

The Idea of the Logos in Relation to the Need of Law in the Apostolic Age.

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I MAY be right in thinking that New Testament study has sometimes suffered from an excess of academic atmosphere. It is a sound law, as far as it goes, that we can only understand what we are. Experience is an indispensable preparation for interpretation. Hence it may easily come to pass, in an age when minute specialization is the order of the day, that the student, lacking certain kinds of experience, may be incapable of fully apprehending certain phases of the literature he studies. As a rule, Biblical scholars have been wholly men of the chair, not men of affairs. Intense devotion to their specialty may have taken them away, in some measure, from the ground whereon the New Testament took shape.

The New Testament, considered as a whole, has two main characteristics.

In the first place, it is the product of a consuming religious passion. Of course, there is reflection in it. There is some speculation. But the bulk of it is the work of men who were, above all things, zealots in religion. This we are not. We are religious, yet the critical element is strong in us. Not one of us but has lost, in a degree, the capacity for throwing himself headlong into the arms of an emotion.

In the second place, the common consciousness is exceedingly strong in the life that put itself on record in the New Testament. This is not to say that the Apostolic age, in its prime, had any large interest in institutions. But we must draw a distinction. An interest in specific institutions is one thing. A deep and glowing common consciousness is another thing. The Apostolic age had this in a high degree. That does not mean that the idea of a Catholic Church was clearly conceived by the average Christian. It does mean, though, that wherever any body of Christians, Jews or Gentiles, existed, the individual's sense of his own being was fused with his sense of corpo-

rate being. However provincial his views of Christianity might be, he was anything but an individualist. Now, here again, we are, in part at least, out of step with the life we are studying. We are individualists. Our individualism is instinctive. Our relation to corporate religious life is more or less conscious and deliberate.

The point I would be at, is that the impassioned religious feeling of the Apostolic age, — unfettered by the critical process, — and the strong sense of corporate life, — instinctive, not like our own, labored — make the question of law in the Apostolic age a matter of importance. Here, again, a distinction must be made. The conscious and deliberate thought of law is one thing. The need of law and the unconscious search for it is another thing. The need of law is the most pressing of human needs. The modern man of the chair does not feel the need. He is not intimate with the caucus. He is not deeply versed in government, either political or ecclesiastical. With a little, a very little knowledge of parliamentary law, he can pass through life unashamed. He is a man of culture. And culture never arrives till the pioneer's work of keeping house has been efficiently done. The man of culture sits at ease regarding questions which to his forefathers were matters of life and death.

This is my excuse for this paper. I suspect that we have studied the Logos idea of the New Testament too largely in the light of academic theory and speculative necessity, too little as an expression of the need of law.

The term "Logos" was fashioned by the Greeks. It was born of a speculative need. Yet Greek speculation differed in one important respect from modern speculation. Human consciousness had not yet clearly conceived itself. It blended with nature. The subjective and the objective were interfused. The emphasis on consciousness is the distinctive mark of modern philosophy. It is true that Plotinus prepared the way for it, and made Augustine, "the first modern man," as he has been called, possible. But of Greek philosophy as a whole, it may be safely said that it did not separate nature from consciousness. Hence in the earlier days the modern speciality called science, and the other speciality called philosophy, were identified. So the term "Logos," as Heraklitus first used it, included our term "law."

Amongst the Greeks themselves, the Heraklitean word found no great career. It played no part in Plato and Aristotle. Nor did it cut any figure in Plotinus. Even with the Stoics its function is less considerable than has been made out. The moderns have read back

into the Stoic doctrines of the *Logos* something of the interest which attaches to it in Jewish and Christian thought. The Stoic distinction between the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* (the word within the breast) and the *λόγος προφορικός* (the word that goes forth from the breast) was merely a single detail of their system. The word "Logos" had to wait for Alexandrine Judaism before it found a career.

And when this came to pass, Greek thought as a whole had acquired a strong tendency away from the common life and the common law. In Plato and Aristotle the genius of speculation joined itself to a deep interest in the life and polity of the Greek city. In the *Republic* and the *Laws* of Plato, and in the *Politics* and constitutional studies of Aristotle, pure reason frankly acknowledged its debt and obligation to the state. But in the post-Aristotelian philosophy this obligation was more and more forgotten. The absorbing question came to be the redemption of the individual. The Stoics, it is true, endeavored to keep themselves men of affairs. And Roman Stoicism gave to the world the basal conceptions of Roman law. But in Stoicism proper the interest in politics was half-hearted. The main interest was the religion and the morality of the individual. The tendency of post-Aristotelian philosophy was to carry thought away from civic life and its pressing problems of law.

