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The Articular Infinitive with *eis*.

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HARTFORD, CONN.

THE well-known difference in opinion among students of the New Testament regarding the force of *eis τό* with the infinitive, continuing as it does with our latest authorities, seems to call for some further investigation which may contribute to a fuller understanding of the extent to which the idiom is used, and its meanings. Winer, in his grammar, does not discuss the expression in detail, but mentions (p. 329, note 3, Am. ed.) its use to denote aim or result. Buttmann's grammar is fuller, but not comprehensive, and confounds distinct usages. The much disputed *ecbatic* sense it allows, but only as a case of *designed* consequence; that is, where the result is one aimed at. This explanation, however, does not cover those passages where, to many interpreters, an idea of purpose seems out of place, the clause being understood to express *pure* result. Professor Burton's recent work on *The Moods and Tenses of the New Testament*, and Professor Thayer's *Lexicon of the New Testament*, defend the ecbatic use; but, in accordance with the scope of these works, the illustrations are taken from the New Testament alone, and the passages referred to have received a different interpretation from many of the commentators. The lately published book of Viteau (*Étude sur le Grec du Nouveau Testament*) does not recognize this use, and it is opposed by many of the later commentators, especially those who have emphasized attention to grammatical laws. Meyer limits the sense exclusively to purpose. On 2 Cor. vii. 3, he says, "Von der *telischen* Beziehung des *eis* mit Infin. abzugehen, ist man an keiner Stelle berechtigt." And with this Hofmann agrees; cf. on Heb. xi. 3, "Ein Satz der Absicht oder der Abzielung ist diess unter allen Umständen; die Behauptung, *eis* mit substantivitem Infin. könne eben so gut eine blosse Folge ansdrücken, ist durch keine einzige der dafür beigebrachten Stellen erwiesen." So also Westcott (on Heb. xi. 3) says, "The phrase *eis τό* . . . can, according to usage, have no other sense than that of expressing the end." Professor

Mayor (on Jas. i. 18) finds "only one Pauline passage in which it may not be translated *in order that*." Others, while not limiting the sense to purpose, deny the use for *pure* result; so Alford (on Rom. i. 20) and Ellicott (on 1 Thes. ii. 12). Professor Sanday, in the new series of International Critical Commentaries, says (on Rom. i. 20), "The use of *εἰς τό* for mere result is not, we believe, generally recognized." The high authority in grammatical usage enjoyed by the commentators who oppose the ecbatic force would seem to have caused their view to be regarded as an established law; so Gifford in the Speaker's Commentary (on Rom. i. 20, additional note), speaks of it as "the rule."

Our standard lexicons and grammars of classical Greek do not treat the idiom specifically, and the corresponding works on the Greek of the New Testament base their treatment on these writings alone. Among these, Winer only, so far as known to the writer of this paper, notices a source outside of the New Testament, and that, in a single instance (p. 329, Am. ed.), where he evidently misinterprets, the passage referred to having no bearing upon the point under discussion. The phrase is often designated as a 'Pauline' construction, and it is true that it occurs with great frequency in the Epistles of St. Paul. It is, however, still more frequent relatively in Clemens Romanus. In point of fact, the usage is not confined to a few writers,—not to those of the New Testament, nor to those of that age. In determining its force, therefore, it would seem a useful, or rather a necessary, undertaking to investigate sources without as well as within the New Testament. In the following inquiry, in the first place, the usage of a considerably wide range of authors other than those of the New Testament will be examined; and in the second place, in view of the results thus obtained, an effort will be made to determine the use in the passages within the New Testament in which the idiom occurs.

I.

As is well known, the articular infinitive as a fully developed substantive is not found in the earlier stage of the language. Its *free* use begins with Thucydides. Herodotus is the first to use it in connection with the preposition *εἰς*. In this connection it occurs twice in Herodotus, twice in Sophocles, once in Euripides, not at all in any of the other poets of the classical age. (See Birklein's tables in Schanz's *Beiträge*, Heft 7.) The cases in Thucydides are 11, Xenophon 70, Plato 40, Demosthenes and the works attributed to

him 16, Isocrates 3, Hyperides 3, in the remaining eight Orators of the Attic Canon, *none*. Passing to a later age, the cases in Polybius are about 50, Philo Jud. 36, the Septuagint 10, the Apocrypha 16, Clemens Rom. 16, the so-called Second Epist. of Clemens 1, the Teaching of the Apostles 2, Ignatius 14, Barnabas 3, Hermas 6, Justin Mart. 3, the Epistle to Diognetus 1, the Letter of the Smyrnæans 1, the Passion of St. Perpetua 2, the Testament of Abraham 4, Acts of Paul and Thekla 1, Athenagoras 1; Polycarp, Martyr. of Peter, Martyr. of Paul, Martyr. of Peter and Paul, Fragments of Gospel and Apocalypse of Peter, *none*. In gathering material covering so wide a field, as concordances were for the most part not available, cases here and there have probably been overlooked; but such oversights cannot have happened to an extent sufficient to affect the general result. And it will be seen that while the use increases in general in the Hellenistic period, it is common in classical as well as post-classical writers, and that writers of the same age and sphere differ greatly in regard to it, the difference being due doubtless to personal causes.

