over them in a specially solemn and sacramental manner'. This may be true in part of Origen,¹ but it cannot be said of Ambrose: his argument is not concerned with the consecration of the elements at all; and his 'position' is, not that the elements are holy because 'a formula of special importance and sanctity has been recited over them', but that the Holy Spirit is God, equally with the Father and the Son, because He is invoked with the Father and the Son. The emphasis is all on the preposition cum. It is heightened no doubt by the solemnity of the occasion; but the celebration of the Eucharist is an occasion quite solemn enough to satisfy the argument, and the expression 'in oblationibus' (which means no more than 'in the Mass') cannot be pressed to mean in the very formula of consecration. Such an interpretation of the words is actually excluded by another consideration: St Ambrose is one of the few early writers who have left a plain statement of their views as to the precise words by which the Eucharist is consecrated, and for him the 'form of consecration' is not an invocation of any kind, but our Lord's own words in the recital of the Institution.²

I still think it most probable, therefore, that the Trinitarian formula referred to by St Ambrose in the above passage is the doxology at the end of the eucharistic prayer. The importance of the part played by doxology in controversies about the Person of the Holy Spirit is sufficiently shewn by St Basil's work de Spir. Sanct., and by the passage of St Ambrose referred to above (de Spir. Sanct. ii 8).

R. H. Connolly.

TWO EXAMPLES OF LITERARY AND RHETORICAL CRITICISM IN THE FATHERS (DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE APOCALYPSE, AND TERTULLIAN ON LUKE VI).

Some three years ago I contributed to this Journal a paper on a difficult word in Clement's Stromateis, which I tried to explain by reference to the grammatical science of his time. The present article is on somewhat similar lines. It aims, not so much at elucidating (for

¹ Though I cannot see how it is to be reconciled with Mr Tyrer's explanation of Origen discussed above, in which he suggests that Origen's words would be satisfied by a separate mention of the divine names at various points in the prayer.

² De Myst eriis ix 52–53 'Nam sacramentum istud, quod acceipis, Christi sermone conficitur'; 'Ipse clamat Dominus Iesus: Hoc est corpus meum; ante benedictionem verborum caelestium alia species nominatur, post consecrationem corpus significatur'. The same view is alluded to in de Bened. Patriarch. ix (Migne P. L. xiv 719) and in the commentary on Ps. xxxviii (ibid. 1102).
the general if not the detailed meaning is clear) as at illustrating two passages from the Fathers in which they stray for a moment into the ideas and language of the secular scholars around them. In the other paper I made a reservation which I should like to repeat. We have in these cases without doubt Christian Fathers speaking as scholars or ex-students of contemporary learning, but they remain Christian Fathers still. I said then that I would not dogmatize on a term used by Clement, without knowing more of Clement and Christological controversy as a whole. So here: my knowledge of the Fathers with a few exceptions is scrappy, and it is possible that a fuller acquaintance with that vast literature might lead me to modify conclusions, which are based chiefly on what I know of that other large but very different literature, which is concerned with the secular culture and scholarship of the decaying pagan world.

I.

The first passage is the series of extracts made by Eusebius (H. E. vii 25) from the Ἐπαγγελματία of Dionysius of Alexandria in which that writer develops his argument that the author of the Apocalypse is a different person from the author of the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine Epistles. This extract, of which Westcott says that there is ‘no other piece of pure criticism in the early Fathers to compare with it for style and manner’, has always received due notice from theological scholars, but I cannot find that its relation to the secular learning of the time has ever been carefully examined. I do not indeed suppose that such an examination will substantially increase our understanding of Dionysius’s reasoning, for his three arguments drawn from (a) the fact that the author of one book gives his name, while the author of the other suppresses it, (b) the difference in the conceptions and terms in the two, (c) the difference in grammatical usage, present no difficulty. Still, as a matter of historical interest, it is surely worth our while to consider how far Dionysius was influenced by similar investigations of the scholars of his age into questions of authorship, and by their canons of literary criticism, and also how far he is using the terminology of the schools.

The need for discriminating between genuine and spurious works of classical authority was quite familiar to the grammarians from the days of the great trio Zenodotus, Aristophanes the Byzantine, and Aristarchus, all of whom taught in Dionysius’s own city. Quintilian notes that it was one of the functions of the grammarians, not only to form ‘canons’ of the best authors in each branch, but also to exclude particular books from the list of the works of a particular author. Elsewhere he

1 Inst. Or. i 4, 3.
mentions a particular case. He tells us that Aristophanes was the first to lay down that a certain educational poem, the 'Precepts of Chiron', was not, as commonly supposed, the work of Hesiod. But Quintilian does not tell us what were the arguments used by Aristophanes; and in fact, though I would not venture to affirm that in the great and obscure mass of critical and scholastic work still extant none such is to be found, I do not know where any detailed discussion of such questions has been preserved except in the case of Homer.