In Neo-Platonism this tendency becomes all-controlling. Compare Plotinus with Plato and Aristotle, and it is plain that the problem of clear thought has shaken itself free from the problems of the human community. Even his opposition to Christianity with his strong defence of the beauty and worth of the visible universe against the views of the monks, was not able to drive him back to the old ground. Yet his is the strongest head after Aristotle. His silence, therefore, regarding political fact and theory, is deeply significant. Had he made any considerable use of the term *Logos*, he would have put it wholly into the service of the speculative reason.

Alexandrian Judaism carried the Old Testament into immediate contact with Greek thought. In Palestine, Greek thought could not beat down the resistance of the local strongholds. It might Hellenize an occasional thinker. Through silent channels it might work into Jewish consciousness. But the Sacred Texts stood, for the most part, just beyond its reach. The contact between the Old Testament and Greek philosophy was largely indirect. Alexandrian Judaism, on the other hand, gradually left behind it the baggage-train of Rabbinism. It carried the Sacred Texts out from the defences of Palestinian tradition. Moses and Plato could now take part in a symposium.

But history gives no great gain without imposing some loss. While Alexandrian Judaism gained mental breadth and freedom, it lost its touch on affairs. Philo, the most accomplished of the Alexandrian Jews, is like the modern broad churchman of a certain kind, who, sitting before the open fire of generous speculation, leaves to his high-church brother the task of making and maintaining the ecclesiastical machine. In Palestine, the Torah was the living law of a great community. Its exegetes were lawyers and magistrates. In Alexandria the Torah was a text-book for speculation.

Philo had no considerable touch on affairs. To him, as to Plotinus, the thinking nature of man is the human essence. He was not even as much of a statesman or churchman as the Stoics. Indeed, the Stoic influence did not go deep into his system. The Platonic influence was far more searching and profound. This is due, not alone, as Zeller suggests,¹ to the fact that the Biblical consciousness of sin broke the Stoic line at the centre; it is also due to the fact that the problem of authority had been already solved by the Old Testament. The Neo-Pythagoreans were the first men in the Græco-Roman world to think out loud the unphilosophical thought that a specific divine revelation can alone give the authority demanded by conscience.² Philo has the divine authority under his hand. His Old Testament is God's final word. The Stoic law of nature made no appeal to him. He had something better — the revealed will of God.

But it is profoundly significant that in his working out of the reconciliation between Greek philosophy and the Hebrew Scriptures, the idea of the Kingdom of God, which is central in those Scriptures, should have played an insignificant part. He inherited the Messianic idea as an heirloom; he could make no vital use of it. It may be said that he had no need to consider the social problem. For Judaism, through the development of the Old Testament Canon on the one hand, and on the other through the evolution of the synagogal system, had already given an admirable solution to the problem of law. And that solution was a part of Philo's inheritance. But this is merely to reaffirm the point in issue. Philo had on his shoulders a thoroughly academic head. He was in no sense a man of affairs. Speculation was his business and his joy.

In the discussion of the relation between the Philonian Logos and the Fourth Gospel, too much, I think, has been made of the question regarding the personality of the Logos. Upon that question, Philo

¹ 4^e *Aufl.* iii. 2, p. 405.

² Windelband, *Hist. of Phil.* p. 206.

never came really to know his own mind. His shifting views depend upon the changing relations between the two men inside his skin. When the Jew is uppermost, when the monotheistic and monarchical idea of God controls him, the Logos is impersonal, a philosophical synonym for the will and work of God. When, however, the Greek prevails, when the cosmos bulks large before his mind's eye, the Logos becomes personal. But the central question is not here. As regards the Fourth Gospel the more important qualities of Philo's system are (1) That in his view the whole of things is completed. His system is static. He has two main terms, *cosmos* and *nomos*. In the *nomos*, conceived as God's full and final self-revelation, he finds clear answers to the questions which the *cosmos* proposes. But all stands still. The eager thrill, the impassioned forward look of prophecy, is wholly wanting. (2) The idea of the Kingdom of God plays an inconsiderable part. Philo is more remote from Isaiah than Plotinus is from Plato.