In inquiring into the meaning of the construction it should be kept in mind that when the infinitive assumes the article it becomes distinctly a noun, standing like any verbal noun in a variety of relations and governed by various prepositions, especially *δά*, *μετά*, *πρός*, *eis*, and *ἐν*. Therefore the relations expressed by it when governed by a preposition conform to those of the noun proper in the same connection, and are determined by the preposition itself. With the exception of one or two rare usages not important in the present inquiry, the cases enumerated above fall into the following classes, where it will be noticed that in many instances the construction does not differ essentially from the simple infinitive; it will also be noticed that in 2 b and 6 it forms a separate clause, but in all other cases it is joined closely to the governing word, so as to form with it a single phrase:

(1) After words implying motion it denotes direction, or, more commonly, the state in which the action ends or that into which a thing is brought; e.g. Soph. *O. C.* 1537, *ὅταν eis τὸ μαίνεσθαι τραπῇ*, 'when one turns to madness'; Hdt. I. 216, *ἰκέρο ἐς τὸ τυθῆναι*, 'reached the (honor of) being sacrificed'; Xen. *Hell.* IV. 8, 27, *μετέστησε eis τὸ δημοκρατεῖσθαι*, 'changed them into a democracy'; Polyb. XXXVI. 1, 2, *συγκαταβαῖεν eis τὸ δοῦναι*, 'should descend into an agreement to grant'; Septuagint, Gen. xl ix. 15, *ὑπέθηκε τὸν ὄμον eis τὸ πονεῖν*, 'submitted his shoulder to laboring'; Test. of Abra-

ham, recension A, 13, ἀναφέρει αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ σώζεσθαι, 'bears him up to a state of salvation'; *Id.* 14, ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ σώζεσθαι. In this class should also be placed the use after verbs of *contributing to*, to denote the direction in which an influence is felt, which is not to be confounded with the *aim* in conscious purpose; e.g. Xen. *Hel.* VII. 1, 35, συνεβάλλετο εἰς τὸ τιμᾶσθαι, (the victory of the Thebans) 'contributed to his being honored'; *Id. Hipp.* VI. 5, ταῦτα προκόπτει εἰς τὸ μὴ καταφρονεῖσθαι, 'these things help to prevent his being despised'; Hyperides VI. 17; Hdt. VII. 6; Dem. 309; Philo Jud. II. 514.

(2) It expresses purpose. Here two usages are distinguished: (a) That in which it is joined closely to a noun or verb so as to form a single phrase; e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* VI. 1, 20, μηχανὰς εἰς τὸ καθαρεῖν, 'engines for destroying'; Sept., Ex. xl. 5, τὸ θυσιαστήριον εἰς τὸ θυμιάν, 'the altar for burning incense'; Apocrypha, 2 Mac. vi. 28, ὑπόδειγμα εἰς τὸ προθύμως διενθανατίζειν, 'an example to die willingly'; Polyb. II. 46, 3; *Id.* V. 63, 6; Xen. *Cyr.* VIII. 8, 9, τῇ ἡμέρᾳ χρώντο εἰς τὸ διαπονεῖσθαι, 'use the day for labor'; *ibid.* II. 3, 8; *Id. Anab.* I. 8, 25; Clemens Rom. XXXIV. 7; Apocrypha, Tobit i. 4. (b) That in which it forms a separate final clause equivalent to a clause with *īva*, *ōπως*, etc.; e.g. Dem. 879, ἀ τις ἔαντῳ παρεσκείασεν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τι δοκεῖν, 'what one has contrived in his own interest that he may seem to say something to the point'; Hyperides, VI. 26, τὸ ζῆν ἀνήλωσαν εἰς τὸ τοὺς ἀλλούς καλῶς ζῆν, 'freely gave up life that the rest might live nobly'; Clem. Rom. II. 4, δγὼν ἦν ὑμῖν εἰς τὸ σώζεσθαι, 'ye had conflict that they might be saved'; so also Thuc. I. 70, 6; Xen. *Cyr.* VIII. 1, 7; *Id. Hipp.* III. 14; Justin Mart. I. 9; *ibid.* 27; Hermas, *Mand.* 4, I, 11; Clem. Rom. XI. 2; *Id.* XIII. 3.; LXI. 1. In the foregoing examples the infin. is in the present (see below, II. 2 b); in the following it is in the aor.: Xen. *Mem.* III. 6, 2; Philo Jud. I. 228; Sept., Lev. xiv. 23; Apocrypha, Judith iii. 10; 1 Mac. xiv. 24.

