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Printed in Great Britain by
RAITHBY, LAWRENCE & CO. LTD
at the De Montfort Press, Leicester and London
The President, Professor R. L. F. Boyd, opened the proceedings at the Annual General Meeting which took place on 4th June, in the Caxton Hall, London, S.W.1. – a regular rendezvous for Institute meetings in the past.

Attention was drawn to the Journal in its latest format so that all present would be reminded to do as much as possible to advertise Faith and Thought as the main organ of the Institute's activity. There were many ways in which Fellows and Members could make the Institute known, particularly in local churches, and the desirability of furthering the work of the Victoria Institute was something upon which all were agreed.

In order to give as much advance notice as possible to Fellows and Members, the Council wished to give preliminary details of the next two public meetings of the Institute. It was decided that each year the Annual General Meeting would take place on the Saturday immediately before 24th May. So the Annual General Meeting for 1967 would be held on Saturday, 20th May. Another meeting had been fixed for Saturday, 19th November, 1966, and details of the speakers would be made available as soon as possible.

Two members of the Council of long standing had repeatedly requested their colleagues that they be allowed to resign. Their appeal had at last been reluctantly accepted, and it was pro-
posed and unanimously approved that the Reverend J. Stafford Wright, m.a., and R. J. C. Harris Esq., a.r.c.s., b.sc., ph.d., be made Vice-Presidents of the Institute.

The Honorary Treasurer presented the Statement of Accounts for the Year ended 30th September, 1965. Mr Stunt drew attention to the generally happier state of increased membership, but also to the less happy fact that there had been some decrease in the amount of subscriptions collected over the year. The Council had decided, earlier in the day, that more rigid means for recovering arrears of subscriptions should be adopted as soon as possible. Proposing that the Accounts be adopted, Mr. A. E. Dale also expressed the pleasure of all present that Mr. Stunt should himself have been able to attend after a very protracted illness.

At the conclusion of the formal business, the President welcomed the two speakers who had been invited to address the Institute on the occasion. Mr O. Raymond Johnston, m.a., dip.th. of the University of Newcastle Department of Education then spoke on ‘Morality and Society Today’, and the Reverend H. Dermot McDonald, b.a., ph.d. on ‘The Concept of Authority’. Both addresses were warmly received and discussion followed.
Income and Expenditure Account

Balance Sheet
THE VICTORIA INSTITUTE OR 
InCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

1964
£482 Papers, Lectures, etc., and Printing
300 Administration: Salaries £300
5 Cleaning and Sundries 2
56 Typing, Duplicating and Office Expenses £35
11 Postage, Packing and Addressing 22
9 Stationery, Advertising, etc. 8
10 Audit Fee 10
— Cost of Meeting (Net) 45

£873 £1,481
287 Excess of Income over Expenditure for the Year 172

£1,160 £1,653

Balance Sheet as at

1964
£31 Prepaid Subscriptions £21
13 Sundry Creditors 86
— Cash Overdrawn on General Fund 99
250 Centenary Reserve Account
— General Fund: Balance at 1st October, 1964 £1,630
Less: Subscriptions w/o unrecoverable 839

791
1,630 Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year 172 963

£1,924 £1,169

Special Funds
418 Life Compositions Fund £403
508 Gunning Trust 508
200 Langhorne Orchard Trust 200
220 Schofield Memorial Trust 220
400 Craig Memorial Trust 400
459 Prize Funds 528

£2,259

£4,129 £3,428

We have audited the accounts of which the above is the Balance Sheet, and have obtained all the information and explanations which we have required. Stocks of Stationery and books are held which do not appear in the Balance Sheet. In our opinion, the arrears of subscriptions will prove irrecoverable to the extent of a further £800. Subject to these comments,
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 30 SEPTEMBER 1965

1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Subscriptions</th>
<th>£</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fellows</td>
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<td>Members</td>
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<td>Life Subscriptions: Proportion</td>
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<td>Sales and Donations</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dividends Received</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Recovered on Covenants</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

£1,160

30 September 1965

| Subscriptions in arrear | £1,582 | £1,020 |
| Office Equipment        | 68     | 103    |
| Sundry Debtors          | 35     | 46     |
| Cash Balances           | 239    | —      |

£1,924

Special Funds – Investments

| Cash and Bank Balances | £515 |
| Investments at cost    | 1,744 |
| (Market Value £1,291)   | 2,259 |

£4,129

£3,428

in our opinion, the Balance Sheet shows a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Institute, and is correct according to the books and records thereof and the information at our disposal.

3&4 Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London WC2
22nd June, 1966

Metcalf Blake & Co
Chartered Accountants
Morality and Society Today

My title immediately raises a whole host of problems. In contemporary discussion the relation of the two terms gives rise to a complex group of related questions. What is morality? In what sense has any society of morality? If we can choose a sense (or senses) in which a society may be said to have a morality, how do we ascertain what that morality is? And what measuring rod might enable us to determine what morality (if any) a society ought to have in contrast to the morality it actually possesses? What means have been, are being and might be adopted to achieve desired changes in the morality of society? And so on.

Because the field is so vast I shall at the outset make clear the precise ground I intend to cover. I shall be concerned mainly to show how man’s increasing control over his environment is now facing him with greater responsibility. We shall be increasingly forced to make decisions on matters concerned not simply with the natural inanimate world around us but with the moral future, the values, of our fellow men. At the very moment when the possibility of such vastly increased control is being put within our grasp, society (by which I mean our British society; I shall not for the most part be concerned with matters outside the United Kingdom, though I believe the main features of the problem are the same for many, if not all developed societies today) – society shows grave signs of ill-health, despite great strides made towards a physically healthier community. Earlier optimism has waned. In the very domain where we are in most need of enlightenment, guidance and strength – the sphere of moral insight and moral energy – we seem most confused. After documenting some spheres of our national life in which these symptoms seem most evident, I shall discuss (all too briefly) certain aspects of moral experience and the light which Christian faith has traditionally shed on this domain, and which it is still competent to shed, if men will but listen.
The history of mankind is the story of increasing control. From the very dawn of civilization we watch the developing mastery of his environment by *homo sapiens*. The flint knife, the fire, the irrigation channel and the wheel were the first painful tools; by contrast today’s achievements through dynamite, bulldozer, drill and reinforced concrete leave us devoid of adequate adjectives as we survey the dam, the nuclear power station and the sky-scraper. Distance disappears with rail, motor and then air transport, with telephone, radio and then television. The saving of time involved is so startling that the whole quality of human life has been decisively changed; in a very real sense we have begun to master time.

This growing mastery has not been confined to the material world. It has in our century been extended to human society. Men now begin to take control of the shape of the communities which they form. In European countries, and increasingly in the emergent countries of Africa and Asia, government action affecting the whole population regulates wage levels, taxation, pensions and other factors such as schooling, housing and medical facilities. We have realized that we are all in some sense responsible for the lives led by the members of our own community, and it is right that communal provision should be made against misfortune. Problems in society are better understood, economic and social pressures producing distress such as poverty or ill-health can be identified and, it is hoped, avoided. This is the age of planning, and of planning by the state for the whole of society, government planning. Noble as the efforts of voluntary bodies have been, no other agency could now tackle what is demanded. Government resources alone are adequate.

The results of this are all around us. New industries are carefully sited, estates mushroom, new towns are decreed after consultation, whole neighbourhoods are re-housed, schools re-organized, national parks officially scheduled for preservation. We can increase the provision of schools, hospitals, prisons and art galleries by legislation. The only limit is the national purse. Planning becomes not only a practical possibility over wide areas of human relations; it is demanded as the most economic way of approaching national expenditure. We can calculate, for example, the size of the school population for the next 20 years,
and hence the number of teachers needed\textsuperscript{1}. At first glance it seems clear that we are not only in control of our material environment, but also of our society as a human group, and of the sub-groups that are found within it.

Yet this mastery extends only to the formal aspects of human associations – where we get together, in what numbers, for what purpose and with what terms of reference. The quality of relationships is a very different matter. Psychology and psychiatry have made great advances, undoubtedly, yet the practical results are disappointing. The springs of human behaviour itself are elusive. In an age when we have vastly increased our control of the natural environment and understand far more about the motives and incentives in human development, we are still searching for the prescription for a happy community. At a time when such advances in living conditions and knowledge can be recorded, it might be expected that human behaviour would show a corresponding turn for the better. Pleasanter living conditions should produce pleasanter men and women – such was the belief of the pioneers of socialism in this country in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Poverty and ignorance were said to be the sources of human misery and vice; affluence and education would give us a happier and more moral world. The roots of this belief lie far back in the history of thought. The Greek philosophers practically equated virtue with knowledge, evil with ignorance. When the triumphs of Victorian science and technology put large-scale social engineering within man’s grasp for the first time, and disease and poverty were no longer viewed as inevitable, the dream of the beautiful and the good society seemed close to realization.

The vision of the Socialist reformers of the early twentieth century was spread by many gifted authors. The delightful children’s writer E. Nesbit married Hubert Bland, who was in the chair at the memorable meeting of \textit{The Fellowship of the New Life} in January 1884 when the Fabian Society was born. Edith Nesbit paints an attractive picture of the sort of world that the

\textsuperscript{1} See \textit{The Demand for and Supply of Teachers 1963–1986}, H.M.S.O., 1965.
early Fabians felt was within their grasp in chapter 12 of *The Story of the Amulet*\(^a\), when four children use their magic charm to visit the London of the future. The first thing that strikes them is the light, airy cleanliness of the capital, the beauty of everyone’s clothing (from schoolchildren to British Museum attendants) and of the city scene. Then they realize that nobody looks worried; all are kind, calm and unhurried. When the children take a lady from the future back to their own London of 1906 she is appalled at the street scene, the beggar and the match-seller and the people hurrying home through the fog.

“Oh, look at their faces, their horrible faces!” she cried.

“What’s the matter with them all?”

“They’re poor people, that’s all”, said Robert.

“But it’s not all! They’re ill, they’re unhappy, they’re wicked . . . . Oh! their poor, tired, miserable, wicked faces!”

Earlier the lady from the future had explained to them how the great change had come about. Her son was named after ‘the great reformer’ H. G. Wells. “He lived in the dark ages, and he saw that what you ought to do is to find out what you want and then to try to get it. Up to then people had always tried to tinker up what they’d got.” The simplicity and faith in human goodness of the early Fabian vision has never been more sensitively expressed than in this chapter. E. Nesbit does not give a date to her age when ‘London is clean and beautiful, and the Thames runs clear and bright, and the green trees grow, and no one is anxious or afraid or in a hurry’. But we can feel the early Wellsian optimism. This was the Fabian vision. We are almost able to do this – we *could* make this true within our time, such was their hope. We know enough, or very nearly enough, to eradicate the conditions which produce misshapen men and unhappy communities.

Little more than forty years later another Socialist writer gave the public a vision of the future. In one way it represented the logical end of the development of human control. In the world he pictured the complete control of man had been achieved. But it was not the control which produced happiness and a richer humanity. The Oceania of George Orwell’s

\(^a\) First published by Benn, London, 1906.
Nineteen Eighty-four is the embodiment of ugliness and inhumanity in social terms. Society is controlled by the Party, using the mythical master-image of Big Brother, the complete domination of the means of communication and a ruthless police force. There is little talk of goodness in the book, but the last bastion of resistance to the Party had already fallen - objective truth. For by this time truth and goodness themselves have been mastered; news, facts, statistics and history are quite literally created by the Ministry of Truth. As often as need be the past is erased or altered in the records. Control of all records plus control of minds equals control of the past. As O'Brien tortures Winston Smith into mental and moral submission, he explains the philosophy behind the Party’s cruelty:

“You are here because you have failed in humility, in self-discipline. You would not make the act of submission which is the price of sanity. You preferred to be a lunatic, a minority of one. Only the disciplined mind can see reality. You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its own right. You also believe that the nature of reality is self-evident. When you delude yourself into thinking that you see something, you assume that everyone else sees the same thing as you. But I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case soon perishes: only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be truth is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party. That is the fact that you have got to relearn, Winston. It needs an act of self-destruction, an effort of the will. You must humble yourself before you can become sane.”

The ghastly treatment that Winston receives destroys even the mathematical certainty of $2 + 2 = 4$. But the Party is not merely content with negative obedience or the most abject submission. O’Brien explains the end-product of the brain-washing thus to Winston:

---

“When you finally surrender to us it must be of your own free will. We do not destroy the heretic because he resists us: so long as he resists us we never destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind, we reshape him. We burn all evil and all illusion out of him; we bring him over to our side, not in appearance but genuinely, heart and soul. We make him one of ourselves before we kill him. It is intolerable to us that an erroneous thought should exist anywhere in the world, however secret and powerless it may be. Even in the instant of death we cannot permit any deviation. In the old days the heretic walked to the stake still a heretic, exulting in it . . . . . But we make the brain perfect before we blow it out.”

This, then, is another vision of what power, final and ultimate control of many by man, might produce, given the fact that man is (in O’Brien’s words) infinitely malleable. And it is a prospect from which we all recoil. We do not want a world like this; we hate it with every fibre of our being. It is not that it is an impossible achievement; the techniques for control of society as a whole and of individuals already exist. In Orwell’s world their use has been perfected. The means are there. Nor is it enough to say that such a world is unlikely to materialize for a number of quite sound reasons. Things may not be going to turn out precisely like that, but our deeper conviction is that they ought not to be allowed to. We do not want this world for ourselves or our children, for there is something inherently wrong, morally degraded about. Wherever control of man by man may lead, we must not allow it to go in that direction.

Yet the need for control of human society is more pressing now than it has ever been. At the international level, after two devastating world wars we seem no nearer to settling differences without resort to arms. The rule of international law emanating from the United Nations Organization seems destined to become as ineffective as the League of Nations before it. Despite its impressive achievements at lower levels, when conflicts between great powers are in question, the moral force of U.N.O. (and it has no other force) is easily swept aside. The ‘war to end wars’ is

*ibid.* pp. 204–205.
now seen as a ridiculous concept, and no one will seriously con­sider an international police force strong enough to be effective.

