I think, it
is so.

The Chairman.—This morning I received a letter from Mr. Gosse, one of
our Vice-Presidents; it contains some brief comments upon Mr. English's
paper, and, with your permission, I will read them:—

"The Rev. W. W. English, in this Essay, appears to look on 'Spirit, Soul,
and Body,' as three essential constituents of human nature. I venture to
think, however, that the testimony of the New Testament is not in accord-
ance with this opinion. Setting apart the multitudinous occurrences of the
word Πνεῦμα and its derivatives, which refer to the Third Person of the
Blessed Godhead; those in which evil spirits are clearly meant; those which
signify a moral condition or temper (as Rom. xi. 8; 2 Cor. xii. 18, &c.);
and a few, in which the word seems to signify a dispensation or phase of
the Divine economy (as 2 Cor. iii. 6, 8);—there remain many which mani-
festly glance at a constituent principle of man, so designated. But, in all
these cases,* if carefully examined, it will be found, I think, that it is re-
newed man, converted man, man 'passed from death unto life,' who is spoken
of. It is plain, from the Divine testimony, that a godly man is not a man
in the flesh, improved;—for the flesh is incorrigible; it not only 'is not
subject to the law of God'; but it 'cannot be' (Rom. viii. 7); he is a 'new
creation, καινὸς κτίσις' (2 Cor. v. 17). Now, what it is that is 'created
anew,' when such a change occurs, is shown in that grand revelation, 1 Cor.
 xv., where alone in the Holy Scriptures the subject under consideration is at
all technically treated. Here the body which true believers (and surely of
no others is the Apostle speaking, in the whole argument) possess in the
present mortal state, is called σῶμα ψυχικόν,—a soulish body; and is contra-
distinguished from that body which they shall acquire at the last trump,
which is called σῶμα πνευματικόν,—a spiritual (or spiritish) body. The for-
er is expressly said to be derived from Adam, who was made a living ψυχή;

* In Luke viii. 55, where it is stated of the daughter of Jairus, that "her
spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῆς) came again"; the word is perhaps equivalent to
"breath."—P. H. G.
and is therefore the common inheritance of all men, as descended from him. The latter is as distinctly said to be derived from the Lord Christ, who was made a life-making πνεῦμα; and is therefore peculiar to those who are federally united to Him; those who are in Christ. But the whole tenour of the Apostle's argument shows that this respective origination is not only true of the two bodies,—the present corrupt, mortal, soulish, and the future immortal, glorious, spiritish;—but must be predicated of the subtile immaterial principle, which animates each of the two respectively. The true believer possesses both of these animating essences; for he is a compound, or, so to speak, a double entity. He still has the body and the soul which he derived from Adam; the former of which, certainly, the latter, probably (see, however, 1 Thess. v. 23), will end, either at death, or by change at the coming of the Lord;—and he has the new principle of life, which is that of the risen Christ; for 'Christ . . . is our life' (Col. iii. 4); and 'he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit' (1 Cor. vi. 17). But of this latter life, we possess as yet only the spiritish moiety: the body proper to this heavenly nature we wait for. Our glorified Head possesses both: His body is risen, and 'is entered into His glory.' We possess the life, 'the spirit' now, in actual fruition and experience: the spiritish body we have not yet, except in sure reversion, and representatively, in Him our Head and Forerunner. It does not appear to me that the Holy Scripture ever attributes πνεῦμα (in this distinctive sense) to an unrenewed, uncon­verted man. He is, and must be, ψυχικός ἄθρωπος; whereas the new-created, though he may be σαρκικός, is yet πνευματικός,—πνευματικὰ συγκρινόν (that is, I think, not 'comparing spiritual things with spiritual' as in A.V., but 'discerning spiritual [things] by spiritual [senses or faculties]'). It is worthy of observation, that the struggling, sincere, but ever vanquished man, whom the Apostle personates in Rom. vii., and whom I believe to represent a legally enlightened and conscientious, but (up to ver. 25) unrenewed, man; speaks of νοῦς, but not of πνεῦμα:—this appears not till the following chapter, when he can joyfully testify that 'the Spirit's law (of Life in Christ Jesus) hath made him free' (viii. 2).

"P. H. GossE."

I propose that the thanks of this meeting be given to Mr. English for his interesting paper, and also to Mr. Gosse for the remarks which he has been kind enough to send. It is now open to any one present to make such observations as he may desire to offer.

Rev. C. A. Row.—I rise first, because the author of the paper gives me a distinct challenge; but I am challenged in good company, that of Dr. Irons, who, I regret, is not present. If Mr. English has read Dr. Irons's papers on 'Human Responsibility,'† he will have seen that the matter is

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* I beg indulgence for the coining of these terminants; no words in English use are available.—P. H. G.

† See vol. iv. of the Transactions.

VOL. VI.
there put beyond controversy. I am also sorry that Dr. Rigg is not here, for
when I read my paper "On Dr. Newman's Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent," Dr. Rigg expressed himself in the discussion that followed
even more strongly than I did; and I think it right to say that the article
which I then alluded to—contained in the London Quarterly—one of the
most important that has appeared on this subject, is from Dr. Rigg's own
pen. Now the author of the present paper personally alludes to Dr. Irons
and myself, and challenges us as holding opinions that tend to infidelity. I
will read the passage:

"The man who puts 'reason' for the basis of religion—"

I do not know that I have ever used that phrase.

"—starts upon an incline whose bottom is infidelity. He cannot receive
the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Resurrection, or the Ascension, with all
that belongs to each, as any consequence following logically from his first
principles; those first principles therefore must be false, if Christianity be
ture. I must here, I know, differ from some statements made by members
of this Institute, particularly by Mr. Row, and I think Dr. Irons, on the
subject of 'reason,' and I do so upon strictly philosophical grounds. Faith
is not the product of reason, it has a closer affinity with what is psychological
than with what is pneumatological. In any case it has not 'reason' for its
basis. Reason gives us knowledge, not faith."