REMARK.—Under this head it should be observed that as *purpose* involves the *result* aimed at, so one and the same fact may frequently be viewed in either relation, i.e. as purpose realized or result aimed at. In such cases it is doubtful whether the writer distinguished in thought the two relations; e.g. Xen. *Mem.* III. 6, 2, εἰς τὸ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκούειν τούτῳ λέξας, 'having spoken thus,' lit., 'to his consent to listen.' The consent is the *thing aimed at* by the speaker and the *result accomplished* in the listener; Passion of St. Perpetua, IX. πολλοὺς εἰσελθεῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἐκώλυεν εἰς τὸ ἡμᾶς παρηγορεῖσθαι, 'he allowed many to come to us to our comfort'; the comfort is both the aim and the result. This usage, which is too familiar to need further illustration, forms an easy transition to that of *pure result*.

(3) It is joined with verbs, adjectives, and even nouns to denote the respect in which the limited word is to be understood; e.g. Thuc. VII. 67, 3, ἀργότερα ἐς τὸ δρᾶν, 'slower as regards action'; Soph. *O. C.* 1368, ἄνδρες, οὐ γυναῖκες, *eis* τὸ συμπονεῖν, 'men, not women, as regards sharing toil'; Justin Mart. I. 15, *eis* τὸ κοινωνεῖν ταῦτα ἔφη, 'he said this in respect to communicating'; Hermas, *Sym.* 5, IV. 2, αὐθάδης *eis* τὸ ἐπερωτᾶν, 'importunate in asking.'

(4) It is used in place of the so-called object-infinitive with a large class of words (verbs, nouns, and adjectives) signifying to *encourage*, *impel*, *admonish*, *influence*, *effect*, and the like; also with words implying *ability*, *fitness*, *readiness*, and the like. The common usage here takes the simple infinitive (see Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, §§ 747-749; Kühner, § 473; Krüger, § 55, II. 3), but the sense is precisely the same. Examples of words after which this use is found are παρορμᾶν, Xen. *Oec.* V. 7; συμπαιδεύειν, *ibid.* 14; συμπαροῦνται, *ibid.* VI. 10; ἐπιρρωνύμαι, Polyb. I. 41, 2; παρακαλεῖν, *Id.* III. 49, 9; προκαλεῖσθαι, *Id.* IX. 28, 4; παρίστασθαι ('to dispose one toward one's self'), *Id.* II. 59, 5; ἐκκαλεῖσθαι, *Id.* XXVIII. 4, 12; νουθετεῖν, Hermas, *Vis.* 3, 5, 4; μελετᾶν, Barnabas xix. 10; ἀπαιτεῖν, Ignatius, *Pol.* II. 3; συμπειθεῖν, Apocrypha, 3 Mac. vii. 3; δύναμις, Plato, *Soph.* 247; ὄρμή, Philo Jud. I. 193; ικανός, Polyb. XII. 25 a, 1; ἀδύνατος, Epist. to Diognetus, IX. 6; πρόθυμος, Sept., Hab. I. 8.

(5) As *eis* is used with the noun proper to denote measure or degree, e.g. Xen. *Anab.* II. 3, 23, *eis* δύναμιν εὖ ποιῶντες, 'doing good to the extent of our power' (see Liddell & Scott, s. v., A. III.), so also it stands with the articular infin. in the same relation; e.g. Xen. *Mem.* III. 3, 10, ἀρκέσει μοι τοῦτο *eis* τὸ πείθεσθαι; 'will that avail for me to the extent that they will obey me?' Philo Jud. I. 477, ὅσα γε *eis* τὸ μῆδ' ὑφεστάναι δοκεῖν ἀνεστοχειωμένος, 'resolved into my elements again so as to seem not even to exist'; Apocrypha, 1 Esdras viii. 84 (87), παραβῆναι τὸν νόμον σου *eis* τὸ ἐπιμηγῆναι, κτλ., 'transgress thy law to such a degree as to mingle with,' etc. This usage is so nearly allied to that of pure result (see below) that some cases can be referred indifferently to either category.

