ARCHBISHOP WHITGIFT gave his sanction to the Lambeth Articles hoping thus to close a controversy which had arisen in the University of Cambridge. The subject of dispute was divine predestination. William Barrett, a young fellow of Caius College, in a concio ad clerum preached in St Mary’s Church on April 29, 1695, disputed certain positions of what is commonly called the Calvinistic creed. He maintained 1:

1. Neminem in hoc fragili mundo tanta firmitate esse suffultum, saltem certitudine fidei, i.e. nisi per revelationem, ut de salute sua debet esse securus.
2. Petri fidem deficere non potuisse: at aliorum posse. Nam pro fide singulorum non oravit Dominus.
3. Quoad finalem perseverantiam, superbam esse illam securitatem de futuro, eoque natura sua contingenti, cuius generis est uniuscuiusque hominis perseverantia; neque tantum superbam, sed impissimam.
4. In fide nullam esse distinctionem, sed in credentibus.
5. Remissionem peccatorum esse articulum fidei, sed non specialem, nec huius, nec illius. Nec posse, nec debere quenquam vere fidelem certo credere peccata sua esse sibi remissa.
6. Quod ad eos attinet qui non servantur, peccatum esse veram, propriam, et primam causam reprobationis.

For maintaining these assertions Barrett was convented before the Vice-chancellor and the heads of colleges, and a retractation was imposed upon him, which he read in St Mary’s Church on May 10. 2

He was made to say:—

1. Fide justificatos pacem habere erga Deum, i.e. reconciliationem cum Deo, et per fideim in illo gratia stare. Ergo debere eos de salute sua, fidei ipsius certitudine, certos esse et securos.
2. Pro singulorum fide Christum orasse; et illius Christi precationis efficacia ita esse singulos vere credentes suffultos, ut eorum fides nequeat deficere.
3. Fidem veram et justificantem, qua fideles arctissime Christo uniantur, ita esse fixam et de futuro etiam certam, ut nunquam possit ullis tentationibus carnis, mundi, aut ipsius diaboli, e fidelium animis

1 Strype Life of Whitgift ii 282. Ed. Oxford, 1832. In (4) he perhaps means to say, that in some men their faith, however genuine, will prove only temporary; but his meaning is sifted later.
2 Ib. iii 317.
radicitus evelli. Adeo ut, qui hanc semel habet, semper sit habiturus. Eius enim fidei iustificantis beneficio, Christus in nobis habitat, et nos in Christo. Ergo non potest non et augeri (Christo in nobis indies crescente) et ad finem usque (quia Deus constantiam largitur) perseverare.

(4) Fidem temporariam (quae idcirco ficta est, teste Bernardo, quia temporaria) non mensura et gradibus, sed reipsa distinguiri et differri a fide illa salutifera, qua peccatores Christum apprehendentes coram Deo in aeternum iustificantur: praeterea Iacobum facere mentionem fidei mortuae [Ia. ii 26], et Paulum, per dilectionem operantis [Gal. v 6].


(6) Reprobationem impiorum esse ab aeterno, et illud Augustini esse verissimum, viz. Si peccatum esset causa reprobationis, tum nullus eligeretur.

It would seem that in reading the retractation Barrett conveyed the impression to his auditors that he was not withdrawing the opinions he had expressed in his sermon. At any rate he did not satisfy the Heads of Houses. They convented him again, and were minded apparently, if it were possible, to expel him from the University. Something of what was doing, through Barrett, probably, who certainly appealed to him against the Vice-chancellor and Heads, reached Whitgift, now Archbishop of Canterbury, who was armed with such authority as his royal mistress had been able to confer upon him. The retractation and possibly Barrett’s sermon came into Whitgift’s hands. He submitted the retractation apparently to Hadrian Saravia; and, whether for further satisfaction or for some unknown reason, he submitted the first article of it to Lancelot Andrewes also. Saravia gave in his criticism to this effect.¹

Barrett was right in denying that any one might feel ‘securus de salute sua’. A man might be ‘certus de salute’ as long as he believed, but it behoved him to be solicitous, as well of the argument of faith, as of perseverance.

