The methods that are applied to the study of the New Testament, especially the Gospels, change and develop, and new names have to be found for new procedures. Redaction criticism is the anglicized form of the German word Redaktionsgeschichte as form criticism was of Formgeschichte. The new method grows out of form criticism which tried to study the literary forms of the component units of the Gospels and to discover their history and origins. Redaction criticism looks specifically at the manner in which the Gospel writers used their sources and tries to discover the particular theological (or other) motivations which led each evangelist to use the sources and adopt them as he did.

The discipline is relatively new as far as the English-speaking world is concerned. Books which apply the questions and methods of redaction criticism have appeared in German and now Dr. Perrin of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago has given us an introduction to this discipline. In addition to tracing the history of synoptic criticism to show the place of redaction criticism in it, Dr. Perrin gives a short exercise, or object lesson, in the new discipline, in which he applies it to a Marcan passage, in comparison with its parallels in the other Gospels.

In the last chapter, under the heading, 'The Significance of the Discipline', the author gives us the assumptions that underlie the procedure. Following form criticism, various affirmations are made: that 'redaction' includes composition (p. 66); that the Gospels give us information about the theology of the early church and not about the teaching of the historical Jesus; that the new discipline increases our knowledge of the history of theology (p. 69); that the responsibility of proving the authenticity of any incident or saying in the Gospels rests with those who consider it authentic (p. 70); that the criteria of authenticity are 'dissimilarity', 'multiple attestation' and 'coherence' (p. 71). The writer claims that redaction criticism 'reveals to us how very much the materials ascribed to Jesus who spoke in Galilee or Judea must in fact be ascribed to the Jesus who spoke through a prophet or evangelist in the early church' (p. 73).

The value of the study in recognizing and delineating the theological motivations of the Gospel writers is unquestionable. It enables us to look at Gospels as wholes as form criticism helped us to look at them as a collection of separate units. Dr. Perrin does
recognize that there is some continuity between Jesus of Galilee and Judea and the Christ of the early church (pp. 75 f.), but the emphasis of redaction criticism is certainly on the Christ of the early church. If the affirmations of redaction criticism are to be accepted without further qualifications or conditions, an explanation will have to be provided as to how and why this kind of revelation stopped so early in the history of the church. The emphasis of form criticism and redaction criticism that revelation is to be truly understood only in the context of Christian experience is certainly legitimate. But along with this it is necessary to give a more important place to the real continuity of the experience of the risen Christ in the early church with that of the Jesus of Galilee and Judea as providing a genuine criterion for the insights of the early church. This is affirmed in the last sentences of the book: 'As revealed by redaction criticism the nature of the Gospels and of Gospel material is such that the locus of revelation must be held to be in the present of Christian experience. At the same time that experience must be continuous with the past of the ministry of Jesus, knowledge of which will both condition and inform it.'

The book provides, in a limited space, a very readable introduction to a new and important development in New Testament studies for which all students using English have to be grateful to the author.

Serampore

MATHEW P. JOHN


This 'meditation' of the author is a 'mystical theology' and so the notes that have been set down by him as they were jotted down during seven years of thinking are too terse to be grasped by average readers in all their theological ramifications and labyrinthine meanderings in the field of metaphysics. It will be an excellent discipline for scholars to struggle with this book and assimilate the stimulating thoughts that scintillate in every phrase as it demands concentrated attention for absorption of the pregnant material. Only those who have a good grounding in Roman Catholic and Protestant theology and Indian philosophy, with a fair amount of proficiency in Latin and Sanskrit, can follow the author closely. The following phrases which are not the current golden coin of the average theological vocabulary are enough to scare away the most earnest readers: 'juridical objectivity' (p. 3), 'kairological dialectic' (p. 10), 'cosmo-anthropomorphism' (p. 15), 'icon-experience' (p. 16), 'apophatism' (p. 28), 'complementarity' (p. 31), 'in-stasy of union' (p. 38), 'sclerosis' (p. 43), 'Christic awareness' (p. 52), 'Christophany' (p. 53), 'monodimensional supernaturalism', 'supernatural naturalism' (p. 54), 'monastic

146
acosmism' (p. 54), 'extraontic foundation' (p. 62), 'disincarna-
tion' (p. 63), 'beings being participants in Being' (p. 67), 'theand-
drism' (p. 69), 'asymptotic limit' (p. 72) and 'angelism' (p. 78).