When we pass from Alexandrian to Palestinian Judaism, we experience a decided change of mental climate. After the destruction of the ancient Jewish state, the Jews had on their hands a problem new to history. How could a people, having lost the cohering principle of the monarchy, be held together? Later on the question took the form, How could a people who had lost the sacramental tie of a common fatherland, be kept from breaking in pieces? In the centuries immediately following the exile, the Holy Land and the Holy House at Jerusalem were the objects on which the religious and patriotic imagination fastened. But more and more, as the Diaspora won significance, the centre of gravity shifted. A new type of community appeared, resting on the Torah and ruled by those who knew and expounded it. The task on which the leaders of Judaism labored was of the selfsame nature as that which exercised the genius and devotion of the great Roman lawyers. Their problem was not philosophical, but practical.

The similarity between the rabbi and the Roman lawyer might be illustrated by Cicero's praise of the Twelve Tables. *Fremant omnes licet, dicam quod sentio; bibliothecas mehercule omnium philosophorum unus mihi videtur XII Tabularum libellus, si quis legum fontes et capita viderit, et auctoritatis pondere et utilitatis ubertate superare* (*De Oratore*, i. 195). This *carmen necessarium*, drilled into Roman boys, was similar in its purpose to the catechetical drill of Pharisaism. Religion was, indeed, the dominant motive in the latter case. Yet this does not disguise the fact that a community was being built, and

that the similarity of end and aim required a more or less similar process.

The rise of the Old Testament Canon was not merely a great religious phenomenon, it was also a great legal phenomenon. In those days men did not distinguish between the civil and the canon law. Nor did they specialize the functions of the Bible scholar and the lawyer. A rabbi like Hillel resembles our Chief Justice Marshall as much or as little as he resembles our Bible critics. He was supremely concerned with religion. But he could not separate religion from law. It was the fusion of the two things, based on the incomparable literature of Prophecy, which created that wonderfully tenacious thing called Judaism,—the only type of ancient community that Rome could not shatter nor destroy.

In this community, for centuries after the Exile, the connection between individual consciousness and the corporate consciousness was so close that we moderns have the greatest difficulty in realizing it. Perhaps the best illustration is found in the Psalms. If we compare these lyrics with the lyrics of Greece, the most striking difference is not that the Greek lyrist deals with a secular process of experience, while the Jewish lyrist deals with religion. It is found in that marvellous fusion of the individual consciousness and the common consciousness of which the Psalter is the product. The Psalms are profoundly individual. At the same time they are intensely national.

The deepest thought of law comes to the moderns, as it came to the Greeks, out of the steady contemplation and study of the universe. For the Jews it grew up out of their study of God's dealings with their forefathers. For this reason the logology of Palestine stands in striking contrast with that of Alexandria. One aspect of the difference is that the former consists altogether of a small change of the Logos idea. The essential cause of systematic logology, the problem of creation, did not exist. Philo's Logos was born of the union between the Greek idea of the cosmos and the Jewish conception of divine revelation. But, apart from Greek thought, the ancient world never reached the scientific or philosophic conception of nature as an organic totality of being. Into this Greek conception Palestinian thought, before the Christian era, did not deeply enter. So in Palestine there could be no problem of creation ; consequently, no need or possibility of a developed Logology. We find but fits and starts of Logology, as in the doctrines of the Metatron, the Shekinah, and the Memra.

The other main point of difference is that the Old Testament as a whole is not taken as a text for speculation. Speculation and allegory thrive upon certain portions of it, but the body of interpretation follows the line of national and ecclesiastical law. When the Romans destroyed the Temple, when the priest forever lost his occupation and his opportunity in Israel, when the logic of the movement that began with the Exile was fully manifested, then Rabbinism became synonymous with Judaism, and upon the foundation of the Torah rose the strange yet imposing structure of the Talmuds.

In a word, Alexandrian or liberal Judaism was for the most part a form of culture, while Palestinian Judaism was in its essence a branch of law. And the question we are to carry into our reading of the New Testament is, Which kind of Judaism does the Christianity of the first century most resemble?

Christianity began its career organized as a community. Whatever one may think about the details of the Whitsunday story, the essential fact stands sure. Our knowledge of historical Christianity begins with a corporate Christian consciousness. It is true that the problem of law did not press upon the early Christians. From the mother church they inherited the Old Testament. And this, with the Master's Logia, constituted an all-sufficient authority. They had a Bible to start with, and herein the Christian consciousness differed from the early Jewish consciousness. Furthermore, the early Christians did not realize that they were anything more than very good Jews. In all their thoughts they remained part and parcel of Israel. They did not need a new law.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the law-making process, while not consciously appreciated, was none the less unconsciously involved, and that, too, in a decisive form. In the first place, the corporate feeling of the community was intense. The so-called experiment in communism plainly illustrates this. It did not result from any theory regarding property, but from the impassioned belief in the Parousia, that is to say, from an overpowering interest in the Kingdom of God. This means that we have here a state of things at the opposite pole to Philo. In him the academic interest is at a maximum, here it is at a minimum. There is little or no surplus of thought over and above practical needs. There is no speculation; all is action, and the action is inspired by the consciousness that the will of God is within the common will of the community.

