Meteaeschymátisa i Cor. iv 6.

Ταύτα δὲ, ἀδελφοί, μετεασθημάτισα εἰς ἐμαυτόν καὶ Ἀπολλὼν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἵνα ἐν ἡμῖν μάθητε τὸ µὴ υπὲρ ἡ γέγραπται, ἵνα µὴ εἰς υπὲρ τοῦ ἕνος φυσιοῦσθε κατὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου.

The word μετεασθημάτισα ‘transferred in a figure’ has exercised a good deal of influence on the historical interpretation of 1 Corinthians. On it has been based the idea, originated apparently by Chrysostom, that the Paul, Apollos, and Peter parties never really existed and that the Corinthian factions were really headed by other men, whose names were veiled under Paul, &c. here and in chapter i. This theory is, I think, now generally discredited, and the view which I believe to be substantially right, that by the example of his and his colleague’s names he intended to teach a general lesson of humility, seems to be usually adopted. Nevertheless, I imagine, the ordinary reader is still pulled up sharp by the word. He understands that the names of Paul and Apollos are used ‘figuratively’, and he has a difficulty in fitting the explanation sketched above into the associations of the words ‘figurative’ and ‘figure’.

I think I may go a step further and say that some of the commentaries I have looked at, while recognizing that a rhetorical ‘figure’ is alluded to, suggest that the writers have no clear conception what such a ‘figure’ is. And occasionally I find traces of what I hope to shew is a wrong conception. Thus Dr Plummer in the ‘International Critical Commentary’ writes: ‘The meaning then will be “I have transferred these comments to myself and Apollos for the purpose of a covert allusion and that for your sakes, that in our persons you may get instruction.”’ The μεταασχηματισµὸς therefore consists in putting forward the names of those not really responsible for the στάσεις instead of the names of others who were more to blame. This is not, of course, the Chrysostom theory, but it agrees with it in so far as it attributes a certain amount of unreality to the names Paul and Apollos.

The fact, I think, is that the English word ‘figure’ and the Latin

1 Though it still goes out to the world under the authority of a great university. The Cambridge Bible and Greek Testament for Schools Editions say, on i 12: ‘St Paul plainly states in iv 6 that he had replaced the names of the antagonistic teachers at Corinth by those of himself and Apollos in order to secure his rebukes from assuming a personal form.’
'figura' have been misleading. 'Figura' is merely one of the many failures of Latin terminology to express the Greek. Many, if not most, of the Latin grammatical and rhetorical terms are merely clumsy, literal, and often misleading attempts at a Greek word, as for instance the absurd 'genitivus' for γεννητος. 'Figura' Englished as 'figure' has naturally acquired the idea of likeness, symbol, or image, and implies that the thing mentioned really stands for something else. But the Greek σχήμα has no such associations. It means arrangement or formation. The conception may be put thus. Besides the direct, obvious way of stating a thing, there are generally other ways less obvious and direct, but for various reasons more effective. Any of these is a σχήμα. But it does not follow that these less direct ways use words in a non-natural sense. When words or phrases are used in any but the natural sense, we get not a 'figure', but a 'trope'. 'Trope' is defined by Quintilian as 'sermo a naturali et principali significatione translatus ad aliam ornandae orationis gratia'. Thus not only a metaphor is a 'trope', but the term includes 'synecdoche' when we use 'roof' for 'house', or 'metonymy' when we use 'Bacchus' for 'wine', and other such variations. On the other hand, a 'figure' is a 'conformatio orationis remota a communi et primum se offerente ratione'. In fact it is an essential, though not of course the main, characteristic of a 'figure', that the words which compose it should be used in their natural and literal meaning. They may suggest more than they say, but they do mean what they say.

Figures are always divided into 'figures of speech' (σχήματα λέεως) and 'figures of thought' (or perhaps better 'of meaning') (σχήματα διανοώσ). The former need not detain us long. They include such things as repetition ('O Corydon, Corydon'), antithesis, and the like. In such cases change the words or their arrangement and the figure is gone. No doubt many rhetoricians made great play with them. I might illustrate their spirit from a passage in Arnold Bennett's story 'A Great Man'. The hero, then a small schoolboy, has won a prize for an essay on 'Streets'. An older cousin derisively recites the essay. There appears in a passage on the unpaved streets of the past 'it was not an unfrequent occurrence', &c. Says the cousin, 'Where did you steal "not an unfrequent occurrence" from?' 'I did not steal it'; says Henry, 'I thought of it.' 'Then you will be a great writer.' No doubt many a Greek and Roman schoolboy received similar, though more serious, encouragement from his teacher. But to the wiser minds 'figures of thought' were far more important.

