CONTENTS

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON LAW
Lord Denning, The Master of the Rolls 3

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Gordon H. Clark, Ph.D. 12

EVALUATING THE QUMRAN MANUSCRIPTS
H. L. Ellison, B.D., B.A. 19

FAITH IN THIS SPACE AGE
The Second Rendle Short Memorial Lecture—I March 1963
R. L. F. Boyd, Ph.D., M.I.E.E. 23

WHAT RIGHTS HAVE ANIMALS?
C. W. Hume, M.C., B.Sc. 38

REVIEWS 48

© Copyright by The Victoria Institute and Contributors 1963

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
ABERDEEN
It is interesting to note how many materialists there are at present who are prepared to admit that there is a growing realisation of the inadequacy of a purely materialistic outlook to provide a basis for human life. They still maintain that man is the well from which all resources for life may be drawn, but they indicate that these resources are inadequate. So we find thinkers, such as Julian Huxley referring to the need for a satisfactory idea-system into which the many items of new information from various branches of learning may be introduced and unified.

This is virtually a call for a new religion. We are still being told that belief in an omnipresent and omniscient deity frustrates the thinking process and impedes intellectual advance. One of the stumbling-blocks, clearly, is the view which many have of a multiplicity of religious systems which are at variance with each other.

There is a clearer call, then, than ever before, to that kind of evidence which bears witness to the finality of the Christian revelation and the authority of the Scriptures. A number of scholars have recently reminded us of the various objections to Christian belief which may be brought by moralists, psychologists and other intellectuals. In addition, therefore, to an emphasis upon the finality of the Christian revelation, there must also be a demonstration of the relevance of the Christian message. This, surely, is where the Victoria Institute has placed its emphasis time and again. There is ever a need for scientists and theologians to work together in the cause of the Faith. Perhaps this is a day in which the professedly non-Christian is much aware of the uncertainty of the notes which come out of the Church’s trumpet. The Christian, therefore, must seek to be aware of those notes of his Faith which demand clearer expression.
LORD DENNING, The Master of the Rolls (1962) is President of the Court of Appeal. He is President, also, of Birkbeck College, London, and of the National Marriage Guidance Council. We are grateful to His Lordship for granting the Institute permission to reprint his address to the Lawyers' Christian Fellowship of 1950.

GORDON H. CLARK is Professor of Philosophy at Butler University, Indianapolis, U.S.A. He is a regular contributor to Christianity Today, and other Journals. We welcome this his first article in Faith and Thought.

H. L. ELLISON is a member of the Council of the Institute. He is closely associated with work among the Jews, particularly as a missionary in Rumania. Later this year he takes up an appointment as Resident Tutor at the Moorlands Bible College, Dawlish.

R. L. F. BOYD has recently been elevated as Professor of Physics at University College, London. He is well-known in England as a lecturer and broadcaster. He has played a leading part in the English programme for space research.

C. W. HUME has since 1955 been associated with the Victoria Institute. He is Secretary-General of the Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, and for his work in this field he was awarded the O.B.E. in 1962.
LORD DENNING, MASTER OF THE ROLLS

The Influence of Religion on Law *

I have come this evening to talk to you about the influence of religion on law. Its influence was obvious in primitive communities, but is not so obvious in modern societies, though I have no doubt it is just as real. In primitive communities religion, morals, and law were indistinguishably mingled together. In the Ten Commandments, for instance, you find the first commandment which is religious: 'God spake these words and said: I am the Lord thy God: Thou shalt have none other Gods but me.' You find the fifth commandment which is a moral precept: 'Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.' You find the eighth commandment which is a legal duty: 'Thou shalt not steal.' This intermingling is typical of all early communities. The severance of the three ideas—of law from morality, and of religion from law—belongs very distinctly to the later stages of mental progress.

These precepts were laid down for the guidance of people who had not sufficient mental development to appreciate the reasons for them: and in the course of time those people came to treat the rule as the thing that mattered, and not the reason behind it. The Mosaic Law came to be interpreted in a very narrow and rigid way. This was for instance the case about the Sabbath day. The fourth commandment ordained 'Six days shalt thou labour, and do all that thou hast to do: but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God. In it thou shalt do no manner of work.' That one day of rest for mind and body was a very wise provision: but the Jews carried its literal observance much too far. The striking instance is given by St Mark ii. 23-28 when our Lord went through the corn fields on the Sabbath day: and his disciples began, as they went, to pluck the ears of corn. And the pharisees said unto Him: 'Behold, why do they on the Sabbath day that which is not lawful?' . . . He said unto them: 'The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath. . . . Therefore the Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath!' Time after time Our Lord pointed out to the Jews their error. In St Mark vii. 8, he tells them 'laying aside the commandments of God, ye hold the traditions of men, as the washing of pots and cups; and

* Message given at the Quarterly Meeting of the Lawyers' Christian Fellowship held at the Law Society on the 22 May 1950.
many other such like things ye do'. That sort of thing often happens in early communities. A parallel can be seen in India. A wise provision for ensuring general cleanliness is turned in time into a long routine of ceremonial ablution.

This part of the teaching of our Lord—his teaching about the interpretation of the Mosiac Law—was very necessary in his day, but it does not touch the fundamentals of the Christian religion. Before I pass from it, however, I would like to give you two illustrations of its practical application in modern society. We tend—as indeed all communities tend—to become too narrow in our interpretation of previous laws. Once a rule of law has been laid down, it often continues to be a rule, long after the reason for it has disappeared—indeed when the reason for it has been forgotten. A good illustration from our own law was the presumption that if a wife committed a felony in the presence of her husband, she was presumed to have done it under his coercion and she was entitled to be acquitted. The reason for that rule was because the husband was entitled to benefit of clergy and she was not. If husband and wife were charged with stealing, the husband, if he could read, was entitled to benefit of clergy and could not be sentenced to death. In order to show that he could read, all that he had to do was to repeat the first verse of the 51st Psalm, 'Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy loving kindness: according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies, blot out my transgressions'. He often managed to repeat this, at any rate with the aid of a compassionate prompter: and so escaped the death penalty. But his wife, who was charged with him, could not claim benefit of clergy, however well she could read, and however well she knew the psalms. Women could not in those days be clergy, any more than they can in ours. So she was liable to be sentenced to death whereas he could not be. In order to overcome this injustice, the judges invented the presumption that she was coerced by her husband, and thus she was let off altogether. The benefit of clergy was extended to women in 1692, so that there was no longer any reason for the presumption, but the presumption remained in our law until 1925, although the reason for it had disappeared 230 years before. Nowadays if a woman commits a felony in the presence of her husband, she is just as guilty as he, unless she proves that she was in fact coerced by him. The lesson to be learned from this is that we ought always to be ready to inquire into the reason for our rules, and not to keep them in existence after the reason for them has disappeared—unless of course there is some new reason to justify them.
The warning of Our Lord about keeping to the letter is also of great value today. St Paul in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, iii. 6, puts it as you know succinctly, 'the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life'. This precept needs especially to be remembered in the interpretation of statutes. In the days when the Bible was first put into English the Judges laid down rules which were undoubtedly influenced by the Bible teaching. The statutes were to be interpreted not only according to the language used but also with regard to the mischief which Parliament sought to remedy, so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature. Those words were taken clearly from the epistle 'the spirit giveth life'. But in the nineteenth century that broad view was supplanted by a rule which Baron Parke described as a golden rule. He said that statutes, and indeed all documents, were to be interpreted according to the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words. Even if the grammatical meaning gave rise to unjust results which Parliament could never have intended, the Courts said that the grammatical meaning must prevail. The Judges used to fold their hands and blame the legislature. There has been a welcome change in our own time. Judges are not so prone as they were to insist on the literal interpretation of the statutes. They look for the just solution.

This shows how the failings of the Jews in regard to the Mosaic law are failings which are apt to react in modern communities. But now let me come to the more fundamental teaching of Our Lord. He himself points the way to a new approach. In answer to a certain lawyer who asked him, 'Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?' 1 He said unto him, 'What is written in the law? How readest thou?' And he answering said, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself'. And He said unto him, 'Thou hast answered right: this do and thou shalt live'. This is the teaching of the Gospel of Christ. It is the Gospel of Love—love towards God, and love towards your neighbour. This is a precept of religion, not of morals, nor of law. But it is not unrelated to them. In social organisation, love finds its primary expression through justice. As William Temple said, 2 'It is axiomatic that love should be the predominant Christian impulse, and that the primary form of love in social organization is justice'. The two—love and justice—are interdependent. As Dr Bell has said,

---

2 Christianity and the Social Order, p. 55.
Justice and Order are in effect the necessary groundwork on which love is to build.'

Here we see the point at which religion and law meet. The aim of the law is to see that the truth is observed and justice is done between man and man, and, I may add, between man and the State. But what is truth? and what is justice? On these two cardinal questions religion and law meet. The spirit of truth and justice is not something you can see. It is not temporal but eternal. How does man know what is truth or justice? It is not the product of his intellect, but of his spirit. Take the sort of question which a lawyer is asked every day. A man who is about to give evidence says: 'If I am asked such and such a question, what shall I say?' The lawyer's answer is: 'You must tell the truth, whether it hurts your case or not.' I have been asked that question by a man charged with murder. My answer was the same, 'You must tell the truth whatever the consequences'. Again a man in a civil case may have kept a diary or notes which hurt his case. He frequently says: 'Why should I show these to the other side? They are my own private documents.' The lawyer's answer is: 'Although these documents may hurt your case you must not keep them back: everything must be put before the Court to enable it to do justice.' Those answers of the lawyer are plainly right. The principle underlying them will not be disputed by any person who has the right spirit within him. But a practising lawyer only too frequently comes across persons who do not regard those principles, persons who do not reveal the truth to their lawyer but go into the witness-box and say anything which they think will help them to win their case, whether it is true or not; persons who keep back documents which they think hurt them, and so forth. Such persons tell any lie or use any circumvention in order to gain their own ends. That is sheer wickedness. They have not the right spirit within them.

How then is the right spirit created in man? That is the province of religion. The law is concerned with directing what acts should or should not be done. Religion, or rather the Christian religion, is concerned with the creation of a spirit out of which right acts will naturally flow. Law and religion are, therefore, closely connected, but religion fulfils the highest function. Religion concerns the spirit in man whereby he is able to recognise what is truth and what is justice: whereas law is only the application, however imperfectly, of truth and justice in our everyday affairs.

