SEMITIC THEISM

'Semitic theism'—to put it briefly—is the subject of the monumental work of the late Count Baudissin of Berlin, for the publication of which we are indebted to the loyal piety, patience, and scholarship of his pupil, Prof. Otto Eissfeldt of Halle a. S.\(^1\) It is the culmination of a long life (1847–1926) throughout devoted to the study of Semitic religion, a field in which his was one of the most outstanding names. For over half a century Baudissin's numerous monographs, articles, and reviews indicated an encyclopaedic and independent mind, and he was described—by Deissmann—as a father of modern religionsgeschichtlich research. In this elaborate work, in three volumes, totalling over 1,600 pages, with a supplementary volume by Eissfeldt, including 100 pages of additional notes by the Editor and exhaustive indexes (mainly by Julius Rieger), we have, not merely the most extensive work of its kind, but, I venture to think, the most suggestive and stimulating since Robertson Smith's Religion of the Semites. It is with the life-work of one whose own span of activity fell within that of Baudissin himself that Kyrios immediately invites comparison. Indeed, while we owe much even to Baudissin's earliest writings—for example, his study of the concept of 'holiness', a concept which holds a central place with Robertson Smith\(^2\)—one is tempted to believe that the opening chapters of Religion of the Semites, and especially Lectures II and III, stimulated Baudissin—even if unconsciously—to undertake his present exhaustive enquiry. At all events, in the course of it some of Smith's most fundamental views are criticized, with unfailing courtesy and respect, but in a way that will not fail to provoke a fresh and independent examination of the nature and history of Semitic theism. Baudissin and Smith approach the subject from different stand-points: it could be said that they emphasize, respectively, Divine Transcendence and Divine Immanence. Certainly Baudissin's volumes mark a fresh step in the study of Semitic religion, and, coming as they do at a day when the accumulation of material has run past the more technical labour of effectively organizing it, they are likely to have considerable influence. Indeed, Eissfeldt, commenting on the present absence of regulative and synthesizing principles, regards Baudissin's work as programmatisch (vol. i p. vi).\(^3\) If for this reason alone, the volumes claim attention, to the end that students of Semitic religion may do justice alike to Baudissin and

---

\(^1\) Kyrios als Gottesname im Judentum und seine Stelle in der Religionsgeschichte (Tüpelmann, Giessen, 1926).

\(^2\) Cf. the latter's reference, Prophets of Israel 2nd ed. p. 424.

\(^3\) Attention may be drawn here to Eissfeldt's fine appreciation of Baudissin's life-work, in the Z.D.M.G. 1926 pp. 89-130.
his great predecessor. To the present writer the permanent value of *Kyrios* lies in its relation to the *Religion of the Semites* as much as in its extraordinary suggestiveness, and this article, after giving a brief survey of the contents of the former, will refer to some of the larger issues which Baudissin directly or indirectly discusses or raises.

The questions with which Baudissin is concerned turn upon the use of *kyrios* by the LXX to translate the Hebrew divine name: why was it used, and what did it connote? Philo, as we know, distinguishes *kyrios* and *theos* as two divine powers, the ruler and the gracious deity respectively; the Rabbis also made a distinction, but to them Yahweh was the milder, and Elohim the sterner, deity. Now the Jewish tendency to avoid the name Yahweh—the question of its true pronunciation may be ignored—and to use the special form *Adonay* is commonly the starting-point of the discussion of the divine names; but Baudissin argues, and with success, that the Greek *kyrios* is not a translation of *Adonay*; it is the cause of it and of its intrusion into the Hebrew text. *Kyrios* and *Adonay* have not the same connotation; and it is an essential part of the argument that while the latter comes to connote absolute Deity, *kyrios* is the lord of the worshipper and implies a personal relationship which goes back ultimately to the old idea of the tribe and its god.¹ Both are fundamentally Semitic nuances; and both reach their clearest expression at about the beginning of the Christian era. The argument runs along three converging lines: (a) the evidence of the LXX, (b) the Hebrew divine names in themselves and in their relation to other Semitic names, and (c) the development of the conception of God in the religions of Semitic peoples—the last (vol. iii) being a most helpful and stimulating exposition of the subject, which alone makes the whole work indispensable for all deeper study of the religions of the ancient Near East.

Baudissin's discussion is throughout minute, even excessively so. It involves (vol. i) a detailed examination of the use of *kyrios* with and without the article—to this Baudissin was stimulated by the work of B. Weiss in 1911 (i 33 n.).² Of great importance for the whole argument is his study of the use of *kyrios* to translate other names of the God of Israel besides that of Yahweh, whence it follows that the word does not depend upon that name alone. In a close survey, covering two-thirds of the 600

¹ Cf. Dr J. A. Smith in *J.T.S.* xxxi 155 sqq. (*kyrios* involves no "servile" relationship).

² It may perhaps be helpful to keep in mind the word Sir (in its widest application), the far more formal (or absolute) Sire or Seigneur, and the fact that these words are derived from Senior, which implies a Junior or subordinate. So, Baudissin is distinguishing (1) *Adon* and *Kyrios*, Sir, (2) *Adonay*, Seigneur, and (3) the relationship which is implied between the lord (or senior) and his worshipper (or junior).
pages of vol. i, Baudissin traverses the O.T. and Apocrypha, analysing
the use of theos and kyrios with and without the article, classifying the use
of the latter in the nominative and in the oblique cases, with and without a
preposition, its employment for Hebrew names other than Yahweh, its
use as a proper name, and its connotation. All this involves a number
of special studies, e.g. the relation between 1 and 2 Esdras and between
both and Chronicles, the significance of the peculiar use of the divine
names in Chronicles, the tendency to give fuller content to kyrios, so
that it seems to break off its connexion with Yahweh (i 477), the
implication of the possessive my, thy, your, etc., when kyrios as a proper
name is used alone—for kyrios never lost its secular meaning of ruler, etc.,
but as a divine name implied that there were subordinates.

In vol. i, part ii, Baudissin considers the use of kyrios from another angle:
does it necessarily point to (1) 'a Hebrew Adonay (or the like, viz.
Adon, Adonay), whether written or merely pronounced, for an original
Yahweh, or (2) to the name Yahweh itself? Often the LXX testifies
to a vocative 'my lord' or to 'Yahweh', rather than to any Adonay;
and it appears (a) that for the present textual reading Adonay Yahweh
(or Yahweh Adonay) the original Hebrew must have had Yahweh alone;
and (b) that this divine name was still unchanged. The evidence of Ezekiel
is especially important (i 525–568) on account of the phenomena in
ch. i–xxxix, where LXX and Old Latin still preserve the simple kyrios,
dominus, for the double name in the Masoretic text (with which agree
Targum, Peshitta, and Vulgate). There is further difference of usage,
which suggests that in the LXX, ch. i–xx (or xxvii) and xxi (or
xxviii)–xxxix and xl–xlviii had each an independent history, with indepen-
dent redactional processes, first in the M.T. and then in LXX.
But the vocative 'lord God', where 'my (our) lord' is at least implied,
is older than the combination of the two proper names, where the
possessive my is out of the question; and some principle has been at
work—e.g. to give additional solemnity—in those cases where the
proper name Adonay has been added to Yahweh. In general, out of
270 cases of the double divine name in the third person only eighteen
are vouched for by the LXX (i 597), and it begins to be apparent that
the redactional changes in the M.T. are, on the whole, later than the
LXX; even the translator of Sirach (c. 132 b.c.) did not know that
Yahweh was to be pronounced Adonay or replaced by it.