Against this one should rejoice to read many sentences and
whole paragraphs which speak pointedly and suggestively of the
subtleties of 'innemess' and 'withinness' and render the exposi-
tion at once both exciting to follow and interesting to enjoy, as
for example on page 59 wherein he expatiates upon how 'true
unity is trinitarian' and says: 'The self of the Father is the Son, his
in-himself is the Spirit. But the Son has no self: he is the
Thou of the Father; . . . similarly with the Spirit; the Spirit "in-
himself" is a contradiction. There is only the Spirit of God, of
the Father and Son. . . . The Spirit is the communion between
the Father and the Son.'

To add to linguistic, philosophical and theological difficulties
there are Latin and Sanskrit idioms sprinkled all over the book,
desides algebraical expressions of the Trinity as on p. 45 where he
uses a formula of identity as follows: "A" is "B" or "F
is S", what F is, is S. F, qua F, separately, in itself, is not. S is
what F is. To the question: what is F? we must reply: it is S'.

Again he cannot resist the allurements of using grammatical
nomenclature to elucidate his point, as on p. 65 when he says
that man 'is not an I (ego) but a thou (te); that he is
only in so
far as the one I (ego, aham) says to his thou:
"I have called thee
in justice'' (Is. 42: 6) and then goes on to say that these are said
to man never in the nominative but in the vocative, accusative,
dative and ablative cases.

It may be mentioned that while in Section I the author brings
out fully the relationship between Personalism and Bhaktimarga
and Advaita and Jnânamarga, this relationship is not so well
brought out in regard to iconolatry and Karmamarga where, how-
ever, the distinction between idolatry and iconolatry is beautifully
brought out to assert that 'there exists within all idolatry a more
or less latent icon-experience', and therefore both Israel and the
Christian Church were and are 'experienced idolators'.

It may also be said that to call this book The Trinity and
World Religions is a misnomer, for it deals only with Hinduism
throughout and only here and there with Buddhism and Islam.

What Raymond Panikkar aims to do here is to defend the
essential and authentically evangelical truths: 'that Christ is the
Son, . . . the very Being of the Father and that his Spirit is none
other than the Holy Spirit' (p. 53). And he does this in a
dialogic context with special reference to Hinduism and defends
and pleads for universalism through 'theandrism'. His thesis
is that the Christian mystery of Trinity embraces the same mystery
existent in other religious traditions, but differently expressed
(p. 92). He believes that 'the Trinity is the junction where the
authentic spiritual dimension of all religions meet' (p. 42). It
is his belief that 'it is in the trinitarian possibilities of the world
religions; in the striving of each in its own fashion towards the

147
synthesis of these spiritual attitudes, that the meeting of religions ... finds its deepest inspiration and most certain hope' (p. 54).

Raymond Pannikar thinks that a ‘theandric synthesis’ of the karma, bhakti and jñānamārgas, without excluding any one of these, is possible because Trinity is God’s self-revelation of what God has already ‘said’ of himself, and of what man has been able to attain. The last paragraph of the book gives in a nutshell what he means by this ‘theandric’; and the last sentence describes man as a ‘theandric mystery, who has affinity with the theandric Trinitarian Absolute’. Elsewhere, he makes some statements which may sound alarming and verge dangerously on the Advaitic identity of ‘tat tvam asi’. He says: ‘The “vocation” which summoned man into being destined him from the very beginning to be the Son of God, one with the only Son’ (p. 71). ‘The Father calls us with the same “calling” with which he calls his Son. In God there is no multiplicity. There cannot be two “callings” nor two “words” in God. We are, only in so far as we participate in the Logos. Every being is, and is only, a “Christophany”’ (p. 66). ‘Theandism succeeds in avoiding anthropomorphism on the one hand and “theologism” on the other. It seeks to re-establish a non-dualist vision of these two poles of reality ... A purely empirical down-to-earth anthropology demotes man, while an exclusively “revelational” theology destroys God himself. Man and God are neither two nor one’ (p. 72). At another place he says: ‘Dualism and monism are equally false’ (p. 35). ‘If the Father and the Son are not two, they are not one either; the Spirit both unites and distinguishes them’ (p. 61). ‘The “identity” is total and the “alterity” is equally total, infinite and absolute’ (p. 47).

