

UNIVERSAL MENTAL TIME

It is now many years since it was announced that time and space are no more ; henceforth there is only a mixture of the two. Yet a deeper analysis remained unwilling to admit that an order of succession in time, before and after, was not the fundamental feature in consciousness, and that arrangement in space was subordinate (cf. A. A. Robb)¹ as being the necessary condition that the successions in time that belong to the various conscious agents, wherever situated and however rapidly in motion, should be mutually consistent. Time would thus belong to the world of mind, and as so it would be expected to have the same succession for all minds everywhere : for that would appear to be a necessary condition for the universality of the laws of reasoning, which, however imperfect—yet perhaps improving—they may be, no one has yet pronounced to be inconsistent as developed by different minds. The world has to adapt itself to universal mind.

Thus it has been a comfort to recognize and insist that in the modified recent exposition of time and space, the so-called theory of relativity, the successions of time for all actual or possible observers associated with local material environments are in fact identical. This is perhaps one of the few instances in which a material scientific development, when properly adjusted, does prove to conform to what would be expected in the universal and unique mental cosmos. But a slight discrepancy has developed in the current adaptation of gravitation, which also is supposed to be universal, into the scheme ; for a field of gravitational influence is alleged to alter the personal flux of time, though very slightly, so as to deviate from the universal standard : that is, that personal universal time is slightly disturbed by neighbouring systems and that this is in the main the essence of gravitation. This can be challenged : and it does seem that one necessary correlation between the world of universal ratiocination and the world of material succession has here been turned up in valid form, which is perhaps equally satisfactory for both worlds. The difficulty in these considerations is the use of the same term, such as time, tacitly in quite different senses. May we, employing the mysterious term 'clocks' of the modern relativity scheme (cf. A. Einstein), assert as a mode of statement, perhaps in substance agreed generally, of this correlation, that every thinking agent associated with a material environment of its own operating on its sensual perception, has an ideal 'clock' of its own which keeps universal time so far as its owner is concerned, but which to another observer not its own, but rushing past it in rapid motion, is found by the rays of light that

¹ His latest book is *Geometry of Time and Space* (Cambridge 1936) : cf. also a notice now prepared for Royal Society Observatories.

come from it to record an apparent succession of time somewhat different from its own standard universal value? This discrepancy is inevitable from the rays of light taking time to travel, which is, in some way not yet fully fathomed, a necessary condition for any extensive scheme of knowledge.

The intellect is fully engaged in profitably adjusting and organizing the more regular features of the wrack that is cast up on the shore of human experience from the unfathomable ocean of existence beyond: and a rather complex frame of space and time for the organization of knowledge is an essential feature, as contrasted perhaps with the requirements of a less elastic and more limited instantaneous mental world.

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DID ORIGEN STYLE THE SON A *ΚΤΙΣΜΑ*?

IN a passage which may represent the original of a portion of the *De Principiis* [iv 4 1(28); Koetschau, p. 349], and which is set forth by Justinian as a quotation from Origen, it is asserted that the Son is a *κτίσμα*. The passage runs: οὗτος δὴ ὁ υἱὸς ἐκ θελήματος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐγενήθη, ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, χαρακτήρ τε τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, πρωτότοκος πάσης τῆς κτίσεως, κτίσμα, σοφία. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ σοφία φησὶν ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισέ με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ. [*Ep. ad Mennam*, Mansi ix 525; quoted by Koetschau, p. 349, and by Harnack *Der Scholien-Kommentar*, 6^c. p. 57—see *infra*.]

Apart from the word *κτίσμα* itself, there is little, if anything, in this alleged extract from Origen's writing to excite surprise or to arouse suspicion. That he taught the Son to have been begotten of the Father by an act of will, though not in time, is certain. That he accepted and made a good deal of the five quotations from Scripture which make up substantially the remainder of the passage is equally undoubted. Since in two of these, both frequently quoted and strongly emphasized in all Origen's writings, the idea of 'createdness' is uppermost, it is difficult to see anything strange in his having referred to the Son as a created being or *κτίσμα*. This, of course, is not to say that Origen's view of the Son was Arian. That would be as much of an anachronism as to array him on the side of the true Nicenes. But unless Origen was serious about his subordinationism and definite in his teaching with respect to it, the subsequent history of doctrine in the East (e.g. Dionysius of Alexandria's *ποίημα*, the whole story of Paul of Samosata's condemnation, Eusebius of Caesarea, his namesake of