Now if that is a true statement, I am in a very unfortunate position;
because, having been trying to defend Christianity all my life, it
would follow that I had really been defending infidelity. There are
certain points in Mr. English's paper which I apprehend Mr. Graham will
discuss, indeed he has taken them up in a paper to be read here a month
hence; therefore I will leave him to deal with them. There is but one
section in the paper to which I can give my cordial assent, that is the third,
and I must add one more illustration to it;—I have been struck by an accom­
modation in the New Testament respecting the name of God; God is only
once called the Lord of Hosts there, in
a
passage where St. James is
referring to the Old Testament; but in the Revelation the phrase is altered
from "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord God of Hosts," to "Holy, holy, holy,
Lord God Almighty."

At the end of his 17th section, Mr. English has this passage:

"'The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground (his body), and
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (spirit), and man became a living
soul;' that is, having Psyche, a bodily frame with life in it."

Now I cannot say it is fair to assert, that because the words are "the
Lord God formed man of the dust of the earth," that this means mere
bodily organization, and that afterwards came the breath of life, and
by the act of the union man became a living soul. As to the passage in

* Vol. vi. p. 45.
St. Paul in which the division of man is supposed to be made into the three principles of spirit and soul and body, the question arises, did the writers of the New Testament use scientific language on this subject?* I have examined the New Testament, and I am happy to say that Mr. Graham agrees with me in thinking that on this subject they did not use scientific language; and I do not see how it was possible for them to have done so without a great deal of previous definition: they use the common language of the Hellenic Jewish race. Take the English language as an example, and the distinction which Coleridge draws between understanding and reason; the only way of using these terms scientifically is by using definitions; because, as used in common English they have a very wide meaning. So it is with the Greek New Testament. But Mr. Graham will take up this point in the paper which he is to read here, therefore I will not occupy your time upon this part of the subject any longer, but will at once proceed to a point on which I feel more especially called to give an opinion. Let us turn to the 18th and 20th sections of the paper, which I own to have read with the most profound astonishment. In the first of these, Mr. English says:—

"The spirit (Pneuma) comprises the directing, self-conscious principle, the ego, that which constitutes man's real personality. 'The flesh lusting against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh,' is the Pneuma in its renewed state, struggling with old habits of the body, become so powerful as to be almost a law unto themselves."

I shall not argue whether Mr. English is right about Pneuma and Psyche, but will assume his principles, and proceed to show that they do not carry out his theory. It is very difficult, after Mr. English has evaporated all the various parts which we usually think belong to the Pneuma, to make out what is left; but here I read that the personality, or the ego, is found in the Pneuma. Then he goes on to say:—

"Pneuma, therefore, comprises not only will and self-consciousness, but discernment, reason, and I may add also speech (logos)."

That is a most curious account of what he conceives to be the Pneuma. But what is the consequence of it? Mr. English seems to think that the personality, and what we call the intellect, or understanding, are the chief constituents in what forms the Pneuma in man, and, I apprehend, of the Pneuma of angels, and of God also, for that seems to me to be a necessary consequence from all these assertions. Then I should observe that so far as language respecting the human mind is concerned, there are several other terms used in the New Testament of equal importance; νοῦς, for instance, is used very strongly in an ethical sense in the New Testament; and σάρξ, σώμα, and ψυχή,

* Dr. Harold Browne says: "All animals have the body, all the living soul (Gen. i. 20, 21), but the breath of life, breathed into the nostrils by God himself, is said of man alone. Cp. 'the body, soul, and spirit' of ancient philosophy and of the apostle Paul."—Ed.
or heart, is also commonly used to describe certain portions of man's nature; and we know that these expressions are not used in a scientific sense: then there is another phrase—bowels—which is often used to denote certain portions of the moral nature of man. There are other expressions of a similar nature. Language, Mr. English says, is not always articulate, but it is always the vehicle of thought, and never of feeling. I must say I read this with astonishment. Has Mr. English read Shakspeare, and does he not know that it expresses both? Inarticulate cries are merely expressive of feeling; but much articulate language is not the expression of thought, or else we should have much more thought in the world than we have.

The CHAIRMAN.—I do not think Mr. English means ratiocination—it is merely a loose phrase.

Mr. Row.—But it is very unwise to use it in such a way.

The CHAIRMAN.—Certainly.

Mr. Row.—In one word, language, according to Mr. English, belongs to the Pneuma, and has its origin there, either in a concrete or articulate form, and is the result of man's threefold nature. Accordingly, language is restricted to the Pneuma, which is purely intellectual—so far as I can discern from this paper—including my personality, or ego, and self-consciousness; and further than this, Mr. English has not told us much about it. Now I come to the 20th section; I have observed that the word νοος is used ethically in the New Testament. In the 7th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, St. Paul says that with the νοος he serves the law of God; and there are dozens of similar cases where the word is plainly used in an ethical sense. The section in question begins with a strange statement:

“The soul (Psyche) as the vital ethical capacity in man's moral nature, has of necessity a closer affinity with the affections of the perishable body than with Pneuma. This follows, I think, from the necessity of the case.”

I think that when Mr. English put forward so all-important an assertion as this at the beginning of a section, it was only right to back it up with some reason; I do not see one atom of necessity in the matter. Mr. English is laying down a principle in philosophy, the effect of which has a serious influence upon the whole range of religion and morals—that the Psyche contains the vital ethical capacity in man's nature. Remember also that, so far as I understand it, the Psyche is mortal. Am I not right in that?

The CHAIRMAN.—Yes.

Mr. Row.—That it does actually contain the moral ethical capacity is a statement which is in the face of nearly every assertion of the New Testament. Mr. English continues:

“And here, again, the New Testament coincides with this thought.”

I deny this. Then he refers to myself, and says:

“I have no wish to disturb the calmness of any that think 'reason' is the basis of religion and morality, but I must say that such a view is wholly alien to sacred Scripture, and, I think, incompatible with sound philosophy.”
I may have used some similar expression, though I do not remember it. Now we come to a statement of the most important and serious character. Mr. English says :-

"Psyche is the vital ethical capacity in man, and its tenderest thoughts, its highest and holiest aspirations, are not seldom trodden underfoot by the dominance of that Pneuma, which even devils have."