It will be helpful for readers to read Mark Sunder Rao’s Ananyatva and Swami Abhishiktananda’s The Hindu-Christian Meeting Point if they do not wish to be confused by this book. One wonders why on p. 67, when he pairs Father, Son and Holy Spirit with Being, Intellect and Love and relates them to Paul’s ‘over all, through all and in all’, he does not mention sat-chit-ānanda or refer to any of the interpretations that Indian thinkers had suggested on its adaptation to Indian Christian theology outlined in books like Dr. Boyd’s Introduction to Indian Christian Theology.

The last 10 pages need to be elaborated if this book is to lead to any ‘mutual fecundation’ and result in any creative ‘correction and development’. Expressions like ‘Man is a theandric mystery’, ‘Reality itself is theandric’ have to be expounded, and the possibilities of the ‘Theandric Synthesis’ of the three spiritualities in the Christian and the Hindu faiths should be worked out and linked up with the current climate of Hindu-Christian dialogue which needs to get deeper and deeper into the ‘cave of the heart’. It does not suffice to indicate negatively that if the concept of ‘Father’ is pursued to the exclusion of the other two, one would land in ‘nihilism’ (p. 75), and if ‘Son’ is
pursued exclusively, one would land in 'humanism' (p. 76), and if the Holy Spirit is pursued exclusively, one would land in 'angelism' (p. 78).

Nevertheless and in spite of this frighteningly overloaded heaviness, highly specialized technicality and the all-too-brief exposition in recondite idioms which one meets with in the book, it is well worth the effort of those adequately equipped to sit at Pannikar's feet and learn, to spend time with this book to dig out, discern and enter the startlingly original vistas of dialogue that it throws open in India. Only a flashing genius like Panikkar could think and analyse like this and only an astute logician like him could pursue these rare insights into such penetrating depths and only a linguistic artist like him could clothe them in such variegated expressions to suit the profundity and the subtlety.

Nagpur A. C. Dharma Raj


The theological problem that is central today is the reality of God. Since our claim is to apprehend God by faith nothing is more fundamental than the nature of faith. Yet during this century, in the Protestant camp, there have been enormous differences of opinion just at this point. I think we are all agreed nowadays on the importance of commitment and trust, although there may be questions about how they are to be understood and about their relation to the cognitive element. But it is over this cognitive element that there is dispute and confusion. At heart is it an intuition? If it is, there are very different accounts of just what the intuition is. Or, perhaps, is it a religious interpretation of events in the world? Or, again, is this cognitive element basically inferential? One way, although only a preliminary one, of tackling such questions is to examine the origins of our way of thinking in men earlier up the line.

Both Catholic and Protestant ideas of faith run back to the Middle Ages. Protestants draw especially on Peter Lombard's descriptive analysis of faith as notitia, assensus and fiducia—cognition, assent and trust. Of course different elements received different emphasis at different times. But the analysis held throughout the period of Protestant orthodoxy. Catholic ideas are based on Aquinas' thorough treatment of the subject. Fr. Mohler's book is a study of Aquinas' doctrine of faith. I therefore welcome it as a contribution of importance to our present concerns in theology. In each of the main chapters the origins of Aquinas' views are set out before expounding his own teaching. Both patristic and medieval predecessors are examined and also Aquinas' use of Aristotle's logic and metaphysics. Yet Fr. Mohler has managed to keep the book quite brief; I do not think there is an irrelevant sentence in it.
The basic structure of Aquinas' teaching on faith can be simply stated. Following Augustine he describes faith as thinking with assent. Each side of the statement needs some explanation.

