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ABOUT THIS JOURNAL

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FAITH AND THOUGHT

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Christian Revelation and modern research.*

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EDITORIAL

Congratulations to Dr. R. J. C. Harris, one time chairman of the Council and now a Vice-President, on his appointment as Director of the Microbiological Research Establishment at Porton. In view of the controversies that have always been associated with the work at Porton, it would be difficult to imagine a more difficult or responsible post. He is assured of our prayers.

The Society's stock of past journals, especially the older ones, is limited. Fellows, Members and Associates may however order a Xerox copy of any paper particularly desired at a cost not exceeding 5p per exposure covering two pages. If desired payment may be made when the annual subscription falls due. Apply to the Editor. The Society would be particularly grateful if any readers have one or more of the following to spare: they are required to complete a set required by Regent College, Vancouver. Vols. 1,3,4,5,79 and Vol. 90, No.2. Please state payment required and communicate with the Assistant Secretary.

With the publication of this issue Mr David Ellis, who has ably Edited the Journal for a dozen years, leaves us and the new Editor takes over. Mr Ellis has worked under increasing domestic difficulties and the Society is deeply grateful to him for his past labours.

To make the Journal wider in its appeal we intend in future to make some alterations. The **REVIEW** section will be enlarged, particular attention being given to books which, because of expense or inaccessibility, might easily be overlooked by Christians. The Journal will contain, as heretofore, the Lectures given to the Institute, but a new feature, '**IN THE NEWS**' will appear. In this we hope, with as wide a coverage as possible, to include resumé's of interesting new developments, preference being again given to matters which do not usually receive attention in religious journals. In due course it is hoped to provide adequate indexes so that reference may be facilitated.

Since the Victoria Institute exists, *inter alia* for discussion, it is hoped that readers will feel free to contribute comments on papers and other matters published in the Journal. Inevitably some of the papers are controversial: the Society is desirous that all reasonable points of view shall be fairly presented.

Delays in the publication of **FAITH AND THOUGHT** are much regretted. It is now hoped that within a year or two leeway will be made up and regular publication resumed.

SCHOFIELD PRIZE

Each year the Council of the Victoria Institute offers a prize or prizes from an endowment fund for an original essay. A Schofield Prize to the value of forty pounds is offered in 1971, the subject set being *Man the Unknown*. Entries, not to exceed 7000 words, should be sent to the Editor by 31 December, 1971. Each essay should be typewritten in double line spacing, and undersigned with a motto only which should be repeated in a sealed envelope containing the writer's name and address. The judges are empowered to award a second prize of ten pounds if they see fit.

Competitors are free to develop the theme as they please. The idea in the mind of the Council in setting the subject was that the essay should deal with some of the unanswered questions about the personality of man.

SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATION

The Victoria Institute *Symposium on Education* was held in the Gustave Tuck Theatre, University College, London, on 6 February 1971, Mr John Hansford being in the chair. Papers were given by Professor P. H. Hirst of King's College, London (who is shortly transferring to the Department of Education, Cambridge); Mr C. T. Crellin, M.Ed., Head of the Education Department at Trent College of Education, Cockfosters, London; Professor F. H. Hilliard, Chairman of the School of Education University of Birmingham, and Mr Peter E. Cousins. The first two papers appear in this issue and the other two will follow shortly.

IN THE NEWS

Route of the Exodus – Time – Inside or Out? – Speaking in Tongues – Philosophy and Ball Lightning – Crucifixion – Was Methuselah dull witted? – RERU – Is Weak Radiation Beneficial? – Radiocarbon Dating – C.14, Creation and the Flood.

ROUTE OF THE EXODUS

The route taken by the people of Israel at the time of the Exodus is a topic which has been discussed on several occasions in this Journal (E. H. Naville, 1893, **26**, 12; G. B. Mitchell with map, 1935, **67**, 231 C. C. Robertson, with map, 1936, **68**, 124).

The *Times* (15 June 1971) summarises a recent Hebrew study by Dr. Menashe Har-El of the Hebrew University Jerusalem, who has studied the matter intensively over recent years.

On the basis of Ex. 14: 21, 24-26, Dr. Har-El argues that since the crossing of the Red Sea or Sea of Reeds was

accomplished in a single night, the sea must have been narrow. The crossing might then have taken place at the junction between the Great Bitter Lake and the Small Bitter Lake, where the water was normally shallow and less than two miles wide. The strong South East wind mentioned in the Bible would then have made a passage of dry land so that the deeper waters on both sides made a wall or protection for the people to north and south (Ex. 14;21).

Of the 13 or so sites suggested for Mount Sinai Dr. Har-El chooses a mountain (possibly Jabal Sinn Bishr) half way up on the West coast of the Sinai Peninsular. He argues that it could not have been in the south which is too inhospitable for a great host to have lived in the vicinity for a year, nor in the north where water is plentiful in contrast to the biblical statement that it was scarce.

We look forward to the English translation which is planned.

TIME

The whole of one issue (No.6) and parts of others (7,11) of the well-known journal *Studium Generale* (1970, 23) are devoted to papers on the subject of *Time*; a number of them were presented at the conference for the Study of Time held in W. Germany in 1969.

Much of the material will be of interest to readers of F. and T. Here are a few notes.

G. J. Whitrow (p 498) draws attention to Lewis Mumford's view that the mass production of clocks and watches in the nineteenth century led to an enormously increased objectivization of time in every-day thinking: 'One ate, not upon feeling hungry, but when prompted by the clock: one slept not when one was tired but when the clock sanctioned it'. This must certainly have had repercussions on the religion of the ordinary man. Even prayer had to be ruled by the clock!

Another paper discusses the influence of the technological revolution on man's attitude to the past. Prior to the scientific revolution man had been backward looking; paradise and the golden age lay in the past. Baconian science brought with it the proud conviction that the past was out of date. Henry Power

(*Experimental Philosophy*, 1664, p 191) in addressing the natural Philosophers of the Royal Society, says, You!... who removing all former rubbish ... do make way for the Springy Intellect .. to unriddle all Nature; methinks, you have all done more than men already and may be well placed in a rank specifically different from the rest of grovelling Humanity” (quoted, p 507).

This was not, of course, the attitude of Bacon himself or the great scientists like Boyle and Newton, but it apparently was and it certainly still is the attitude of hangers-on. Knowledge discovered in the past, even the recent past, is despised 'till all is lumped together not so much with 'Nineveh and Tyre' but with 'Tennyson and Tyre'. The Christian story is doubted, not because it is irrational but because it is old.

INSIDE OR OUT?

In Science, when we observe a phenomenon, we ask if its cause lies within the body itself or whether it results from outside action. (Is the cause of the organisation of the dots of light which make up the t.v. picture to be traced to a source wholly *within* the set, or does an *outside* 'force' produce the result?). The rule we apply is based on an entropy criterion. If the element of disorder stays the same or increases in quantity we say that the cause lies or at least may lie within the system; if it diminishes then the cause lies outside.

In very simple instances entropy which is measurable provides the answer. (A refrigerator separates room air into cold and hot air; therefore it needs an external power supply). It has long been realised, however, that the underlying principle is much wider and attempts have been made (more especially in recent years by L. L. Whyte who gives his further thoughts in one of the *Studium Generale* papers – 'Principle of the One-Way Process', p 525f) to discover an objective measure wider than but inclusive of entropy. A possible cue was given many years ago by Pierre Curie who postulated the Universal law that symmetry increases. (Eg. a drop of water oscillates with loss of energy till it assumes a spherical form, the form of highest symmetry). Renaud sought to improve on this by

measuring symmetry in terms of 'the number of transformations with respect to which' a system is invariant. Little further progress has been made but all agree 'that the class of processes which can be isolated for causal representation, not requiring the inference of external causes, is wider than the class of energetically controlled systems' (Whyte). In other words, you must look beyond entropy to a similar but all-pervading wider Law.

An apparently easy problem which ought to be capable of solution with the aid of such a law concerns biological 'clocks'. The behaviour of organisms is roughly in synchronism with nature (i.e. with day and night; the seasons; the phases of the moon etc). Does the clock-like behaviour of an organism depend on external nature or has it a clock within itself independent of natural rhythms? If the latter how does it work?

Since we cannot yet apply the Law the question generates fierce debate! Those interested will find the opposing parties (represented by J. Woodland Hastings and J. D. Palmer) in strong disagreement in a recent well-illustrated paper-back (*The Biological Clock: Two Views*, Ed. F. A. Brown, Academic Press, 1970). The experiments described (many of them on the rhythmic luminosity of plankton) are fascinating. An outsider can only wonder on the one hand if the immense complexity which internal clocks must involve can possibly be enshrined and encoded in the small mass of matter available or, on the other hand, whether fantastically sensitive and necessarily complex receiver-mechanisms can be similarly enshrined. Methodologically we must be materialists... but... and it is a big but...

Meanwhile every success to L. L. Whyte whose writings (by the way) deserve to be better known. If the LAW can be formulated it will, by clarifying thought, make the captious dismissal of the cosmological argument for God seem a lot less reasonable exercise in intellectual gymnastics than ever before!

SPEAKING IN TONGUES

In a recent issue of *Christianity Today* (1971, 15, 862; 4 June) D. E. Kucharsky gives a preliminary report of the results of a

research project on glossolalia. The investigation was started in 1965 at the Lutheran Medical Centre, Brooklyn, N.Y., under the direction of Drs. J.P. Kildahl and P.A. Qualben both of whom are psychiatrists as well as being Lutheran ministers. The report is later to appear in book form.

Psychological tests on 26 people who speak in tongues and 13 who do not were made and compared. All the subjects belonged to the main line Protestant congregations, not including Pentecostal churches.

Those who speak in tongues are described as being 'more submissive, suggestible, and dependent in the presence of authority figures' than others. The feeling of euphoria they experience was found not to be the result of speaking in tongues but of 'submission to the authority of the leader'.

The help of William Samarin, a linguist, was enlisted. He reported that 'the leader was important not only in inducement of the experience but also in the way in which it was carried out'. In churches which Samarin had visited, he found that groups of glossolalists imitated the style of speech of the leader.

Interviews were arranged with people who had formerly spoken in tongues but had now ceased to do so: the reason in all cases was that they had fallen out with the 'authority figure who had introduced them to glossolalia'.

The researchers found that speaking in tongues was in all cases linked with the ability to make individuality subservient to another person: in short the same requirement as is necessary for hypnosis.

Those who thought they possessed the power to interpret tongues were unable to agree on the nature of the message which they ostensibly interpreted. One person said that a tongues speaker, whose diction was recorded on tape, was praying for the health of his children; another that he was thanking God for a recent fund raising effort by the church.

There was no noticeable difference between the mental health of those who spoke with tongues and those who did not. The researchers however, 'noted the lack of modesty that was often present in the people who practiced glossolalia'.

PHILOSOPHY AND BALL LIGHTNING

Ball lightning has been much in the news in late years, many new observations of the phenomenon having been recorded. Once again an attempt has been made to explain it away (E. Argyle, *Nature*, 1971, 230, 79). There is a neat epitome of the philosophy involved in a recent issue of *Nature*. (Paul Davies, 'Ball Lightning or Spots before the Eyes?' 1971, 230, 576).

In science, says Davies, we encounter phenomena of two kinds which may be loosely called 'laboratory' and 'natural'. The first can be experimented upon, observed at will and predicted; the second (e.g. ball lightning, novae, meteorites etc) are unreproducible and it is sheer chance if the observer has recording instruments in the right place at the right time. The philosophy of the sceptic is that, if a natural phenomenon is hard to explain, the correct procedure is, (1) to deny that it has physical reality, (2) to invent a physiological or psychological explanation and, (3) to ignore any physical evidence in support of the phenomenon. (Thus, in the case of ball lightning, there is the well-known water barrel observation in which water was found to be hot after a ball had disappeared in its vicinity, thus making an estimate of the energy dissipated possible. *Journal of the Institute of Electrical Engineers*, 1937, 81, 1). The increasing sign of dissatisfaction with this procedure in the scientific world is most welcome. Scepticism concerning rare natural events and disbelief in the Christian record go hand in hand.

This is perhaps an appropriate point to draw attention to an exceptionally interesting and fairly recent book on ball lightning: C. M. Cade and D. Davis, *The Taming of the Thunderbolts*, (Abelard-Schumam), 1969.

CRUCIFIXION

Israeli archaeologists have discovered the skeleton of a young man in his twenties crucified near Jerusalem at around the time of our Lord. It appears that this is the only direct evidence of this cruel form of capital punishment that has come to light. The man had been nailed to a cross with nails

not through the palms of his hands but through his forearms. Lower down a small seat block was fastened to the cross and just under this the two legs were slung together sideways, a single 7-inch nail penetrating both feet just below the heels. It is thought that the crucified person must have remained quite close to the ground making conversation possible.

The rarity of these finds is explained by the magic properties attributed to nails used in crucifixion. They were collected eagerly in the belief that they could cure disease. Ancient writings show that the Romans used several postures in crucifixion. Except for representations in art dating from later times, which can hardly be considered evidential, there is no evidence to show in what precise way our Lord was crucified; the new find, however, creates a suspicion that the traditional posture may be wrong. (N. Haas, *Journal of Israel Exploration Society*, Jan. 1971)

WAS METHUSELAH DULL WITTED?

From time to time results of experiments are recorded which appear to have some relevance to philosophy – philosophy, that is, in the time-honoured meaning of the word which was in the minds of the founders of the Victoria Institute or Philosophical Society of Great Britain, when they founded our society.

A recent finding concerns memory. Earlier work seemed to indicate that with age we lose neurones in our brain at the rate of perhaps several thousand a day. Not much fun in prolonging life indefinitely if by the time we are very old we are no longer able to think!

Several studies supported this view, none of them very impressively. Recently a new attempt was made to put the hypothesis on a sound footing (B. W. Konigsmark and E. A. Murphy of John Hopkins University, *Nature*, 1970, 228. 1336). A particular area of the mid brain (the ventral cochlear nucleus) was chosen and the neurones in it, about 60,000, carefully counted. The brains used were obtained from autopsies in Baltimore, USA and in Madras, India, while the ages of the subjects, 23 in all, varied from 0 to 90.

Results showed no significant difference at all with age suggesting that neurones are not lost as we grow older. It would be unwise to jump from this to the conclusion that there is no area of the brain in man where such loss does not occur; on the other hand there is no very convincing evidence that it does. So when in future, we philosophize about the declining powers of the brain we had better forget about the supposed loss of brain cells, at least until their loss is properly confirmed. (For later confirmation see J. Tomasch, *Nature*, 233, 60).

RERU

A recent issue of *Faith and Freedom* (Published by Manchester College, Oxford) gives an interesting account of "A Year of Progress at the *Religious Experience Research Unit*" by Sir Alister Hardy (vol. 24, part 1, 1970) Nearly two thousand replies to Sir Alister's requests for descriptions of the genesis of religious experience have been received and are under close scrutiny. Sir Alister outlines his plans for the future. We wish him well in a difficult task. (Some specimen replies are given in part 2, 1971).

WEAK RADIATION BENEFICIAL?

Some years ago, after the various early trials of nuclear bombs, there was a scare that the rise in radiation throughout the world might cause a general increase in the incidence of cancer. It was easy to calculate by extrapolation, on the basis of the effect of strong radiation, what this increase was likely to be. Taken over the world at large the figures were impressive, indeed alarming: tens if not hundreds of thousands of people might be expected to die. Indeed, Professor E. J. Sternglass made some impressive calculations of the number *already dead* (*Science*, 1963, 140, 1102. *New Scientist*, 24 July, 1969, p 178 and criticised by A. Stewart, p 181).

It now seems possible that such calculations are misplaced. Populations which live in high mountain areas where natural radiation from space is greater than at lower levels, do not apparently have a higher incidence of cancer than others; similarly those who spend their lives in the vicinity of radioactive ore deposits are not unduly short-lived.