In the second volume (316 pages) Baudissin approaches the problem
from the Hebrew side. This involves a study of the ethnic and Jewish-
Hellenistic use of kyrios, the origin of the forms Iao and Yahweh, and
the question whether kyrios would have been used in the LXX for other
names than Yahweh (e.g. El) had it not become the divine name
καὶ Χρίφα. If the ending -ay in Adonay was originally a suffix (-ay)
the title (‘my lord’) could have been used only in the vocative; and, against Dalman’s view that, apart from some admitted exceptions, the -ay is not meaningless, Baudissin argues that frequently a suffix would be entirely unsuitable. The origin of the word adon itself is uncertain, but there is a Semitic tendency to address a god with a possessive suffix (ii 34); and where the suffix in Adonay has any meaning it is used in personal appeal, or expresses a personal relationship with the god. Discussing the use of such suffixes—the Gaza god Marna(s) is dealt with fully—Baudissin introduces an important point: the expression of individual (as distinct from tribal or group) relationship to a god is Akkadian (i.e. Babylonian and Assyrian) rather than West Semitic (Aramaic, Canaanite, Hebrew, etc.), and it is Phoenician rather than Israelite (ii 54, cf. 29, and iii 558).

Next, the form Ādōnāy does not belong to the O.T. period, and can hardly have grown naturally out of old usage (ii 57). It was not used for Yahweh until after the Pentateuch had become canonical and before Chronicles became part of the canon. There is inconsistency in the redactional insertion of Adonay before or after Yahweh, and it is sometimes noticeably absent, viz. in Jeremiah (ii 86). The use of Adonay is an artificiality, and belongs to ceremonial rather than popular usage; it came in about the Christian era. But the Tetragrammaton—in some form—seems to have been still in use, and the Book of Jubilees—in contrast to Maccabees—testifies to it (ii 144, 167). Perhaps Ādōnāy was artificially inserted only into texts that were regarded as especially holy. The fear of mentioning the divine name Yahweh is not due to Egyptian influence (ii 170 n.; against Dalman); and Leviticus, xxiv 16, is not to be interpreted as prohibiting the pronunciation of it (ii 175, cf. vol. iv 189). It would seem that the name Yahweh might be avoided because there was no definite substitute; while in the Targums it could be freely written, simply because, later, it was invariably pronounced Ādōnāy (ii 173, cf. 192 n., 233). Baudissin maintains the fuller form Yahweh, and argues that the Rabbinical warnings against the use of the divine name refer to it, and not to the form Iao which, it would seem, began to fall out of use in the second or third centuries A.D., and survived only in literary tradition (ii 232 sqq.). His argument, it will be seen, presupposes two forms (Yahweh or Yahu and Iaō) of one god; it neither regards Iao as a god other than the Israelite Yahweh, nor does it accept the recent tendency to reject the form Yahweh and treat Y-h-w-h—however pronounced—as merely another spelling of Yahu-Iao. His argument implies that the stricter Judaism which would replace the Tetragrammaton by Ādōnāy would have had to contend with the persistence of the Hebrew Y-h-w-h and the Greek Iao (ii 226 sqq.). Evidently the last word has not yet been said on the
pronunciation of the Hebrew Y-h-w-h and the relation between it and the forms Yahu, Iao, etc.  

Chapter viii is important. *Kyrios* does not translate the Hebrew Adonay, and Geiger and Cheyne had already, on different grounds, suspected that *kyrios* was the prior. As for the connotation of *kyrios*, Baudissin proceeds to discuss Semitic ideas of lordship. It is lordship over man, and not nature, e.g. the 'lord of all the earth' is lord of the peoples of the earth. Oriental usage has influenced the non-Jewish use of *kyrios, kyria* in Hellenistic circles; and from the Semites (of Syria or Phoenicia) it can have passed over into Egypt (ii 266 sqq.). The *kyrios* is princeps inter pares, a deity is *theos* in his own right, but *kyrios* to those who call upon him; and Baudissin rejects Boussèt’s view that the latter could be used of the leader of a communal cult. The use of *kyrios* as an epithet expressing or implying some relationship is distinct from its use as an absolute title or proper name—not found before the second century B.C.—and has a connotation of its own (ii 295). Just before or after the beginning of the Christian era, at an age when conceptions of God were undergoing widespread development, the scribes replaced one Tetragrammaton Y-h-w-h by another A-d-n-y (‘Adonay), where the force of the suffix was lost, and they employed it to express, not so much God’s relation to Israel, as his transcendence over Israel, the nations, and nature. To express relationship Judaism preferred Ribôni. The Alexandrian Jews of course had ideas of universalism: but they used *theos* of God in his relationship to the world. Hence ‘Adonay (Seigneur) on the one side, and *kyrios* (*dominus*) on the other, represent two streams of tendencies, which are not confined to the Semites (ii 310 sqq.).

Finally, in vol. iii (710 pages), Baudissin discusses at length, with practically exhaustive lists of relevant proper names and other material, the leading ideas in Semitic theism. More difficult to summarize than even the preceding, this volume is by far of most general interest and value. Ideas of divine overlordship are deep-rooted in Semitic (iii 70, cf. 87 sqq.); and, in his discussion of the various names for ‘god’, Baudissin argues that Baal differs from *El* in typically representing some personal relationship, and not the god in himself, nor the god as owner or possessor. Here and elsewhere, however, Akkadian usage stands more or less alone. The O.T. usage of the divine names runs parallel to that of the Semites in general, and Baudissin’s views of religious development deserve particular attention, partly because of his profound knowledge of the

---

1 See Lukyn Williams, *J.T.S.* xxviii. 276 sqq. Baudissin (ii 222 sqq., cf. iv 10) collects the forms *i a B e, i a B a s*, etc., and notes that Mandaeans distinguishes Adonay and Yo (ii 231).

2 ii 283 n.; cf. also 298 n. 4, and iii 705 with the *Nachtrag*.

3 So also the Deism of Islam is softened by the use of *rabbi* (ii 36, iii 678).
whole Semitic field, and partly because, as years passed, he gradually adopted the 'critical' attitude towards the writings of the O.T. He attempts to distinguish the religion of (a) Canaan, (b) the Pre-Mosaic Hebrews, and (c) the Israelites after Moses, and his remarks on the second are important. The book of Genesis, he considers, is not a safe guide to Pre-Mosaic religion (iii 123–176). El was no specific local divine name; and, although the (Canaanite) Elim were no better than the Baalim, later repudiation of the Baalim accounts for the absence of the latter and the retention of the Elim. Baudissin sees no justification for the view that the Deity in the stories in Genesis acts differently from the Yahweh of the later books—against the familiar supposition that Genesis has traces of an earlier Pre-Mosaic type of religion; such differences as are alleged are due to the idealizing aim of the writers who, *inter alia*, wish to emphasize the novelty and peculiarity of the Sinaitic covenant. There is *eine Zurück-datierung der Volksreligion* (152), and the god of the patriarchs is not that of separate individuals or tribes, but of representatives of an all-Israel. The reconstruction of the Pre-Mosaic religion of the nomadic Hebrews settled in Palestine is, he thinks, one of the most difficult tasks of *Religionsgeschichte* (pp. 158 sqq.; useful); and our material is to be found in (1) what is not Canaanite (Phoenician, etc.), but, in so far as it is not borrowed, can be called Hebrew or Israelite, and (2) what is common to all the Semites. The enquiry is, however, complicated by the fact that the religion of the Canaanites would contain survivals of their earlier nomadic stage, and that Baudissin, like Kuenen, Dussaud, and others, finds much in the O.T. that is really 'Canaanite', rather than due to Hebrew or Israelite tribes from the desert. Further, (3) Mosaism meant the formation of a *Volksreligion*, and since we may naturally presume the earlier existence of tribal religion with its gods, we may conclude that these tribal gods were replaced by a single *Volksgott*, who indeed may have been already the god of one of those tribes.