Faith is firstly thinking. It is quite specifically a rational activity. Faith is discursive thought deliberately and actively seeking the perfection of vision. But vision is possible only hereafter. And so there is in faith a restlessness and dissatisfaction which comes from its inability fully to grasp its object. Aquinas keeps the divine object central in his doctrine. It is the object to which faith is directed that specifies faith as faith and distinguishes it from other activities of the intellect. Faith is a kind of knowledge because the intellect is directed in faith to a knowable object. But it is not like the knowledge that comes from sense perception because the object is unseen. And it is not like the knowledge that comes by inference from first principle which is demonstrative.

Faith, although a single act, is related in three ways to its object. Two of them have to do with the intellect. It is, first of all, believing God. Faith is directed to God who reveals his truths to men. This is the reason for believing them. But the principal object of belief is God himself. Secondly, faith believes what is revealed. God reveals certain unseen truths and man believes them because they come from God and lead to God. The truths he reveals are about himself and other realities related to him. Aquinas deals here with what has become an issue in contemporary thought. He observes that things are a matter of faith only when they refer to God. The passion, for instance, is not an object of faith except in so far as it took place through the activity of God. Thirdly, faith is believing in God. It is here that other aspects of the personality are brought in. It takes us to the second side of Aquinas' basic statement on faith, namely assent.

It is on assent that Aquinas places the main emphasis. Reason has to be convinced of the truth of what it accepts. But it is convinced not by the matter itself which is presented for belief but by the divine authority which presents it. Because the objects of faith are unseen, reason is inadequate to apprehend them by its own power. So faith is basically the submission of the reason at the command of the will. The fundamental assent is to God who reveals his truths to men. Just as a pupil submits to the authority of his teacher to gain knowledge which he cannot yet see for himself, so we have to submit to the authority of God who reveals his truths.

What is it that makes the will command the reason to assent? Aquinas describes a number of factors. One is reason itself. Relatively few of the things of faith can be rationally demonstrated, although some can. Therefore faith goes beyond reason in its knowledge. But reason can support faith by rational preambles, especially in demonstrating the existence of God.
We have been thinking of faith as purely a human activity. But this is not Aquinas' doctrine. It is that God not only acts externally, inviting a man through the preaching of the gospel, but also acts internally, illuminating the mind and inclining the will. The assent of faith is therefore in part the work of God who moves us inwardly by his grace. Without this it is hard to understand, Aquinas thinks, why some believe, while some who see the same miracle, or hear the same prophecy, do not.

One of the important influences on Aquinas' doctrine of faith is the definition given in Hebrews 11:1. One clause describes faith as the assurance of things hoped for. This is taken to be eternal life promised in the gospel. It is the divine end of the human life which begins here and continues hereafter. A man has an interest in his own fulfilment and therefore there is in the will a certain appetite for it. This reaching out for the promised good is therefore another factor influencing the will.

In addition to this interested striving for its own good there is a disinterested striving. Love also has an appetite for the divine Good. And so love is able to perfect the basic tendency of the will which is directed to the same divine Good. For love seeks the divine for its own sake and so corrects the impulse of the will. It makes us will as we ought. Every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, Aquinas says, quoting Augustine. And so faith, when perfected by love, is a virtue. It is in the treatise on the theological virtues that Aquinas deals with faith in the *summa*.

Faith has one more characteristic: it is certain. This certainty comes in part from the authority of God who reveals his truths. In part it is supplied by the subject. For the will seeking its own good and led on by love and grace makes an act of choice. It is this decision which provides the firmness with which the intellect assents.

Fr. Mohler does not suggest that Aquinas has said the last word on faith. But he does think that he has laid a secure foundation. He is well aware that Aquinas has been criticized for not making faith sufficiently personal and he partly accepts the criticism. He allows that his teaching is not fully personal in the modern sense and that this aspect may need development. It is quite compatible with it. On the divine side Aquinas certainly teaches that it is the person and not the words that is the chief end of belief. And on the human side, even for Aquinas, it is the whole man who believes. Faith is the contact of the whole man with God even though the analysis is done in terms of intellect and will.