It may be true that the Pneuma in devils treads underfoot what is good in man; but remember that the Pneuma is, according to this paper, the essence of Almighty God, and of the angels. Then Mr. English puts a very indefinite qualification upon that assertion. He says :-

"I do not here say that Pneuma has nothing to do with religion and morality."

If it embraces the intellect, it must have something to do with them. Then he says :-

"It has its part to fill in the constitution of the human conscience, and also in religion and morality; but it is not, I venture to think, upon distinct grounds, the ground of Holy Scripture, the basis of either."

A line further on, he says :-

"The basis of religion, as well as of morality, is to be found in man's psychical, rather than pneumatical, nature; a principle well worth further development and illustration than I can here afford to give it."

I am sorry he should have made such a statement, and not have given us some reason for his belief. Again ;-.

"For it seems to me that reason and rationalism have well-nigh gone mad in these our times. Intellect has its proper sphere, but it cannot take the place of the soul without stripping morality and religion of all that is holy and tender, and good."

Then what is the result of all this? The Pneuma, being stripped of all morality, and ceasing to be the centre of what we call the higher affections of our nature, is reduced down to pure intellect, or something very like it; and the Psyche, or soul, being perishable, the whole of the moral nature of man perishes along with it. The following passage is still more remarkable :-

"The Pneuma is a foundation, I venture to think, quite incapable of bearing the kind of superstructure which we mean when we speak of what is holy, and just, and good."

The Pneuma is unable to bear the superstructure of what is holy, just, and good! God is a Pneuma, and therefore He is neither holy, just, nor good! The CHAIRMAN.—That is scarcely a fair interpretation.

MR. ROW.—That is the strictly logical consequence of what Mr. English says.

The CHAIRMAN.—He speaks of the Pneuma in man.

MR. ROW.—But he tells us more than once that it relates to the Divine Spirit.
The **CHAIRMAN.**—I do not think that much good is to be gained by forcing the author’s language too far.

**Mr. Row.**—I do not wish to do so; but I think it is very important to show the logical consequences of the principles here laid down. What Mr. English in effect says, is that the Pneuma is no foundation on which you can erect what is holy, just, and good. I agree with Mr. English in thinking that the Pneuma does represent the higher faculties of the mind, and the Psyche the lower faculties; but I do not agree with him in thinking that the Pneuma is incapable of bearing the weight of the highest aspirations of the human soul. I will not enter into any discussion about Aristotle and Plato, for we have more important matter before us than they ever treated; but I want to call attention to a misquotation from Scripture, which Mr. English has made. He gives a quotation to show that the Psyche, as distinct from the Pneuma, is the seat of the affections, but he gives it only partially. The quotation, in the paper, is: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul;” but in the Bible the passage runs thus:—“Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one God, and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with all thy soul, and with all thy might”—“with all thy νοῦς” in fact; which Mr. English translates as though it were πνεῦμα; leaving out the very phrase which bears upon the point. Then he quotes the words of the Canticle of the Virgin Mary;—“My soul doth magnify the Lord,” but he omits the following words, “and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour.” The word is really “exults,” and the conclusion is that in the Pneuma there are moral and spiritual principles that can rise to the height of exultation. And now I must defend the ladies for a moment. Mr. English has treated them so very badly that I feel compelled to say a word in their vindication. He has represented the female as having a predominance of the Psyche, which is used in a very unfavourable sense; in the Epistle of St. James, it is said that a certain thing is “earthly, sensual (psychical), and devilish.” I own that Mr. English’s argument appears to me to be a very singular one. In one part of his paper, you will find it stated that inasmuch as woman was made of Adam’s rib, and inasmuch as the Psyche resides there, therefore women have got a larger share of the Psyche than they have of the Pneuma, which belonged to Adam. It seems to me that we might as well argue that inasmuch as men do not now come into existence by the direct breathing of Almighty God—for He breathed into Adam, but not into Eve, nor into any of us—that therefore we have lost some share of the Pneuma too. Then Mr. English gives a passage in Latin from Scotus—I did not know that Scotus has so bad an opinion of women. I will translate it:—

“The human nature of man is of intellect, which is called in Greek νοῦς; of woman, sensation, of the feminine gender, αἰσθησία, which means sensation.”

Again, Mr. English complains of the infidelity of the French, arising from the predominance of the Pneuma, the very highest part of man, and says it
is because they have such a predominance of the Pneuma, that infidelity is so rife amongst them! I will again refer you to a passage which I have already read, for I will not go into the other remarks on the subject of infidelity. There is the same assertion in this part of the paper, that the infidelity of modern writers arises from the distinct predominance of the pneumatical element. Mr. English says:

"The man who puts 'reason' for the basis of religion, starts upon an incline whose bottom is infidelity."

The object of my paper "On Dr. Newman's Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent," was to show that the very thing here spoken of was the means of getting out of it; but I am afraid that Mr. English holds some portion of Dr. Newman's philosophy. Mr. English goes on:

"He cannot receive the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Resurrection, or the Ascension, with all that belongs to each, as any consequence following logically from his first principles; those first principles, therefore, must be false if Christianity be true. I must here, I know, differ from some statements made by members of this Institute, particularly by Mr. Row, and I think Dr. Irons, on the subject of 'reason,' and I do so upon strictly philosophical grounds."

Now I freely admit that reason cannot discover everything under heaven, but when a thing is discovered, it may agree with my highest rational convictions. Reason cannot discover creation; there are ten thousand things which are not discovered by reason, but which are yet within its compass afterwards; and that, I endeavoured to show in the last paper I read before this Institute. I do not hold that reason is competent to discover everything under heaven; but when God Almighty has revealed a thing, whether by nature or by divine revelation, reason is the only thing that is capable of dealing with it. Mr. English continues:

"Faith is not the product of reason, it has a closer affinity with what is psychological, than with what is pneumatological. In any case, it has not 'reason' for its basis. Reason gives us knowledge, not faith."