The exception is of course for our purpose important; for since Homer was predominant in Greek education (to say nothing of the fact that Alexandria in the past at any rate had been the chief home of Homeric scholarship), Dionysius is not likely to have been altogether ignorant of this form of 'Higher Criticism'. The questions that arose for discussion may perhaps be ranged under four heads. First the Homeric 'Apocrypha', the outlying works such as the 'Margites' and especially the 'Hymns'. These last were sometimes quoted as 'Homer', even by writers like Thucydides, but they were not accepted by scholars, and there is no evidence that they received the devout attention given to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Next come the 'Separators' or 'Chorizontes', who declared that the two great poems were by different authors. This problem has considerable resemblance to that which exercised Dionysius, and it is no doubt possible that it may have been argued on grounds not unlike those which we find in Eusebius's extracts. On the other hand it appears that the 'Chorizontes' found no favour with the orthodox, and Dionysius may have had as little acquaintance with the question as a student of the last generation, trained in his youth in biblical studies but turned off afterwards to other interests, would have had with the Johannine problem. Thirdly came the 'dubia' within the two poems. Both Aristophanes and Aristarchus are stated to have alleged that the *Odyssey* really ended at line 309 of the 23rd book, but whether they meant that the rest was not written by 'Homer', or that the real story of the *Odyssey* ended at this point and the rest was an excrescence is not quite clear. But within this excrescence there is a solid mass, the genuineness of which was impugned by Aristarchus more definitely. This is *Odyssey* 24 1–204, often called the 'Second Nucia', in which the souls of the Suitors descend to Hades and there meet Agamemnon and Achilles. The grounds on which Aristarchus rejected this episode are given with considerable fullness by the scholiasts, who also supply the answers of the apologists. These objections are mainly based on inconsistencies with regular Homeric beliefs or ideas, such as that only here is Hermes represented as the Conductor of Souls; or on the use of names and phrases, e.g. nowhere else is Hermes called 'Cyllenius' or

*Inst. Or. i 1, 15.*
the Muses spoken of as 'the Nine Muses'. Finally there are the objections brought against individual lines or small groups of lines. These ἀθετήσεις (to give them their technical name) of Aristophanes and Aristarchus are also preserved by scholiasts. Most of them perhaps are based on considerations of sense or fitness, but some call attention to non-Homeric forms or words and so far fall into line with Dionysius's second and third argument. So far the analogy between the criticism of Dionysius and that of the grammarians is vague, though not, I think, vaguer than we should expect in such different material. I pass on to a closer consideration of his treatment of the subject and especially of his terminology.

In the first extract made by Eusebius Dionysius tells us that some earlier critics had rejected the Apocalypse altogether on the grounds of its unintelligibility and declared it to be the work of Cerinthus, who had palmèd it on the Church under the name of John. Dionysius himself does not reject the book on the ground of its difficulty, but is willing to believe that it has a higher meaning beyond his grasp.

This extract is introduced by the following words:

Τινὲς μὲν οὖν τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν ἡθέτησαν καὶ ἀνεσκεύασαν πάντη τὸ βιβλίον, καὶ καθ' ἐκαστὸν κεφάλαιον διευθύνοντες ἁγγειότον τε καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστον ἀποφαίνοντες, ψευδεσθαί τε τὴν ἐπιγραφήν.

Here the two words ἡθέτησαν and ἀνεσκεύασαν, though often used in a general sense, are technical words from the schools.

I have already said that the rejections of lines and passages from the classical authors were called ἀθετήσεις, and when Dionysius puts the words into the mouth of the opponents he means the same. But from what did these opponents reject it? Not merely from the Johannine writings; for Dionysius himself, who does not believe that the book comes from the same hand as the other Johannines, says later ἐγὼ δὲ ἄθετησα μὲν οὖν ἀν τολμήσαμε τὸ βιβλίον. I understand them to mean that as the ἁθετήθεντα of the schools were declared to have no rightful place in the Homeric text, so the Apocalypse has no right to be classed as inspired scripture. And so, I observe, Rufinus takes it, for he translates the words ἡθέτησαν καὶ ἀνεσκεύασαν by 'refutandum a canone scripturarum atque abiciendum putarunt'.

1 e. g. II. 7, 475 was 'athetized' on the ground that ἀνδράποδον was a word which only came into use in post-Homeric times: Odyssey 4, 62 on account of the non-Homeric form σφήν.