Again, Barrett was right in asserting there was no difference in faith, if he meant to say that the temporary faith of some did nothing differ from justifying faith. If, however, he meant that no temporary faith differed from justifying faith he was wrong. Some temporary faiths are feigned and some are not.

Not all vere credentes were ‘suffulti, ut eorum fides nequeat de-

¹ Strype, iii 321 and ii 241.
Barrett was right in asserting that sin was the true, proper, and first cause of reprobation, and the Heads of Houses were wrong in making him retract the assertion.

Andrewes gave his opinion to this effect:

Barrett ought not to have been made to say, ‘fide iustificatos debere de salute sua certos esse et securos’; for he had never denied that they were certos, nor any sane man before him.

In making him say they were securos his judges had censured St Leo, ‘Nemo est tanta firmitate suffultus ut de stabilitate sua debeat esse securus’ (Serm. v. De quadr. 3).

To have peace with God, or to be in a state of grace, is not to be ‘securus de salute sua’. The scriptures nowhere urge security; rather they take the word in evil part (‘eam vocem malam in partem accipiant’). Security drives away not only doubt, but solicitude (cura) also. It does not belong to this life, but to the life to come ... We ought not to depart from the accepted vocabulary of the Church. (Here he quotes the Fathers at length.)

Such were the opinions of the Archbishop’s advisers. They were predestinarians, of course, but they rejected the doctrine of absolute predestination. The cause of reprobation was God’s prescience of sin. A justifying faith was no absolute promise of any future state. From them we pass to the Archbishop himself.

On June 8 Whitgift sent Dr Clayton from Lambeth with an expostulation to be delivered to the Vice-chancellor and the Heads of Houses by word of mouth. Clayton was to tell them that in the Archbishop’s opinion ‘in some points of Barrett’s retractation they had made him affirm that which was contrary to the doctrine holden and expressed by many sound and learned divines in the Church of England, and in other Churches likewise, men of best account: and that which for his part he thought to be false and contrary to the Scriptures. For the Scriptures were plain, that God by His absolute will did not hate and reject any man, without an eye to his sin. There might be impiety in believing the one; there could be none in believing the other. Neither was it contrary to any article of religion, established by authority in this Church of England, but rather agreeable thereunto.’

Likewise to affirm, ‘neminem debere esse securum de salute’, to what article of religion, established in this Church of England it was contrary, he saw not: seeing security was never taken in good part: neither did the Scripture so use it. And what impiety was it to affirm that a man ought to be certus de salute, but not securus?

1 Articuli Lambethani, London 1651, p. 21. 2 Strype, ii 238.
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(5) Unumquemque vere fidelem, hoc articulo fidei (sc. Credo remissionem peccatorum) teneri, certo credere sua ipsius peccata particularia; esse sibi gratuito remissa. Nec tamen hinc sequi petitionem illam orationis Domini (viz. Remitte nobis debita nostra) esse supervacaneam. In illa enim petitione petimus fidei tum donum, tum incrementum.

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¹ Strype, iii 321 and ii 241.
ficere’, but only the elect; and no man had the right to assume that he was one of the elect.

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1 Articuli Lambethani, London 1651, p. 21.  
2 Strype, ii 238.
To say also that credentium fides, or ‘electorum fides, potest deficere totaliter, sed non finaliter’, he asked again, to what article of religion, established in this Church, was it contrary? It was a matter disputable, and wherein learned men did and might dissent without impiety.

‘In fide nullam esse distinctionem, sed in credentibus,’ he took to be an error, but yet without compass of their authority; having no article directly against it: and an error of that nature that might be solved by distinction; worthy of reprehension, not of recantation, for anything he could yet understand.

‘Remissionem peccatorum esse articulum fidei, sed non specialem, nec huius, nec ullius,’ was likewise untrue; and that if Barrett had in that manner and sort affirmed it, he shewed therein his ignorance. Wherein he should have been better instructed, and in more Christian manner.

