

earnestness of purpose, which do occur in journalism and elsewhere, but require proof in his case. It implies also a late date for the Gospel and the Acts. This is not in itself impossible; but it leaves us with the task of explaining the absence of all knowledge of the fall of Jerusalem and of the deaths of St Peter and St Paul, which is very far from easy.¹ The case for 61 or thereabouts is not disposed of by any means. Perhaps then, in conclusion, I may put my case thus. If St Luke were writing in the early sixties, he would be describing how the Holy Land of the time *at* which he wrote was governed thirty years before. The truth of the converse does not follow of necessity—he may, for instance, not have kept up to date or, though I doubt it, he may be just a journalist; but the converse is highly probable; and we have a point most certainly to be considered, when an attempt is made to fix the date of writing, especially as at first sight, and even on examination, Jerusalem was not yet destroyed when ‘St Luke’ wrote and St Peter and St Paul were still alive.

H. S. CRONIN.

¹ As hard in fact as it would be 2,000 years hence to assign to 1915 or any later date a writer (*floruit* limited to 1900–1940) of two volumes on the history of a great religious movement in Belgium in the last decades of last century, who gave no hint of the destruction of the country, whether he was an original authority or no and whatever may have been his point of view.

PHILO ON EDUCATION.

THAT the ancient world took a great interest in the subject of education is attested by innumerable scattered allusions and observations. Yet it is remarkable that very little systematic or formal writing on the subject survives. That Aristippus and Theophrastus, Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus, Cato and Varro all wrote treatises on education we learn on the authority of Diogenes Laertius and others.¹ But nothing of them survives and very little is known of their views. If we may set aside the *Republic*, we are practically left with the fifth book of the *Politics*, the first two books of Quintilian, and the treatise *περὶ ἀγωγῆς παιδῶν* which is bound up with Plutarch’s *Moralia*. Of these three Aristotle is not, I think, for practical purposes of great importance. Neither his general outlook nor his treatment of details seems to have greatly influenced the theory or practice of later times. Well before the date of our era, the system of the *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία* had been firmly established. It consisted of (1) *Grammaticæ*: originally the

¹ A collection of these is given by Wytttenbach in his introductory note to the *De Lib. Ed. Plutarch. Mor.* vol. vi p. 66.

literary and critical study of the poets, historians and orators, but tending more and more to include scientific grammar in our sense of the word; (2) rhetoric: including the theory, and carefully graduated exercises culminating in the declamation; (3) geometry: which included arithmetic and a certain amount of astronomy; (4) music: to which still adhered something but by no means all of the virtue which Aristotle ascribed to it. To this was added in most cases a tincture of formal philosophy, at any rate of dialectic. Drawing (*γραφικῆ*), on which Aristotle lays considerable stress, appears to have dropped out of the curriculum. Now I do not suppose that this system was based on any definite theory of education. Probably it came into being through the same causes as other educational systems, namely, because people wish their children to learn what either their own generation believes or other generations have believed to be useful knowledge. At the same time we find clear evidence of two opposing theories, which while accepting the Encyclia in practice endeavoured to justify them on general principles. The ideal of Quintilian is practical, but a broad and liberal view is taken of what is practical.¹ The object of education is to make an orator, but as the ideal orator must be a good man, both good discipline and a knowledge of ethics are essential. And as there is no form of knowledge which cannot become the subject of oratory, he must study all the Encyclia, while music will give him grace and melody of voice, and geometry will train him to logical reasoning. Throughout this disquisition, Quintilian clearly indicates that he wishes to keep education out of the hands of the professed philosopher. Not only the ethical branch of philosophy, but the logical and physical also are useful enough, but they are part of a rhetorical education, and the pupil need not go to the philosopher's lecture room to acquire them. In fact, the philosopher evidently is to him what the priest is to many modern educationists. And even if we had only Quintilian we might be sure that there was another theory, in which philosophy was the one thing needful and general education was only valued in so far as it led up to philosophy. This theory we find in pseudo-Plutarch. Here the general remarks on discipline do not differ vitally from Quintilian's, but when we come to the subject of school work itself, we find that while the writer admits that the whole *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία* has to be taken, it should be taken *ἐκ παραδρομῆς ὡσπερὶ γέυματος ἕνεκεν*: but philosophy must hold the first place (*προσβέειν*). In a genuine treatise of Plutarch *De audiendo poetas* the relation of one of the most important branches of the Encyclia to philosophy is discussed. Here it is laid down that poetry is to be valued because of the numerous pieces of sound morality to be found

¹ Vide particularly Quint. i 10.

in it, which are rendered palatable to the young through the poetical form. In fact, Plutarch does little more than restate the famous dictum of Lucretius (*de Rer. Nat.* 936) :—

‘sed ueluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes
cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum
contingunt mellis dulci flauoque liquore,’ &c.