How does all this look to a Protestant? To begin with, there are some very salutary aspects to Aquinas' teaching. Firstly, like Barth, Aquinas maintains that faith is directed to an object. Of course the word object needs care. But even for those who stand in the Augustinian tradition the divine is an object in the epistemological sense, having a relative independence
of the divine, we to that extent stand over against it, so the divine is to us a Thou and an object to be known. No doubt we have to make two statements in this connection. One is primarily epistemological: it reckons with the subject and object structure of the knowledge situation. The other is ontological and corrects, although it does not abrogate, the first. Aquinas did not, of course, think of God as an object in the same sense that finite things, including persons, are objects. We are not, however, concerned with his doctrine of God. But we must add with Aquinas that God is also ontologically objective. A good deal of recent Protestant writing, in lamentable contrast with Aquinas’, is far from clear at this point. If God is real, and even Bultmann maintains this, it means that he is known to exist, using the word in the ordinary sense; he has objective being. He is not only an epistemological object but is also ontologically objective.

Secondly and connected with the foregoing, is Aquinas’ teaching that faith is a rational activity. Of course he held that the will had to move the intellect to assent. But it was the intellect that grasps the divine. Now Aquinas’ doctrine of faith was dependent on his view of man as essentially a knowing subject and whose end was one of intellectual contemplation; he was bound to think of faith as primarily rational. But this genetic point has little bearing on the question of the truth or falsity of his assertion. Now I am not suggesting that Aquinas’ account of the place of reason in faith is satisfactory. Nor am I suggesting that our relationship with God is primarily one of knowledge in the restricted sense of the word in which Aquinas, together with almost the whole Western world, has generally used it. Knowledge of God is knowledge in the Hebrew sense of intimacy. It is not a detached intellectual apprehension but is a relationship in which the whole being of a man is involved. And it shows its reality in action in every department of life. Nevertheless, when full justice is done to the wider sense of the knowledge of God, it remains the case that this knowledge does have a certain intellectual content; knowing God involves some knowledge about God. Faith is not in contrast to reason; faith, in one aspect, is reason. It is reason directed to the divine. That faith has other aspects does not invalidate this point.

Thirdly, again in continuation, it is the discursive intellect to which faith belongs. Faith is not an intuition which you get or do not get, and if you do not get there is nothing to do but wait for the light to dawn. No, it is active reason which is ready to take the help of rational preambles to reach its object. For faith in its cognitive aspect is belief. It is comparable with other acts of belief, save for its divine object.

If Aquinas is right on these points, as I think he is, then a number of alternative suggestions can be ruled out and the nature of faith is greatly clarified. For although the points are simple they are basic. Yet even with regard to the cognitive element in faith criticisms have to be made about other aspects of his doctrine.
Aquinas’ teaching on the functioning of reason in faith is authoritarian. Perhaps one should not be too hasty in condemning him here. This is the thinking of much of the modern world on basic issues. The basic political orientation and therefore the basic political decisions for the greater part of the world, democratic as well as communist, are of this nature. There is a commitment of the mind to authoritarian teaching at the behest of the will. And the will is influenced by a number of factors in the kind of way that Aquinas described. Justification is provided afterwards as rationalization. But what Aquinas was aiming at was truth. And in discriminating between truth and falsity the will cannot have the major part. It has this if reason has to assent to authority.