Within our own country, the national life is scarred by a num­ber of ugly features, all of which underline the grave mistake made by so many social reformers when they imagined better conditions would inevitably produce happier people, more contented, unselfish, idealistic citizens. Not only have we schemes and organizations of social welfare on a scale and over a range of needs unparalleled in past history, and in most other countries of the world today, but we have also lowered our standards of behaviour somewhat in order to be less demanding and more accommodating. C. H. and Winifred Whitely in a recent study of standards in society today examined five spheres of conduct – sexual relations, relations between parents and children, economic responsibility, the decline in decorum and ceremony and attitudes to crime and criminals. In all spheres they detect a more relaxed and less exacting attitude to life. They find ‘a general relaxation of standards, a greater per­missiveness, a raising of the demands a man may make on life and a lowering of the demands life may make on him’. The writers attempt to assess the gains and losses in the change towards a more accommodating morality. Communal pro­vision against misfortune has helped to avoid a vast deal of human misery. Prisons, families and personal relations are all more humane. But they add: ‘It is still possible to doubt whether people are any happier than under the old dispensation. It was hoped that with the relaxation of demands, with a gentler attitude to human imperfections, strain and tension would be reduced, far fewer people would be troubled by neurosis, joie de vivre would be more in evidence... Unfortunately the evidence does not support this claim.’ People now have inflated expecta­tions of what life should offer and what society should undertake on their behalf. Relaxation of the rules leads to insecurity, since where there are no conventions I have no clear idea of what I can rely on others to do, or what they expect of me.

6 The Permissive Morality, Methuen, 1964.
7 ibid. p. 21.
But we can today be quite precise about these disquieting features of contemporary human behaviour in Britain. Statistics relevant to public morality – in the sense of behaviour almost universally adjudged to be harmful to the individual, or to the community, or to both – are more readily available than ever before\(^8\). Our standards are less demanding, but our behaviour appears to deteriorate in quality even more rapidly. We shall spend some time looking at these figures.

The most obvious place to begin is with the criminal statistics of recent years. Over the ten-year period 1954–1964 the total population of England and Wales increased by a fraction over 7 per cent, (from 44.27 million to 47.4 million). In the same period, indictable offences known to the police in England and Wales increased by 145 per cent, that is, there were very nearly two-and-a-half times as many offences in 1964 as in 1954. The number of those found guilty of such offences showed an increase of 92.9 per cent. Within these broad categories it must be noted that the number of those found guilty of violence or sexual offences went up more steeply than the general increase, since it more than doubled (102.86 per cent increase, to be exact). The number of juveniles in this category showed an even greater increase; in 1954 they represented 14 per cent of all such offenders; in 1964 nearer 15 per cent. (In absolute terms, of course, the number was more than doubled – from 1,381 to 2,872.) If we were not so used to such figures from the reports of magistrates, Chief Constables and the Home Secretary, they would fill us with alarm and concern.

The only way we may qualify this picture is to say that it represents only offences known to the police. Over a vast range of criminal offences there lies a blanket of ignorance, since there are many reasons why certain offences never reach the light of day. Ignorance of the real total of crime could conceivably mean that the actual amount of crime has declined, and we were in fact catching a greater proportion of criminals, or at least hearing of a larger proportion of their offences. But we know that there are today fewer police rather than more (London alone is more

\(^8\) Most of the figures in the ensuing paragraphs are taken from the *Annual Abstract of Statistics*, H.M.S.O., 1965.
than 2,000 short) and that the chances of the criminal's getting away were never better. Year by year with apparent inevitability the amount of crime in our society increases.

From crime we turn to look briefly at various other features of life in the community. In particular we must examine areas of social irresponsibility. Psychologically speaking this indicates the attitude expressed in such phrases as 'So what?', 'Why should I worry?', 'Let them look after themselves – it's no concern of mine'. When this attitude lies behind an action or set of actions which is known to be likely to be harmful, not merely or primarily to the agent but also to other members of the society I shall use the term 'socially irresponsible behaviour.' Now there are specific actions and habits which are known to be harmful, and which may be encouraged or discouraged by teaching and example.

Probably the clearest case is that of cigarette smoking, about which there has been no reasonable doubt since the Royal College of Physicians Report *Smoking and Health*. It stated: 'Cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer and bronchitis, and probably contributes to the development of coronary heart disease and various less common diseases'. The report received wide publicity. It advised more public education, and especially of school children, concerning the hazards of smoking. Much of what the report had to say was already common knowledge, especially amongst the medical profession. Among British doctors, the 24 per cent of non-smokers in 1951 had risen to 50 per cent in 1961. But there are few signs that this knowledge is having much effect, apart from the cessation of cigarette advertising on commercial television networks. There seems to have been little falling off in the smoking habits of public exemplars; parsons, pop singers and school teachers, for instance. Some education authorities arranged for the excellent colour films available to be shown to all schoolchildren, and invited doctors to visit the schools to speak. Other local authorities did none of these things, and after a duplicated letter had been sent to head teachers, expressing the hope that the teachers would set a good example, the matter was left to sink quietly into obscurity.

The figures are bleak and not encouraging. In 1961 30 million people in Britain consumed 12,000 million cigarettes. Three out of four men, one out of two women and one out of every four boys of school-leaving age smoke cigarettes, the average consumption being 15 a day, we were told in 1964. In the same year it was calculated that £27,000 was being spent each day on advertising tobacco in this country. The Central Statistical Office's Annual Abstracts show that of all natural causes of death, cancer comes only second to heart diseases. And cancer of the respiratory system is by far the most common type of cancer. The toll in lives is not precisely known, but as cigarette smoking is one of the main causes of lung cancer, it is pertinent to know that though the death rate between 1955 and 1964 only rose by 2.55 per cent, the death rate from lung cancer increased by more than 48 per cent; nearly 5 out of every 100 deaths are now due to this condition. More vividly, perhaps, 77 people die of it every day of the year.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that this position could be altered. After all, if the nicotine content of three cigarettes injected direct into the bloodstream would kill a man within minutes, then a 'Nicotine is Poison!' campaign would seem both possible and desirable. Yet little is done, and the nonchalance with which the topic is treated by the community as a whole suggests a disturbing degree of moral irresponsibility. If we do care, few of us show it, and no one feels able to give an official lead with much confidence that it would be widely supported.

I turn now to another problem which is in many respects similar. The physiological effects of alcohol have been closely studied and the results have been widely known amongst the educated sections of the community for many years. There has been no sudden dramatic documentation, as in the case of cigarette smoking, with a research report giving conclusive proof. Instead we have witnessed the gradual dissemination of the information concerning the effects of alcohol upon the nervous system. Most physical activities are significantly less efficient after only small doses of alcohol. Muscular output is lowered,

liability to reasoning error increases, speed of reaction to sudden change of circumstances drops. With all this goes a feeling of relief, cheerfulness and increased competence in general, a combination which makes the total effect of alcoholic drink so dangerous. Mental and physical tension is in fact relieved by alcohol, hence the cheery ‘mateyness’ so often observed when men drink together. But the higher levels of consciousness in the brain are being deadened, there is less reflective thought. Mental and moral discrimination is impaired. What seems at first sight to be a masculine, daring, devil-may-care attitude and a welcome increase of sociability is obtained at the expense of a temporary impairing of those parts of the personality which are distinctive of man. We are less human when we are under the influence of alcohol.

Our society as a whole does not seem fully alive to these dangers. Few organizations and few individuals take seriously the suggestion that restraint in public could be a part of their moral responsibility. Over £70,000 per day is spent on advertising alcoholic drinks in Britain. Over the ten-year period 1954–1964 consumer expenditure on food went up by almost exactly 50 per cent; on alcoholic drinks by over 60 per cent. Closer investigation of the figures shows that in recent years consumption of spirits has risen more rapidly than that of beer, and consumption of imported wines faster than either. The only figure that has shown signs of dropping is the annual rate of increase in the amount drunk; and even here spirits seem to be an exception. The B.M.A. Conference of July 1965 once more drew the nation’s attention to the problem and called for immediate Government action.

There is a further aspect of this habit which makes the situation even more pressing. Britain is now a car-owning democracy. And the car is a lethal weapon. In a morally responsible community as the amount and the speed of traffic increased, so would the care and attention of its drivers. Not so in Britain today. Road deaths increased by more than one third between 1954 and 1964. Very nearly 9,000 people are killed annually on the roads of Britain. On average now more than one person per hour, day and night, is killed in a road accident. Now there are various types of irresponsible driving, some of which still
need investigation. Some are known to any driver of a few years’ experience. But one is known beyond all doubt. At least 18 per cent of all road accidents are due to drivers who have been drinking. At Christmas this figure rises to over half. It is in the light of such figures as these that the alcohol problem stands out as an urgent matter, a social problem which devolves ultimately upon individuals who are required to make responsible decisions. At the moment we can scarcely be said to be making much progress here.

The affluence of present-day Britain and the increase of leisure makes the task of assessing the moral climate of the community somewhat easier. Given leisure, a certain amount of personal income remaining after obtaining the necessities of life, and a choice of a wide range of possible activities, then priorities and personal attitudes of the members of that society are more readily detectable. And one activity which is clearly of paramount importance on any showing in indicating our attitudes is gambling. In 1965 we spent more than £1,000 million on gambling in Britain, more than half the defence budget (£1,909 million). The Churches’ Council on Gambling Annual Review for 1965 (Gambling, A Nation’s Responsibility) puts the total turnover at £915 million without taking into account gaming in clubs and gaming machines, and with a conservative estimate of the amount involved in horse-racing and commercial Bingo clubs. But it is not the 60 per cent increase over the 1958 figure to which I wish to draw attention here, nor to the strange case of Premium Bonds (so frankly alluded to in the Council’s Review), nor to the effect of legislation designed to curb but in fact encouraging these increases. It is rather the attitude of mind which makes such rapid growth possible.

There is a whole group of issues here, and each of them is a moral issue. There is no doubt that some people are liable to become gambling addicts; they cannot stop. The Review states ‘It is morally indefensible to ignore this fact or its consequences’. If this be so, we are on similar ground to that involved in the case of cigarette smoking. Gambling, in fact, is the most clearly irresponsible activity of all, for it involves the surrender of one’s money to the caprice of the unpredictable. Except in the case of Premium Bonds, the vast majority lose their money. Many
forms of gambling, the Review demonstrates, represent a shift of wealth from the already poor to the already rich. It is an irrational means of distributing wealth, and it works with often dramatic inequality. The money involved has neither been given for services rendered (outside the gambling industry, that is), nor invested to increase the nation’s productive resources in any way. From the point of view of the material benefit of the community, it is a complete loss.

To these considerations we must add the fact that as a nation we are in economic difficulties, and that knowledge about the undernourishment of more than half the world’s population is now widely publicized. The opportunities for organizations like Oxfam, War on Want, Save the Children etc, etc, are endless, if only they had the financial means. The irresponsible element in gambling is surely crystal clear in this light. It indicates lack of concern for fellow human beings and the community as a whole. ‘Sales promotion foments a naturally acquisitive response to the increasing opportunities there are in life. No matter what the income may be it is easy for it to appear inadequate . . . to secure all that is desirable or even necessary for the enjoyment of life. It can easily be argued that what does not come by work may come by chance. This attitude would hinder progress with those social and economic policies which true morality demands we pursue.’ It would be difficult to dissent from these comments, from the Council’s Review.

The morality of our society may also be approached from the standpoint of human relations. The quality of relationships within a society is always difficult to evaluate, and here, though it must be said at the outset that statistics do not tell the whole story, nevertheless what we do know about marriage and the family gives cause for some concern. Since 1958 the marriage rate per 1,000 in the United Kingdom has remained almost constant between 14.9 and 15.1. Marriage, we might say, is remaining as popular as it was 7 years ago. But divorces granted in England and Wales rose from just over 22,000 in 1958 to more than 34,400 in 1964, an increase of more than 50 per cent in five years. Over 7 per cent of all marriages now end in divorce. The traditional ideal of marriage as an attachment meant to be binding for life is being rejected or found unworkable by an
increasing number. Though nearly every civilized culture we know has regarded marriage as a bond only dissoluble by death and always attempted to formalize with public ritual the ceremony in which the marriage obligations were shouldered, marriages in Britain today are increasingly often contracted and dissolved quietly and privately. From a sociological point of view this is one more aspect of the individual's isolation and the 'marooning' of the family which results from rapid urbanization and a shattering of the tighter, communal neighbourhood allegiances of earlier centuries.

In one way marriage as an institution has had to bear an increasing burden in our vast and complex contemporary society. It is in warm personal relations that the individual finds a bulwark against loneliness. Marriage must now provide the emotional security formerly found in family, kinship group and wider community relations such as those of the village. Hence the increase in teenage marriages. A glance at the national and international scene understandably fills young people with perplexity and fear. They are in general cynical about politics and politicians at home; internationally, the whole landscape is dominated by the threat of the mushroom cloud. Most writers on young people today stress the deep-seated anxiety which drives young people into groups of their own age, where they may enjoy brief bouts of intense nervous entertainment of various types. Some are driven to seek security in reciprocal personal affection, and from there to marriage. Walker and Whitney\textsuperscript{11} tell us that 'in 1930 only 10 per cent of spinster brides were under 20, but by 1959 a quarter of the spinster brides were still in their teens. During the same period the average age of all brides fell from 25 to 23.4'. But the same writers also note that nearly one third of all girls marrying under 20 were expecting babies when they married.

This raises the other issue involved with family ideals and personal relations in our society – the problem of sex relations outside marriage. Here again there seems to be enough evidence to cause much disquiet. The illegitimacy rate in the United

Kingdom has risen steadily since 1958, (after remaining fairly constant between 1951 and 1958) thus:

Percentage of illegitimate births in total live births

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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The 1964 figure is only exceeded by the exceptionally high illegitimacy rate in the two years 1944–1945. Quite apart from all moral and religious convictions, this is clearly a most serious trend. It indicates that more children are being born each year without the stability, balance and love of two parents. These children will lack the double and complementary foci of affection and authority – all that is implied by the words ‘father and mother’. No child can ever grow up to be a well-adjusted and happy individual if he or she has been emotionally starved during the early years of life, and no one can ever act as a complete substitute for blood or adoptive parents. All this must be added to the anguish and confusion in the experience of the unmarried mother and, very often, her parents and relatives.

This topic brings us to the final set of figures which seem to bear very clearly on the moral climate of our age, and again indicate a disturbing degree of moral irresponsibility. These are the statistics of the incidence of venereal diseases. (We shall use the term in its more popular sense to cover all sexually transmitted diseases.) The number of new cases of venereal diseases at clinics increased between 1958 and 1962 by about 31 per cent. The British Medical Association Report on Veneral Disease and Young People (March 1964) provides many other disturbing facts besides this. Between 1952 and 1962 the incidence of these diseases went up by 73.5 per cent, and this figure does not include those treated by general practitioners, or outside the National Health Service or in the forces. The actual increase may well be 15–20 per cent higher. This important report also contains the results of questionnaires and interviews on a number of related topics. Their first and main conclusion was ‘Promiscuity

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12 *ibid.* p. 23. See also ch. 15 on the effects of family breakdown on children.