Another chapter of special interest deals with the biblical conceptions of Yahweh (pp. 176–242). It introduces us to the question of gods as nature-powers, for Yahweh is distinctively an ethical god, and his functions in history are so many sided that 'Yahweh' is a proper name, like a man's name, denoting one who cannot be summed up in a single title or attribute. The name Yahweh comes to cover all that the god has been and can be; 'lord' would be much too narrow a term (pp. 202 sq.,

---

1 See Eissfeldt *Z.D.M.G.* 1926, pp. 95, 98; cf. here, iii 115 (on Gen. xiv 18 sqq.), 331 (the fiction of a 'family history'), 434 sqq. (on P).

2 This tendency, also found in Gressmann (who uses the term 'Amorite'), finds independent confirmation in the archaeological evidence for established religious conditions in Pre-Israelite Palestine.
212). With Deuteronomy and later writers new developments can be traced. The god as ‘king’ is Isaianic (p. 97), but is more especially found in the later literature. Similarly Yahweh’s ‘greatness’ is enhanced, especially in the Psalms, which Baudissin definitely considers post-exilic. The idea of his holiness is more intense, but it is less rather than more ethical (pp. 226 sq.), and we miss the earlier immediacy of Yahweh. If the name is less used, it is because—among other reasons—it is becoming more mysterious, and the way is being prepared for the use of Ἀδῶν (in some form) and kyrios. A religion is not shaped by a people’s language, but must shape the language to its needs; hence the existence of secular words for ‘lord’ (ἀδῶν, kyrios) preserved something of the natural meaning of Adonay and Kyrios as divine names, whereas proper names—like Zeus, etc.—with no immediately obvious meaning were on another footing. Analysing the content of Ἀδῶν, Baal, Kyrios, etc., Baudissin is at pains to emphasize the absence of any real gulf between superior and inferior or between god and worshipper from the tribal constitution upwards. In the course of a long discussion of the term Baal, in which he insists upon the idea of personal relationship rather than mere ownership of property, he distinguishes the El, the god in himself, or the god par excellence, and the Baal who embodies all that the tribe desires or values.

The wide distribution of El is noteworthy, but indicates a certain indifference, no closer determination being felt to be necessary. Although the Elim may be mere numina, and even without personal qualities, we cannot carry back our enquiry into the history of religion before the stage of tribal religion. This is to be kept in mind. Our starting-point is social religion, and in the following chapter (pp. 379-403) we have an admirable discussion of the tribal god and ideas of legal Right and Righteousness. A tribe, as such, differs from the horde in its recognition of ‘Right’, which is associated with a leader, a god, who, as such, is not, says Baudissin, a mere nature-god. The tribal god is judge of his own tribe and of its immediate neighbours; and such a god is more ethical and less particularist than the god who is the god and ‘father’ of a family (pp. 391, 420). His markedly original study of the ‘righteousness’ of gods is practically a reprint from his contribution to the Harnack-Festgabe (in 1921), and is the first of its kind. The essential meaning of the root š-d-k is that of the conformity of a person (or thing) to that which may be expected of him (or it); and, although he considers it especially juridisch (p. 402 sq., cf. pp. 425 sqq.), repeatedly he

1 Here one naturally thinks of the interpretation of Y-h-w-h in Exod. iii 14 (E), which presupposes a pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton which suggested it, whereas an original Yahu (or the like) would be unlikely to suggest ehyeh asher ehyeh.

2 Pp. 234 sqq.; Yahweh as ‘king’ in the Psalms is also not pre-exilic (pp. 218, 235).
understands it to involve the idea of a norm, a conception which seems
to me to be far more fundamental.\footnote{In view of my note in Robertson Smith's \textit{Rel. of the Semites} (3rd ed.) pp. 555 sqq., I give some references to Baudissin: i-iii 388, 421 (\textit{maqāṣeṭ}), 422 (\textit{maṣṣ}), 424, 428, 432, 439, 450, and 664. I do not understand his rendering '\textit{gēdā}' (p. 404, n. 1, cf. 422), which hampers his argument, p. 406, n. 1 (where the general meaning of the root is well said to be \textit{einer Norm entsprechen}).} Hence Right(eous)ness is primarily
the usual tribal and cult obligations; and here we miss—if we may rely
upon the full indexes to inscriptional and other sources—a reference to
the 'dues' on the Aramaic Teima inscription (\textit{C.I.S.} ii 113; Cooke
\textit{N. Sem. Inscr.} no. 67): it is one of the very rare omissions in this
encyclopaedic work. The root involves ideas of norm and of customary
behaviour not to be transgressed with impunity, whence arose the
problem whether suffering and all ills, evidences of divine wrath and
punishment, were arbitrary or not; but, although Baudissin does not
discuss this, it is obviously relevant, in view of his emphasis upon the
extent to which fear enters into the Semite's conception of his god.

'Right(eous)ness' is an ancient conception, the only definitely ethical
quality of the oldest Semitic gods—it is not applied to goddesses.
'Right' is not something created by the judge, but the judicial decision
presupposes it. Tribal order does not necessarily presuppose written
law, and the Israelite \textit{torah} is 'teaching' (\textit{lehre}, p. 432), or, better,
'direction'.\footnote{We may compare \textit{hōrah} in Gen. xlvii 28 ('not cited), and the widespread idea
of the 'way'. Baudissin rejects the view that \textit{torah} arose from 'lot-casting' (p. 437 n.).} Torah is \textit{eine in der Gottheit ruhende Norm} (p. 453,
cf. p. 450); and while the Greek found the 'law' within himself, in
Israel it comes from outside—Jer. xxxi 33 is exceptional (p. 454 sq.,
cf. pp. 426, 439)—though men find in themselves that it is true. Men
sin against their conscience in the one case, against God in the other.
We cannot, says Baudissin, understand Amos and the later prophets if they
were the first to frame the ethical demands which they assert; we have
to postulate a Moses, indeed ethical relations between the tribe and its
god are Old Semitic and, as such, Pre-Mosaic (p. 440, n. 3). But it
does not follow that the present Pentateuchal legislation existed before
the prophets. In general, law and culture are god-given—the agri-
culture lore in Is. xxviii 26 is Canaanite rather than old Israelite
(p. 448) and the Semitic god favours all that is for the \textit{lebenshaltung}
of his tribe. He is not \textit{kulturfeindlich}, and it was only because of the
character of Canaanite religion that Canaanite culture was condemned
(p. 451 n.). Baudissin, it should be observed, deliberately lays stress
upon the native Canaanite or Palestinian elements in Yahwism, rather
than the 'nomadic ideal' which has been so often emphasized, since
Buude. This characterizes also his important monograph \textit{Adonis und
Esmun}.
There is no absolute 'law'. The Semite's only 'Absolute' is the will of his god, to whom all nature is subservient (p. 428, n. 1). Hence the prominence of legalism in later Judaism and in Islam. The conception of a divine law in a wide sense is not, however, peculiar to the Semites, though to them rather than to other peoples the god is in the first instance he whose will is the norm (pp. 456 sqq.). Law and order are not immanent in nature—not even in the regular course of the stars—but they are to be seen in history, where the plans of the god (Yahweh) or the gods (in Babylonia) are unfolded in the course of human events. We reach the significant conclusion that the gods of the Semites primarily do not rule over nature but over men; they rule over nature only in so far as men are concerned. To put it otherwise, all speculation upon man and the universe begins with the god—and his group of worshippers.