Further evidence now comes to hand (*New Scientist*, 13 May 1971). The ABCC (Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission) is still working on the incidence of cancers in Japan resulting from the use of atomic bombs over a quarter of a century ago. Members of the Commission have recently been investigating the medical histories of those who were ten years old or younger at the time of the explosions. In the more heavily exposed areas (where subjects received 10 rads and upwards of radiation) the incidence of cancers and leukemias is about seven times the national average. But in the low exposure group (up to 9 rads) the incidence found is actually *less* than the average; it is claimed significantly so. In this connection the ABCC refer also to some fairly recent work at Oak Ridge on mice in which it apparently transpired that low dosages of neutrons reduced the incidence of natural cancers.

Is it possible that low doses of radiation are beneficial rather than harmful? Such a conclusion would be difficult to establish with certainty. It is at variance with what would be expected from the basically destructive nature of radiation observed in biological studies.

Work by Alice Stewart on the effects of X-rays on unborn babies during pregnancy gave a contrary picture (*Lancet*, 6 June, 1970): observations on 700,000 children showed that the risk of leukemia developing during the first ten years of life was increased by some 40% as a result of radiation *in utero*. The dosage levels were comparable to those of the under 10 rad group in the Japanese situation.

If the ABCC observations are correct it will be a cause for thankfulness that the low dose effects of radiation are not as heavy as has commonly been supposed. But in the present state of knowledge it would be unwise to regard this as a ground for accepting a significantly higher level of radiation than that to which we are all naturally exposed.

The dangers of radiation are too well known to admit of any complacency. (Written in collaboration with Professor F. T. Farmer).

RADIO CARBON DATING

Much has been written about radio carbon (C-14) dating. Attention may be drawn to two recently published Symposia on the subject.

(1) *Symposium on the Impact of the Natural Sciences on Archaeology*. (A joint symposium between the Royal Society and the British Academy). *Philosophical Transactions* of the RS, A, vol. 269, 1-185, No. 1193, £5).

The various papers cover (a) the history of the subject including a most readable account of the early work of W. F. Libby written by himself; (b) descriptions of methods now in use; (c) correlations between known dates in Egyptian history, varve, tree-ring and C-14 dates. There is also much other interesting information, including a coverage of newer physical methods used in dating.

Uncorrected C-14 dates are approximately correct back to 3000 BP (before present, i.e. 1950); they then become increasingly too low to about 5000 BP, after which they tend to level off about 7000 BP. Further back still, at about 10-11,000 BP there is evidence that they tend to return once again to the agreement found for more recent times. The greatest error, at about 7000 BP is 10% but now that correlations are established allowance can be made for this.

The fall in accuracy is plausibly associated with a lower overall value for the earth's magnetic field in the past. This would have reduced the shielding effect of the field on the cosmic rays which produce the neutrons which, in turn react with N atoms to give C-14. Increased production increased contemporaneous radioactivity of organic carbon, thus lowering the apparent age. The earth's magnetic field (i.e. the magnetic moment of the earth) is believed to have been at a minimum at around 4000 BP.

Possible errors are discussed. There is a short time 'fine structure' in the accuracy of C-14 dating and this may be due to small variations in the solar wind. It is now accepted that the intensity of the galactic cosmic rays has changed little in recent millenia. It is argued that if there had been a change it would show itself by a change in the ratio of the radioactive intensities of the shorter to the longer lived radioactive

isotopes in meteorites, and this cannot be detected. Looking much further back there is the possibility that the sun may at times have given rise to cosmic rays, whilst occasional outbursts of nearby novae would certainly have caused sudden increases in C-14.

(2) *12th Nobel Symposium: Radioactive Variations and Absolute Chronology.*, I. U. Olsson (Ed.), Wiley, (Dec) 1970. pp 657.

This offers a more ambitious coverage than (1) above. It includes much similar material and reaches substantially the same conclusions though often on a more cautious note. There are many contributors and the presentation is more technical. Charts are supplied with the volume from which corrected dates may be read off. One interesting chart goes back 100,000 years. This is based on the ratio of O-18 to O-16 in North Greenland ice cores. The ratio depends on the temperature at which the snow was formed. The last ice age, finishing around 11-10,000 BP shows up clearly on the graphs.

Again the position is that, over the past 6-7,000 years C-14 dating agrees, at least to within 10%, both with tree ring dating and with varve dating. Other methods, notably correlation with known Egyptian dating, agree over a limited range. Disagreements, where they exist, are confined to second order effects.

The book may be read in conjunction with the later paper by M. Stuiver (*Nature*, 1970, 228, 454). The varve counts from Sweden have been supplemented with those from the Lake of Clouds, Minnesota. Alan Craig, of Minnesota, has counted 9,500 varves through the entire core with the exception of the those in the bottom foot or two where they are not differentiated. Comparison with C-14 dates is possible because of the organic matter (pollen) found in varves. There is exceedingly good agreement between varve and tree-ring dating and this makes corrected C-14 dating increasingly accurate. There are no discrepancies back to 7000 BC but further back than this there is a discrepancy of a few per cent between the Swedish and American varves. (*Note.* Where a river from a glacier pours into a lake, the sediment carried by the river consists of much finer particles in the winter when

the water flows slowly than in the summer when the ice is melting and flow is rapid. The larger particles swept down in the summers settle rapidly, the smaller much more slowly. The sediments at the bottom of such a lake therefore show a layered appearance, the layers being referred to as varves.)

C-14: CREATION AND THE FLOOD

The above references give the orthodox view. Many Christians, however, especially in America, are exploring the possibility of a return to the older opinion according to which the world is only a few thousand years old. This view is sponsored, in particular, by the *Creation Research Society*.

In 1968 Professor Robert L. Whitelaw wrote a paper in the Society's *Journal* (5, 78) with the title 'Radiocarbon Confirms Biblical Creation' in which this unorthodox view is supported. An article by P. W. Kroll taking the same line appeared in *The Plain Truth* for March 1970 while similar material appears in *Bible Science News-Letter*.

Whitelaw's reasoning is as follows. Following Libby, orthodox C-14 dating assumes an equality between the rate of formation of C-14 (from neutrons and nitrogen) and its loss by radioactive disintegration. Early measurements showed that 2.6 free neutrons per cm^2 of the earth's surface, per second are produced in the upper atmosphere. Assuming 8.29 gm per cm^2 of exchangeable carbon on the earth's surface this means that 18.8 atoms of C-14 are formed per second for each gm of such carbon. But recently incorporated carbon in living matter only gives 16.1 counts per sec. per gm. 'The agreement seems to be sufficiently within the experimental errors' says Libby. Whitelaw (who perhaps follows R. E. Lingenfelter in *Reviews of Geophysics*, 1963) doubts this. He suggests that if cosmic rays with concomitant neutron formation only started to reach the earth 15,000 years ago, the radioactivity of organic carbon would still be building up. Revising Libby's figures, he reduces this to a creation 7000 years ago at which time the cosmic rays started to bombard the pristine earth.

All this is highly ingenious but needs to be put on a firmer factual basis before it can be used to overthrow generally

accepted and well-supported views. Even if nearly all neutrons combine with N in the upper atmosphere to give C-14 some of the carbon atoms, subjected to the sun's intense radiation, might surely reach escape velocity and leave the earth. In addition, the figures for neutron formation and for the extent of a carbon reservoir may be subject to considerable error. (The problems raised by the carbon reservoir are discussed in great detail in the *Nobel Symposium*: the subject is not easy because there are great variations in the rate of mixing of C-14 with ordinary carbon according to the location of the latter in deep ocean, surface of the ocean, etc.)

In a later paper (1970, 7, 50) Professor Whitelaw presents some material which bears on the date of the biblical Flood. Up to the end of 1969, 15,000 C-14 datings of archaeological materials had been published either in *Science* or in *Radiocarbon* (up to the end of vol. 11). Leaving out replications and dubious material about 7000 independent datings remained. Whitelaw conceived the idea of dividing these into batches of 500 years each – those between the present and 1450; 1450-950 A. D. etc.

We should not expect to find many datings in the first batch relating to the very recent past – for people do not send the remains of their great grandfathers for dating by the expensive C-14 method. Before that, however, the number would be considerable but since, with passage of time, there is increasing loss or destruction of animal or vegetable remains; it is to be expected that (other things being equal) there will be a gradual and steady fall of numbers in the 500-year batches as we proceed back in time.

It is here that the biblical Flood is relevant. For if, in accordance with the Bible, there was once a disaster which destroyed animal and plant life on a gigantic scale, it would afterwards have taken many years for living species to reach their former abundance. Specimens from the half millenium following such a disaster might then be rare, and the number of them sent to laboratories for dating correspondingly few. But in the epoch before the disaster manifestations of life would be abundant once more; before this we might expect to find the same steady fall off once again.

Now this is exactly what Whitelaw claims to find. There is a highly significant drop in the half-millennium starting at 4000 BC. (corrected this would give about 4,500 BC.) The following figures refer to successive half-millennia starting at 1,745-2345 BP – 777, 628, 538, 447, 371, 290, 86, 218, 146, 133 The fall off is found at the same date for (1) man and animals in the Old World, (2) man and animals in the New World, (3) trees in both hemispheres combined.

Unfortunately Whitelaw's paper is presented in a confusing way: he makes his own dating corrections to bring the Flood to 3000 BC and he gives no comparative figures for aquatic material. Nevertheless, his paper does afford highly significant evidence for a world-wide catastrophe. It is interesting to note, too, that the rate of build-up of samples is higher in the Old World (where Noah had his ark) than in the New. This does not necessarily imply that the Flood itself was world-wide; changes in conditions (temperature, cloud cover etc) occasioned by a vast catastrophe in one hemisphere might well be expected to make living conditions over the entire Earth more difficult with consequent extensive loss of life.

The Flood must have left many traces: the difficulty of interpretation may be due to repeated catastrophies in much earlier times. It is to be hoped that definite dating and information on the extent of the Flood will not be too delayed. F. A. Filby's *The Flood Reconsidered* 1970, is very helpful in this connection.

It is worth adding that the common assertion, accepted by the CRS, that everyone took the Bible to mean that the Flood was universal until modern times is misleading. J.P. Lewis (*A Study of the Interpretations of Noah and the Flood in Jewish and Christian Literature*, Leiden, 1968), has looked into this point carefully. Philo says that the Flood was so vast that it almost flowed out beyond the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar) and the Great Sea. A number of the Rabbis (e.g. R. Levi) appealed to Ezekiel 22: 24. 'A land not rained upon in the day of indignation' to prove that the Flood did not cover Palestine. The Mount of Olives and the Garden of Eden are specifically mentioned as exempt. Though the Flood was usually spoken of as universal, it is evident that such language is not to be understood as we should understand it today.

ARTHUR C. ADCOCK

The 'Soul': Some Reflections

In his provocative Prize Essay Dr. Howard recently argued that it is time for Christians to abandon the traditional idea of the 'soul' as the part of a man that lives on after death. In the following short article Mr. Adcock, who lectures on the philosophy of religion at Manchester College, Oxford, maintains that if they take Dr. Howard's advice Christians will abandon more than they had bargained for.

In his recent article in *Faith and Thought*, Dr. J. K. Howard¹ argues that the traditional idea of the 'soul' owes more to Platonic philosophy than to Biblical teaching, and that it is in fact basically wrong. His view is likely to appear attractive to those Christians who desire to state their beliefs in such a way as to render them invulnerable to scientific criticism of all kinds. There are, however, a number of points which Dr. Howard seems to have overlooked.

Let us say at once that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to define, locate, or consistently talk about the 'soul' in relation to the other features of the psycho-physical organism that is a man. It is certainly not easy to refute reductive materialists or behaviourists who seem to identify the mind with the brain. It is even less easy to refute the common-sense opinion that when we are dead we are dead, especially when the scientists argue that there is no valid or indisputable empirical evidence of survival and the philosophers argue that the notion of a disembodied spirit is meaningless. Christians who wish to avoid a direct clash between science and philosophy on the one side and revelation on the other might well be glad to know that the 'soul' and

its survival do not form a part of revealed religion. It will please them to know that if the 'soul' can be analysed without remainder into physical constituents this need not mean that any important theological truths have been falsified.

Dr. Howard follows a line that some Protestants have found attractive, for a number of disparate reasons, ever since the 16th century.² For the Roman Church, on the other hand the doctrine of the survival of the soul is *de fide*.³ Dr. Howard is prepared to accept the idea that *nothing* of a man survives physical death — though he is strangely inconsistent, for he refers also to 'the intermediate state' and its importance.⁴ He believes that the Scriptures are not talking about any survival of any part or aspect of a man: the Gospel hope is one of resurrection on the Last Day. This is a matter about which none of the natural scientists could possibly have anything to say. It is not an event which takes place in this world in the ordinary course of history, and it is compatible with any and every theory about the relations between 'mind' and 'body'. What revelation states, on this assumption, is that God will *re-create* human beings *ex nihilo* on the Last Day. In the meantime, they have been literally *nothing*: when they died they died *completely*. Belief in the resurrection on the Last Day does not depend on any sort of philosophical or scientific evidence, argument or analogy, but *solely* on our belief in God's promise together with our belief in his absolute omnipotence.

It may save the Christian a great deal of trouble if he can show that Christian theology is unaffected by any of the controversies about the relations between 'mind' and 'body' or between 'mental events' and 'material events'. The Christian belief in a future life would then be in principle irrefutable. But it is possible that this sort of 'victory' for the Christian apologist may involve consequences far greater than he realises.

Whatever other functions the notion of the 'soul' may have, the word is used in common parlance and in traditional Christian theology to refer to that 'part' of a human being which survives bodily death. If we believe that a human being does in any sense survive, we cannot entirely dispense with

the term 'soul'; we need rather to think about its possible meaning. As the physical body has died and disintegrated, the 'soul', or 'psychic factor' (as Broad called it⁵) must be either disembodied or immediately reincarnated. The only other possibility is total annihilation. Professor H.H. Price⁶ has sought to analyse carefully what disembodied experience could possibly comprise. The Jesuit theologian, Fr. Karl Rahner has also written a valuable paper on 'The Life of the Dead'.⁷

Both the above writers are trying to give an account of a state of affairs in which they believe. On the other hand, a more detached philosopher, Professor T. Penelhum,⁸ has argued that it is almost impossible to talk meaningfully about the experience of disembodied spirits: if we abstract from experience, as we know it empirically, everything that is bound up with embodiment, there is virtually nothing left. Those who are interested in such matters from either a religious point of view or in connection with psychical research are certainly faced with some very difficult philosophical problems. I am not making any attempt here either to underestimate or to solve such problems: I am merely arguing that these *are* the problems with which Christian philosophers have to deal — they cannot be shelved. It is implausible to argue that those who believe either in Biblical revelation or traditional Christian experience can safely jettison either the notion of human survival or the possibility of disembodied spirits.

There are numerous Biblical references to non-human spirits, presumably disembodied — e.g. angels and demons. There are also instances of the dead being brought back — e.g. Samuel and the Witch of Endor incident, Moses and Elijah at the Transfiguration. Those who argue that the dead do not in general survive try to explain these away as special cases: the Transfiguration was a special miracle, it was not really Samuel who appeared, but rather a familiar spirit.⁹ The prohibition of necromancy in the Bible implies that it *ought* not to be practised, not necessarily that it *cannot* be practised. What did Jesus mean in Matthew 22: 32 about the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob being the God of the living

rather than of the dead? Again, for Jesus' hearers, 'Abraham's Bosom' was not *just* a literary manner of speaking: the Jews believed that the just are received at their death by Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Dives' discussion with Abraham in the parable does not suggest that Abraham was completely non-existent at the time of Dives' death.

It is, of course, possible to de-mythologise all such stories: but we should then need to de-mythologise very much more, including much that Dr. Howard would almost certainly *not* regard as expendable. We might also ask whether Jesus had ceased to exist between Good Friday and Easter Sunday: If bodily death *entails* soul-death, he must have done so; it is hard to see how in such a case he visited 'spirits in prison', or how they could exist. It is also hard to understand what Jesus meant when he promised the repentant thief 'Today thou shalt be with me in paradise'. According to Dr. Howard's theory, the only way out of this difficulty is to suppose (as many of the radical theologians do suppose) that Jesus expected an *immediate* Parousia, but that Jesus was certainly wrong. Does Dr. Howard agree with Schweitzer on this matter?

