

# Social Movements: A Reflection on the Concrete Struggle for Life in India

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## I Introduction

Struggle for existence may be observed in any sphere of life, whether in the realm of caste, class, religion and so on. In other words, "struggle" connotes continuous existence. However, the struggle for life need not always be manifest. It is only when there is maximum awareness of deprivation that a *concrete* struggle for life ensues. It is in this context that it is possible to hypothesize that there is a distinction between "struggle for life"—which signifies a continuous part of existence without any overt manifestations, and "concrete struggle for life"—where perceptions of deprivations reach such an optimum level that overt declarations are made for change. It is this level of struggle which can be encompassed within "social movements." In other words, "social movements" typify the concrete struggle for life. The analogy is appropriate to our subject of interest, that is, "concrete struggle for life" because a "social movement is not an unnoticed accretion of many unrecognized changes, rather it has the characteristics of an explicit and conscious indictment of a whole or part of the social order together with a demand for change."<sup>1</sup> Where the perception or awareness of what is just in society is at odds with reality then "a collective attempt to reach a visualized goal especially a change in certain social institutions is made."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph Cusfield, "The Study of Social Movements," in *The International Encyclopaedia of Social Science*, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 445.

<sup>2</sup> Rudolph Heberle, *Social Movements, An Introduction to Political Sociology*, New York: Appleton—Century Crofts, 1951, p. 6.

## **II The Purpose of this Paper**

We observe that the incongruity or hiatus between the idea of what is just and observable reality, or which may simply be referred to as the factor of perceived deprivation, is particularly manifest in certain areas, such as caste, religion and language, whereas it is less manifest in other areas such as education.

We propose in this paper to survey briefly three instances where maximum perception of deprivation propelled significant action—either concerted effort to demand change of the status quo, or, if the demand produced no reaction on those capable of bringing about a change, then complete renunciation of one's previous life style in exchange for another is possible, where the stigma of deprivation is considerably less than in the previous life style.

In this paper deprivations perceived by certain significant communities have been dealt with. The Sikhs' perception of deprivation and the resultant demand for Khalistan, the Muslims' perception of deprivation and the resultant Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, and finally the perception of deprivation of the Harijans and their consequent efforts for survival through a different "stigma-free" religious set-up. Only these three instances have been chosen to prove the hypothesis: an optimum level of perception of relative deprivation promotes concerted struggle.

It is however true that movements reflecting varying levels of deprivations can be recounted in plenty throughout India today—the tribal resurgence in the Northeast; the Assam agitation; the peasant based movements influencing the agrarian lobby in the western states; the widespread politics of caste in the south—all these have been dealt with extensively either from the viewpoint of their individual impact, or as theoretical studies. Our intention, as stated above, is not so ambitious as to cover all these particular instances of "concrete struggle for life in India." We intend to focus on the multiplicity rampant within India and the channels sought for the sustenance of such multiplicity.

## **III The Theoretical Basis of the Paper**

At this stage, we think it is quite pertinent to raise the question, what is the justification for socio-religious, caste or linguistic movements, or for that matter any movement in India today? Do those

movements presuppose disintegration of society? In fact such were the questions raised by the theoreticians dealing with modernization and the political development of the new states, till the late fifties.<sup>3</sup> It was assumed that, "urbanization, industrialization, secularization, in short mass society will automatically pulverize communal identities, below those attaching to the national state."<sup>4</sup> Such were the views of the modernization theoreticians, befogged by the western framework of political development. However, such outdated theories have been successfully refuted today. It has been proved that these theories are not models applicable in all spheres. Contemporary theoreticians like Charles Tilly, Theda Skockpol and Crawford Young<sup>5</sup> impart a certain amount of legitimacy to social movements, particularly in the developing world. They have founded their thesis on the assumption that, in newly developing nations, loyalties to lineage, cast, tribe, village and ethnic group are not necessarily abandoned for the larger loyalty to the state. It may be possible that these subnational loyalties remain and are "merely capped with loyalty to the state."<sup>6</sup>