(6) In rarer cases it expresses result. As already pointed out, the uses mentioned above in (2) Rem. and (5) may frequently coalesce with or pass into the idea of pure result. Before noticing such instances of pure result it may be well to inquire whether the preposition is found in this sense with the noun proper, for we may expect the articular infin. with the preposition to stand in such relations and such only as does the noun proper. The use of *eis* to express result,

though not noticed by our standard lexicons and grammars, is one which lies near to the ordinary uses and is found in both the earlier and the later Greek. Two classes are here distinguished : (a) Where the phrase is *closely* connected with the limited word ; e.g. Hdt. VIII. 88, συνήνεκεν ἐστυχίην γενόμενα, ‘chanced to turn out to her good fortune’ ; Thuc. III. 37, 2, οὐκ ἐστὶ τὴν τῶν ἔνυμάχων χάριν μαλακίσθαι, ‘show a weakness which is not to,’ i.e. ‘does not result in, the thanks of the allies’ ; Xen. Mem. II. 1, 22, τεθραμένην εἰς πολυσπακίαν, ‘reared so as to be plump’ ; Soph. Aj. 1138 ; Eurip. Herac. 350 ; Ignatius, Eph. XXI. 2, ἡξιώθην εἰς τιμὴν θεοῦ εὑρεθῆναι, ‘I was counted worthy to be found to the honor of God’ ; Id. Phil. VIII. 1, ἐὰν μετανοήσωσιν εἰς ἑνότητα θεοῦ, ‘if they repent so as to be at unity with God.’ It is convenient here to anticipate the second part of this paper so far as to cite similar cases from the New Testament ; e.g. Rom. x. 10, πιστεύεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ‘man believeth unto righteousness’ ; righteousness is the result of faith (even Meyer admits the force here) ; 2 Cor. vii. 9, ἐλυπήθητε εἰς μετάνοιαν, ‘your grief resulted in repentance’ ; Rom. v. 18, vi. 16 ; 2 Tim. iii. 15. (b) Where the phrase is *more loosely* joined to the context, e.g. Philo Jud. I. 40 ; the writer describes the result of woman’s offices and cares in the phrase εἰς ἀφαίρεσιν ἐλευθερίας καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνόντος ἄνδρὸς δεσποτείαν, ‘so that she loses her freedom and becomes subject to the dominion of the man who lives with her’ ; Id. II. 21, ζωτικὴν δύναμιν ἔφειρεν εἰς ἀγονίαν παντελῆ, ‘destroyed the vital force, so that complete barrenness resulted’ ; also in the New Testament, Heb. x. 39, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ὑποστολῆς εἰς ἀπώλειαν, ἀλλὰ πίστεως εἰς περιπόησιν ψυχῆς, ‘we are not of them that shrink back so as to be destroyed, but of them that have faith so as to save the soul.’

To these considerations, which show the eccentric use of the idiom to be a natural one, may now be added the following illustrations, which would seem sufficient to establish the use : Dem. 430, οὐδὲ τὸ πιστευθῆναι προλαβόντα παρ’ ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ μεῖω δύνασθαι κακουργεῖν καταχρῆσθαι (sc. δεῖ), ‘nor ought he after gaining your confidence, so that he is able to do greater evil, to abuse it.’ It is impossible to take εἰς τὸ δύνασθαι as a purpose clause after προλαβόντα, for such a case could stand in no relation to the person under discussion ; also foreign to the topic were the statement, that a man who had sought confidence with the express purpose of being able to work greater harm, ought not to abuse that confidence. Most translators of Dem. disregard δύνασθαι, and misinterpret accordingly. Id. 239, ὥχετ’ ἐκείνους λαβὼν εἰς τὸ μηδὲ ὅτιον προορᾶν τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ; the phrase ὥχετο λαβὼν