2 Dr Feltoe has this note: ἀνεσκεύασαν 'a canone scripturarum sacrarum abiciendum putarunt' (Ruf.). Apparently therefore he read 'refutandum et' etc. But Mommsen's edition (1908) has it as I have printed it, and while he records a v. l. 'et canone', he does not record any omission of 'atque'. Unfortunately the translation of Rufinus, who probably understood these terms better than we do, is so abridged, that he does not throw any light on the others.
The other word ἀνασκευάσαν has also a very definite history in this connexion. Κατασκευή and ἀνασκευή were the names given to exercises regularly set in the schools in which the pupils had to argue for and against the truth of a story. Very full accounts of these are given by the Greek writers on this sort of 'progymnasmata' such as Aphthonius, Theon, and Hermogenes. The stories thus treated were mostly mythological, the typical example given being that of Apollo and Daphne. But Quintilian notes that in the higher stages the stories of the Roman kings might be utilized and also more strictly historical matter, where questions of chronology or locality were open to dispute.1 If Dionysius had an ordinary Greek education he must have written dozens of ἀνασκευαί or κατασκευαί in his time. The ἀνασκευαστής was trained to consider his story under various heads. Was it vague or obscure in its details (ἀσαφής)? Was it incoherent (ἀνακλολούθος)? Mischievous (ἀτύμφορος)? and the like. It is easy to see that these or similar tests could be applied to the case before us, and when Dionysius speaks of these 'Anasceuasts' of the Apocalypse as διευθύνοντες τό βιβλίον καθ' ἐκαστὸν κεφάλαιον, while it is possible that by κεφάλαια he may mean sections or topics in the work, it is also possible that he may mean logical heads like those just mentioned. The conclusions that the book is (1) ἀγνωστὸν ( unintelligible), (2) ἀσυλλόγιστον ( incoherent), (3) intended to inculcate false doctrine under an apostolic name, roughly correspond to the ἀσαφής, ἀνακλολούθος, ἀτύμφορος of the scholastic 'Anasceuasts'.

It thus appears that while ἀσέτης impugns the genuineness of a writing and its right to the place which is claimed for it in a text or series of texts, ἀνασκευή impugns its truth and value. In that part of his treatise which followed Dionysius took the part of the 'Catasceuast' and examined the book in detail. This part, Eusebius, to our great loss, has not transcribed but merely tells us that it shewed that the prima facie interpretation could not be maintained. When the verbatim reproduction is resumed, we find Dionysius asserting his view that the book is really by a John, but not the John who wrote the Gospel and the Epistles; and here again I must quote some of his exact words:—

Τεκμαίρομαι γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἄθος ἐκατέρων καὶ τοῦ τῶν λόγων εἴδους καὶ τῆς τοῦ βιβλίου διεξάγωγῆς λεγομένης μη τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι.

1 Inst. Or. ii 4, 18 f.

2 As to ἐκατέρων Dr Feltoe says 'Some take it to mean both writings; but it is doubtful whether ἄθος can be so applied in the sense of style.' It is true that ἄθος can only mean style in so far as style reflects personality, but I would not venture to say that a book could not have ἄθος. It can express ἄθος and it is a very slight extension to say that it possesses it. Strictly speaking indeed ἐκατέρων should be neuter, for ἐκατέρως and ἐκαστὸς are properly (though not invariably) used of two or more sets, ἐκατέρως and ἐκαστὸς of two or more units. 'Ekátera therefore is the more
Now as the next part goes on to shew that the John of the Apocalypse puts his name into the forefront, while the other writer suppresses his name throughout, I have no doubt that the Ἰάθος ἐκατέρων refers to this contrast and so, I believe, it has been generally understood. But the reader who is unversed in the subtleties of the scholastic use of Ἰάθος may naturally ask whether this distinction amounts to a difference in character. For Dionysius clearly does not mean to suggest that the anonymity was due to superior modesty, or that the Evangelist wished to conceal his identity. On the contrary it is assumed that he clearly indicates himself as the Beloved Disciple. To explain this point, it is necessary to say something about the scholastic use of ὁθὸς.1