Thus, rather than being a reflection of the disintegration of society, it may be said that in developing societies there is a high correlation between the national solidarity achieved and the scope given for primordial sentiments to be satisfied.<sup>7</sup> In other words, multiple ethnicity or cultural pluralism (as existent in India) presuppose constant voicings of demands by these sub-national groupings. To the extent that their demands are recognized as legitimate by the political authority and steps are taken to satisfy them, to the same extent, or to a greater extent will the stamp of legitimacy be awarded to the national state.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization Protest and Chance*, Englewood Clift: Prentice Hall, 1966.

<sup>4</sup> Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, Wisconsin: The University Press, 1976, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Charles Tilly, *Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: The University Press, 1975; Theda Skockpol, *States and Social Revolution*, Cambridge: The University Press, 1979; Crawford Young, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Joseph Elder, "National Loyalties in a Newly Independent Nation," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. D. Apter, London: The Free Press, 1964, p. 77.

<sup>7</sup> D. Apter, "Ideology and Discontent," in *ibid.*, p. 22.

In view of the above theoretical formulation, we assert, the national authorities should view the frequent voicing of demands (in the form of social movements) by multiple ethnic groups within the Indian polity as being progressive in nature and in keeping with democratic norms. The more the authorities display lack of sympathy with these voicings, the greater will be the possibility of the social movements assuming a disintegration stance.

#### **IV The Dimensions of Cultural Pluralism in India**

Religion, language and caste have been identified as the three axes of differentiation in India.<sup>8</sup> It is along these axes that attempts at identity-formulation are made. The movements chosen for discussion conform to the three axes partially, for even though the roots of the Sikhs' separatist demands were linguistic, yet today their loss of identity is more in the realm of religion than language.

#### **V Language as an Axis of Cultural Pluralism**

The language Issue was very popular as a factor of cultural pluralism in the pre-Independence stage and also immediately after the onset of Independence when the States Reorganization Commission (SRC) was considering petitions from the major linguistic communities for separate state status within the Indian federation. Today language is a part of the demand incorporated in the Assam problem—though their major focus is related to the “sons of the soil” theory. We also observe language based spurts now and then. From the South very recently the Karnataka ministry tried to uplift the status of Kannada as a teaching medium. Nevertheless, the major demand for linguistic identity seems to have been met. The movements inspired by “linguistic-pluralism” which occur now and again reflect lack of concerted action. More particularly, failure of the leaders to identify themselves with the rank and file prevents collective bargaining. This was very much apparent in the case of the Maithili movement in Bihar.<sup>9</sup> It was perhaps because of the weakness of collective bargaining efforts that Maithili was not included in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution.

<sup>8</sup> Crawford Young, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Paul Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, Delhi: Vikas, 1975.

Despite the fact that language-based movements seem to have become less frequent methods adapted to voice cultural pluralism, that does not mean that cultural pluralism is itself a diminishing force today. On the other hand, religion and caste remain predominant indices influencing cultural pluralism.

## VI Religion as an axis of Pluralism

### a) *The Case of Khalistan*

The Khalistan movement and the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind movement have been taken to represent the religious axes of cultural pluralism in India. We deal with the Khalistan issue first.

Until very recently, the Sikhs as a distinct political entity did not feature very prominently in the Indian political scene. In the post-Independence period their agitations for a Punjabi Suba was justified on linguistic grounds and hence was not termed segregationist in character. However, lately particularly since 1980, the mass media coverage of events in the Northwest shows quite significantly that Sikhs have suddenly felt an imperative urge to voice their distinctiveness with as much force as possible. We interpret this urge as the result of their heightened perception of existing as a distinct cultural entity. But the question is, why should the feeling of deprivation be heightened at this late stage in the post-Independence era, and how intense is the awareness that it should encourage extreme anomalous behaviour? The answer to these questions may well reflect upon the complexity of cultural pluralism, as well as the extremity of the frustration it evokes at not being given legitimate recognition.