13 It should be noted, however, that half of this figure represents the cases of immigrants, not indigenous population, *ibid.* p. 79f.
is a serious problem among young people today'\textsuperscript{14}. Those who are deeply concerned about standards of behaviour in our society and fear that they are deteriorating find their fears grounded once more in hard fact in this report. Here is yet another sphere of social irresponsibility.

Figures have their place, and evidence must be produced before it can be asserted that our society is threatened, or decadent, or improving, or no worse than it was 50 years ago. I have tried to show that on the evidence at present available there are clear grounds for asserting that we live in an age of uncertainty and increasing moral irresponsibility. And of course statistics do not lead us to the real heart of the matter. We have justified certain statements about trends in society as a whole\textsuperscript{15}. We have for this purpose regarded people as numbers, identical counters. But we know they are more than this. It is fathers and mothers, children, friends, shopkeepers, doctors and dustmen — persons — who are victims of the social irresponsibility which increasingly characterizes our age.

We are faced then with a society that needs changing. And for the first time we are a generation which can glimpse the way it could be changed, for the techniques are known. In some directions we press ahead with tremendous confidence. The unwilling revolution being forced upon the schools at the present time is a deliberate piece of social engineering calculated to eliminate certain undesirable attitudes and to implant others — to change men, and thus, society. But it is difficult to decide in which direction we should move and what means we ought to employ.

This is our dilemma. The conquest of matter has been followed by the conquest of man himself. We now possess the knowledge and the techniques so to organize the environment of any individual that he will tend to become more or less the kind of person we desire to produce. Evidence is increasing on all sides

\textsuperscript{14} p. 32. The inadequacy of the B.B.C. coverage of this highly significant report is disturbing; the matter is documented in Lunn and Lean, \textit{The Cult of Softness}, Blandford, 1965, p. 83f.

\textsuperscript{15} Nearly all the figures in this section have been taken either from the \textit{Annual Abstract of Statistics} or \textit{The Christian Citizen} for October, 1962, 1963 and 1964, produced by the Methodist Church.
indicating the predominant influence of upbringing and social background on the development of personality, intellectual performance and values. There seems little difference in principle between tampering with a man’s environment to induce certain expectations, desires and beliefs and tampering with the man himself to produce their readier acceptance. If we are so sure that a certain type of person is the only kind worth producing, why do we not – having found out what we want – simply ‘try to get it’? The formula was simple enough at the time when E. Nesbit wrote of young Wells; today it fills us with horror, for the atmosphere has become charged with uncertainty, and in many places with pessimism. Violence and meaninglessness characterize modern art and modern drama, and the triumph of man over man is seen as putting the final most deadly tool into the hands of all the dark and irrational forces that lie within human nature. The result of a gloomy view of human nature added to a realization of the extent to which any individual could be changed by deliberate ‘treatment’ produces the tragic vision of Nineteen Eight-four. Orwell’s ‘Inner Party’ is intoxicated with the spectacle and experience of power, power for its own sake, power over men which finds its most tangible and undeniable expression in making other men suffer, as O’Brien finally explains.16

But might not such power be exercised for the good of all men? Is there no possibility of a benevolent totalitarian society? Some such possibility is clearly in the mind of Julian Huxley, whose essays on evolution stress the emergence of modern man into the ‘psycho-social’ stage of his development in which he can fully control his future. Huxley’s picture is probably the only one in which we can still detect the positive chords of humanist optimism. A wonderful time is coming, he predicts, if we will but purposefully grasp our opportunities. There would seem to be two objections to this kind of suggestion. The one is founded in what we have learned of human nature since E. Nesbit; the pessimism of the modern intellectual is a valid and inescapable insight into human nature. Power does corrupt, and there is no evidence to suggest that absolute power would long resist

16 p. 84.
absolute corruption. The development of Marxist and Nazi societies shows that only external pressures and compromises due to unforeseen practical difficulties can halt the progress of despotism towards inhuman tyranny. We cannot trust ourselves with the exercise of complete control.

The second difficulty is inherent in the conception of a benevolent totalitarianism permitted to shape every part of every individual's life in a given society. It is a matter of pure logic, the baffling dilemma of the meaning of 'good' in such a situation. If the benevolent O'Briens of some future society were able by brain surgery, infant conditioning and various means of indoctrination to produce precisely the kind of citizens they wished to have, men and women whose very morality they were able to determine, whose behaviour could never be anti-social and whose concepts of 'good' and 'evil' were already laid down, how would the content of these concepts be found? How would those who programmed the national morality proceed? The content of these terms could not be the old meanings, since 'good' has always traditionally been that which I ought to choose, but need not; 'evil' that which I am free to follow but which I ought not. However the citizens of this future state would not be free. Choice is the very thing which would not be open to them, since the benevolent governors had already chosen for them in determining what sort of persons they should be. The new meaning of 'good' would have to be something like 'What the leaders (or party, or experts or governors) tell me'. Neither could the leaders themselves get the vision of what is good from the old sources and then use the new means to transmit the vision. For values cease to be the same values if they are propagated without a built-in freedom to reject. 'I ought not to steal' ceases to be a moral choice or a genuine ethical experience if a man is watching me with a gun to shoot me the moment I take someone else's property, or if brain surgery has ensured that such an idea would never enter my head, or be regarded with the utmost horror if it did. The old vision, morality as we know it, simply could not be transmitted that way. The means would destroy the end. We reach the conclusion then that a benevolent totalitarianism using all possible modern means of control over the characters and beliefs of individuals is an impossibility. If
benevolent (in any of the hitherto agreed uses of the word) it could not use these means; if it did use them it would cease to be benevolent. Truly moral actions would disappear, except from the experience of the leaders, and they, by their use of total control, would have committed themselves to an unmistakably evil course. The annihilation of choice is the destruction of humanity.

We reach the conclusion, then, that man must not regulate morality. He may proclaim it, enshrine it in legislation, discuss it and apply it. But he does not control it. If he does, it will disappear. Like the goose that laid the golden eggs, it comes to us on its own terms. If we interfere we are lost. In a very real sense the great principles of morality stand over against us, claiming our obedience. They have authority. Man may apprehend them imperfectly, forget them or refuse to respond to them. We may sometimes have to search for them, we discover (or fail to discover) them. But we do not create them. And we cannot tamper with human beings on their behalf, for in doing so we bring down a great darkness upon them and upon ourselves.

The claim which the most general rules of human morality have upon us is remarkably akin to that with which the material world confronts us. It is there and we cannot ignore it. We discover more about it and how it works, but we neither produce it nor can we alter the broad rules of behaviour it proclaims. But while there is no limit (in principle) to the experiments we may carry out on the material world to verify hypotheses or to check earlier observations, we have seen that when we come to human behaviour in its moral aspect, to tamper with the works is disastrous. We have in fact to draw a line between medical care for man’s physical body on the one hand, a type of interference which few would dispute to be right and proper, and psychological or neurological treatment on the other, which only seems justified in cases of agreed and proven mental illness.

It may be objected here that although we must not tamper with morality itself, which is ‘given’, nor attempt directly to determine a man’s moral convictions by brain-washing, surgery or torture, yet what we are doing in teaching moral principles

\[17 \text{ p. 214.}\]
to our children is nothing but a weaker (and hence perhaps a more insidious) way of doing the same thing, a process belonging essentially to the same category of action.

There are, however, at least two fundamental differences. The first is that the traditional approach to the understanding and teaching of moral principles depends, at least, as much on inspecting actual situations as it does upon bare deduction and the reiterating of general rules. We examine the problem – our own or someone else’s – and we ask ‘What would I – or he – be right to do there’? We invite the person we are attempting to teach to look at the situation from all aspects, to see what is involved, the various loyalties, the principles that might be invoked, and so on. We may help our pupil in this inspection, but his response is only a truly moral one if he decides that he would do this or that because he sees what is involved. We may help him with the background or the analysis, but he must decide which features are most important and which course of action is the right one, or the best possible in the circumstances. By watching, thinking and discussing the moral problems of others, and by deciding his own courses of action and seeing their consequences, an individual grows and develops as a truly moral being. Whether or not we think that a moral education consisting only of questions, such as Socrates offered, was too frugal a diet for the moral education of most men, the fact remains that this kind of dialogue has characterized our approach to moral education for the past four hundred years at least. ‘You must decide’, says the parent, pastor, teacher or older advisor, ‘I can only point out the following factors which seem to me to be relevant . . . . . ’. The study of literature, Classical, Biblical and later, formed the staple diet of European education for so long for just this reason – it informed the mind, stimulated the conscience and provided the material for just such discussion. This is certainly not to regulate or determine human morality in the totalitarian sense. If moral principles are truths in any real sense, they have to be seen, grasped by the individual as coherent, meaningful and convincing. The learner must perceive them for himself, not accept them by parrot-fashion learning or unreflectively on the authority of one particular person or group.

This brings us to our second difference between moral teaching
as traditionally practised and that put within our grasp by modern techniques of 'treatment'. The teacher is always under the moral principles he enunciates as well as the learner. He may say 'You ought not to . . .' but what he usually means is 'We ought not to . . .'. The most powerful moral rules which the human race has discovered are the most general ones, stating that 'Every man ought to . . . ' or 'No one should ever . . .'. A man aspiring to be a moral teacher who excepts himself from the rules he is propounding will have little influence. (There are of course lesser rules and duties applying only to certain people by reason of their particular status or function such as parents, policemen and so on. We are thinking here however of the more basic and general rules of human morality upon which there has been more or less universal agreement.) The corollary is even more evident. Only the teachers of the good life who have practised what they preached have stirred men in all ages. This was part of the attraction of Socrates; he lived out the morality he so diffidently tried to elicit in his conversations with men. But the totalitarian treatment of men is very different. There, the victim's question 'Have you had this done to you?' is out of place. The relation is that of potter and clay – 'This is what we're going to make you'. In genuine moral teaching, teacher and pupil are on the same road, one a little further on than the other. But the obligations which bind them make their paths one. If any man possesses moral authority, he is always willing to confess that it is not his own. It is derived, he has been given the vision of the good life which he has. He may share it but can never claim to be its creator.

Things are not right and good solely because one particular man or group says they are. This is neither what the words 'right' and 'good' mean, nor is it what any of the great moral teachers have intended to teach when they have enunciated rules and defined duties. There is a kind of authority in the rules themselves which is strangely similar to the kind of obligation felt between people, but the authority is manifestly not derived from the men who have framed the great moral principles for any particular age or culture. These principles belong to that category of hard, bed-rock ultimates which contain mathematical and logical truths and the 'common-sense' apprehensions
of the material world as our senses (with adequate safeguards) perceive them.\textsuperscript{18}

The uneasy state of our contemporary society with its rising crime rate and its disturbing increase in moral irresponsibility, apathy and hardness calls us to probe somewhat deeper. If we were to leave our consideration of morality here we should be leaving it very much where the eighteenth century thinkers left it. The French philosophes, following the lead of Locke and Hume in England, and fashioning their thought upon the system of ‘the incomparable Mr Newton’, believed that if only men would rid themselves of prejudices, superstitions and unjustified appeals to authority and look calmly and coolly at Nature around them and human nature within themselves, they would in the end reach clear, definite and distinct truths about every realm of human thought, investigation and experience. To all questions there were answers, so long as they were real questions asking for truth about the Universe. To each question there would be found one right, true and eternally valid answer. Only the laziness, muddle-headedness or perversity of men would stand in the way of complete enlightenment. With the admirable clarity of the French language, the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen expresses the united conviction of the French National Assembly of 1791 that the morality of human social behaviour is of this luminously obvious nature. The natural, inalienable, sacred rights of man are simple and incontestable principles on which the law will henceforth be founded, thus ensuring the happiness of all. To the men of the Enlightenment, science, philosophy, morals and politics would all soon yield up their basic truths, the structure of Reality.

From the depths of our twentieth century pessimism we are tempted to give a hollow laugh. We know the era of Romantic individualism which swallowed up the Enlightenment vision. If the earlier current of thought was too dryly intellectual, the other was a torrent of undifferentiated emotion in which the

\textsuperscript{18} The argument of the preceding section is substantially that of C. S. Lewis in the latter part of his penetrating Riddell Lecture The Abolition of Man (Bles, 1943). The work has been undeservedly eclipsed by some of Professor Lewis's other writings.
voice of reason was silenced. We do not wish to defend Romanticism, but we can now see that the Enlightenment vision failed because it left matters concerned with men and women at the level of principles and propositions. It lacked the personal note which Romanticism supplied so freely. Nowhere is this more evident than in morality. The fact that the stress on personal commitment has now run to seed in the blind self-affirmation of modern existentialism does not alter this judgement of the Enlightenment.

It may well be true that I ought never to murder, or tell a lie, or break a promise. But somehow the feeling of obligation and the authority which such rules seem to possess is not adequately explained by someone telling me that these are self-evident truths. In moral obligation we feel we are being *spoken to*. And here the Christian steps in to say that this is precisely what is happening. The ‘voice’ of duty, the categorical imperative, the authority of the good is a voice in more than a figurative sense, for it is man’s apprehension of the commands of the God who made him. This explains the constant tendency to refer to moral truths or rules as ‘laws’ and also the feeling of responsibility that goes with moral perception – man feels answerable to someone for his choices. The Christian maintains that it is precisely the solemnity and the binding quality of morality that was lost, or drastically weakened, by the rejection of theism on the part of the French thinkers of the eighteenth century. Most were atheists, some were deists retaining a vague supreme being as a kind of proto-engineer to explain the existence of the world, but denying revelation and all characteristic Christian doctrines.

The Christian is not concerned to deny that man is able to discover moral truth for himself without appealing to God, and without any knowledge of revelation. Nor do Christians wish to assert that all men are immoral without God, or can never do good deeds unless they have faith. What he is concerned to assert is that final and authoritative justification of moral rules will always elude man if he regards morality as in essence a matter of human expediency or convenience, a set of rules we can change at will or a series of arbitrary productions of a particular environment. Morality has a kind of lordship over us, and such a feeling of authority and responsibility can only be
adequately explained by our relation to a person. There is, that is, 'a Being who knows what we are, what we do, and what we ought to be and do; who approves of the right and disapproves of the wrong; and who has the power and the purpose to reward and punish us according to our character and conduct'\textsuperscript{19}. Nothing else accords so well, the Christian maintains, with the facts of our experience of moral obligation and responsibility.