From this it follows that lawyers should be men of religion: and speaking generally that has always been the case in this country. It is the
reason why the common law of England is so great. The law has been moulded for centuries by Judges who have been brought up in the Christian faith. The precepts of religion, consciously or unconsciously, have been their guide in their administration of justice. Let me illustrate this from different branches of the law: and firstly Constitutional Law. The primary principle of Christian ethics is respect for every person as a person. If each man and woman is a child of God, whom God loves and for whom Christ died, there is a worth in each absolutely independent of the State. The State exists for the citizen, not the citizen for the State. The Christian Church has always insisted that the State has no ultimate and omnipotent authority of its own but derives its authority from God. St Paul in his Epistle to the Romans xiii. I made this clear. ‘There is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained by God.’ This is the great principle, which has had great influence in our constitutional law. It has been the shield under which our forefathers resisted oppression. To quote St Paul again—the Ruler of the State was the ‘Minister of God for Good’, and so long as he fulfilled his high trust it was not right to resist him: but if he forsook it and sought absolute power, then resistance was justified. A celebrated instance occurred when James I claimed the right to rule in England as an absolute sovereign. He claimed that he could judge whatever cause he pleased in his own person, free from all risks of prohibition or appeal. He was fortified by the authority of Archbishop Bancroft who said: ‘This is clear in divinity: such authority doubtless belongs to the King by the word of God in the Scriptures.’ The King summoned all the Judges and said to them: ‘I have often heard the boast that your English law was founded upon reason. If that be so, why have not I and others reason as well as you the judges?’ Lord Chief Justice Coke replied: ‘True it is, please your Majesty, that God has endowed your Majesty with excellent science as well as great gifts of nature: but your Majesty will allow me to say, with all reverence, that you are not learned in the laws of this realm of England. . . . which law is an art which requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it. The law is the golden metwand and measure to try the causes of your Majesty’s subjects, and it is by the law that your Majesty is protected in safety and peace.’ King James, in a great rage, said: ‘Then I am to be under the law—which is treason to affirm.’ The Chief Justice replied: ‘Thus wrote Bracton, “The King is not under any man, save under God and the law”.’ James nevertheless was said to have tried his hand at trying a case as a judge: but he was so much perplexed when he had
heard both sides that he gave it up in despair. 'I could get on very well hearing one side only', he said, 'but when both sides had been heard, upon my word I know not which is right.'

These words of Bracton, quoted by Coke, 'The King is under God and the law', epitomise in one sentence the great contribution made by the common lawyers to the constitution of England. They insisted that the King was under God and the law. Right, not might, was supreme. In insisting upon this, they were really insisting on the Christian principles. In the distracted world of today we need them more than ever. Under the totalitarian system the State itself is supreme. The rulers are not under God and the law. They are a law unto themselves. All law, all courts are simply part of the State machine. The freedom of the individual, as we know it, no longer exists. It is against this terrible despotism, this overwhelming domination of human life, that Christianity protests with all the energy at its command.

Let me now revert to the individual. The Christian religion emphasises the responsibility of each individual before God. It taught the difference between sin and righteousness. It gave hope to the sinner who repented. 'There is joy in the presence of God over one sinner that repenteth.' ¹ This emphasis on the individual responsibility had great influence on the development of our criminal law. In early days, the tribe was answerable for the individual. If a man killed a member of another tribe, it used to result in a blood feud, when vengeance was taken, not against the individual, but against the tribe as a whole. The first step to remedy this state of affairs was when money compensation was taken in lieu of blood retribution. A striking passage in King Alfred’s Dooms attributes this reform to the authority of the Church: ‘After the English had received the faith of Christ, they ordained that, out of the mercy which Christ had taught, secular lords might, without sin, take for every misdeed the money compensation which they ordained.’ This money payment took the place of private vengeance. But the liability of any person who injured or killed another was an absolute liability. Even if the act was accidental or in self-defence, it had to be paid for. And the thing itself which caused the death or injury was itself guilty and had to be given up as deodand. There was no inquiry as to moral responsibility at all. That came at a later stage and was due to the teaching of the Church which looked primarily at the state of mind of the individual offender. The requirement of a guilty mind—the mens rea—was first stated by St Augustine who said that you are not guilty

¹ Luke xv. 10.
of perjury unless you have a guilty mind. This found its place in the laws of Henry I when it was laid down as law that *Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea*, that is, there is no guilt unless there is a guilty mind. That has been the rule of English law from that time to this. In order that an act should be punishable, it must be morally blameworthy. It must be a sin. We must be careful today that this principle is not whittled away. In many of the regulations to which we have had to submit in recent years, much is punishable even though there is no guilty mind at all. In the form of punishment too, the teaching of the Church has had much effect. It never regarded any individual as beyond repentance, and held that he might be redeemed and saved from his sins. It set its face against any form of punishment which was merely an expression of vengeance, and it introduced imprisonment which gave the offender opportunity to consider his situation and reform. So also in regard to the insane, if a man was insane when he committed a crime, he could not be punished, because he could not be said to have had a guilty mind. If he became insane after he committed a crime, he could not be executed, because that deprived him of the opportunity of making peace with his God before his death.

Parallel to its influence on criminal law, so also was the influence of religion on the law of torts or wrongs. At one time the mere fact of doing damage was held to import liability, even though there was no fault on the part of the one who did it. This still survives in some forms of the action for trespass, as for instance cattle trespass. The teaching of the Church has been in favour of some degree of moral blame before imputing liability. A striking example occurred in 1932. In a judgment of great importance in the law, Lord Atkin took the Christian precept as the underlying basis of his decision in these words: ‘The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour: and the lawyer’s question, “Who is my neighbour?” receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.’

Turning now from the law of torts to the law of contract, the influence of the Church was immense: because the Church Courts assumed jurisdiction in matters of conscience. Originally in English
law a promise was not enforceable unless it was hedged about with the formality of a seal. But the teaching of the Church was in favour of rejecting formalities and insisting on good faith.

The just man is 'he that sweareth not his neighbour and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance'. If a man made a promise and did not keep it, the ecclesiastical courts would punish him for his breach of faith. A Christian could pledge his hope of salvation in order to secure a debt and he was subject to ecclesiastical censures if he did not pay. In the fifteenth century the procedure of the Church Courts was even adopted by craftsmen to enforce trade union regulations. 'The smiths made a confederacy supported by an oath, with the object they said, of putting down night work, but really of preventing any but members of their own organisation from working at the trade (a closed shop) and summoned the blacklegs before the ecclesiastical court. They forbade anyone to work between sunset and sunrise and brought an offending journeyman before the Archdeacon with the result that, after being three times warned, he was expelled from the Church and excommunicated until he had sworn to keep the ordinance.' This power of the ecclesiastical courts made them formidable rivals of the courts of common law. In order to meet it, the Chancellor gradually assumed jurisdiction in cases of breaches of contract. In 1468 complaint was made before the Chancellor for breach of a parole promise. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had no remedy save in the Church Courts. He said that if the plaintiff had taken the trouble to obtain the defendant's promise under seal, he could have sued in the courts of common law, and it was 'his folly not to have a deed'. But the Chancellor dismissed the suggestion with the observation Deus est procurator fatuorum—God is the protector of the foolish. Faced with this rival jurisdiction of the Church, the Chancellor and the common law courts gradually developed a theory of contract themselves. But they required the formality of consideration. Even this formality is now under attack. As recently as 1937 the Law Revision Committee reported in favour of abolishing the doctrine of consideration which is the last remaining formality in the law of contract.

I have yet to mention another field of law in which religion has had a great influence. It is in respect of marriage. For centuries the law as to marriage in this country was administered by the Church in its own ecclesiastical courts. Those courts affirmed Our Lord's principle. The standard of marriage was a life-long and indissoluble union for better

1 Psalm xv. 5.
or for worse, of one man with one woman to the exclusion of all others on either side so long as both should live. Divorce was not allowed so as to give the right to remarry. This principle was in marked contrast to other legal systems such as the Jewish laws or the Roman law which always permitted divorce to a greater or lesser extent. This principle of indissolubility of marriage has had a profound influence on the social life of this country. The well-being of all requires that children should, so far as possible, be brought up by their own parents as members of one family, with all the give and take that family life demands and also with the security that it affords. The institution of marriage is the legal foundation of this family life. The principle of indissolubility was the guiding force which cemented it. It involved hardship in many cases. It bound innocent men and women to faithless partners. It gave the stigma of illegitimacy to innocent children. But the Church considered that these were hardships which had to be borne for the sake of principle. During the last ninety years the state has abandoned the principle. Divorce has been allowed for grave causes prescribed by law, but the consequences that were foreseen by the Church, and of which its leaders gave warning, have followed. Undeserving cases have slipped through. Collusion has not been detected. The result is that people have come to regard divorce as a matter which can be arranged between the parties. Every thinking person is profoundly disturbed by the prevalence of divorce and its grave effect on the family unity and the national character.

I have no time to tell you more. I have endeavoured to indicate to you some of the principal points on which religion has influenced the law. The subject is a big one. It would require much research to cover it properly. But even from this tentative discourse it has surely emerged that if the law is to fulfil its purpose—which is to see that justice is done between man and man, and between man and the State—it must be administered by men who have the right spirit within them, the spirit of truth and justice which cannot be taught, but can only be known, and which is the product of true religion.

We lawyers must always try to walk worthy of the vocation where-with we are called. We must strive to show in our lives and in our example a true sense of Christian values. This fellowship—this Christian fellowship—is witness to this great endeavour. It is the leaven which enlightens the whole.
GORDON H. CLARK, Ph.D.

Capital Punishment

The contemporary proponents of the abolition of capital punishment rely mainly on so-called ‘practical’ considerations: capital punishment does not deter; sometimes an innocent man is executed; the wealthy can buy their freedom, and only the poverty-stricken are put to death. To these practical considerations a religious flavour is given by applying ‘Thou shalt not kill’ to governments, and by appealing to Christian sentiments of mercy and brotherhood. It has even been said that everybody is guilty of something, and that therefore nobody should punish anybody—at least for murder.

The theological principles are in fact of determinative importance. One is tempted to centre discussion on these and ignore the so-called practical considerations. Indeed this would be justifiable; but since some people might infer, incorrectly, that such a procedure betrays a timid avoidance of the real issues and hard facts in the case, the present argument will offer a token response to these more superficial contentions.

First, it is claimed that the wealthy always, or usually, escape the death penalty because they can afford to employ extremely clever criminal lawyers. Unfortunately there is a good deal of truth in this claim. In the United States a generation ago that evil genius, Clarence Darrow, obtained, not an acquittal, but a life sentence for two wealthy college students who killed a little boy merely to show that they could commit a perfect crime. One of the guilty students was himself murdered in prison, but the other one was set free.

Now, however true and deplorable it is that the wealthy, including the lords of vice and their mobsters, can often escape while the poor criminal suffers, the inference that capital punishment should therefore be abolished is invalidly drawn. Wealthy criminals also escape the punishment for other crimes: embezzlement, narcotic crimes, tax evasion, bribery, and what not; but the opponents of capital punishment do not usually contend that therefore the penalties for these crimes should be abolished or reduced. Lax and uneven justice, so prevalent in the United States where extreme solicitude is shown the
criminal and scant sympathy for the victim, ought to be remedied, not by the abolition of penalties, but by the strengthening of justice.