In pre-Independence India, we do not find instances of the Sikhs opting directly for separate status. Rather, history proves, they were very much a part of the Hindu dominated Indian nationalist struggle. That their nationalist aspirations were entwined with the Hindu-majority state of India can be proved from the fact that they did not support the two nation theory.<sup>10</sup> Sikh leaders opted for the democratic model of governing which India had adopted. The Indian Government was relieved to find that the Sikhs at least did not prove

<sup>10</sup> Zail Singh, "Sikhism's Wide Vision—II," *The Statesman*, Sept. 24, 1981, p. 8.

to be a troublesome community. This feeling may have prompted initial laxity on its part in recognizing the Sikh urge for a separate state on linguistic basis. Thus the 1946 demand for Punjabi Suba was turned down. It was said, the Sikhs were not geographically concentrated in a specific area, and that their numbers were too small for a separate state.<sup>11</sup> However, Punjabi Suba finally came into being before the 1967 elections, when the States Reorganization Commission finally recognized the Sikh demand for Punjabi Suba as being legitimate. But the agitation for Punjabi Suba cannot be called segregationist in character as the SRC sanctioned the claim in view of the fact that the Sikhs were the dominant majority in the Punjab.

So, if Sikh politics for almost two decades after Independence cannot be termed fanatic, then extremism is merely a late post-Independence development.

We may raise the question, what are the legitimate sources of grievances of the Sikhs today? The reasons or causes may be divided into political and religious grievances.

i) *The political grievances*: Even though the Sikhs manifested no overt separatist tendencies in the pre- and immediate post-Independence periods, yet they were not unconscious of their distinct cultural entity. "Hum Hindu nahin hai" (We are not Hindus), the Prime Minister of Nabha State had declared as early as in 1903.<sup>12</sup> More specially in the political sphere, the grant of Punjabi Suba as the legitimate right of the Punjabi-speaking people came much later than the recognition of similar rights for other linguistic minorities. The move was interpreted more as a political tactic to capture Sikh votes before the 1967 elections than as recognition of the legitimate claims of the community.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> O. P. Goyal, "Demand for Khalistan—Seeds for Secession or Pressure Tactics for Better Accommodation," unpublished paper, presented at *The All India Seminar on Indian Federalism*, Department of Political Science, University of Kalyani, 1982.

<sup>12</sup> Quoted by K. R. Malkani, "Demand for Khalistan," *The Statesman*, Sept. 28, 1981, p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> O. P. Goyal, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

However, even after the creation of Punjabi Suba, the Sikhs were not able to establish a distinctive channel for permanent, separate representation of their communal interests. Subsequent events showed the Congress gaining ground, *vis à vis* the Akali Dal, for example the results of the 1971 and 1980 parliamentary elections and consequent State Assembly elections.<sup>14</sup>

This factor was a source of increasing frustration, particularly to the rural Jat Sikhs, where seeds of fundamentalist conservatism are most likely to abound. The tactics of the ruling party to retain its hold over Sikh affairs further abetted fundamentalism. Political manoeuvrings included political slander of the Akali Dal's activities, alleging that the Dal was not a true representative of the Sikhs as "Akalis had been sold to Jana Sanghis."<sup>15</sup> Such provocations not only alleged increasing Hindu influence over Punjab, but also the undermining of the Dal, on which the future aspirations of the community depended.

ii) *The religious grievances*: These are much more serious. The Sikhs fear that with the growth in popularity of such cults as Nirankari Satsang, which attracts Sikhs and non-Sikhs alike, along with manifestation of Hindu extremism itself, there is extreme danger of Sikhism's submersion in Hinduism.<sup>16</sup>