Aquinas, of course, has an answer but it is in the answer that his main weakness lies. His answer would be that in divine matters reason has no other option and that God's revelation is necessarily authoritative. But this raises the question of what revelation exactly is. A radically different understanding of revelation entails a radically different understanding of faith. The nature of revelation has been discussed since the beginning of the nineteenth century and at no time more than during the last 40 years or so. It is astonishing that Fr. Mohler does not raise the question, for it is the Achilles' heel of Aquinas' whole doctrine of faith and therefore of the major part of his religious epistemology. Aquinas taught that faith was more than assent to propositions; it was primarily assent to God revealing. But this involves assent to propositions as the content of what is revealed. If it is not truth that God reveals then the cognitive aspect of faith is something different from what Aquinas took it to be. Belief on authority has to be replaced by belief on evidence. Evidence may be incomplete and a decision may be needed about it. But the decision is made on the evidence that there is. This was not Aquinas' position. As mentioned earlier, reason was to be convinced not by the matter itself but by the divine authority which stood behind it.

The second element in the traditional analysis of faith is assent. It was thought of by Aquinas chiefly as the assent of the intellect to authoritatively revealed truths. And he described a number of factors which influenced the will in commanding the intellect to assent. So he recognized that much more was involved than the intellect in the decision to believe, for the will may be regarded as the centre of the personality. These considerations hold good even if the assent is a decision to attend to and accept the evidence set forth in preaching. The issue is one of truths but it is also one of right. And the man listening to the gospel is aware that it promises or threatens to affect his whole life. Therefore other aspects of the personality are necessarily brought in to the decision to believe. It cannot be an act of the detached intellect. Where one has to differ from Aquinas is this: his teaching was that although other aspects of the personality are involved
in making the decision, the act of faith is essentially an act of the intellect in belief. He did not think of it as essentially a commitment of the whole person for life. He was too much influenced by the contemplative attitude to life taken over from the Greeks to do so. Therefore his teaching on assent needs to be expanded into one of commitment of the entire person for the whole of life.

On the third aspect of faith in the traditional analysis Aquinas is disappointing. Reliance, one translation of fiducia, is the second word in Fr. Mohler’s book. After that we hear of it no more, nor of trust either. Fr. Mohler is simply reflecting Aquinas’ position. This does not mean that Aquinas thinks of our relationship with God purely in terms of intellectual apprehension. He speaks of our love of God and describes this love as a kind of friendship with God. And he says that this friendship is founded on communion. But he does not enquire into the part that trust, as a distinctive element going beyond commitment, has to play in our communion with God. We miss a description of that element in faith which, to use Luther’s phrase, ‘throws itself upon God whether in life or in death’.

Fr. Mohler thinks that Aquinas’ account of faith will form the starting-point for a present-day doctrine. It may be so. But considerably greater changes will be needed than he seems to think necessary. But Fr. Mohler deserves our gratitude for his careful and interesting exposition of what is for the whole Church a primary treatment of a primary doctrine.

*Serampore College*  
W. S. RHODES


This book narrates the absorbing story of the Cowley Fathers’ work in India, which began in 1874 and ended in 1967. It is good to have a record of their work and experience, when memories are fresh, for the Society of St. John the Evangelist was in India sufficiently long, about 93 years, to make a contribution to the life of the Church in India. When we talk of the Cowley Fathers, we remember them primarily not as a missionary society, but as members of a religious community and, for that matter, of the first religious community for men to be successfully established in the Anglican Church after the suppression of Religious Orders in the sixteenth century. It is interesting to note that as early as in 1859, even before the founding of the S.S.J.E. in Cowley in 1866, Father Benson had designs for establishing what he called a Collegiate Association in India. Although the Collegiate Association never came into being, his great interest in India spurred him on to send members of his community to India in 1874, within eight years of its foundation in England.
The Cowley Fathers' work in India was mainly centred upon Bombay and Poona in the diocese of Bombay, and they established themselves very firmly in these two cities. The book describes in detail the various works they undertook at these two centres. In the field of education, in running hostels for boys and in parish work, especially in the training of young Indian priests, they have made a great contribution to the Church in the Bombay diocese. They have done much to popularize Retreats and Quiet Days in the Indian Church. In the art of counselling they were past masters, and many could testify to the help received from them. But above all by their life of discipline and devotion they made a tremendous impression on the clergy and people alike. Most people who have had any contact with them would endorse what the late Archdeacon Ashley-Brown has written: 'Their lives of discipline and devotion lift high the standard of the priestly and pastoral life among us. The steel in the moral fibre of their lives undergirds our own. They set the step for their brethren in the ministry.'