The next chapter is devoted to ideas of the god and nature (pp. 463–524), and endeavours to distinguish between the ideas derived from tribal gods and those derived from nature-powers. Here Baudissin contends that, besides the tribal god, the members of a tribe might recognize other gods, who, however, did not stand in the same relation to them as the tribal god. Polytheism arose, not merely from the union of different tribes and tribal gods, but also through the presence of gods who were venerated, not by the tribe as a whole—as was the tribal god—but by sections thereof. Especially intricate is his analysis of the diverse origin of certain religious beliefs and practices: he finds the clearest traces of nature-gods in the sexual cults (pp. 481 sqq., 498). Throughout, his discussion of Nature and the gods is extremely suggestive, but to justify the criticisms one is tempted to make would take too much space.

Another vital chapter (pp. 524–610), on the relations between gods and worshippers, makes the point that the 'servant' of a god was not necessarily without honour—after all, the meaning of 'servant' turns upon the one whose servant the individual is—and although the 'ebel was a chattel, a piece of property, he placed himself in the hands of his lord and, in the Semitic world, might be a trusted servant. In the O.T. the servant-relationship becomes most marked in the sixth century B.C. and later (cf. p. 178), an age when Israel was feeling uncertain of its standing. In general, the individual 'servant' of a god is an earlier conception than 'servants' (used, e.g., in S. Arabia of a family or league, but not of a tribe or clan). Also, the 'fatherhood' of the god of the tribe is more primary than the 'sonship' of the individual—unless he be a king or a representative of the tribe or group (pp. 554,

1 The words italicized are important for the argument later on in this article (cf. p. 241, n. 2 below).
563, cf. 357 sqq.) From the personal names and other data Baudissin distinguishes three types of 'my god': (1) my (= our) group god who is addressed by the individual (king, prophet, or representative), (2) one of the supplementary gods, not the tribal god but the god, for example, of a guild, and (3) the personal or patron god of one and only one individual. Here he makes the point that the individual gains the fullest religious value of a god only when it is the god of his group. Distinguishing personal and tribal (collective, national, or group) religion, he styles them, respectively, unvermittelt and vermittelt (pp. 603, 606). The former type he finds especially in Babylonia. Individual religion is rare in Israel before the exile. Moreover, apart from the deified king and a type of mysticism which is un-Semitic, the intimate relationship between a man and his god was not a mingling or blending of human and divine life: there was always a wall between gods and men (p. 609).

The god's 'lordship' was not absolute; and though lifted up above men, the god was, so to say, not out of reach.¹ The O.T. writers aimed at severing Yahweh and nature, but this did not mean that they thought he was indifferent. Baudissin thinks that the powerful and destructive aspects of Yahweh were derived from his earlier association with nature-worship (p. 621). This is partly true; but surely the arbitrary and explosive character of the Oriental despot—especially if a divine king—would also account for the attributes of a god who, Israel had yet to learn, was different from men (1 Sam. xv 29)? Yahweh's Erhabenheit (p. 624) was not derived from sun- or star-worship, but from religious experience; and such a god, as tribal god, bridged the gulf between man and deity. That man is 'half god, half man' is un-Semitic; there is no 'divinity' in man waiting to be released from human bonds (p. 633),² and the divine kingship, instead of giving rise to the idea of divine lordship, was influenced by it. The Semite and the Indo-European differ in their conceptions of the relationship between man and his god, for while the latter (and especially India) treats it as one due to man's nature, the former attributes it to the god, who tells man that he is his lord (p. 640). The deeper problems of the psychology of religion Baudissin does not handle.

From the lordship of the god of the tribe Baudissin passes to the

¹ Baudissin objects that Tiele characterizes Semitic religion as 'theocratic'—it is 'theo.' but not 'cratic' (p. 620 n.). But the term comes from Josephus, c. Ap. xvi; cf. Robertson Smith Prophets of Israel p. 52 sq.

² Abrahams (Studies in Pharisaism ii 168, n. 11, see ib. p. 144) observes that the idea of man as a compound, part beast, part angel, is found in the older Midrash (esp. Genesis R, viii 11, Theodor p. 64 sq.), but in places much influenced by Alexandrian Judaism.
conception of the Kingdom of God among men, where, in the course of development, the old religious, social, and political terms gain a new and fuller content. Changing social conditions explain the growth of this conception, and it is helpful to contrast typical tribal solidarity with the conditions in Babylonia and Assyria under a monarchy, where the people had no unity, and, unlike Israel, had no significance for the religion. Yahweh's ethical character severs him from other national or nature-gods. He is lord over nature—for the benefit of his people; and he uses other nations as his tool on behalf of or against Israel. But his interest also extends to people not connected with Israel (Amos ix 7), and he even cares for them (p. 660 sq.). Here are ideas which, as Baudissin remarks, fall outside ordinary social-political development. Baudissin proceeds to compare Israelite monotheism with Egypt (Amenhotep IV [Ikhnaton]), Persia (Zoroaster) and Babylonia, noting at the same time the national limitations which the O.T. did not break down (p. 674). Judaism, while strengthening its conception of God, felt, not that He was the God of the World, but that the God of the World was manifested in Him whom, of all peoples of the earth, Israel had worshipped from the days of her fathers; and as we survey the paganism of the age we cannot fail to be impressed by the way in which Israel preserved its belief in the accessibility of such a God. It was a synthesis of universal and personal religion (p. 686). Finally, a section on the meaning of kyrios starts from the great religious movements, east and west, before and at the beginning of the Christian era, and shows how the content of the word, as a proper name, far outstrips its inherent meaning, and must have arisen independently of the name Yahweh. Kyrios, as we see from the LXX of Exod. iii 14, &c., is an eternal god—eternal in a religious rather than a physical or a metaphysical sense. The relationship-idea ('my', 'our') is not forgotten or ignored as it is in the absolute use of Adonai in Palestine, and so far from representing the Hebrew Tetragrammaton—in one of its two uses—Kyrios illuminates Jewish Alexandrian thought, which was more developed than Judaism in theological reflection and in the spiritualizing of the conception of God. In the Semitic religions, as nowhere else, the god is the lord of his own community, both father and judge, preserving and regulating their rights (p. 704).

How this bears upon later developments is only briefly indicated (iii 709 sq., cf. ii 310 sqq.). Baudissin had intended, we are told, to extend his researches to the use of Kyrios in the N.T. (iv 28); but, even as it was, his editor states that the MS of the last quarter of vol. iii lag stückenweise erst im Entwurf, noch nicht in Reinschrift vor.