Furthermore, the mental characteristic of the new life is the revival of prophecy. The Christian consciousness is a new prophetism. Now

prophetism, whether in the Old or the New Testament, has this difference from Greek philosophy, — the latter is predominantly a matter of reason, the former is predominantly a matter of conscience. Of course, reason and conscience may not be separated ; they are parts of a single and undivided consciousness. Still, they may be distinguished. Where reason prevails, the main interest is in the nature of things. Where conscience dominates, the chief interest is in the realization of an authoritative programme. Prophetism does not think of itself as speculation, but as a medium of divine revelation. The free reflective reason does not play a large conscious part. It is there, but it is absorbed in a greater total. And the total is the feeling of divine power and authority. A sovereign law is laid upon consciousness. Consciousness, subjecting itself to law, becomes conscience.

Early Christian consciousness had as little interest in the nature of things as the Montanists of the second century showed. Thought did not run back or down, it ran forward to the end and aim of history, — the Parousia. The mood was apocalyptic. At the same time Christian apocalypics, as Jülicher has well said, differed from Jewish apocalypics in the fact that the Christian consciousness had restored that sane and wholesome connection between history and prophecy which Jewish apocalypics, beginning with the book of Daniel, had lost. But this meant that the sense of immediate divine authority was far stronger, so strong, in fact, that the present dared to speak again, as in the days of Old Testament prophecy, in its own name, and was not forced to hide behind the great names of the past.

The supreme element in the early Christian consciousness was its dominating sense of divine authority and law. And this sense of law expressed itself, as might be expected, in an impassioned interest in the future of the community. The glowing visions of the Second Coming portended and portrayed the speedy triumph of the community over all its foes.

The Christian consciousness of law expressed itself in two ways : first, as the development of the monarchy of Christ ; second, in claiming the Old Testament for Christ. As to the first, it answered to what may somewhat loosely be called the inner need of the new community. What the unity of God was for the prophets of Israel, that the selfsame unity of God revealed through and embodied in the Messiah was to the Christian prophet. God had visited his people in the person of the Christ. The vision of the Parousia

expressed, in pictorial form, the belief in Christ's monarchical right to control history.

As to the second need, it sought to satisfy itself through apologetics. The Christians, in order to maintain their own self-respect, must prove to their fellow-countrymen that they are the best of Jews. And how? By proving that the Old Testament belongs to Christ. The reasoning process expends itself in the argument from prophecy. Prophecy is the implicit Christ. Christ is explicit prophecy.

Here we have a situation which, by its form, recalls Philo. Both to the Jews of Alexandria and to the Christian Jews of Jerusalem, the Old Testament was the sacred book to which thought runs for its proof and authority. But in substance the two situations are radically unlike. To Philo the thinking nature of man is his real essence. Manipulated by this thought, Moses becomes a Semitic Plato. The Christians, however deep their unlikeness to Palestinian Judaism, are entirely Palestinian in their emphasis on the practical side of things. Christianity is the glorified Torah. As in the Epistle of James, the new religion is viewed as the sublimation and realization of the law. It is the engrafted word (James 1²), differing from the Old Testament, not in its ideals, but in its power to realize the ideals.

So, when the person of Christ began to claim preëxistence, to enter into deeper relations with the Godhead, we do not find here a process like Philo's. The Philonian Logos was born of the mental union between the Jewish idea of God and the Greek idea of the universe. But the early Christian Christology grew up out of a practical consciousness, which took itself to be final, and which rested its claims to finality on a deepening appreciation of the relation between the Messiah and God.

The track to be followed by a mind at work in this process was foreordained by the existence of the Old Testament. Philo took the thought of the Logos from the Greeks, followed it through the Old Testament, and, coming out on the other side, looked off toward God. The Apostolic mind instinctively took the same course. In part, this was due to the intrinsic worth and beauty by reason of which the Prophetic writings had such vast drawing-power. One should compare the ethical genius of the Old Testament with Homer — over whom the Stoics labored so hard that they might make him a people's Bible — in order to understand this. Furthermore, all the habits of Palestinian laymen led them this same way. From early boyhood they had been trained to turn to the Scriptures for an

answer for every need. They looked to the Torah, as Xenophonanes looked up to the sky when he said that God was one.

