

NOTES ON JUSTIN MARTYR, *APOLOGY* I.

## NOTE I.

Ch. 14, p. 61 D. Βραχεῖς δὲ καὶ σύντομοι παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι γεγόνασιν οὐ γὰρ σοφιστῆς ὑπήρχεν, ἀλλὰ δύναμις θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἦν.

I suppose these words are generally taken to mean something as follows: 'His speech was short, concise, clear, simple, practical, not like that of your tedious and longwinded sophists.' Otto's note is 'nota sophistarum loquacitas'. It may be so, but I cannot help feeling that there is something more delicate than this. In considering the sense in which Justin uses the term 'sophist', we have to remember that he lived at the height of the 'Second Sophistic'. The sinister meaning familiar to us in Plato and Aristotle, never perhaps so predominant as we are apt to think, had in a great measure given way before the movement, which had popularized rhetoric, in the sense of an eloquent and cultivated exposition of practical life where ethical, aesthetic, and intellectual considerations were evenly balanced.<sup>1</sup> As applied to the distinguished lecturers, preachers, professors, who in the eyes not only of the schools, but of the educated public, represented the highest ideal, it was a very complimentary term. The bad sense still remains side by side with the good, and Justin himself uses it thus in the *Trypho*. Still I doubt whether in writing officially to the Emperors, he would use any other sense than that which it had in Philostratus's *Lives of the Sophists*, and that in accordance with which the great chair of rhetoric at Athens, sometimes called *par excellence*, the chair, was officially known as θρόνος σοφιστικός. True there is an antagonism, to which Justin appeals—the eternal antagonism between philosophy and rhetoric even in this higher aspect; but it is a very different and less bitter antagonism compared with that which we find in Plato.

Again βραχεῖς and σύντομοι may not be such simple terms as they appear. In this age when all such terms are carefully, though not always consistently, defined, they were naturally examined by writers of rhetorical treatises. In these we have some attempts to distinguish the two, but on the whole they appear to be almost synonymous. We find βραχύτης καὶ συντομία discussed as a single phrase, and characteristics, ascribed to βραχύτης in one writer, are ascribed to

<sup>1</sup> These words are more or less a reminiscence of Arnim's 'Dio von Prusa', the best account I know of the 'Second Sophistic'.

*συντομία* in another. We are told that there is a *συντομία πραγμάτων* and a *συντομία λέξεως*, and that the marks of the latter are such things as the avoidance of epithets, short and unjoined sentences, and the like. The rhetorician does not discard all this. It is one of his tools which he carries about with him as a golfer does his clubs, to be used in particular emergencies. He employs *συντομία λέξεως* perhaps about as frequently as the golfer does a 'left-hand niblick'. It is particularly recommended in *διήγησις*, that is, when the speaker in the course of an exposition or argument has to give an account of certain facts. But the use of it is only occasional. The general style of the Sophist is fuller and more periodic, while *συντομία* is the normal characteristic of the philosophical style. Any one, I think, can verify this by reading a page of (say) Aristides or even Dion Chrysostom<sup>1</sup> beside one of Epictetus or better still Marcus Aurelius. Take, for instance, this well-known passage (*Meditations* iv 23):

Πᾶν μοι συναρμόζει, ὃ σοι εὐάρμοστόν ἐστιν, ὃ κόσμος· οὐδὲν μοι πρόωρον οὐδὲ ὄψιμον τό σοι εὐκαιρον. πᾶν μοι καρπὸς ὃ φέρουσιν αἱ σοὶ ὄραι, ὃ φύσις. ἐκ σοῦ πάντα, ἐν σοὶ πάντα, εἰς σέ πάντα. ἐκεῖνος μὲν φησι· πόλι φίλη Κέκροπος· σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἐρείς· ὃ πόλι φίλη Διός;

This is a fair but by no means extreme case of philosophical *συντομία*, and I suggest that 'rough and rugged' would give the meaning of the epithets better than 'short and concise'.