In Seneca *Ep.* 88 we find a somewhat similar view to that of pseudo-Plutarch. The Encyclia (*liberales artes*) prepare the soul for philosophy (‘non perducunt animum ad uirtutem sed expediunt’). But this is somewhat grudgingly admitted, and the greater part of the letter is a polemic against the Encyclia. On the whole, philosophy seems to have undertaken the patronage of the accepted system somewhat reluctantly. The Cynic and the Epicurean repudiated it to the last. Even in the Stoic schools Zeno declared the *ἐγκύκλια* to be *ἀχρηστα*,¹ and though Chrysippus reversed this, something of a reaction appears in Posidonius.² At the best the Encyclia are admitted to be a preparation. How they prepare is, so far as our evidence goes, never seriously discussed.

Now it is one of the many interesting points in Philo that he gives us a genuine discussion of this very important question. Our main source is the treatise *περὶ συνόδου πρὸς τὰ προπαιδείματα*. The title has been Latinized as *De congressu eruditionis gratia*,³ and this version seems to have been accepted without question. But it is clearly mistake. The meaning of the Greek is, as the whole treatise shews, ‘On mating *with* the preliminary forms of training’, and the book discusses the results produced by the intercourse of the soul with these subjects. Abraham, the soul—so runs the allegory—is married to Sarah, who stands for wisdom. Such a union should produce wise words, blameless thoughts, and noble actions. But the soul is not at first ripe for it, and Sarah is barren. She therefore sends the soul to mate with Hagar the Egyptian, whose name signifies sojourning (*παροίκησις*), while Egypt stands for the external senses. In plain words, the boy who is not yet ripe for philosophy must have a preliminary training in the Encyclia, in which the use of the external senses plays so great a part and which can only be temporarily useful. So Abraham finds Hagar fruitful and Ishmael is born. But in time Sarah can bear a child to Abraham, and then Hagar and Ishmael must be cast out.

¹ Diog. Laert. vii 32, and 129. I imagine that the general attitude of the Stoics is given by the epithet *μέσα*. This technical term of Stoicism, equivalent, if I understand it aright, to *ἀδιάφορα*, is constantly used by Philo of the Encyclia, and evidently represents accepted usage.

² So I understand Sen. *Ep.* 88, 21, &c. Norden *Antike Kunstprosa*, p. 672, seems to take the passage differently.

³ Sometimes *De cong.* ‘*quaerendae*’ *er. grat.*

School studies must not be prolonged when we are ripe for something higher.

The allegory is not altogether original. In pseudo-Plutarch we have a hint of the figure of *παροίκησις* probably derived from some earlier teaching. For the writer, after remarking that the Encyclia are to be taken *ἐκ παραδρομῆς*,¹ goes on to say that it is well to travel to many cities, but to live only in one—the best. And the story of Sarah and Hagar is clearly outlined in a saying, which he quotes from Bion,² that those who being unable to win philosophy wear themselves out in the *προπαιδεύματα* are like the suitors of Penelope, who when they could not win the mistress contented themselves with the maids. This saying is elsewhere attributed to Aristippus and Ariston of Chios, and is clearly one of those accepted Homeric allegories on which Philo modelled his use of the Old Testament. But the transformation of Penelope and her maids into Sarah and Hagar is a very happy touch. The Homeric allegory stated the view of the later Stoics at any rate very inadequately. In their eyes the training given by the Encyclia was only temporarily valuable, but it was valuable; it was inferior, but it was legitimate. And this thought the Old Testament story hit off with curious felicity.