A second objection to capital punishment is the occasional execution of an innocent man. Here too it cannot be denied that this has occurred. But so few are the executions in proportion to the murders and so obviously guilty are those executed, that the tragic exception is extremely rare.

It is less rare that innocent persons are punished for other crimes. For example, in my own state of Indiana a man was convicted in 1897 of the petty theft of fifteen dollars. Later, by executive order, i.e. without a hearing, he was sent from prison to a mental institution. In 1959 at the age of eighty-three he escaped and walked to the local courthouse to plead for his freedom. His sanity was affirmed and he was discharged after more than fifty years of wrongful imprisonment.

Granted, if he had been executed in 1897, he could not have been freed in 1959. The opponents of capital punishment have a point, but in view of a half-century of wrongful imprisonment the point has little length, breadth, or thickness.

Justice indeed needs to be improved. It is an outrage that in Massachusetts a person can be incarcerated because he is deemed ‘likely’ to violate ‘the conventions or morals of the community’. He need not have done anything reprehensible; the mere ‘likelihood’ is sufficient to have him put away for life. Again, the remedy is not the abolition of penalties for crimes, but a stricter justice.

The third practical objection mentioned in the introductory paragraph was the claim that capital punishment does not deter. Now, it may be that the law of capital punishment does not altogether deter murderers. The laws against theft do not altogether deter thieves. The frequency of crime in the United States is appalling, and it is all too evident that the laws do not deter. Perhaps, however, enforcement of the laws might deter.

In the United States for every four murders only one suspect is tried; of the suspects brought to trial only one in ten is sentenced; and only one in eighty is executed. New York City had 390 murders in one year; 10 per cent were convicted. In the same year London had twenty-six murders; thirteen of the murderers committed suicide and the other thirteen were executed. If therefore the American judiciary would support the police and have a care for the safety of the community, capital punishment would deter.
But even with our present laxity, capital punishment in one respect does indeed deter. The claim that it does not is palpably false. Once a murderer is executed, he is effectively deterred from murdering again. Unfortunately there are too many cases of murderers, given life sentences and then paroled or pardoned, who go out to commit several additional murders.

Caryl Chessman was recently a celebrated case. He had committed murder, rape, and assorted crimes. Pleas for his release came from all over the world; there were demonstrations in London and Paris; the Pope as well as Khrushchev interceded. These misguided sympathisers paid no attention to Chessman's defiant declaration in court that if he should be released, he would commit the same crimes again, only he would be more clever and not get caught. Most fortunately for us all he was executed. There was no doubt of his guilt; there was no reasonable doubt that he would continue in crime if released; and yet the opponents of capital punishment, without the support of their 'practical' arguments, demanded that he be not executed.

There is another practical consideration with reference to the matter of deterrence. If the penalty for murder were life imprisonment instead of execution, then a criminal would run no further risk in murdering the witnesses of his other major crimes. He would run no further risk in murdering the arresting officer. These additional murders would give him a chance of escape without increasing his danger. No wonder the police are not pressing for the abolition of the death penalty.

This must suffice for the practical considerations; let us turn to the deeper theological issues. Questions of political philosophy are also involved. If the sixth commandment forbids the infliction of capital punishment by civil authorities, one must frame a theory of government by which limitations on the state's activities are determined. More generally, by what right does the state exist? How does it acquire, not merely power, but right? The opponents of capital punishment, and particularly their friends, the pacifists, often neglect this general problem of civil government. Now, if these political questions cannot be answered by a purely secular philosophy, as I believe they cannot, the problem becomes theological, and from this point on the matter will be discussed within a Christian context.

That the Old Testament authorises capital punishment cannot be denied. The principle was laid down in the time of Noah that 'whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image

\[1\] Cf. A Christian View of Men and Things. chap. iii.
of God made he man'. This divine declaration not only authorises capital punishment, but also gives its justification: man was created in God's image, and murder is a direct affront against God.

Also implicit is the authorisation of civil government, for unless God gave the right of capital punishment to individuals in the first place (compare the theory of civil arrest), one would be at a loss to explain governmental authority.

The Old Testament is clearly unfavourable toward pacifism and the abolition of the death penalty. Yet with some frequency we are told, 'Thou shalt not kill'. This appeal to the sixth commandment is nothing else than silly. The context from which it is wrenched, the Mosaic Law, specifies the death penalty for the infraction of this law and other laws also. The establishment of cities of refuge, to which a suspect might flee and where he might remain while his guilt or innocence is being determined, is itself evidence that capital punishment is embedded in the law. Hence one cannot escape the conclusion that the Old Testament authorises this penalty.

Furthermore, the nature of civil government receives considerably more attention in the Old Testament than in the New. Either then one must discard the Old and rely on the lesser amount of information in the New, or one must consider the Old as the foundation on which the New builds. This latter alternative is the view of the New Testament itself. The Pharisees had mistaken notions as to what the Old Testament taught, and the New Testament purports to give the correct explanation. Thus Jesus appeals to Moses (John v. 46-47), and Paul quotes Habakkuk and Genesis (Rom. i. 17; Gal. iii. 8 and iv. 24).

Therefore I must insist that when the Old Testament lays down basic principles, such as the sovereignty of God, the creation of the world, the divine control of history, the inclusion of infants in the Covenant, and other matters not explicitly abrogated or modified in the New Testament, the silence or near silence of the latter is not an excuse for abandoning the principles of the former.

Now, does the New Testament abrogate or modify the Old with respect to civil government, war, and capital punishment? All theologians acknowledge that the New modifies, and even abrogates the Old in some way or other. The most obvious of these is the abrogation or fulfilment of the ritual by the death of Christ. We no longer sacrifice lambs or turtle doves. But it would take a foolhardy logician to argue for the abolition of the death penalty on the sole ground that the Mosaic sacrifices have ceased.
However, it is also true that the New Testament abrogates the civil laws of the ancient state of Israel. God abolished the theocracy. Such is the teaching of Jesus in Matt. xxi. 33–45. The Pharisees thought that any men who would kill the Messiah would be miserably destroyed, but that then God would let out the vineyard to other High Priests and the theocracy would continue as before. Jesus said, 'No'. The Kingdom would be altogether taken from the Jews and a new order would be instituted in which the rejected stone would become the head of the corner. So it happened; and therefore the detailed civil and criminal code of Israel is no longer binding.

For this reason we no longer have cities of refuge: police and judicial protection is enough. Nor are we required to marry our brother’s widow, because the purpose of preserving his name and tribe is no longer in effect.

But although all this is admitted, it does not justify the abolition of capital punishment. In the first place, the purpose of the death penalty still remains, even though the purpose of marrying a brother’s widow does not. In the second place, the abrogation of the Mosaic code does not affect the moral and political principles given to Noah: such abrogation in and of itself merely leaves the situation as it was before the Mosaic legislation. And capital punishment dates not merely from Noah, but apparently from the time of Cain and Abel. God commanded the death penalty because murder was a direct affront to the divine Majesty. To agitate for the elimination of this penalty is disobedience to the will of God, motivated by a low opinion of human life.

The only answer to this argument would be an explicit statement in the New Testament that governments no longer have authority to execute a criminal. There is of course no such explicit statement, but the opposition tries to show that the equivalent is implied.

For example, sometimes an extreme antithesis is drawn to the effect that the Old Testament God is a God of wrath, while the New Testament God is a God of love. Or, more modestly it is claimed that law in the New Testament rests upon an entirely different basis. Some of the opponents have used the account of the woman taken in adultery as evidence.

Now, the case of the woman taken in adultery is a particularly poor piece of evidence. In fact, one wonders what the opponents’ argument really is. Do they mean that the principle of capital punishment requires every guilty person to be executed regardless of circumstances? This must be their unacknowledged assumption, for otherwise a single
case would support no conclusion. But obviously, the Old Testament, which establishes the death penalty, opens with an exception. Cain was not executed. In the case of the woman the account itself discloses certain peculiar circumstances. The woman, it will be remembered, was taken in the very act; but the Pharisees had not arrested the man, whom they must also have found in the very act. Jesus therefore may have thought it wise to free the woman in order to convict the Pharisees of their own partiality. Furthermore, if the case of the woman implies the abolition of capital punishment, it equally well implies the abolition of all punishment. The woman went scot-free. This embarrassing implication points up what was said earlier: pacifists and opponents of the death penalty have not sufficiently considered the general problem of civil government. By what right is any penalty inflicted?

Sometimes other verses are grasped at in desperation. One author argued that in the synagogue at Nazareth Jesus stopped his reading just before the clause on the day of vengeance. From this the author inferred that vengeance is antichristian and that therefore the New Testament opposes the death penalty.

Such an inference, if valid, would put every preacher in jeopardy at the last verse of his Scripture reading before the sermon. Think what wild conclusions would be allowed! At any rate the argument from Jesus’ closing the book rests on the assumption that the Old Testament and the New present antithetical views of God.

This contention, however, is demonstrably false. To begin with the verse in question, Jesus stopped reading at a given point because he wanted to read only so much as he was to fulfil during his earthly ministry. Therefore he began his preaching with the assertion, This day is this scripture fulfilled in your ears. But there is not the slightest hint that the remainder of Isaiah’s prophecy will not be fulfilled at a later date. It is well to note that, in substance, Isaiah’s prophecy is repeated in the New Testament, where Paul predicts that Jesus shall return in flaming fire to take vengeance on them that obey not the Gospel.

Besides this God’s wrath is mentioned in Romans i. 18, Ephesians v. 6, and Revelation xvi. 1; and Jesus more than anyone else in the whole Bible had a great deal to say about hell.

On the other hand, the Old Testament frequently mentions the loving kindness and tender mercies of the Lord. Therefore the liberal contention that the Bible presents two different concepts of God is demonstrably false.
Finally, to brush aside all these minor arguments, what does the New Testament itself teach concerning civil government? Although, as has been granted, it does not say as much as the Old Testament, its principle is no less explicit. The *locus classicus* is Romans xiii. After stating that civil government operates on divine authority, Paul assigns it two specific functions. The first is the function of the sword, viz. war and capital punishment. What else could the sword mean? The second is taxation. There is nothing, whatever, anywhere, in the New Testament that contradicts this basic principle of politics.

In fact, there are other passages which more particularly support the principle of civil penalties:

Luke xix. 27: But those mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring them hither and slay them before me.

Romans i. 32: They which commit such things are worthy of death.

Acts xxv. 11: For if I be an offender, or have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die.