Further it is to be remembered that style like music was to the ancient mind more a matter of morals and less a matter of taste than it is to us. When the Cynic or Stoic adopted *βραχύτης καὶ συντομία* as his mode of expression he did not do it as a matter of literary judgement. It was rather a form of asceticism—a definite renunciation of one of the most dazzling delights of the world.<sup>2</sup>

It seems to me then quite possible that the thought in Justin's mind is not so much what I suggested above as being the usual view, as something like the following. 'Jesus had no eloquence. He was not one of your professional lecturers—no Herodes Atticus or Dion the Golden-mouthed. His style was the rough and abrupt style of the philosophical preacher. But you will not reject it for that, but rather see moral value

<sup>1</sup> Dion is perhaps in thought half way between philosopher and rhetorician, but in style and manner belongs rather to the latter.

<sup>2</sup> There is a good illustration of this in Quintilian xi 1. 33. He is dealing with the point *eloquentiae genus aliud alios decet*. One example given is 'philosophiam ex professo ostentantibus parum decori sunt plerique orationis ornatus'. He adds 'compositio numerosa tali proposito diversa', i. e. rhythmical arrangement, by which he largely means 'well-rounded periods', does not agree with such principles or views of life (*propositum* almost = creed). The audience hearing such periods from the mouth of a philosopher apparently felt as some people at some times in this island would have felt at seeing a minister of religion taking part in theatricals.

in the style as well as in the substance.' Justin has at the back of his mind a contrast of two figures, familiar in that age in every city. One is the lecturer-orator talking to great fashionable audiences and drawing the income of a *prima donna*. The other is the thread-bare Cynic missionary, addressing knots of rather eccentric people in the side streets, and it is with this one that he wishes to range Jesus as a teacher in the eyes of the Royal Philosophers.

## NOTE 2.

Ch. 23. 3, p. 68 c. Καὶ πρὶν ἢ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αὐτὸν γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον, φθάσαντές τινες διὰ τοὺς προειρημένους κακοὺς δαίμονας διὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ὡς γενόμενα εἶπον, ἃ μυθοποιήσαντες ἔφησαν, ὃν τρόπον καὶ τὰ καθ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενα δύσφημα καὶ ἀσεβῆ ἔργα ἐνήργησαν.

The clauses φθάσαντες . . . ἔφησαν seem almost hopeless as they stand. Three corrections seem to have been proposed.

(1) (Maran) Substitute λέγω δέ for the first διὰ. The main objection to this is that this periphrastic way of speaking of the δαίμονες as τινες is very strange, and ἃ μυθοποιήσαντες ἔφησαν seems otiose.

(2) Omit διὰ before τῶν ποιητῶν, and take it 'some of the poets, &c.' Here we have the same meaningless repetition in ἃ μυθ. ἔφ. The position of τινες is odd, and a further difficulty arises. As the subject of ἐνήργησαν is clearly δαίμονες, we should expect the same subject to εἶπον or ἔφησαν or both.

(3) Substitute τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν for διὰ τῶν π. The meaning then will be that some (i. e. the μυθολόγοι) reproduced the mythological stories of the poets. The only objection I see to this is that we still have the difficulty about the subject of ἐνήργησαν.

(4) I should myself prefer to transfer διὰ τῶν ποιητῶν to after ἃ. The clause will then run φθάσαντές τινες διὰ τοὺς προειρημένους κακοὺς δαίμονας ὡς γενόμενα εἶπον ἃ διὰ τῶν ποιητῶν (sc. οἱ δαίμονες) μυθοποιήσαντες ἔφησαν, and the sense will be 'some persons under the influence of the demons proclaimed as real occurrences (cp. the contrast of γενόμενα and γεγραμμένα in the MS text ii 15) the myths which the demons had uttered through the mouths of the poets'. This avoids the difficulty of the change of subject, for though there is a change from εἶπον to ἔφησαν it is far less awkward. Otherwise the sense is the same as (3), and both concur in the assertion that there are two stages of demonic action—one the invention of the myths through the poets, the other the working by which the 'mythologists' (cf. ποιηταὶ καὶ μυθολόγοι in a very similar context ii 4) are induced to lay them before the public. In this statement, if we waive the question of demonic agency, Justin is perfectly true to history. For the 'mythologists' are none other than the *grammatici*. This succession of literary men, one of the greatest powers in the ancient world,

was undoubtedly the agency by which Homeric and other myths were popularized. They had indeed many other functions and might resent the emphasis here laid on this particular one. But they did do this work and without them the poets would have had a far more restricted hearing. Nor is Justin wrong in his chronology as expressed in *φθάσαντες*. The work of the great *grammatici* in collecting and interpreting was mostly done before our era. Didymus, the most famous of all, nicknamed *χαλκέντερος*, and *βιβλιολάθας* because he forgot in one of his 3,500 works what he had said in another, was a contemporary of Cicero.