It is difficult to assess to what extent the influence of the Cowley Fathers and some of the other Brotherhoods was responsible for the bringing into being of several Indian Christian Ashrams during the last 50 years. Even if there was not much direct influence, I think it is true to say that it was the revival of the religious communities in the Anglican Church, their extension to India and the resulting impact on the Church in India, which set in motion the Christian Ashram Movement of the twenties of this century.

It is often said that the Anglican efforts to extend religious life in India have not met with much success. In some ways this criticism is true. During the period of 93 years of its existence in India, the S.S.J.E. had only two Indian members, and one of them was never actually professed. When at the same time one sees that the Roman Catholics have had no lack of vocations in India, one is tempted to think of the extent of the loss sustained by the Church by the absence of the tradition of religious life for well over 300 years. Thus the author's concluding remarks are: 'the immediate present is a task of thankful waiting.'

There is a chapter entitled 'discoveries', in which the author recalls some of his personal experiences in India, which provide very interesting reading and contain much valuable insight. I was specially attracted by the story of a drowning dog (on p. 110) caught in a torrential current in a flooded river in Poona. The dog was struggling hard to swim against the current, and all the time getting weaker. There was nothing the onlookers could do to save the dog. Then a boy (the dog's master) from the far bank started to whistle. The dog paused in his struggle, then ignored it. The boy whistled again. Once more the dog paused and seemed to think. He then deliberately surrendered to the current. He was at once swept away helplessly into the deepest part of the river. It was then the onlookers began to realize the boy's wisdom.
He was calling from a point on the bank to which the current was moving, and as the dog was swept along, he was being taken without further effort of his own to safety. The author comments: 'Heroic struggle was not enough. In fact until the dog obediently surrendered to what seemed death, he could not be saved.' He might have added that this story might well be taken as a parable of what happened to the S.S.J.E. in India.

Pollution and the Death of Man: A Christian View of Ecology:

Ecology is a subject that started receiving attention in the West a few years ago, and we have therefore as usual started doing a little thinking about it in India now. So far as I can see, this subject is a must for us as we go full speed ahead into development and technology. Dr. Schaeffer not only points out that ecology is a Christian's proper concern, but also offers concrete solutions to help us think through what we must do if we are to combat the horrors that seem imminent all over the world because of technology, and to heal the considerable damage that has already been done in our own country. In this, his fourth outstanding book, Dr. Schaeffer sets out to present a Christian viewpoint in the context of this current preoccupation with ecology.

The first chapter, 'What have they done to our fair sister?', portrays the ecological crisis whose possibly most graphic statement is found on a tablet by the seaside in California which reads:

The oceans born (gives hypothetical date);
The oceans dead—A.D. 1979;
The Lord gave; man hath taken away;
Cursed be the name of man.

Dr. Schaeffer also crosses swords with some eminent thinkers who in his view typify the modern outlook on this subject: Lynn White, Jr., and R. L. Means, whose articles ('The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis', Science, 10 March 1967; and 'Why Worry About Nature?', The Saturday Review, 2 December 1967, respectively) Dr. Schaeffer appends to the book. The first article lays the blame for the ecological crisis on Christianity, and the second article goes on from there to suggest pantheism as the answer.

Dr. Schaeffer exposes the inadequacy of any pantheistic answer in chapter two, 'Pantheism: Man is no more than the Grass', while in the next chapter, 'Other Inadequate Answers', he admits the inadequacy of certain forms of Christianity to answer these questions (among these forms being Byzantine Christianity and a Christianity that is concerned solely with the saving of souls): 'In such a Christianity there is a strong tendency to see
nothing in nature beyond its use as one of the classic proofs of God's existence. "Look at nature", we are told, "Look at the Alps. God must have made them." And that is the end. Nature has become merely an academic proof of the existence of the Creator, with little value in itself' (p. 40).