is here used figuratively of Philip's influence over the Thebans, etc., and the sense is, 'he got them completely under his influence, so that they foresaw none of the consequences.' The anonymous *Epitaphius* attributed to Dem., 1397, ἀ πᾶσιν ὑπῆρχε τοῖσδε τοῖς ἀνδράσιν *eis* τὸ καλῶς ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, εἴρηται, γένος, παιδεία, κτλ., 'what these men all possessed, so that they wished to die nobly, has been said, viz. birth, education,' etc. Plato, *Parmen.* 149: in reasoning that, as there must be at least two things if there is to be a contact, so if there be additional things the additional number of contacts will be one less than the number of things, Plato says: φὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησε τῶν ἄψεων *eis* τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ή τὰς ἄψεις, κτλ., 'for in so far as the first two things exceeded the contacts, so that their number is more than (that of) the contacts,' etc. Cf. the version of Bekker's ed., "quanto enim prima duo tactus ipsos exsuperarunt, ita ut plura numero, quam tactus essent," etc. Philo Jud. I. 649: speaking of the world of essence, the author says it is apprehended not by the senses but by the mind only, adding, πάντων αὐτῷ τειχῶν καὶ πάσης πύλης ἀρθέντων, *eis* τὸ μὴ ἀπό τίνος ἀθῆσαι, 'when all the walls and every gate (*i.e.* of the senses) are taken out of the way, so that man beholds it through none of these.' Ignatius, *Rom.* I. 2, ή ἀρχὴ εὐοικονόμητός ἐστιν, ἐὰν πέρατος ἐπιτύχω, *eis* τὸ τὸν κλῆρόν μου ἀπολαβεῖν, 'the beginning is well managed if I reach the end so as to receive my inheritance.' *Id. Pol.* VII. 1, ἔάντερ θεοῦ ἐπιτύχω, *eis* τὸ εὑρεθῆναι με μαθητήν, 'if I attain unto God, so as to be found a disciple.' Like cases are the following also, where the idea of purpose is expressly denied by the context, the matter under discussion being an unintended consequence: Apostolic Const. I. 3, μὴ καλλωπιζόμενος *eis* τὸ ἀγρευθῆναι τινα ἐπί σοι, 'not adorning thyself, so that another is captivated with thee.' *Ibid.* παγιδεῖσαι γυναῖκα *eis* τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι σον, 'to ensnare a woman, so that she was seized with a desire for thee.' *Ibid.* I. 8, ἀναγκάσασα ἐπενεχθῆναι σοι τινα, *eis* τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι σον, 'compelling one to be drawn to thee, so that he is seized with desire for thee.'

In closing this review of the various uses of the idiom discussed, it is enough to remark that as regards *meaning* there appears no difference between the classical and post-classical Greek. And it will be seen below that in this respect the uses of the New Testament writers are in agreement with those of other writers. But certain usages seem to become somewhat more frequent in the later age: such as separate purpose clauses, phrases equivalent to the object-in infinitive, and clauses of result.

II.

In the New Testament there are 72 (Text. Recept. 76) cases of the construction, it being found in all the books except those of St. John and the following Epistles: Colossians, the Pastoral Epistles, Philemon, 2 Peter, and Jude. And these uses in the New Testament differ in no instance from those found in other writings. An effort is here made to classify them according to the order and numbering of the categories given above. Some cases naturally might be referred to different classes without essential difference of meaning. Those cases which do not call for special comment and may be assigned to their respective categories without much question are given first; those requiring particular notice are considered afterwards:

(1) The few passages which have been interpreted by some commentators in a sense that would require their reference to this class are more naturally assigned to some other class and are given below:

(2) a.

Matt. xx. 19.	1 Cor. xi. 22.	Heb. vii. 25.
" xxvi. 2.	" xi. 33.	" viii. 3.
" xxvii. 31.	2 Thes. ii. 10.	" ix. 28.
Rom. xv. 16.	2 " iii. 9.	" xiii. 21.
1 Cor. x. 6.	Heb. ii. 17.	

For the use after *rύπος* (1 Cor. x. 6; 2 Thes. iii. 9), cf. the example with *ὑπόδειγμα* (2 Mac. vi. 28), given under I. 2 a.

b.

Mk. xiv. 55. (Lk. iv. 29 T. R.).	Rom. viii. 29. " xi. 11. " xv. 8. " xv. 13.	I Thes. ii. 16. " iii. 2. " iii. 5. " iii. 13.
(Acts iii. 19 T. R.).	2 Cor. i. 4. 2 " iv. 4.	2 Thes. ii. 6. Heb. ix. 14. " xii. 10.
Acts vii. 19.	Eph. i. 12. " i. 18.	Jas. i. 18.
Rom. i. 11. " iv. 11. " iv. 16. " iv. 18. " vii. 4.	(Phil. iii. 21 T. R.).	I Pet. iii. 7.

Such passages as Rom. iv. 11 (first case), 16, 18; 2 Cor. i. 4, might be referred to *result*, but the idea of purpose better suits the apostle's mode of thought.