In conclusion therefore the pacifists and the opponents of capital punishment, so at least it seems to me, have a defective theory of politics or no theory at all. They fail to justify civil government. Next, their liberal theology is a serious misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the text of the Bible and the nature of Christianity. Lastly their moral principles are perverse. The abolition of capital punishment is an instance of the ethical irresponsibility of the modern secular community where a misplaced sympathy for the criminal has widely replaced a lost sense of justice.
Evaluating the Qumran Manuscripts

Some archaeological discoveries, however important in themselves, serve mainly in the shaping and clarifying of theories already formulated on the basis of earlier discoveries. Hence they seldom arouse much controversy. Others, like that of the Qumran scrolls, are entirely unexpected and open up a new field of thought and knowledge. It is to be expected that at the first they will call out contradictory, and sometimes sensational interpretations. This is particularly the case, when, as was the case with Qumran, the discoveries impinge on our understanding of the Bible. It is natural for scholars, and for writers who can hardly claim to be scholars, to look for proofs of their views in the new discoveries.

The first of the Qumran scrolls were discovered in 1947, and they became public news in 1948, but it was not until 1955 that the journalistically brilliant article by E. Wilson in The New Yorker, published as The Scrolls from the Dead Sea, revealed to a wide public the potential dynamite in them. His views about the relationship of the scrolls to the early Church were reinforced the next year by A. P. Davies, The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls. The remarkable feature is that the following six years have seen not merely the withering away of these extravagant theories but also an almost universal acceptance of the main lines of the theory put forward by A. Dupont-Sommer in 1950 in his Aperçus préliminaires sur les manuscrits de la Mer Morte (English translation, The Dead Sea Scrolls, 1952).

One reason for the disappearance of wild hypotheses is that the serious reader is in a position to study the manuscripts in adequate translations. Apart from the translations offered by Millar Burrows in The Dead Sea Scrolls (1955) and More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls (1958) there was the brilliant, but sometimes erratic rendering by T. H. Gaster in The Dead Sea Scriptures (1956). This has to a great extent been replaced by the more pedestrian but more reliable work by G. Vermes, The Dead Sea Scrolls in English (Pelican, 1962). The latter has the advantage of being able to include various fragments which have become known since Gaster's work. Unfortunately the non-expert, who is confined to English, has not yet the advantage of a work like J. Maier's two-volume work Die Texte vom Toten Meer (1960),
which by its very full notes gives the reader a chance of making up his own mind in cases of disputed renderings.

The earlier remark about the withering away of extravagant theories must not be over-stressed. They still appear and will continue to do so. One example is Upton C. Ewing, *The Essene Christ* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1961). Although the publishers make great claims for both the author and his work, it is doubtful whether it should be regarded as a scholarly work at all. By a suitable choice of quotations, often from authors who would never be regarded as authorities today, the veracity of the Gospels is questioned and an idealised picture of the Qumran Covenanters, identified with the Essenes, is offered. In spite of the balance of evidence both in the manuscripts and from the excavations they are presented as rejecters of animal sacrifices and vegetarians—the advocacy of vegetarianism is one of the main purposes of the book. It is assumed as certain that both John the Baptist and Jesus were brought up among them. He does not seem to realise that to quote A. P. Davies and D. Howlett (*The Essenes and Christianity*) as authorities is quite inadequate, when their views have been seriously discredited by competent scholars. It is disingenuous to quote W. H. Brownlee’s summary of Dupont-Sommer’s early views of the similarities between the Teacher of Righteousness and Jesus, when he should know that the whole underlying interpretation of the texts is seriously challenged.

This façade of scholarship is used to justify the writing of a new gospel, ‘The Covenant of Love’, which would probably have astonished the men of Qumran almost as much as the evangelists. In it the first temptation of Jesus is to eat meat; the nets break in the miraculous draught of fishes (Luke v. 4-10) to show the disciples they must not catch fish; the demons do not enter the swine (Matt. viii. 31); the fig tree is blessed, not cursed; the miracle at Cana of Galilee is a sermon on the merits of water; the cleansing of the Temple is an attack on animal sacrifice; and the prodigal’s ‘fatted calf’ turns into ‘best ripe fruits, the pulse, the honey of the comb, the bread, the cakes and the wine’. The crucifixion was a purely Roman action drawn on himself by Jesus by his insult to the Roman gods by condemning animal sacrifice. It need hardly be mentioned that the resurrection is not even hinted at.

We have devoted so much to this book because it is typical of the wrong way to approach the Qumran discoveries. The future will doubtless see other ingenious theories based on them. When we turn to true scholarship, however, we find increasing agreement and a dis-
inclination to listen to siren voices attracting down new paths. As a result attractively argued theses like that of C. Roth in \textit{The Historical Background of the Dead Sea Scrolls} (1958), identifying the Qumran Convenanters with the Zealots, or K. H. Rengstorff’s \textit{Hirbet Qumran und die Bibliotek vom Toten Meer} (1961), arguing that the manuscripts represent remnants of the official library of the Temple stored away before A.D. 70, have few to follow them.

The ordinary reader wishing to know what is known about Qumran cannot do better than turn to the second edition of F. F. Bruce, \textit{Second Thoughts on the Dead Sea Scrolls} (Paternoster Press, London, 1961). Although the book was written for the ordinary intelligent reader, its qualities of clarity, fairness and balance brought many appreciative remarks from scholars. The many new discoveries since the first edition in 1956 have caused the book to expand by about a third (the re-setting of the type makes an accurate estimate of the increase difficult) and there can be hardly a page that has not been altered. For all that we have noted only one comparatively unimportant point where the writer has changed his mind, viz. the etymology of the name Essene. Curiously enough, this is one of the few points where we disagree with him. Probably his first thoughts were better, when he maintained that it was derived from the term Hasidim, even though the history of the development may be complicated, as suggested by Matthew Black (see below, p. 14). It is questionable whether the ordinary reader will for a considerable time need more than this book and the same author’s \textit{Biblical Exegesis in the Qumran Texts} (Tyndale Press) for an adequate appreciation of the Qumran discoveries.

Some of the deeper implications of the discoveries are suggested by Matthew Black in his \textit{The Scrolls and Christian Origins} (Nelson, 1951). His argument that the Qumran Covenanters were Essenes seems irrefutable, and he is particularly valuable in his closer examination of the sect and its probable origins. There seems to be somewhat too much unprovable theory involved for us to accept some of his more far-reaching theories. What evidence is there that the Hasmonean priestkings were not of Aaronic origin? Though it is frequently affirmed today, there seems to be no evidence for it. The denial of legitimacy does not of necessity deny descent. In British history the Jacobites in denying the legitimacy of the Hanovarian kings did not question that they had Stuart blood. It is most improbable that the Pharisees would have tolerated a non-Aaronic high-priesthood. In addition the Essene objection was based quite as much on character as on legitimacy.
It is here that we meet one of the major weaknesses of the work. To look for accurate information about heretics and schismatics in the traditions and writings of enemies, or even of the inquisitive, e.g. some of the early Christian fathers, can be dangerous. The pre-Maccabean evidence needs to be handled with much more, the early Christian with a good deal more care than is here in evidence. We can, however, accept his conclusion that in first-century Judaism, both B.C. and A.D., beside the Pharisees and Sadducees and their allies there were a large number of groups sharing approximately the same type of outlook although they were not linked with one another and in some cases might be openly hostile. The Essenes of Qumran will have been one of the most influential of these groups.

This puts his study of the similarities and dissimilarities between Qumran and the Church into a new light. Not only does he show that the dissimilarities are in certain respects more important than the similarities, but many of the latter need not be specifically due to Qumran at all and may be derived from a common non-Pharisaic background.

In fact many of these similarities link with the customs of the Primitive Church rather than with teaching and acts of Jesus. Here again we must exercise caution. Black stresses the hieratic or sacerdotal character of the Church from its earliest beginnings (p. 80) in contrast to the Synagogue. But this is to overlook that so long as the Temple stood the Synagogue, in Palestine at any rate, never stood in opposition to it but rather presupposed it. Some of the most striking similarities are based on post-Apostolic evidence and often in heretical or semi-heretical settings. It may well be that we here have a clue to the remarkable collapse and disappearance of the Jewish-Christian church. We are all familiar with the concept of the Pharisaic element within it predisposing it to legalism. It is likely, however, that the collapse of A.D. 70 will have brought in many of the disillusioned Essenes and people of similar outlook, who will have found suitable soil for the propagation of their particular views and practices. It may be that beside the Hellenistic perversion of New Testament thought, which is so often stressed today, we shall in the future have to speak of a parallel Essene or Jewish sectarian perversion.

The study of individual Essene concepts is excellent, and we are brought to see that there has been perhaps a premature acceptance of the view that Qumran expected two Messiahs. It may be added that the work contains some outstandingly fine photographs.
Faith in this Space Age

Introduction

There are two ancient questions that have always been relevant in the minds of men as they have striven and still strive to come to terms with the enigma of being, and especially of their own being. No doubt it is just because of their timeless relevance that the following two passages of the Old Testament, containing these questions, are amongst the best-known parts of the Bible. The first quotation, which comes from the eighth psalm, and has provided a title for a recent psychological symposium and for many a thesis and discussion, is ‘What is man?’ In the particular context in which it occurs in the psalm it is, perhaps, especially significant for our present subject: ‘When I consider thy heavens... What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?’

The second question, from the fortieth chapter of Isaiah, is, in a sense, the obverse of the first: ‘To whom then will ye liken God?’ for it is only in the mould of the latter that we can hope to congeal an adequate concept of man, and it is only in anthropomorphic terms that those parts of God’s ways which can be known could possibly be expressed. At the very start, however, we must recognise that the second question is all too rarely asked in this age of human prowess and human terror, and that, if asked, it receives too often the agnostic reply, ‘We cannot know’; a reply that is frequently honest, that may hide agonies of a questing spirit, but is sometimes merely the slick answer of a lazy ignorance that has not bothered to enquire.

‘What is man?’ and ‘To whom... will ye liken God?’ are the two questions on which faith in any age turns, for faith, in the sense in which I shall use it, is that relationship of trust and confidence between the creature man and his Creator which characterises true religion, which marks it off from superstition. It is to be noted that faith in this sense is entirely different from belief in, that is to say acceptance of, objective faith. It is not less but more. Objective facts there must be, otherwise faith is mere superstition, but there must also be subjective experience.

1 The second annual Rendle Short Memorial Lecture delivered under the auspices of the Bristol Library for Biblical Research, at the University of Bristol, on 1 March 1963.
if faith is really to be a personal relationship. To put it biblically, 'Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God'. When the Word of God comes to a man it comes not in the indicative mood, simply conveying information. It comes in the imperative demanding response.