In his fourth, fifth and sixth chapters, Dr. Schaeffer goes on to demonstrate how a truly Biblical Christianity does adequately answer these questions. He does not, in these chapters, concern himself with the huge technological problems of, e.g. the pollution of our oceans and atmosphere, but confines his attention to the physical ugliness caused in daily life by technological expansion. He deals with the problem, therefore, at a level where it affects all of us as lay people so far as this subject is concerned. (I might mention here that the book is written in fairly simple English, is free of technical jargon, and has only one diagram and an easily comprehensible one at that.)

Dr. Schaeffer points out that the major reason for such problems is haste and greed. 'Here is a village up in the mountains somewhere ... The people have managed well for a thousand years without electricity. Now suddenly "civilization" comes ... This can be done in one of two ways. They can have their electricity in about two months: just chop off everything, tear the forest in pieces, run big, heavy wires over the whole thing and create ugliness out of what was beautiful. Or they can wait a couple of years for their electricity: we can handle the cables and the forests with more care, hiding what we need to hide and considering the integrity of the environment, and end up with something infinitely more preferable: they have their electricity and the village has its beauty ... the only cost is to add two years to the thousand that they have already been without electricity. There would be some economic factors here, but the largest one is of sheer haste' (p. 84). He goes on to urge us to 'refuse men the right to ravish our land as we refuse them the right to ravish our women' (p. 86).

This emphasis may not seem particularly welcome to some, especially in view of the present economic conditions in India, but this would seem to me to be precisely the moment where the choice before us is either barrenly to imitate the aesthetically dull and existentially dangerous Western technology, or to learn from its mistakes and build more wisely even if at the cost of a little more time and money. Dr. Schaeffer emphasizes the need for not merely academic exercise and understanding of problems, but for a demonstration in life of what should be done. He urges Christians, 'individually and corporately', to act as 'pilot projects' pioneering the way.

He comes down very heavily on the churches for failing to exercise their prophetic role in this yet another crucial area (which has not been touched by any other modern theologian). 'What have we done to heal sociological problems?', he asks; for example, 'Often our churches are a scandal. They are cruel not
only to the man "outside" but also to the man "inside" (p. 69). And he reminds us that "Christians . . . should consciously in practice be a healing factor . . . in the separation of man from God, of man from himself, of man from man and of man from nature" (p. 83).

Dr. Schaeffer brings to the subject his penetrating intellect and breadth of reading combined with a most careful scriptural exegesis. As is usual with him, he takes in all areas of thought and knowledge for this province, illustrating his points with examples from fields as diverse as painting, pop music and art movies. Quotations range from Simone Weil and Harvey Cox to Edmund Leach (the Cambridge anthropologist), Arthur Koestler, Huxley, Camus, Sartre and Francis Bacon. This book is very clearly meant for the intelligent and 'aware' twentieth-century person.

Even though this book is second in readability only to his Death in the City, one problem that arises is that at places one finds oneself wondering what precisely Dr. Schaeffer is talking about—if one has not read at least his basic thesis in The God Who Is There. His book on ecology is really an outworking and application of that basic thesis. (A similar exercise in another area is promised us in his next book, Hidden Art.)

Another problem, paradoxically, is that many of Dr. Schaeffer's points seem to be overemphasized. This may be due to the fact that he is concerned with pointing out things which are perhaps not very clear to the West today, but are clear enough to us in India.

Dr. Schaeffer's strength lies in his balance and saneness. He has a good sense of proportion and an ability to be succinct and to go straight to the point. I only wish the book were longer, and Dr. Schaeffer's points argued in much more detail. The lack in this area often makes one feel that he is sketchy.

As I have said elsewhere, I am willing to stick my neck out far enough to say that he is the most exciting contemporary writer I have come across. His books have all been published in the last eighteen months and we have just started getting them in India. I predict that his books will have a wide audience and vast influence. It is difficult to disagree with him; and it will certainly be impossible to ignore him.

St. Stephen's College
Delhi

PRABHU GUPTA RA