

## ΑΠΑΡΕΜΦΑΤΟΣ.

IN the July number of the JOURNAL Prof. J. A. Smith published a very interesting explanation of the use of this word in Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iv 25, 198, the ingenuity and acuteness of which I fully recognize, though I am unable to accept his conclusions. Before giving my reasons for this it will be best to transcribe the passage :

Ὁ μὲν οὖν θεὸς ἀναπόδεικτος ὢν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς σοφία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτῳ συγγενῆ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει καὶ διέξοδον, πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ πνεύματος συλλήβδην μὲν ἔν τι πρᾶγμα γενομένοι συντελοῦσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν υἱόν, ἀπαρέμφατος δὲ ἐστὶ τῆς περὶ ἐκάστης αὐτοῦ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐννοίας. καὶ δὴ οὐ γίνεται ἀτεχνῶς ἔν ὡς ἔν, οὐδὲ πολλὰ ὡς μέρη ὁ υἱός, ἀλλ' ὡς πάντα ἔν, ἔνθεν καὶ πάντα. κύκλος γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς ἔν εἰλουμένων καὶ ἐνουμένων.

This Dr Bigg (*Christian Platonists of Alexandria* p. 93) translates, with a query to the word 'infinite', as follows :—

'The God then being indemonstrable is not the object of Knowledge ; but the Son is Wisdom and Knowledge and whatever else is akin to these, and so is capable of demonstration and definition. All the powers of the Divine Nature, gathered into one, complete the idea of the Son ; but He is infinite as regards each of His powers. He is then not absolutely One as Unity, nor many as divisible, but One as All is One. Hence He is All. For He is a circle, all the powers being orb'd and united in Him.'

Dr Smith's interpretation gives quite a different sense to the clause ἀπαρέμφατος δὲ ἐστὶ τῆς περὶ ἐκάστης αὐτοῦ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐννοίας. For a full understanding of it the article itself must be referred to. But I shall perhaps give the main point when I say that he traces the word to the use of *παρεμφαίνειν* in connexion with the phenomena of an imperfect mirror. Such a mirror is said (at the imperfect patch) *παρεμφαίνει τὴν αὐτοῦ ὄψιν*, instead of the object which it elsewhere reflects. So ἀπαρέμφατος may mean 'not disabled from reflecting the object presented to it', and the statement in the passage means that the Son has no powers of his own, but reflects, without impediment, the powers of the Father. It is essential to this interpretation that αὐτοῦ should refer to ὁ θεός, and not to ὁ υἱός. This in itself is difficult, but my main objection to the interpretation is that it does not give due weight to the history of ἀπαρέμφατος as a grammatical term.

Ἀπαρέμφατος, as far as we know, is a coinage of grammatical philology, and in the large majority of cases signifies the infinitive mood. It is in this sense that we first find it in the classic textbook of Dionysius Thrax (about 80 B. C.), which in subsequent centuries was expounded by generations of commentators, many of whom have given an explanation of the use and origin of the term. The Infinitive, as they tell us, is

called *ἀπαρέμφατος*, 'not-suggesting-further', because it does not suggest more than the bare meaning of the verb. The other parts of the verb (*τὰ παρεμφατικά*) suggest some particular *ψυχική διάθεση* or 'mood' and some particular person or number. This is not the case with the *ἀπαρέμφατος*, which may be thought of as having no persons or moods, or more properly (and this is exceedingly important for our purpose) as covering and combining them all. The word may also be applied to any class of words in so far as they exhibit the characteristics of the *ἀπαρέμφατος* proper. Thus the chief of the later grammarians, Apollonius, who lived a generation or so before Clement, and has left us an elaborate disquisition on the infinitive in his *περὶ συντάξεως*, can also speak of the personal pronouns, as *ἐγώ* and *σύ*, as being (in contrast to *οὗτος* and *ἐκεῖνος*) *ἀπαρέμφατα γένους*, not limited to any particular gender. This is still more frequently the case with the corresponding positives, *παρεμφατικός*, *παρέμφασις*. Thus he calls the article *παρεμφατικὸν γένους*, and by a slight extension notes that a singular ordinal numeral as *ἐνδέκατος* has a *πληθυντική παρέμφασις* because we cannot use it without thinking of plurality. Again, by a further extension they may be applied to individual words. *\*Ἐρρωσθε*, we are told elsewhere, while in itself meaning *valete*, may have the sinister *παρέμφασις* of 'be off with you'. And it is apparently by some such enlargement that Epiphanius<sup>1</sup> speaks of a statement, which is to be taken literally and not allegorically, as being *ἀπαρεμφάτως κεκηρυγμένον*.

It is then in this sphere of grammatical philosophy that the word lives and moves and has its being. It is in fact a leading and fundamental term in what was in Clement's time one of the most favourite and best understood of studies. It is surely reasonable then to suppose that when Clement applies it to theological metaphysics it is with direct allusion to its grammatical usage. When in recent utterances I find 'acid test' or 'touching a Freudian Complex on the raw' applied to politics, it is to contemporary science that I go for an explanation, not to the original meaning of the words as supplied by the dictionary. And so, even if when grammatical philosophy<sup>2</sup> first adopted these terms there was any thought of the optical sense of *παρεμφαίνειν*, we need not go so far back for an explanation—at any rate if grammatical usage will supply a clue, as I think it will.

Before, however, I give my own explanation, two others should be noted. Dr Gilbert Murray, in a note supplied to the reprint of Dr Bigg (loc. cit.), took the word to be passively used and explained the phrase as meaning that the Son 'is not indicable or defined by the conception

<sup>1</sup> 772 A. Stephanus gives another reference to Epiphanius (II 24 D) which I do not understand; but evidently the word is used in some quasi-grammatical way.