It is also clear that much post-Biblical Christian experience would be delusory if *no* human being had *ever* returned to give a message. Thus, I cannot see how Biblical, or indeed any traditional, Christians can deny the existence of disembodied spirits or argue that no human spirit can exist in a disembodied state. In what he calls a 'Heretical Postscript' Professor Penelhum also asks whether the denial of the possibility of disembodied spirits may not entail the denial of the existence of God himself. After all, God is traditionally believed to be non-material,¹⁰ even though John Laird,¹¹ in his Gifford Lectures, (like the Mormons) does entertain the possibility that God may have a material body of some sort or other.

Dr. Basil F.C. Atkinson¹² has recently written an excellent book in which he argues that the Bible does not teach the survival of any soul. His philological study of all the Biblical words used in connection with life and death etc. is persuasive as far as it goes. But the way in which the Biblical writers use words like *psyche* depends on what they are talking about: the meaning of words is governed by their context. The

problems the Biblical writers were discussing were not the same as the problems now being discussed within the Moral Sciences Faculty; they were not investigating scientifically and philosophically the relations between mind and body or the validity of reductive materialism. We simply do not know what they would have written if they had needed to talk about completely different matters in a completely different intellectual climate. We cannot properly strain their metaphors and their poetry so as to extract from them theological or philosophical dogmas or to prejudge later controversies. In any case, the nearest we come to any sort of philosophical argument on such matters is in St. Paul's letters to the Corinthians. 'How do the dead rise, and with what body do they come?' (1 Cor. 15:35). His answer, based on the seed analogy, would suggest continuity rather than discontinuity. A gardener would not expect to get a good crop by planting non-existent seeds years after the natural seeds had really died! Similarly, in the Second Letter to the Corinthians (2 Cor. 5:1), St. Paul would seem to endorse the popular idea of body-soul dualism when he speaks of living in a tabernacle which is shortly to be dissolved. His other remarks in the same chapter might suggest a slight Hellenistic bias, 'hough when he talks about needing to be absent from the body so as to be present with the Lord, he may be using the word 'body' in a pejorative sense only.

Suppose we do decide, however, to jettison survival of the soul and all types of body-soul dualism, and to pin our hope on the last great resurrection miracle on the Last Day. We now find ourselves, as Professor Penelhum shows, in even greater difficulties.¹³ Suppose that I (i.e. Adcock-I) die completely. Suppose that on the Last Day God creates a new Adcock (Adcock-II) *ex nihilo*. In what sense is it possible to say that these two Adcocks are identical? If God programmes A-II to resemble A-I absolutely, with all the memories and guilts etc. built in so that A-II *believes* he is a continuation of A-I, how can anyone tell whether the two of them are identical *numerically*, or just perfect 'doubles'? *But*, if it has been stated dogmatically that A-I did end and that A-II has been created *ex nihilo*, then they are not numerically identical and there is no continuity between them in fact. It is

logically impossible to distinguish in such circumstances between creation and re-creation. Unless there is a real continuity between A—I and A—II, the Last Judgement would not be in fact a judgement of A—I. It would be blatantly unjust to punish anyone for someone else's sins: Conversely, there is no point in our developing our personalities *to fit them for a future life* if there is *for us* no such life.

Though some of my criticisms may appear wholly negative and destructive, we are bound to sympathise with Dr. Howard's emphasis in the later pages of his essay. He thinks of Christ as offering 'Wholeness of life here and now' rather than a shadowy future life. Dr. Howard is a Christian physician, well aware of the intimate relations between physical and psychological ailments, with a love for the physical body, as befits a doctor, and with a desire to cure people *now*. He would naturally be attracted by the Lucan picture of Jesus the healer and by the Johannine emphasis on eternal life as a *quality* of contemporary life rather than as a mere extension of this life here and now. But this does not mean that the notion of survival is of no interest in connection with other problems in other contexts. The late Professor C.D. Broad was interested in establishing the priority of mind over matter on the ground that no religious view of life could possibly be validated if mind were simply epiphenomenal or if mental events could be analysed without remainder into material events: Broad studied psychical research in search of some empirical evidence which would refute the sort of naturalistic philosophy which he regarded as muddle-headed, narrow, and destructive of cultural values.¹⁴ A colleague of his, Dr. F.R. Tennant,¹⁵ also sought to show that empirically-based Christian theism cannot be sustained if there is no sort of survival. However tempting it may be to espouse a 'secular Christianity' and to refrain from offering pie-in-the-sky as a substitute for wholeness of life in this world, I wonder what Dr. Howard would think of Dr. Wren-Lewis' version of the Gospel hope,¹⁶ looking forward to the day when the idea of the resurrection 'might well be an expression of the ultimate achievements of technology'? 'We now have definite evidence from physiology that the body's mechanisms for preserving its vitality and

integrity are much stronger than we ordinarily realise so that there is no difficulty in imagining that they might be made to prevent ageing and to resist even major acts of violence (like crucifixion)'. Again, 'the general line of the actual findings of modern science make it quite reasonable to take the New Testament idea of physical resurrection quite seriously, if we look at them in the *spirit* of modern science'. An American writer, Dr. Rosin,¹⁹ has developed this notion of 'do-it-yourself immortality' in much greater detail. The traditional Christian view of the relations between the 'soul' and its body is much more rational and sober than some of the more recent theories which seek to replace it.

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10. cf. Thirty-nine Articles of Religion. Article I. "Without body, parts or passions"

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- 15 Tennant, F.R. *Philosophical Theology*, Vol. II. pp. 269–272. Tennant concludes that "The world, in short, cannot safely be regarded as realising a *divine* purpose unless man's life continues after death."
- 16 *Fact, Faith and Fantasy*, By C.F.D. Moule, J. Wren-Lewis, P.R. Baelz, D.A. Pond. (Open Lectures of the Cambridge Divinity Faculty. 1964) Published in Fontana Books. J. Wren-Lewis: 'Does Science Destroy Belief?' pp. 42–44.
- 17 Rosin, J., *In God's Image*, 1969. Philosophical Library, New York. Dr. Rosin argues that 'Man is capable of anything nature and God can do, given time.' He shows how *homo sempervirens* will be evolved by science.

* * *

Dr. Howard writes:

Adcock is approaching my argument from a purely philosophic standpoint and, I feel, with basic preconceptions (not that I am without those!). Research into the nature of man may well pose problems for the philosopher, but if his solutions are to be in any sense valid they must take into account the discoveries of the research biochemist or physiologist. The 'psychic factor' of man; his thought processes, memory, his dreams, his moods; are complex physico-chemical processes which cannot be separate from the wholeness that is man. Philosophers or theologians must always beware of 'doing a Nelson' and ignoring information or data which does not fit in with their preconceptions.

CLIFFORD T. CRELLIN

The Psychology of Moral Development: Its Implications for Education.

A child's idea of morality grows with him. Piaget set the ball rolling by a serious study of this subject in 1932. Work based on his ideas has continued ever since till today the study of moral development invades the educational field.

In this paper, originally given to the Victoria Institute 6 Feb. 1971, (enlivened by entertaining tape recordings of the childrens' conversations!) the author, who is Head of the Education Department of Trent Park College of Education, Cockfosters, brings the subject up to date and asks what use teachers ought to be making of modern findings.

The writer's three children were recently playing bagatelle. Five year old Ruth fired the balls with glee but little concern for her score: sometimes she demanded an extra turn if a shot was unsuccessful. Martin (9) was obviously interested in the score and argued about whether or not his sister should be allowed an extra turn for her 'misfires' Andrew (13) suggested that as Ruth was so much younger allowances should be made for her.

This incident illustrates the main stages of moral development as propounded by Professor Jean Piaget of Geneva (1932); ¹ stages of egocentricity, equality and equity respectively. The value of this work in the field of education has been increasingly appreciated, particularly over the past decade. ²

In all his studies into the cognitive development of children, Piaget stresses that the child is not just a miniature adult but

employs thinking which is different in kind from that of his later adult self, for example in the difference between thinking in concrete and abstract terms. As Piaget himself puts it, 'Because children talk like us we assume that they think like us'.

Although other and often more sophisticated models have been suggested to explain the moral development of children,^{3, 4, 5} later workers owe a great debt to Piaget whose ideas were seminal and initially simple.

Piaget's Theory of Moral Development

His theory is based upon observations of children playing the game of marbles (an apparently simple model yet one which, he suggests, is at least, as complex as spelling) and upon his conversations with them in which he feigned ignorance of the rules. He first investigated the childrens' conformity to rules as seen in actual play and, later (in much greater detail) their verbal descriptions of the nature of the rules.

Observed Conduct. In the practice of the rules Piaget noted four stages; the *first* based on the pleasure/plain principle, the *second* on egocentricity (compare the bagatelle incident in which the youngest child played, to use Piaget's words, 'in an individualistic manner . . . learning the rules but applying them as suited her own fantasy', and producing a caricature of the proper game); the *third* (from about seven years old) based on a mutually agreed but often inflexible set of rules but with gradually increasing grasp of their complexity, and finally, a *fourth* in which the rules are complied with fully and understood to a degree which enables the child to revise and modify them with confidence as did the older of the two boys in the incident described at the outset.

Two Moralities. But Piaget's main concern was less with the social conduct of children than with their verbalised ideas. At the outset he states, 'It is moral judgment that we propose to investigate, nor moral behaviour or sentiments'. In this sense his theory is 'value neutral'. As Kohlberg⁶ points out, the 'level of moral judgment is quite a different matter from knowledge of or consent to, conventional moral clichés'.

In fact Piaget proposes two moralities, the morality of constraint or *heteronomy* and the morality of co-operation or *autonomy*. This last is subdivided into the stages (a) of equality or reciprocity and (b) equity. 'For the very young child, a rule is a sacred reality because it is traditional: for the older ones it depends on mutual agreement. Heteronomy and autonomy are the two poles of this evolution'.⁷

The child is influenced socially in two ways: he is subordinate to adults and constrained by them: he also has a social relationship with his peers. It is this latter peer group morality which Piaget sees as the chief formative influence upon the development of morals; the constraint of the former, he suggests, merely serves to retard the development of the morality of co-operation. Unlike some other developmental theorists he does not see the second morality maturing or growing out of the first but coming from within the child and supplanting the morality of constraint. Perhaps the growth of a child's second teeth replacing the earlier set would be an appropriate if only a partial analogy.

Stage Development

The answers of the children to his questions led Piaget to discern three main stages in the growth of moral judgments, parallel to, but not identical with the earlier four which referred to their observed conduct.

Stage 1 - Egocentricity. As in the initial stages of his behaviour, the child has not really absorbed his notions of morality as part of his conceptual understanding. It is a time when 'feelings are set up before the child has any clear consciousness of moral intention . . . What is done or not done on purpose'.⁸ He gives illustrations from his own child's conduct which show that she is aware that parental authority and wishes are different from her own immediate inclinations, yet she is sometimes moved by the desire to retain the affection of the parents. (Whilst removing books from a shelf the present writer's three year old son anticipated reprimand with the remark, 'I am not a naughty boy. You like me doing this, don't you?')

This is the stage of adult constraint, when adult disapproval is synonymous with wrong. Constraint helps to perpetuate this first stage yet even Piaget admits, 'However averse one may be in the field of education to any use of constraint, even moral, it is not possible completely to avoid giving children commands which are incomprehensible to them'.⁹ *Stage 2 – Equity* Here, about the ages 5 to 8/9 years, the rules are rigid, external, even eternal and sacred; 'verbal precept can be elevated . . . to almost supernatural status'.¹⁰ Suggested changes are resisted even though the child breaks the rules himself, having as Piaget puts it 'a curious mixture of respect of law and caprice in its application'.¹¹ The sense of the pre-existence of rules would seem to hold even when the child devises a completely new game for himself, as did one six year old who commented afterwards, 'It was lucky that I knew the rules of that game of running round the bushes, the one who says, "let's play" must know the rules'.

This is the stage at which privileges and punishments are required to be strictly, even meticulously, equal. On one occasion the writer's nine year old reported that he had allowed his five year old sister to push him over because he had accidentally knocked her over! Generally, however, if allowances are made at all at this stage they are begrudged; it is the age at which the cry is frequently heard, 'It's not fair'.

Nevertheless, according to Piaget, it is at this point in the social interplay between peers that the child begins its development towards the second morality of co-operation (or autonomy).

Stage 3 – Equity. This is achieved in the final stage beginning at the age of 10 or 11. Here rules may be changed provided this is mutually agreed upon: they are no longer imbued with divine authority and the child will now make allowances for younger children. He will also make relative judgments ('it all depends . . .') and generally he adopts an equitable attitude.

It will be noted that in Piaget's developmental theory of moral judgment he ends at the threshold of adolescence. This, as we shall later see, has given rise to criticism.

Moral Realism

In Piaget's work a child was presented with a series of situations involving clumsiness, stealing etc. and asked to assess the blame-worthiness of the actions taken. Results showed that the younger children judged actions objectively with no consideration of circumstances or motive. Thus accidental breakage of a trayful of cups was deemed more reprehensible than the wilful destruction of one cup.

Lying. The younger child 'distorts reality in accordance with his desire and his romancing'.¹² The parent hears such remarks as 'I didn't hear you say put the toys away' . . . 'The doctor said I had to eat chocolate' and (as I check this script my five year old daughter irritated by my lack of attention to her, announces 'Daddy, a crocodile has bitten me on the arm, Look! just there!').

Also, the younger child deems a lie told to an adult as more reprehensible than that told to one of his peers. Lying is equated with 'naughty words' or swearing. Only at a later stage, is objective truth and finally intention taken into account.

Ideas of Justice. Punishments are *expiatory* or *retributive*. The former are meted out in proportion to the crime - an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth - but are of a kind which is not always clearly relevant. Retributive punishments, on the other hand, seek 'to fit the punishment to the crime'. As might be expected the younger child chooses the expiatory end of the spectrum, the older the retributive.

Some attention was given to how children believe rewards and punishments should be administered to those who violate parental commands. The younger child accepts as fair whatever the adult decides, at the next stage the slightly older child demands equality for all, while at the stage reached sometime after eleven, motive and circumstances are once more of greater importance than objective action.

In these investigations the early stage of moral realism is seen as a time when the letter not the spirit guides the child. *Peer Groups* Thus morality develops through a stage of constraint to one of co-operation and Piaget, as noted above, claims that it is co-operation with the peer group which is the

vital factor in the moral development of the child. If this be so, then there are obvious implications for both the content and organisation of our teaching he adds that, 'it is often at the expense of the adult and not because of him that the notions of just and unjust find their way into the youthful mind'.¹²

From the early adult dominated morality or heteronomy the child moves in this way to autonomy which appears 'when the mind regards as necessary an ideal that is independent of adult pressure'¹³ when, for example, telling the truth is seen as necessary to the proper function of social intercourse.

Not surprisingly, Piaget's work has both stimulated research and provoked criticism. His main sequential stages are generally accepted, but as to the details much remains to be filled in. Before continuing we shall now illustrate what has been said by examples culled from children talking.

Situation A. Lies. The children were asked, 'What is a lie?'
Aged 5 answered: 'If I said I am in bed and I'm not, is that a lie?'
Aged 9, 'When you don't tell the truth'
Aged 13, 'A lie is when you don't tell the actual true fact. . . when you don't tell the truth on purpose. If you tell so as to get out of something!'

Thus the older child brings in the idea of intention as a modification of his initial statement of fact. This distinction was also put rather more clearly by another child aged 11 who distinguished between 'white' and 'black' lies. The youngest child gave an example rather than a definition being at a concrete rather than an abstract stage of reasoning, while the nine year old answered 'When you didn't tell the truth!' Confusion concerning the matter of a lie and the difficulty in distinguishing intention even for the intelligent child was well expressed by a six year old who although able to refer to 'the mistake' of taking the wrong train stated that to report this would in fact be a 'double decker lie'!

Piaget warns that until fairly late (between 6 and 10 on average) the definition of a lie consists simply in saying 'a lie is something that isn't true', but the mere words must not deceive us and we must get at the implicit notions which they conceal'. It is not until later on at about 11 or 12 that

we find an explicit statement which shows the lie as something involving deceit.