Besides their purely professorial and literary work the *grammatici* were much in request with adults. But the main body were school-masters, and to this Justin refers in two passages. One is in ch. 54 οἱ δὲ παραδιδόντες τὰ μυθοποιηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν οὐδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν φέρουσι τοῖς ἐκμανθάνουσι νέοις, καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ καὶ ἀπαγωγῇ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους εἰρῆσθαι ἀποδείκνυμεν κατ' ἐνέργειαν τῶν φαύλων δαιμόνων. The other is in ch. 21 where he says of the tales of the so-called sons of Zeus εἰς διαφορὰν καὶ προτροπὴν τῶν ἐκπαιδευομένων ταῦτα γέγραπται μμητὰς γὰρ θεῶν καλὸν εἶναι πάντες ἡγοῦνται. In this we might be at first inclined to accept the correction *διαφθορὰν καὶ παρατροπὴν*. But the clause that follows forbids this. Nor is there any real contradiction between the two passages. *εἰς διαφορὰν καὶ προτροπὴν* gives the motive of the *grammatici*; *ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ καὶ ἀπαγωγῇ* that of the demons. Otto is, I think, quite wrong in saying that the former phrase is ironical. Justin does not wantonly question the motives of the educationists. They are right in thinking it good to imitate the divine; but the demons have misled them as to what the divine really is.

## NOTE 3.

Ch. 28. 4, p. 71 C. Εἰ δέ τις ἀπιστεῖ μέλειν τούτων τῷ θεῷ, ἢ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν διὰ τέχνης ὁμολογήσει, ἢ ὄντα χαίρειν κακία φήσει, ἢ λίθω εὐκόστα μένειν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀρετὴν μηδὲ κακίαν, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ταῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι.

The general sense of this passage, that a denial of God's care for men involves either a denial of His existence or of His moral nature, or of moral distinction in general, is clear enough; but the words *διὰ τέχνης* seem to have misled the editors, and the emendation *ἀτεχνῶς* was perhaps tempting. [By the way Otto prints this as *ἀτέχνως*, which bears quite a different meaning, and also translates *plane*. But *ἀτεχνῶς* here would mean *omnino*—'He denies that God exists at all.'] But the genuineness of *διὰ τέχνης* is settled by *Trypho* 54 where, speaking of the prophetic phrase 'he shall wash his raiment in the blood of the grape', he adds *διὰ τῆς τέχνης δεδήλωκεν ὅτι αἷμα μὲν ἔχει*

ὁ Χριστός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου σπέρματος, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως. In our passage Blunt translates 'He will by some artifice deny his existence', which conveys no meaning to me. Otto also translates *quodam artificio*, and notes with approval Maran's statement that these virtual atheists or materialists 'astute profiteri quod totidem verbis efferre non audent'. But obviously we cannot apply this phrase to Jacob who uttered or Moses who recorded the prophecy of the grape. And there is no need to read any thought of motive into our passage. Τέχνη merely means 'a rhetorical method' or perhaps better 'a special form of speech' and covers both 'tropes' and 'figures'. In the Genesis passage it is a 'trope', for 'blood of grape' does not literally mean 'non-human blood'. Thus again in *Τρυφή* 57 Justin explains that the merest novice in *τροπολογία* will understand that, when we speak of angels eating, literal eating is no more meant than when we speak of 'fire devouring everything'. In our passage the τέχνη is a σχῆμα διανοίας or 'figure of thought'. The words do mean what they say, but they mean something more. This particular figure is 'emphasis' 'cum ex aliquo dicto aliquid latens eruitur' (Quintilian ix 2. 64). If we translate 'by implication' or 'this is only another way of saying' we shall really get the meaning.

In *Τρυφή* 114 the practice of the prophets in speaking of future events as present or past is also called τέχνη. This device, which is of course a very familiar one, would be a σχῆμα λέξεως or figure of speech.

## NOTE 4.

Ch. 32. 6, p. 73 E. Πῶλος γάρ τις ὄνου εἰστήκει ἔν τινι εἰσόδῳ κόμης πρὸς ἄμπελον δεδεμένος.