So far Philo has not carried us much further than pseudo-Plutarch and Seneca, but he then proceeds to discuss what the various influences of the Encyclia are.³ *Grammatice*⁴ dealing with poets and prose-writers produces intelligence and wide knowledge (*πολυμάθεια*), and teaches us to despise vanities through the picture of the misfortunes which demigods and heroes experience in the pages of literature. Music charms away the unrhythmical and unmelodious and brings the soul into harmony. Geometry plants the seeds of equality and analogy, and by its logical continuity (*συνεχῆς θεωρία*) creates a love for justice. Rhetoric sharpens the mind to *θεωρία* (the *εὔρεσις* of the technical rhetorician), trains and welds thought to expression, and thus makes the man truly *λογικός*. Dialectic is the twin of rhetoric and shews us how to distinguish truth from falsehood.

In the first list of the Encyclia astronomy is included but never appears again, though as Philo's lists are seldom exhaustive, this need not imply that he intended to exclude it. Indeed, as geometry seems to have been regarded generally as including some elementary astronomy, it is reasonable to suppose that Philo took this view. But there are other passages⁵ in which astronomy seems to occupy a higher or at

¹ *De Lib. Ed.* 10.

² *Ibid.*

³ *De Cong.* 4.

⁴ *Grammatice* with Philo is not yet divided into *μεθοδική* = our 'grammar' and *ιστορική*, literary criticism, &c. The literary side is still predominant.

⁵ e.g. *De Mig. Ab.* 32, &c.; *De Gig.* 14.

least a different place in Philo's system. It is rather a philosophy in itself, a false or inferior philosophy indeed, but still something more than a mere stepping-stone like the Encyclia. The soul which cultivates this astronomical philosophy is represented by Abram in Chaldaea. When he left Chaldaea, he entered so to speak on another state of existence. I imagine that the explanation of this is that 'astronomy' in these passages rather means 'astrology', a science which Philo seems to regard with distrust mingled with a sort of respect. The astronomy which the schoolboy learnt in connexion with geometry was of a simpler kind and free from the astrological taint. So at least it appears in Quintilian.

Amongst the judgements above mentioned on the various subjects, that on *grammaticæ* is perhaps the most interesting. Elsewhere he speaks of the student of *grammaticæ* as nurtured in ὠγύγμαι δόξαι, 'time-honoured thoughts'. A reverence for the past and its records is indeed a leading idea with Philo. It finds perhaps its happiest expression in the *De Abr.* 4, where the phrase 'Enoch was not found' is explained as meaning that the good man loves to hide himself in some solitude, 'communing with those best of men whose bodies time has dissolved, but the fire of their virtues lives in poetry and prose'. The remark that literature is valuable because the picture of the misfortunes of heroes and demigods teaches us to despise vain dreams is also noticeable.¹ A similar breadth of view characterizes his remarks on the other subjects. In all it is not their direct bearing on philosophy nor yet the usefulness of the knowledge obtained that justifies these studies. It is rather that they give a certain tone and colour to the mind.

That Hagar and Ishmael should be cast out after the birth of Isaac is a natural conclusion both from the Bible and from the general views of the philosophical educationist. In the *De Congressu* itself this conclusion is never actually drawn, though it is perhaps implied in the censure of those who grow 'old in poetry or geometrical problems, or musical colours'.² But in the *De Cherubim* the point is clearly made. Philo's theory was indeed rather embarrassed by the two flights of Hagar.

¹ It reminds me of a letter of one who inherited much of Philo's love of culture, Gregory of Nazianzus. Writing (*Ep.* 165) to Timotheus ἀνὴρ πεπαιδευμένος in affliction, he says γένου σεαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν βιβλῶν αἷς καθωμίλικας ἐν αἷς πολλοὶ μὲν βίοι, πολλοὶ δὲ τρόποι, πολλὰ δὲ ἤθρονα καὶ λειώτητες, πολλὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ εἶδος σύμφοροι καὶ τραχύτητες. Christians and Jews both felt how clearly the lesson of resignation is taught in Greek literature.

² Οἱ μὲν ἐν ποιήμασι, οἱ δὲ ἐν γραμμαῖς, οἱ δὲ ἐν χρωμάτων κρᾶσεσι. It is perhaps pardonable that Yonge's translation takes the last words to refer to drawing and painting. But (1) γραμμὴ is, I think, generally used of geometry, (2) musical 'colours' have just been mentioned.