Even if such fears may be interpreted as the psychological nervousness that exists among the religious minorities of India, who fear the possibilities of a Hindu Raj in India, yet governmental influence in Sikh religious affairs is a more genuine cause of fear. K. R. Malkani cites an instance when the President issued an Ordinance early in 1982 waiving the matriculation qualification for President of the Delhi Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. "The object was nothing more—and nothing less—than to install a certain political protégé as President." Governmental interference was also

<sup>14</sup> O. P. Goyal, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> K. R. Malkani, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>16</sup> O. P. Goyal, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

observed in selecting the entire batch of pilgrims to Pakistan. So far, the government has maintained a stolid indifference to the various demands incorporated in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.<sup>17</sup>

The Sikh agitation shows that the perceptions by the Sikhs of their grievances are genuine. It is very naive on the part of the authorities to put aside the agitations as an indication of the Sikhs' desire "to serve the interests of their foreign masters by fomenting trouble in India which they don't consider their homeland."<sup>18</sup> It would be more appropriate to say that there are genuine grievances of the Sikh community which cannot be accommodated at the State level. To seek accommodation at the Central level, extreme postures have been devised also because the idiom of extremism alone creates the necessary effect and provides audience at the level of the Central authority.<sup>19</sup>

#### b) *The Case of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind*

If Sikh extremism was an outgrowth of the late post-Independence era, Muslim extremism can be traced to the period much before Independence. Moreover, Sikh fundamentalism is a tool adopted to awaken the central authorities to the plight of the community: this reveals an attitude that is open for negotiation. But Muslim fundamentalism does not stem from a similar desire to awaken the central authorities to their plight; rather, it stems from a stance which positively allows no accommodation with the non-Muslim community. Moreover, the demand for Khalistan is also sometimes interpreted as an inherent desire for a community "to preserve, perpetuate and to monopolize the affluence that has come into Punjab."<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind's object is the establishment of Deen (Religion), which means the revival of Islamic values and ideals in the life of the people.<sup>21</sup> Hence, one can say the Khalistan demand represents an open system, whereas the other represents a positively closed one.

<sup>17</sup> The demand for Khalistan was voiced in this Resolution. The Resolution also demanded that Amritsar be given a "Holy City Status."

<sup>18</sup> Prabhu Chawla, "Dal Khalsa, Extreme Measures," in *India Today*, May 31, 1982, p. 19.

<sup>19</sup> O. P. Goyal, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>21</sup> Moin Shakir, *Secularization of Muslim Behaviour*, Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1973, p. 8.



How far the Jamaat conforms to an expression of cultural pluralism needs to be explored. In other words, is it possible to pose the same question, or apply the same hypothesis in this case—that the outgrowth of the Jamaat is due to heightened perception of deprivations faced by the Muslim community.

The dawn of Independence found the Muslim community divided into two strands of ideological thought. The liberals, led by such as Dr Latif, Nawab Ismail and others, were for accommodation with the majority community, for peaceful co-existence; hence they denounced communalism. But the separatists and isolationists within the Muslim community remained. In their opinion, it was politically as well as culturally desirable for the Muslims to retain their separate identity.<sup>22</sup> Thus separate electorates for the Muslims were demanded in view of the fact that joint electorates had not worked favourably for the minorities. Such views were justified, because, in a newly independent multiple ethnic society undergoing the process of allocation of privileges, there was every chance of a religious minority being overlooked in the interests of the majority. This situation provoked a section within the Muslim community to propound the thesis of supremacy of canonical law and the development of a theocratic state where Muslims would be able to retain their distinctiveness.

The Jamaat-e-Islami Hind was the product of a revolt against the composite nationalism of the Jamiyyat-ul-Ulama,<sup>23</sup> and the separatist nationalism of the Muslim League, “the former because it seemed to threaten the absorption of Muslims into a predominantly Hindu society and the latter because it was secular and not based upon the religious law and ideology of Islam.”<sup>24</sup>

In the wake of the bitter communal riots of the pre-Independence era, the Jamaat-e-Islami came into being. Its ideology has been described as accepting the “validity of Islamic canonical law as

<sup>22</sup> Moin Shakir, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>23</sup> This was the predecessor of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. It advocated traditional orthodoxy and pan-Islamism, but sided with the Congress in political affairs.