It will be remembered that Justin makes this statement to shew that Gen. xlix 11 was a prophecy of Christ. There is indeed no absolute need to assign any source for the statement beyond tradition. Yet I cannot help thinking that he may have been misled by the Marcan ἀμφόδου. I do not suppose that if he actually read ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφόδου in Mark xi 4 he would mistake it for ἐπὶ τῆς ἀμπέλου or rather for πρὸς ἄμπελον. But when we remember (1) that Justin was in the habit of hearing the Gospels read at the Eucharist, (2) that copies of Mark appear to have been rare, (3)<sup>1</sup> that he shews no detailed acquaintance with the text of Mark, it seems to me very probable that the ear may have misled him, or his informant. Most authorities appear to hold

<sup>1</sup> Τέκτωνος (*Τρυφ.* 38) and Βοανεργές (*ib.* 106) might also be reminiscences of what had been heard and did not require a copy for verification. Moreover evidence of acquaintance with Mark in the Dialogue does not really affect the argument, as Justin in that work 53, while quoting the prophecy, does *not* allege this historical fulfilment. Very possibly during the interval he had found out his mistake.

that  $\phi$  was at this time sounded as  $p$ - $h$  rather than as  $f$ , and the labio-dental  $d$  is near akin to the labial  $l$ . The case will become much stronger if, remembering the connexion of both Justin and the Second Gospel with Rome, we suppose him to have heard the word there. In that bilingual society the oral reading of the Greek Scriptures by persons whose native speech was Latin of some sort must have led to much confusion. Quintilian notes that even in the upper classes the simultaneous study of Greek and Latin led to Greekish pronunciation of Latin, and the tendency in a lower stratum to import a Latinish pronunciation into Greek must have been considerably stronger. Now the Greek sounds which gave most trouble to the Italian were the aspirates, which had no proper Latin equivalents. Even literary Latin for a long time sounded  $\phi$  as  $p$ , and though later on educated people were particular on the point, vulgar Latin seems still to have been 'unable to frame to pronounce it right'. Thus *κόλαφος*, though rendered in literary Latin as *colaphus*, is *colpo* in Italian.<sup>1</sup> The Greek  $d$  did not present the same difficulties, but there are various signs of Italian tendencies to modify it to  $l$ , and it is an odd coincidence (if it is a mere coincidence) that this tendency has been specially noted in words whose second syllable ends in  $d$ , and first in  $p$  or some labial. Thus *tepidus* in the Neapolitan dialect is *tiepolo*.<sup>2</sup> In fact in many readers' mouths the two words may have been undistinguishable. The difference of gender would no doubt act as a corrective, but on the other hand Justin's preconceptions would lead him if in doubt to accept *ἀμπέλου* rather than a word which, though the papyri shew that it was not so rare as Liddell and Scott lead us to think, was so far alien to the context that neither Matthew nor Luke reproduced it. Altogether a confusion between the two is on much the same level as the confusion of *Semoni Sanco* with *Simoni Sancto*, in ch. 26.<sup>3</sup>

## NOTE 5.

Ch. 66, p. 98 A. Οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον διὰ λόγου θεοῦ σαρκοποιηθεὶς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ σὰρκα καὶ αἷμα ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἡμῶν ἔσχεν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφήν, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν, ἐκείνου τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ καὶ σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐδιδάχθημεν εἶναι.

In this passage I wish to discuss only the words ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν. I have been surprised to find that the majority of the critics whom I have read (Otto, Blunt, *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, s.v. Justin) take *μεταβολὴν* to refer to the change effected in the con-

<sup>1</sup> Lindsay *Lat. Lang.* pp. 57-59.

<sup>2</sup> *ib.* p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> I suppose there is no doubt that Justin really did confuse these two.

secrated elements. To me it seems clear that the *μεταβολή* is merely the ordinary conversion of food into constituents of the human body which takes place whenever we eat, and that his point is that the change in the consecrated elements is analogous to this. I have been glad to find that both Professor Bethune-Baker and Bishop Gore take this view. I should read, however, into the words a subsidiary thought, which neither of these writers notes, viz. that this everyday wonder makes the eucharistic miracle more credible. In dealing with Baptism (62) Justin takes a similar analogy, namely, our natural birth from water or *ὕγρα σπορά*. And though neither there any more than here does he dwell on the wonder of these processes, we know from ch. 25 that he felt that the marvel of natural reproduction made the bodily resurrection credible.