A 'figure of thought' is found when a whole passage is cast in a way which departs from the obvious and thereby serves some

1 Quintilian ix 1. 4.
effective purpose. Thus irony is sometimes a 'trope', sometimes a 'figure of thought'. When Cicero speaks of an accomplice of Catiline as 'virum optimum' he uses a 'trope'. So does St Paul in his ἐπλοντῆσατε, ἐβασιλεύσατε, a few verses on. But the irony which runs through the Apology, and I think that of 2 Cor. x-xii, are 'figures of thought'. The Epistle to Philemon has 'figures of thought'. The request for forgiveness to Onesimus might have been made more directly; the delicate manner in which it is actually put is in the rhetorical sense 'figurative'. No doubt one of the favourite 'figures of thought' is ἐμφασίς, where a more or less veiled meaning is conveyed by words which, though they do bear their natural sense, may also suggest something more. So far Dr Plummer's remark about 'veiled allusion' might be justified. But there are plenty of other 'figures' which do not come under this head. For instance, Quintilian mentions 'communicatio', where the speaker takes the audience into deliberation with himself. Cato says somewhere, 'What, gentlemen, would you have done in my case?' This 'figure' suggests to the judges that after all they may have the same difficulties to meet as the speaker. By enlisting sympathy it makes our speech more effective and thus fulfils the purpose of a 'figure'.

St Paul seems to me to indicate pretty clearly what the 'figure' in our passage is. He wishes to warn the Corinthians against pride and faction, and to impress upon them that no one has anything to boast of. But as this is depreciatory, and to state it directly might alienate, he employs a 'figure of thought'. He leads up to his point and disarms hostility by speaking of himself and Apollos as nothing more than 'stewards', and instruments. The 'figure' would be described by a rhetorician as follows: 'When you are obliged to make remarks which may be offensive to the pride of the audience, lead up to them by shewing that this depreciation includes yourself.' As a matter of fact I have not found this particular 'figure' in the lists of any rhetorician, and I think for a sufficient reason. They wrote for public speakers, and public speakers usually avoided depreciatory remarks altogether, and therefore did not need 'figures' to lead up to them. But it finds an excellent converse in the 'communicatio' mentioned above, and also in a very similar figure, which Tiberius, a writer on the subject, calls καθόλου. This

1 Quintilian ix 2. 45.
2 ἐμφασίς is used in this way by Chrysostom in his homily on this passage. There is ἐμφασίς or further suggestion in the word σχίσματα. Our modern use of 'emphasis' does not seem to have any foundation in ancient rhetoric. The correct use survived in English till the seventeenth century (v. Murray).
3 Quintilian ix 2. 20.
4 Spengel Graec. Rhet. vol. iii p. 68.
The figure consists in impressing on the judges that you are only asking διαβούλεται τῶν ἀνώνυμων ἕκαστος 'what every one who ever entered a law court has wished'. In this figure, as in 'communicatio', we disarm hostility by shewing that what we claim for ourselves we also claim for those we address. In St Paul's figure we disarm it by shewing that the depreciation we mete out to others extends also to ourselves. The remark which Tiberius makes about καθόλου 'by this figure we can often preserve the requirements of our purpose and at the same time avoid what jars', might very well be applied to St Paul's figure.

Though I have not found this 'figure' in the lists, I am not sure that we may not give it a name. Chrysostom, who in spite of his erroneous theory about the names, treats the whole passage in the spirit of the trained rhetorician, speaks of St Paul's method as συγκατάβασις καὶ οἰκονομία. Both these words are, I think, frequently used theologically of the Incarnation, but the second, at any rate, is also a well-known rhetorical term. It signifies 'organization', the arrangement and adaptation of the material (as opposed to the language) to make it more effective, and therefore covers 'figure of thought', though of course much besides. I should be inclined to guess that συγκατάβασις (Latinized no doubt as 'condescensio') had become in Chrysostom's time a more or less technical term. Christian preaching is an offshoot of pagan rhetoric, but with some mutata mutanda. While the forensic pleader is for the moment the inferior, having to persuade those who for the moment are his masters, and therefore needs 'communicatio' to convince them that not only he but they are involved, the preacher starting from the position of the superior, and having some plain speaking to do, requires, if he wishes to conciliate, to shew that he as well as they are involved; and it may well be that συγκατάβασις in the pulpit had become an accepted 'figure'. At any rate it makes a good name for St Paul's figure in our passage.