This difficulty is seen again when two Piagetian situations were presented to the children as follows:-

Situation. B. Lies, continued,

(a) "A little boy (or a little girl) goes for a walk in the street and meets a big dog which frightens him very much. So then he goes home and tells his mother he has seen a dog that was as big as a cow."

(b) "A child comes home from school and tells his mother that the teacher has given him good marks, but it was not true; the teacher has given him no marks at all, either good or bad. Then his mother was very pleased and gave him a present."

The children were asked to say which child was the naughtier. *Aged 5* laughed at the idea of a dog as big as a cow but could only answer, 'I don't know'. *Aged 9*, 'I think the one who said he had been given good marks was naughty. The other might have felt it was an as big as a cow and it wouldn't have caused any trouble but the other boy got a present.' *Aged 13*, 'The first wasn't really naughty, he was just showing his fear.'

Here the youngest sees no moral problems at all, still less distinguishes between them. The nine-year old expresses his answer in the tangible terms of trouble and the undeserved reward. At thirteen Andrew pinpoints the emotional motivation for the exaggeration in the first story, an equitable judgment indeed.

Clumsiness. In two examples involving clumsiness similar differences in reasoning can be discerned:

Situation C. Clumsiness.

(a) A little boy who is called John is in his room. He is called to dinner. He goes into the dining room. But behind the door there was a chair, and on the chair there was a tray with fifteen cups on it. John couldn't have known that there was all this behind the door. He goes in, the door knocks against the tray, bang go fifteen cups and they all get broken!

(b) Once there was a little boy who's name was Henry. One day when his mother was out he tried to get some jam out of the cupboard. He climbed up on to a chair and

stretched out his arm. But the jam was too high up and he couldn't reach it and have any. But while he was trying to get it he knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and broke.

Which boy is the naughtier John or Henry?

Replies were:-

Aged 5, 'John - because he knocked too many over'.

Aged 9, 'I think the one who was trying to get the jam because he was being naughty; the other one wasn't.

Aged 13, 'Henry who was trying to get the jam was the naughtiest because in the first place he shouldn't have been trying to get the jam . . . but on the other hand John might have come through the door less quickly'.

Here the five year old quite firmly gives an objective type answer that shows her to be in this respect at the stage of moral realism; The nine year old is equally clear that Henry in attempting to steal is the only naughty one; the oldest while agreeing that Henry is at fault also considers that some blame is due to John and thus brings in the notion of culpable negligence!

This last response also displays some of the characteristics of the *equitable stage* of development which distinguish it from the earlier *equitable stage* namely a concern with relative opinions and with finer points of judgment.

Intention. A clear distinction between objective and subjective responses¹⁴ is seen in the following:

Situation D. Intention.

(a) There was once a little girl called Mary, she wanted to give her mother a nice surprise and cut out a piece of sewing for her. But she didn't know how to use the scissors properly and cut a big hole in her dress.

(b) A little girl called Margaret want and took her mother's scissors one day that her mother was out. She played with them for a bit, Then as she didn't know how to use them properly she made a little hole in her dress.

Who is the naughtier Mary or Margaret?

Replies were:-

Aged 5 'Mary because she made the biggest hole'.

Aged 9, 'Margaret, because although she made a little hole she just played with the scissors and didn't use them for a proper purpose.'

Here the nine year old responds subjectively, in contrast to the moral realism of the five year old. He also approaches the equitable stage by introducing the notion of purpose.

Let us now return to the same three children answering questions on the following story.

Situation E. Carelessness. One afternoon on a holiday, a mother had taken her children for a walk by the side of a river. At four o'clock she gave each of them a roll. They all began to eat their rolls except for the youngest, who was careless and let his fall into the water. What will the mother do Will she give him another one? What will the older ones say?

Answers were: *Aged 5*, 'Don't know'. ('what do you think the mummy should do?') 'Give her another one.' (What will the older ones say if she does?) 'Don't give him one because he let his go into the water.' *Aged 9*, 'I think she shouldn't have given him one because she had seen that he had been careless. So I think the same as Ruth (aged 5) that the others would have said "don't give him one" - but I don't think she would anyway.' *Aged 13*, 'She would let him have another one I would have thought, but the other children if they had been smaller and not understood would have objected, but say they were older would have seen and understood that it was an accident.'

In the above responses Ruth (5), maintains her moral realism and here unlike the previous situation is joined by the nine year old. This illustrates the variation in judgment shown by a child at a transition between the equality and equity stages of development. It also introduces a further suggestion of punishment which the younger child often demands 'because he had been careless'. At the equality stage no consideration is given to extenuating circumstances. The need for some such allowance is clearly voiced by the eldest child who not only considers the age of the child in the story but even begins to develop his own theories of moral judgment or conduct according to age!

Several points emerge from the above conversations.

(1) Whether or not we accept Piaget's theoretical model of two moralities there is certainly a developmental structure in the child's conceptualisation of morality. (2) Such development does not advance evenly over the whole front of our

judgments; as earlier suggested it continues into adolescence and perhaps beyond. In this connection Bull¹⁵ complains forcefully of the incompleteness if not distortion of the developmental picture produced by a failure to continue testing throughout adolescence. (3) The posing of questions involving moral situations may prove an aid to their moral education. This method is advocated by Kohlberg⁴ in particular.

Criticisms and Developments

We turn now to later work inspired by Piaget. Morris¹⁶, Edwards¹⁷ and the Williams's⁵ have concentrated on the adolescent age group which Piaget neglected. They find that judgments made at this time are far more fluid and various than Piaget's notion of the achievement of the stage of equity might suggest. In general, recent researchers express dissatisfaction with the unrealistic 'happy ever after' implication of the stage of equity.

In the writer's own studies of several hundred adolescent boys in Liverpool¹⁸ there was considerable variation in the judgments made within the age group of 10–15 years. With increasing age there was found to be a significant shift away from authoritarian judgments towards peer group loyalties. There were further significant differences in the judgments made between a sub-cultural group in a deprived area of the city and a cross sectional sample; furthermore, there seemed to be important situational influences operating which showed up in the analysis of responses to a series of individual, factually based incidents. Similar conclusions had been reached by others. For example, Harrower¹⁹ in a survey carried out in two areas in London soon after the publication of Piaget's book, found that environmental influences clearly affected the development of moral judgments.

More recently others have attacked the apparent rigidity of Piaget's basic notion of ages and stages in moral development. The Williams's⁵ report findings of sophisticated and 'final stage' responses among even the youngest group (4 years old)²⁰ It is urged that moral behaviour may involve a number of components.

Wilson of the Farmington Trust has suggested a model which can be used to distinguish between them.²¹ (see also refs. 3, 4, 15.)

Immanent Justice

Immanent Justice is defined by Piaget as the 'existence of automatic punishments which emanate from things themselves'²². It has been discussed *inter alia* by Isaacs,²³ Lerner²⁴ and Jahoda.²⁵

Isaacs speaks of Immanent Justice as a central issue in moral education, a view with which the present writer is in agreement.

Lerner points out that because a young child's life is full of 'unintelligible prohibitions and a very considerable portion of a child's social life consists in nothing but rule violations which mean punishments, one after another, it is not surprising that his belief in universal immanent punishment is reinforced when he accidentally hurts himself'. As adults we unwittingly reinforce this when we make statements such as 'Don't run on that ice or you will slip' and then our words are proved to be only too true!

Two examples from the writer's experience illustrate aspects of this belief (a) a three year old shook his finger at a thundery sky and said, 'You'll get shot for making such a noise' and, (b), (more typically), an eight year old on finding a coin on a footpath announced, 'That is because the woman in the sweet shop gave me the wrong change; it serves her right'.

In his investigations on Immanent Justice Piaget presented the story of the Broken Bridge:

Situation F. Broken Bridge. Once there were two children who were stealing apples in an orchard. Suddenly a policeman comes along and the two children run away. One of them is caught. The other one, going home by a roundabout way, crosses a river on a rotten bridge and falls into the water. Now what do you think? If he had not stolen the apples and had crossed the river on that rotten bridge all the same, would he also have fallen into the water?

The childrens' answers were:

Aged 5, 'Yes. 'Cos it was a rotten bridge.' *Aged 6*, 'No because it was a magic bridge and it would break for the naughty people, but it wouldn't let (other) people fall in, it would hold them up. *Aged 9*, 'The weight of the apples might have caused it to break.'

Jane (11) 'He could have fallen in because it was rotten, but you see he had stolen apples — that's why — so he might have fallen in because of that but also because the bridge might have been rotten.

Question: *Could you tell me what might cause this to happen?*

'Well you can't depend on it (breaking); but mummy says if you do something wrong your sins will find you out.'

In this case the five year old is answering at a level more advanced than that which we have noted earlier. The 9 year old, while clearly rejecting Immanent Justice, still expresses his answer in concrete terms, not in the abstract concepts underlying the question. The response of David a (6 year old) is characteristic of the age (but more imaginative in expression) while the 11-year old introduces another point of view.

Immanent Justice aptly illustrates the uneven rates of development of different aspects of moral judgment. Not uncommonly grown-ups reveal by their comments on controversial topics that they accept Immanent Justice much as if they were still children. Thus someone may say that Social Security allowances are demanded only by those who 'deserve no more', or are suffering because they deserve to. I am acquainted with one elderly lady who firmly believes (like Job's comforters) that all who suffer deserve their fate.

Two further but very different examples which illustrate this belief are taken from B.B.C. television interviews.

Major Mike Hoare,²⁶ the Congo mercenary reported the case of a man court martialled for rape and murder. Hoare's officers urged him to execute the man, but he chose a lesser sentence. Some days later the man was killed in an aircraft accident... 'Fate had confirmed the sentence', remarked Hoare.

A group of people decided to attend a Billy Graham Rally. At the last minute they changed their plans in

favour of a social function but were involved in a car accident. At the Billy Graham Rally the attention of the crowd was drawn to this instance of Immanent Justice – according to a Professor of Theology from Manchester, speaking on the BBC.

Implications for Religious and Moral Education

It will be recalled that in her answer to the Broken Bridge story (*Situation F*) the eleven year old girl referred to ‘your sins finding you out’. The influence of religious teaching is obvious enough here. A background of similar teaching is equally obvious in a child’s response given to one of the writer’s students, ‘When you are out of God’s sight, Satan will get you if you tell a lie’.

It is evident from what has been said that mere moral precept is insufficient: indeed some precepts may actually cause confusion in a child’s mind. This poses the question: Does religious instruction of the traditional kind help or hinder the moral development of the child?

Not surprisingly humanists question the value of such teaching though Hemming²⁷ does admit that in marginal cases where the school practices its ethical beliefs, the influence of religious education can be beneficial.

The Williams’s deemed religious responses irrelevant to their investigation because they wished to investigate the type of thinking rather than the source of judgment.²⁸ Yet they point out that religious answers could themselves be classified in developmental stages. One can draw parallels when comparing, say, the Decalogue with the Golden Rule or the judgments of the Pentateuch with those of the Prophets. It is of interest that, Kay²⁹ mentions a theory of recapitulation of the development of the human race within each individual.

Goldman³⁰ in his work on the development of religious concepts found close parallels to the Piagetian stages outlined earlier. For example he asked children of varying ages who had listened to the New Testament account of the ‘Temptation of Christ’ to say what they understood by the statement ‘man shall not live by bread alone’. The

age of thirteen proved a 'watershed': only those above this age had a clear conceptual understanding beyond the mere concrete stage. The writer has encountered even greater misunderstandings in the case of Old Testament stories (e.g. Esau and Jacob). The implication of all this for religious teaching is not a little disturbing.

But not for the religious teacher alone; other curriculum subjects also involve human judgment e.g. English and in particular History. Some interesting research has been done in this area.^{31,32} The title of one such article paraphrased from a child's answer is itself significant, 'God supports the side that wins'.³³

As other research has shown (compare Williams³⁴) children tend to act in accordance with what they see as the source of power, affection or social acceptance rather than precept. It is obvious that unless we 'practise what we preach' religious, philosophical or other similar teaching will be of little avail.

Kohlberg follows Piaget in ascribing primary importance to the peer group as the formative influence in moral development. The classroom 'climate' will obviously have a great bearing upon this. He further suggests that teaching should take account of the stage at which the child has arrived and that the concepts involved should be geared to be at or preferably one stage above. (His proposals involve some six stages in all). In place of the classroom examples of right and wrong, many of which he points out are morally irrelevant (e.g. silence, dress, tidiness) he suggests the presentation of problem situations (like some of those above considered) which involve universal judgments. No doubt he would approve the programmes used by the Schools Council Humanities Project or by Goldman.³⁰ Perhaps consideration of the moral and religious dilemmas of Henry VIII as presented in the recent television series would be appropriate.

The explicit sentiments of Kipling's 'If' would be of less value in this respect than would D.H. Lawrence's 'The Snake' where the question is put more controversially.

If

You were a man, you would take a stick and break him now, and finish him off.
But I must confess how I liked him. . . .

Implicit in much of the foregoing is the belief that knowledge of the various stages of moral development would lead to a healthier understanding of children by adults. Lack of such understanding is seen in its extreme form in the reports of children who have been physically assaulted by their parents.^{35,36} In most instances the parents did not view their children as babies but ascribed to them intentions and motives which would be appropriate only to adults.

Wilson aptly compares rocket launching with moral education: 'To get a rocket launched on course each of the rocket's stages must be ignited at the right time, to get a person on the way to being morally educated it seems that he or she must have certain kinds of experience at certain stages of life'.³⁷)

In a wider context there is the need for a frame of reference in a changing society, it is essential, therefore, that we take a cold, close look at the formative influences on moral development and the means by which the optimum conditions can be provided for its nurture. As Niblett puts it, 'The educated man needs to discuss his direction of progress and the 'whys' of his conduct as well as build up knowledge and skills'.³⁸ In classroom terms, as Kohlberg says, 'this implies that the teacher must be concerned about the child's moral judgments rather than about the conformity of the child's behaviour or judgments to the teacher's own.'⁴

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PAUL H. HIRST

'Christian Education': A Contradiction in Terms?

In this paper, the first of four given at the Victoria Institute's Symposium on Education on 6 Feb. 1971 in London, Professor Hirst, then Professor of Education at King's College, London, expresses himself vigorously and provocatively. With no shadow of doubt he lets it be known that in his view a 'Christian Education' is neither a reality nor even a possibility. Even to speak of it is as absurd as to speak of 'Christian farming' or 'Christian mathematics'. Institutions for Christian commitment have their legitimate place, but not in the class room or assembly hall!

The central thesis of this paper is that there has already emerged in our society a view of education, a concept of education, which makes the whole idea of "Christian Education" a kind of nonsense, and the search for a Christian approach to, or philosophy of, education a huge mistake. From this point of view the idea that there is a characteristically or distinctively Christian form of education seems just as much a mistake as the idea that there is a distinctively Christian form of mathematics, of engineering or of farming. In mathematics, engineering and farming we have developed activities in which what is right or wrong, or good or bad, of its kind, is determined by rational principles which make the activity what it is. Mathematical proofs must be judged right or wrong according to the principles of mathematical reasoning. A bridge to stay up in a gale must be designed strictly according to the principles of

engineering. A particular use of land which reduces it to a dust bowl is bad farming judged by the principles of farming. And the principles that govern these matters of mathematics, engineering and farming, are neither Christian nor non-Christian, neither for Christianity nor against Christianity. Nor is anything in these areas decided properly by appeal to Christian tradition, the Christian scriptures or anything else of that kind.

Once of course this was not so. Man's view of the physical world and how to cope with it in practical affairs, was at least in part determined by his religious beliefs. It was not thought possible to attain the relevant knowledge on autonomous, independent, rational grounds. But the pursuits I have mentioned have now been recognised as legitimately autonomous and an exactly similar status is, I suggest, quite properly coming to be accorded to education. Here too, we are progressively coming to understand that the issues must be settled independently of any questions of religious beliefs.