Judaism gave to the new religion two great gifts, a Bible and the Messianic idea. Christianity starting with the Christ, the embodied Messianic idea, was forced by all its needs, outer and inner alike, to go deep into the Old Testament. As Philo followed the Logos idea through the Scripture, so was it foreordained that the Apostolic mind should follow its Christ into and through the sacred book. The early Christians were men of one book. Moreover, their great book was not — what it is more or less to us — a succession of laws and events and prophecies, but an organism of prophetic truth, every part of it related to the Messiah. That the mind should follow the person of Christ into and through the Old Testament was inevitable. We find an illustration of this mental process in 1 Pet. 1¹¹.

We must, however, be on guard against over-emphasizing the common consciousness. The bias and bent of individuality must be allowed for, since pronounced individuality necessarily carries with it a promise or possibility of speculation. Now in Paul we have the greatest individual of the Apostolic age. Temperament, genius, and his conversion conspired to set him apart by himself. His missionary career caused him to abound in his own sense. Everything coöperated to drive him in upon himself. The literary result is seen in his singularly egoistic style.

In Paul, then, we may with reason look for evidence of a free reflective process. Beyond question some evidence is found. The letter to the Romans is the work of a mind that loves and seeks system; and while it may not be called a formal treatise, yet it borders close upon this. The Epistles of the Imprisonment seem to be, in a measure, the result of speculative genius.

At first sight, Paul takes us far away from the mental processes of primitive Christianity. But as regards the point of this paper, the difference is nowhere so great as it seems to be. Of speculation, pure and simple, Paul had no felt need. His consciousness of revelation, of the immediate and satisfying experience of the divine life and power, was too rich and deep for that. He is the most prophetic and religious nature among the men of the New Testament. Religion, as Schleiermacher once for all taught us, is primarily a matter of feeling; *i.e.*, it is the consciousness of an objective energy pressing upon us from a source independent of humanity. The man who is dominated by immediate religious feeling can give but little play to free and pure reason. The speculative impulse, the reflective

mood, cannot become strong till religious passion has, in some measure, cooled down. When the consciousness of revelation is less powerful and compelling, reflection gets its chance. This law is psychologically certain, while it finds an historical illustration in the appearance and growth of the Wisdom mood in Judaism.

Paul's nature was intensely prophetic in its mental methods. For this cause, his thought, while remarkably subjective in its color, is profoundly objective in its processes. This is a matter that has not been sufficiently considered. For example, our term "conscience," while it is in form the exact equivalent of *συνείδησις*, in fact is not entirely satisfactory as a translation. With us, conscience is largely subjective in its mental associations. But Paul could not use the word *συνείδησις*, without thinking of an objective norm. In this, he was like the Stoics, who were far more objective than the moderns in their use of the term "conscience." But Paul was even more objective than they.

A larger example is found in the contrast between him and Philo in regard to the dogma of creation. In Philo's case, creation is a problem to be gotten over by the doctrine of the Logos. In Paul, creation is an experience. The freshness of his teaching at this point reminds us of Isaiah of the Exile. He had felt the creative energy of God at work in Christ, raising up the new humanity. His conversion led him to regard himself as an ethical creation out of nothing. His brilliant success as missionary to the heathen made it possible for him to see the new religion building its house from the basement. So he felt the creative power of God, rather than thought it. Least of all did creation propose any problem. It was an assured and immediate fact, charged so richly with emotion that speculation had neither function nor opportunity. The Hellenic element in Paul's system is not large. Greek culture touched him here and there, but never went deep. His psychology affords us a satisfactory proof. It may be laid down as a law that the deep-minded Israelite of Paul's time, to whom the majesty of Greek philosophy appealed, would be most strongly drawn by Platonism, for in Plato he would find not only speculative power, but, what is lacking in Aristotle—religious passion. Paul's older contemporary, Philo, is a case in point. It may be also affirmed that a man who was strongly impressed by Platonism would accept the Platonic trichotomy as later Platonists knew it; for that psychology is central in the system. Thus does Philo. Thus does also the Epistle to the Hebrews. But thus does not Paul. The trichotomy of 1 Thes. 5²¹ is on the surface a literary expression that

came handy to the moralist. Paul's real psychology is built up on the prophetic dualism between flesh and spirit.