The Archbishop added further that ‘the doctrine of the Church of England did in no respect depend upon Calvin and the Calvinists’.

We learn then from Whitgift himself that he rejected the doctrine of irrespective reprobation on which the doctrine of absolute predestination is founded. Further, he rules out, as Saravia and Andrewes had done, the words securus and securitas. No man may be securus, a word which looks to the future, of the remission of his sins, of his perseverance in faith and holiness, or of his final salvation. He may be certus, a word which relates only to the present, and Barrett himself apparently, either in his sermon or in a communication to the Archbishop, had admitted the word. Of the faith of the fide iustificatus the archbishop says nothing, and that, no doubt, because Barrett, as a matter of fact, had not used the term in his sermon. The faith of the elect could not, of course, fail finaliter; and this apparently Barrett had asserted. The Archbishop seems to assert that the faith of credentes cannot fail finally; but he is plainly speaking of those whom God knows as credentes; he is not identifying the fide iustificatus with the elect, as the Cambridge authorities would have had him do. When he says that ‘in fide nullam esse distinctionem, sed in credentibus’ is an error of that nature that might be solved by distinction, he is apparently repeating what Saravia had said, that some temporary faiths are feigned and some are not. Wherein Barrett’s error lay in denying that remission of sins was special, of this man or that, he does not say. To his opinion on that point we shall come later on.

It was long before the Archbishop could bring the Heads of Houses to submit their case against Barrett to his decision. Meanwhile he empowered Whitaker, Regius Professor of Divinity, and himself a
‘Calvinist’, to examine Barrett further. Whitaker, therefore, put the following questions to him.\footnote{Strype, ii 263. \textit{Are these questions extant in Latin?}}

(1) Whether Christ prayed for Peter only, that his faith should not fail; or also for all the elect, that they fall not away from faith and salvation, either finally, or for a time totally?

(2) Whether justifying faith is not in reality distinct and diverse from a hypocritical, feigned, and dead faith?

(3) Whether justifying faith doth not make us certain of our election and adoption, and persuade, without all doubt, that we shall be saved?

(4) Whether any godly and faithful Christian ought not to believe the remission of his sins?

(5) Whether it was an extraordinary and private revelation, concerning which St Paul maketh mention, Rom. viii 28 ‘I am persuaded that neither death’, &c.?

(6) Whether God from eternity hath predestinated certain men to life; and reprobated certain. And why?

It is plain, I think, that Whitaker is laying a trap, not only for Barrett, but also for the Archbishop. No one who rejected the doctrine of absolute predestination could answer his questions with a direct affirmative or a direct negative, least of all to a believer in the doctrine. Yet not to do so might easily rouse suspicion that his creed was somewhat ‘popish’. The pitfall in the first is the assertion of St Peter’s supremacy amongst the Apostles; in the second, third, and fourth the rejection of the doctrine of justification by faith only; in the fifth and sixth the denial of the Catholic doctrine of predestination.

To these questions Barrett made answer both \textit{viva voce} and in writing; and Whitaker forwarded his answers to the Archbishop, together with his own animadversions upon them. I suppose that Barrett’s paper is not extant; but fortunately we may gather all we want from Whitaker’s animadversions and the Archbishop’s reply.

Whitaker says\footnote{\textit{Ib.} ii 265.} that the whole tenor of Barrett’s answers was not only indirect but Popish also. As to (1) he could not by any means be brought to make a direct answer, but discoursed upon the place, Luke xxii 32; alleging such places out of the Fathers as might seem to make most for the supremacy of St Peter, and that were wholly alleged by the Papists for that purpose . . . And that so for any part of his answer, he might hold that our Saviour Christ prayed indeed for St Peter that his faith should not fail, just as Papists do. That to the second branch of this article he answered nothing. To (2) he answered so as might be thought that he disliked the doctrine of justification by faith, approved in the Book of Articles; and the distinction he made
of *fides formata* was Popish, and not only against the Scripture, but the Book of Articles also; teaching that good works are the fruit of faith, and so must be the formal cause thereof. To (3) he answered not in form: but that a man might be assured of his salvation by certainty of faith he denied. To (4) he answered as though remission of sins depended upon the performance of penitential acts; and made such an exposition of the article, *credo remissionem peccatorum*, as never was made by any learned and Catholic writer. That is, not that a man may believe remission of his sins, but that Christ hath given to His Church a power: so that the sins of this man, and that man, and every particular man, truly repenting, may be forgiven. As to (5) his opinion appeared to be, that Paul was not assured of his salvation, but by private and extraordinary revelation. To (6) his answer was direct.