<sup>2</sup> I use this phrase, because it is important to remember that all this side of grammar was the work of the various philosophical schools and not of the 'Grammatici', who began by being literary critics and only took over our 'grammar' later.

*we have*<sup>1</sup> of each of his powers, e. g. Justice ; *our*<sup>1</sup> conception of justice does not *παρεμφαίνειν* Him, or indicate or define what He is'. With all deference to so high an authority, I do not think this is quite satisfactory. Apart from minor difficulties, such as the unauthenticated change of voice-sense, I agree with Dr Smith that we have no right to read into τῆς ἐννοίας the thought of human as opposed to divine. We may apply the terminology we are discussing, and say that the simple noun ἐννοια is ἀπαρέμφατος of such a παρέμφασις as 'ours' or 'which we have'.

I think that more is to be said for the rendering 'infinite as regards', which is also given in the Latin translation in Migne. We may allow that the word, suggesting as it does absence of limitations as regards persons, &c., *might* have easily come to mean 'unlimited in extent', and as a matter of fact this is the case with the accepted Latin equivalent *infinitus*.<sup>2</sup> But I know of no example outside this passage which suggests that such an extension actually took place.

My own explanation is as follows. Laying stress on ἐκάστης I understand Clement to mean that the idea of the Son does not call up the thought of powers exhibited singly and one to the exclusion of another, but of powers blended into a single whole. The phrase is not very translatable and the above is as near as I can get, though if it has to be given more shortly 'not limited to' would have to serve.<sup>3</sup> Under it lies explicit, though perhaps half-felt, a grammatical allegory. Ordinary human beings do not exhibit all these powers, but possess one or some to the exclusion of others ; nor even, if they had them all, would they exhibit them simultaneously. They are therefore like 'paremphatic' words, which indicate one person, one mood, one number to the exclusion of others. But the Son is like the Infinitive mood, which is not limited to these individual persons or moods, *but embraces them all in an indivisible unity*.

I daresay that, at first sight, exception may be taken to the words I have here italicized, and it will be said that the analogy breaks down because the Infinitive does not embrace all moods and persons, but is the negation of them, and that therefore to say that the Son is like the Infinitive is to say that He has no powers at all. I think (as I hinted above) that a further study of the Greek doctrine on the subject will

<sup>1</sup> My italics in both cases.

<sup>2</sup> I doubt, however, whether *infinitus* (*indefinitus, infinitivus*) is a translation of ἀπαρέμφατος. I suspect that it comes from an earlier terminology, in which the infinitive was called δόμιστος. This ultimately dropped out, because the name was required for the 'aorist tense', a need which of course was not felt in Latin. So too *modus* seems to be a translation of διάθεσις, which was the earlier Greek name for 'mood and voice'. Afterwards it was restricted to the 'voice' and was replaced for the mood by ἐγκλισις, though the doctrine that it expressed ψυχικὴ διάθεσις remained.

<sup>3</sup> Dr Bethune-Baker suggests 'He is not to be particularized by the idea of his powers one by one'.

dispose of this objection. I have noted above that Apollonius speaks of the personal pronouns as *γένους ἀπαρέμφοτα* and we should certainly think of these as covering all genders. And in the case of the Infinitive itself, while he sometimes uses expressions which imply that the Infinitive does not possess these 'accidents', we also find language of another sort, as when he calls it the *γενικὴ ἐγκλισις* or 'general mood', of which the others are *εἶδη* or species. A clearer example appears in one of the commentators on Dionysius Thrax (Heliodorus),<sup>1</sup> who speaks of the *ἀπαρέμφοτος* as *ῥῆμα καθαρὸν οὐσίας μὴ καταμικτυμένης, ὅτι εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναλύονται αἱ λοιπαί*. Clearer still is Aulus Gellius i 7. He is speaking of the Ciceronian 'hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum'. Some people thought that *futurum* was a solecism, but he points out that it is not a participle, but 'verbum indefinitum quod Graeci appellant *ἀπαρέμφοτον*, neque numeris neque generibus praeserviens, sed liberum undique et impromiscuum . . . qui modus neque in numeros neque in personas neque in genera distrahitur, sed omnia isthaec una eademque declinatione complectitur.'<sup>2</sup> In fact, to use Clement's language, it is ἐν ὧς πάντα.

I put forward this explanation with diffidence, not only out of respect to the authority of others, but because to pronounce dogmatically on it would require more familiarity with Clement in particular and Christological controversy in general than I possess. But it has, I think, the merit that it explains an undoubtedly grammatical term in accordance with *contemporary grammatical doctrine*. This seems to me a matter of sufficient importance to justify labouring so minute a point. I have several times in this JOURNAL and elsewhere urged that grammatical and rhetorical conceptions, which to us are more or less dead and meaningless, are of the very life-blood of the thought of Clement's age, and that students of early Christian theology cannot afford to neglect them. And I feel grateful to Dr Smith for calling my attention to a passage which seems to me an admirable illustration of this truth.

F. H. COLSON.

## THE ODES AND PSALMS OF SOLOMON: AN AMENDS.

My attention has been called by Dr Mingana to the fact that in my review in the JOURNAL (Oct. 1920, pp. 76-84) of the new edition of the *Odes and Psalms of Solomon*, which Dr Rendel Harris and he have recently brought out in two volumes, I have done the editors an unintentional injustice.

(1) On receiving the volumes for review, my first care was to make use

<sup>1</sup> *Gram. Gr.* iii p. 400.

<sup>2</sup> A similar idea may be implied by another name *perpetuus* which is sometimes given to the Infinitive (e. g. Mart. Cap. 310).