The weakness of the position which stops short at abstract moral principles as final authority is seen in another way, which highlights the contemporary bewilderment in morals that we so frequently meet. Young people who are told that certain things are wrong, even by sympathetic relatives or friends, still ask ‘Who says so?’, ‘Why shouldn’t we if we’re not caught?’, ‘That’s only your idea, isn’t it?’ and so on. Though it may sometimes be possible on grounds of prudence or social expediency to suggest some valid reasons against a particular wrong act, this is not always the case, neither do our explanations carry conviction in the sense that we can adequately convey the obligatoriness of acting rightly. We are dissatisfied with the effect, and social irresponsibility increases. Is this not perhaps because we have been propounding the law as if there were no Law-giver, responsibility as if there were nobody to whom we were finally answerable for every deed done in the body?

Once we have admitted that it is the voice of God who speaks in our moral experience, we have taken an important step towards seeing how morality might be regulated. The way the Christian faith approaches this is to explain that as men are not morally perfect, and their moral apprehensions are often conflicting, or wavering, or uncertain, God in His goodness has chosen to repromulgate the main items of His law. This He did in the first place to one nation, the Jews, but through the Bible and the Christian Church this knowledge is now world-wide. The picture of the good life was not only painted in the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount; it was also lived out by Jesus of Nazareth, the eternal Son of God who was made man. To those who are willing to receive more light than that offered by their own consciences, the Bible offers all that is

\textsuperscript{19} Charles Hodge, \textit{Systematic Theology} I, p. 238, Nelson, 1875.
necessary to regulate and check our understanding of the fundamental constituents of morality. There is in fact no other way to measure the correctness and perspective of our moral view. All other ways involve the assertion of one human group against another, which only gives a stalemate. Men may however regulate their moral standards by reference to the law of God in Scripture.

It is important to note here that speaking plainly in this strain is no matter for which Christians need to apologize. One essential ingredient in responsible moral living is a sense of guilt when a wrong choice has been made. It has recently been maintained by the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin\(^{20}\) 'that a sense of guilt is a necessary factor for the maintenance of order, and indeed that it plays a much more important part in the preservation of order than any punishment that the state can impose'. It is his conviction that 'the most potent source of a sense of guilt is Christian morality'. Though this paper has not in the main concerned itself with the criminal law, it is worth while quoting Lord Devlin's concluding words on this matter: 'It is not necessary to be a Christian to say that in the Western world at the moment there is not even a discernible sign of anything that in the minds of the populace - and it is in the minds of the populace that law and order has to be kept, not among the enlightened thinkers - is capable of replacing Christianity as the provider of the moral force that is vital for the maintenance of good order'.

In an age of hesitancy and doubt over the very nature of morality and how it should be regulated, the Christian maintains that our hope lies in recognizing afresh the danger of our present situation, the recurrence of moral problems at all levels, national and local despite the lowering of public standards and the great advantages in living conditions which this age has over earlier times. Our control has increased, but things are becoming worse not better. Indeed, we now admit that the use to which man's control of man might well be put is more likely to be evil than good. In the realm of morality any attempt to 'treat' men and women to 'make them good' is self-defeating - improvement

\(^{20}\) 'The Sense of Guilt as an instrument of law and order' *The Listener*, April 1st, 1965.
does not lie that way. In that sense man cannot regulate his own morality, or he would destroy it. Yet the traditional teaching of morality has left man free, by its use of dialogue and discussion. And this traditional view also contained the view of morality as something given, under whose authority all men stood. It preserved responsibility and created a healthy sense of guilt.

This view of moral experience leads to questions about the ultimate authority behind moral experience; once we acknowledge God, sovereign Creator and Judge behind the moral law, our experience of moral obligation becomes comprehensible. But each man still left with the problem of how he may check his partial and fluctuating vision of the good life with what is the will of God, and then how he may obey and acceptably serve God. Christians maintain that both these needs have been met; knowledge of what God is like and how He wishes men to live is adequately given in the Bible, and the problem of our relationship to God, our restoration and strengthening to follow that will are given in the Gospel of Our Lord Jesus Christ.

I cannot but conclude that though I believe this Gospel must be proclaimed primarily because it is true, yet there is also ample evidence that it provides the best explanation of moral experience, and that it alone can safeguard and strengthen the moral fabric of a nation as confused as ours seems to be today.
The question of authority for and in ethical life and religious faith is one of the most pressing and challenging of modern issues. Is there any final court of appeal, any absolute norm to which the moral life may be referred? And is there any sure word and any ultimate fact in which religious trust can be reposed? This is the problem which will engage us in this paper.

The idea of authority is, of course, one with which everyone is aware. At every turn we are brought face to face with it. We are confronted with this law, that rule, the other requirement. We are under no illusion either, that authority is in a very real way a restriction of liberty. Yet the two are not contradictory. In a well ordered society the expression of liberty is not the repudiation of authority, any more than the acceptance of authority is the renunciation of liberty. Liberty without a recognized authority would mean anarchy; while authority without real liberty would mean tyranny.

Authority and liberty are consequently complementary. In the whole round of social life, in the home, in the state and in the Church, man’s happiness consists in the felicitous combination of both liberty and authority.

Yet it does seem more natural for a man to assert his liberty than to accept an authority. Liberty is something he assumes as a right; whereas authority is something he must need accept as a duty. The recognition of primary authority is, however, of more consequence than the realization of personal liberty. There is only one thing greater than liberty, according to the reckoning of P. T. Forsyth, and that is authority. It might indeed be argued that the repudiation of authority is the clearest evidence of man’s fallen nature. The essence of sin lies in man’s wanting to live independently of God – and of his
fellow man. He first rejected the authority of God, ‘Hath God said?’ – then his responsibility for his brother, ‘Am I my brother’s keeper?’

It is, all the same, in his recognition of authoritative duty-claims that man reveals himself as other than an animal. It is at this point comes the assurance of the immortal honour of being an individual. It is here he shows himself a responsible being. To be responsible is another way of saying that man is human. Morality is not a discovery of yesterday. It is as old as man, and there is a sense in which it is true to say that to be human is to be moral and vice versa. Morality is not an invention. It is neither dictated by utter self-interest; nor is it the result of man’s desire for social cohesion. Society, to be sure, can only survive on moral principles but we must, at any rate, be clear that moral principles are not simply the outcome of a social contract. They are not the mere artificial agreements of a pact between a collection of individuals who would otherwise bite and devour each other. Man qua man is a moral being and because he is such he has moral obligations.

‘If we hold’ observes H. J. Paton, ‘that moral principles are universal in the sense that they are binding upon all men – and without this there may be mores, but not morality – we are not talking of men as ‘a forked radish with a head fantastically carved on it’: we are talking of him as a rational and reasonable being. There must be something common to men in virtue of which they can be moral agents and can be treated as such’. Yet man somehow recognizes a moral authority in his admission of moral obligations. Furthermore, he reveals his moral autonomy by the fact that he knows himself to be a responsible being. He knows that there is no evil act that he should not have repudiated. He regards others as blameworthy or praiseworthy because he considers that they, as himself, could have resisted the performance of this evil deed or that.

To the question therefore, ‘Why should I?’ – the answer must be, ‘You should do right because right is what you should do’. And this is not by any means a glaring tautology. For to say we should be moral because we are moral beings is analogous to,

\[1 \text{ The Modern Predicament, p. 301.} \]
and no more tautological than to say, we should think because we are rational beings. Not to exercise thought is to contradict what is an essential truth about us. So, too, is it with morality; we should do what is right because we are that sort of being.

What strikes the reader in the section dealing with morality in Harold Loukes' *Teenage Religion* is that children seem to have an instinctive awareness of the rightness of right, even though some of them might regard the doing of it, at least at times, as boring or as requiring the admixture of a bit of cheek to assure one of getting on. It is, after all, beings such as we who ask the question 'Why should I?', or more often, 'Why shouldn't I?'; and in the very asking we demonstrate a fundamental fact of our nature. Animals, it seems, have no temptation to act out of harmony with their animality. This is man's problem: and yet a sign of his greatness. Thus to the question 'Why shouldn't I?' the reply must come in the form of another question, 'Does it contradict your nature as a moral being?; 'Does it make you less than a human individual by putting you on a level with the animals?'

What the Scripture says, man knows to be true of himself; he was made to have dominion over the beasts of the field. He was crowned with glory and honour. And as John Baillie reminds us: 'There are some things you can't comfortably do with a crown upon your head'\(^2\).

Two facts are, therefore, clear. On the one hand morality is a category *sui generis*. It is in one sense unique and cannot be reduced to any more fundamental non-moral terms. It is neither derivative from, nor explicable in any more basic amoral categories. Goodness is goodness, and rightness is rightness. The good is not just what I happen to approve and the right is not what happens to appeal.

Most men, we would venture to say, are intuitively aware of the *claim* upon them both to be good and to do right. They may not, to be sure, be always certain that this particular thing is good and that right. But of the *authoritative claim* of duty upon them, both to be and to do, they have no doubt.

On the other hand, when the implications of morality are worked out they will be seen to require an ultimate Personal

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\(^2\) *A Reasoned Faith*, p. 98.
reference. The fact of moral demands and obligations invites us to seek beyond them an unconditional authority in which they may be understood. It is clearly the duty of man to act in the world of space and time in accordance with moral principles. And because this is so, can it be unreasonable for him to believe that he lives in a universe governed by moral principles? To allow such is a tacit acknowledgement that ultimate reality must be personal and moral. It is only here that the reason why this is good and that is right, gets its answer. It is in this relation that morality is seen finally as the expression of God's character as the universe itself is of His creative activity. The unconditional authority of the moral law must be grounded in the nature of things; it must have its roots in God.

It is precisely here that Humanism proves itself as finally self-destructive. It encourages men to be satisfied with reasons less than ultimate and to depend upon their own powers as alone sufficient. The truth of the matter is, however, that a human power which thinks itself unrestricted is very apt to become tyrannical and thus to destroy the very glory and freedom of humanity which is the Humanist's chief boast. Humanism fails because it refuses to rest the ladder, by which it would have men ascend, upon the bar of heaven, and it is the verdict of psychology and history alike that ladders without some support in a meaningful cosmic Reality are apt to come crashing down again on the earth. Humanism fails just because it avoids the ultimate question and quest. It suffers because it is not serious enough about life: it is too trivial to be true.

Thus the failure of Humanism lies in the fact that it cannot see beyond the human. It shrinks from the ultimate enquiry because it has no answer for it, not because of the certainty that the human can be all there is. Without the last word on the final problems of human life it can have no more in a man's philosophy than an interim position. The man awakened to his heart's need and mind's quest will need something more sure and more secure.

It is the Christian certainty that morality finds its sense of worthwhileness in God alone; it is here it comes into contact with that source of energy from which it may be replenished and reinforced. Very properly, therefore, has H. P. Owen reminded
us that ‘morality is not self-sufficient. Moral facts are not in the last resort self-authenticating; they require religious justification. The task of theism is to show how morality, when it is most true to itself, raises questions to which the Christian concept of God is the only answer."

We are not, of course, intending to imply here that morality has no meaning and no autonomy apart from theological presuppositions. Such an assertion would not only do injustice to the facts, but would be at odds with what we have already contended. It is our firm conviction that man \textit{qua} man, just because he is a moral being, has an understanding of right and wrong. It is quite certain that multitudes of ordinary men and women act on moral principles without the least notion that they could have and should have a Divine reference. As far as they are concerned, for the most part, they do this or that because they have either a latent or lively conviction that they just ought to do so. They act without further enquiry as if moral claims exist in their own right. They do not stop to consider that, in fact, ethical concepts really occupy, what we have suggested as a sort of ‘interim’ position. Yet this is precisely the case. When, however, they are challenged to think through the issues most people would, we think, come to see that even if moral obligation is binding it is not thereby finally self-authenticating. Whether, however, recognized or not, the truth of the matter is that human life is in the end life under God and it is in this context and from this fact that human existence derives its significance and moral obligation its sanction. In a God-ordered universe and a God-invaded planet this must be so.

The order in the natural world and the obligations of the moral life are clearly inescapable facts. The only fatal error in the former case is to take the generally ordered anatomy of the universe for the sum total of reality and truth. And in the latter case to suppose that because moral obligations have a meaning and validity on their own account that they have not, and need not, ultimate metaphysical justification. But in both spheres the truth is that there is a deeper and more fundamental fact to be taken into account. From the point of view of an ordered universe law is an intellectual concept and as such is only a half-

\footnote{\textit{The Moral Argument for Christian Theism}, p. 33f.}
truth. It is so for the reason that it can never be its own explanation and justification. ‘The radical difference between the Christian and the scientific hypothesis is that, for Christians, the supreme fact in the universe is not a law, nor any stupendous concatenation of laws, but a Person.\(^4\) Of course this is an act of faith. But is it not a faith well-grounded? We are quite ready to admit that the awareness of God is not necessarily given in the recognition of the orderly design of the natural world. If this were so no further ‘proof’ or ‘pointer’ to His existence would be needful. Nevertheless there must be some reason in the conviction of the Christian believer and the contention of the Christian apologist that an orderly universe could hardly have been hatched out of ultimate chaos. The creative action of a Personal God would seem to be what the situation as we have it requires. It was that *Saint of Science* as L. Pearce-Williams has entitled his book on Michael Faraday, who declared that ‘physical laws are the glimmering we have of the second causes by which one Great Cause works His wonders and governs the world’. To ‘see’ by faith behind the actuality of the world the activity of a Personal creative God is not to be guilty of crass stupidity or blind credulity, but is rather to attain to the wisdom of faith; for by faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God (Heb. xi. 3).

From the point of view of morality the position is no less challenging. Is it unjust to assert that fundamental moral concepts have only final significance in a context which sees the Ultimate Fact as a Moral Being? We have allowed that moral terms have a meaning outside faith in God for the reason that there is a ‘natural’ law of morality binding on all men and that it is only as a result of a prior grasp of moral values that we can speak of God at all. But while we understand the moral claim without God, its distinctive nature and content cannot be known independently of religious faith. All the important moral concepts, such as responsibility, goodness, duty and the like, have an ultimate personal reference.