To the wealth of material, the innumerable detailed discussions, and
the author's mastery of his subject the foregoing summary scarcely pays the tribute that is deserved. Eissfeldt himself has increased the value of the work, not merely by Rieger's full and indispensable indexes, but by the Nachträge (vol. iv), wherein he has to some extent brought the work up to date by bibliographical material and numerous notes, by himself and others, those of Zimmern on Babylonian religion being especially useful. Naturally there is repeated occasion for difference of opinion; and while Baudissin has given a new direction to the study of Semitic religion, and we can agree with many of his main arguments, there are times when we feel that scholarship is perhaps more likely to be stimulated than shaped.  

Some of the questions on which he writes with such penetration and skill demand a larger canvas, even though a less crowded one. In spite of the size of the work, Baudissin has had to keep his discussion within definite limits; but again and again his arguments involve other questions which cannot be left on one side, if we are to gain from him—and from Robertson Smith—the fullest possible profit. Together they raise fundamental problems, and further progress in the study of Semitic religion will come, not from blind adherence to the one or the other of the great pair, but from the patient effort to understand wherein they agree and why they differ. The rest of this article will be devoted to some preliminary questions relating to the different standpoints of the two masters.

At the very outset the term 'Semitic' raises intricate questions. In the first place, while the O.T. and the history of Israel are naturally of cardinal importance for current conceptions of the evolution or development from tribal to universal religion, it is proper to ask whether it is legitimate to discuss fundamental problems of religion—religion as a world-wide phenomenon—solely on the basis of Semitic, not to say Israelite, religion. To-day when western civilization is on trial and the non-western world is keenly self-conscious, it may be asked whether theology and philosophy are not unduly biased by western retrospects, outlooks, and modes of thought. We make the Mediter-

---

1 Budde has criticized Baudissin's reference to Marizell (Journ. of Bib. Lit. xlvi 198; cf. also xlvi 139 sqq.) and some of the criticisms of Noth (on whom see J.T.S. xxxi 427 sq.) are taken up by Eissfeldt in the Nachträge. In the latter a reference might have been made on iii 368 n. to the male Tyche published by Dussaud (Syria v, PL. XX, fig. 2); and on iii 680 n. 2, the reference to Lidzbarski should also include Eph. ii 122. The reference to Chabot's index to Waddington (iii 537, n. 5) seems nowhere to be explained; see Revue Archéologique, 1896. Among quite minor matters may be mentioned the inexplicable ninth-century date assigned to the Lebanon Inscription (C.I.S. i 5; Cooke no. 11), and the—to me—no less unintelligible separation of the y–h on the Jericho jar-handles from the divine name (ii 198, n. 1, 199, n. 4 [one of the rare misprints, l. 5]).
The Journal of Theological Studies

Renaissance lands the centre of human history, whereas, if we consider things *sub specie aeternitatis*, do not both the Comparative Study of Religions and ideals, whether of a Kingdom of Heaven or of Universal Religion, urge us to adopt a wider and more objective view? May it not be said that we have not yet gained that objectivity of standpoint which in the case of the man of science precludes him from confining himself to the geology or to the flora and fauna of part only of the earth's surface, or from ignoring the 'lower' organisms as unworthy of his attention or irrelevant to his purposes?

Israel's conviction that her history had a more than national significance is confirmed by the line of development in the Old Testament and the New; and the history of Christendom marks, or rather has hitherto marked, the real difference between western and eastern thought. Viewed in the light of modern knowledge the history of Israel might seem to be submerged in that of the Ancient Near East, and her religion essentially one with that of her neighbours; but in and behind the O.T. we can trace the first permanent successful attempts to reshape and reorganize religion, and can lay our finger upon certain developments of thought for which there is no parallel elsewhere, and certain pregnant ideas which are unique. Yet while we feel able thus to justify objectively the supreme value which we attach to the Semitic field, it is proving difficult to determine with some precision our real debt to the 'Semites'. Baudissin himself, while constantly speaking of 'Semitic' religion—the editor's omission of the ethnic in the title is significant (above, p. 228, n. 1)—by no means ignores the various non-Semitic influences, Egyptian, Sumerian, Hittite, Persian, and Greek; though, to be sure, if the 'Semites' assimilated 'non-Semitic' beliefs and practices these must have found favourable soil. Moreover, writers have often commented upon the extraordinary variety of the physical conditions in and about the Semitic area, and notably in Palestine, in striking contrast to the relatively simple Arab type and desert mentality. Palestine was part of an exceedingly complex area; and, accordingly, what we owe to that land may be of not less complex origin. Indeed, in view of the close contact between Egypt and Southwest Asia, it is really safer to speak of Semitic *languages* than of a Semitic *culture* or *religion*, though we are entitled to determine—if we can—how far we can justify the feeling that there is that which is distinctively 'Semitic'.

1 P. 151, cf. pp. 159 sq., 494, 499. (All references to Baudissin, unless otherwise specified, are now to vol. iii.)

It has not infrequently been thought (e.g. by Lagrange) that the arguments of Robertson Smith suffered because he not only confined himself to the Semites, but concentrated upon Arabia and Israel, leaving on one side the much older and more advanced civilization of Babylonia. It is extremely significant, therefore, that Baudissin, in turn, recognizes the superior value of the Arabian evidence, and finds that the more highly developed social conditions in Babylonia only bring out more clearly, by way of contrast, the fundamental characteristics of the tribe and of tribal religion. The tribal idea, which forms the foundation of his study, is to be understood from Arabia and Israel, rather than from Babylonia (pp. 252 sq., 265 sq.). It is Semitic, or rather—and the change is a very important one for these pages—it is best seen among the Semites (cf. p. 600); and they, more than any other people, have shaped the religious content. ‘Semitic’ monotheism, too, naturally strikes us as something distinctive, characteristic; but Baudissin remarks that there is no innate Semitic predisposition to religion, we have rather to notice the Verankerung of religion in the tribal constitution, such as can also be conjectured for the early Sumerians and Egyptians (p. 609).

In other words, we may think, not so much of ‘Semitic’ religion, as of the shape given to religion in the Semitic area. Baudissin independently confirms Robertson Smith’s insistence upon the significance of the social-religious group (a more generalized term than ‘tribe’, Rel. Sem., p. 504), and is in harmony with the sociological study of religion of the school of Durkheim, Irving King, and all those who concentrate mainly upon primitive or rudimentary peoples. Consequently, we have to recognize the fundamental significance of all forms of group-cult for the history of religion in general; and we may perceive in the Semitic field, in Palestine, and in and behind the Bible, certain developments which have shaped the history of religion and which enable us to realize, objectively, the profound difference between the vicissitudes of tribal or group religion in the Semitic area, culminating in ideas of universal religion and religious unity, and those elsewhere, which lie outside the line of historical development and have had little or no influence upon universal history or religion. In a word, the particular religious development with which the western world of Christendom is concerned, ‘Semitic’ though it seems to be in its growth, cannot be ultimately severed from the general history of the religion of man. This is equally important for enquiries into the ‘origin’ of religion and for hopes concerning its future line of development.

1 See Rel. Sem. p. 13 sq., and cf. ib. p. 497 sq. To the contrary objection, that he went afield to savage tribes and ‘drugged in’ totemism, I shall turn later.