<sup>24</sup> Paul Brass, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

unalterable and immutable for all time to come, and the adoption of the Shari'a rather than a modern constitution as the fundamental law of the state.'<sup>25</sup>

In the post-Independence era, the influence of the Jamaat has increased in direct proportion to the increase in the incidence of communal violence. "Few knew it existed till the first wave of riots in free India between 1961 and 1965."<sup>26</sup> To counter the riots, frantic alternative means were sought. However, it was realized "with great trepidation" that the menace of communalism, "had not died, despite partition and the supreme sacrifice of Mahatma Gandhi."<sup>27</sup> Riots in Jabalpur, Jamshedpur, Rourkela, Moradabad and Calcutta have each in turn bewildered and shocked the Muslims who have been driven out of sheer panic into the closed shell of fundamentalism, in an effort at Muslim consolidation.

In view of these grievances, the Jamaat propagates, it is only within the precincts of religious sovereignty, that is, in a theocratic state, that the Muslim would be safe. No communion whatsoever is possible with non-Muslims.

The grievances of the Muslims are no doubt real. But the perception of deprivation within a culturally pluralist society presupposes use of democratic channels for bargaining in one's favour. In this case, one finds, a non-negotiable, uncompromising attitude, encouraged by the firm belief that only in an Islamic state can their identity be fully safeguarded.

## VII Caste as an Axis of Pluralism

### a) *The Case of the Harijan Conversions*

Caste represents the third factor contributing to cultural pluralism in India. However, we do not observe any concerted movement for change within the entire institution of caste. This is so, because the perception of deprivation has not been felt uniformly in all the

<sup>25</sup> Paul Brass, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

<sup>26</sup> D. R. Goyal, "The Communal Jamaat-e-Islami," *Sunday*, March 1981, p. 18.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

categories of caste. It is in the lowest category within the caste hierarchy that deprivations are most evident and it is in this category that we wish to concentrate our attention.

The Harijans have borne the stigma of "untouchables" throughout history. According to the *varma* classification of caste, they are considered as *avarnas* or outside the pale of caste. Despite deprivations being manifest in the case of the untouchables, yet we do not find instances of any long drawn out concerted effort to wipe out the stigma of untouchability. We presume that the high correlation necessary for "perception of deprivation" to be transformed into a concerted action in the form of a social movement has been absent so far in the case of the Harijans. Not only did the community fail to inspire struggle for change, but the governmental efforts also seemed to fail. Article 17 of the Constitution prohibits the practice of untouchability. Moreover, Justice Havanur's Backward Classes Commission of 1975 was also a notable effort in this direction. Yet there is an immense "gap between the legal abolition of untouchability and the actual state of affairs."<sup>28</sup>

Of late, we observe a massive upsurge within the Harijan community to rid themselves finally of the stigma of caste. The method adopted is not one of the known methods of democratic bargaining (which have failed so far) but mass conversions. We interpret this phenomenon as a concerted effort for change in the form of a social movement, induced by the perception of their present status which has reached an optimum level.

#### b) *Reasons for Conversion*

i) *Impossibility of structural change*: Despite considerable legislation, the Harijan finally has realized that he can never be emotionally accepted as a part of the Hindu mainstream. Even though overtly the caste Hindus resent discriminatory practices on Harijans, yet, "this is a consciously cultivated intellectual attitude which is often in conflict with their urges, reactions and conduct in private life."<sup>29</sup> What is most significant is that "even the intellectually liberal Hindu way of life is insiduously and firmly resistant to

<sup>28</sup> Sachchidananda, *The Harijan Elite*, Haryana: The Thompson Press, 1977, p. 163.