Not only the Christian ethic without doubt, but the general ethic by implication, requires a personal ultimate. While the

Christian ethic finds its significance in the experience of man in grace as a redeemed individual *coram Dei* as Redeemer, the general ethic finds its significance in the fact that man by nature is a responsible being *coram Dei* as Creator. It is in the recognition of God as Creator that general moral requirements become changed and charged by the admission of this Personal origin. They are here lifted up out of the realm of the impersonal into that of the expressed will of God as Holy Sovereign. As indeed the ethic of the New Testament is for the Christian believer the expression of the will of God as Holy Saviour. Ethical obligations and constraints would seem to have no ultimate claim upon us unless they have such a Personal Source. It is in this way that morality, which is in itself a 'higher immediacy', leads on to the awareness of a 'Higher Reality' which is both Personal and Moral. In the last analysis it would seem reasonable to insist that ethical claims and constraints demand our acknowledgement and acceptance in ratio to the personal context in which they come. The marriage vow, for example, seems remote and impersonal until one is involved. It is in the give and take of personal relationships that such words as obligation, duty and claim have meaning. In truth, the more intimately and personally mediated they are the more urgent and binding they become.

The duty claims of morality have, of course, authority of themselves. So long as we continue to talk in terms of moral obligation, or recognize moral law, or insist on moral duty, we are allowing for this authority. But in the last resort it is a borrowed authority. Authority must in the ultimate be personal. Wherever it exists its origin will be found to be traceable to some person or persons who have the right to command and to shape custom. All delegated authority takes up into itself the authority of the person or persons by whom its obligations and duties were originated or promulgated. Laws and principles rest ultimately on personal grounds.

Thus, while morality as obligation, law, and duty are authoritative for man as a moral being, it is important to see how cogent is a remark of Kierkegaard's when brought into this context. He is arguing that only one authority alone can give adequate justification to faith. He continues with the remark that 'to lend
sanction to all authorities is possible only to him who is unique authority. If we add 'morality' to 'faith' in Kierkegaard's argument he would be no less on the mark. It is in God as Personal Moral Being, to whom the reality of man's moral nature points, that we have the final authority for man's duty as a responsible moral agent.

It is proper to emphasize, however, that if all authority is personal in its origin, it is also true, that all authority becomes personal by its recognition. It must, that is, be accepted by personal decision and choice. To be sure nothing is made authoritative in this way. Personal choice and decision, that is, are not the ground of authority. Such an idea would taint all authority with the leaven of subjectivism, and the result would be every-man doing that which was right in his own eyes. It is, therefore, imperative to recognize that real authority always exists independently of any appropriation of it. And whatever the mode of appropriation, this does not in its turn become another authority. A real authority, as P. T. Forsyth so finely and firmly declared, is not the authority of experience; it is the authority for experience. It is an experienced authority.

Ultimate authority is unprovable, just because it is ultimate. But while it is incapable of rational demonstration it is not thereby impossible of recognition. It has been our contention that as far as general moral demands are concerned this assurance of the ultimate personal authority of an Existent Personal God is open to 'whosoever will'. Not only, as we have argued, is this so for the reason that ethical duty-claims need such a personal reference, but for the further consideration, which we now add, that any man honest with himself will allow that he neither completely did nor fully can accomplish all that he should. The good that he would he does not. It has often been the case that this sense of failure has been creative of religious faith. The pointer to the Higher Reality, to an existent Personal God has come through an inability to fulfil even general moral obligations to one's own satisfaction without a power beyond one's own to make for righteousness. It is in this state that some men have come to seek God and thus to find in Him the grace to do

the good they know they should. Thus have they discovered behind the moral law, Him who in the words of H. H. Farmer, is at the same time Absolute Demand and Final Succour.

The fact of the matter is, however, that in the New Testament this is a truism. The idea that man can achieve a moral perfection sufficient to make him accepted and approved by a Holy God is there nowhere allowed. No man 'on his own' account or 'in his own' strength, can make himself 'good enough' for God. Thus, the central fact of the Christian Gospel is that which is given emphatic declaration by the apostle Paul, that by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in the sight of God. Before God every man is a sinner. In relation to God, man is never in the right.

In ordinary daily life many a man has been and, perhaps, has some reason to be, well satisfied with his moral rectitude. In a human way of speaking, he is right in everything. He lives satisfied without the awareness of any more fundamental relation than that required by the necessities of social life. But in the moment when he becomes stabbed awake to or comes to see the reality of morality's ultimate as the will of a Holy God, the Moral Ruler of the universe, he makes the discovery that all is not so well with him. For in the recognition of this relationship the moral claim is seen as much more stringent and demanding than he had hitherto supposed. He there finds that what was sufficient for his approval of man (and of his own conscience) is not enough for his acceptance by God.

In the relationship between man and man there is no such thing as absolute guilt, for in this relationship a man may be in the right in this respect even if he is in the wrong in that. But between God and man the case is different. God and man do not meet as equals, as partners in a common search and strife. In the relationship between God and man, God is never in the wrong; man always.

'Give me a great thought', requested Herder in the midst of his life's struggles. A great thought may, perhaps, give some comfort to a man in the throes of some of life's conflicts. But for the man awake to his guilt before God because he has come to see the futility of his best endeavours, the need is not for a great thought, but for a great fact. And it is this great fact, grand and
glorious in its divine authority, which the Christian gospel assures to him. It assures him God’s forgiving and renewing grace revealed in Christ, the incarnate Son of God.

The position, then, is this, that it is in God who has declared himself in general as the Moral Ruler of the universe and who has revealed himself in particular as the Spiritual Saviour of men that the ultimate seat of authority for morals and faith is located. This declaration puts in right context and perspective man’s last authority. To Him who is at once Moral Ruler and Spiritual Saviour man is accountable as a last fact. He alone has the right of absolute rights over us. It is a fundamental truth that there is nothing finally binding upon human beings, whose chief end is to glorify God, but God’s holy will. Only that which is clearly and convincingly of Him can demand our fullest allegiance. It is in the reality of and in response to the authority of God that man finds his true destiny as man. In the presence of God man learns that his rightful attitude is not that of a sovereign, but of a suppliant. It is here he makes discovery that the reason for things does not lie in himself or even in his world.

Before God the human understanding can find no reasons but to own the authority of God. It is here the will knows its own master and the heart its own Lord. ‘God is the last authority for the religious, and therefore for the race, and He is the only authority we have in the end.’ God remains forever the Object of man’s authority, not the Subject for man’s contemplation. God is Holy Imperative. Man, on the other hand, has a receptivity for authority. Herein is to be marked his distinctiveness, his essential greatness. He has power to recognize authority and to own it. This is the a priori in man; not itself an authority, but the capacity for authority. It cannot, therefore, be too strongly emphasized that God is His own authority, as He is man’s. And for a man to ‘own up’ to the reality of that authority as the final court of appeal for his moral life and to ‘own’ that authority as the sure word in his religious life is indeed to make good his destiny as an ethical and theological being. In this recognition and acknowledgement man, made by God and for Him, finds his freedom and fulfilment in the God of the Universe and the Lord of the Cross.

To say that God is man’s ultimate authority in the realms of morals and faith is to be committed to the conclusion, which Augustine long since had seen so clearly, namely this, that God’s authority and God’s self-disclosure are two sides of the same reality. It is in His revelation that God’s authority is to be found. Revelation is, therefore, the key to religious authority. In revelation God is seen as Moral and Redemptive disclosing His authority. In revelation the main thing is not that God gives Himself to us so much to be known as to be owned. He does not unveil Himself for theoretic investigation. He reveals Himself as urgent, demanding and authoritative.

Just here one of the significant contrasts between religion and science is to be observed. In science knowledge is for the sake of understanding; in religion it is for the sake of worship. In science the object of knowledge is ‘there’ to be investigated. In revelation God, as infinite Subject, moves to the ‘here’ in personal self-disclosure. In revelation God as Ultimate Authority speaks to man who has a receptivity for authority. It is thus rightly declared that ‘authority’ can only be found in the revealed will of God.\(^7\)

The idea of revelation is not, however, something strange to us. There is a sense in which all reality is self-communicative. There is nothing known without some indications of its presence. The more we ascend in the scale of being and the more personal beings become, the more self-disclosure becomes necessary and possible. Where individuality exists, with the power of feeling and volition there exists, too, the reality of communication. Man himself is a social being who can enter into relationships. But this presupposes the power of utterance, the ability to communicate with others, the possibility of giving direct and immediate revelation of one’s innermost soul. In a world where friendship is a real experience the idea of a direct communication from mind to mind is no strange phenomenon. All of us are aware of this ‘overagainstness’ in relation to others and of the truth that we only enter into a deep fellowship with those who choose to admit us into their inner life. The knowledge that

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is most vital for us to know, we see to be that of self-disclosure. Our own experience testifies that between individuals capable of it, direct revelation is a constant fact.

The medium of this communication is mainly speech and act. It is by these media that a personal disclosure is the most surely made. Aware as we are of the difficulties in taking up into the theological realm the ‘analogy of nature’ we cannot but feel the force of the contention that if the testimony of religious faith is given any credence, then the fact of a Divine Self-disclosure is necessarily presupposed. It can hardly but be admitted that God, who is the infinite heart and mind beyond all hearts and minds, cannot or would not do what He has conditioned and required His highest creatures to do. It is incredible to suggest that God can give at most a mere glimmer of Himself only faintly and uncertainly through dumb material symbols, and never through speech and act. The whole of nature is against the view that God cannot disclose Himself. The experiences of human beings is a flat denial of the idea that God would not make any disclosure of Himself. Human beings, made, as we contend, in the image of God, speak to each other in an intimate and immediate way and make direct revelation of what they are. It is of all conclusions the most reasonable that the Personal God, whom for men to know is their deepest need and their highest good, should reveal Himself to them, so that their deepest need may be met and their highest good may be realized.

The fact of the self-disclosure of God is, then, the fundamental truth. It is only because God has spoken and acted in revelation that man can respond in faith. Faith is, indeed, the total response of the individual to God’s revealing. If therefore, as Emil Brunner argues, God is anything more than an idea; if, that is, He is a personal spiritual reality, we can only have a personal knowledge of Him by His actually speaking to us. This is quite a different thing from the monologue of thought reflected on itself. Assuming that God is a Self, an Ego, He must proclaim Himself as such to us if we are to know Him at all. He must ‘name His name to us’. For the ‘name’ that we give to Him on our own account is not His name.

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The English word 'revelation', which derives from the Latin, conveys the idea of the drawing back of a veil. It is thus the disclosure of something that would otherwise remain hidden. The term is therefore almost an exact equivalent for the New Testament word 'apocalypse', 'an uncovering', 'a laying bare' (cf. Rev. 1:1). Thus has God drawn back the curtain to show Himself. He has stepped forth and disclosed Himself in a way we can understand in speech and act. He has not, that is to say, merely slipped a note to us from behind the curtain. Revelation therefore, as Berdyaev observes,\(^9\) bears the character of a breakthrough of the other world. At the same time it is in some measure conditioned by the circumstances of its time and the men and nations to whom and through whom it came. Consequently, while revelation moves from above it is no less prepared for from below. This consideration keeps us from the error of identifying divine revelation with human discovery. God's revelation to men is always in the context of man's immediate position. God speaks to man where He finds him. But the contingent element in the revelation must not be allowed to obscure its divine origin.

In revelation there is a making known of that which no man 'on his own' could ever discover. It is the unveiling of the \(\mu\nu\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\sigma\iota\nu\ \tau\epsilon\omicron\ \omicron\omicron\nu\). It is the self-manifestation of God—of His being, His purposes, and His grace.

This remark brings into view the question of the relation of what is known as general or natural revelation and special or supernatural revelation. The distinction sets before us two species or stages of revelation which it is as well to keep in mind. There is a revelation which God makes continuously to all men and there is His special revelation which He has made through a chosen people and a Select Person. In Psalm xix these two ideas of revelation are brought together. The Psalm begins with praise of the glory of God, who as Creator, has written His signature upon the spacious firmament. It may be that men are so blinded as not to be able to read the Name aright, or even not to be able to see it at all. For in this sense, as has been said, natural revelation is God's braille for blinded man. But the

\(^9\) Truth and Revelation, p. 54.
Psalmist goes on to utter his praise of the mercy of Jehovah, the God of the covenant, who has visited him with His saving word. It is on the reality of this higher revelation he bases his prayer for salvation from sin which ends with the acclamation of an adoring heart: 'O Jehovah, my Rock, and my Redeemer'.

The distinction then between general and special revelation may be put like this: the first comes to man qua man, the second to man qua sinner. But as sinner man has not ceased to be man, he has rather added to himself new needs which require additional provisions to bring him to the end for which he was created. Thus the revelation made by God to man as man is not rescinded. It is as man still that God would meet him, but He comes with those additional provisions to meet the new conditions created by man's sin, guilt, and helplessness.

The distinction suggested by the other alternative, natural and supernatural revelation, contains also a useful emphasis. Natural revelation is communicated through natural phenomena, whereas supernatural revelation puts the stress upon the idea of an intervention of God into the natural order. Revelation as natural is addressed to men generally as intelligent beings and is, for that reason, at least ideally, accessible to all. The supernatural special revelation is essentially soteriological. It is addressed to man as a sinner, that in and by the experience of God's grace he might be made to realize the high purpose of his creation. Natural revelation, therefore, assures to man as God's creature a possible knowledge of Himself as Moral Ruler of the universe. Supernatural revelation comes as God's forgiving grace to the same creature as sinfully guilty before God, the Holy One.

God's revelation is, therefore, as H. R. Mackintosh puts it, first 'primary' with its three fold constituent factors of nature, history and the moral consciousness of man. All the conditions for the rise and progress of true religion are here. But the fact is that this 'primary' revelation has of itself failed because of man's changed nature through sin. Neither nature, nor history has made a sufficiently deep impression on man. Even conscience has proved unavailing, for, as the apostle Paul has declared, uncontrolled sensuality renders man at last incapable of recognizing the moral imperatives of God as God's. God has therefore
come in a new manifestation of Himself in what Mackintosh calls His 'remedial' revelation.