Harmsen in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1874, has sought to show that this use in a purpose clause is not found in

the present tense. As some weight has been given to this opinion, it may be worth while to observe that, apart from the impossible interpretations to which he resorts to maintain that view, the passages he examines are taken from the epistles to the Romans and Corinthians exclusively. Such passages as Acts vii. 19; Heb. ix. 14; 1 Pet. iii. 7, can hardly be taken in any other sense than that of purpose. Cf. also the numerous cases cited above under I. 2 b.

(3)

Jas. i. 19.

(4)

Lk. v. 17.		1 Thes. ii. 12.		1 Thes. iv. 9.
Phil. i. 23.	"	iii. 10.	"	ii. 2.

On δύναμις *eis* τὸ ἰᾶσθαι (Lk. v. 17), cf. the example from Plato, *Soph.* 247, given above, I. 4. On ἐπιθυμίαν *eis* τὸ διαλῦσαι, cf. ὄρμή, Philo Jud. I. 193 (I. 4 above).

(5)

Rom. vi. 12. | Rom. xii. 3. | 1 Cor. viii. 10. | 2 Cor. vii. 3.

In Rom. vi. 12 the sense apparently is 'let not sin have the mastery of your body to such an extent that you obey the bodily desires.' In Rom. xii. 3, the contrast with παρά favors the reference of *eis* to measure or degree (Philippi). It cannot be purpose (Meyer). In 1 Cor. viii. 10, *eis* τὸ κτλ., expresses the degree to which the influence called ironically οἰκοδομῆσθαι extends. These cases approximate closely to *result*.

(6) Passages which seem to belong to the category of pure result are spoken of below. Those which are there assigned with more or less confidence to this class are :

Rom. i. 20.		2 Cor. viii. 6.		Heb. xi. 3.
" vii. 5.	"	Gal. iii. 17.	"	Jas. iii. 3.
" xii. 2.	"	Phil. i. 10.	"	

The following passages, calling for fuller notice, have (excepting those under 6) not been included in their respective classes as given above :

Rom. i. 20. Regarding this much-discussed passage it will be enough for the present object to say that διὰ (vs. 21) introduces the ground of man's inexcusableness, — not the ground of God's purpose, that man should be inexcusable. If therefore *eis* τὸ κτλ. express God's purpose, there must be understood before

vs. 21 an ellipsis so harsh that the commentators, who allow the ecbatic use of the infinitive clause as a possible one, have almost universally maintained that use here.

Rom. iii. 26. Some have taken this as ecbatic, but the course of thought seems to require the *telic* sense. It has also been taken as an appositional clause explaining δικαιοσύνης, but upon the error of confounding this idiom with the simple epexegetical infinitive (Kühner, § 472; Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 745), see below on 2 Thes. i. 5.

Rom. vii. 5. The clause here may express either purpose or result. The parallel clause, ὥστε, κτλ. (vs. 6), is in favor of the latter.

Rom. xii. 2. δοκιμάζειν here, as in Eph. v. 10, is ‘to determine,’ i.e. by scrutiny. Cf. Lk. xii. 56, τὸ πρωτηπον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δοκιμάζειν, ‘discern (by scrutiny) the meaning of the face of the sky.’ The corresponding passage (Matt. xvi. 3) has διακρίνειν. St. Paul’s exhortation in vv. 1 f. is wholly practical, aiming at complete consecration of life; and in the clause μὴ συνεχηματίζεσθε . . . τούτῳ the thought is set forth negatively, in δλλὰ . . . τελειω, positively. In keeping with this aim he seems to be emphasizing here, not the influence of character on the discernment of God’s will, but the reverse, i.e. the transformation of character to be wrought through the renewed mind’s apprehension of that will. The clause εἰς τό, then, is not so appropriately taken as a purpose clause with μεταμορφώσθε, κτλ., but is to be joined directly with διακαίνωσε, and its meaning is illustrated by Heb. vi. 6, διακαίνειν εἰς μετανοίαν, ‘renew unto repentance,’ i.e. repentance being the result of renewal (Linemann, Alford). Probably also in Col. iii. 10, διακαίνωμενος εἰς ἐπτύγματα, εἰς should be interpreted in the same way. The sense of our passage then is, that the renewing of the mind unto, i.e. resulting in the discernment of God’s will, works (of course through the Holy Spirit) the transformation of the man.