The first flight (cf. Gen. xvi), which was voluntary and because Sarah (or rather Sarai) afflicted her, is not explained very satisfactorily. Affliction means righteous discipline, and the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία is conceived of as wishing to escape the 'austere and gloomy life of the lover of virtue'. Philo may perhaps mean that education when conducted under the philosophical ideal was apt to assume a dullness which deterred the student. To judge from the dull treatment of poetry by Plutarch, this is not unlikely to have been the case. But if so the allegory would seem to demand a flight of Abraham rather than of Hagar. The expulsion of Gen. xxi presents no difficulties. When Sarai (ἀρχή μου), that is, wisdom in its partial and specific aspect, has become the generic wisdom, when Isaac or εὐδαιμονία has been born, the time has come to cast out the bondwoman and her son for ever. No doubt such an expulsion was often 'very grievous in Abraham's sight'. Many a student in those days must have felt great reluctance to leave the charms of *grammaticæ* and rhetoric. But such a student must yield to the oracle which says to him, 'In all that Sarah hath said unto thee, hearken unto her voice'. The claims of philosophy are paramount (*Leg. All.* iii 87).

I do not suppose that we know how widely opportunities for an encyclical education were extended in Philo's world, but no doubt many who took to philosophy later had either never had, or had not used, such opportunities.¹ In *De Gig.* 13 Philo tells us that such men feeling the loss that they sustained through want of a grounding often went back in later life to the Encyclia. This reversal of the natural order is, he says, quite wrong. When Laban said 'It is not the custom in our place to give the younger before the elder' he laid down falsely (ψευδογραφεί) a law contrary to that of nature. And the worst of such a practice is that many of these later students of the Encyclia never get back to philosophy at all. Partly no doubt because some of them, e.g. music and geometry, are no doubt difficult to acquire in later years, partly also, I believe, because the Encyclia as a whole had for a widespread public a charm and romance which they have now for only a few.

There is one question on which Philo seems to have gone against the general opinion of antiquity. The usual view was that formal education should begin when the child had passed his seventh year. Some indeed would have put the date of beginning earlier, amongst whom was Quintilian himself, though he admits that there was a great body of opinion

¹ Amongst such, at a later date, was perhaps Justin Martyr. I do not know on what grounds the article in *Dict. Christ. Biog.* says 'that he speaks of having received a thoroughly Greek education'. He tells us at any rate that he had not learnt music or geometry (*Dial.* ii).

against him. Aristotle would have the child between five and seven be 'a spectator of the forms of learning which he would have to study'. Amongst the fathers Jerome holds to the seven years' principle, while Chrysostom¹ acquiesces in a child beginning at five. Philo stands alone, so far as I know, in wishing to postpone all schooling till a later age.² Abraham before he lived in Canaan sojourned in Egypt. Now Egypt, which typifies *πάθη*, here means the age of childhood, in which the soul dwells with pains, fears, and the like, which come to us through the senses, while the reasoning powers are not yet able to distinguish between virtue and vice. But when we enter the second stage of life, apparently at seven, we enter Canaan, which signifies wickedness.³ The child becomes *λογικός*, he can distinguish right and wrong, but he generally chooses the wrong—such is Philo's curiously pessimistic view of boyhood. But the fact that he has become *λογικός* does not necessarily fit him for instruction in the Encyclia. The intellect is fluid or flabby (*πλαστώσα*), and it is only after a further period that we can approach them with profit. And therefore it was that Abraham did not take Hagar till ten years after he had entered Canaan. Not that 'ten' is to be pressed. It is merely the perfect number. The truth intended is that some considerable time should be allowed to elapse, and that the plan of forcing the Encyclia upon young boys really misses its aim.

Hagar and Ishmael are the prevailing parabolic form by which the Encyclia are represented, but there are others. The familiar figure of 'milk'⁴ as opposed to meat occurs once or twice. On the other hand, their unsubstantial character is shewn in *De Sac. Ab.* 43 by comparing them to a fragrance. Viewed in this light they are represented by Keturah, whose name signifies *θυμῶσα*. Somewhat similar perhaps is a fine passage in *De Cher.* 101. Here the soul appears as the earthly house of the invisible God. Of this house the Encyclia are the ornaments, 'just as in an ordinary house plasterings (*κονιάματα*) and pictures and arrangements of costly stones do not contribute to its strength, but delight the dwellers therein'.⁵ In *De Agr.* 18 the Encyclia are saplings

¹ Quint. i 1, 15. Arist. *Pol.* iv 17. Jer. *Ep.* 98. Chrysostom, Migne vol. iii c. 125.