Now I am somewhat astonished at these observations, for in the Epistles of St. John, knowledge is placed as the fundamental, ethical, and spiritual principle twenty-seven times; and faith only seven times. I think Mr. English has adopted a narrow view of reason; I do not mean the logical faculty alone, but the whole of the rational faculties of man, which are vastly more extensive than the logical faculty. This attempt to separate faith from reason I consider is contrary to Scripture. The Epistle to the Hebrews tells us that "he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him." How do I believe that God is, except by a rational act? But that is described as an act of faith, because he says it is impossible without faith to believe in God. These two things are necessary and antecedent to all revelation, for we cannot accept it without believing, first, that God
is, and secondly, that He is a rewardee of them that diligently seek Him. I will only mention one other point,—Mr. English says that the ethical part of man's nature and his affections are to be found in the Psyche. He does not define the body; but there is one passage in the Scriptures—the beginning of the 12th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans—to which I should like to call his attention. It runs thus:—“I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.” This passage alone proves that the language of Scripture on this point is not scientific but popular. (Cheers.)

Rev. C. Graham.—I will not occupy much time in what I have to say upon this paper, as I shall shortly have the honour of bringing a paper of my own before the Institute on the tripartite nature of man. But, in order to corroborate what Mr. Row has stated, I will quote one passage which I think bears directly upon the subject:—“This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent.” “That they might know Thee, the only true God.” Without a knowledge of God, and a knowledge of Christ, as the expression of what is in God, there is no salvation. With regard to Mr. Gosse's view, that in unregenerate man there is no spirit—that the spirit is something which man receives when converted and regenerated,—I may quote a passage which will not harmonize with that opinion. It is the word of Elihu, who uttered divine wisdom (Job xxxii. 8):—“There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration (the neshamah) of the Almighty hath given them understanding.” There is a spirit in man as man—in universal man. There is a spirit in man that is not restricted to regenerate man, and the inspiration of the Almighty hath given them, universal man, understanding. I must say that there is thought in this paper of Mr. English's; there is research, and there is reasoning in it; it is not obscured with metaphysics; Mr. English gives his views on the whole distinctly and clearly, but I must say that I take exception to the main positions. I quote a passage from the first section of his paper:—

“Taking the New Testament as a text-book in regard to the science of pneumatology and psychology, I find that spirit, the immortal part, whether as referring to God, to man, or to demons, is there Pneuma, never Psyche.”

Spirit, as referring to God, in the New Testament is never Psyche. Now I would refer to the 18th verse of the 12th chapter of St. Matthew:—“Behold my servant, whom I have chosen; my beloved, in whom my soul is well pleased.” That is God who speaks,—“my beloved in whom my Psyche is well pleased.”

Mr. Row.—That is from the Old Testament. St. Matthew is referring to another similar passage, and says it is a quotation from the Old Testament.

Mr. Graham.—I say that nephesh in the Old Testament answers to Psyche in the New, and ruach to Pneuma. Let any one look at the quotations for himself. We cannot, then, accept this as an argument. Look,
again, at the 38th verse of the 10th chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews:

"Now the just shall live by faith; but if any man draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him." There, again, is Psyche in reference to God.

Mr. Row.—A quotation from the Septuagint.

Mr. Graham.—Well, be it so; I say that here you have "soul" used in the New Testament in relation to God in two passages. I will now, for a few moments, invite attention to one or two other matters. First, in reference to the title "Lord of Hosts," in his 3rd section, Mr. English says:

"I will here give an illustration of this from the different names applied to God. In the Pentateuch, in Joshua and Judges, we never meet with the title 'the Lord of Hosts'; but in the books of Samuel, Chronicles, and throughout the rest of the books of the Old Testament, it occurs frequently."

Yes, but you meet in Exodus with "the hosts of the Lord" going out of Egypt. But does the phrase occur in Ezekiel, in Job, or in any of the books written by Solomon, in Proverbs, in Ecclesiastes? It does not occur in any of these. Mr. English uses it tropically; but before you can have a literal use, you must have a literal use. Then there is another passage in the same section to which I would call attention:

"But just as the Church came in contact with what remained that was good of the world's religion, she took up, as wisdom itself would have directed, the terms of that remnant, and made them her own."

I should prefer saying it was the spirit of inspiration that took them up. It is not the Church that gives us the Bible, but God.

The Chairman.—Mr. English does not mean the Church in that limited sense—he would not differ from you as regards that. He means rather that the language was adopted by the Holy Spirit.

Mr. Graham.—Well, I should prefer to see it otherwise put. Then he says:

"The priest of the older religion was 'Priest of the Most High God.' The earlier Canaanites were of course familiar with this title; and hence, as they came upon the scene it reappears."

Mr. English regards the title 'Most High God' as originating in the idea of distance, "one far off"; but I take it that in the Scripture it refers to Jehovah as King of Kings, Lord of Lords, above all potentates and authorities of the earth. But I will not dwell on these points. I come now to the close of the 7th section:

"'Nephesh,' soul, is not uniformly employed in the same sense, but the soul is not therefore confounded with either the spirit or the body of man. 'Nephesh' means, in the earlier books, a bodily organism, a living frame."

In fact it means the entire man, and, as meaning the entire man, it embraces the ruach. But is it true that in the earlier books it is used merely in relation to organic man? Do we not read that "as the soul of Rachel was departing"? Do we not also find Jacob saying: "O my soul (my nephesh),
come not thou into their secret; unto their assembly, mine honour, be not thou united." The soul here certainly does not refer to bodily organization. The section goes on:—

"‘Nephesh’ means in the earlier books a bodily organism, a living frame; sometimes, as in Numbers, a dead corpse; but in the Psalms it is applied rather to the living animal principle. It is never, like ‘neshamah’ and ‘ruach,’ applied to God, who is pure Spirit.”

But is nephesh never applied to God, who is “pure Spirit”? I find it so applied again and again—I can give you many distinct quotations in proof. I take such a passage as that in the 26th chapter of Leviticus, where God says: “My soul shall not abhor you”; or that in the 10th chapter of Judges, where it is said of God, that “His soul was grieved for the misery of Israel”; or that in the 1st chapter of Isaiah: “Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth”; or that in the 5th chapter of Jeremiah:—“Shall not my soul be avenged on such a nation as this?” I might refer to passage after passage where the word is used in relation to God; and yet Mr. English distinctly says here that it is never so applied. Here it is used as synonymous with spirit. In point of fact, we may predicate just as truly that God is nephesh, as that God is ruach. God is soul, as truly as God is spirit. I come now to the 10th section of the paper:—

“Spirit (Pneuma) occurs about 350 times in the New Testament. In each case it is applied, in a literal or figurative sense, to the highest powers of being, the immortal part of nature.”