In every one of his answers except the last Barrett appears to have fallen into the trap laid for him. As to his last answer Whitaker is naturally as curt as he can be. It appears to have been 'affirmative; et quia Deus voluit'. Barrett must have meant, the world had been lost had not God chosen to save in Christ those that should believe. Whitaker would have given another interpretation of his answer; but he dared not so do to the Archbishop; and henceforth the question of the cause of reprobation is heard of no more in the dispute. The Archbishop asserts that the Heads of Houses had conceded the point to him.

Now we come to Whitgift's final pronouncement on Barrett's assertions. It is contained in a letter to the Vice-chancellor and the Heads of Houses, dated September 30. He says that 'in perusing Baret's answers he was partly of their minds... As to whether that of the xxii of Luke be meant of Peter alone, or of the rest of the Apostles also (for it cannot be drawn to all the elect), men might without impiety, vary in opinion. But that elsewhere (as namely in the xvii of John) Christ prayed for all the elect, no man could doubt. He was also of the same opinion touching Baret's doubtful answer to the second; and that distinction of *formata* and *informis fides*. And for further satisfaction therein, he wished to know his opinion of the doctrine of justification, approved in the book of Articles, or of any other point by him preached concerning the same, wherein they thought he varied from the book of Articles. That his answer to the third question, as he took it, was direct, that *electi* or *fideles* were *certi de salute*. And that he did not take it, that he denied that *fideles* might be assured of their salvation by the certainty of faith. But that he denied that they were assured "certitudine fidei, qua tenent omnipotentiam, unitatem, et sacrosanctam Personarum Trinitatem" &c., whereby he expounded

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1 Strype, ii 268.
what he meant “per certitudinem fidei” in that place. Wherein he (the Archbishop) did not yet perceive that his opinion differed from any article expressed in the book of Articles; or whether from any other article of Religion professed in this Church of England, is questionable. It therefore required further conference of learned men. That to the fourth he did altogether mislike his answer. And therefore he wished them to enquire a more direct answer to that question; that is either affirmative or negative, without any further circumstance. That as for Baret's answer to the fifth article, in part borrowed out of some of the Fathers, and his doubtfulness of his understanding of the viii to the Romans, it was common to him with some others; and the question was of that nature, that men might answer unto it, pro et con, without impiety. And therefore he thought he could not be censured for his opinion in that: but he might be instructed by some that varied in opinion from him.'

The Archbishop is plain enough except as to Barrett's answer to the third question. What he means to say is, that certitudo has to Barrett two meanings. A man has not the same certitudo of a conditional state, e.g. if ‘I call, I shall be heard’, as of a categorical statement, e.g. ‘There is one God’. The certitudo fidei by which the justified man is assured of his salvation contains a condition, viz. if he persevere in faith. Barrett acknowledges that a fides may be assured of his salvation certitudine fidei, if the word certitudo be understood conditionally; not if it be meant absolutely; and he (the Archbishop) cannot see that Barrett's opinion contradicts any article accepted by the Church of England. It is certain then that Whitgift, in common with Andrewes, whose opinion we shall soon come to, distinguished between the meanings of certitudo; though he was prepared to submit the question regarding assurance of salvation to further discussion.

We are now in a position to see how far the Archbishop joined with the Vice-chancellor and the Heads of Houses in their condemnation of Barrett's positions. He would not have Barrett made to retract his denial of the doctrines of absolute predestinarianism; but there is something to retract—his lapses from the English reformation views of justification by faith alone, his assertion that remission of sins depends on the performance of penitential acts, and his desire to distinguish Peter above the rest of the Apostles—all of which were to the Archbishop's thinking 'Popish' positions.