² *De Congr.* 15, &c.

³ Compare *Quis Rer. Div. Her.* 59, where an even gloomier picture is drawn of the age from seven to fourteen (?). This is *ἡ ἐναπαροράτη ἡλιεία*. Its passions are compared to the fire of Ex. xxii 6 which 'catches in thorns, so that the standing corn, or the stacks, is consumed'.

⁴ e. g. *de Agr.* 2.

⁵ This conception appears also in Sen. *Ep.* 88 to be rejected: 'At enim delectat artium notitia multarum . . . an tu existimas reprehendum, qui supervacua usu sibi comparat et pretiosarum rerum pompam in domo explicat: non potius eum, qui occupatus est in supervacua litterarum supellectile?'

(μοσχεύματα) which are planted in childish minds. They are contrasted with the trees of folly, which must be cut down, and the full-grown trees of philosophy. The same sort of classification is found in *De Gig.* 60, where the lover of bodily things is earth-born, the student of the Encyclia and the other arts heaven-born, the philosopher—the true priest and prophet—God-born. In *De Mut.* 229, &c. the story of Abraham's prayer for Sodom is utilized. Where fifty men were not attainable God would accept ten. And so where true philosophy is not to be found, He may accept the Encyclia. In *De Fug.* 183 we have a more elaborate allegory founded on Elim with its twelve fountains and seventy palm-trees. Elim itself signifies 'vestibule', and the Encyclia are the vestibule of philosophy. So, too, the fountains themselves are more especially the Encyclia. Beside them Israel thirsting for knowledge encamps rather than by the palm-trees which are the prize of those who aim at perfect virtue. Again in *Quis Rer. Div. Her.* 272 &c., the Encyclia (or perhaps their result) are the ἀποσκευὴ πολλή or much substance, with which it was promised (Gen. xv 14) that Israel should depart from Egypt. The soul descending from heaven, if it maintains its true nature amidst the constraints of the body, obtains from the Encyclia provision (ἐφόδια) for its heavenward return.¹

There are two places in Philo in which I seem to find a different kind of conception. One is a long section in the *De Ebr.* 9 &c. Philo has been commenting on Deut. xxi 18 &c., where the parents are told to denounce the disobedient and profligate son. In the allegory which Philo finds on this the father is ὀρθὸς λόγος or philosophy, the mother is the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία. Now there are children who are disobedient to both their parents. Such was the child of whom the parents say 'This our son is stubborn and rebellious,' &c., and who 'is put away from among you'. But the words 'this our son' imply other children. These may be divided into three classes. These are (1) those who respect their mother but not their father, (2) those who respect their father but not their mother, (3) those who respect both.

¹ I think this last illustration has had a descendant of some importance. The πολλή ἀποσκευὴ would naturally be connected with the spoiling of the Egyptians (Ex. xii 38). In his letter to Gregory Thaumaturgus (Migne i 87) Origen, evidently adopting Philo's theory of the Encyclia, but substituting secular learning in general for the Encyclia and Christian truth for philosophy, suggests that Ex. xii 37 is an allegorical representation of the Christian taking and using the Pagan's treasure. From Origen this parable was passed on to Augustine (*De Doct. Christ.* ii). No doubt a different turn is given to the allegory. The point is no longer that the treasure serves as ἐφόδια, but that it is the spoil taken from the Pagan. Still, considering the evident dependence of Origen on Philo, it is surely probable that he had the passage in *Quis Rer.* in his mind. See Norden *A. K. P.* pp. 676, 679, who does not, however, suggest a connexion with Philo, nor is this instance amongst the list of connexions between Origen and Philo drawn up by Siegfried.

Of these the first tend to follow exclusively what is *θέσει* but not *φύσει δίκαιον*, and are liable to constant change at the bidding of human opinion. Those who follow the father only (these, of course, are the professed philosophers) are in a sense highly praiseworthy. They are the true priesthood, they have sacrificed all human weaknesses, even as the Levites at Moses's bidding 'slew every man his brother and every man his neighbour'. And yet the highest place belongs to those who honour both parents, who have the wisdom to seek after God through philosophy, yet to honour the customs and laws of men. For life is *πολύτροπος*, and needs that the wisdom which guides it should be many sided.