2 Cf. also Baudissin on the ‘Semitic’ idea of divine law: see p. 256, n. 1, above vol. XXXII.
Next, the study of 'Semitic theism' finds, of course, its universal interest in the three great monotheisms of history—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is this remarkable religious creativeness of the Semitic area which will always give the 'Semitic' a permanent place in history. Baudissin goes further and finds some instructive points of resemblance, not only between the three religions, but also (1) between the most recent, Islam, and the oldest postulated type of tribal religion (p. 692: we might say that Islam was 'true to type'), and (2), what is highly suggestive, between the Ausgangspunkt and the Endpunkt of Israelite and Jewish religion (p. 1). On the modern view of the O.T. there is yet another creative period: it is that of the prophets of Israel, and it culminates in the changes dating from the age of Deuteronomy, Jeremiah, Ezekiel—let us say, the sixth century B.C. To this Baudissin frequently reverts. We appear to start afresh from uralt conceptions (pp. 214 sq., 232). There seems to be a harking-back (zurückgreifen), though in point of fact there is an advance in the content of old terms (p. 677). What was once taken for granted (e.g. Yahweh's compassion) must be restated (p. 232), for Israel felt that Yahweh had cast off his people. A new series of stages is inaugurated; and instead of any continuous progress in the successive stages of the history of religion in the O.T. (or rather behind it), we have the decay or collapse of one system (before and at the exile) and the rise of another. Disintegration is followed by redintegration, and our facile theories of continuity and discontinuity are corrected and enlarged. On any view—even the traditional one—the religious history of Israel implies a remarkable process of some sort, and it is noteworthy that Baudissin should come to hold what is essentially the modern literary-critical position. But there is no simple evolution J-E-D-P: it is one much more complex; and it seems obvious that a sound historical view of the development of religion which lies behind the O.T.—and of course the New—would be of the utmost value for correcting the vague and misleading assumptions that are apt to prevail as regards the general tendencies of the progressive development of religion.

When we pass from the O.T. and the successful reconstruction of the old religion of Israel (e. sixth century B.C.) to the first century A.D., we meet with both Rabbinical Judaism and Christianity. Now while the usual Christian 'evolutionary' retrospect discerns throughout continuity and development, we owe it to Schechter, Abrahams, Montefiore, and, most recently, G. F. Moore, that we must no longer regard Judaism as stationary: it too had undergone a progressive development along its

1 Cf. Robertson Smith, Rel. Sem., p. 78, on the 'new and more timid type of piety', and with his remarks on the gér cf. Baudissin on the idea of Israel as 'servant' (pp. 178, 529).

2 Cf. my remarks, J.T.S. xxx 303 sqq.
own lines. Yet, early Christianity, with all its continuity with the past, was marked by creativeness and fresh energy, new ideals of personality human and divine, new ideas to be worked out, new ideals to be followed. It felt itself to be at the beginning of a new chapter which—with St Paul—was also the end of an earlier one; there was a looking forward, an anticipation, which proved to be full of meaning for history: it was a feeling which Judaism naturally could not share. There was, in truth, a new growth in the absolute history of thought, from seeds which—as often in new movements—had to create their own environment if they were to germinate. The history of Christendom is a hard fact that cannot be gainsaid; and notwithstanding the initial indebtedness of Christianity to its 'Semitic' home, and in the Middle Ages to 'Semitic' (Jewish and Arab) thinkers, its internal inherent problems prove more complex, more stimulating, more pregnant, and more fruitful than those inherent in Judaism and Islam—or indeed in any other religion. And this fact is of really vital significance for the objective study of religions in general and, in particular, of the place of the Semites in the history of religion.

The fact that the O.T. was the prelude to the Talmud and the N.T., and that Rabbinical Judaism and Christianity sprang both, as it would seem, from the same source, compels us to treat the history of Israelite religion in a way that does justice to the sequels. And at once it is surely noteworthy that the religious and historical background in the sixth century B.C., which we are wont to associate with that of nascent Christianity—one recalls Jeremiah, the Second Isaiah, the Servant of the Lord—should belong to a period historically so obscure. What lies behind the 'Servant' is disputed: some religious movement, some outstanding religious genius or band of leaders—even a figure who claimed to be a Messiah has been suspected. An age of incalculable import for the religious vicissitudes of Israel—and yet tradition has not troubled, or has not wished, to preserve a recollection of the man or men who are central in the Songs of the Servant, or of the despised figure in Is. liii, of whom orthodox tradition hardly seems to have been proud! There are instructive psychological, religious, and other points of contact between the two great periods, the sixth century B.C. and the first century A.D., the one when a new series of developments was inaugurated, the other when the once reconstructed religion bifurcated into Rabbinical Judaism and Christianity. While in the later period the new sect could flourish only by cutting itself off from the parent stem, in the former, the historical circumstances are of the obscurest, and the canonical religion, covering up all traces of what actually had happened, claimed to be the Mosaism of eight, nine, or

more centuries earlier. It is little wonder that it proves so difficult to
trace at all clearly the religion of Israel prior to the exile and the post-
exilic reconstruction!

At neither period can the religious vicissitudes in Palestine be severed
from those of a much larger area. Hence it is noteworthy that Baudissin
speaks of Jeremiah as *am meisten universal-menschlichen ... am wenigsten
semitischen* (p. 209). This is the prophet whose life and teaching are
regarded as, in some sense, a foreshadowing of Christianity, and it is of
him, too, that it has been said that he was 'the prophet whose ideas the
Rabbins seem to have most faithfully reflected'. Baudissin's judgement
is not isolated, for he finds that the later writers are more truly Semitic (*dem
allgemeinen Semitischen näher*) than the prophets (p. 237). We may recall the
view that Jesus, as a Galilean, was non-Semitic, if not actually 'Nordic',
and that Plato was not a representative Greek thinker. Certainly there
is a sense in which great movements are not narrowly national or racial in
their inception, and great creative minds are not typical or representative
of their land or people. One must also bear in mind the extent to
which Palestine was exposed to non-Semitic influences. These could
tend, on the one hand, to modify restricted or narrowly national types
of thought, or, on the other, to bring out, by way of protest, that 'soul'
or 'genius' of a people which is rarely seen save in times of crisis.
Even the rise of 'Mosaism' can probably be dated to a period of social
and political disorganization, when non-Semitic influences of no mean
value can be traced. Paradoxical though it may appear, the deeper
study of Semitic theism only enhances the non-Semitic factors.