At this point, may I say that I am neither a theologian nor a philosopher but, if I may borrow the words of Mark Antony, I am 'a plain, blunt man that love my friend'. It is that divine friendship, that trust, confidence and reliance which I shall call faith.

It cannot be denied that this confidence of which I speak is not common in the world today. There are of course many reasons, amongst which is the fact that population growth outstrips missionary potential (a fact that is a challenge to the Church to look to its strategy), but in this discussion I shall confine myself to the situation in the literate, and therefore presumably educated, Western world, to so-called Christendom.

**Attitudes in the World Today**

It is a truism that people's attitudes to society, to life and to religion in this space age are largely conditioned by science, but this conditioning is not direct. It is not that people are becoming more scientific. Indeed, it is open to question whether even scientists as a whole are becoming more scientific, as the perils of specialisation blind them to the unsubstantial basis of their thought forms, and the axiomatic rather than logical foundation of their presuppositions.

In a foreword to one of the monographs published in association with the Nuffield Foundation Unit for the History of Ideas, Jaques Barzun says, 'Western society today may be said to harbour science like a foreign god, powerful and mysterious. Our lives are changed by its handiwork, but the population of the West is as far from understanding the nature of this strange power as a remote peasant of the Middle Ages may have been from understanding the theology of Thomas Aquinas.' Earlier he refers to 'the work that modern science sets its hand to: no longer the improvement of man's understanding or man's comfort but the increasingly confident assurance of his self-destruction'.

We shall return later to this popular lack of understanding, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that the power for destruction is real enough, in all conscience, and that coupled with the mystery and uncertainty as to what will be cooked up next, it has established fear
as a characteristic attitude of the age. Of course, there is healthy fear and morbid fear, and while we cannot but regret the actions of our race that have brought such fear upon the world, and deplore our own frequent unwillingness to face the facts, our shirking of our responsibilities, yet the outcome of this fear has not been wholly bad. It has contributed in no small way to the growing political and social awareness of our age. However much we may disagree with the policies of the ‘Committee of one hundred’, it is a healthy thing for a nation and for the world when a tiny minority is prepared to swim against the stream of public opinion and to suffer for it as well. In short, fear has made people think. It has awakened the dormant question ‘What is man?’ The other, ‘To whom then will ye liken God?’, cannot be far behind.

But apart from fear and an increasingly active social conscience, with its awakening concern for the underfed, the underclothed and the underprivileged, there have been two other attitudes generated. The first of these, scepticism, again is not wholly evil. By sweeping away the Jewish fable and medieaval speculation that for long clogged biblical interpretation, this scepticism has given the Word of God a freer, more direct approach to men’s minds. Because the voice of ecclesiastical dogma and theological authority is heard with the healthy, even rebellious scepticism of contemporary intellectual youth, that same youth is turning to the Bible in a genuine and honest spirit of enquiry, more than ever before. The churches of our land may not often be filled, but where they are filled it is largely with students, and those students are in earnest.

While Milton could castigate the unfaithful pastors of his day with the words ‘The hungry sheep look up and are not fed’, amongst the student classes at any rate today the situation is changed, for the church that gives no food has no sheep.

The other attitude that characterises our society today is cynicism. This is far less healthy. It is the attitude of an empty spirit, with no philosophy of life, no ‘weltanschauung’ as the Germans have it, no faith. It is demonstrated by the growing popularity of satire, which is wholly destructive, frequently dishonest and largely irresponsible. While scepticism is an attitude of the mind unwilling to be stampeded by the emotions, cynicism is an attitude of the emotions which prevents the mind from taking the future seriously.

It is against this background of common attitudes that we must now consider some misunderstandings affecting faith.
Misunderstandings about Science

We have already referred to Barzun's remark that 'Western society harbours science as a god' whose theology is virtually unknown to the layman. Before addressing ourselves, therefore, to a brief enquiry into the aims and character of science it is important that we should take notice of the popular image of the god, for it is of course the popular image of science (and sometimes even of scientists) rather than the true character of science that affects the faith of most.

To many people, science is conceived almost entirely in terms of what is done or said to be done in its name. It is science that sends men into space and it is science that has succeeded, so far, in bringing them back again. It is science that makes hydrogen bombs and that explodes them in the atmosphere to rain an ever-increasing flux of radioactive poisons over the face of the earth. It is science that fits people with new kidneys, sews up holes in their hearts, changes their minds or even their sex. Science, in the popular mind, is even more like a demigod than a god. Indeed, to not a few it appears to be a monstrous offspring from the unholy union of the mind of man with Mother Nature.

But if the responsibility for man's technological achievements is thus wrongly laid on the shoulder of science, the other shoulder is asked to bear another heavy load. Science is thought of, not only as the great doer, but as the final cause. It is the explanation of, and therefore the reason for, everything. Once let the oracle pronounce on any subject and all mystery and wonder is gone, no worship is left but for the mind of man that thought up the explanation.

It is just here that the image of science is most godlike and most impious. It has often been said that much of the progress of modern science has arisen from its determined exclusion of final causes from its explanations. Teleological principles and purposive tendencies have no place in scientific understanding. Mechanism, not meaning, is at the heart of a scientific account, pattern not purpose. We are inclined, too, to think ourselves wiser than the Greeks because, having made this abstraction, we have been more successful in harnessing nature. But the Greeks were seeking to understand rather than to use, and their preoccupation with final rather than efficient causes, with purpose rather than mechanism was a preoccupation with a more difficult, perhaps a hopeless research—a research that today we would not regard as scientific, that was metaphysical rather than physical.

If this were realised, the popular image of science would be cut down
to size and no harm would be done. Unfortunately, nine out of ten people one meets today confuse explaining with explaining away. The nucleic acids have robbed life of its wonder for them, and the ontological problem vanishes from their minds like a morning mist under the omnipotent beams of continuous creation.

No, let us face it, the mystery of being is no less a mystery because we have, or hope soon to have, an adequate theory of fundamental particles. The evolution of the primates (I use the word in a sense which would include Bishop Wilberforce) is, for me at any rate, as great a cause for worship as if they had been created ex nihilo.

Those of us who are in any way concerned with science, education or the press have an iconoclastic responsibility. The popular image of science must be broken and science must be seen for what it is, an important cultural activity, perhaps the most important, nevertheless an activity made, like the sabbath, for man, not man for science. I believe that no small part of the cynicism and scepticism and of the lack of any sense of purpose or any genuine faith, which affects a section of youth today, is due to the erroneous view of science that many of them have received from their school teachers. It seems to me to be vitally important that those who will teach our young people in the future must themselves have been taught not only science, but sufficient of the history and philosophy of science to prevent them presenting the image of a false god to their pupils.

What then are the aims and character of science? I would like to quote my colleague Dr Toulmin in his book *Foresight and Understanding*, to the foreword of which we have already referred. 'The central aims of science', he says, 'are . . . concerned with a search for understanding—a desire to make the course of Nature not just predictable but intelligible.' I need hardly say that the fact that understanding may also be useful is not relevant. It is the understanding that is the good to be pursued. Now, Toulmin asks, 'What patterns of thought and reasoning give scientific understanding?' and replies in effect '“ideals of natural order,” which settle what a scientist regards as “self-explanatory” or “natural”’.

These ‘ideals of natural order’ are the basic presuppositions of science. They cannot be logically deduced but are rather borne in upon us by our collective experience. These ideals are many and varied. They differ from discipline to discipline and from generation to generation. The reputation and respectability of many of them as providing the axioms on which the structure of science is based are beyond dispute.
The principle of the uniformity of nature, the rational validity of those biophysical processes in our brains which we call thought, the value of the principle of economy of hypotheses (Occam’s razor) in the search for truth, are assumptions that every scientist makes. So much do our ideals of natural order become a part of our thinking selves that we may readily forget that these ideals are not a logically essential aspect of reality but are rather, in part at any rate, the way we look at Nature. To use Eddington’s famous picture of the ichthyologist, they are the mesh of the net by which we draw specimens from Nature’s ocean.

That those questions which we ask of Nature are determined by the way we look at her, that we see her through spectacles tinted pink by the tremendous success of mechanics and the truism of natural selection, has a most important bearing on faith in this space age.

Because the presuppositions of our science, which are rational though not logically determined, have sunk far back into our subconscious, with an almost Freudian desire to forget, we deceive ourselves into imagining two errors. We forget the empirical faith-like basis of our science, that even science is based on non-demonstrable conclusions, whose validity like those of faith lies simply in the fact that they work. They fit our experience. Secondly, the comfortable detached attitude of the scientist, protecting us, as it does, from any involvement in the scheme of things, rapidly becomes so prominent in our thought that other ways of looking at things are neglected. Preoccupied with the ‘How?’ we fail to ask ‘Why?’ Satisfied with the pattern of the world, we no longer seek for a purpose. Intoxicated by our own increasing appreciation of the mechanism, we leave no thought for the meaning.

Misunderstandings about the Bible

No ‘ideals of natural order’ have been more successful in presenting us with an intelligible and coherent pattern of Nature than Newton’s laws of motion. So successful has the classical mechanics based on these laws been that the elusive phenomena of electromagnetism and atomic physics were first explained in images borrowed from fluid and corpuscular motion, vortices, waves and idealised billiard balls. The Universe came to be regarded as if it were an immensely complex piece of clockwork, rigorously determined in its behaviour by the laws of mechanics, from its first ‘tick’ to its last ‘tock’. God was allowed, by most, to retain the key, and by the pious to hold a pair of tweezers by which to intervene. Thus was a miracle seen as violence done to
Nature by an omnipotent Supernature. At the same time, so familiar did mechanics become that not only did most people rarely wonder at the mystery of being, but they never wondered at all at the mystery of mechanics, of causality. Strangely, while an apparently capricious nature spawned animism in the minds of savages, the concept of an orderly nature which was itself nurtured by Christian theism is today a frequent excuse for agnosticism.

Nature is exalted above God so that even hymn-writers say 'laws that never shall be broken for their guidance Thou hast made'. But this concept of a Nature guided by the laws of God is neither biblical nor scientific, for the laws of nature do not prescribe the behaviour of nature but describe it, and the biblical view, indeed the plainly stated word of Jesus Christ, is that the events of Nature are the activity of God. He of whom it is written that 'He upholds all things by the word of His power' said, 'God maketh his Sun to rise . . . and sendeth rain'.

Christians, who are rightly concerned to guard against pantheism and jealous of the transcendence of God, too often today overlook the immanence of His activity. They forget that Isaiah says God 'stretches out the heavens as a curtain', God 'brings princes to naught', God 'blows upon them', and of the stars, God 'brings out their host by number . . . and because He is strong in power not one is missing'. The wonder of a miracle is not that God is great enough to mess about with Nature, but that God is great enough to be 'mindful of man', and sufficiently concerned to act here in this tiny speck in the Universe in a way that declares His concern. A miracle declares His concern, not because He has acted where He does not normally act, but because His action has differed from what He is normally expected to do. That the Sun shone only on Israel and not on the Egyptians during the plague of darkness is specially significant, but it is neither less nor more the activity of God than its rising in England today on good and evil alike.