Now that is a proposition to which no exception is given; but when you come to examine the Holy Scriptures, you find that you are obliged to make exceptions. I read in the 11th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, of “the spirit of slumber”; and I also read of “the spirit of fear”; and of “the spirit of bondage.” In the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, we read: “And then shall that wicked be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of His mouth.” In Isaiah, and in Hebrews, the word is “breath,” so that “spirit” and “breath of his mouth” are clearly synonymous. Then, in the 13th chapter of Revelations, we read that the false prophet is to give breath, or Pneuma, to the image of the beast. There are many exceptions in the Holy Scriptures, and therefore there is no basis for the statement made by Mr. English. In the 11th section I find:—

“Soul (Psyche) occurs about one hundred times in the New Testament, and is almost as often translated ‘life’ as ‘soul.’ There are no passages where ‘life’ would not be the correct rendering, for it uniformly implies life, as combining soul and body; it never refers to life, or pure spirit, in the intermediate state.”

I take that point up in my own paper, therefore I will not go into it now, except to call attention to one or two passages. In the 5th chapter of the Epistle of St. James, we read: “If any of you do err from the
truth, and one convert him, let him know that he which converteth the sinner from the error of his way shall save a soul from death.” Is that saving from physical death? Then in the Epistle to the Hebrews I find this passage:—

“Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves, for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account, that they may do it with joy and not with grief.” Is that watching to preserve the life of the physical organism? That soul and life are always interchangeable is an assertion that will not stand. I wish now to touch upon a point which will somewhat lighten this heavier argumentation. In the 29th section I find:—

“Another point of inference is one in regard to space and time. The view taken in this paper would lead to the inference that the idea of space and time does not enter into the consciousness of spirits in Hades. The clockwork of the material world is there not only never seen, but even the gauge which the moral or psychical affections supply is wanting. There is, therefore, nothing, so far as we can conceive, to measure space or time with.”

Now that is a very curious speculation, and certainly it took me quite by surprise. Where is this Hades? I find Christ saying to the thief: “Today shalt thou be with me in paradise”; and St. Paul says: “Absent from the body, present with the Lord.” Stephen, we are told, “looked up steadfastly into Heaven, and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God.” And how do we know that, when disembodied, we may not see the whole universe of being? I do not say that we shall, but where is the argument to prove that we shall not?

The CHAIRMAN.—But that would not be contrary to Mr. English’s views.

MR. GRAHAM.—I think it would; because if we saw the universe, we should see the revolution of the orbs, which would give us the idea of the lapse of time. Does the Pneuma retain memory? because, if so, it brings back to us the past with our experience of the sequence of events, and of the lapse of time. Will not the spirit be conscious of time past as differing from the present? Then, again, how do we measure time, or know of its existence? Not so much by the revolution of the heavenly bodies, as by our own mental acts and emotions. We feel and think, and just as we feel and just as we think we have a consciousness of the lapse of time. Time appears to us long or short according to the strength and number of our emotions and thoughts.

(Cheers.)

Rev. J. H. Titcomb.—In the first place, I should like to adduce one argument against Mr. Gosse’s view, namely, that the word “Pneuma,” or spirit, simply has reference to the regenerated condition of man. In addition to the quotations given by Mr. Graham, I call to mind that text in the book of Ecclesiastes in which, speaking of death generally, it is said “the spirit shall return unto God who gave it”—the Pneuma (ruach), implying that all created mankind possess the Pneuma (ruach); and that that is an essential and conditional part of man, which, after death, is disintegrated from the body, and goes to its rest. Then I should like to say one or two words with respect to the controversy opened by Mr. Row, namely, as to how far reason, as
distinct from faith, may be considered the basis of religion. We are always in
danger of riding our hobby to death: hence, to say that religion is based on
reason, is as little erroneous, as it would be to say that it is based on faith.
Reason and faith are twin sisters—it is impossible to separate them in
Christian experience. Religion based upon reason without faith would be pure
rationalism; and religion based upon faith without reason would be pure
superstition. (Cheers.) It is by the union of the two under the teaching of
God's Holy Spirit, that we conceive what God is, and that we can receive from
Him the gift of everlasting life. As to spirit, soul, and body, I find that
Mr. English, in his 5th section, calls them prime factors in human nature,
co-ordinate and inseparable. In some respects, this is perhaps fair. They
are separable, however, in this respect; that pneumatology may be considered
as the science which relates to the spirit; psychology may be considered
separately, as the science which relates to the soul; and physiology may be
considered as a science quite distinct from the others, relating to the nature
of the body. As matters of thought and subjects for study, those three
things may be viewed as separate and distinct sciences. The body, I take it,
would be simply the human frame?

Mr. Row.—I think not.

Mr. Titcomb.—I do not mean in its dead, but in its living state. Then
the soul, according to this paper, would be the vital ethical capacity in man's
nature, and the Pneuma would be the pure immaterial spirit. Now the
question we have to discuss—for this is the crucial point of the paper—is
not that the body can be separated from the other two, for that no one
would dispute, but that the soul and spirit are separable and are separated
by death, the soul being mortal and dying, while the spirit is liberated and
goes to its rest. Now we ought seriously to protest against that position. I
should be sorry if it went out to the world that the Victoria Institute, which
was designed to conserve the principles of religion, should speak so loosely
upon the question of the soul, as to give its imprimatur to the doctrine that
the soul is mortal, and dies, and is disintegrated.

The Chairman.—One of our rules is that members are individually
responsible for their opinions. We do not give an imprimatur to anything
and everything uttered here.