Yet while the two modes of revelation can be distinguished, it is necessary to insist upon their permanent relationship and interconnection. They belong together and each is incomplete without the other. Revelation in its most general sense is rooted in creation, and in those relations with His intelligent creatures into which God has brought Himself by giving them existence. The purpose of God was the creation of a fellowship of men with whom He could have communion. By the entrance of sin and the destruction of this fellowship, the 'natural' relationship was disrupted and the knowledge of God blurred. God, therefore, initiated a new mode of revelation conditioned upon the new needs of men. This new mode of revelation must not, however, be thought of as an ex post facto expedient. Sin did not take God by surprise. Thus the introduction of special revelation must not be regarded as a make-shift. The course of human history was not something which God failed to see and over which He had no control. Consequently revelation in its dual aspect was God's intended revelation from the beginning, the single purpose of which was to realize the ends of creation. Hence without the soteriological activity of special revelation, general revelation itself would seem to lack cogency. It is general revelation which provides the fundamental knowledge of God as wise Creator and Moral Ruler without which God's special disclosure would appear to be in some necessary sense irrelevant.

At the same time it is by means of special revelation that the truths given in general revelation are illuminated and vindicated. This was the fact clearly seen by Augustine. His problem was not how to supplement a strictly natural revelation by a strictly supernatural one. For him, what is braille to a blind man, is God’s open signature 'writ large' to one whose eyes have been opened. As a sinner, in Augustine’s thought, general revelation on its own profits little. It is from the vantage point of special revelation that the full speech of general revelation is heard.

Brunner, it is well known, is not disposed to accept Barth’s reductionist concept of revelation. He does not regard it as being in accord with the facts of the situation to deny outright all general revelation. It is not possible, he affirms, to believe in a
Christian way in revelation in the Mediator, without believing in a universal revelation of God in creation, in history, and especially in the human conscience. He is quite ready to allow that in Christian eyes ‘general’ revelation is only an indirect (gebrochen) form of revelation. But he insists that the recognition of this indirect general revelation is the presupposition of the Christian revelation, with its unique character. The prophets of ancient time certainly declared that God is Lord of history and nature and life. Nevertheless even they were surely aware that the speech of God in the created universe and human history was baffling. In the light of the supreme revelation of God as Redeemer they found a new significance, and where hitherto their voice was not heard, they now speak plainly that he who runs can read.

In contrast, then, with general revelation, God’s revelation of which the Bible is the record, is special. It is, that is to say, directed towards a specific end. It is ‘saving’ in its purpose. And from what we have said it will be clear that this special redemptive disclosure was progressive. It came ‘in bits and pieces’, in a way appropriate to the time, sometimes through dream or symbol, sometimes by God’s mighty acts of national disaster or deliverance, sometimes by priestly ceremony or by prophetic word, until the fullness of time came when His final unveiling was accomplished. Thus was the Word of God spoken in its grand ultimacy in the Word made flesh, and His acts on behalf of man’s salvation given their completeness and perfection, once and for all, in the deed of the Cross and the crowning fact of the Resurrection. The biblical revelation is as a consequence historical: it is tied up with history. It did not, as H. R. Mackintosh so aptly remarks, reach the world like a bullet out of a pistol. Each state and stage of the new self-disclosure of God serves itself heir to what went before, and bears it all up to a higher level. By a new and living impulse it perpetuates and enhances what God had previously made known. And from first to last, and therefore as an ultimate fact, God’s redemptive revelation is personal. While there is a variety of non-personal entities used by God in His self-disclosure, the personal element

and note are never absent. Whatever its form, be it lot, or dream, or vision, or theophany, or institution, or prophecy, the one fact is there, that it is God, the personal God, who is disclosing Himself to man. Revelation is from God and for man: God is the source of it and man the object of it. Thus, at its highest point revelation moves in the realm of personal relationships. As personality is the essential thing in man, it is just here that God has disclosed Himself in His clearest and final form - a Face like my face. It is for this reason that the Christian points to the living Person of Christ as the final Exegete of God. Here God speaks in word and deed. Incarnation is thus the highest possible form of divine revelation known to us, since human personality is the highest created form of existence known by us. The fullness of time came in the fifteenth year of Tiberius Caesar, when Pontius Pilate was governor of Judaea. Then God spoke in one who is Son of God; then was the Life manifested. Then God appeared in the arena of human history. Then the Literature of Heaven was translated into the language of earth. The Truth of God was embodied in a Life. Hitherto, in nature, in history and in conscience, God revealed His hand. Now all the previous special tokens of His goodwill for men were taken up in Christ and here God made bare His heart in a final unfolding of Himself, for which He had been preparing through the selection of Israel from among the nations to be the vehicle of His purposes of grace for mankind.

Thus is the Old Testament a prelude to the New: the Old is the promise, the New the fulfilment. They belong together, and both constitute the ‘history of our salvation’, in its prophecy and its performance. It can be seen, then, that the history of the Old Testament in which great personalities played so vital a part, and the Personality of the New Testament which is so decisively grounded in history, together set forth that disclosure of God to man the purpose of which is man’s redemption through grace that he might fulfil his ‘chief end’ in glorifying God.

The whole sweep of the revelation of God is seen therefore to be mediated at its highest point in Jesus Christ so as to appeal to and claim the whole personality of man.

Since then God’s will has been given personal revelation in Christ, the Word of God incarnate, He becomes at once the final
court of appeal and absolute norm to which the moral life of man must be referred, and the sure word and ultimate fact in which religious trust can be reposed. It is here that Divine authority finds its focus and its finality. This is the reason why we read in the Gospel records that His teaching caused astonishment because He taught as one having authority. The scribes appealed to tradition. But He had no need to make any such appeal. He made it evident that He possessed authority in His own right. All His teaching bears the character of this divine authority. Since God's final revelation is in Christ it follows that He possesses God's authority for man. The absoluteness of Christ's authority in the sphere of ultimate knowledge of God is asserted in Matthew xi.27, as is a like ultimate authority in the realm of a complete knowledge of man implied in John ii.25. In His work of revelation God has exhausted Himself in Christ and in Him it has an adequate organ and authoritative voice.

It is necessary to emphasize, however, the further fact that for our knowledge of God's authoritative revelation of His will in Christ, we are shut up to the biblical account. Charles Gore has underscored this truth by showing that we cannot, and we need not, seek to go beyond this account. For the external knowledge of our Lord, of what He taught and was, we are dependent, 'by His express intention', as Gore maintains, upon the witness of His apostles. And these men were specially 'qualified for a unique function by a special inspiration'. It is they who were commissioned to record God's disclosure and to take up into their account by allusion and reference God's earlier manifestations so as to give understanding and significance to His final word. As recorders and interpreters of the Christ-Fact these apostolic men were, as Forsyth says, God's 'elect and providential personalities'. They were not corruptors of the revelation, they were conveyors of it. Their words were not an intrusion upon the revelation, but part of the schema of it. 'We cannot therefore as a matter of historical enquiry', as Gore observes in the passage to which we have just alluded, 'go behind the apostles, for our Lord never wrote anything Himself, and as a matter of fact we do not need to go behind it.'

11 cf. Charles Gore, The Incarnation of the Son of God, p. 188.
not need to go behind them because in the Scriptures we have the revelation of God recorded for perpetual remembrance.

In the written record, therefore, we are brought into contact with God's unfolding revelation of Himself in every age. In this way we are made contemporaries of His divine progressive unveiling which finds its culmination in Christ the Lord. Thus for us, as James Orr states it, 'the record in the fullness of its contents, is for us the revelation'. It is in this way the authority of revelation is given objectivity. At the same time, as we contended at the beginning of this lecture, there must be a personal appropriation of authority so as to make it actual for one's self. Yet whatever the subjective method for receiving the revelation might be, it neither constitutes nor comprises of itself our authority. Consequently, neither faith as the medium whereby God's authoritative revelation is appropriated, nor experience as the sphere in which it operates, can be made the ultimate grounds of our certainty.

But it is the united testimony of Christian faith that the objective authority of God's self-disclosure wins its response in the human heart by the inner testimony of the Spirit of God. It is not, therefore, the documented revelation of God in Scripture as something mechanically followed, nor the inner impulse of the Spirit as something to be acted on, on its own, where the ultimate seat of authority lies. The Spirit without the fixed Word is nebulous; while the Word without the Spirit is numb. It is in the duality of Word and Spirit that the essential Christian principle of authority exists. It might indeed be said that it is in this 'duality' that it consists.

Authority rests upon a 'must' and an 'ought', and the 'ought' is reached through the 'must'. External authority provides the 'must' and internal authority awakens the 'ought'. The 'must' flows from the revelation as an objective fact, and the 'ought' flows from revelation in its subjective spiritual nature. The 'must' and the 'ought' coincide in God.

We have been facing throughout this paper, what every man at some time or other seems unable to escape, an ultimate question. And where there is an ultimate question it most certainly follows, as Dostoevsky assures us, that there is an ultimate answer. 'How else', he asks, 'could there be a question
concerning it? It is only in the question that man can get hold of this answer, however, because it is an ultimate answer. God would certainly not be God, if He were not really the solution. And, therefore, the problematical does not remain the final word of true knowledge of life. Behind it an absolutely final word can be perceived. What is impossible for men is possible for God.\footnote{cf. Eduard Thurneysen, Dostoevsky, p. 37f.}

The revelation of God, therefore, as Ultimate Demand and Final Succour does not leave a man, awakened to the mind’s quest and the soul’s need, to be contented with the limits of the interim and to be condemned to the twilight of the uncertain. The total revelation of God assures us of His final authority in the whole area of life. ‘And this is life eternal to know Him the only true God and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent.’
My purpose in this paper is not to reveal my own personal beliefs and opinions. Rather, we will consider the various theories which have been propounded as men have sought to consider the origin and nature of man and his initial relationship with God, as described in the first three chapters of Genesis, in the light of modern scientific knowledge and speculation.

I want to commence by laying down some guiding principles for our study. First of all, on what basis are we to consider the contents of Genesis? Genesis imparts to us the main motives for the existence of this world and for the life of man in a concrete form; but we may not consider biblical language as language designed to convey contemporary scientific concepts and hence we cannot exact from it precise scientific knowledge.

The Christian doctrine of creation is an exposition of the first article of the Creed which says ‘I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth...’ It is, therefore, to be distinguished from any attempt to describe how the Universe began, nor is it any kind of argument for the existence of God. No inferences from design in nature can enable us to determine if the mind (if any) behind creation was omnipotent or limited, but with a sufficient supply of free energy. Between these two, there is an infinite qualitative difference for one is God and the other is not. The words ‘I believe’ are significant when we remember that ‘science is a partial activity of man limited by the observer-attitude, while faith is an activity in which man must be a partaker as a totality.’ (Mark xii. 30)². The doctrine also guards against two misunderstandings; one that the world was co-existing eternally with God and secondly, that the world is

¹ A paper read to the London Christian Graduate Society, 6 December, 1965.
some kind of emanation of God. Finally, it seeks to affirm the transcendency of God and dependence of the creature, and God's continuous preserving, sustaining and directing power.

I want, at the beginning, to state my belief quite clearly that in Christian theology the notion of creation is not primarily concerned with a hypothetical act by which God brought the world into being at some past time, but with the incessant act by which He preserves the world in existence so long as He wills it shall exist. In this respect I stand with St. Thomas Aquinas\(^3\) who said 'As it depends on the will of God that he produces things into being, so it depends on his will that he preserves them in being, for he does not preserve them in any other way than by always giving them being, hence if he withdrew his action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing'. Creation then is not the bridge between God and his creatures. They are two distinct beings, God, who is self-existent, and his creatures, who exist because he wills it so. This view stands in opposition to the deistic one which states the belief that God initially ordained and 'wound up' his perfect creation which he now allows to function by set rules. He can 'intervene' from outside but this implies a change in a perfect creation. This view to me seems contrary to the scriptural facts that 'he upholdeth all things by the Word of his power' and 'he maketh his sun to rise on the just and on the unjust'.

The other main point I wish to make in this introduction is one concerning the concept of, and terminology associated with evolution. Barclay\(^4\) has made a comprehensive survey of the confusion arising with the use of the word "evolution" and has categorized its use in literature to mean three different things, (1) descent with modification (2) the extent of descent with modification and (3) the mechanism of descent with modification. We shall attribute the first meaning to it in this paper.

Unfortunately over the years, too many people have forgotten that the theory of evolution is purely a scientific hypothesis and that 'the theory of man's evolution wholly by natural means is a philosophical and not a scientific claim' as stressed by Lack\(^5\).

\(^3\) Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* I (ii), 3c.
He continues ‘if an essential part of human nature, for example, responsibility, morality or truth, lies outside the terms of reference of science, then since all natural phenomena can be studied scientifically, it would appear to follow that man has not evolved wholly by natural means’. To me, therefore, the doctrine of evolution is amoral or in the words of Huxley ‘neither anti-theistic nor theistic’.

Ramm in his excellent book *The Christian View of Science and Scripture* lists four main views with regard to the origin of life to which I should like to add a fifth. They are (1) fiat creation (2) progressive creationism (3) theistic evolution (4) naturalistic evolution, and my fifth, that life may have originated on some other planet and been carried here by a meteor.

About the first position, little can be said. It’s philosophy was summed up by Higley who wrote ‘No true servant of God would knowingly rob the Creator of His glory by regarding creation as a mere process instead of a miracle’. The illogicality of such a stand stems from his many “a priorisms” and such thinking is representative of an extreme fundamentalist position. Belief in fiat creation is a possibility, in my view, remote, but it certainly does not warrant the imperative standing attributed to it by its advocates.

We will also spend little time on the latter two beliefs. On the grounds of what has already been said, I reject naturalistic evolution which, as we shall see later, also fails to account for man’s sense of ethics. The extra-terrestrial origin of life has its scientific adherents. Bernal has suggested evidence to the effect that carbonaceous compounds may have been formed by the interaction of ice, ammonia and methane radicals on catalytic metallic iron and silicate dust. However as this just removes the origin of life one step, it is of little help to us.

The differences between theistic evolution and progressive creationism are fundamental. Buswell has summarized them as follows: The evolutionary origin of the major taxonomic groups

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or of paleontological series, between which there is only inferential evidence of connection, sometimes referred to as "quantum" or macro-evolution, is accepted implicitly by theistic evolution and rejected by progressive creationism. Similar acceptance and rejection respectively is afforded to the concept of the origin of man from some pre-human form. Progressive creationism taught from the time of Augustine, believes in two types of creation, one, "creation potential" which is the evidence of the \textit{ex nihilo} creative will of God, and two, "creation actual" which is subject to the secondary laws of causation and thereby, in the process of time, realizes the pre-ordained forms of nature. The theistic evolutionist, however, believes that the evolutionary process was the \textit{modus operandi} which God used to make man and part of man's glory in his relationship with God before the Fall lay in his position as the supreme being of the evolutionary process.