<sup>29</sup> "The Hindu Way of Life," *The Statesman*, Oct. 26, 1981, p. 8.

any structural change in social relationships. The structure shapes unstated personal attitudes and responses.”<sup>30</sup>

ii) *Dr Ambedkar's impossible dream*: Dr Ambedkar, the champion of the Harijans, proposed the creation of a *Dalistan*—an area exclusively for the Harijans. For, so long as the village system provides an easy method of marking out and identifying the untouchables, the untouchable has no escape from untouchability.<sup>31</sup> Since these demands could never be justified, proselytization was preferable to the continuation of the present set-up.

iii) *Psychological appeal of Islam*: It is remarkable that most of the recent conversions of the Harijans have been into the fold of Islam. Buddhism had some appeal, Christianity also, but the mild theology of the former and practice of caste within the latter makes Islam the most favoured religion. Moreover, K. R. Malkani, writing in *The Statesman*, believes that Islam's sturdy egalitarianism, its militancy, and its socio-psychological appeal attracts the members of the deprived community, who have no hope of salvation in their own particular set-up.

Now what has been the attitude of the authorities,<sup>32</sup> at such a large-scale denunciation of the present order of society?

### c) *Attitude of the Authorities*

The incident at Meenakshipuram, a village in Tamil Nadu, on March 19th, 1981, when more than 1000 Harijans embraced Islam has evoked a certain response from the authorities.

i) The initial reaction has been one of *concern*, at the thought that the social balance may tilt positively in favour of a hitherto minority community (the Muslims). It is alleged that the conversions are the result of a widely planned move. The Tamil Nadu Government has told the Parliament Committee on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes that, although conversions had been taking place in the State since 1944, the present mass conversions

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> V. T. Rajshekar Shetty, *Dalit Movement in Karnataka*, Bangalore CISRS, 1978, pp. 12-14.

<sup>32</sup> We use the word authorities to signify both the dispensers of law and order and the leaders of the Hindu religious set-up.

“were very serious” and were “being done in an organised way.”<sup>33</sup> The Committee was also told that the conversions were of “great concern to the State Government” and the latter was “trying to find out what and where things had gone wrong.”<sup>34</sup>

ii) That the authorities have been trying to find a scapegoat is amply clear from their naive assertion that foreign money was responsible for the conversions. “Unaccounted money for political and religious purposes constitutes a threat to the nation, against which the Government should take immediate action.”<sup>35</sup>

iii) A militant reformist stance had been evoked amongst the Hindu traditionalists. Thus, a “Virat Hindu Sammelan” was summoned on October 18th 1981, at the Boat Club in New Delhi, where a pledge was taken to remove untouchability and to treat Harijans on an equal footing.<sup>36</sup>

#### d) *The Effects of the Conversions*

Are the conversions definitely a positive remedy and has it been possible to achieve positive results where even governmental legislation has failed?

i) Reports in the newspapers on the new converts show that the very first problem they are faced with is maladjustment in society. Not only is discrimination shown by the Caste Hindu, the erstwhile tormenters of the Harijans, but their new “fellows in religion” also do not accept them completely. A report mentions, “after the initial euphoria, there was a certain disillusionment already setting in among the new Muslims since they had been given separate places of worship etc.”<sup>37</sup>

ii) The conversions, as a whole, proved to undermine the plausibility of religion. This was particularly so when the conversions were associated with material gain. The case of Gurman Singh,