If the biblical view of God and the World is all too rarely known because the Bible is more talked about than read, the common excuse for not reading the Bible is half a century out of date. The Bible has been recognised down the centuries since the Reformation, even by those not committed to a personal faith in Christ, as a book full of wisdom and good counsel. But though it is heard by the Christian as the Word of God it is, of course, only in these circles that we can expect it to be recognised as such. The majority of people believe that the Bible has been discredited, and this belief keeps them both from listening to its message and from giving serious attention to Christ.
It is impossible to over-emphasise the effect of the tragic and rigid opposition of the Church a hundred years ago to the need for a fresh, more spiritual look at the Genesis teaching about creation. But again the effect has not been wholly bad, for today the Church is rediscovering its mission and is to be found once again presenting Christ to men. The preaching of Christ, however, requires reference to the Gospels and the attitude of a man to what is read or preached is rightly coloured by what he believes about the documents. Of course, it is easy to say that the Word of God, when it comes to a man, is the Word of God whether he recognises it as such or not, but the remark is, in fact, irrelevant; as irrelevant as is a realisation that 'God makes the sun to rise' to the preparation of the nautical almanac. If I may use the metaphor of one of Christ's parables, a man's presuppositions and attitude are part of the situation in which the Good Shepherd seeks him, and they do affect his response to the Shepherd's voice.

There seem to me to be three valid contemporary attitudes to the Gospel records, other than indifference, all of which are ways to faith in Christ. There are those to whom, for example, the words of Christ in Matthew's Gospel, 'No one knows the Father but the Son and those to whom the Son may choose to reveal Him', come as the Word of God. To such, it is but a step to hear the ensuing invitation, 'Come unto me', and to respond. There are many people with a robust and active faith in Christ in this space age, whose initial response was to preaching which reiterates—'The Bible says'.

There are others in whose lives and affections Christ is enthroned, who began with no preconceived notions about the validity of the New Testament; yet to them the account of the life, teaching and death of Jesus and the founding of the Church are in themselves the authentication of the Gospel. The ring of authority, of rectitude, of unselfish love in the life of Christ and the story of the change in the apostles from the cowardice of Good Friday to the confidence of Whitsun, these things, they are convinced, ring true. No attempt to account for the Gospels and the Acts (and the Epistles too for that matter) commends itself to their minds when endeavouring to reach a right judgment but that Jesus lived and taught essentially as the evangelists portrayed, that He died and rose again, in fact that 'in Christ God was reconciling the World to himself' (2 Cor. v. 19, R.S.V. margin).

For the great majority in this age, however, neither of these two attitudes seems adequate as a basis for the faith of a lifetime. While in
the deepest sense it must always be the sheer fact of Christ that is the datum, the objectivity on which the faith of a Christian is based, that fact may break in upon a man's being, may become a matter to be reckoned with, in a variety of ways. There is no more insistent mode in which the fact of Christ invades the mind of man than its historicity. The first Rendle Short lecturer, Professor F. F. Bruce, has done much to dispel the uncertainties about the dates and reliability of the New Testament documents with which the last century closed. To quote the late Sir Frederic Kenyon when he was director of the British Museum, in a lecture aimed to make this very point, 'nine-tenths of the ingenious theories of the origin and structure of the Gospel falls to the ground, because there is simply not time for ... complicated processes of development' (Presidential address to the Victoria Institute, 1949). It is not my intention to dwell on this point in detail, but no lecture on Faith in this Space Age would be complete if it did not draw attention to the immense difference in our contemporary certainty of the history of Jesus Christ and the origin of the Church from that existing a generation or so ago. To quote Kenyon again, because there is probably no greater authority, 'Both the authenticity and the general integrity of the books of the New Testament may be regarded as finally established' (The Bible and Archaeology, 1940).

It is the historicity of the Christian religion that is its very core. It is this which distinguishes the Christian faith from both Philosophy and Superstition. The apostles of Christ who companied with Him, who saw Him in public and in private, in acclamation and rejection, in prayerful anticipation of the cross and in its horrible reality, these men came in their various ways and differing idioms to the conviction of the reality of what we call the incarnation, and John, who gave us the mysterious and pregnant phrase, 'The Word (the Logos) became flesh', says himself at the end of his gospel record that 'these things are written that ye might believe'.

Faith in the Christian sense is the response of the personality to God as seen in Christ. While there is a complementary account in terms of subjective experience and response to the Word of God, faith itself is as objectively based on events outside the self as are the theories which compose our current picture of the physical world.

Complementarity

In reviewing some of the attitudes of mind today which affect the approach of thinking people to matters of faith, and in considering some
of the misunderstandings about science and about the Bible that are abroad, implicit reference has been made several times to the idea of complementarity. This idea has had such an important impact upon the thinking of scientists and others that we must now consider it rather more explicitly.

The concept of complementarity grew up in physics in the first decades of this century. In searching for models, generally of a conceptual character but sometimes of purely mathematical formulation, by which to represent the basic entities of atomic physics, it was found to be convenient to the point of practical necessity to employ for the same entity more than one complementary model. For example, the ancient dispute in which Newton himself had been engaged, whether light was really corpuscular or wave-like in character, was finally resolved by the answer ‘both’. Anyone who endeavours to form a mental picture of a wave and of a particle is immediately aware of their utter dissimilarity, even if he does not realise that the theory of refraction demands of the first that the velocity of light decreases on entering a denser medium and of the second that it increases. So much of our understanding of the behaviour of light rays (and of other electromagnetic radiation) could be explained, or perhaps one should say represented, by the wave theory that it required the genius of Einstein and Planck to break free and to represent the interaction of light with matter on a corpuscular model. But they did not thereby dismiss Young, Maxwell, Lorentz and all who had done so much to establish the wave theory. Instead physicists came to see that reality was too subtle and complex to be represented by any one model taken from gross macroscopic experience. Impossible as it is to conceive of a ‘wavicle’, a kind of hybrid between a wave and a particle, yet the two views must be held together. Justice to experience, that is to say to experiment, could only be done, not by mixing up the models to give a wavicle of which nonsensical questions concerning the radius of the wave or the frequency of the particle could be enquired, but by holding both models in the mind as different facets of a truth not to be encompassed in a single imagery, and by employing at any one time the model relevant to the aspect of the whole situation currently under consideration.

To take a well-known and homely (literally!) illustration; if I want a new house I may have drawings prepared by an architect. These drawings will consist of plans and elevations. The elevation shows no detail of the kitchen floor tiling or the wood blocks in the hall. The
plan shows little evidence of the high windows I asked for. Yet only an idiot would take either drawing for the whole and complain that either the house had no floors or it had only vestiges of windows. To form an adequate mental picture of my new home I must make a synthesis in my mind from the drawings in front of me and, furthermore, must see my wife and children, my visiting friends and myself in it.

The simple criterion on which the requirement for complementary models rests is that they must be necessary to do justice to our experience. It is nearly sufficient to say 'experiment' here but not quite, for although the whole of science is based on experiment, if we may interpret the word to include observation of that over which we have no control—such as radioactive decay or the motion of the Moon; life itself consists of experience. What we are concerned with here is life itself, our experience of the whole. That is to say, there is a degree of involvement, of subjectivity, of 'cogito ergo sum' as Descartes put it, about life that is missing from science. 'I think, therefore I am' is true to the experience of all of us although experimental psychology might reach the different but equally true conclusion that 'I am, therefore I think'.

Three areas out of several in which tension between science and faith arises from time to time in men's minds are creation, creation of life and freedom of will. I have no special competence in any of these fields. It is therefore inappropriate to do more than note the way in which our experience would seem to require that complementary views be held here, that we realise that reality is too complex, has too many facets, for justice to be done to it by a single model.

Because we have just mentioned involvement and subjectivity we will start by considering freedom of will. If I choose to eat a boiled egg for breakfast there are at least three complementary ways I can look at the phenomenon. Moreover, each of them may, in principle, be complete and self-contained, having no gap where the others must be fitted in, just as the plan of my home has no empty space waiting for the elevation to be fitted in.

There is, presumably, an unbroken chain of physical cause and effect by which my brain came ultimately to generate those potentials which resulted in my boiling and eating an egg. While the significance of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle would be taken by most to mean that my decision to eat the egg could not have been predicted by a knowledge of the whole physical configuration of the Universe at some distant time in the past, yet we would not expect a microscopic
examination of the chain of cause and effect to show anything mysterious, anything that would appear to behave in a way foreign to quantum statistics, anything we would recognise as purposive.

On the other hand, the psychologist would see (I must resist the temptation to say ‘imagine he saw’) in my subconscious a set of forces, desires and inhibitions connected with other things (that I cannot think of for the moment, for reasons they would be happy to explain). The resultant of these forces is seen as my choice to eat an egg.

Of course, I know that all this is beside the point. I ate the egg because I chose to, and what is more I acted with a sense of responsibility in that I made sure there were enough for the other members of the household before I made up my mind. If I were to become obsessed with either of the other ways of looking at the situation my personality would be affected. I would, to that extent, become abnormal, subhuman. No, I am responsible for my choice, I expect others to hold me responsible, and I hold them responsible for their choices. Only this will do justice to my experience; yet you cannot expect to find in my brain anything you can label ‘consciousness of responsibility’.

Let us now consider the problem posed by the origin of life and ultimately of self-consciousness.

The Bible is emphatic, not just in Genesis but throughout, that life is due to God’s will and that the spirit of man which, for the ancients, was symbolised by the breath, is sent by God and returns to God. Today, the work of Crick and his colleagues has gone a long way to showing how the basic material of organisms in all the intricacy of its structure and inherited pattern may be built up by the normal processes of chemistry from inorganic matter, and he would be a brave, not to say foolhardy, man that would say that the artificial synthesis of living matter from its chemical elements will not be accomplished in a decade or so. None would deny that life, even in the lower creatures, is unimaginably complex and wonderful, and many consider that self-consciousness is a natural (if I may use the word to imply not supernatural) concomitant to a certain high degree and kind of order met with in the brains of homo sapiens, if not of other creatures. That this may well be the case, and the whole climate of thought today tends to this view, does not in the least detract from the complementary and biblical view that God is the eternal giver of it all.