For the better understanding of religious development, and in
particular of that which lies behind the Bible, it is helpful to start by
recalling that neither Rabbinical Judaism nor Christianity accepted
those apocryphal and pseudepigraphical writings which have enabled
*us* in some measure to see the successive stages 'between the Testa-
ments' leading to Christianity. Although these writings unite the Old
Testament with Judaism and Christianity and contributed so bountifully
to their content, they lie, in a sense, outside the line of progressive

---

1 Abelson *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature* p. 373.
2 For the former, see e.g. the late Paul Haupt in the *Transactions of the Third
Internat. Congress for the History of Religions* (1908) i 304; and for the latter, the
reference in Inge *Philosophy of Platonius* i 71 n.
3 Camb. Anc. Hist. ii 331, 400 sqq.
4 Islam stands by itself, yet here we may recall its indebtedness, in the course of
its growth, to Greek, Persian, and other non-Semitic influences. Moreover, we
may contrast this Islam in its more thoughtful aspects with its crudeness otherwise,
as seen in many parts of the Mohammedan world: see e.g. the gloomy description
by so sympathetic an interpreter as the late Sir Thomas Arnold in *The Islamic Faith*
(Benn, 1928, p. 54 sq.).
development; and when—and only when—one has mastered them is it not difficult, perhaps, to understand why they came to be ignored by both Christian and Jew.¹

This is a familiar experience when we look back upon the successive steps in the history of some line of thought, and, out of the complete series of workers, pick out—each from his standpoint—those, of whatever nationality, who contributed to its progressive development. In history as in thought there are periods we pass over; there are 'dark periods'—the Hellenistic age has been one—and in both Babylonia and Egypt there is a certain continuity of religious development, but with intervening 'Dark Ages', which, however, are gradually being illumined. So, as we look back upon the development leading up to Judaism and Christianity we may fairly distinguish (a) the actual sequence of steps, and (b) the more 'evolutionary' development when, as Jews or as Christians, we select or ignore material, as the case may demand. All such ordinary processes of development as these have to be kept in view alike when one is concerned with the earlier religion of Israel and with conceptions of religious development in general; and they are especially relevant here because of Baudissin's standpoint as regards Tote-mism and Baalism, wherein he differs widely from Robertson Smith, and brings important questions of the methodology of the study of religion.

So far, then, we can see that 'Semitic' religion or theism is not the same as the great developments in the history of religion within the 'Semitic' area; and that the progressive development of religious thought is not necessarily one of successive stages or confined to a single area. Robertson Smith's theory of primitive totemism now comes up for consideration. Baudissin, while most generously acknowledging the debt we all owe to Robertson Smith for his exposition of group-religion (the social-religious unit) and sacrifice, is by no means alone when he dissent from the latter's treatment of mother-right and totemism (pp. 338, 492, 517 n.). Yet I venture to think that he has himself shewn us the way out of the difficulties. More than any other scholar he has discussed tribal religion and the development from the tribe with its god to the Kingdom of God (in the three great monotheisms) and Universal Religion. It is much to be deplored that he did not live to pursue his labours, since in the Kingdom of Heaven, the Church, the Christian Body, and the Body of Christ we have varying developments of the fundamental group-idea.² Indeed it seems probable that Robertson Smith

¹ See e.g. E. R. Bevan The Legacy of Israel p. 53, on the way in which Philo partly represents a pure Jewish type of thought (in contrast to Hellenism), and partly is less fully Hebraic than Christianity.

² It may be mentioned that Baudissin observes that in the Kingdom of Ahura-mazda the individual is a genoue rather than (as in all group-religion) a ghed (p. 695).
was—even if unconsciously— influenced in his theory of the group and its god by his earlier reflexions on Christian 'organic unity'.

But what precisely is the nexus? Baudissin recognizes that tribal religion is not confined to the Semites; and the sociologist Durkheim found—rightly, as I believe—the germinal idea of a 'Church' even in totemic societies. Obviously we ourselves are in no intelligible manner influenced by remote social conditions, tribal, much less totemic; nor can the 'Churches' in Hinduism, and more especially Buddhism, have a similar ancestry. Surely, then, the essential fact is man's natural tendency to form gangs, groups, clubs, societies, bodies, corporations, and the like; and the psychological tendency to 'organize' is not to be confused with the ideological enquiry into the functions and aims of all such groups and their possible derivation one from another. To suppose that highly-developed groups, institutions, or churches have been 'derived'—or the like—from primitive or rudimentary social groups is not the same as to recognize that the same sort of tendency may take very different forms, varying from the simplest to the most complex and differentiated. Once the necessity of a more logical treatment of the evidence has been realized our problems of development or evolution take another shape, for, as followers of Baudissin, or of Robertson Smith, we are under no obligation to look for some direct 'origin', 'derivation', or 'ancestry', whether tribal or totemic. We may freely find in the most rudimentary communities very rudimentary forms of even the most highly-developed conceptions or institutions; but it is quite another step to seek to determine whether historical connecting lines can be traced between them.

In his emphasis upon the part played by tribal religion, Baudissin adopts a very sceptical attitude to both totemism and mother-right. It is

1 See Rel. Sem. pp. xxxiv, 504 n. 1, 594, and his Essays and Lectures p. 326 sq.; cf. also, e.g. Goudge S.P.C.K. Comm. iii 418 b (the great conception of union with Christ is true to Hebrew thought); H. Wheeler Robinson in Peake People and Book p. 375 (‘the Apostle is true to Hebrew tradition and sentiment in his parable of the human body as a figure of the community’, 1 Cor. xii 1 sq.); and id. The Cross of the Servant pp. 78 sq., 83.

2 The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life book i, chap. i; see in general, on primitive 'churches', Toy Introd. to the Hist. of Rel. §§ 1095 sqq.

3 For the latter, see pp 362 sqq., 370 sq. and iv 44, 207. Whereas Robertson Smith refers to legends of female judges (Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia p. 125 sq.), Baudissin belittles the evidence for female exponents of Recht (Deborah's function is 'perhaps an unhistorical trait', p. 386). Mother-goddesses are said to be un-Semitic, perhaps Anatolian (p. 482 sq.). Ishtar is only secondarily a war-goddess (see p. 393 n. and iv 48)—but what of the function of the sheikh's daughter in warfare (Rel. Sem. p. 508)? It might have been noticed that traces of the 'classificatory' system of kinship among the Semites have been pointed out by Mrs Seligman (Rel. Sem. p. 511 n. 3).
possible that the data upon which Robertson Smith relied for his theory of matriarchy belong to particular social phases and cannot be used to prove an absolute matriarchal (better, matrilineal) stage in social development (see Rel. Sem., Pref., p. 1). But when advanced social (tribal or other) systems disintegrate—and no one supposes that there has anywhere been unbroken continuous progressive development—other smaller and simpler types will come to the fore, and they may leave some impress upon the next stage of reintegration. Now, as regards totemism, Robertson Smith in an important passage speaks of local nature-gods not evolved out of an earlier totemism, but out of ideas or usages which also find their expression in totemism (Rel. Sem. p. 125, cf. p. 540 sq.). The distinction is a vital one, and might have been maintained more consistently. It means that the recognition of comparable 'lower' and 'higher' elements does not necessarily involve any genetic continuity or derivation; and that it is unsafe to seek to 'derive' (or the like) higher religions from the lower, when the evidence allows, in the first instance, only a more logical wording such as I have italicized.

So, as regards totemism, it is undeniable that outside the Semitic area it is found to contain elements that could or did develop into those found in the higher religions; some significant steps can actually be traced. Further, although modern totemism, as we know it, cannot be traced historically in the Semitic area, there are to be found there many very crude and rudimentary features, especially of a theriomorphic type. Moreover, besides the sanctity of both animal and human blood, it is a really important fact that there should be a marked appearance of theriomorphic features about the sixth century B.C., an age of disintegration. Such theriomorphism would have been more pronounced at earlier periods of disintegration. Yet, just as we find a continuity, though we skip 'Dark Ages' or ignore the decisive steps 'between the Testaments', and can ignore time and space when we pass from Aristotle to St Thomas Aquinas or from Ancient Greece to the Renaissance, so we have to consider whether, from the methodological point of view, we are obliged to postulate—if we follow Robertson Smith—a totemic stage in Semitic religion itself.