Long before I came to this conclusion, that judging what is good or bad in education has nothing to do with whether one is a Christian, a Humanist or a Buddhist, I suspected that there was something wrong with the whole idea of Christian Education, but could not put my finger on the real cause of my unease. I recognised that what one is offered under this label is often very dubious from both an educational and indeed from a Christian point of view. Much of it is based on very general moral principles, backed by perhaps Scripture or Christian tradition, which, having little or no explicit educational content, are applied to educational problems in a highly debatable way. It is not uncommon to hear it argued that Christians, convinced of the value of personal relationships, must clearly object to any school of above 500 pupils. One is sometimes assured in the name of Christianity, that comprehensivization is a wicked thing, and that specialization in the sixth form is equally deplorable. But clearly the general moral principles that people use to back up these beliefs about education do not alone determine any particular, practically relevant, educational principles. To get these one must consider equally important matters of

psychological and sociological fact, the structure of our social institutions, the availability of money and manpower, and so on. All these and many other considerations must enter into the discussion before one can move from very general principles of a moral kind, to specific educational recommendations, and it is on just these particular considerations that ideas of so-called Christian Education are often quite indefensible. The main point to be noted however, is that none of these considerations has anything to do with Christian beliefs. What is more it seems to me the general principles on which the whole exercise is based are usually not in any sense significantly Christian either, though people might appeal to Christian texts, or Christian tradition in support of them. Working from this end of general moral principles, I suggest that one simply cannot produce anything that is in any significant sense a distinctive Christian view of education.

But if one tries to work from the other end, formulating educational principles from what is specifically said in Scripture about education, one seems to run into an equally impossible situation. If you take what the Bible says about punishment and discipline, and try to compose some general educational principle from this, you will not, I think, get very far. To take ideas of social control out of a Biblical, social context, and transfer them directly to an East End school in our twentieth century industrial society is patently ludicrous. Christians of any intelligence have long since recognised the need to disentangle within Biblical teaching the general principles that can be legitimately applied in our own context from the practices justifiable only in the social and cultural circumstances of Biblical times. The problem then is how to abstract the principles without entering on inconclusive debate about Biblical interpretation. If that hurdle is surmounted is one likely to achieve much that is both educationally significant and distinctively Christian? I think not. And even if one does get so far, how much agreement can there be amongst Christians on particular applications of these principles? Experience suggests very little if any. On these grounds I concluded long ago, that much as one might

like to find a Biblical or Christian view of education, it isn't discoverable. Not because I saw anything wrong with the idea in principle, but because in practice it seems to be the case that one just cannot produce anything of substance that deserves to be labelled a Christian view of education.

Such a conclusion is clearly unpalatable to those Christians who are convinced of the total sufficiency of Biblical revelation for the conduct of all human affairs in all places and at all times. I suggest, however that the conclusion is valid, and that the people who hold the contrary view should rethink what they understand by the sufficiency of Biblical revelation in these matters. It seems to me that as a matter of fact the Bible is insufficient in what it implies for education today and that if crudely interpreted and crudely applied its teaching is positively dangerous.

But if I once thought that the *pursuit* of a distinctively Christian form of education is in principle satisfactory, I have now come to the conclusion that even that is not so. Let me approach this issue by voicing a possible reaction to what I have already argued. It might be said in reply that surely I have wrecked my case by vastly overstating it. If we cannot get an all embracing view of Christian Education that tells us what to do about comprehensivization, the curriculum, how to teach history, or even whether we ought to have compulsory education, surely there are some things in education on which Christians and, say, Humanists would disagree. If so, does it not follow that there is *in part* a distinctively Christian concept of education, one which is distinguishable from other views at least in these particular areas if not in others? If one cannot get everything necessary for educational practise from Christian teaching, surely one can get *something*, and something distinctive. Well, if so, what? The most likely answer a Christian will give is that surely he will want his children brought up in the Christian faith, that the Humanist, say, will certainly not want that, and that in this respect, their ideas of the content of education will be radically different. At this point, however, a very important shift can occur in the whole discussion, for another Christian may well say that the last thing one should do as

part of *education*, is to bring up a child in any faith, even the Christian faith. This second Christian would maintain that communicating our understanding of the Christian faith is a legitimate part of education, and with that many Humanists in our society might well agree, whereas bringing a child up in any particular faith is not what *education* is about. What we have here are two quite different views of education. According to the first, it is concerned with passing on to children what we believe, so that they in their turn come to believe it to be true. According to the second view, education should not be determined by what any group simply believes, but by what on publicly acknowledged rational grounds we can claim to know and understand.

The first of these concepts of education I shall call the primitive concept, for it clearly expresses the view of education a primitive tribe might have, when it seeks to pass on to the next generation its rituals, its ways of farming and so on, according to its own customs and beliefs. Whatever is held by the group to be true or valuable, simply because it is held to be true or valuable, is what is passed on so that it comes to be held as true and valuable by others in their turn. On this view, clearly there can be a Christian concept of education, one based on what Christians hold to be true and valuable in education, according to which Christians seek that the next generation shall think likewise. Similarly there can be a Humanist or a Buddhist concept, indeed there will be as many concepts of education as there are systems of beliefs and values, concepts overlapping in character in so far as the beliefs and values of the different groups overlap.

The second view of education is much more sophisticated, arising from a recognition that not all the things held to be true or valuable by a group are of the same status. Some of their claims and activities will be rationally defensible on objective grounds, whereas others, perhaps held equally tenaciously, may on objective grounds be highly debatable. Some may in fact be matters of nothing but mere custom and tradition. Once it is fully recognised that the belief that something is true, even if that belief is universal, does not of itself make it true, a new principle emerges for carefully

assessing what we pass on to others and how we wish them to regard it. That we hold something to be true or valuable is of itself no reason why anyone else should so regard it. That something can, on the appropriate objective grounds, be shown to be true or reasonable is a very good reason for passing it on to others. But even then what we must surely seek is that they will hold it not because we hold it, but because there are objective grounds. Only then will they be prepared to reconsider, and where necessary revise, their beliefs and practices when new evidence and better arguments arise.

The second, sophisticated view of education is thus concerned with passing on beliefs and practices according to, and together with, their objective status. It is dominated by a concern for knowledge, for truth, for reasons, distinguishing these clearly from mere belief, conjecture and subjective preference. On this view, when science is taught, its methods and procedures are seen to be as important as any contemporary, for these may in significant respects have to be changed. In history, pupils are introduced to examining evidence so that they come to recognise that claims about what happened must satisfy the canons of historical scholarship. Where there is dispute, debate and divergence of opinion this fact is taught. Where in any area there do not seem to be agreed objective principles of judgment, exactly that is what is taught. Of course, mistakes will be made in seeking to follow as closely as possible the ideals of objectivity and reason, but education committed to these ends will be very different from education determined by the particular beliefs and values of a limited group.

On this second view the character of education is not settled by any appeal to Christian, Humanist or Buddhist beliefs. Such an appeal is illegitimate, for the basis is logically more fundamental, being found in the canons of objectivity and reason, canons against which Christian, Humanist and Buddhist beliefs must, in their turn and in the appropriate way be assessed. When the domain of religious beliefs is so manifestly one in which there are at present no clearly recognisable objective grounds for judging claims, to base education on any such claims would be to forsake the

pursuit of objectivity, however firm our commitment might be to any one set of such beliefs. Indeed an education based on a concern for objectivity and reason, far from allying itself with any specific religious claims, must involve teaching the radically controversial character of all such claims. An understanding of religious claims it can perfectly well aim at, but commitment to any one set, in the interests of objectivity it cannot either assume or pursue.

I hope it will not be thought that in the forgoing I have been maintaining something that is necessarily either anti- or un-Christian. I see no reason to think anything I have said is incompatible with any religious position in which truth and objectivity matter, and I am taking it that Christianity at any rate is concerned with asserting truths about what is, in an appropriate sense, objectively the case. If, of course, Christianity is itself held to be in some sense a-rational, irrational or anti-rational then contradictions there certainly are. But then the trouble is, I can see no *reason* why anyone should take such religious claims seriously. Certainly I personally am not prepared to base my life on the glaring contradictions such an approach involves.

It might however be objected by some that my whole argument is based on the thesis that there exist vast areas of knowledge and understanding using concepts and canons of thought, objective in character and in no way connected with religious beliefs. This they would deny, insisting that in all areas of knowledge one is necessarily involved in presuppositions of a religious nature. In history, literature or even science one cannot, it is said, escape these elements and certainly in teaching these matters one's commitment necessarily infects all one does. To argue thus is indeed to deny the whole autonomy thesis on which my case rests, but such a denial seems to me so patently false that I find it hard to understand what is being maintained. In what way is mathematics supposed to depend on Christian principles? Its concepts and forms of argument seem to me to be totally devoid of religious reference. Nor do I understand what is meant by saying that science rests on Christian presuppositions, when the tests for its claims are ultimately matters

of sense observation. Scientific terms have meaning and criteria of application which are not connected with religious concepts of any sort. They are in this sense autonomous and scientific understanding is therefore of its nature autonomous. To maintain that it was only in a context of Christian belief that science did in fact arise, even if true, does not affect the nature of the activity of science at all. The pursuit is perfectly compatible with quite other beliefs, as is obvious in the present day, and nothing by way of historical, sociological or psychological analysis can in any way deny the claim that the concepts and principles of science are in no sense logically connected with Christian beliefs. That there is here an autonomous domain of knowledge and understanding seems to me indisputable. And surely this is why what matters in science, as in any other pursuit, is the mastery of its own logical and methodological principles, not holding any particular religious beliefs.

But it might be objected that if science is autonomous, historical studies are not, for an understanding of say the Reformation must be either Catholic or Protestant. Yet surely even this is an unacceptable claim if it is intended to deny the objectivity of contemporary historical scholarship. What matters is truth based on evidence, irrespective of the particular religious beliefs of the *scholar*: indeed these are nowadays recognised as an irrelevance, it is the justice to the historical data that counts. The idea of coming to a situation to interpret it from a set of beliefs to which one subscribes, is to reject the demand of historical scholarship. What is true of historical studies is, I suggest, also true of literary and even religious studies. I see no reason why there should not be, and indeed there is already being practised, an objective study of religions in which the particular religious beliefs of students are an irrelevant consideration. To understand beliefs or actions does not necessitate that one either accepts or approves of them and to teach for such an understanding demands acceptance or approval of them by neither teacher nor pupil.

But even if the autonomy thesis is accepted, and it is granted that something called education could be planned and

conducted in terms of the second sophisticated concept that I outlined, it might still be argued that this would be undesirable. If education can be understood in two senses, either in the primitive sense of simply passing on beliefs and practices or in the sophisticated sense of passing on knowledge and understanding and reason, why should we not stick to the first which can take on a distinctively Christian form?

In the first place, I suggest the sophisticated concept is important because it provides a clear and to my mind appropriate demarkation for the educational functions of State run institutions. I personally hold that it is quite improper for State institutions to align themselves with any religious group and in particular to take over any of the affairs that properly belong to the Christian Church. The function of the State in religious matters should not, I think, be one of taking any side on issues of so controversial a nature, but the more objective function of preserving freedom and liberty. This is to suggest that there are many areas of life from which the State should keep clear and that in education it should not act outside a domain in which objectivity and reason govern all that is done. This would then leave to the Church, the home and other social agencies those matters which might figure in a concept of education in the first or primitive sense, which could not figure in the sophisticated concept. Bringing up a child in a particular faith is thus seen as the proper concern of the home or Church but not of the State school. It is seen as an element in education in the first of my two senses but not in the second.

Simply to suggest that education in the second sense is appropriate for State schools does however seem to imply that education in the first sense is nevertheless a thoroughly coherent and acceptable concept which can properly be applied in a context wider than or outside the State school. With that conclusion I am however far from happy. For, is bringing up children so that they believe what we believe, *education* in any sense that is nowadays acceptable? Indeed I suggest that this pursuit is in fact now increasingly considered immoral, wherever it is conducted. What I want

for a child, whether he is at home, in Church or at a State school, is that he shall come to believe what there are reasons for believing, accept what there are reasons for accepting and commit himself to nothing simply because I say so. Of course in his early years he may accept things in this way, but what one is trying to develop in education is an autonomous human being who will be responsible for his own judgments as far as he can, certainly on controversial issues of importance to him. It seems incumbent upon me then in home and Church as much as in school, to be as objective as I can about all matters. In so far then as education in the first sense goes beyond concern for objectivity and reason, be it conducted in the home or the Church, I am against it. I am therefore rejecting the moral acceptability of anything which falls under the first concept of education but not under the second. But in that case, the whole idea of Christian education is one I am rejecting, for I wish to resist the suggestion that it should be conducted anywhere.

But, you might say, that is surely to ask too much. What would be the difference between the State school and the Church and the home in their educational functions if none of them went beyond the measured, objective consideration of different religions? In their *educational* function there should I think be no difference. Yet the home and the Church do have other functions that do not run counter to education in the objective sense. Clearly, in areas where there is radical debate on matters which are of enormous importance for peoples' lives, we have by definition issues which cannot be fully settled simply on objective, rational grounds that are recognisable as such by all reasonable men. The whole domain of reasoning in politics, for instance, is one in which rational men disagree, and we accept that they will in all honesty disagree. There are institutions where political matters can be taught from an objective point of view, and I trust this is what we do in school. But we also consider it proper for there to be institutions concerned with promoting and developing particular political beliefs. What they seek is not in any sense anti- or irrational, but commitment, in that people come to a decision however difficult, on highly important issues. In a

similar way, in addition to objective education in religious matters, there is surely a proper area for other religious concerns, that do not run counter to the interest of education. The significance of religious commitment, on matters on which equally reasonable men differ, can be considerable. There is thus a manifold need for institutions in which men can explore to the full and act together according to the beliefs they hold, and through which they can also seek to present and commend to others what they hold to be true. In the Church and the home, children and others are faced with just these aspects of religious belief and commitment. Provided they are introduced to them in a way that does not oppose the development of rational beliefs, there is no need for any conflict with the interests of education in my second sense. But what we should call these quite proper activities, in which religious and political groups seek to commend their beliefs and practices to others, I am not sure. The term education is I suggest inappropriate. My first sense of that term is so broad that it includes not only these quite proper activities, but also others which I have argued are morally indefensible. My second sense of the term is so specific that it excludes these proper activities. To seek to form a third concept of education lying between these two, covering both this category of proper activities and those of education in the second sense, would, I suggest do us all a dis-service.

At present the concept of education in our society is moving clearly towards my second sense, a sense so valuable in its central demarcatory function, that it would seem to me most important to hang on to this notion. In so far as we do that, there can be no such thing as Christian Education. Not that there is any necessary contradiction between Christian beliefs and education in this sense, provided Christian beliefs form a rationally coherent system. It is rather that the term education is being used to pick out activities that can be characterised independently of any religious reference.

I conclude, then, that we have now reached a stage in the development of our grasp of what education might or might not, ought or ought not to, include, that the notion of Christian

Education is properly regarded as an anachronism. If that is so Christians working in education would do well to follow the example of those working in engineering or farming, who simply get on with mastering the non-religious principles of their own professional business. And if that seems to be asking for a divorce between one's Christian beliefs and one's professional practice, I can only suggest that any rationally coherent approach to the Christian faith must see it as perfectly consistent with the knowledge and understanding that man has amassed on autonomous grounds.

GEOFFREY W. ROBSON

Christian Education *is* Meaningful:
a Reply to the previous paper

Professor Hirst's provocative paper failed to convince Mr. Geoffrey Robson. He fears the ultimate implications of the view so strongly expressed by the newly appointed Professor of Education at Cambridge.

Professor Hirst's basic point is simple: there are areas of human understanding which depend only on reason: education should now be included in their number and since religious faith is not reason, it should be excluded from education. Unlike the Victoria Institute, which exists to relate faith to thought, he settles the matter for education by rigorously severing them.

Professor P. H. Hirst's thesis is based entirely on an *a priori* dichotomy between reason and faith. Without pausing to justify this dichotomy, he hurries on, relying on increasingly strong statements asserting or implying its existence. 'If Christianity is itself held to be . . . a-rational, irrational or anti-rational . . . I can see no *reason* why anyone should take such religious claims seriously'; to do so would involve a 'glaring contradiction'. The Victoria Institute, as one member sees it, does not accept the presupposition in Professor Hirst's sentence. Its *raison d'être* is that Christianity is not a- or ir- or anti-rational. But it is not Christianity if it is not supra-rational and this is clean contrary to Professor Hirst's point: 'in so far as education . . . goes beyond . . . reason . . . I am against it'. His contention becomes so strenuous that he affirms: 'one just cannot produce anything of substance that deserves to be labelled a

Christian view of education'. 'The whole idea of Christian education . . . I am rejecting, for I wish to resist the suggestion it should be conducted anywhere'. The common man (or the popular press which writes for him) might fairly take one such sentence from the paper and conclude simply that a leader in education is against any association of Christianity with education. Professor Hirst's hope that it 'will not be thought . . . I have been maintaining something . . . either anti, or un-Christian' is forlorn. Apart from this remark he advances no objective grounds to support such a 'hope'.