In this allegory, as I have said, Philo seems to me to put forth a different conception of the common education. It is no longer the preparation for philosophy, but an influence which tempers it and accommodates it to life. It is closely connected with the conventional side of things. It creates law and custom as opposed to abstract reason and justice. In fact, he has slipped more or less into the rhetorical or sophistical view, which held that the study of the Encyclics equipped a man with the power of getting on in the world.

Somewhat different again is the conception brought out in a fine passage in *De Somn.* i 35. Philo is speaking of the flock of Jacob and Laban, described as (1) *διάλευκοι*, (2) *ποικίλοι*, (3) *σποδοειδείς ῥαντοί*, and proceeds to discuss the meaning of *ποικίλος*. He says something about the vast variety of the universe, and then goes on to speak of the 'lover of wisdom', who takes from the elementary¹ (*παιδική*) branch of *grammaticæ* reading and writing, from the more advanced branch criticism of poetry and the restoration of the past through history, from arithmetic and geometry the element of absolute certainty (*τὸ ἀνεξάπαιτον*), from music rhythm, metre, harmony and the like, from rhetoric invention, arrangement, style, memory, delivery, from philosophy what these fail to give and what goes to make up a full human life. Thus the learner weaves a rich garland of flowers and blends wide knowledge (*πολυμάθεια*) with ability to learn still more (*εὐμάθεια*). Here the division between philosophy and the Encyclics is for a moment forgotten and the world of knowledge is conceived of as a world where 'the different qualities blended together make up one harmonious symphony'.

These last two passages, though they strike a different note, do not of course contradict Philo's dominant conception of education as something really good, but a preparation for something higher. There are, however, other passages which at first sight do seem to contradict this view. That Ishmael should be cast out when Isaac is born or at least

¹ Commonly called *γραμματιστική*.

developed, is, as we have seen, natural enough, and does not asperse the value of Ishmael in his proper time or place. But there are some places where Ishmael is spoken of with disrespect. Thus in *De Fug.* 38¹ the text 'his hand shall be against every man', &c. is explained as meaning that Ishmael is a 'sophist' who rejoices in eristic reasoning and shoots at the followers of true learning. Again in *De Cher.* 3 the Encyclia are declared to be σοφιστεία providing persuasive arguments to destroy the soul. Now we must not press the words σοφιστής and σοφιστεία. They were often used in a not unfavourable sense, but still the general sense in these places does seem unfavourable. I imagine that the explanation is that in such places Ishmael suggests not so much encyclic learning itself as the professors of it. Philo had a real reverence for the learning, but he did not like the teachers. Not only did he consider that they had deserted Sarah permanently for Hagar, but he saw in them a vanity and contentiousness which probably really existed to some extent and was particularly visible to the rival race of philosophers.

Here we may leave the Encyclia; but a few words should be said on the allegory constantly recurring in Philo, by which Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob² are regarded as types of those who learn respectively through instruction, nature, and practice. The formula φύσις, μάθησις, ἀσκησις is very frequent in literature of this kind. It may perhaps be traced back to Archytas, and certainly to Plato's *Phaedrus*, the original source of many a rhetorical and educational idea. It is quoted by Diogenes Laertius from Aristotle, and is dilated on by ps-Plutarch. It appears also in Latin writers, as Cornificius and Quintilian. The formula bears two somewhat different meanings. In a wider sense it means that ἀρετή is attained through knowledge of what is right acquired intellectually, through natural qualities, and through self-discipline. In a narrower and pedagogic sense it means that knowledge is acquired by instruction from others, intelligence, and industry. In this last sense it lays down that good teaching is as necessary to progress as ability and industry on the part of the pupil. It is in this sense that it is understood by the schoolmaster Quintilian, and I should imagine by the great mass of people who lived in a world which laid great stress and value on the influence of the teacher. I am not sure that I understand Philo completely on this point, but I do not think

¹ See also *De Mut.* 38.