On the other hand, if the names of Paul and Apollos are simply disguises of the names of Corinthian party leaders we should have not a 'figure', but a 'trope'. For the names are changed 'a naturali significatione ad aliam'. We may go further and say that it is the species of 'trope' called 'allegory'. Quintilian, in his chapter on

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1 Ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σχήματι τούτῳ πολλάκις τὴν χρείαν τῶν νόμιμων ηροῦντα τὸ προσκροῦν φωλάγγεια.
2 Ἑυμ. 12.
3 Chrysostom, however, calls it 'hyperbole', which also was a trope not a figure. His idea seems to be 'you name something greater instead of the reality, as e.g. Paul is greater than any Corinthian. But if it is wrong to make the greater into a party leader, how much more wrong must it be to make the less.'
'tropes', devotes some space to 'allegory', in which he distinguishes two varieties. One consists of a series of metaphors ('continuatae translationes'). Such is the 'allegory' in Hor. Odes i 14, where the Roman commonwealth is described as a ship. The other kind is exemplified by Verg. Ecl. ix 7-10:—

Certe equidem audieram, qua se subducere colles
Incipient, mollique iugum demittere clivo,
Usque ad aquam et veteris iam fracta cacumina fagi
Omnia carminibus vestrum servasse Menalcan.

Here, as he remarks, there are no metaphors. All except the name is described propris verbis. For the passage is a literal description of Vergil's farm and its retention by the owner. But the name of Menalcas is substituted for Vergil. Here we have a very close parallel to Chrysostom's interpretation of St Paul. In one case the name of some one else is an alias for the writer. In the other the writer's name is an alias for some one else. It will be remembered that St Paul uses the term allegory (ἀναλογορέωμενa) quite correctly in Gal. iv 24.

It would perhaps be rash to say that St Paul is not likely to have confused 'figures' and 'tropes'. Quintilian tells us that even distinguished rhetoricians sometimes ignored such distinctions and that many people, including some professional writers, identified the two. But when we see that (1) St Paul uses ἀναλογορέα correctly in Gal. iv 24, (2) that the correct use of σχῆμα makes excellent sense in our passage, while (3) the theory of an incorrect use involves very great literary and historical improbabilities, we are, I think, justified in rejecting that theory absolutely. I would go further than Lake, who says of Chrysostom's view that, though improbable, it is not 'impossible exegesis'. The question may be asked, how came Chrysostom, who no doubt was well acquainted with scientific rhetoric, to blunder about a common term. I very much doubt whether he did. He certainly bases his idea that Paul and Apollos are used fictitiously on μετασχημάτισα. But otherwise he seems to me to interpret the passage as if he thoroughly understood it, and I am inclined to think that he found the idea of changing the names not in the ἐσχημάτισα, but in the μετά. I do not think this is 'possible exegesis', but it does not involve any misuse of rhetorical terms. His interpretation then would be if he

1 Quintilian viii 6. 44.
2 Ib. ii 11. 1. He tells a story of one who, when asked what a σχῆμα was, replied that he had no idea, but 'si ad rem pertineret esse in sua declamatione'.
3 Ib. ix 1. 2. No doubt this applies only to earlier times, before the theory was finally established.
4 Earlier Epistles of St Paul, p. 126.
expressed himself as a rhetorician, 'I changed (by a trope) the names of the party leaders to Paul and Apollos, and in doing so also used the "figure" of συνεκατάβασις.' The 'trope' of course, on this view, consisted in using the names of Paul and Apollos instead of the real leaders, the 'figure' in conciliating his readers by suggesting that any deprecation he meted out to them extended also to himself.

F. H. Colson.

ON I CORINTHIANS xv 26.

It must surely have occurred to others besides the present writer, when listening to the Lesson in the English Burial Service, that the asyndeton in I Cor. xv 26 is very odd. 'The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death.' Good: but how is this connected with what goes before? How has it been led up to? And if it be odd in English, a language that easily admits simple juxtaposition of sentences, with no conjunction but their inner logical appropriateness, it is still odder in Greek, which of all languages has most developed the use of connecting particles. The absence of any connecting particle at the beginning of I Cor. xv 26 ought to indicate a break in the thought, and yet there is no such break.

I am convinced that the current punctuation is wrong, that a comma should be put at the end of ver. 25 instead of a full-stop, and that τὸ τέλος at the beginning of ver. 24 does not mean 'the End of all things' but is adverbial (= 'finally'), as in I Pet. iii 8.

The passage will then run:

'28 But every one in his own order: Christ as first-fruits, then those that are Christ's at his coming, 29 then finally . . . when he has abolished all rule and all authority and power (25 for he must reign till he "put all the enemies under his feet") 26 death will be abolished as the last enemy, 27 for "He hath put all things in subjection under his feet".'

It is all one long sentence. The general sense is much the same as before, but the syntax I venture to think is better. And the nomenclature is better, for according to St Paul's presentation τὸ τέλος in ver. 24 is definitely not 'the End'. It is not the beginning of the End, for that surely is the Coming, the Parusia, of Christ. Nor again is it the absolute End, for St Paul goes on immediately to speak of a further event after the abolition of death, viz. the subjection of the Son to the Father. But if we take τὸ τέλος as an adverb, in conjunction with ἐτέρα, and in contrast to ἀπαρχή and ἐπετείρα, all these difficulties are avoided.

In the above I have given an independent translation, in order to make my meaning clear. But all the change that is needed in the