Let us examine his paper further. Professor Hirst assumes, without argument, that it is legitimate to distinguish sharply between an education exclusive of all elements save the rational and objective, and an education inclusive of other elements: the first he says is right, the second wrong. Speaking of education he says 'that there is here an autonomous domain of knowledge and understanding seems to me indisputable.' Again no proof is offered. The present writer regards it as equally indisputable that in the mind, and so in education also, 'understanding' is not and cannot be an autonomous faculty. Neither in the mind, nor in education, do we find a sharp 'demarcation' between subjectivity and objectivity, or between faith and thought. A man cannot divide himself into subjective motivation and objective thinking. It is simply not the case that some men are thinkers and others believers: the thinking of a man who believes he is committed to no belief is biased by precisely that subjective belief.

Professor Hirst comes near to admitting that this dichotomy is artificial: In all areas of knowledge one is necessarily involved in presuppositions of a religious nature . . . in teaching . . . one's commitment necessarily infects all one does. To argue thus is indeed to deny the whole autonomy thesis on which my case rests'. He dismisses the point but not logically. First, there is a direct unargued contradiction in strong rhetorical language: ' . . . such a denial seems to me so patently false that I find it hard to understand what is being maintained'. What is being maintained is that in man,

reason is not an autonomous faculty. Second, the argument is shifted: 'In what way is mathematics supposed to depend on Christian principles?' This was not the point made: which was that 'presuppositions' and 'commitment' 'infect all one does'. The exposition which follows about mathematical concepts being 'devoid of religious reference' and 'scientific terms not (being) connected with religious concepts' likewise does not relate to the point raised. The subsequent statement that 'nothing . . . can in any way deny the claim that the . . . principles of science are in no sense logically connected with Christian belief' is different. I would ask: 'not logically', perhaps, but philosophically?

As Professor Hirst's paper progresses, the unreality of his dichotomy works itself out into plain contradiction: the 'not anti-Christian' but 'against' Christian education 'conducted anywhere'. 'Bringing up a child in a particular faith' is 'morally indefensible' but 'commending their beliefs and practices to others' are 'quite proper activities'. 'I am against it': 'education . . . beyond reason, be it conducted in the home or the Church'. 'Yet the home and the Church do have other functions that do not run counter to education in the objective sense' . . . 'We have by definition issues which cannot be fully settled simply on objective rational grounds'. 'There is a proper area for . . . religious concerns that do not run counter to . . . education'. 'In the Church and the home, children . . . are faced with just these aspects of religious belief'. 'There is no need for any conflict with . . . education in my . . . sense'.

The contradictions steadily lead Professor Hirst towards the abandonment of his dichotomy. The idea of filling the artificial gap he has created with a third category occurs to him. 'What we should call these quite proper activities in which . . . groups . . . commend their beliefs and practices . . . I am not sure. The term education is I suggest inappropriate'. 'To form a third concept of education lying between these two, covering both, would, I suggest, do us all a dis-service'. So he draws back from the final gap in his logic with 'I am not sure', and avoids answering the problem he has raised by saying

that to answer it would 'do us all a dis-service'. It is a greater dis-service to raise it and leave it unanswered.

However, in fairness let it be added that Professor Hirst's paper is not entirely negative. We can all share his educational aim: 'What one is trying to develop in education is an autonomous human being who will be responsible for his own judgements . . .' But, for the Christian, man's full autonomy is attained only 'in Christ'. The Christian teacher will approach his work with a dedication to absolute truth, so far as he is able, whether in physics, history, mathematics, engineering, farming or education. If he is a teacher his Christian integrity will be of supreme importance to the way he presents truth what ever he teaches.

A subordinate Christian insight is that a man in Christ only finds his own autonomy fulfilled in the community of other men in Christ: in the sharing of the ultimate common good. This inescapably involves 'bringing up children so that they believe what we believe'. But this is not to make them believe it *only because* we believe it (that produces unsatisfactory Christians) but so that they shall find it true for themselves. On this last point, Professor Hirst and I are not in dispute. Where I am in dispute is that I want the fullest degree of Christian education to achieve this outcome, whereas he says that 'this pursuit is now increasingly considered immoral where ever it is conducted' and 'I wish to resist the suggestion that it should be conducted anywhere'.

Professor Hirst's comments on Christianity as Christianity seem slight and his language exaggerated. Dispassionate objectivity cannot speak of 'Christians who are convinced of the total sufficiency of Biblical revelation for the conduct of all human affairs in all places and at all times'. 'The Bible and the most unintelligent Christian take many aspects of human affairs for granted'. 'The Bible is insufficient in what it implies for education today': 'what does it imply for education, town-planning or engineering'? The argument is shifted: 'if crudely interpreted and crudely applied (for education) its teaching is positively dangerous'. Why link 'crudely' with the Bible? Ideas from any source 'crudely' applied, are no doubt 'positively dangerous'.

The examples given seem crude. The historian with a Christianly-informed conscience, whether Catholic or Protestant, would never claim that his particular insight was needed to evaluate the Reformation objectively. A Christianly-sensitive view may, without inconsistency, desire both small schools and comprehensivization. A Christianly-sensitive attitude to social control may be far from 'patently ludicrous' in 'a 20th century East End school'. Language like 'Christians of any intelligence have long since recognised' is emotively coloured to support the author's preconceptions. As answer to the question 'cannot there be that which is educationally significant and distinctively Christian?', 'I think not' or 'very little if any' seems inadequate. Is not Christian motivation distinctive? A layman has no difficulty in understanding a Christian education as an education by teachers whose outlook is Christian. The *reductio ad absurdum*, 'one just cannot produce anything of substance that deserves to be labelled a Christian view of education', would seem to recoil on the author. There are worldwide examples at all educational levels as there have been for 2000 years. Shall we abjure the 'Christian tradition' of Bede, Comenius, Franke and Robert Raikes or our modern education's debt to Methodist day-schools in Co. Durham or to Anglican day-schools in South East London?

As a Christian who does not believe in State-Church affiliation, I would concur that 'it is improper for State institutions to align themselves with any religious group' and that 'the function of the State is . . . the more objective function of preserving freedom and liberty'. That is why some Christians, and others, built non-church day-schools in South East London. But if the State properly represents a Christianized community, which wants to act as if it were a Christian community, then I see it as having a moral responsibility, not as acting immorally, if it seeks to pass on the beliefs of the community, providing it does not do so at the expense of the liberty of parents. I do not think Professor Hirst has out-dated Lord Butler, 1944.

The State-Church school issue is not new. In the 1840's the USA settled it as Professor Hirst now advocates. There is however, one fact of history which ought not to be overlooked. Those states which have most rigorously applied to Christianity Professor Hirst's view of 'resisting anywhere bringing up children to believe what we believe', such as the USSR where even parental religious instruction under age 18 is forbidden, have filled the vacuum with the most intensive anti-theistic instruction. Panorama's film of infants chanting at the beginning of each day in catechetical fashion from Mao's book, precisely as some of us learned the Ten Commandments, or a past generation of Scots dealt with the catechism of the Westminster divines, prompts some questions: can man, being man, ever finally accept a religious void? When the void is created by casting out God is there no ground for fearing the spirit that rushes in instead?

I fear that, with the best possible intentions, Professor Hirst may be simply conforming education to the current world view which demands autonomy without God, a world view which makes man autonomously answerable to none but himself.

ESSAY REVIEWS

New Wine or Old Bottles : Which?

It is customary for philosophical theologians to discuss arguments about the existence of God within the frame work handed down to us from past generations. In this review of a typical modern book on the subject, Professor Hick's *Arguments for the Existence of God*,¹ it is urged that this approach is quite unsuited to our time.

Professor John Hick, Professor of Theology at Birmingham University is a well-known authority on philosophical theology on which subject he has already published a number of books. In the present book he seeks to marshal and examine the arguments for belief in God.

The author fits much of what he has to say into the classical framework. There are chapters on the *Design Argument*, *Teleology and Probability*, the *Cosmological Argument*, the *Moral Arguments*, the *Ontological Argument* in its various guises (two chapters) and, finally the possibility of belief without proof.

It hardly needs be said that, as an expert in his field, Professor Hick knows his stuff. The book is a useful reference source, giving apt quotations and terse statements of the contributions made by Aquinas, St. Anselm, Hume, Kant, etc., to the subject.

On the philosophical side it is also well up to date: you may learn how Professor So-and-so has modified this or that classical argument. There are some valuable insights too, and some unusual arguments which are well developed; for example a simple and convincing reply to Anthony Flew's astonishing but false claim that 'no reason whatever has yet been given for considering that God would be an inherently more intelligible ultimate than—say—the most fundamental laws of energy and stuff' (p 46). In another striking section Professor Hick argues for the inadequacy of humanist ethics on the basis that: 'On humanist principles no possible object of desire could, on a rational calculation, be worth to me the price of my own existence' (p 64).

The general conclusion is that though none of the traditional 'proofs' are valid in a rigid sense, all save one of them do at least give a hint, or

possibly more than a hint, that theological explanations of our universe are valid. You can avoid this conclusion if you like, he says, but only by asserting that ultimately the universe is unintelligible.

An excellent book! Then why complain?

Chiefly because the title is so misleading. Pick it up and you might think that it is really about arguments for the existence of God in 1971. It is not. In fact the author does not seem unduly interested in arguments for the existence of God. His primary interest is philosophy (or what currently passes as such): for this reason he devotes nearly a quarter of the book to the irrelevant and valueless ontological argument, defending himself thus:

'Even in its failures it is still *from a philosophical point of view* (m.i.) in many ways the most rewarding of the proofs to study; and its fascination shows no sign of failing even after nearly a thousand years of intermittent discussion' (p 69).

A thousand years! The treatment is, in fact, historical, even archaic. Too often it seems utterly alien to the thinking of the ordinary educated man of today.

For instance, there is the repeated use of the word *prove* (even though the author explains earlier that it does not always mean what it says). The word is inappropriate and long outdated except in mathematics or similar disciplines. Given premises, as in geometry, you can prove a proposition, but you cannot prove the existence of stars, atoms, black holes, angels or God: a geologist does not prove his tectonic theory, nor a biochemist his conception of the structure of DNA. Why becloud the issue by applying the word to God? Do philosophers *never* ask how other people talk?

Or think? Listen to this (from Aquinas *cum* Aristotle). Iron has the non-selfactualising potentiality of being hot, but to realise its potentiality you must heat it by something already hot (p 39, shortened). No doubt there is a point here, but the archaic jargon grates. Nor is it exactly helpful to be told on the next page that of course Aquinas was not quite right for Professor Anthony Kenny (a 1969 reference is given!) pointed out that temperatureless electricity makes wires hot. Did Aquinas never see a lightning flash?

Though he presents all the old arguments with great skill and meticulous care, together with their possible refutations, his antiquarian approach seems at times to blind the author to quite obvious rejoinders. In illustration (following Hume) Professor Hick devotes pages to the argument that it is impossible to assert that it is probable that God is Creator of the Universe because probability to be meaningful implies comparison. If the dice falls once only, I cannot say if the result is

probable or improbable because I have no other results of the throw of dice with which to compare it. (Not the only meaning of probability, surely, but let that pass!) Similarly the coming into being of the Universe is like one throw of the dice – we have no other universes with which to compare the event. But however cogent this argument may have seemed in the days of Hume, modern education has greatly reduce its appeal. We may parallel the argument thus: Let us call the sum total of all the writing (art, or music etc) that has ever existed X. Then since X exists and there is nothing (relative to the components of X) outside X, it follows that we cannot argue that it is probable that X is designed. X is just there; there is no other X for comparison. X is like the one and only throw of the dice.

No one in his senses would take this argument seriously. Then why need we take it more seriously when someone says, 'Let us take the sum total of everything and call the result "the universe".' The universe consists of parts and we are not obliged to call the sum total of the parts 'Universe' or X; moreover parts *can* be compared. It is meaningful to assign probability to parts: the semantic devise of adding parts together and giving the total a name does not remove the meaning. It is a purely verbal procedure.

Professor Hicks evidently aims at stating the case against religion as strongly as he can, to show that in the end, however strongly it is stated, the case for Theism is better. This is an admirable aim, but in carrying out his objective he often underestimates the case for theism. An astonishing instance of this occurs in his discussion of the design argument (p 14). He is here discussing the argument that the enormous complexity of proteins cannot be the result of chance. To do so he resurrects a form of the argument now half a century old (C.E. Guye, 1923) couched in terminology much older still, in which it is naively calculated that the odds against 2000 atoms (*sic*) combining in a certain way is so and so. After more than two pages of this (14-16) we are regaled with a completely irrelevant refutation, based on natural selection, followed by the triumphal conclusion that 'du Nouy's (i.e. Guye's) argument is altogether lacking in cogency'. Is Professor Hick ignorant of the writings of C.F.A. Pantin, W.H. Thorpe and others who have discussed the design argument in a modern context? Even Bernal, of the Marxist materialist school, admits many difficulties in the natural selection formula which Professor Hick seems to find so convincing. Why not Malcolm Dixon instead of Guye? Why no mention of two levels of the design argument (design of the pieces: design in putting the pieces together) with no mention, even, of Lawrence Henderson? The sad answer seems to be that because Aquinas, Hume,

Kant and the rest did not discuss these things, neither should anybody else, at least in respectable philosophical circles.

Why then do philosophical theologians remain glued to the language of past ages? Imagine, if you can, a book on atomic physics in which the chapter headings, the very language, follows closely that of Boyle's *Skeptical Chymist*. The book seems excellent in its way but will not reviewers say that the wine of new thinking ill befits old bottles? That, too, is the only verdict one can reach about Professor Hick's book.

R.E.D.C.

REFERENCE.

1. John H. Hick, *Argument for the Existence of God*, Macmillan 1970. pp xiii + 148. £2.50

Max Weber and India

It is often assumed that the primary need of developing nations is help from the West in the form of capital and 'know-how'. A recent publication, originating in India, reveals the problem in a new light.

In historical circles in recent decades much of the discussion on the relationship between Christianity and civilisation has centred around views first expressed by Max Weber¹.

There are two main points in Weber's thesis. (1) The Protestant ethic sanctified a man's calling (*beruf*); not priests, monks and nuns only but ordinary men and women were called by God to work in His vineyard. Therefore all work must be done to the glory of God and since our life span is so limited, it follows that pleasure seeking and waste of time are especially sinful. Even when a man has provided for his needs and those of his dependents, it is wrong for him to cease his labours, for he must then endeavour to help others. A man must not seek self-advancement for its own sake, but it is his duty to accept rank if this will increase his usefulness to society. The Reformers knew that this ethic would inevitably increase wealth and they fully realised that devotion to God might suffer in consequence. Wealth would increase because even if used for charitable purposes (e.g. a man might in kindness lend his neighbour money to start a business), the end result would be the same. And this, according to Max Weber, is

how Protestant doctrine worked out: money became available for large loans and capitalism was free to develop.

(2) In a non-Protestant environment, trust is confined to the family or clan. A number of studies have shown that even within Christian groups Protestants are far more trusting towards those outside their blood relatives than are Roman Catholics in a similar environment (p. 28, ref 2). The Christian, and particularly the Protestant, comes to think of others who are not his blood relations as brothers and sisters in Christ; he learns therefore to trust them implicitly. In fact Protestantism's greatest achievement was to 'shatter the fetters of the sib'. This showed itself in the development of banking and credit systems which involve trusting other people with one's money; trust in political leaders to use their power wisely; acceptance of 'the principle of staffing with the best people out of a wide universe of candidates' and the use of 'present wealth for capital inputs and future gains' which is difficult if not impossible without a trust which extends beyond tribal, ethnic or blood boundaries.