Mr. Titcomb.—To show that the soul, as the ethical part of man, survives
after death, and is inseparable from the spirit, I will give proofs from the
New Testament. The parable of Lazarus and Dives, which we read yes­
terday in church, although it is only a parable, yet really in its nature does
set forth a moral relationship on the part of the disembodied portion of
man after death with that which has been left behind. The soul in hell is
described as recollecting—there is memory, as sympathizing with and feeling
for the misery of those who belonged to him by kinship in nature. Surely
there is an ethical capacity surviving after death, as shown by our Lord Jesus
Christ, who spoke as man never spoke; and if that be true, I do not know
how the Psyche can have died, and the Pneuma alone have survived. They
are both so inseparable, that I cannot understand how they could be separated.
The CHAIRMAN.—There is the passage in which Dives calls for a drop of
water, which relates to the body.

Mr. TITCOMB.—Yes, but that belongs to the language of poetry, and
is more like a metaphor than a representation of conversation would be.
One will bear argument; the other will not. Then Our Lord is described
after death, in a very disputed passage, as going to preach to the spirits in
prison,* those spirits in the time of Noah having been disobedient. If that
be interpreted as representing the setting forth by Christ Himself to those
spirits—a statement of what He had done for man, in the place of disembodied
souls—I do not know how the Psyche, the ethical part of man, would not be
there as well as the Pneuma. Otherwise, how could preaching have been of
any use? There must have been an appeal to reason and to the affections,
or otherwise preaching would have had no basis. Then there is the passage
quoted in the paper, but got over very slightly and superficially, where
St. John describes the souls under the altar crying out, "How long, O Lord,
how long?" Is not that a representation of what is ethical, and involving
memory? Then, lastly, there is that oft-repeated text "What shall it profit
a man if he gain the whole world and lose his soul?" Are we to think that
mortal life is of such great account as that? The passage must refer to that
which will survive after death; thus we have the Psyche or soul surviving
death. And having gone so far, we come to a point that has not yet been
touched upon,—how far the psychology presented to us by the brute creation
is analogous to our own. I do not know how it ought to be imported into
this discussion, but, taking the interpretation of Psyche which is given in
Mr. English’s paper, I should lay it down that one of its weakest points is
the necessary inference that man’s Psyche, dying with him, is very little better
than the Psyche of brutes. It is indisputable that the dog, for instance, has
mental properties and moral properties, which approximate to our own. It
may be a new idea to some present, but there are ethics, so to speak, in the
affections, habits, and instincts of the brute creation. A dog may love its
master—it has memory; and it almost has veneration. It is a very difficult
question, but there is a Psyche or soul which is perishable, and which is the
analogue to the Psyche in this paper. The doctrine of which I complain
lowers the human Psyche to the level of the brute Psyche; of course there
being a vast interval between the two, but their nature being the same.
As the soul is the life of the body, so I take it the spirit is the life of the soul.
You reach the soul through the body, but you only reach the spirit through the

* Biblical exegesis is without the scope of the objects of this Institute,
otherwise I would give at length the difficulties which result from attaching
such a meaning to the verse in question. Pearson, in a most elaborate argu­
ment, holds that the Spirit of Him “who is from everlasting,” strove with
the spirits of those who lived before the Flood (Gen. vi. 3), and that He
used Noah as His instrument in preaching righteousness to them (2 Pet. ii. 5);
that the spirits of those who rejected His word were now in prison
-awaiting the sentence of the last day). Most commentators support this
view. See also Parkhurst.—Ed.
soul. I forget who it is, but some one has said that the body is the house in which the soul lives, but the soul is the house in which the spirit lives, and I think that illustrates the case very admirably—at least it appeals to me more than anything else. Death comes and separates the body from both soul and spirit; it does not disintegrate the soul from the spirit, for they, being inseparable, go together to their eternal resting-place, and the soul and the spirit are capable of being really touched, both together, by the higher power of the Holy Spirit, as in the twelfth verse of the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews: “For the word of God is quick and powerful and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit”; not separating but dividing between them, reaching into the spirit and renewing it. The soul, I imagine, is often touched, but the spirit not reached, and that accounts for the fact that in the New Testament the spirit is sometimes spoken of as going to heaven, and the soul is sometimes spoken of as going to heaven: they are adopted as one, because when the spirit has received its higher life it has sanctified the soul. We come to the crucial text of St. Paul, where he prays that God will sanctify them in body, soul, and spirit. When a man is converted from sin, his affections are brought into play, and his body is brought into subjection, and the whole man becomes sanctified. It begins in the spirit, passes through the soul, and the moral and ethical part of man, and is then distributed through the members. That is the exposition of it. (Cheers.)

Rev. Edward White.—I have listened to the proceedings of this evening with interest, and would be glad to be allowed to offer one or two observations. The first subject on which I should like to say a word is the use of Scriptural language. It has been proved this evening that if there be any exact or scientific language at all in the Bible, it is not uniformly employed. A remark made by Mr. Graham appears to me to be quite sound, that the only approach to scientific language on the soul is to be found in the Epistle to the Corinthians. If we look back to the Old Testament, we find it is truly said in the book of Job that there is a spirit in man. But I always guard myself when quoting from Job, for there were three or four friends of Job whose utterances were not always the utterances of wisdom, and in fact they are condemned at the end as not having spoken according to the mind of God; and when any of these discourse philosophically I will not be bound by his statements. But why should there have been a greater exactness then than now? I apprehend that they spoke then as now, indifferently of soul or of spirit. There is a passage in Ecclesiastes which is of great importance, for in the third chapter it is said: “Who knoweth the ruach of man that goeth upward, and the ruach of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?” Now there the sacred writer speaks of the animating principle of the beast under the name of “ruach,” and this proves that it is in vain to look for strict and scientific language in the Bible. The only approach to it is in that important passage on the creation of man, on which St. Paul comments in the First Epistle to the Corinthians—“God formed man of the dust of the earth, and he became a living soul.” English writers
attach to that phrase the idea that it was some high distinguishing principle in man, but the same thing is said of the animals that died in the Deluge. I consider that St. Paul argues on this very identity in the 15th chapter, when he says that “the first man Adam was made a living soul, but the last Adam was made a quickening spirit.” There, undoubtedly, St. Paul makes a strong distinction between the Psyche and the Pneuma; and his words are a comment on the nephesh hhayyah; but, be it observed, St. Paul introduces the distinction to show that the first man was χορδής, a man of dust, an animal man, while the second man is a spirit from heaven. As to St. Paul’s language, which is more precise than that of the other writers, turn to the second chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, where he distinguishes between the ψυχικός and the πνευματικός. The ψυχικός is different from the πνευματικός, not in that he has not mind, or spirit, or feeling, but in that he has not the spiritual feeling, and is unable to comprehend the divine relations, while the πνευματικός comprehends all things. There has been a controversy in the Christian church for many years on the question whether the natural man possesses pneuma. Mr. Heard and others hold that every man has a body, soul, and spirit; but there are others who hold with Mr. Gosse that man has only body and soul, and that Pneuma is the result of regeneration. And they are not without some support from the Bible; for our Lord’s own words to Nicodemus are strong, where he says “That which is born of the flesh is flesh,” and “except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.”