<sup>33</sup> “Conversions Being Done in an Organized Way,” *The Statesman*, Sept. 21, 1981, p. 9.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> “Pledge to Remove Untouchability,” *The Statesman*, Oct. 19, 1981, p. 1.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> “Conversions Being Done in an Organized Way,” *The Statesman*, Sept. 21, 1981, p. 9

a Mazhabi Sikh, is most illuminating in this respect. Unable to repay a loan of Rs. 4,000 to his Muslim employer, the Sikh embraced Islam. But, with subsequent expression of concern by his community, he "agreed to revert to Sikhism after repaying the loan."<sup>38</sup>

iii) Moreover, despite discrimination faced as a Harijan, the new converts could not forget the privileges they had enjoyed as members of the Scheduled Castes. "The reservations in education and jobs the Constitution has granted to the Scheduled Caste people . . . . has forced many (converts) to register themselves as people of Scheduled Castes."<sup>39</sup>

The above mentioned reasons amply demonstrate that the mass conversions are perhaps only a temporary phenomenon. Neither are they a corrective to the stigma inherent in Hindu society, nor do they awaken within the Government a positive attitude towards constructive legislation. What is needed is not only progressive legislation buttressed by dedicated social work, but also the readiness to "fight the battle from within." "Opting out of the struggle by changing their religion, apart from being a negative and defeatist act, will actually make it more difficult to win the final battle against untouchability."<sup>40</sup>

## VIII Conclusion

We asserted at the beginning of this paper that a concrete struggle for life in the form of a social movement occurs when deprivations reach a certain optimum level. Such struggles are definitely distinguished from the struggle that has been accepted as a part of life itself. In the former vein, we have tried to discuss the case of Khalistan, of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and the mass conversions of the Harijans.

We have also tried to prove that these different overt manifestations of collective behaviour reflect a culturally pluralist society, in other words a society that is not homogeneous. The various categories of demands of the innumerable sub-national groupings at

<sup>38</sup> "Mazhabi Sikh Embraces Islam," *The Statesman*, Aug. 3, 1981, p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> "New Lease of Life for Maharashtra Listed Classes," *The Statesman*, Oct. 19, 1981, p. 9.

<sup>40</sup> Karan Singh, "Challenge to Hinduism—II: Fighting the Battle from Within," *The Statesman*, Sept. 14, 1981, p. 8.

varying levels from each other, in such a society, necessitate individual attention from the authorities. To the extent that such individual attention is accorded, and attempts made for progressive or constructive amelioration of the demands, the sub-national groupings are satisfied. But, if, despite repeated assertions by a sub-national grouping of its deprivations, the necessity for correction of the same is ignored or mere half hearted measures are made for amelioration, anomic behaviour or more appropriately disintegrationist attitudes may result. A perfectly democratic pluralist society presupposes *equal* access to the channels through which democratic bargaining can be made in one's favour, for all the sub-national groupings. Thus, the intermittent voicings for privileges or rights in such pluralist societies merely reflect a facet of democracy.

Finally it can be said, in a newly independent society, which is struggling to allocate resources in an equitable manner to all its sub-national groupings, the feeling always arises among different communities that the central authority is averse to their rights. Pluralism necessitates distinct channels or representation and this can come about only through proportional representation of the various sub-national groupings or communities. Our present method of election, "the first past the post" system of election, does not provide for communal representation and hence heightens the feeling of neglect.

Christians affirm that Jesus lives in and through history, in and through the world today. Since Jesus is true man, it is the life of the people that constitutes the life of Jesus. There is no separate existence for Jesus. Insofar as the life of the people is the life of Jesus, Jesus is the life of the world. The pattern of the concrete struggle for life of Indians as expressed through the present social movements Jesus is the pattern of the life of Jesus of twentieth century India. Jesus' concrete struggle for life in India in the form of a social movement occurs when deprivations reach a certain optimum level. Moreover the different overt manifestations of collective behaviour that reflect a culturally pluralistic society simultaneously reflect a culturally pluralistic Jesus. The intermittent voicings for rights in the cultural pluralism of India reflect a facet of Jesus of the democratic world. To the extent that the demands of the sub-national groupings are recognised as legitimate by the political authority, to the same extent will the stamp of legitimacy be awarded to the national state by Jesus.