There is not a shadow of evidence for the assertion that Greek speculation touched Paul to the quick. The speculative elements in his body of teaching are always flushed full with rich religious feeling. His theology, for the most part, is a pastoral theology, the theology of a missionary who does his best thinking on his feet, and whose letters smell but slightly of the lamp. Phil. 2¹⁻⁸ is a capital example. The idea of the Kenosis of the Son of God is there developed out of ethical passion and enthusiasm for the magnificence of virtue; and it returns quickly to its source. The mental process is practical rather than speculative.

It went along with this that the common consciousness in Paul was exceedingly strong. Coleridge said that every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. If that is true, then Paul was born an Aristotelian. His ethic, based on his idea of faith, is a doctrine of the will. The highest good is the creative energy called love, and love is the energy of faith (Gal. 5⁶). The essence of man is will-power, and the will-power expresses itself and exhausts itself in devotion to the Kingdom of God. We have here a system whose core is antithetic to Philo and Plotinus.

The corporate consciousness is instinctive and strong. The human will which is created by faith, is as social as it is personal. Hence the emphasis on the Body of Christ. In Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Romans this is suggested rather than developed. In the Epistles of the Imprisonment reflection enters. The idea of the Body of Christ is brought out by a more or less speculative Christology. But the significant point, so far as this paper is concerned, is that the two develop together. The process is quite unlike that of Philo, totally unlike that of Plotinus. In them the essence of the individual man — pure thought — shakes itself free, in large measure, from its relations to the community. In Paul, man's essence is a loving and redemptive will. So the common consciousness deepens as the individual consciousness deepens. The two are never long apart.

Hence the growth of Paul's Christology is due, on the whole, to the pressure of the problems of the common consciousness. It is Paul the missionary, Paul the church builder, Paul the Catholic caretaker, rather than Paul the speculator, who develops the idea of Christ. Of course, the speculative element enters into the process. For, without speculation, experience is blind. But the main line of motion is distinctly non-speculative. Paul is an Old Testament

prophet on New Testament ground. The prophet was a statesman. Isaiah finds his first cousin in Demosthenes, not in Aristotle. The life of the state, as it presses upon the earnest will of the individual — this was his task and his inspiration. Even so with Paul. The unity of God, embodied in the Christ, offers itself to men as the basis of human unity (Rom. 9–11, Eph. 2¹³, 3⁶); this was the gist of his preaching and thinking.

We may, therefore, with a measure of confidence affirm that, after all allowance is made for the play of the speculative impulse in a man so richly endowed as Paul, still in him, even as in the simpler forms of Apostolic consciousness, the development of Christology has strong analogies to the law process which goes on in the building of states and commonwealths. Roman law is the expression of an imperial consciousness. The publication of the Twelve Tables betokened the triumph of the popular will. The empire, inheriting the policy of the great popular leaders, and borrowing from the Stoics the form and inspiration of clear thought, eternalized itself through its Corpus Juris. Even so, the deepening Apostolic consciousness of Paul, taking the empire for its province and parish, insured the claims of Christianity as a world-religion by following the doctrine of the person of Christ down to its foundations in the Godhead. The Greek influence was, at the highest estimate, a strong occasioning cause. The main cause was the pressure of the common consciousness.

Additional evidence is found in the cosmology of Ephesians and Colossians. How quickly does the mind pass through nature. We have substantially the same perspective as in Rom. 8¹⁸⁻²⁴. The nature, *κτίσις*, that here manifests itself, is nature as the Old Testament Prophet saw it, nature as the New Testament apocalypticist viewed it, not nature as the Greek scientist and philosopher thought of it.

Finally, while the Old Testament track of thought is not as plain or as well-defined in Paul's case as it is in the case of the simpler and more apologetic forms of Apostolic thought, there are strong suggestions of it. For example, 1 Cor. 10⁴ (*ἡ πέτρα ἦν ὁ Χριστός*); and 2 Cor. 4⁶, connecting the story of creation in Genesis 1 with the story of redemption as it is in Christ.

In the Epistle to the Hebrews the academic element is much more pronounced than in Saint Paul. On the one hand, it is plain that the letter comes from a Christian who belongs, in every sense, to the second generation. Religious feeling is less impassioned; reflection plays a considerably larger part. On the other hand, it is equally

plain that the writer has studied in the Alexandrian school. The Greek influence goes deep. This is seen in the psychology (4¹²), wherein trichotomy is seriously taken, becoming an inherent part of the author's system. It is seen again in the Platonic treatment of the human body. Compare 10²⁰ (τοῦ καταπέτασματος, τοῦτ' ἔστιν, τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ) with Paul's doctrine of the σὰρξ in Romans 7 and 8. The former is as plainly Platonic as the latter is plainly Prophetic. It comes out again in the persistent habit of allegorizing, which colors the letter from beginning to end.