At the present time a number of undeveloped nations are seeking to grow into the twentieth century. A recently published book² deals with India. It is clearly vital in India, as elsewhere, that the issues raised by Weber should be squarely faced. How will it ever be possible for India to advance from its present low cultural level without the Christian faith, or some substitute for that faith which will provide what the Christian faith gave to Western man at the beginning of the technological era?

The book represents what appears to be the first attempt to tackle the problem. It is the outcome of a seminar held in Hyderabad in 1966 to discuss Max Weber's theory of religion and socio-economic change.

The Editors, the Loomis's, under various chapter headings, summarize the basic tenets of Weber's teachings. At the conference opportunity was given for the participating Indians to comment and the comments were collected and printed. At the close of each chapter the Editors then summarize the position and comment briefly on what has been said.

Among the Indians participating there is a good deal of diversification of opinion, yet no sign of a solution is hinted at. Some points of interest which stand out follow below.

Lalit Sen (p xix) thinks the Max Weber problem has been shirked by Indians as a result of 'a mental block against Western thinkers writing about India'.

There is much discussion on the effect of the caste system, the doctrine of the transmigration of souls and the belief in karma. In Indian society, if a man wants to rise in caste status he can do so

only by imitating the upper castes: this involves giving up all occupations involving manual work and deliberately increasing social distance from inferiors (p. 52) — no recipes for technological advance!

Indian society, in the villages, is dominated by caste and family: trust beyond these confines is non-existent. As a result when new 'knowhow' is discovered by artisans it at once becomes one of the family secrets. The would-be inventor is thus precluded from knowing the 'present state of the art' (p. 52) and the patent system cannot develop usefully.

Hinduism does not recognise that all men are equal in the sight of God. It knows nothing of the sense of sin which prevents the Protestant idling his time away. Nor is Hinduism a religion at all in *our* sense of the word: a man does not *become* a Hindu, he is born into the system. Though some Indians feel that the caste system is disintegrating, one of them states candidly, 'To say that caste should be abolished is a *cliché* now. Yet we know, in many ways, it is finding new strength and operating in new ways. The more important question is *how* to break it and develop the larger ties and identity beyond the family and caste' (Nair, p. 88). Even when, in Hindu society, some wealth has been accumulated it is commonly dissipated on an extravagant wedding which may impoverish a family for years. We are reminded (p 40) that it is hard to imagine an old-time Calvinist who would use all his fortune and more in launching a child into matrimony! This is an interesting aside on the desperate shortage of capital for industrial development.

A fascinating point arises in connection with the interpretation of disease (p. 117 - 120). One Indian found that in villages he had visited nearly all the non-Christians thought that evil spirits caused small pox: unlike the Christian villagers they showed no interest in vaccination. This finding did not apply to another Indian tribe. Here a smaller proportion (but still well over one half) held the evil spirit theory, nevertheless three out of every four persons thought the vaccination afforded protection — apparently by frightening the spirits away!

R.E.D.C.

REFERENCES

- 1 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Eng. Trans, 1930. Also several later works. For a symposium on the subject see R.W. Green, (Ed.), *Protestantism and Capitalism*, 1959.
- 2 Loomis C.P. and Z.K. Loomis (Eds.), *Socio-economic Change and the Religious Factor in India. An Indian Symposium of views on Max Weber*. Van Nostrand Reinhold (also published in Delhi), 1970, £2.50 xx + 140p.

REVIEWS

LUKE

I. Howard Marshall, *Luke, Historian and Theologian*, Paternoster Press, 238p, £1.75.

Dr. Marshall states the problem in vivid terms: in the view of the more radical exponents of redaction criticism 'the Gospels — and Acts — are extremely poor quarries for bedrock tradition. The strata of original tradition are thin and inaccessible beneath considerable layers of other rock and much rubble. Further, if the metaphor may be pressed, they now consist of largely metamorphosed rocks whose original composition, shape and position must be a matter of uncertain conjecture' (p. 17).

This book is in part an *argumentum ad homines*. It is a contribution to a debate, and it excels as a balanced and constructive criticism of those views of Conzelmann and others which have made Luke-Acts a storm-centre of contemporary scholarship. This is a valuable undertaking, for the opinions here combatted are influential, and it is important that they should be sifted so painstakingly.

But Dr. Marshall has done more than this. He makes a thorough survey of the Lucan writings and their special emphasis, and reaches positive conclusions about the qualities of Luke both as historian and as theologian. He argues that the two roles are not incompatible. The central motif of Luke's theology was 'salvation', and this depended upon the acceptance of historical facts about Jesus. Luke was accordingly concerned to give an accurate account of events, not a historicised 'salvation-history'. Dr. Marshall rightly insists that it is one-sided to see Luke's hand only in his supposed editorial alterations of his sources: his preservation of tradition is highly significant and shows his stature as a conservative theologian, who, while having his own purpose and emphasis, was essentially controlled by his sources.

In the early chapters Dr. Marshall discusses problems of historiography and proceeds to a very cautious survey on Lucan source-criticism and cites testimonies to Luke's demonstrable accuracy in detail. While very sensitive to problems in such areas as the speeches in Acts, he reaches a favourable verdict on Luke's historical abilities. His rebuttal of Conzelmann's attack on Luke's knowledge of Palestine geography is important in view of the theological structure which Conzelmann tries to build on the idea that the topographical data are redactional.

The bulk of the book is devoted to a systematic exploration of Luke's main theme of salvation. Dr. Marshall shows repeatedly that

where redaction critics have laid undue weight on an atomistic analysis of Lucan peculiarities his thought and language are actually to be paralleled with the earliest parts of the New Testament tradition. Luke has brought the primitive emphases into sharp focus, but he has not felt free to harmonise varied accounts to a pattern (pp. 198-9). The whole section is rich in exegetical discussion and salutary comment. Many interesting issues are illuminated in passing and the argument is carefully documented. Dr. Marshall is rightly wary of reading theological significance into non-technical usage of words (pp. 106n., 108-9), and of arguing negatively from the absence of motifs which Luke may have had no occasion to mention (pp. 179, 209-11).

In detail the force of some of Dr. Marshall's arguments will vary in the judgment of different readers. There is room for some variation of emphasis. Popular usage of the 'salvation' group of words, for instance, in Acts 16: 17, 30: 27, 31, 34, 43, 44 is set in a Gentile context. A more explicit recognition of their obsessive currency in the pagan world will not detract from the stress on the Septuagintal background of Luke's thought (p. 96). Rather it brings out the relevance of Luke's emphasis to a life-setting in the earliest Gentile mission. It is perhaps to make Dr. Marshall's essential point in a rather different way. And a comparable background may be relevant elsewhere: the problematic use of *euangélion* in Rev. 14: 6 (pp. 123-4) might for instance be set against the language of a decree of Augustan date extant from four cities of proconsular Asia (*Oriens Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae* 458.41).

Dr. Marshall inclines to an early date for Luke-Acts and to acceptance of traditional authorship (p. 220). He sees corroboration of these judgments in his case for the primitive character of Lucan theology. One feels they might also be maintained on other grounds. He makes only passing reference to some of the chronological issues (pp. 75-6, 135, 157n.), though an independent consideration of the date of composition seems a very relevant topic for the discussion of the historical value of the Acts, as well as a check on the vexed problems of theological development.

But it would be ungenerous to regret the absence of questions which lay outside the frame of reference of the main purpose Dr. Marshall has fulfilled so ably. In the historical sphere he could build upon a long tradition of British scholarship. He has made an important contribution to at least one aspect of the debate and has pointed the need to renew the closer consideration of the bearing of the historical evidence in face of the new challenges.

The book is well produced and well indexed.

IMMORTALITY

B. F. C. Atkinson, *Life and Immortality*, n.d. Available from Rev. B. Bateson, Winsham Vicarage, Chard, Somerset. Price £0.50 post free.

The subtitle of Dr. Atkinson's book is 'An examination of the nature and meaning of life and death as they are revealed in the Scriptures'. He concludes that the Scriptures do not teach body-soul dualism or the natural immortality of the human soul, or even the actual survival of the soul as a disembodied spirit after bodily death. He also argues that there is no Scriptural authority for the belief that those whom God needs finally to reject are kept alive for ever to be everlastingly tormented. Though the doctrine of Hell seems to have been an obligatory dogma of most branches of the Christian Church for most of the time, there is also a strong tradition in favour of 'conditional immortality'. The strength of this testimony has been massively evidenced in two huge volumes, *The Conditionalist Faith of our Fathers*, by Professor LeRoy Edwin Froom (Washington D.C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1965 and 1966). Dr. Atkinson himself warmly commended these volumes when they were published.

Dr. Atkinson's own aim is much more specific than Professor Froom's. His book is also somewhat shorter — 112 pages as compared with 2476 pages! We should all profit from this very clear, straightforward, honest and learned book by a distinguished and devout Christian philologist who has played such a big part in the religious life of Cambridge: he was Under-Librarian of the Cambridge University Library for 35 years. He examines carefully all the important words in Hebrew and Greek which are used in the Bible in connection with the topics of life, death, survival, resurrection, heaven, hell, etc. He examines them in all their important contexts and on the strength of this mass of linguistic evidence seeks to infer *the* Biblical doctrines about life and death. It says much for Dr. Atkinson's skill that he has succeeded in making a treatise of this sort very readable, and easily understood by the amateur. It is certainly much more useful than many of the more fashionable and pretentious books on the same subject. It is a pity that it seems to be printed by a small publisher and that it is difficult to order through bookshops. It is also a pity that the author may fall between two stools. On the one hand, his unswerving acceptance of the absolute authority and inerrancy of the Scriptures may make him suspect among so-called 'liberal' scholars. On the other hand, his conclusions about Hell may not fit in with the Conservative Evangelical party line, and his friends may fear that he is 'unsound'. But whereas many have criticised the hell doctrine because they do not

feel it fits in with their picture of the Christian God, Dr. Atkinson (although he obviously agrees with this feeling) relies solely on the fact that *it is not in fact revealed in the Scriptures*.

Even if we do not postulate *a priori* the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures and the consequent homogeneity of their revealed teaching, we have to admit that Dr. Atkinson has put up an overwhelming case to show that the doctrines he criticises, cannot be 'proved from Scripture' by *any* sort of reputable exegesis and that they are incompatible with the obvious opinions of at least most of the Biblical writers. The only qualification I might wish to make would concern those books which are most obviously influenced by Greek ideas, e.g. the Wisdom Literature. His case might also be weakened slightly if he accepted the longer Canon as defined by Rome. We might then argue that the immortality of the soul is something about which a Christian might *speculate* legitimately. It would certainly mean that the line between revelation and speculation could not be drawn quite so sharply. But no such qualifications as these could shake his conclusions about the dominant trends of thought in those writers he does discuss. All students should certainly read his book.

A. C. ADCOCK.

FREEWILL

J. R. Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will*, OUP, 1970. £1.50.

R. L. Franklin, *Freewill and Determinism*. Routledge and Kegan Paul 1968, £2.25. M. R. Ayers, *The Refutation of Determinism*. Methuen, 1968, £1 (PB), £2.

Until comparatively recently philosophical arguments in favour of determinism seemed to be coercive. In my own Cambridge days, in the 1930s, it would have been rash to try and defend libertarianism in *any* sense in philosophical circles. Professor C. D. Broad summed up the whole matter in *Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism*. For most of us, that was that. Broad defined the rules of the game in such a way that libertarianism, whether in the 'strong' sense or in the 'weak' sense, could never hope to get off the ground. The Vienna Circle alone seemed to offer a crumb of comfort: as all metaphysical speculation is nonsense, determinism is as nonsensical as libertariansim. In 1936, the Burney Prize Essay argued that absolute determinism is certainly true and that it accords better with the highest Christian and liberal values than any of the alternative metaphysical theories on this matter. At the time it seemed to many of us in Cambridge that this was the only profitable line to take.

Nobody in his right mind, if at all scientifically or philosophically literate, would claim that all the crucial problems have yet been solved. Even so, in recent years there has been a very great change. It is no

longer obvious that philosophers like Broad considered *all* the logical possibilities, or that their analysis of a human action and its reasons and causes was beyond all possible criticism. Nor is it obvious that the term 'cause' is monolithic. The whole matter needs to be re-opened and the semantics reconsidered. M. R. Ayers provides a brilliant analysis of the factors which go to 'cause' an action. This analysis might well suffice to show that a thoroughgoing determinism could never hope to get off the ground. Professor Franklin goes further and writes a much longer and more detailed book, raising very many more questions. He thinks that beneath the technical issues discussed by philosophers, and the different answers given, lie some of men's most disputed and important beliefs about themselves and the world they live in. The sub-title of this book — 'A Study of Rival Conceptions of Man' — is significant.

Mr Lucas's book is by far the most ambitious and provocative. 'The freedom of the will can now be established. Although the development of the mathematical sciences used to be regarded as inimical to our view of ourselves as free agents, two discoveries of the present century — Quantum Mechanics and Gödel's Theorem—have entirely altered our view of the world, and have shown not only that there is no reason to suppose we are not free but that there cannot be. Gödel's Theorem demonstrates that all attempts to construct a computer which can do everything a man can do must fail, and therefore any determinist theory which purports to explain in physical terms the intelligent activity of a rational being must be false.' Though he relies on this Theorem a great deal, his book contains many short, neat and clear arguments about other aspects of the subject. It provides an excellent classified bibliography and copious references to most of the books and papers recently written on the subject. Mr. Lucas is most anxious to link up the latest theories with the traditional discussions. His book should be compulsory reading for all students of philosophical theology. It is clear enough for a much wider public as well. A. C. ADCOCK

Thanks are due to the Editor of FAITH AND FREEDOM for permission to publish these two reviews by A. C. Adcock.

THERAPY OF MEANING

Viktor E. Frankl. *The Will of Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy*, (Souvenir Press) xi + 180p, £1.75.

Logotherapy, or meaning therapy, was introduced by Dr. Viktor E. Frankl soon after WW2; it arose as a direct result of his experiences and observations in Hitler's death camps, a story which he vividly tells

in an earlier book (*Man's Search for Meaning* 1964). The present volume is a collection of 13 papers, all save two by Frankl himself, dealing with logotherapy. Inevitably there is much repetition but there are some interesting and amusing asides.

Two kinds of people think the human will is not free – the schizophrenic suffering from the delusion that his will is being manipulated and the deterministic philosopher. A dose of LSD will quickly put you or me into class 1; is the truth, then, to be discovered by the deliberate generation of a delusion?

An old widower grieving for his deceased wife was greatly cheered when he was asked to think of how she would have grieved if he had died first: he came to regard his suffering as meaningful because he saved her from suffering. The psychoanalyst, after 500 couch-hours would have brain-washed him into thinking that secretly he hated his wife, thus accounting for his excessive grief. Would he have been happier in the end?

Freud claims that mankind suffered three terrible shocks in the modern era; the Copernican when he discovered that his planetary home was not the centre of the universe: the Darwinian when he learned that he was descended from animals and the Freudian. The Freudian shock was genuine enough, but the other two imaginary. No one was ever upset because man did not live in the centre of the universe, any more than that Goethe was not born at the centre of the earth or Kant at the magnetic pole. Darwinism did not diminish but increase man's self-esteem: wonderful fellows those monkey ancestors to have risen so high, thought the Victorians!

Psychoses used to centre round man's guilt; now they concern his financial worries. But they are not fewer in number, or less in severity.

The therapeutic method mainly advocated is that of *paradoxical intention*: if you fear you will sweat, or cough, or stutter, or blush or die of a heart attack when you are faced with a certain situation, then make up your mind next time to bring about what you most feared. Kill yourself with a heart attack if you can! 'Take the wind out of the sails' of your neuroses or psychoses and 'strangle the feedback mechanism' (p.203)! It's all great fun; if it isn't we must make it so. Apply the recipe every time your fears arise and the cure is yours. No recurrence of symptoms in 20 years, we are assured, and other psychologists testify to success in cases which were otherwise untreatable.

Religion is not a part of the therapy, but if religion is already there it greatly increases the chances of success. The Christian may derive much help from Frankl's writings: Frankl himself is a religious Jew who often refers to the Old Testament.