² I cannot help suspecting that this is founded on some Homeric triad, just as Odysseus, Menelaus, and Nestor are frequently given as types of the three styles of oratory. Odysseus might have well stood for ἀσκησις, and Achilles for μάθησις, on the grounds of the much-quoted words of Phoenix, *Il.* ix 441-442. But who in this case was φύσις?

that he uses the formula in this latter sense. I have already spoken of his dislike for the teachers of the Encyclia, and I do not think he shews much appreciation of teachers as a whole. In an interesting passage of the *De Post. Cain* 42 he describes the attitude of the true teacher. When Isaac said to Rebecca 'Give me to drink', she did not reply 'I will give you drink', but 'Drink'. This last is the language of one who displays before the learner the divine riches, the former is the language of the professional (*ἐπαγγελλόμενος*) teacher. He goes on to say how foolish are those teachers who base their lessons not on the powers of their pupils, but on their own high attainments, not knowing how greatly display (*ἐπίδειξις*) differs from true teaching. All this, of course, does not exclude the possibility of the true teacher, but it suggests that the more he confines himself to offering opportunities to the pupil the better. In the *De Cong.* 127 we are told that teachers who get a clever pupil pride themselves unduly on the result and raise their fees in consequence. So again in the *Vita Mosis*, where an imaginary sketch is given of Moses's education,¹ though there are instructors, their position is a very subordinate one, for Moses in a short time 'anticipated their instructions by his natural abilities'. It is not clear (at least to me) why Abraham should be the type of the *διδάκτορς*, and Isaac of the *αὐτομαθής*, but, at any rate, it is clear that Abraham has no human instructor.

Perhaps the acutest remarks of Philo on education are to be found in a passage (*De Agr.* 131 &c.)² where he discourses on the Mosaic enactment that every beast is unclean which does not 'chew the cud and divide the hoof'. The true meaning of this is that learning involves two processes. We must divide and classify the material presented to us, and this is 'dividing the hoof' (*διχηγλῆν*). We must then ruminate on it at leisure. There are some learners who, like the camel, are unclean, because they do not ruminate. But, on the other hand, the great mass of 'sophists', among whom seem to be included the teachers of philosophy, as well as those of the Encyclia, pay far too much attention to τὸ διχηγλῆν, and are therefore typified by the pig. Philo proceeds to describe in detail the distinctions created by the grammarian, the rhetorician, the musician, the geometrician, as well as the dialectician. Much of this diatribe is rather unjust. Geometry, for

¹ The passage has some curious details. The Egyptians taught Moses arithmetic, music, and geometry, including Egyptian astronomy, which it is suggested differed from Chaldaean astronomy (astrology?). The Chaldaeans taught him 'Assyrian letters' and their own astronomy. The Greeks taught him the rest of the Encyclia. Does this suggest that music and mathematics flourished in Philo's time in Egypt more than in the rest of the Greek world? Or is Philo following Plato *Leg.* vii 799 and 819?

² Also *De Spec. Leg.* iv 5.

instance, cannot really be described as a science in which τὸ διχλεῖν plays too great a part. But, on the whole, Philo does surely lay his finger on the weak point of the science of his time. The fashion for making pigeon-holes and distinctions, without sufficiently considering what can be made of them, was a real evil. It had its excellent side. It certainly cultivated the legal mind, and we owe to it perhaps the stability which belongs to the Codes and the Creeds, yet on the whole its character is not summed up amiss by Galen when he speaks of it τὸ τῆς φιλοριστηίας νόσημα.

The subject of Philo on Education seems to me interesting for two reasons. In the first place, it is strange to find one of the most vexed questions of classical antiquity most fully discussed in the work of this semi-hellenized Jew—to find the old issue between the sophist and the philosopher stated to us in terms of the Old Testament. It may perhaps be said that there is nothing really strange—that all it means is that while the work of the post-Aristotelian philosophers has for the most part perished, Philo has been preserved by his affinities to Christianity. Perhaps so, but this irony of time seems to me none the less interesting.

In the second place, the views of Philo have had a permanent influence on Christian thought on education. The question of what attitude the Church should adopt to pagan learning was, of course, one of the most difficult and important which the Church had to face, and her decision was clearly influenced by the philosophical theory of education. What the Encyclics had been to philosophy, that the Encyclics plus philosophy became to theology. That is the view of Clement and Origen. They might, no doubt, have derived the idea from the philosophers in general, had Philo never written. But their direct obligation to Philo is beyond question.¹ From Origen the same thought is passed on to Ambrose, Augustine, and Cassiodorus, and from them into the Middle Ages. And perhaps it is not too much to say that the mediaeval conception of theology and its relation to the other faculties in our Universities may ultimately be traced back to Philo's view of the relation of philosophy to the Encyclics.

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¹ The evidence for this is given in Siegfried's *Philo von Alexandria* pp. 343 &c.