Unfortunately the emotional antagonism engendered between the Church and the adherents of naturalistic evolution has left a legacy of bitterness in the Church which has tended to cloud the issues involved. As evolution is only a scientific hypothesis the stand of the theistic evolutionary case, providing it postulates nothing contrary to Scripture, depends to a great extent on the soundness of its scientific basis. J. S. Huxley\textsuperscript{10} has described the evolution as follows, 'the capacity of living substances for reproduction is the expansive driving force, mutation provides its raw material but natural selection determines its direction'. Professor L. T. More\textsuperscript{11} believed that in the final analysis, belief in evolution was based on faith, 'exactly the same sort of faith which it is necessary to have when one encounters the great mysteries of religion' while Barnes\textsuperscript{2} has pointed out that there are many scriptures which teach that God is the master of physical randomness. (Prov. xvi.33; Acts i. 24–26; Is.lv.8–9; Rom.xi.33.) Alfred Wallace\textsuperscript{12} the co-originator, with Darwin, of the evolutionary theory, felt it necessary to believe that God creatively 'intervened' three times in history – on the occasions of the creation of matter, life and man. This

\textsuperscript{10} J. S. Huxley, \textit{Evolution as a Process} (Ed. J. S. Huxley and others).
\textsuperscript{11} L. T. More, quoted by N. Watts in \textit{Why I Believe in Creation}.
\textsuperscript{12} A. R. Wallace, \textit{Darwinism} (1889).
corresponds to the three times the Hebrew word *bara* (*to create ex nihilo*) is used in Genesis one.

Two major criticisms of evolution have been (1) the adaptations are too complex and interlocking to have been brought about by so random an agent as natural selection, and (2) the necessary intermediate steps in the gradual evolution of such adaptations could not be advantageous. The only alternative to natural selection, however, is a “good genius” or “life-force” which influences the direction of the mutations. This is neither scientific nor factual for mutations are essentially random with respect to the needs of the animal. On a long-term view, the best evidence that evolution is not random is provided by convergent adaptation; for example, the Galapagos Islands have been so isolated that most of the American land song birds have not colonized them. In their absence one of the few forms which did become established has evolved into a group of species which, in their habits and appearance, resemble the seed-eating finches, insect-eating warblers and tits and tree-climbing woodpeckers of the American mainland.

R. E. D. Clark\textsuperscript{13} warns us in his consideration of design in nature, not to rush to any conclusions about the improbability of evolution taking place ‘over its whole realm’ for ‘chemistry has revealed a quite fantastic correlation between the properties of matter and the needs of life. It is conceivable that the entire creative activity of God went into bringing this correlation about rather than in subsequently arranging the atoms to form organisms’. Henry Drummond\textsuperscript{14} has said, with regard to this problem of the discontinuities in human knowledge, ‘There are reverent minds who ceaselessly scan the fields of nature and books of science in search of gaps – gaps which they fill up with God, as if God lived in gaps’, and Professor Coulson\textsuperscript{15} has said ‘when we come to the scientifically unknown our correct policy is not to rejoice because we have found God’. Let us sum up by restressing the three main points of Genesis I, none of which are involved with scientific mechanism. First, God made the

\textsuperscript{13} R. E. D. Clark, *Faith and Thought*, 92 (1962).
\textsuperscript{14} H. Drummond, Quoted by D. Lack op. cit.
\textsuperscript{15} C. A. Coulson, *Science and Religion – A Changing Relationship.*
universe and all in it. Secondly, he saw that it was good and 
thirdly, he placed man in a special relationship to himself.

As the physical universe was created before biological life 
according to Genesis and commonsense, it is not necessarily true 
to say that biological life was created out of nothing. We must, 
therefore, briefly consider how effective science has been in 
creating life in conditions supposedly similar to those pertaining 
at that time. First, however, as Keosin 16 has pointed out, the 
definition of life is variable due to the different levels of organiza­
tion in biological structure, and it is this difference which is the 
important thing to realize rather than the need for an all em­
brasive definition. Present-day scientists are fairly unanimous in 
the view that the earth, about $1.5 \times 10^9$ years ago, when they 
first postulate life, was much more covered with water than 
today. Also the atmosphere was a combination of ammonium 
ions, carbon-dioxide, water vapour and methane. Note there 
was no free oxygen. There were four potential sources of energy, 
heat from the earth’s core, the sun’s ultra-violet rays which 
penetrated the atmosphere due to the absence of the present 
ozone layer, atmospheric electricity and radioactivity.

The first men to experiment with these conditions, i.e. an 
electric arc across the above postulated atmosphere were 
Professors Miller and Urey 17. They found that the main com­
pounds formed were amino acids, the building blocks of life! 
Since then this type of experiment has demonstrated the syn­
thesis of purines, pyrimidines, sugars, ribose and dioxynribose, 
adenosine and nucleotides AMP, ADP and ATP, as well as 
aromatic hydrocarbons. Miller 18 also showed that any free 
hydrogen needed was made in the experiment. As carbon, 
nitrogen, oxygen and hydrogen are the most abundant elements 
in our earth and universe, it would seem permessible to postulate 
their use. So man has found himself able to synthesize all the 
基本 requirements to produce a living system. Also Berkner and 
Marshall 19 have demonstrated, from the existing evidence, the 
subsequent processes of photosynthesis to give free oxygen. This

16 J. Keosin, The Origin of Life.
much is fact. It was given added impetus this year by Professor Spiegelman\textsuperscript{20} who was able to produce a virus RNA off an RNA primer which is a step forward in the attempt to synthesize test-tube life.

The mechanism used to cover the steps from amino acids to living cells is still a matter of scientific conjecture. Some questions to be answered include the effect of the environment on the protein and was there a feedback mechanism involved?

Did the protein serve its own template or did it link up with a DNA molecule?

If so, how was the DNA molecule formed? By chance?

Or was there no such thing as DNA, only a primitive RNA from which our present DNA has ‘evolved’?

How did the control of the cell pass from outside the cell to inside and what caused a membrane to enclose the cell?

Could all this have happened on a statistical basis?

Did life originate in the oceans, as commonly believed, or on dry land as recently postulated by Professors Hinton and Blum\textsuperscript{21}, by virtue of the almost universal ability of primitive plants and animals to survive total suspension of metabolism due to dehydration?

My object here is to show that what was once fantasy has become possibility, and that if God has been postulated to fill this gap in scientific knowledge, He is already beginning to suffer the same humiliation as on previous and similar occasions. Science here is not proceeding as an enemy of Christianity and standing in opposition to it, rather it is demonstrating the difference between the realms and again stressing the necessity for believing in the continuous creative activity of God. It should also be noted that the above conclusions rule out neither of our considered ideas on the mechanism of creation, though the theistic evolutionist is at a disadvantage in that there is a large gap here in his theory which he can only postulate will be bridged eventually with scientific knowledge. It should also be realized that we have assumed in this discussion that there is such a thing as chemical evolution and that it follows the same pattern as the biological.

\textsuperscript{20} S. Spiegelman, \textit{New Scientist}, 1965 (October).

\textsuperscript{21} H. E. Hinton and M. S. Blum, \textit{New Scientist}, 1965 (October).
Once we have propagation, metabolism and then respiration instituted, how, as yet, we can only surmise, we are at the threshold of the evolutionary theory as it is commonly understood.

It is not the purpose of this paper to hold a brief for evolution, but we must consider it in general. Darwin's theory of evolution was based on three observable facts from nature and two deductions based on them.

FACT 1 More offspring are produced than are necessary for the reproduction of the species.

FACT 2 The number in any species is approximately constant in each generation; therefore, there is a struggle for existence.

FACT 3 There is much variation shown among offspring therefore, some variations will have survival value and this explains the multiplicity of forms. Note he never claimed to explain the origin of life.

We conclude, therefore, that biological deployment is a two dimensional movement, sideways due to different aspects of environment producing specialization and forwards due to further adaptive change. Julian Huxley had this to say about it, 'natural selection automatically results from the basic biological property common to all living matter of slightly incomplete self-copying, and it in turn automatically results in biological improvement which can be of any extent from a minor adaptation in one property of a single species to a large-scale advance in genetical organization. One result of specialized improvement is an eventual restriction of any further improvement. In addition, high specialization for one mode of life restricts the possibility of switching to another'. Haldane lists what he believes are the three main conditions on which natural selection acts as rare mutants, changes in gene frequency and disease. The big, and as yet unanswered, question is, are these enough?

The main evidence for evolution is based on (1) the similarity in the structures and biochemistry of all higher animals (especially in the case of apes and men) (2) the gradual changes in structure seen in fossils, (3) rudimentary organs; for example, whales contain relics of hind legs and moles have eyes under

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22 J. B. S. Haldane, *Culture and the Evolution of Man*. 
their skin, (4) facts of geographic distribution, (5) hereditary changes known in domestic animals, and (6) the nearness of relationships between groups of animals which can be established by immunological means. Let me give two examples, which I realize can be matched by two queries from those who do not believe the evolutionary theory. When two forms of a Californian species of fruit fly are reared together in competition, one predominates at low temperatures and the other at high. This accords with the finding that in the wild, one predominates from March to October and the other from October to March. Secondly, in a Hawaiian Archipelago, birds called sicklebills, found nowhere else, have radiated into 18 different genera.

The evidence for evolution is by no means conclusive. There are serious and large doubts in the fossil record, interspecies transformations have not yet been demonstrated, and hybrid animals are conceived sterile if at all (for example, the mule). There also remain unexplained phenomena such as the similarity of the foetuses of vertebrates at an early stage in development, or the so called redundant organs in man, for example, ear lobes or male nipples, though these may just be the by-product of normal biological mechanisms. There is also the big difficulty of whether each step leading to a highly specialized result would have been advantageous. Darwin himself considered the case of the eye and drew the distinction between the impossibility of something happening and the impossibility of our being able to conceive that it happened. These doubts have led some to the viewpoints of Kuhn23 'The fact of descent remains, only descent beyond the typologically circumscribed boundaries is nowhere demonstrable. Therefore we can indeed speak of a descent within the types but not about a descent of the types', or Davis24 'practically all students of evolution agree in recognizing an element of real or apparent discontinuity in the origin of a major adaptation', with which statement, many biologists disagree! Schindewolf25 has summarized it thus, 'in the first period, the development is

discontinuous, sportive and without transition. There originate fundamentally, that is, qualitatively, new organizations. During the second phase, in contrast, the progress of phylogenetic development is continuous. It shows here an ontogenetic change of characters of a quantitative kind, documented by numerous transitional forms upon the basis and in the framework of the organization-texture, formed during this first period. Only this second phase corresponds to what, till now generally has been considered the essence of phylogenetic development' – significantly he proposes no mechanism to explain the discontinuities! These quantum evolutionary jumps may be explained in acceptable micro-evolutionary terms if we postulate during the transitions that the number of individuals was small and the tempo of evolution fast. Therefore there is a very small chance of fossils – which is at least possible.

Let us make two other points. The order of fossil discoveries i.e. vegetable, invertebrates, fish, amphibiae, reptiles, mammals and man agree with the accounts of the third, fifth and sixth days in Genesis 1. Secondly, the references in Genesis 1 to 'after their kinds' has been equated with fixity of species, which incidentally is a seventeenth century concept. The more correct translation of the Hebrew is 'according to their varieties' which, if anything, argues against fixity of species.

Many fossil finds have been made covering the last step in the evolutionary process, from apes to men, and they provide powerful evidence for a physical link. In this paper we will avoid anthropological names dwelling rather on the findings. Man is basically different from the apes in three respects, those of posture, the power of abstract thought and the making of tools. Napier\textsuperscript{26} in a 1964 publication started with the fossil finds dated at $12 \times 10^6$ years ago and has traced the evolution of the pelvis, teeth, hands and jaw from apes to present-day man. The brain capacity of man is noticeably greater that that of the ape, and this has been associated with greater mental ability though it need not be an accurate reflection of it. Increasing brain capacity has been found in more recent fossils but Le Gros Clark\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} J. Napier, \textit{Discovery}, 1964.
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is probably right when he says 'the definition of “man” will ultimately have to rest on a functional rather than anatomical basis, the criteria of humanity being the ability to speak and make tools'.

One must distinguish between the use and the making of tools. Animals are often known to do the former but never the latter. An ape, given a broken box, will pull up a slat of wood and use it as a weapon but he cannot see in an intact box the possibility of a weapon. Tools have been found and dated at $5 \times 10^5$ years ago, whilst man's first use of fire is dated $2.5 \times 10^5$ years. About one hundred thousand years ago, the Neanderthals showed a slight increase in skill with tools, but the real cultural explosion came with glacial man $2 \times 10^4$ years ago. Among the finds from this period are needles (with eyes), flutes, lamps and ornaments. They also buried their dead with tools, etc. indicating that they had a concept of life after death but that this life was to be lived somewhere on earth rather than being spiritual.

Speech is believed also to have evolved. Darwin\textsuperscript{28} concluded that facial expressions in apes are very similar in kind to those performed by a baby in giving an open-mouthed kiss. The grunt of communication by a baboon can be modulated as human vowels can. Animals can learn by conditioned reflex, specialization or imitation; though instinct is hereditary and therefore not a learned process. Both apes and parrots have been taught to say a few words but these are without biological significance in as much as they are not associated with any thought processes. We quote Kohler\textsuperscript{29} who said 'The time in which the chimpanzee lives is limited in past and future . . . it is in the extremely narrow limits in this direction that the chief difference is to be found between the anthropoids and the most primitive human beings. The lack of an invaluable technical aid (speech) and a great limitation of those very important components of thought “images” would thus constitute the causes that prevent the chimpanzee from attaining even the smallest beginnings of cultural development'. Professor Zuckerman\textsuperscript{30} is on record as

\textsuperscript{28} C. Darwin, \textit{The Origin of Species}.
\textsuperscript{29} W. Kohler, \textit{The Mentality of Apes}.
\textsuperscript{30} S. Zuckerman, \textit{The Physical Basis of Mind}. 
agreeing with this viewpoint. The peculiar attributes of mind are that it can translate quantitative differences in electrical pattern into qualitative differences of sensation. The second is however restricted only to the minds of men. As Kierkegaard has said ‘the endlessness of its reflexion belongs to the essence of its consciousness.’