The speculative element in the Epistle is relatively strong. This comes out both in the Christology and in the pistology. The New Testament has three main types of opinion regarding the nature of faith: there is James's idea, wherein the Old Testament idea of Faith as steadfastness is restated, almost without change; there is Paul's conception, which goes to the root of ethics and lays bare the foundations of the righteous and efficient human will; and there is the view of the Epistle to the Hebrews. This is the Old Testament view, as it is when first passed through the impassioned eschatologic mood of primitive Christianity, and afterward analyzed and restated by a speculative mind.

Yet even here, in this thoroughly academic book, the community's interest is the guiding thought. The author's mind has been more than colored, it has been shaped, by Philonian or Alexandrian influences. Still, the track of his mind is not Philonian. His starting-point has nothing to do with the problem of creation. On the contrary, he starts with the consciousness of salvation as it exists in the Christian community. The central thought, as Bruce has said,³ is the direct and full access to God afforded by Christ. The theme is the right of the new community to God. So far does this right exalt itself over the right of Judaism, that the latter becomes a thing outworn. Beyond question, the speculative faculty of the author is strong. But it is significant that the faculty should wholly devote itself to the service of the religious consciousness in the Christian community. Even here, then, we have an analogy, though it is less strong than in Paul, to the law-making process. The Christian consciousness seeks for its foundations, and to find them carries the idea of Christ deep into the idea of God. The speculative process is inspired and controlled by the need of a religious community for authority and law.

Moreover, it is a matter of some significance that our author does not use the term "Logos" to describe the Christ. Taken with the

³ Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*, ii. p. 927.

marked Philonian element in his education, this fact suggests that the Logos idea in Philo's system did not make so quick or so deep an impression on Philo's contemporaries as it does upon us. And we may venture at this point to caution ourselves, lest when we find the word "Logos" used by a New Testament man to designate the person of Christ, we should hastily build upon a single term.

To sum up what has been said so far. The Greeks were in a peculiar sense the people of the word. Our eighteenth-century ancestors gave such a nominalistic and mechanical bias to our thought about language that it is impossible for us to take the term "Logos" as Heraklitus took it. In Longinus's treatise concerning the sublime, we have a striking illustration. When a modern man speaks of the sublime, he instinctively thinks, with Kant and Burke, of the sublime in nature. Hence, when one reads Longinus for the first time, he cannot prevent a feeling of mild surprise that Longinus should treat wholly of the sublime in literature. But this is characteristic of the Greek point of view. Hence the nobility of the Herakleitan name for law.

Greek philosophy, being the affair of speculative individuals, gradually moved away from the common life and the common consciousness. In this tendency Alexandrian Judaism deeply shared, although for somewhat different reasons. It was not because free-thinking individuals of his own race had been carried by the power of their own thought outside politics in order to think clearly, that Philo took so little interest in the question of the Republic. It was rather because the problem of efficient common action had been so well solved by his people that he could rest upon their achievement. None the less, his Neo-Platonic tendency is deeply significant. His mind did not work along the Jewish line. His ancestors had not conceived nature as a distinct reality. Their thought of it was religious, as in Ps. 104, where nature is the flowing robe of the Almighty. In their eschatologic pictures, nature lies, plastic as wax, in the hands of an omnipotent will. In their more reflective moods they thought of nature as in Gen. 1, where the word of God is the symbol of creative efficiency and ease. But Philo has learned from the Greeks to think of nature in a philosophical way. Nature is an organic total, complete like a noble work of art. By reason of the inherent defects of matter, the Platonist, Greek though he was, could discover in the cosmos many inevitable flaws. Philo's sense of sin greatly deepened his sense of the tragic incompetence of matter. So the dogma of creation, given by the Prophets as a deliverance of the

religious consciousness, becomes a pressing problem. The Logos idea, mediating between the Jewish idea of God and the Greek idea of the universe, is the solution.

Palestinian Judaism had a practical task, analogous to the task of state-building in all ages. The task was done through the development of the Torah. This is a legal rather than a speculative process. The wisdom mood plays some part in Palestine; but, on the whole, it is a by-product. No systematic Logology was possible or necessary. The Torah, standing with majestic authority before the will, attracted and retained the imagination.