It is certain then that at this date Whitgift was a predestinarian of a very different stamp from Whitaker. He rejected the doctrines of irrespective reprobation, of the indefectibility of faith in the man once justified, and of the absolute assurance of perseverance and salvation. According to the received opinion of the Lambeth Articles we are
asked to believe that three weeks later he gave his sanction to a manifesto which expresses the doctrines of absolute predestination in their harshest shape. Is this possible?

On the Archbishop's suggestion Whitaker and Tyndal came with Barrett to Lambeth sometime in November. Whitgift gives the following account of what occurred then and immediately afterwards: 'The Dean of Ely and Mr Dr Whitaker came unto me, and so did Baret. I found that Baret had erred in divers points. I delivered mine opinion of the propositions brought unto me by Dr Whitaker: wherein some few being added, I agreed fully with them, and they with me. And I know them to be sound doctrines, and uniformly professed in this Church of England, and agreeable to the Articles of Religion established by authority. And therefore I thought it meet that Baret should in more humble sort confess his ignorance and error: and that none should be suffered to teach any contrary doctrine to the foresaid propositions agreed upon.'

And this is the sum of all this action. And if this agreement be not maintained, further contentions will grow, to the animating the common adversaries, the Papists, by whose practice Baret and others are set on, some of his opinions being indeed Popish.'

Strype's account of this dispute has been very superficially read in many places; but here, if I mistake not, we come upon the most serious misunderstanding of all. The Archbishop has been generally taken to say, that he agreed fully with the Lambeth Articles, and they with him, as though they were food, or physic, perhaps, and he the patient. Had he intended the joke, he would have chosen a more suitable adverb. He seems to me to say that he on the one side and Whitaker and Tyndal on the other had come to a full agreement in the amended articles, which he knew to be sound doctrines, uniformly professed in the Church of England, agreeable to the Articles, and not infected with the errors which he had found in Barrett's retractations and in the animadversions of Whitaker and the Heads of Houses on Barrett's utterances. He seems to me to mean, that the issue of the proceedings at Lambeth is (1) that he found Barrett had erred in certain points, viz. in making Peter supreme amongst the Apostles, in asserting that remission of sins depended on the performance of penitential acts, and in holding that a justifying faith was a *fides formata*, and included good works; and therefore he thought it meet that he should in more

1 Strype, ii 277.

2 I have not ventured to disturb Strype's arrangement of the text. But I cannot but think that the break should come lower down, after 'authority'.

3 When Barrett was sifted these opinions were found to underlie his 2nd, 5th, and 4th assertions.
humble sort than he had done in his retractation confess his ignorance and error; (2) that the propositions agreed upon were sound doctrines, and therefore he thought it meet that for the future they and not the opinions of the Heads of Houses should be the standard by which to judge whether any particular utterance on predestination was tainted with impiety, in allowing too much to man's free will. This, he says, is the sum of all this action; and if this agreement be not maintained by the Heads, but they persist in proscribing utterances which are not contrary to the doctrine of the Church of England, as they have done in Barrett's case, others like Barrett with Popish opinions will raise fresh contentions to the animating the Papists, the common adversaries of the two parties in the Church of England, the one represented by himself and his assessors, the other by the Cambridge Heads of Houses.

If this be the meaning of the Archbishop's minute, we learn from it, not that he upheld the 'Calvinism' of the Heads against Barrett, but that he condemned the 'Popish' opinions of Barrett on the one hand and the 'Calvinistic' opinions of the Heads on the other. We learn further how to regard the Lambeth Articles. They are not a 'Calvinistic' manifesto, but they exhibit how much ought to be conceded to the Heads, who claimed the work of a man's salvation or damnation wholly for God. The above interpretation of the Archbishop's minute seems to be the only one that consists with his previous conduct. Is it borne out by his Articles?