1 Cor. ix. 18. The principal thought of the apostle in the paragraph ix. 1-23, is that while he possesses all the rights of the apostolic office, including maintenance, as the hire of the laborer, nevertheless his principle, seen in manifold ways (19-23), has been to waive these rights for the furtherance of the gospel. As a part of this thought, he shows that so far as he has a ground of glorying, it lies not in the mere preaching of the gospel, for that is laid upon him by necessity, but in the fact that the Lord, accounting him a faithful slave, has made him his steward, and therefore his services are not rewarded with the stipulated pay of the hired laborer whose work is voluntary. If, then, he is accounted a steward, he asks, ‘What pay have I?’ τίς οὖν μοι ἔστιν δι μισθοῖς; The apostle’s meaning has been supposed to be, ‘Though I have no pecuniary recompense, yet I have indeed a reward, and what is it?’ Some, placing the question mark at the end of the verse, find the answer in 19 ff., γάρ there being explained as elliptical, in the sense, ‘Verily,’ or ‘Why, surely,’ as in vv. 9 and 10. But in such ellipses γάρ introduces an explanation or ground of a self-evident answer, not the answer itself. And further, the passage 19-23 does not describe a reward, but illustrates by particular instances the apostle’s general principle of surrendering his prerogative for the gospel’s sake. Others, placing the question mark after μισθοῖς, find the answer in the ἵνα clause immediately following: ‘My reward is that in preaching I make the gospel without cost.’ But this, as Hofmann points out, confounds the μισθοῖς and the καύχημα, which in the foregoing the writer

insists upon distinguishing. In fact, the question as to *what reward* the apostle is to receive is out of place in the connection. The thought runs through unbroken to vs. 23, and is concerned not with the reward which the apostle has or may have, after all, for preaching the gospel, but only with his principle of self-sacrifice. Meyer (whom Hofmann follows) is probably right in regarding the question as equivalent to a negative assertion. The meaning then is, 'What hire, then, have I? None at all; and that, to the end that when I preach I may avoid hindrance by making the gospel without charge.' That the thought here returns to that of vs. 12 is indicated by the added clause *eis τὸ κτλ.* This clause, then, might denote result, as in vs. 12 the corresponding phrase expresses the result of the determination to avoid hindrance to the gospel; and the sense would be, 'I take no hire, that I may make the gospel free, and so I refuse to use my right and take pay.' But apart from the tautology involved in this interpretation it is probably better to take it as a purpose clause, for vv. 19 ff., which γαρ closely connects with the clause, would indicate that a general principle is thought of, rather than the particular right of recompense, and would favor the interpretation, 'I make the gospel free that I may maintain my life principle of not using my rights to the full, for such has been my course throughout.'

a Cor. viii. 6. So difficult is it to take the infinitive clause in any other than an ecbatic sense in this passage, that it is so interpreted even by most of those who elsewhere insist on the telic use. Meyer's reference of it to the purpose of God is most artificial.

Gal. iii. 17. The argument here is concerned with the *result* rather than the *purpose* of the law's nullifying power, and the clause may pretty certainly be taken as ecbatic.

Phil. i. 10. The clause here might equally well express purpose or result, but the analogy of Rom. xii. 2 (see above) would suggest result or degree; that is, 'knowledge and all perception, to the degree that, or so that, ye may discern τὰ διαφέροντα.'

a Thes. i. 5. In vv. 4 ff. the thought of the writer is, 'Your endurance of persecution is a token that the Lord at his coming will pronounce the just judgment of your worthiness of his kingdom.' That the clause *eis τό* is to be joined with δικαίας κρίσεως is clear; and in that connection the idea of purpose (Hofmann, De Wette, Alford), or of result (Lünemann), or of tendency (Ellicott), is, without the addition of some connecting thought, less pertinent than that of *respect*; for the phrase, 'the just judgment,' clearly refers to a particular act which must be defined in the context. Such a definition, which in the more common usage would be expressed by a clause with *δι*, is here given by the prepositional clause. The literal sense, then, is 'the just judgment, that is, in respect to or regarding your being counted worthy.' It is hardly correct in such cases to call the clause an epexegetical, or appositional, infinitive, as some authorities do; for, although it is used where in some cases, e.g. after a nominative or accusative, the epexegetical infinitive might be used, the employment of *eis* to introduce an appositional noun does not occur, and consequently it would not so introduce the articular infinitive. In all such cases there is an idea of limitation or relation which might be expressed by some such phrase as *in respect to*.

a Thes. ii. 11. If the prepositional clause be joined closely with ἐπέγειαν, as Hofmann takes it, it might express result or degree, but it is more in keeping

with the Pauline mode of thought to take it as the purpose of the whole phrase *πέμπει . . . πλάγη*.