Enthusiasm is no substitute for scientific facts and it must be stressed here that interpretations from fossils tend to vary depending on the observer. There is no clear unequivocally demonstrated line of fossil evidence linking apes and men, neither is there unanimity as to which of the various sub-groups is the progenitor of Homo Sapiens. This, of course, means the very existence of the link is unproven despite the many similarities, and this is an important matter, from the Christian point of view, as we shall shortly see.

Naturalistic evolutionists are divided and confused as to the purpose of evolution. Sir Arthur Keith says its laws are opposed to the laws of Christ and as man is incapable of glorifying God, the Westminster divines were wrong! He explains man’s dual nature as having evolved, the good for his friends and the bad for his enemies, which is again contrary to Christ’s teaching outlined in the Sermon on the Mount. Julian Huxley sees only apparent purpose in evolution, purpose which man has injected, ‘purposes’, he says, ‘in life are made not found’. Aristotle, Dante, Kant and Herbert Spencer all believed that the development of personality was the purpose of existence, though Spencer and Sir Francis Galton saw it as possibly being part of a vast unknown plan. Julian and Thomas Huxley, Waddington, Leake and Romanell have all tried unsuccessfully to formulate evolutionary ethics. Haldane once wrote, ‘Science cannot answer . . . why I should be good’ and this view was echoed by Levy ‘science can offer no finality’.

We have now reached the frontier between scientific mechanism and religious belief and experience. Modern upholders of

31 A. Keith, Essays of Human Evolution.
32 J. S. Huxley, Evolution.
33 J. B. S. Haldane, Science and Ethics.
34 H. Levy, The Universe of Science.
evolutionary ethics accept the theory of natural selection and hence postulate that high moral standards have been evolved by man because they increase the chances of survival of himself and his offspring. These theories fail to account for man’s possession of moral standards and ethical ideas, the nature of those standards, man’s self-awareness, apparent free will, capacity to reason truth, sense of the holy and beautiful, knowledge of and his preference for good, and why, knowing good, he so often does evil. Professor Coulson has said ‘man lives in two (or more) worlds . . . there is a world of science in which questions posed in scientific terms get scientific answers, and another world where words like belief, love, splendour and majesty have meaning. The other world refuses to be shut out of our experience’. H. J. Paton gives this summary, ‘if as seems probable, the scientific point of view is incompatible with freedom . . . then as moral agents we have to maintain that the scientific point of view is not enough. There are two points of view, the moral and the scientific and while each may be valid within its sphere, it is from the moral point of view that we get the fullest insight into human action’.

Fully developed awareness is diagnostic of humanity. This is illustrated by Descartes’ famous phrase ‘cogito ergo sum’ – ‘I think, hence I am’, and Teilhard de Chardin’s remark, ‘the animal knows, of course, but certainly it does not know what it knows’. The possession of a soul and the ability to think logically and abstractly and to examine and understand truth are definitely linked, but are not synonymous. Mascall’s summary is excellent and I reproduce it here. ‘It thus seems to me to be thoroughly congruous with the evidence of biology, to hold with the tradition of Christendom that the human soul is a spiritually subsistent entity which for its full and normal functioning needs to be united to a body but which even while it is united to the body, is capable of a certain undiscursive contemplation of spiritual realities and which, even when it is performing discur-

37 T. De Chardin, Le Phénomène Humain.
38 E. L. Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science.
sive ratiocinations in reciprocal partnership with the body, infuses into that discursive ratiocination a certain supra-sensory contemplative character. I believe each soul is a fresh creation of God infused into the humanly derived body and not derived by generation from the parents (can each parent give a fragment of a soul?) for the soul is transcendent too, as well as immanent in the body and it is a subsistent entity round which the life of the physical structure is organised.’ In the light of this, the deistic view, would then require a direct divine intervention from outside, but not so in our view of creation. The first moment of the existence of a creature is no different from any other moment except to the creature. So in saying God creates the soul we learn something concerning the nature of the soul rather than of the creative activity of God for there is no difference in God’s creation of the biological and in the originating of a soul.

Let us now consider our conclusions in the light of Genesis. I must first state my position with regard to these Chapters. I do not consider Chapters one and two to be separate accounts of the creation story. Rather, when one remembers that the Bible is the story of man’s relations with God, it seems quite logical to me that Chapter one should sketch in the background, and Chapter two becoming more specific, should consider man, centrally, with respect to this background. I also believe that the many New Testament references to Adam and Eve, especially in relation to the marriage bond, argue for two historical people rather than a totally allegorical story. So while I consider the passage as factual, and ignoring mechanisms, I also realize some of the phrases may not be literal interpretations but descriptive – non-scientific, but inspired prose.

The Old Testament genealogies place Adam between $6 \times 10^3$ years ago and this immediately faces us with a major problem to which I foresee four possible solutions. The first is to accept this as literally true. This position then affirms (1) that Adam was the first Homo Sapiens (2) the traditional belief in the universal fatherhood of Adam. The problem here then is to explain away all the contrary scientific data with relation to man’s culture and the evidence that pygmies, eskimos and bushmen have been in their environment much longer than 10,000 years.

Secondly, we can say the genealogies are wrong and place man,
with science $5 \times 10^8$ years ago. This I reject for I believe it contravenes scripture.\textsuperscript{39} Thirdly, we can postulate pre-Adamic men, all of whom were in Eden. This however appears contrary to Genesis, also Romans 5 which seems to indicate that only two people were in Eden.

Finally, one can postulate that God created man \textit{i.e.} made him qualitatively different from the animals by giving him a soul and a capacity to have fellowship with his creator pre-Adam, and that Adam and Eve were the Representatives of this group in Eden.

Let us consider our two possible theories, first in the light of Genesis. It says (i:27) that man was made in ‘the image and likeness of God’. This is understood to mean that man was given his rational and moral characteristics as well as his capacity for holiness – this put him in a state of original righteousness and is definitely associated with his pre-fall existence. However, there is nothing to suggest whether this was done in a special act of creation in Eden together with a special creation of this new species, man, or whether it occurred when God, at a certain time in his progressive creation, gave man his Soul. One thing, however, is certain, it did not evolve. It would seem acceptable to interpret ‘from the dust of the ground’ (ii:7) as either literal and instantaneous or as descriptive of what man’s body is in essence. The ‘breathing of life’ appears from (ii:7f.) to have occurred pre-Eden but acquires the same meaning in either system. Finally, the same Hebrew word is translated ‘man’ and ‘Adam’ in Gen. i – iii and competent Christian scholars are divided as to whether the Hebrew rules out pre-Adamic man.

To suggest that the traditionally held view of the universal fatherhood of Adam may be based not on Scripture, but on the mistaken idea that sin is transmitted genetically is highly contro-

\textsuperscript{39} Professor D. J. Wiseman has kindly indicated in a personal letter, subsequent to the reading of this paper, that my comment here may not be accurate. He points out that ‘in common with early Sumerian genealogies (c. 2,000 BC) the time-scale is not the essential element in this form of historiography. Indeed, it can be argued, as in the case of Our Lord’s genealogies, that there are omissions and overlaps, and that there is nothing in the text against dating Adam $5 \times 10^8$ years ago’. I am grateful to Professor Wiseman for this helpful information.
versial. The main two New Testament passages cited in favour of universal descent from Adam are Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15. Romans 5 does stress that sin is transmitted and that this transmission originates in Adam – however the mechanism i.e. genetics is neither mentioned nor postulated. It does affirm that the effect of Adam’s sin reaches the whole human race, both those who received the law and those who did not. I like the idea of J. M. Clark who suggests that as the grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ is operative retrospectively, for God knows no time limitations, why not also the sin of Adam? In 1 Corinthians, Our Lord is pictured as the ‘last Adam’ and the ‘second man’ – here the references are in a purely spiritual and not physical sense. If we must reject the literal interpretation for Our Lord, why are we forced to accept it for Adam? Note Adam’s contemporaries would also have been sinners as well as being guilty in Adam’s sin when they broke God’s requirements as related to them by Adam and which requirements were passed on by word of mouth until the time of Moses.

Whichever theory is right, we have in Eden man’s initial and unsullied knowledge of, and fellowship with, God. Man is there faced with a moral choice and exercises for the only time in the history of mankind “free will” which is unbiased. By their choice against God, the communion is broken, though man still remains man, and sin is introduced along with the hope of a future Redeemer. We are seemingly taught here that the basic sin which man commits against God is one of disobedience based on a desire for independence. Man thereby at the expense of his original righteousness gained self-consciousness and spiritual death. Whichever theory one holds on the appearance of Man in Eden, these facts constitute the basic lesson of Genesis three. Whether you believe in Adam as your father or your representative, all men are born in a state of original sin, with no chord of fellowship with God and seeking their fulfillment which can only be found when they are re-created in Christ Jesus, new men.

We must here answer one more question. What is the relationship in the Bible between the genealogical origin of a creature and the value of that creature in the sight of God? Is the signifi-

cance of a creature in the sight of God dependent on its ancestry? From John the Baptist’s teaching (Luke iii:8) to the Pharisees who claimed Abraham as their father and Paul’s teaching in Romans nine in relation to the Jews, it seems clear that physical ancestry is not the criterion God uses in dealing with his creatures.

In conclusion let us cast aside, for a moment, our strivings after mechanisms and take a look at man himself. Immediately behind the objective realm we see a subjective “I” and this to me, is me. With all the techniques of natural science open to me I can find no clue to the existence of this “I” in the objective world nor of the knowing and willing “I” which I conclude from outward appearances belongs to my fellow man’s body. With Professor Karl Heim we are forced to two very basic considerations. First, either I am fettered to this body by blind and frivolous chance, in which case life is arbitrary and meaningless, or I have been specifically placed here by an eternal “Thou” for I certainly did not place myself here, and therefore I have the possibility of a life of faith.

The second consideration is of my solitude – I can only see into myself and, being bound to this body, am unable to explore another. This failure to penetrate the “I” of another is the root cause of all misunderstanding. Again either there is no escape from this solitude and I live a futile life of silence and misunderstanding till I sink into the void at death or there is an omnipresent “Thou” who sees, knows and understands, before whom all things are open (Heb. iv:13) and in whose presence our thoughts and deeds are not misunderstood for he does not heed to try and deduce from outward appearance.

The question we then must answer is, which philosophy do I find acceptable? If this eternal “Thou” does exist, and we believe he does, then there are four inescapable conclusions as listed by Heim. There is a personal God who rules all things and in whose omnipresence all things stand. He gives personal existence and position and his divine sanction for our actions stems from his authority to be the way, truth and life for all those who put their trust upon him. (John xiv:6.) Finally, behind the whole

41 K. Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science.
course of the world and the process of nature, there is a plan which derives from a universal mind or spirit.

The whole creation stands in contrast to God for it is subject to decay unlike God (Eccles. iii 19–, Ps. xlix: 12,20, John iii: 7–, Rom. vii 21,22 Isa. xi 6–8) and it is temporal in contradistinction to the eternal being of God. So in the objective sphere the forces at work have a limited field of operation in space and time and are in conflict or co-operation with other temporal factors. God’s authority issues from a point beyond time and space. This authority cannot therefore, be in competition with any factors in the objective world. For the one who is here at work sets aside as powerless the whole system of cause and effect although the system goes on working without interference in its own sphere. This is the invincible authority of Psalm xxx: 9 ‘For he spoke and it came to be, he commanded and it stood forth’.

How then is man different from the animals? As in Psalm viii: 3–8 so in Gen. i:26–, God elevates man, this little creature, and makes him his companion – he brings him into His personal society. So man’s prominent position in relation to creation rests, not on a higher birth but solely on the unique relationship which God has established with him. Man rules the animals not as a biological superior, but on a commission based in his relationship with God. In sin, man sank down again to the level of the beasts and salvation is then seen as restoring the former relationship. The crucial event of the “calling of man” stands in the centre of world history. The grace of a sovereign God is seen in his desire to exalt a lowly creature to his side and to commune with him. God’s unfathomable mercy is seen in that he refused to abandon man but issued instead a second call in the person of Jesus Christ. Our eternal destiny depends not in any way on the physical or spiritual qualities which we carry in ourselves but solely on a decision of God to exalt us from creaturely humility and give us an eternal purpose in the promised Redeemer.
**BOOK REVIEWS**

*By What Authority?*

**BY BRUCE SHEELLY**

The Paternoster Press, Exeter, pp. 166, 5s.

The early centuries of the Christian age is probably the most neglected study of the average Christian. The book under review is an attempt to remedy this. Dr Bruce Shelley, Professor of Church History in the Conservative Baptist Theological Seminary, Denver, Colorado, attempts the not easy task of showing the background to ‘standards of truth’ in the early Church. The introduction outlines the difficulties surrounding ‘rule of faith’ and the following chapters proceed to explore Authority, Tradition and Canonicity in the early decades of the second century. Commencing with the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, the study continues to the times of Clement and Origen. The problems which beset the Church concerning Authority derived from the time when no Apostles remained alive to bridge the gap between the Ascension and the end of the first century. The attitudes taken by various members of the Church of that time are of some importance in our understanding of the situation as it then was. Dr Shelley’s book comes at a time when the relation between Scripture and Tradition is to the fore in thought and is both valuable and opportune. **D. C. M. BACON**

*Darwin: Before & After*

**BY ROBERT E. D. CLARK**

The Paternoster Press, Exeter, pp. 192, 5s.

One wonders what a previous occupier of a house in Gower Street, Bloomsbury, would remark were he able to return. The house, with many others, has long been demolished and made way for the University College of London’s Department of Biological Sciences. A L.C.C. plaque proclaims: ‘Charles Darwin, 1809-1882, Naturalist, lived in a house on this site 1838-1842’. *Darwin: Before & After* needs no introduction, save to say that this new edition in paperback form is exactly as the original printing with some additions to the Bibliography. This book is now eighteen years old and will begin to lose some of its usefulness; certain revisions should be made to keep it abreast of current thought, if there is a further reprint. **D. C. M. BACON**

*Men Spake from God: Studies in the Hebrew Prophets*

**BY H. L. ELLISON**


Since its publication in 1953 Mr Ellison’s study of the teaching of the Old Testament prophets has been recognized as an ideal book to place into the hands of the student who is embarking upon serious study of this part of the Bible. Those who have the responsibility of teaching the Scriptures will be deeply indebted to The Paternoster Press for adding this title to their ‘Mount Radford Reprints,’ for now it may find its way into the personal library of each one of their students. Both publisher and author are to be commended for making a paperback edition of this book available at such a reasonable price. **WARD GASQUE**
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