It has been generally assumed that the conference at Lambeth was suggested by the Cambridge authorities. I can find no evidence in support of this view. As early as July 11 the Archbishop wrote to the Vice-chancellor and the Heads of Houses: 'I pray you to take care that hereafter the pulpit, nor any other places, be used in these controversies; until such time as you shall receive some resolutions from hence in these causes, which had been ere this, if your hasty proceedings had not ministered occasion to the contrary.' Again, when they

1 'None should be suffered to teach any contrary doctrine to the foresaid propositions agreed upon.' The subject of the sentence is really 'the foresaid propositions agreed upon'. The sentence means, the foresaid propositions agreed upon should be what none should be suffered to teach any contrary doctrine to. The Archbishop has been absurdly understood to say that he knew the Lambeth Articles to be sound doctrines, and therefore thought that Barrett ought to retract his anti-Calvinistic utterances. Whitgift has himself endorsed Barrett's anti-Calvinistic opinions, and in no point do Barrett's assertions contradict the articles, unless it be part of his 5th assertion, 'Remissionem peccatorum non esse speciæm, nec huius, nec illius'.

2 See for example Hardwick Hist. of the Articles p. 172. Whitgift was assisted at the conference by Richard Fletcher, Bishop of London, and Richard Vaughan, Bishop-elect of Bangor.
had submitted to be guided by him, he writes (Sept. 30).\(^1\) he prayed them 'to give strait and earnest charge, that no man in pulpit within the University should deal in these causes, to or fro, until further order were taken'. It seems likely therefore that the Cambridge propositions were brought to Whitgift by his command. The question that has arisen is, how much may be claimed on behalf of the freedom of the will without impiety to God? Presumably, therefore, the Archbishop will have asked the Cambridge authorities to set down all they claim as God's doing in the work of man's salvation or damnation. We shall expect to find the original Cambridge propositions limited in their scope; for the Archbishop has already ruled out irrespective reprobation, and absolute assurance as regards the future. I hope to make it good that the changes which the Archbishop and his assessors introduced, though verbally slight, were of the utmost importance, and redeemed the series of Articles from whatever of fatalism was originally in it. The Archbishop seems to have kept his own counsel, and the world failed to see that he had framed a rule to keep the extreme predestinarians in check. The courtiers of Elizabeth denounced the Articles as fatalistic,\(^2\) but she herself 'was persuaded of the truth of the propositions'.\(^3\) Baro perceived that they 'scarcely touched the state of the controversy',\(^4\) and confessed that they were all true.\(^5\) Even Lancelot Andrewes found them almost correct, though he saw what might and did actually ensue. 'Materia huius litis futura est: quisque ut affectus est, utque animum habet, voculam aliquam pertrahet ad opinionem suam; si desit, supplebit de sensu suo.'\(^6\) Matthew Hutton, Archbishop of York, an Augustinian who rejected the doctrine of irrespective reprobation, suggested three slight changes, which if made, 'ipse Momus non haberet quod contra diceret.'\(^7\) Some fifty-five years later the author of *Articuli Lambethani* gave a non-fatalistic interpretation to each article in turn; and with his, Baro's, Andrewes's, and Hutton's comments I shall now deal. Hutton's and Andrewes's were written at the request of the Archbishop, no doubt after the lay mind had found fault with his work. Baro's were written and sent to the Archbishop to make it manifest that he had not contradicted the articles as they might be conveniently expounded.\(^8\) The author of *Articuli Lambethani* (London 1651) describes himself as 'F. G. Sancti Nicolai apud Trinobantes Minister'.

\(^1\) Strype, ii 268.  
\(^2\) *Articuli Lam.* p. 4.  
\(^3\) Strype, ii 284.  
\(^4\) *Ib.* ii 288.  
\(^5\) *Ib.* ii 295.  
\(^6\) *Articuli Lambethani* p. 32.  
\(^7\) Strype, ii 314.  
\(^8\) 'Rogatus sententiam meam de his articulis, idque a Dominatone tua, cui non parere Religio fuit'—obviously the Archbishop (*Artic. Lam.* p. 21).  
\(^9\) Strype, iii 340.