ὁθὸς in rhetoric and criticism is generally opposed to πάθος and indicates the gentler emotions or the sum of the characteristics which a man habitually displays when not under the influence of passion. The underlying theory seems to be that in πάθος the man, as indeed we often say, is ‘not himself’. It was an accepted principle in Homeric criticism from the time of Aristotle that the Iliad exhibited πάθος and the Odyssey ὁθὸς,2 and other books or writers are classified in the same way. Thus Herodotus shews ὁθὸς rather than πάθος, and Thucydides πάθος rather than ὁθὸς. But the ὁθὸς of a man is often thought of as a bundle of ὁθη, and then ὁθη need not be what we should call ‘ethical’, though, if I understand the usage aright, they must be something which helps us to picture or individualize the man. From this point of view it is not difficult to see how the use or non-use of the name of ourselves or others may help to determine our ὁθὸς. I may take some examples (I hope they will not be thought frivolous) from modern literature. Frederick Bayham in the Newcomes speaks of himself as ‘F. B.’ It helps us to individualize him. We are quite sure that Col. Newcome could never speak of himself as ‘T. N.’ Mr Weller senior was wont to interpolate an affectionate ‘Sammy’ into his discourses to his son. Mrs Elton in Emma used to speak of her husband as ‘Mr E.’ All these are ὁθη, and indeed Emma herself says as much of the last. If we translated ὁθὸς in our passage by ‘personal idiosyncrasy’ we should perhaps get the feeling of the word.
As to the two other terms used above, λόγων εἶδος and διεξαγωγή, the first may be regarded as meaning the nature of the ‘terms and conceptions’ which we shall see are the subject of Dionysius’s second argument. But διεξαγωγή presents considerable difficulty. If it were not for the addition of λεγομένης we might perhaps be disposed to pass it off as a vague phrase suggesting that the general character of the two books in tone, thought, and language is dissimilar. But λεγομένης no doubt suggests that we have here a technical term, and so Heinichen, whom Dr Feltoe reproduces, says ‘hoc vocabulum proprium fuit rhetorum’. But Heinichen was, I fear, talking at random. If he had consulted Ernesti’s Lexicon Rhetoricum he would not have found the word there at all: nor have I any reason to think that Ernesti was wrong. Heinichen goes on to suggest that it means either οἰκονομία that is arrangement and structure, or ‘forma et ratio scribendi’: that is to say, it means either the second or the third in the three processes of εὔφρασις, οἰκονομία, or τάξις, and φράσις or λέξις, into which ancient rhetoric analysed the art of effective speaking. But Dionysius does not deal with οἰκονομία at all; he does deal with φράσις, but διεξαγωγή is an odd and certainly an otherwise unknown equivalent for it. The best suggestion I can make is as follows. There were certain terminologies in which συντάξεως was used for the whole of the treatment of the material or, in other words, to cover both οἰκονομία and φράσις. Dionysius may perhaps be thinking somewhat confusedly of it, but it is a far cry from διάθεσις to διεξαγωγή. Oddly enough, the one word in this tractate which suggests to the reader unversed in the study of rhetoric that Dionysius is using technical language is the word which leaves the chief doubt of his knowledge of rhetoric in the mind of any one who has made a study of the subject.

Having disposed of the matter of the use or suppression of the name in the documents, Dionysius goes on to say that the same non-identity of authorship may be argued ἀπὸ τῶν νοημάτων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ρήματων καὶ τῆς συντάξεως αὐτῶν. I must leave συντάξεως for the moment, and νοηματα and ρηματα (‘conceptions’ and ‘terms’), words which of course belong both to orthodox rhetoric and common use, give no difficulty. In the sequel he abundantly illustrates his meaning. He notes the constant appearance in the Gospel and Epistles of such ideas as light, life, love, judgement, ‘convincing the world’, &c., and in fact, though some of his examples seem rather inexact, says much what any modern scholar would say on the subject. He then goes on to his third argument and contrasts the good Greek of the one with the ungrammatical Greek of the other.

Before dealing with this, I must return to the word συντάξεις. Our commentators suggest ‘collocation’, and undoubtedly the word may be
applied to any arrangement or collocation of anything. But I do not quite see what it means in this connexion. If the ‘conceptions and terms’ of the Evangelist were present in the Apocalypse, we might perhaps contrast the way they were combined and arranged. But as on the hypothesis they are absent there, the word seems otiose. Nor will the examination of the use of it in grammar and criticism lead to any clear conclusion. In these there are two names regularly applied to the connexion of words, σύνθεσις and σύνταξις, and though they are sometimes confused, the first is generally applied to the arrangement which produces rhythm and harmony, the second to that which produces logical and grammatical coherence. The distinction is well illustrated by the titles of two of the most important works of the age. The Περί συνθέσεως ὑνομάτων (De Compositione) of Dionysius of Halicarnassus deals with the point that literary effect is largely produced by the arrangement of words; the Περί συντάξεως (De Constructione) of Apollonius Dyscolus is a semi-philosophical enquiry into the function of words in the sentence; and it is from this usage of course that we draw our word ‘syntax’. Possibly Dionysius may be using σύνταξις in this sense and thus anticipating his third argument. But on the whole I am inclined to think that αὐτῶν stands for τῶν ῥηµάτων only and does not include τῶν νοµάτων, and that σύνταξις ῥηµάτων means a phrase as contrasted with ῥῆµα a single word. Thus, in his examples, φῶς would be an instance of a ῥῆµα, and ἐλέγχειν τὸν κόσμον an instance of a σύνταξις ῥηµάτων. But I must confess that I have not found elsewhere such a use of σύνταξις. The only expression I know for ‘phrase’ is λόγος itself, which is sometimes contrasted with ὄνομα or ῥῆµα. Still it is a natural development which Dionysius might quite well make on his own initiative.