If any are still inclined to doubt that *κατὰ μεταβολήν* refers to the natural processes of digestion and assimilation, I think they may be interested, if not convinced, by a study of the *Περὶ φυσικῶν δυνάμεων* of Justin's great contemporary, Galen. Here, the conversion of food called *τροφή*, *σιτία*, and once at least *ἄρτος*, into *αἷμα* is dwelt on at length and with full anatomical explanations. The word, perhaps, most frequently used is *ἀλλοίωσις*, but we also find *μεταβολή*, e. g. 89 *τὴν πέψιν ἀλλοιώσιν τιν' ὑπάρχειν καὶ μεταβολήν τοῦ τρέφοντος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ τρεφόμενου ποιότητα* (cf. 155).

I was primarily led to this treatise in the hope of finding there some evidence as to whether *κατὰ μεταβολήν* could properly apply to digestive assimilation, a point on which Stephanus throws little light. But in the course of reading two special points emerged. One is that Galen teaches that this conversion of food is primarily into blood, the formation of flesh from blood being a secondary process (*σάρκα μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἵματος γενέσθαι ῥᾶστον* (21)). It seems to me exceedingly probable that Justin is aware of this belief and is speaking with physiological precision, and that this is the reason why while in speaking of the divine body he follows the usual order of *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα*, he reverses the order when speaking of the human body. The other point is concerned with a passage (4) which seems to me specially interesting, and which I transcribe at length:—

*ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἐξαλλάττεται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν γεύσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀφὴν αἷμα γιγνώμενα τὰ σιτία συγχωροῦσιν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἐπι τοῦτ' ὁμολογοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταί· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τινες αὐτῶν ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἡμετέρων αἰσθήσεων ἀπάτας τινὰς καὶ παραγωγὰς νομίζουσιν ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως πασχουσῶν, τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας μηδὲν τούτων οἷς ἐπονομάζεται δεχομένης, οἱ δὲ τινες εἶναι μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ βούλονται τὰς ποιότητας ἐξ αἰῶνος εἰς αἰῶνα, καὶ τὰς φαινομένας ταύτας ἀλλοιώσεις τῇ διακρίσει τε καὶ συγκρίσει γίγνεσθαι φασιν.*

Galen goes on to say that he cannot afford time to refute these other

views at length, but refers the supporters of them to what Aristotle and Chrysippus have said on the question of change in οὐσία generally (περὶ τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλοιώσεως). From all this it appears that there was a controversy amongst scientists on the nature of this process of food-transformation. It was admitted that something took place which made the digested food appear to the sight, taste, and touch, as blood. But was this a mere illusion, or was there a real μεταβολὴ τῆς οὐσίας or a σύγκρισις τῶν οὐσιῶν? A modern Justin might almost be inclined to see here the working of the λόγος σπερματικός foreshadowing future controversies; for one Greek phrase is the literal equivalent of the later *transubstantiatio*, and the other of *consubstantiatio*. But, fancy apart, have we not here something which afforded a basis for eucharistic thought? Analogies, misleading as they are, are a very potent instrument in shaping thought, and they are particularly potent when they have been the subject of controversy, and have emerged from it with increased force and colour. Justin does not give us any positive indication, as in the case of αἷμα καὶ σάρκες above, that he knew this controversy. But he may well have had it in mind, and we may perhaps expand his meaning into something like this. 'In the natural process food is changed into blood, and ultimately into flesh—changed I say κατ' ἀλήθειαν and κατ' οὐσίαν. For though some philosophical opinion has declared this to be impossible, our best scientific authorities have declared it to be the fact. Is it then an incredible thing that this should be repeated in another and higher sphere?'

## NOTE 6.

Ch. 67, p. 98 D, 99 B. Καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου λεγομένη ἡμέρα . . . συνέλευσις γίνεται . . . τῇ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς κρονικῆς ἐσταύρωσαν αὐτὸν καὶ τῇ μετὰ τὴν κρονικὴν, ἣτις ἐστὶν ἡλίου ἡμέρα, φανείς . . . ἐδίδαξε ταῦτα.

In addition to its importance in the history of Christian worship, this chapter has the interest that it forms a landmark in our knowledge of the planetary or astrological week.