THEOLOGY OF TIME

Nelson Pike, *God and Timelessness* (Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1970, 192p. 7 dollars.

In Christian theology God is said to be eternal. Formerly this was often taken to mean that God exists backwards and forwards unendingly in time — He always has existed and always will exist.

There are, however, many theologians, Catholic and Protestant, who interpret 'eternal' in a different way. They claim that the life of God has no relevance to time: God is eternal in that He is 'outside time'.

In this book the author examines this second meaning in a thorough and scholarly way, tracing its source back through Augustine, St. Anselm, Boethius, St. Thomas and Schleiermacher in particular. He asks what 'outside time' can mean; whether God can be both personal and timeless; how 'outside time' is related to 'outside space'; whether a being outside time can be omniscient or immutable; and so on.

No matter how hard he tries, or in what book he searches, the author can find no justification for the idea that God is 'outside time'. Such a notion, he argues, is not to be found in the Bible, nor in early Christian tradition, nor in the confessions of the churches, Catholic or Protestant. It originated, it seems, from Plato's doctrine that things of ultimate value are 'timeless', on to which teaching Christians appended the argument that since God is the Ultimate Value, it follows that He also must be timeless. But then, as Dr. Pike wryly remarks, Plato was not a Christian and Christians are not obliged to follow his thinking.

In conclusion, says the author, 'my suspicion is that the doctrine of God's timelessness was introduced into Christian theology because Platonic thought was stylish at the time and because the doctrine appeared to have systematic elegance. Once introduced it took on a life of its own'.

This is a useful book in a day when woolly minded admirers of Schleiermacher are often esteemed for their erudition! However, though very well written, it is not an easy book to read: carefully numbered statements of what old writers *might* have meant by their ambiguous wording, followed by discussion of each possible meaning, is hardly compatible with armchair relaxation by the fireside. That would be asking too much!

DID MAN BEGIN TWICE OVER?

Victor Pearce, *Who Was Adam?*, Paternoster Press, 1969, 151p. £1.25.

No part of the Bible has been more discussed than its early chapters. Since the rest of the Bible seems in many ways to be an unfolding of its start, these chapters are vastly more important than their length might seem to warrant. Yet after the interminable discussions of the past, what is there left to be said?

A great deal, thinks our author. But whether we are disposed to listen to him or not will depend on how we think the Bible should be interpreted. If we believe it can be understood by reference to itself alone we shall think lightly of this book. If, however, we think that interpretation is sometimes impossible save in the light of knowledge which was not available at the time the Bible was written, we may feel most indebted to Canon Pearce. The reviewer can only express his conviction that the first approach is too narrow and, indeed, disloyal to the spirit of the Bible itself. The words, 'His disciples remembered that it was written' occur often and imply new understandings in the light of new knowledge and experience.

What then is the theme of the book? It raises the question, Why does the Bible seem to record two beginnings of man, in Chapters 1 and 2 of Genesis? The suggested answer is that man did in fact have two beginnings, perhaps even more than two. The man of Chapter 1 is old Stone Age Man. He lived in small groups, widely dispersed, and he exercised dominion over beasts, birds and fish, killing them for food by means of his simple tools. Perhaps he died out. At all events, about 10,000 years ago man started again. This time it was New Stone Age Man who lived in the high Turkish plateau, practising agriculture and husbandry, and developing settled city life. This happened at the tail end of the last Ice Age: the land at these high levels was watered not by rain but by annual floods caused by the melting of the retreating ice sheet. A great civilisation developed, some of the cities of which have been excavated, but later all was destroyed by the flood. Archaeology confirms that every trace of civilisation in every country where it had been now disappeared for a thousand years: where previously inhabited sites were again occupied the new cultures are unconnected with the old. (On these subjects reference may also be made to T. C. Mitchell, this *Journal*, 91, i, 28-49; J. O. Buswell, this *Journal*, 96, 3-23; Derek Kidner, *Tyndale Bulletin*, 1967, 109-114; F. A. Filby, *The Flood Reconsidered*, 1970).

The general picture is one which brings archaeology and the Bible closely into line. It is reasonable to think that the man or adam of Gen.

1 is a generic not a proper name, unlike Adam the name of an individual man in Chapter 2. There is nothing to suggest that the men of Chapter 1 knew sin, nor is there mention of a Fall. Yet this man, the tool maker, may have had a primitive language and his intelligence was way above that of the beasts: like Adam of Chapter 2 he was also made in the image of God.

A possible criticism of this view, one which has in fact been made by D. Kidner (*Christian Record*, Feb. 5, 1971) is that our Lord seemingly connects the man of Gen. 1 with the man of Gen. 2. (Mark, 10: 6-8). However, the wording in the Gospels is all to be found in Gen 2 and 5.

What was the relation between Old Stone Age Man and New Stone Age Man? When an author writes a book, for a new edition, says, Pearce, he does not scrap everything that went before. When the car manufacturer produces a new model, he modifies an older model. In this way books, cars, aeroplanes, office machines and so on evolve. But no man in his senses denies they are creations.

There is much in the Bible, says Victor Pearce, which implies that in God's creations He makes good use of what was there before. We must expect to find, as indeed we do find, that man shares a good deal of bodily structure and genetical mechanism with the beasts. Similarly New Stone Age Men were physically not unlike Old Stone Age Men, though their endowments were somewhat different.

These considerations bring the question of creation to the fore: the subject occupies the second half of the book. The result is impressive. In a popular way, which has not perhaps been bettered, Pearce digresses on the difficulties associated with the view that life could have arisen without the intervention of God. The treatment is modern and couched in the current language of DNA and RNA, homely analogies being brought to bear to illustrate the degree of order involved in an organism. There are many interesting asides.

The book may be strongly recommended; it should prove especially suitable for young Christians perplexed by difficulties of a scientific kind.

PROFESSOR BRUCE IS STILL YOUNG

Apostolic History and the Gospel, Essays Presented to Professor F. F. Bruce on his 60th birthday. Edited by W. W. Gasque and R. P. Martin, Paternoster Press, 1970. £2.50.

There is plenty of good fare for a rainy day in this impressive volume dedicated to Professor Bruce who was, for a number of years, President of the Victoria Institute. The general impression is one of erudition;

footnotes run into hundreds and there is a fair smattering of Greek. Nevertheless, taken as a whole the essays are readable enough. A Bibliography of Professor Bruce's writings is also provided — about 265 items altogether. Rumour has it that the number should be larger, that FFB himself has forgotten all about many items and that he keeps no records. However, be it 265 or 1265 the question remains how does he find time to write so much?

To pick out chapters for comment is an invidious task! There are 24 in all, each taking up some aspect of the work or scholarly interests of the Professor. Invidious or not an attempt must be made.

E.M. Blaitlock writes interestingly on the political scene at the back of the Book of Acts. Several other contributors also write on the Acts, a subject on which Bruce is an acknowledged authority. H. L. Ellison (well known to V.I. members) writes on Paul's principle of 'all things to all men'; Professor C.F.D. Moule writes helpfully on *Philippians* 2:5f arguing that despite some modern conjectures scholarship is still on the side of the traditional interpretation that Christians should imitate Christ in His humility; Dr. Guthrie examines some of the apocryphal writings and A. F. Walls has a most interesting and lucidly written chapter on *Romans* 1 in which he dwells specifically on what Christians think this passage tells us about the ancient pagan world. Then there is a study (by W. J. Martin) on that puzzling passage in 1 Corinthians 11 about the long hair of women: the author argues persuasively that Paul did not intend women to wear veils.

After a recent attempt by the reviewer to peruse Allegro's *The Sacred Mushroom and the Cross*, the essay by B.M. Metzger seemed most apposite. It tells the story of how, a decade ago, Stefan Weinstock announced that he had been profoundly impressed by his discovery that there is a close correspondence between the names of the 16 countries mentioned in *Acts* 2: 9–11 and a list of places ruled over by the signs of the Zodiac in a fourth century astrological treatise by Paul Alexandrinus. The correspondence could be no coincidence, of course: St. Luke's singularly unoriginal mind must have been reeling off names from a queer astrological treatise in his possession. Result — theologians were delighted; one by one they saw to it that his brilliant tit-bit of scholarship found its way into modern commentaries for the intellectual titillation of the laity. One commentator (1967) in particular surpassed himself — the lists, he claimed, 'are exactly the same'.

And the truth? Of the 16 names in *Acts* only five are mentioned at all by Paulus and even these correspondences are unimpressive. Englishmen do not need astrological treatises to bring to mind the existence of Wales, Scotland and France nor did Luke need such help when he mentioned surrounding countries. Strange folk, some of these theological

scholars; they badly need the Bruces and the Metzgers to put them back on the rails.

Professor Bruce has done much, very much, to respectabilize (to coin a word) the view that a learned theologian can actually believe the Bible. In this selection of essays we have further reminders of his activities. May he long keep the flag flying.

TRADITION

F.F. Bruce, *Tradition Old and New*, Paternoster Press 1970, £1.25.

The strength of tradition is often astonishing; it may even be amusing in retrospect. In a recent book (R. O. Crummey, *The Old Believers and the World of Antichrist*, Wisconsin, 1970) we learn of how, in 1653, the Russian Patriarch Nikon published a new psalter and ordained that in future the faithful were to make the sign of the cross with three fingers instead of two as formerly, and in addition were to prostrate themselves a different number of times than that hitherto customary during the recital of the prayer of repentance of Efrein the Syrian. Confronted by these and other enormities it was no wonder that the Old Believers rebelled so initiating the Great Schism in the Russian Orthodox Church.

Evangelical Christians often suppose that, unlike catholic sections of Christendom, they are relatively free from the influence of tradition. In this charmingly written, authoritative and well-documented book Professor Bruce sets out to tell them how wrong they are. Francis Newman, writing of John Nelson Darby wrote: 'He only wanted men to submit their understanding to God, that is to the Bible, that is to his interpretation' words which aptly sum up the position. For reliance on the word of God may mean no more than reliance on a prevailing and sectarian tradition as to its meaning.

The tragic element in tradition is that it most influences those who are least aware of its existence. Reared in a tradition Christians hardly realise that they have a tradition: our Lord's insistence on a radical approach falls on deaf ears. Even after they have come to realise how strongly they are held in its grip, the grip is not always loosened. Many of the rabbis in the days of Jesus were well aware of the divergence between their own teachings and those of Moses. On occasions, Bruce tells us (p 22) they would regale the anachronistic story of how Moses one day chanced to enter R. Aquiba's lecture room where he heard an exposition of a law which he failed to recognise as his own.

The book contains ten chapters covering such topics as, 'The Tradition of the Elders', tradition in the NT and the early church,

'Tradition and Interpretation' and 'Tradition and the Canon of Scripture'. The style is didactic and terse; the information content very considerable.

By dwelling in great detail on aspects of tradition which are rarely discussed Professor Bruce makes his point without controversial distraction. The Protestant reader who expects to be regaled with traditions of the blessed Virgin, lenten observance, fish-eating on Fridays, making the sign of the cross or visits to the holy shrine of Lourdes will not increase his repertoire of anecdotes!

Not all tradition is bad, indeed much is good; nor would the Church of Christ flourish in its absence. Bruce, like the NT before him urges us to hold fast the good and reject the bad.

CHRISTIAN GROWTH

K. S. Latourette, *Christianity in a revolutionary Age*, 5 vols, 1958. PB edition, 1970. Paternoster Press and Zondervan. £7.50 complete (boxed).

This beautiful edition of Latourette's famous and authoritative history of Christianity in modern times (from the early 19th century) is a credit to the publishers. The typography is excellent and the binding is up to the quality of a hard-back: the volumes even lie flat when opened! By present-day standards the price is remarkably low. It is good news that plans are well advanced for the publication of Latourette's earlier volumes covering Christian advance in the pre-modern period.

Because the coverage is world-wide the number of people, movements and sects mentioned is of necessity enormous. Inevitably this makes for rather "bitty" reading: just as one's interest is aroused in the achievements of one of God's saints the subject changes. Though this makes for difficulty in continuous reading it does not, of course, affect the value of the work as a source of reference. One cannot, in fact, imagine a good library without a copy.

The volumes cover the 19th century, the century of the birth of the Victoria Institute and of the Darwinian controversies. One could only wish that space had been available to treat such matters in greater detail.

Latourette's general conclusion is encouraging. Despite the partial set back of Christianity in the West during the modern period the overall picture is one of unparalleled advance. Speaking of the 19th century in particular he writes: 'Nothing to equal it had previously been seen in the history of the faith; and nothing remotely approaching it in any other religion on earth'.

The Victoria Institute or Philosophical Society of Great Britain.
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3 Years to 30.9.69		£	£	£	£	£
1,911	Papers, Lectures etc. and Printing		1,058		Annual Subscriptions	
142	Administration: Salaries	300		847	Fellows	243
1	Cleaning & Sundries	4		1,217	Members	319
152	Postage	12		145	Associates	36
7	Bank Charges	1		514	Library Associates	175
45	Audit Fee	15				
15	Accountancy	—				
3	Legal Charges	—		49	Life Subscriptions Proportion	12
		—	332	1,100	Sales and Donations	702
				82	Dividends Received	27
149	Cost of Meeting (net)		30			
—	Editorial Fees		200			
—	Professional Fees		53			
			—			
2,425			1,673	3,954		1,514
1,529	Excess of Income over Expenditure (1966-1969)		—	—	Excess of Expenditure over Income	159
3,954			1,673	3,954		1,673

The Victoria Institute or Philosophical Society of Great Britain.

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30.9.69			30.9.69			
£	£		£	£		£
53		Prepaid Subscriptions	70	924	Subscriptions in arrear	180
155		Sundry Creditors	467	103	Office Equipment	103
	713	General Fund: Balance at 1st October 1969	1,137	93	Sundry Debtors	105
		Less Subscriptions Written Off as irrecoverable	312	224	Cash Balances	815
	1,105					
	392 DR		825			
1,136	1,528	Excess of Expenditure over Income	159			
				666		
1,344			1,203	1,344		1,203
		<i>Special Funds</i>			<i>Special Fund Investments</i>	
343		Life Composition Fund	331	638	Cash and Bank Balances	695
508		Gunning Trust	508	2,382	Investments at cost	1,744
200		Langhorne Orchard Trust	200	1,744	(Market Value £980)	2,439
220		Schofield Memorial Trust	220			
400		Craig Memorial Trust	400			
711		Prize Funds	780			
			2,439			
3,726			3,642	3,726		3,642

We have audited the accounts of the Victoria Institute and have obtained all the information and explanations which we have required. Stocks of stationery are held which do not appear in the Balance Sheet. In our opinion the Balance Sheet shows a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Institute, and is correct according to the books and records thereof and information at our disposal.

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CONTENTS

Editorial	1
In the News	3
A. C. Adcock, <i>Lecturer in Philosophy, Manchester College, Oxford</i> , The 'Soul', Some Reflections.	17
Comment by Dr. J. K. Howard	24
C. T. Crellin, M.Ed., Dip.Ed.Psy., <i>Principal Lecturer and Head of Education Department, Trent College, Cockfosters</i> , The Psychology of Moral Development.	25
P. H. Hirst, <i>Professor of Education, University of Cambridge</i> , Christian Education: A Contradiction in Terms?	43
C. W. Robson. Christian Education is Meaningful: a Reply to the Previous Paper.	55
Essay Reviews	
New Wine or Old Bottles: Which? — Professor J. H. Hick on <i>God's Existence</i>	61
Max Weber on India — <i>the Loomis Symposium</i>	64
Short Reviews	
Howard Marshall, on <i>Luke</i> . By A. C. Adcock	67
B. F. C. Atkinson on <i>Immortality</i> . By A. C. Adcock	69
Three Books on <i>Freewill</i> . By A. C. Adcock	70
Viktor Frankl on the <i>Therapy of Meaning</i>	71
Nelson Pike on the <i>Theology of Time</i>	73
Vactor Pearce on <i>Did Man begin Twice Over?</i>	74
Professor Bruce is still Young. A <i>Symposium</i>	75
Tradition	77
Christian Growth	78
Accounts of the Victoria Institute	79/80