The third argument brings out, as I have said, the contrast in grammatical usage between the two, and is based especially on the well-known ‘solecisms’ in the Apocalypse. This contrast is obvious, but the words in which Dionysius describes the Gospel and Epistles deserve some attention.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἀπαίτως κατὰ τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων φώνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογιστάτα ταῖς λέξεσι, τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, ταῖς συντάξεσι τῆς ἐρμηνείας

1 How blunders are repeated! Valesius wrote on συντάξεως ὑνομάτων ‘vide elegantissimum librum Dionysii Hal. περὶ συντάξεως ὑνοµάτων’. Heinichen first and Dr Feltoe later repeat this. But I know of no evidence that this important treatise was ever known by any other name than that by which it is known now, viz. Περὶ συνθέσεως ὑνοµάτων.

2 e.g. Dion. Hal. Ep. ii ad Ammaeum 92 ὄνομα τεθήκεται αὐτῷ ὅλου τοῦ λόγου, ὅπως ἀν τῆς τοῦ σίτου κομηδίας σιτοπομπικὸς λέγηται. So in Latin ‘sermo’ is sometimes in the same contrast with ‘verbum’. Has this any bearing on Tertullian’s choice of ‘sermo’ as a translation of the Johannine λόγος?
That is to say, John the Evangelist writes not only correct Greek but good Greek; and here we get to one of the most basic of Greek scholastic ideas, the idea, that is, of the two stages of education. The Evangelist had mastered not only the ars recte loquendi, which it was the business of Grammatica to teach, but the ars bene dicendi which belonged to rhetoric. He is λόγος, the regular equivalent of the Latin facundus or eloquens. And, since we find in him the virtues of rhetoric, a fortiori (πολλοὶ γε δεὶ βάρβαρον τινα φθόγγον ή σολοκισμὸν ή ὅλως ἰδωσισμὸν ἐν αὐτῶς εὑρέθηνα). As for the terms used in describing his λογισμὸς, the last (ἐρμηνεία) is a frequent synonym for φράσις (elocutio), the ‘how to say it’ which followed when you had found (εἰρέσις) and arranged (οἰκονομία or τάξις) your ‘what to say’. It is to be taken, I think, with all the three preceding nouns. Of these λέξεις means, presumably, ‘diction’, as quite frequently, and συντάξεις I should understand as the construction of the words within the sentence, a meaning somewhat different, but not very different, from that which I mentioned above as given to it by Apollonius. ¹ For this, I think, some parallel can be found, though the more usual word is σχηματισμός. But συλλογισμὸς is difficult. No example is given in Stephanus of its use for ‘reasonings’ in general, though διαλογισµος is used as above in this vaguer sense. Still, as arguments of a syllogistic nature, or, as they were called, ‘enthymemes’, were an accepted and indeed necessary element in history and oratory and in fact in all literature, and as the ‘enthymeme’ from the time of Aristotle had been defined as the ‘rhetorical syllogism’, Dionysius may mean ‘enthymemes’, and certainly the Fourth Gospel abounds in what the critics and rhetoricians would have called by this name. But does he mean merely that John reasoned or used ‘enthymemes’ with ability? If so, he is mixing up εἰρέσις with ἐρμηνεία, res with verba, in a way that would have discredited him with any one who had had a rhetorical education. Possibly he may mean that the form in which John

¹ The difference is this: simple examples of what I mean are the use of parentheses, or of a question instead of a negative statement. These are not σύνταξις in Ap.’s sense, for they do not affect the logical coherence of the sentence, nor yet σύνθεσις, for they do not (necessarily at any rate) affect its rhythm or harmony. All the same they produce some literary effect. Thus ancient rhetoric recognized in φράσις or ἐρμηνεία three main elements: (1) ἔλογος ὑμωμάτων the diction here, as often called λέξεις; (2) σχηματισμὸς or form; (3) σύνθεσις or harmony. Both (2) and (3) are sometimes loosely called σύνταξις, and it is the former of these two which I suggest that D. had in mind. If we could do anything so drastic as to emend συλλογισμοῖς to σχηματισμοῖς, and take συντάξεις as συνθέσεις, we should really be in accord with orthodox rhetoric.
expressed his 'enthymemes' shews λογιστικα. His namesake of Halicarnassus certainly implies that 'enthymemes' require a style of their own.  