1 Cf. Robertson Smith Kinship p. 275, on the disappearance of the old Arab tribes known to Ptolemy and the emergence of older and more primitive stocks.

2 To generalize, then, the evolution or development which we trace in the, b, c, is the reappearance of some x in the different forms a, b, c, which we may then proceed, if necessary, to evaluate, and to connect, if justifiable, on evolutionary principles. But, in the first instance, we recognize 'homologies', just as, in the organic world, the fin of the fish, the wing of the bird, and the arm of the man, are, in spite of their external differences, really 'homologous'.

We are under an obligation to find a place for totemism in our study of religion, for even if it be said that it is not a religion, it contains some of the simplest and rudest forms of what is more familiar and intelligible in the great historic religions. But when we are concerned with the theory of the progressive development of religion in general, and of Christianity in particular, it does not follow that the earliest stages of a process which can be traced in the Semitic area must be looked for there, for the process which has passed from the Near East to the West did not necessarily—unless it can be proved otherwise—take its rise there. Even the data of 'Semitic' religion—leaving on one side the question of the terms 'Semitic' and 'non-Semitic'—are but the specific, and, of course, often highly spiritual forms of what we find elsewhere. In other words, when we trace back the lines of our religious development we are not obliged to assume that they started among the Semites of history.

On the other hand, although we do not look in early Western Europe for those stages of thought which are actually to be found in Greece, the prior genetic development of the West had been significant—for example, when the Schoolmen prepared the way for the rights of reason, the emancipation of religion and 'la bonne philosophie' (Condorcet). So too, in the Semitic area, there must have been, in any case, a stage or stages of thought which would account for the theiromorphic and other crude phenomena which—after Robertson Smith—one is tempted to explain as the dissecta of an earlier totemism. On methodological grounds, a 'totemic' stage in the Semitic area is not necessarily demanded; but there may well have been in prehistoric times tribes (totemic and other) similar to those found in Africa and India; and the unique discovery of human sacrifice at Ur has shown that a thoroughly barbaric type of religion—and old oriental religion, even in Palestine, was barbaric—could exist virtually in historical times, viz. c. 3000 B.C.—the sixth century B.C. comes roughly midway between that date and to-day—and disappear leaving no recognizable traces.

Both Robertson Smith and Baudissin raise serious methodological questions which cannot be settled by the mere accumulation of data. The former, especially, realized the philosophical importance of the study of Semitic religion, and though he definitely speaks of the recurring uniform features which 'govern the evolution of faith and worship', features which 'form the real interest of Semitic religion to the philosophical student' (Rel. Sem. p. 15), this has generally been over-

---

1 James Ward Essays in Philosophy (1927) p. 118.
2 In the present case it is the difference between the development of religion in the Semitic area alone, and that of religion in general, viewed from a particular western standpoint.
looked by those who have criticized his discussion of Sacrifice and its 'origin'. For in all such discussions we may distinguish (a) the actual prehistoric 'origin', which of course eludes all sober enquiry, (b) the most rudimentary forms of it—which Robertson Smith found in totemism—, and (c) the 'creative' idea governing its progressive development, as, at different stages, this development becomes more complex. Now, it is essential to remember that Robertson Smith felt himself to be a son of the Reformation; he was convinced that its work was not complete, and he looked for a new Catholicity in religious development. Indeed, it is not difficult to see the connexion between the reforming zeal of the Protestant evangelist and the author of The Religion of the Semites. Consciously or not he was searching after the creative or originating factors or elements which, effective in the past, were no less vital for the future.¹

Not all writers on the history of ancient religion are—consciously or otherwise—swayed by their religious idealism and their thoughts touching the future of their religious environment; and, while we owe to Baudissin the finest treatment of the development from tribal religion to national and universal religion, it is Robertson Smith with his personal religious universalism who felt the necessity of deepening and widening his foundations and of understanding the 'lower' religions, especially totemism.² It seems necessary to grasp this fact if we are to make, as I think we must, the work of both the great teachers our starting-point for the more penetrating study of 'Semitic' theism and what it means for us now. If Baudissin is more ideological, more religionsgeschichtlich, Robertson Smith with his evangelical standpoint was more psychological; and it is not difficult to see why he regarded religious experiences which were interpreted as a communion or fellowship or intercourse with the god of the group as creative, the 'origin' of new series of developments.

Accordingly our insistence upon the importance of totemism justifies itself by the necessity of co-ordinating the 'lowest' and 'highest' organisms in the social-religious world. Modern theism cannot be indifferent to the question of the Deity's part in rudimentary religions, even in the apparently bizarre aspects of totemic cults, the most striking of which are only now dying out in Australia. The entire theory of the development or evolution of religion is at stake, and while Baudissin's knowledge of the whole Semitic field is unequalled and up to date, Robertson Smith takes us to the profounder problems of religion—religion as involving man's ideas of ultimate truth and reality—problems of religion in general and of 'Semitic' religion in its significance for Christendom.

² 'It is the business of Christianity to conquer the whole universe to itself and not least the universe of thought' (see Rel. Sem. p. xxxi; from a lecture when Robertson Smith had barely turned twenty-two).
From time to time he verges on questions which bear directly upon the interpretation of Christianity (see Rel. Sem. p. lxiv); and what is more implicit in the Religion of the Semites becomes more explicit when, e.g., the late Dr Dukinfield Astley associates totemism and Christianity (Biblical Anthropology pp. 210, 223 sq.). Baudissin differs from Robertson Smith in leaving out both; and although it could be urged that they lay outside the scope of his investigations, we are finding that the ‘lowest’ and the ‘highest’ forms of religion illumine each other—as is only to be expected on biological and psychological grounds—and throw light upon such ‘middle’ types as one finds in the O.T.

Indeed, when one proceeds to a more detailed examination of the relation between Yahwism and Baalism and between tribal (group, national, etc.) and nature gods, it is essential to combine the best of both Baudissin and Robertson Smith. Here, again, one acquires a better understanding of the processes in the religious development that lies behind the Bible, and of the way in which Christianity and Judaism reflect rival tendencies in the earlier religion. The present article, however, has already exceeded its limits, and it remains to express the sincerest appreciation of Baudissin’s great work, the labours of Eissfeldt and his helpers (G. Bertram, Littmann, Rieger, O. Weber, and Zimmerm), and the public-spirited publishers, and to repeat that the result is to give an entirely fresh impetus to the critical study of religion, and that not of the ‘Semitic’ alone.

S. A. Cook.

STUDIES IN THE VOCABULARY OF THE OLD
TESTAMENT. II.

At the end of the last article 1 I drew attention to the use of ובו (i) ‘turned the back’; 2 as suggested by Eitan, and (ii) ‘caused to turn the back’, i.e. ‘drove away’ or ‘overthrew’, and ובו ‘threw on the back’, i.e. ‘threw down’, 4 as being derived from the √בּוּ back. 5 I now add that ובו is used in Pss. xxxv 13-14. Here the translation of ובו is

1 In J.T.S. xxxi 284-285.
2 In Ct. v 6, where ובו means ‘when he turned his back (on me)’, and Jb. xix 18, where ובו means ‘then they turn their backs on me’.
3 In 1 Chron. xxii 10.
4 In Pss. xlvii 48 and xlvii 4.