The new religion developed along the Palestinian line, and when the force of history drove it into independence and self-consciousness, it endeavored to prove its right to exist by following Christ's claims upon Israel through the Old Testament. In Paul and the unknown author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the reflective reason has considerable play. But even in Hebrews the mind acts under the spur of the common consciousness. The philosophical tendency is not strong enough to carry it away from the problem of the new community. If, then, we are to seek outside the Old Testament a strict parallel to the motion of the Apostolic mind, we shall find in the relation between Stoic philosophy and Roman law a closer parallel than the Philonian system can give us.

In dealing with the Johannine literature, I shall assume that we may treat it as a whole. Whatever our views regarding the existence of a so-called Johannine school may be, no matter what we may think about the composite authorship of the Fourth Gospel, the Gospel according to John and the First Epistle of John are so closely related in thought and in style that, when handling generalities as I am doing, we may safely regard them as constituting a single literary organism.

The Epistle is the homiletical essence of the Gospel. It has two regulative terms, *φῶς* and *κοινωνία*. The first, as applied to God, means that God has no mental reservations. He has kept back nothing from his people. In him there is no darkness at all; in his being there is nothing hidden which can defeat or belittle the purpose of his children. In the other term, *κοινωνία*, the Christian consciousness of early days, the splendid passion for brotherhood, comes to its full fruition. The thought of fellowship is central. The community idea is paramount.

In the Gospel it is equally paramount. The true Israel is Christ's little body of disciples. The apparent Israel, the Jews, disbelieve in him. But the real Israel gives itself to him. And he, in response,

gives himself to the disciples to the uttermost. In chapters 13-17 the master unbosoms himself to his men, the heavenly bridegroom communes with the bride. And the objective point is the fellowship of men. The end and aim of the Christ's whole being and work is that his disciples may be one.

A striking point of difference between the Johannine and the Synoptical Gospel is the absence of thought about the Kingdom of God, the presence of an all-absorbing thought of the King. But this isolation and exaltation of the Christ has not been reached by a philosophical process. At least, the philosophical or reflective element in the process has never left the service of the Christian community. The perspective of the Gospel is in substantial agreement with the Epistle.

The Prologue bears witness to the same conclusion. The cosmological verses (1-3) do not long delay the reader. The author passes through them quickly, on his way into history. They are more likely to have been shaped in the school of the eschatologist than in the school of the metaphysician; and the centre of gravity is not in them but in 12-14, the story of the founding of the Christian community in whose midst and to whose members the incarnate Logos unbosomed himself.

From the Prologue to the climactic chapters 13 to 17 the purpose of the Gospel shines clear. The book has two aspects. Objectively, it describes the being and person of Christ. Subjectively, it is an account of the unbelief of the Jews and the belief of the chosen disciples. The Messiah, the incarnate Word of God, cannot reveal himself to the mass of his people. After the attempt to do so has failed, he opens his heart to the little community which he has founded. The perspective of the Gospel is practically identical with the perspective of the Epistle.

I infer that the author followed the same track that Paul did. The mental quality of his book is not markedly metaphysical. Indeed, taken as a whole, the story reads rather like condensed history than metaphysic. The author probably got his term "Logos" from Philo. But he came up to it along a different road. Philo's main need was a mediator between God and the world. Our author's need was a law of life. He found it in Christ, the incarnation of the self-revealing reality of God. In his earlier days he may have applied the term "Logos" to God very much in the sense of Apocalypse 19¹³. By it he meant Christ's mastery over history, and the surety and ease of God's masterhood as expressed by him. He may have gone on to call

Christ the Alpha and Omega (Apocalypse 1⁸), thus applying to Christ the words which Isaiah (41⁴, 43¹⁰, 44⁶) applies to God. The mental process is analogous to that which took place in the great prophet of the Exile, in whom the unity of God was more fully revealed through the impassioned belief in the indestructibility of Israel. The common consciousness of God's people and the unity of God were inseparable. Even so with our author. The life of the new community and the person of its founder are in his thought inseparable.

When he began his mental career he had Christ and the Old Testament for his capital. He followed the being of Christ deeper and deeper into the Old Testament, and at last, passing clean through it, came out on the other side. Then, taking his stand on the first verses of Genesis and looking off toward God, he saw the root and ground of Christ's being in the nature of God, and called him the Logos, the expression of the creative will, the fulfilment of all the divine promises to Israel, the embodiment of ultimate reality.