In the second half of the sentence, βάρβαρος φθόγγος (or βαρβαρισμός) and σολουκισμός are among the commonest of grammatical terms. It is hardly necessary even now to say that they signify respectively errors in a single word and errors in combining words, and it certainly would not have been necessary then. Their meaning was as familiar to every educated man as the distinction between nouns and verbs. But ἰδιωσιμός is not quite the word we should have expected in this clause where we are concerned with grammar. It belongs rather to rhetoric, and suggests vulgarisms or plebeius sermo. It was discussed by rhetoricians largely because it was recognized that a certain amount of it might occasionally lend raciness to oratory. It is not to be confused (in its ordinary use at any rate) with the ἰδιώματα βαρβαρικά shortly afterwards ascribed to John of the Apocalypse. ἰδιώμα means a peculiarity whether good or bad and springs from ἰδιώς in the sense of proprius, while ἰδιωσιμός comes from ἰδιωσις in the sense of an uneducated man. Still when we remember how ἰδιώται is coupled with ἀγγέλματοι in Acts iv 13 we can hardly be surprised to find Dionysius deflecting its meaning slightly from 'vulgar diction' to 'illiterate error'.

The contrast shewn by the Apocalypse is given in the following words: διάλεκτον καὶ γλώσσαν οὐκ ἀκριβῶς Ἐλληνίζουσιν αὐτὸν βλέπω, ἀλλ' ἰδιώματε τε βαρβαρικοί χρώμενον καὶ τον καὶ σολοκισταντα. (He goes on to say that he will not give details of these barbarisms and solecisms, lest he should seem to be scoffing at the book.) These words do not present much difficulty. Διάλεκτος and γλώσσα are, I think, practically synonymous and suggest 'usage' or 'language' rather than a language or a dialect. So, too, Ἐλληνίζουσα does not imply that this John spoke a language which was not Greek in the ordinary sense. Ἐλληνισμός and Ἐλληνίζειν are frequently used in literary language for 'correct Greek'.

On the whole we may say that Dionysius's terminology, with a few exceptions, follows the accepted usage of grammarians, critics, and

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1 Ep. ii ad Amm. 15. But this seems a little too recondite for our Dionysius.
2 Dr Swete seems to have identified the two. He gives (Ἀρκ. p. cxxii ff) several examples of solecisms in the Ap., and then of ἰδιωσιμοί. Among these last he classes (e.g.) ἀρτὸς Χ. ὄρν καὶ ζηρ and οὐαὶ τὴν γῆν and ὅταν δύναται. All these, I think, would be solecisms. I understand the ἰδιώματα βαρβαρικά to be another synonym for ἰδιωσιμοί, and if so it must according to (I believe) the universal usage of ancient grammar mean 'vitia unius verbi'. Dionysius has in mind, I think, such words or forms as καθήκωρ and εἰχαν (v. Swete p. cxxi).
rhetoricians,\textsuperscript{1} and, as I said above, his method of treating the question of authorship is, as well as could be expected in such different material, on the lines which would be suggested by what we may suppose to have been his early education, and by the scholastic ideas which were current around him. The impression he leaves with me is of a man who has been familiar with literary criticism in his earlier life, but has been switched off to a different line of thought with the natural consequences. His attitude cannot, I am sure, be regarded as independent of the scholastic culture of his age. And conversely I should say that Dionysius's method of reasoning should be treated as a valuable testimony in our estimate of Alexandrine scholarship. If a monograph should be written on the 'Higher Criticism' as applied by the scholars of the ancient world to Homer and other texts, Dionysius's discussion of the Johannine question ought to hold in it a prominent if not a foremost place. There can be few, if there are any, other specimens of so careful and sustained a discussion of such a question. Yet I fear that there is every probability that such a monograph would entirely ignore Dionysius. For if it is true that our theological scholars have neglected the light which ancient grammar or criticism or rhetoric might throw on their studies, it is still more true that classical scholars have failed to use the help which that great body of literature which begins with the New Testament might have given them. Too often indeed have they deserved the censure, which the elder of that Par Nobile Fratrum, who head the small band of scholars, which has tried to hold an even balance between the Old Pagan and the New Christian worlds of letters, passed on those who 'fence off the half of Latinity with the notice, Christianum est; non legitur.'\textsuperscript{2}

II.

My second example is one of much less detail, and, as will appear from the sequel, is given mainly to point a particular moral or morals. It is a passage in Tertullian \textit{ad Marcionem} iv 12, where in the course of answering Marcion's allegations that the sayings and actions of Christ contradicted the Old Testament he has arrived at Lk. vi and our Lord's defence of the disciples for plucking the ears of corn on the sabbath. After stating the facts he goes on 'excusat illos Christus et reus est.'