Mr. Titcomb.—Mr. Heard believes that everybody has the Pneuma, but in a dead or torpid state until regeneration.

Mr. White.—Yes, that is so. One of the most able advocates of the opposite theory, Dr. William Morris, cites against Mr. Heard, two passages—first, “That which is born of the spirit is spirit,” and then that passage from St. Jude: “Fleshly men not having spirit.” It may be said that that is merely rhetorical language, and that men, until born of God, may be said not to have spirit apart from their animal life; but those who are learned in the theory, maintain it most stoutly, reminding one of Luther in his battle with Zwingle, when he said “There are the words, This is my body—I defy you to contradict them.”

The Chairman.—There is no article in the Greek, is there?

Mr. White.—No, it is not “the spirit.” As to the argument in Mr. English’s paper, I do not like to say all I feel about it. I could speak more strongly in Mr. English’s presence than I would venture to do behind his back. I cannot compliment him on his clearness. For example, taking the case of the ladies, if we are to argue anything from the silence of the Scriptures, the inference from the books of Moses is that women have neither souls nor spirits, as there is not a word in the Scriptures about their souls or spirits at all. But would not that be a monstrous exaggeration? As to the survival of the psyche, what is the inference which is to be drawn from the statement of Our Lord—“Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both body and
If the New Testament doctrine were that only the Pneuma survived, there ought to be some clear statement to that effect.

Mr. James Bateman.—So far, you have all united in pulling Mr. English's paper to pieces; now I should like to throw in a word on the other side. I differ from its metaphysical deductions, but I think it valuable in the shaft it has sunk into other matters bearing on the relation of the Pneuma and the Psyche to being. In pneumatology—the science of spirits—there are two distinct divisions, one referring to spirits as living things, the other referring to the science of ethics and morals, and philosophy and metaphysics, as deducible from the relation between body, soul, and spirit. I thought the discussion would have turned on spirits as such, and I thought it might have been a very useful discussion too. If we gathered together the evidence contained in Scripture on spirits clean and unclean, we might find very valuable matter to assist us to form a true judgment on many points which are now controverted. We all know of the abomination of "spiritualism," and there are many who believe that the agencies at work are really the spirits of the departed; but I utterly repudiate the notion. They are not the spirits of the departed, but I believe them to be unclean spirits that are wandering about—far more numerous than man, and quite conscious that the time is coming when they will be cast into the abyss; and as the end draws near, we may be sure that they will be more and more active for evil; and hence the many ways in which they now bewilder men's minds. That is one line of thought which I conceived we might enter upon, and indeed it would be very useful to do so upon another occasion. But the paper deals with the sleep of death, and moral probation after death, and space and time in Hades. Now all those things are most interesting, bearing, as they do, on the controversy between Protestants and Romanists. Moral probation after death brings us into the domain of purgatory, and it would be very useful to see what Scripture teaches, or rather does not teach, upon that point. If we could get a clear notion of the distinction between body, soul, and spirit, we would be greatly assisted in forming a proper view on all the above important matters. Mr. White has told us that he thinks the language of Scripture on these points is not scientific. Now I venture to differ from him, because I think there is a marvellous scientific accuracy in Scripture. Take two instances bearing upon the question before us: one is in the book of Ecclesiastes, where there is a contrast drawn between the spirit of man and the spirit of the beast; and it is said: "Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?" the customary inference being that man, after death, ascends to the skies, while the beast returns to its mother earth. But our best Hebrew scholars say that the word there is not "spirit" in the sense of being a part of our nature, but "spirit" in the sense in which it is used in other passages as breath. Here, then, we have a most graphic description. The breath of the beast, pumped out through its nostrils, goes down to the earth, but the breath of man ascends.
Mr. Graham.—But it is more than breath that goes up to God.

Mr. Bateman.—Yes, we know that, when it is meant of the glorified spirit, but I maintain that in this instance it is only breath that is meant, and therefore there is nothing to interfere with the scientific accuracy of cognate passages. While I dissent very much from the metaphysical deductions of Mr. English's paper, I think it will eventually be found that he is right in this threefold distinction of body, soul, and spirit. Together they make up our present selves; but in the future state the spirit or Pneuma will exist, though I doubt whether the Psyche will, seeing that it is essentially related to our flesh and blood. But I believe that the more we examine into these things, the more perfectly and scientifically accurate shall we find the language respecting them in Scripture. (Cheers.)

The Chairman.—I will not detain you very long, but I must say a word or two before this discussion closes. I do not quite agree with the paper before us, but I should like to make some defence for it on one or two points; and whether we agree with it or not, we must admit that it has been written in a very inoffensive tone. I will not believe anything which I do not consider reasonable. We are told to give a reason for the hope that is in us, and we are rebuked for not exercising our reason and judging what is right, and I will never give up the notion that all true religion must be reasonable. As for the rationalists, as they are called, I can only say that they are not entitled to the name. In those very remarkable papers which Dr. Irons read last session on Human Responsibility, he referred to the Compteists, who consider themselves inductive philosophers; but, as he pointed out, they do not make any induction of all the facts that relate to the Pneuma and the Psyche; but I maintain that they will in the end, be bound to take notice of many things that are not now "dreamed of in their philosophy." (Cheers.) I think that Mr. Row's gallant attack on Mr. English was not altogether opportune. We must not take our own interpretation of words that an author may use, but we must take his interpretation of them; and according to Mr. English's definition of the Psyche, he meant nothing derogatory to women, but just adduced the point that women are more religious than men, because they have less Pneuma, which leads to intellectual effort. Everybody admits the fact that there is a great difference between women under the Christian dispensation and under the old dispensation and among the heathen; and without going into Roman Catholic views about the blessing of redemption having come to us immediately through the Blessed Virgin Mary, who had faith in God's promise, and was chosen to be the vehicle for the coming of our Blessed Lord, we may think that if Adam blamed Eve for the fall, we had the redemption brought to us by Mary—the one was as blameworthy as the other was praiseworthy. But these sexual recriminations are altogether unworthy. As to the animals, Mr. English's reply to Mr. Titcomb would be that those animals have intelligence as well as affections; for he implied that they had a conscience, an intelligence, and an intellect. At least it must be admitted (he would say) that they have Pneuma as well as Psyche; but that does not, therefore, put them on a level with man. Although Mr. English speaks of
the soul dying with the body—with which I do not agree—still he believes in the resurrection of the body in a purified and different condition with the Psyche. That differs from Mr. Bateman's idea in saying that the spirit would be found in another world, and not the soul.