The story of the growth of week-observance presents some curious features. A sequence of this sort running on without relation to other divisions of time or natural phenomena could hardly, one would think, maintain itself unbroken, unless either it enters into the life of the community as it does with us, or has some strong religious sanction behind it, as it had in the Jewish Diaspora. The planetary week, as we first find it in the Roman Empire, certainly was not in the former position, and therefore must have been in the latter. Though oddly enough it does not seem to have had much influence on official astrology—at least I can see no trace of it in Manilius or Firmicus Maternus<sup>1</sup>—it must

<sup>1</sup> There is some allusion to it, but very casually so far as I understand it, in the astrologist Vettius Valens, a contemporary probably of Justin.



have had behind it a great fund of astral mysticism, which gradually acquired force and volume, so much so that it ultimately imposed itself upon the barbarian tribes behind the Rhine and Danube, who, as we know, adapted the Roman names of the planets to their own deities, leaving, however, Saturn unchanged.<sup>1</sup>

The first day of the planetary week was the *κρονική*, and this, whether by accident or design, synchronized with the Jewish sabbath. If Cumont is right in saying that the planetary week does not date earlier than the second century B.C. one may conjecture that the synchronism was deliberate, the devotees being impressed by the resemblance of the sabbatical observances to their own cult of the planet.<sup>2</sup> However this may be, the *κρονική* seems to have been recognized by the general public as identical with the sabbath. There appear to be only two allusions to the planetary week in general literature prior to Justin. In both of these (Tibullus i 3. 18, and Frontinus ii 1. 17) we hear only of Saturn's day, and it is a mere synonym for the Sabbath. Plutarch, indeed, a specialist in obscure cults, wrote a treatise (*Symp.* iv 7) on 'why the order of the planetary days differs from the accepted order of the planets'.<sup>3</sup> Only the title survives, but it is noteworthy that it follows a discussion on the Jewish Sabbath.

It is a fair assumption that, for a prolonged period, all that the general public knew of the system was that it ran concurrently with the Jewish week with a special day sacred to Saturn identical with the Sabbath, and that the other days were distributed amongst the other six 'planets'

<sup>1</sup> When did this happen? Grimm thought about A.D. 300. From the names one may say almost with certainty before the triumph of Christianity. When one considers the extraordinary prevalence of Mithraism in the army and the undoubted fact that Mithraists observed the week (Cumont *Textes et Mon.* i 118), is it not possible that it was due to Mithraistic propaganda?

<sup>2</sup> This is rather a guess. I know no positive evidence that the planetists observed Saturday as a *dies nefastus* earlier than Tertullian. But it would naturally follow that the malign planet's day would be unlucky for enterprise and work, like our sailors' Friday.

<sup>3</sup> I have found this so little understood that it may be well to state the facts (as given by Dion Cassius 37. 18). The accepted order of the planets in ancient and mediaeval astronomy (e.g. in the *Paradiso*) is Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, Moon. Now start with Saturn on the 1st hour of Saturn's day and give one hour to each planet in turn. Saturn will have the 8th, the 15th, and 22nd. The 23rd will belong to Jupiter, the 24th to Mars, and the 1st of the next day to Sun. Hence Sunday. The Sun will have besides the 1st, the 8th, the 15th, and 22nd. The 23rd will go to Venus, the 24th to Mercury, and the 1st of the next day to the Moon. Hence Monday. In other words always miss out two planets, and you will get our order, Saturn, Sun, Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus. It follows from this that the week is really a cycle of hours rather than days. The idea of the hours did not die. It apparently is found in Paulus Alexandrinus, an astrologist of the fourth century (Ideler *Chronologie* i p. 179),

in some topsy-turvy order. People do not trouble themselves about other people's calendars unless the observance really affects their own lives, as the Jewish Sabbath evidently affected the Gentile world. There are many Roman and Anglo-Catholics who observe Corpus Christi, and a great many non-catholics who know that there is such a day, but probably not one in a hundred of these last could tell when or how it falls.

Justin's words entirely agree with this view. Though Saturday has no connexion with his subject, he takes it as his standard of week-measurement. He is aware that the next day is the Sun's day, but by the addition of *λεγομένη* he hints that it is not so familiar a name as *κρονική*. Friday he does not name at all. It has been suggested that he wished to avoid any mention of the impure Aphrodite. But Cronus, whose day he names freely, was not a particularly pure deity. The probable explanation, I think, is that like most other people he was ignorant of, or hazy about, the other days.