Two matters may be worth mentioning here in passing. The first is that the New Testament doctrine of resurrection and the body celestial implies that after death the personality shall have a new and different
body, when ‘asleep in Christ’ shall cease to be the appropriate way to
describe it. Is it, I wonder, too fanciful to suppose that it is the order or
the pattern that represents the self that can be said to be immortal and
that is, in the resurrection, ‘clothed upon with our house that is from
heaven’ (2 Cor. v. 2)? The second point is that we must be careful that
we do not imagine a God smaller than His Universe. A Universe
 teeming with life, as this may well be, requires a God vastly greater
than the Church often represents Him to be, incredibly greater than
most of us imagine. God, if He is the Christian God and not a local
terrestrial deity, must not only dwell in eternity but be great enough to
humble ‘Himself to behold the things that are in heaven and that are in
Earth’.

Earlier on we referred to the ‘ideals of natural order’ which men take
as self-evident, requiring no explanation. Such an ideal is the continuity
of existence of matter and of energy. The great conservation laws of
physics, which in fact embrace other things than matter-energy, are
regarded as axioms requiring no further explanation. This is entirely
proper, yet both the basic cosmological theories, that of continuous
creation or that of creation at some past epoch, require that the
continuity laws shall not hold absolutely. In each case matter-energy
appears or has appeared, as it were, from nowhere. Now, it is important
to realise that creation in this sense is as much an empirical fact about
which we may seek to formulate laws as are any of the other facts of
physics. Of course, it may be difficult to the point of impossibility to
formulate such laws, but this does not make creation mystical. The
sense in which creation is mystical is the sense in which the whole of
existence continues to be mystical. It is another, a complementary way
of looking at it in which we may ask what is the purpose and meaning
of it all, and in which the reply ‘for Thy pleasure they are and were
created’ (Rev. iv. 11) becomes meaningful.

Jesus Christ

It may seem from what we have said that a theistic view of the
Universe is neither unscientific nor unreasonable. Some years ago a
panel of scientists from different disciplines who answer listeners’
questions on science on the B.B.C. were asked, ‘Has science made
belief in God more difficult?’ The unanimous verdict of the panel, of
which at that time I was a member, was ‘No; belief in God is unaffected
one way or the other by science’.

3*
The fact, however, that complementary views of mind, of life and of creation are not only possible but also seem necessary to do justice to these great concepts does not of itself force us to take a theistic view of the world, to believe in God.

God, if the word is to correspond to any reality other than Nature itself, must surely be personality. If the ‘I . . . it’ relationship appropriate in our attitude to Nature does not also take in God, then the only remaining relationship possible is ‘I . . . Thou’. If God is not Nature or a part of Nature to be observed (which would rob the word of its meaning) He can only be Subject to be encountered. That is to say God if He is, and if He is to be known, must reveal Himself in personal encounter. He cannot be expected to turn up in scientific experiments.

Now, I do not pretend that the revelation of God comes to a man easily any more than I suppose it to be easy to synthesise a valid and balanced concept of the World from the possible complementary views. What I do say is that the central claim of the Christian gospel is that God has taken the initiative without which He could not possibly be known, and that those who are sufficiently in earnest to accept the moral consequences of the encounter may still find God in Christ.

It is in Jesus Christ that the two questions with which we opened this talk find an empirical answer. It is not without reason that Jesus adopted the title of ‘Son of Man’ and referred also to Himself as the Son of God.

I said earlier that faith is a trust, a confidence, a reliance. Christian faith is like this today in this space age as much as it ever was. The encounter of St Peter and St John with Christ convinced them that here was a man on whom they could rely, whom they could trust. The manhood they saw in Jesus was the true answer to the question ‘What is man?’ He is higher, nobler, humbler, more unselfish than the men that we have known. Moreover, Manhood seen ultimately in this perfection is seen to subsist by its relationship to God. It is this fact that God is mindful of man and man in his turn is mindful of God that marks man off from the animals, and the teaching of Christ, and indeed of the Bible, makes it clear that it is the purpose of God that men should be like Christ and so be truly men. But the divine fiat ‘let us make man in our image’ (Gen. i. 26) had found its answer in the supreme Imago Dei, so that St Matthew quotes that the Son alone reveals the Father and St John recalls, ‘He that hath seen me hath seen the Father’ (John xiv. 9). Not only does contemplation of the Christ
call forth the conclusion ‘here indeed is man’, but it results too in the conviction ‘here indeed is God’.

‘To whom then will ye liken God?’ Those who have caught a glimpse of Christ today still find as did the founders of the Christian Church that no explanation will suffice, no synthesis of views will do justice to their experience that does not contain, as its frontage so to speak, the Pauline declaration, ‘In Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily’ (Col. ii. 9).

Of course, it necessitated the mystery of ‘kenosis’. Of course God emptied Himself to be found in Jesus, but if I want to know what God is like there is nowhere else to look. At this point, faith is as empirical as science itself. Speculation and philosophy cannot search out God, but if my experience may be a guide for others, that which can be known of Him will be found in Christ.
What Rights have Animals?*

The dispute about the rights of animals is partly a dispute about the meaning of words. Many casuists deny that animals can have any rights at all, and this view has been carried into effect in French law; in France cruelty to animals is not punishable unless it is performed in public so that it might offend the feelings of a kind-hearted human onlooker. In Britain, on the other hand, animals have legal rights of their own, the infringement of which entails fines or imprisonment whether or not any human rights have been infringed at the same time. The punishment is imposed for the offence against the animal, not for offending any human being.

The theory that animals have no rights descends from the Roman jurisprudence of pre-Christian days. In Roman law only a person, persona, could have legal rights, and in early pagan Rome only a citizen who was father of a family could be a person; a slave was not a person, nor was a foreigner, and a paterfamilias had the right to sell or kill his children, who had no rights against him. In the course of time the privilege of personality was extended more and more widely, but this purely legal meaning of the word 'person' eventually gave place, in the minds of the casuists, to a metaphysical meaning which is quite different. They say that every intellectual nature, with one important exception, is a person. Thus the word 'person' now means something quite different from what it meant when it connoted simply the possession of legal rights, and there is no logical connection between rights and this changed meaning of the word 'person'. Yet the association between the two words has persisted and has been defended ex post facto by fine-spun dialectics.

The great Cardinal Newman had little use for verbal gymnastics of this kind. Although his Catholic soul was near to Heaven, his English feet were firmly planted on the ground. In the Grammar of Assent he wrote: 'I am suspicious of scientific demonstrations in a question of concrete fact.' The starting-point of his own philosophy of religion

Was conscience, and by conscience he meant not only consciousness of the moral law but also a gestalt perception of the Lawgiver implied in that experience.¹

Now conscience implies a sense of duty, and duties are correlative with rights. You can start with rights and deduce duties from them, as the pagan jurists did, but you can also start with the dictates of conscience and thence deduce rights, and this surely is the more Christian way. Let us see how the Christian conscience at its best works when it is brought to bear on man’s relations with animals. Fr Jean Gautier in *Un Prêtre se Penche sur la Vie Animale* has a chapter entitled ‘Does the Church love Animals?’ ² He is qualified to know the answer, being a doctor of canon law, an authority on Catholic spirituality, and Superior of the Provincial House of the Great Seminary of St Sulpice in Paris. The conclusion he comes to is this: ‘The Church does love animals and has not ceased to show it. But there are in the Church ecclesiastics who do not love them.’

The Church loves animals. For the first thousand years and more of Christian history the lives of the saints are full of legends of neighbourly relations with them. Some of these stories ring true: the stories of St Giles being crippled through defending his tame hind, of St Columba with his horse, of the wild ungulates that frequented the cell of St Theonas, for instance. There are other cases in which legends seem to have been drawn from a common stock and attached to individual saints because friendship with animals was felt to be a natural expression of the humility and charity which mark a saint. In our own day Fr Aloysius Roche has written: ‘Man’s attitude to the brutes is elevated or degraded in strict accordance with the clearness or dimness of his spiritual vision, in strict accordance with the strength or feebleness of

¹ Newman anticipated the gestalt psychology when, in illustration of this point, he wrote: ‘This instinct of the mind recognizing an external Master in the dictate of conscience, and imagining the thought of Him in the definite impressions which conscience creates, is parallel to that other law of not only human but brute nature, by which the presence of unseen individual beings is discerned under the shifting shapes and colours of the visible world. . . . The new-dropped lamb recognizes each of his fellow lambkins as a whole, consisting of many parts bound up in one, and, before he is an hour old, makes experience of his and their rival personalities. And much more distinctly do the horse and dog recognize even the personality of their masters’ (*The Grammar of Assent*, p. 405, Burns, Oates & Co., 1870).

his spiritual capacity,'\textsuperscript{1} and Cardinal Newman wrote: 'Cruelty to animals is as if a man did not love God.'\textsuperscript{2}

The present Pope is a friend of animals, and the late Pope refused the present of a luxuriously bejewelled bullfighter's cape which the Spanish bullfighting industry had offered him. Bullfighting was condemned, with severe penalties, in the papal bull \textit{De Salute Gregis} of 1567, and this condemnation has been sustained in the Code of Canon Law of 1917.\textsuperscript{3} But the subject has been so well discussed by Fr Jean Gautier\textsuperscript{4} and in Dom Ambrose Agius's tract published by the Catholic Truth Society,\textsuperscript{5} that I need not labour the point beyond citing this fact. The Holy Office has officially pronounced that animals do have some rights as against their masters or owners; that it is sinful to torture dumb animals; and that such sins are degrading to the soul and disposition of the tormentor.\textsuperscript{6} Admittedly, as is often pointed out, the New Testament does not contain any such command as 'Thou shalt be kind to animals'. But what is often overlooked is that it also does not contain any such command as 'Thou shalt not tolerate slavery'. The gospel does not work in that way. It works by generating humility and charity in the minds of men who obey it, and the natural consequence of such a state of mind is consideration for inferiors.

Thus the Church loves animals. How then are we to account for the fact that Roman Catholic countries are notorious for indifference to their feelings, and that in those countries any protest against cruelty is likely to be met with the retort that 'animals have no souls and so don't matter'? There can be no doubt of the fact, and it is a scandal in the literal sense of that word: it is a stumbling-block in the path of humane people whose approach to Christianity is hindered by it. It is a potent weapon in the hands of the Church's enemies. But what is the reason for it? I think it is that parishioners get their view of animals from the parish priest, who gets his from the casuists, who get theirs from St Thomas Aquinas, who got his from the pagan philosopher Aristotle.

Aquinas earned the well-deserved honour of being decreed a Doctor of the Church. That means that a Catholic must treat his opinions with

\textsuperscript{1} Fr Aloysius Roche: \textit{These Animals of Ours} p. viii (Burns, Oats and Washbourne, 1939).
\textsuperscript{2} Cardinal J. H. Newman, op. cit. Quoted by Dom Ambrose Agius, see n. 1, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{4} Jean Gautier, op. cit., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{5} Dom Ambrose Agius, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
WHAT RIGHTS HAVE ANIMALS?

respect, but it does not mean that those opinions are binding on the Catholic conscience. According to the Catholic Encyclopaedia: 'The decree is not in any way an ex cathedra decision, nor does it even amount to a declaration that no error is to be found in the teaching of the Doctor.' Moreover Aquinas carefully states his reasons, thereby inviting us to apply to them our own reasoning powers, to which he constantly appeals. It is not presumptuous, therefore, to scrutinise his views carefully, especially in those cases in which they are admittedly drawn from a pagan source.