\textsuperscript{1} In another sentence where, speaking of the similarity in 'terms and conceptions' of the Gospel and Epistle, he says, καὶ ὅσοι διὰ τῶν χαρακτηρίζωντας ἐνα καὶ τῶν ἀναφοράς τοῦ τε ἕναγγελίου καὶ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς χρώτα πρόκειται, we have two rhetorical terms used naturally though rather loosely. For in Greek rhetoric, I think, χαρακτῆρ and χρῶσ are regularly used of φάσις. In Latin 'color' is used more widely.

\textsuperscript{2} v. J. E. B. Mayor \textit{The Latin Heptateuch} p. lvii.
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sabbati laesi; accusant Pharisaei. Marcion captat statum (MSS status)\textsuperscript{1} controversiae (ut aliquid ludam\textsuperscript{2} cum mei domini veritate) scripti et voluntatis. De scriptura enim sumitur creatoris et de Christi voluntate color.'

Tertullian is here applying to biblical criticism one of the most fundamental points in the school of rhetoric. At the very beginning of his course the student was taught to classify questions that might come up for discussion under their various \textit{status}. The word is a translation of \textit{στάτους}, and another rendering (used by Tertullian himself elsewhere) is \textit{constitutio}. I doubt whether there is a real equivalent in English, but perhaps the nearest is 'issue'. The meaning, however, will be clearly seen when I say that the three main \textit{status} were \textit{an sit}, \textit{quid sit}, and \textit{quale sit}. That is to say we have to consider either whether an alleged fact is true or not, or whether an admitted fact or action is what it is alleged to be, or what the degree of right or wrong in it is. In a trial for murder a complete denial produces the \textit{status} of \textit{an sit}, a plea that it is rather manslaughter that of \textit{quid sit}, a plea of justifying circumstances that of \textit{quale sit}.

These three formed in Greek the \textit{λογικὰ στάτους}, a phrase rendered in Latin by \textit{status rationales}; but besides these three rhetoric usually recognized certain \textit{νομικὰ στάτους}. There were such questions as conflicting laws, ambiguities in a law, and above all the question of \textit{scriptum et voluntas}, in Greek \textit{᾿πρὸν καὶ δὲνων}. The applicability of this 'status' to the controversy of Lk. vi is obvious. Marcion is represented as stating that the Creator had laid down a certain law, which the disciples (with Christ's approval) had broken. If so, the case would be \textit{ἀνάστασις}: there is no issue. But Tertullian holds that our Lord argues that while the \textit{scriptum} was no doubt as represented, the \textit{voluntas} of the \textit{ἔγγραφος} was as he states, and it is on this question that issue was joined. That this is the general meaning is, I think, clear, but the details of the passage are obscure. Provisionally I should translate the whole as follows: 'Marcion cavils against the view that the issue raised is that of "letter and intention" (if I may be allowed to treat Divine Truth thus humorously), for he puts in a plea that it is a question of the letter of the Creator against the intention of Christ.'\textsuperscript{3} But I do not regard this

\textsuperscript{1} The correction seems almost necessary and is adopted by Kroymann in the Vienna Corpus edition. It may be just possible, since one explanation of the term was the attitude or position taken up by the two combatants, that the plural was sometimes employed, but I have no evidence for it. The error might easily be made by some one who supposed that 'scriptum' was one 'status' and 'voluntas' another.

\textsuperscript{2} MSS 'cludam' or 'eludam'.

\textsuperscript{3} The difficulty lies in the last clause. I take it as above because (1) 'color' in this usage, though sometimes it may mean nothing more than 'a line of argument', seems generally to suggest an ingenious method of explaining away difficult or
rendering as at all certain and I have cited the whole passage, because the general meaning, which is beyond dispute, seems to me to suggest a twofold moral.

In the first place distinctions of the type of the status-lore, which, no doubt, were mastered by every serious student of rhetoric, that is by every one who went through a course of Higher, or indeed we should almost say of Secondary, education, are something quite different from that popular conception of ancient rhetoric, which regards it as consisting in acquiring a facile mastery of phrases and so-called rhetorical artifices. The rhetoric of the schools had many sides, and not the least important of these is the preparatory training which it gave for law. Concrete or actual law was not perhaps taught in the ordinary schools. But the regular course involved a good deal of consideration of juristic principles, and the declamations which played so great a part in it are constantly founded on the supposition that certain laws existed.