Mr. Graham.—Mr. English's words are that the Psyche dies.

The Chairman.—And yet he believes in the resurrection of the body with the soul—his theory is not that that the soul perishes utterly. But we shall resume this subject in April, when Mr. Graham will read his paper.

The Meeting was then adjourned.

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THE REV. W. W. ENGLISH'S REPLY.

I desire to make a few remarks upon two or three points in the speeches and criticisms on my paper.

The Place of Reason.—I think Mr. Row has put reason out of its proper place in regard to the Christian religion, and, if he will forgive me saying it, he has also put it out of its proper place in ratiocination when he takes my words "the Pneuma is a foundation quite incapable of bearing the superstructure which we mean when we speak of what is holy and just and good," and insists that it is a "strictly logical consequence" to say that God, being Himself Pneuma, according to my statement, would be "neither holy, just, nor good." I am not aware of any "logical" rules which justify one in reasoning from man's tripartite nature to what is true of God, the Great Spirit. I think there is one logical rule which forbids this, or rather convict of it, the charge of fallaciousness. What I maintain is that the terms holy, just, and good, as regards man, refer to what is psychical and ethical rather than pneumatical and rational, not meaning of course that Pneuma has nothing to do with holiness, justice, and goodness, but that Psyche rather than Pneuma is the foundation of these. The sentimental theory of conscience implies priority of feeling, not feeling to the exclusion of reason, in its exercise. I thought I had guarded myself sufficiently against this misinterpretation of my words in section 20, where I say "Pneuma has its part to fill, &c., but is not the basis of either religion or morality." Nor is Mr. Row more fortunate in convicting me of a "misquotation," for I think he quotes one passage and I another. Nor yet can I admit that my views use the ladies "badly" where I give them, psychologically speaking, their proper place. Indeed when I say they are more religious than men, because of their psychological propensities, I do them simple justice. Because St. James uses Psyche in an "unfavourable" sense, I hope Mr. Row did not mean it to be inferred that therefore the ladies, having Psyche in predominance, could not be more religious than men, as I had stated. Nor did I argue from "Adam's rib" in favour of anything distinctive of woman, but from the passage in Genesis, coupled with St. Paul's statement in 1 Cor. xi. 7—9, which has evidently escaped Mr. Row's notice. Reason, Mr. Row admits, cannot "discover everything," but contends that when God has revealed a thing "reason is the only thing that is capable of dealing with it." I deny the proposition entirely,
and will test it by the Apostles' Creed. "Conceived by the Holy Ghost," is part of its statement and is the foundation of Christianity. The Duke of Somerset has "dealt with this" part of the Creed by "reason alone," and rejected it, and my words in this paper, "faith is not the product of reason," are true enough here. But if so, Mr. Row's views of reason, as a final arbiter in matters of religion, are proved to be untenable, and, I think, destructive of Christian dogma.

Psyche, &c.—Mr. Graham says, truly enough, that God is represented as having Psyche. But he is also represented as having "hands," &c. I never meant that terms expressive of man's nature were not applied to God, but that "Nepesh is never, like Neshamah and Ruach, applied to God" as His proper designation. Anthropomorphic representations of God abound in both Testaments; but this is not the question. Again in saying that "the Church" adopted certain phrases, Mr. Graham objects "it is not the Church that gives us the Bible, but God." I think the Church was called out in the person of Abraham with the set purpose of giving us the Bible. The Bible came to us through the Church most certainly. I had fully answered by anticipation what Mr. Graham says about the translation of Psyche, but, at the suggestion of the late Mr. Reddie, it was omitted, with matter deemed to be too theological. I will not ask to have reinstated any of this, but say that I am fully convinced that the passages referred to, when fairly examined, do not militate against any position I have laid down.

The Mortality of Psyche.—Mr. Titcomb thinks my views in regard to the soul dying need protesting against. They were held by several in the Primitive Church. It is a position that I lay no stress upon. I simply adopt it as the teaching, so far as I understand it, of the Holy Scriptures. No parable can be adduced to prove the contrary of the many plain passages I have referred to. Nor do I see any other "proofs" that Mr. Titcomb has adduced, though he speaks as if there were such. There may be feeling without an "ethical capacity" most certainly, after death, as we know from the lower animals there is before death. Dives had feeling, after death, but not, I think, an "ethical capacity" for improvement. Our Lord, says St. Peter, went and preached to the spirits in prison, and, in answer to Mr. Titcomb's question, if they had not an ethical capacity, how could preaching be "of any use" to them? I reply, that supposing preaching to mean the declaration of pardon, what need of an ethical capacity for this to have effect? In section 27 I say, though probation is over and improvement impossible, "man may be pardoned; this is another and a different question," which I express no opinion upon. The text "What shall it profit a man, &c.," is dealt with in section 11. Life here and life after the resurrection are contrasted. Both imply Psyche of course. The intermediate state is there passed over. Mr. Titcomb should have noticed my reasons for saying this. I say the intermediate state passed over in this passage does not imply the existence of Psyche, and I fail to see any attempt to answer this position. Mr. Titcomb quotes this text, but does not refer to my use of it, and the reasons given for not taking his view.