Heb. xi. 3. Here the writer having affirmed, ‘By faith we understand that the worlds have been framed by the word of God,’ adds *εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὸ βλεπόμενον γεγονέα*. Westcott takes this clause as expressing the purpose of *πίστει πούδει*, and explains the meaning to be, ‘The purpose of the knowledge gained by faith is the conviction that the visible order has not come into existence by material causation.’ But the idea of purpose is irrelevant to *πούδει*. We may speak of purpose in *seeking* or *granting* understanding, but not in the simple act of understanding itself, which is all that is contained in the former clause. And besides, *γεγονέα* expresses merely the *fact* of the origin of the universe and not our *conviction* of that fact. Hofmann (in essential agreement with Lünemann) takes the clause as the purpose of *κατηρπλόθαι . . . θεοῦ*, and gives as the meaning this: the thing which we understand by faith is not only the fact that God framed the worlds by his word, but also that his purpose in framing them so was that the visible universe might not have arisen out of things apparent to the senses. In other words, as regards the creation, the substance of our understanding gained by faith might be expressed thus: God’s purpose in framing the universe by *his word* was that it might not have come into existence from a material source. With such a proposition touching the purpose of God a legitimate faith could not occupy itself, much less give us any assurance. The phrase can hardly be taken otherwise than as expressing the *result* after *κατηρπλόθαι βήματι θεοῦ*, and the sense is, ‘It is by the word of God that the worlds have been framed, so that the visible universe has not arisen from material things.’ In this interpretation are agreed most commentators, even many of those who in general are reluctant to admit the ecclastic use of the infinitive clause.

Jas. iii. 3. In vs. 2 the statement has been made that, ‘If any stumbleth not in word, the same is a perfect man, able to bridle the whole body also,’ that is, control of the tongue implies full Christian maturity. The statement is then illustrated and enforced by two comparisons, the force of which is evidently that the tongue is as all-controlling as the bit of the horse or the rudder of the ship; and, as he who can control the bit or the rudder can direct the horse or the ship, so he who can control the tongue can direct his entire person at his will. The first comparison (according to Sin., A, B, *et al.* and the critical eds.) is in the form of a conditional sentence, and if the comparison is to be applicable, the thought demanded is, not if we *aim at*, but if we *secure*, obedience to the bit in the mouth of the horse, we control his whole body also. But this thought would suggest the propriety of taking the *εἰς τὸ* clause as one of *result*, and the sense of the passage would be, ‘if we put the horses’ bits into their mouths to their obedience, i.e. and so secure their obedience, we control their whole body also.’

1 Pet. iv. 2. In this passage the apostle has returned to the thought of suffering for the gospel’s sake,—a subject frequently mentioned in the epistle (cf. i. 6; ii. 20; iii. 14–18; iv. 12–19; v. 9); and he urges his readers to follow in this respect the example of Christ. As a motive he reminds them of the blessing to spiritual character to be derived from such endurance of suffering: one who for well-doing (iii. 17) has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin (Sin.¹, A, most critical eds. *ἀμαρτίας*). Then follows the clause *εἰς τὸ κτλ.* Some have connected this with *διλέσασθε*, taking *ὅτι . . . ἀμαρτίας* as a parenthesis. But the evident

reference of *μηκέτι* to the perfect *τέκνανται* is against that, and points to a close connection with the foregoing (Huther); and besides, δὲ ταῦθα . . . ἀμαρτίας needs such a limitation (see below). The subject of *βιώσαι* is, then, the same as that of *τέκνανται*. What, now, is the relation denoted by the prepositional clause? It is less appropriately taken as purpose, for in that case the thing aimed at is already contained in what has been done, and the sense would be, that the man's motive in having ceased is that he may not continue. It would seem rather that the phrase is added to *define the extent* to which *τέκνανται* *ἀμαρτίας* can be affirmed. For while St. John, speaking of the child of God with reference to his essential and ideal nature, can say (1 Jn. iii. 9), 'Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin,' the very different statement, 'he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin,' cannot be affirmed without limitation. That limitation is found in the prepositional clause, and we may understand the apostle's meaning to be, 'he who for well-doing has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin *to the extent* that he makes the norm (the datives denote *accordance*) of the rest of his life no longer the lusts of men, but the will of God.' Cf. the examples above under (5). It should perhaps be added in defence of this interpretation, that while vs. 3 gives the ground of an exhortation to the reader and *παρεληλυθός* is contrasted with *ἐν λοιπών*, it does not follow that *βιώσαι* has the same subject as *ἐν λοιπάσθε*, and that the sense must be; 'Arm yourselves . . . in order that ye may no longer live the rest of your time . . . to the lusts of men; for the time past may suffice,' etc. Equally clear is the connection, 'Be ready to suffer, knowing that one who has suffered makes the rest of his life conformed to the will of God; for the time past may suffice you to have conformed your life to the will of the Gentiles.'