My other point is this. Recent critics have been ready enough to suppose that the meretricious and insincere side of rhetoric had a baneful influence on Christian historians like Luke. I do not myself believe that this aspect of rhetoric existed to so serious an extent as these critics believe it did; but assuming that it was so, what about the manifold other sides? What, in particular, about the legal or semi-legal side which I have been considering? To how many students of Lk. vi besides Tertullian must the thought have leapt, 'this is merely the "status scripti et voluntatis" which we learnt about at school'? The fact is that the influence of both the grammatical and the rhetorical schools on Christian thought, exegesis, and preaching, is a branch of history which has yet to be written.

In one of the earliest papers that I published on these subjects I ventured to write as follows: 'it is true that the schools did not teach suspicious circumstances, and so far is more appropriate to Marcion than to Christ; (2) the word 'Christi' seems inexplicable on any other supposition. It is essential to the 'status' of 'letter and intention' that both should emanate from the legislator, and so below we have 'adversus statum scripti et voluntatis Creatoris'. On the other hand, an opponent might well rejoin to the advocate of intention, 'you say this is the intention of the legislator; the letter is his, but the intention is yours only'. But the meaning must also be judged from the sequel which runs 'quasi de exemplo David introgressi sabbatis templum et operati cibum audenter fractis pani­bus propositionis'. As it stands this makes for the 'color' being Christ's. Kroy­mann, however, supposes an omission after 'quasi' and suggests 'non instructi', i.e. 'as though Christ did not know that He had an O.T. precedent.'

1 It is true that Tertullian is credited with an unusual knowledge of law (ρως 'Ραμαίνους νόμους ἡμεροθεωρός αὐτήσ, Eus. H.E. ii. 3) and readers of this passage may have thought of it as exhibiting the legal specialist, rather than the ordinary rhetorical student. But the most cursory reading of the extant rhetorical treatises will shew that the point must have been familiar to any one who mastered the regular course, that is to every well-educated Roman.
people to write or speak with genius and power, but they did teach
a very clear insight into the meaning, nature, and function of language.
Perhaps their work may best be seen in two products of these centuries,
which have had at any rate a very remarkable permanence—the Roman
Codes and the Creeds of the Christian Church.

Writing now ten years later I might wish to add to or modify these
words, but I should still maintain their substantial truth.

F. H. Colson.

P.S.—$\text{id\omega\tau\iota\sigma\mu\omicron\acute{o}}$. Since writing the above I have noticed that
Irenaeus (v 30) speaks of those who $\varepsilon\rho\phi\alpha\lambda\eta\rho\varsigma\nu\eta\alpha\pi\kappa\omega\lambda\nu\theta\iota\beta\sigma\alpha\tau\iota\varsigma\iota\varsigma$ $\text{id\omega\tau\iota\sigma\mu\omicron\acute{o}}$
by which 616 was substituted for 666 in the number of the Beast. The
Latin translator keeps $\text{se\nu\epsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\iota\omicron\sigma\iota\tau\mu\omicron\nu}$, but as below where the
Greek is not extant it is explained as $\text{pe\ce\c{c}\text{c}a\tum s\text{c}\text{r}\text{i}\text{p}\text{\o}\text{\t\i\o}\text{\r\n}}$ ($\alpha\mu\acute{\alpha}\rho\nu\mu\alpha$ $\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\delta\epsilon\omicron\nu$?) by which $\iota$ was substituted for $\xi$. I infer that Irenaeus uses
the word for 'error' much as Dionysius uses it.
The thought which this suggests is 'how imperfect is our lexicography
of this sort of Greek'. These two examples of $\text{id\omega\tau\iota\sigma\mu\omicron\acute{o}}$ are ignored not
only in Liddell and Scott, a work, so far as my experience goes, of little
use for later Greek, but also in Stephanus. Yet both come from well-
known passages in Greek Fathers and certainly vouch for a shade of
meaning different from any there recorded.

MARCAN USAGE: NOTES, CRITICAL AND EXE-
GETICAL, ON THE SECOND GOSPEL.

Dr Hort, in the great Introduction to his edition of the Greek Testa-
ment, lays down as fundamental the principle that 'Knowledge of docu-
ments should precede final judgement upon readings' (§ 38), using
capitals in the text and italics in the table of contents to call special
attention to the importance of the words. I want to enter a similar
plea for what I conceive to be an even more important principle, namely
that 'Knowledge of an author's usage should precede final judgement'
.alike as to readings, as to exegesis, and—in this case—as to the mutual
relations of the Synoptic Gospels. The studies that follow are intended
to be a contribution to the textual criticism and the exegesis of St Mark,
and also to the better understanding of that department of the Synoptic
problem which is concerned with the agreements of Matthew and Luke
against Mark. So long as it is supposed that there is a residuum of
agreements between Matthew and Luke against Mark in matter taken
from Mark—apart, that is, from passages found also in Q—which
cannot be explained without assuming literary contact either of Matthew