The remarkable passage in Dion Cassius xxxvii 18 is quite compatible with this. He has been speaking of the Jews, and how they dedicated the day of Cronus to the *ἀρρητος καὶ ἀειδῆς θεός*, and takes the opportunity for a digression about the planetary week and the strange order of the days. The fashion began in Egypt and is now universal, but is not 'ancient to speak generally' (*οὐ πάλαι ποτὲ ὡς λόγῳ εἶπεῖν ἀρξάμενοι*). Now it is the regular fashion (*ἐπιχωριάζει*) even at Rome, and is, indeed, *πάτριον τρόπον τινά*. As Dion wrote from sixty to eighty years after Justin it is quite possible that this attribute of *πάτριον*, by which I suppose he means that in spite of its recent origin it had now all the sanction of an ancestral practice, may have grown up in the interval.

The evidence then, such as it is, seems to me to point this way. But it is of course meagre. Justin's omission to name Friday may be accidental, and Dion's language is vague. It is possible that from the first the Church may have been well acquainted with the planetary week-system. I do not know whether the Christ-myth theorists have suggested that Sunday was from the first really Sun-day, and that the story that Jesus rose on that day was an aetiological myth. It would be much more plausible than other suggestions I have seen. But without going so far, speculative persons may, without doing any certain violence to chrono-

and the next place where I know of its cropping up is a thousand years later in *The Knight's Tale* (line 2217). Still it was only natural that the planet which began the day and gave its name to it should be, as Paulus calls it, *κύριος* of that day. Thus we find Apollonius (Philostratus *Vita Ap.* iii 41) wearing seven jewelled rings, in each of which the jewel symbolized a planet and which he changed according to the day. Another thing which follows is that monumental representations of the Seven in the week order (some of them belong to the first century A. D.) are a sign of week observance.

logy, indulge in the fancy that from the first the Church was attracted by the significance of the coincidence—as quite probably Justin was—and that he who was in the Spirit on the Lord's Day and saw the vision of One whose face was 'as the sun shining in his strength', had some thought of other mystics, who held the day sacred to the chief of the 'seven stars'.

This raises the question—at whatever date the Church came into everyday contact with the planetary week-system, what was her attitude? So far as the evidence I have seen goes, not one of active hostility, and this would be *prima facie* probable. Many, no doubt, would see in the institution definite planet-worship, and Tatian's play of words on *πλανήται δαίμονες* was obvious.<sup>1</sup> But Matth. ii is in itself enough to shew that a belief in astral influences need not mean worship of the stars. The employment of the names of pagan deities may have been a stumbling-block, though Clement actually presses this into his own use, and shews that the Christian fasts on Hermes's day against covetousness, and on Aphrodite's day against lust.<sup>2</sup> But I take it that on the whole people felt that, though the planets were named after deities, they were not the deities, and indeed a precisian could avoid the difficulty by using the earlier and alternative set of titles.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the general attitude may be seen from the history of the names. Where Christian or Biblical associations predominated, they could carry the names with them, and thus the pair of planetary names which is the first to appear in literature is the pair which ultimately disappeared. Over the whole of Latin Europe *Dominica* and *Sabbatum*<sup>4</sup> have ousted *Solis Dies* and *Saturni Dies*. On the other hand, where there were no such strong associations, the planetary names triumphed. Even *Parasceue* had no chance against *Veneris Dies*.

I may add that I have never been able to find any good monograph on the week. The facts and suggestions here given have been pieced together from many different quarters, and are put forward quite as much in the hope of eliciting information as of giving it.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ἐδωρεστοῦσι δὲ αὐτοῖσι οἱ ἐπὶ πλανήται . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ . . . ἀντὶ πλανητῶν δαιμόνων ἕνα τὸν ἀπλανῆ δεσπότην μεμαθήκαμεν* (*Ad Graec.* 9). It should be remembered, however, that worship or honour paid to the Seven does not necessarily mean week-observance.

<sup>2</sup> *Strom.* vii 12.

<sup>3</sup> *Φαίνων* = Saturn, *φαέθων* = Jupiter, *πυροείς* = Mars, *φωσφόρος* = Venus (this of course always held its ground), *στίλβων* = Mercury. These are used by Martianus Capella, concurrently with the others, in the fifth century A.D.

<sup>4</sup> *Samedi* (dialectically *sabedi*) is certainly *sabbati dies* quite as much as the Italian *sabato*.