Why does Aquinas so frequently appeal to the authority of the pagan philosopher Aristotle? One reason seems to be this. Europe had been flooded with a novel and heretical philosophy based on Aristotle's writings in combination with neoplatonism, and derived from Aristotle's Mohammedan and Jewish commentators such as Averroës and Avicenna and Avicebron. It swept the schools and gravely imperilled the Christian religion. It was by the mighty intellect of Aquinas that the flood was stemmed, and because he had to argue with people who staked their faith on Aristotle he had to quote Aristotle against them. Moreover he was appealing to reason, and in those days reason and Aristotle meant much the same thing.

Aquinas took so little interest in animals that, so far as I can find, apart from a few brief and ambiguous sentences, he discussed their status only thrice in the whole of the Summa Theologica and twice, covering the same ground, in the Summa contra Gentiles. In two of these passages Aquinas admits that animals have souls but agrees with Aristotle that they have neither intelligence nor reason—'non enim intelligunt neque ratiocinantur'—and accepts his inference that they are incapable of immortality; for Aristotle had said that the mind (nous) with its intelligence (theoretikes dunamis) seems to be a species of soul, distinct from the vegetative and sensory souls postulated by him, and that it 'alone admits of being separated' from the body 'as the immortal from the perishable'. His Arabian commentators expanded this notion and Averroës inferred that the intellect is the only part of a man which is capable of immortality. Aquinas rebutted the inference as to man while

1 'Doctors of the Church', in Catholic Encyclopaedia.
2 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, prima 76 (3), secunda secundae 25(3) and 102(6, reply to objection 8).
3 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, II 82 and III 112.
4 Aristotle, De Anima, II 2.
5 Ibid. II 58-61.
adopting the inference as to animals, but he really cannot have it both ways.

However, this subject need not detain us, partly because Aquinas's animal psychology is untenable in the light of modern knowledge,¹ and still more because, if it is true that there is no future life for animals, that fact will strengthen the moral obligation to consider their welfare in the only life they are to have.

In the other three passages Aquinas denies that animals can have any intrinsic claims upon man's compassion, and he tries to explain away any scriptural injunctions to the contrary. Again quoting Aristotle, he bases this opinion on the ground that animals are 'irrational'. It is interesting to note that although the Koran enjoins kindness to animals the Arabs treat them as things, whereas the Turks, who do not inherit an Aristotelian tradition, have indigenous animal-welfare societies.

But Aquinas was not interested in animals, and his treatment of the subject was so superficial that he failed even to make the fundamental distinction between killing and hurting. Neither he nor Aristotle had any understanding of an animal's mind, which they supposed to be purely sensory. Neither of them could know that in the present century electro-encephalograms of animals would turn out to be closely analogous to those of human beings, or that several thousand scientific papers would be devoted to the psychology of the rat alone, or that the study of learning in rats would throw a great deal of light on learning in human beings.²

This negative teaching, which bottoms upon the pagan philosophy of Aristotle, has been adopted whole-heartedly by some at least of the casuists, that is, the thinkers whose responsibility it is to apply moral principles to particular cases. Three factors seem to have favoured this result. One is the glorification of the intellect, and particularly of the ability to do geometry, which came into Western thought from the pagan Greek philosophers. Animals cannot do geometry, and though their intelligence is much more extensive than was formerly realised it is much inferior to normal human intelligence. But this glorification of the intellect is pagan, not Christian. Our Lord pronounced beatitudes ³ on the meek, on those who hunger and thirst after justice, on the merciful, on the peacemakers, but not on the contemptuously in-

³ St Matthew, Gospel, v. 5-9 (Douai version).
WHAT RIGHTS HAVE ANIMALS?

tellectual. He even said: 'I bless thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou has hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones.'

Secondly, two centuries after Aquinas this glorification of the human intellect was reinforced by the humanism of the Renaissance, which tended to flatter man and almost put him in the place of God. And finally, in our own days a prejudice against animal welfare has been created by the sentimentality of all too many animal-lovers who, indeed, are more often sentimental than humane. But all good causes have their fanatics, including Christianity itself, and you would not abandon the Christian religion because there have been Donatists and Jansenists and Anabaptists. The behaviour of animal-loving cranks is a cause of, but not a justification for, a contemptuous attitude towards animals themselves. It affords no excuse for complacent interspecific snobbery.

A particularly strong example of this contemptuousness is afforded by the late Fr Joseph Rickaby. He did indeed disapprove of cruelty practised for its own sake, but only for the self-centred reason that it is bad for one's own soul. As to cruelty which is incidental to some other purpose he wrote that ‘Brute beasts, not having understanding and therefore not being persons, cannot have any rights.... They are of the number of things, which are another's; they are chattels, or cattle. We have no duties to them.' And again: 'Charity is the extension of love of ourselves to beings like ourselves, in view of our common nature.... Our nature is not common to brute beasts but immeasurably above theirs..... We have then no duties of charity, nor duties of any kind, to the lower animals, as neither to stocks nor stones.'

This position is based on two assumptions. First, the assumption that charity is a form of selfishness: 'charity', he says, 'is the extension of love of ourselves to beings like ourselves, in view of our common nature.' Contrast this principle with our Lord's command: 'If any man will come after me let him deny himself.' Indeed, it would not be difficult to show that selfishness, far from being the basis of charity or any other virtue, is at the bottom of every one of the mortal sins.

Fr Rickaby's second assumption is this, that because our nature is considered to be 'immeasurably above' that of the animals, this superiority entitles us to deny them any rights, and to disclaim any moral

---

1 Ibid. xi. 25.
3 St Matthew, Gospel, xx. 25 (Douai version).
obligation towards them. This, surely, is the mortal sin of pride in all its evil ugliness. If superiority entitles me to disclaim duties, I am at liberty to cheat or insult or maltreat anybody whose education or intellect is inferior to my own. If the lack of understanding is a bar to the possession of rights, then a new-born baby is devoid of rights, and anybody who pleases is free to maltreat it or kill it. This is the logical consequence of substituting intellectual pride for the Christian virtue of humility.

Much has been made of the statement in the book of Genesis that man is to have dominion over the animals, and dominion has been taken to justify irresponsible tyranny. But Jesus Christ revolutionised the concept of dominion, making it imply responsibility instead of tyranny. ‘You know,’ he said, ‘that the princes of the Gentiles lord it over them, and they that are the greater exercise power upon them. It shall not be so among you; but whosoever will be the greater among you, let him be your minister.’

Much has been made, likewise, of the statement that man is made in the image of God. But man cannot create matter or souls, his existence and immortality are not independent of any other agent, nor is he omniscient or omnipresent or particularly holy. His best hope of justifying a claim to be like God is to imitate as closely as possible the incarnate Son of God.

Now if Christianity means anything it surely means this, that one who was highest in the scale of being humbled himself for the advantage of those whom he was ‘immeasurably above’; qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de caelis. Christians are exhort ed to follow this example which must, therefore, mutatis mutandis, govern their behaviour towards creatures which are inferior to them. This is obvious, but it raises difficult questions of casuistry. What are the mutanda, and how are we to balance the conflicting claims of man and beast? I shall return to that subject in a moment, but first let us notice that pride is not the only mortal sin that affects the issue. The main cause of cruelty today is the mortal sin of avarice. Much capital is invested in it. The most striking instances are the fur-trapping industry and the whaling industry, in both of which great wealth is won by perpetrating extreme cruelty on a vast scale, but many other examples could be given. I well remember the violent opposition which the Meat Traders’ Federation offered to the introduction of humane slaughter thirty and more years ago, because of the loss of profit which

---

1 Ibid. xvi. 24.  
2 St Paul, Epistle to the Philippians, ii. 5-8.
they expected it to entail, and only recently the same battle has had to be fought in the United States. But it would be easy to give many other instances of cruelty arising from avarice.

I now come back to this difficult question: Christians, in their behaviour towards creatures which are inferior to man, are bound to imitate, mutatis mutandis, the example set by their Master by his condescension towards beings who were so much inferior to him. But what are the mutanda, and how are we to balance the conflicting claims of man and beast?

The early church was faced with a similar problem in respect of slavery. It would have been impracticable to abolish slavery overnight, though St Paul in his Epistle to Philemon started a train of thought which eventually led to the modern reprobation of it. As to the treatment of animals, casuistry is still in a backward state owing partly to the subject having been so much neglected by theologians and partly to the wide range of technical knowledge which it calls for. It presents such a large and difficult problem that here I can only discuss, by way of example, how it has been worked out in one particular field which I happen to be familiar with, namely the use of animals in the laboratory.

Two extreme views have been held. On one side the antivivisectionists, of whom Cardinal Manning was one, condemn all experiments on animals. At the other extreme Fr Rickaby wrote that 'there is no shadow of evil resting on the practice of causing pain' provided that this is not done for the sake of causing pain but as an incidental concomitant of something else, and he instances the pursuit of science. He adds 'nor are we bound to any anxious care to make this pain as little as may be. Brutes are things in our regard: so far as they are useful to us, they exist for us, and not for themselves; we do right in using them unsparingly for our need and convenience, though not for wantonness.' ¹ I am glad to say that these truly horrifying views are not shared by British scientists who use animals, though unfortunately they are acted upon by many in Latin and Asiatic countries, and in some laboratories in the United States and Eastern Canada.

Between these two extremes the truth must lie, but it is an unfortunate fact that Britain is the only nation to have made a systematic attempt to work out the problem, which is one of the most difficult that the discipline of casuistry has to solve.

A number of human beings have volunteered to be laboratory animals on occasion. For instance, Mellanby's work on scabies was carried out

¹ Fr Joseph Rickaby, op. cit., p. 43.
on a sample of conscientious objectors who volunteered for this service in wartime. Such clinical research on human beings raises ethical questions which have been discussed in a recent symposium by Dr T. F. Fox, Editor of the *Lancet*, and some of his conclusions are applicable to experiments on animals, as I have shown elsewhere. But animals cannot volunteer, and so somebody else must take the decision for them, thereby incurring a grave moral responsibility.

In Britain two Royal Commissions on Vivisection have laid down general principles, and the Home Office, with its Inspectors and Advisory Committee, has the duty of interpreting those principles, including what is called the ‘Pain Rule’; this sets a limit to the amount of suffering that may be imposed and is attached to every Home Office certificate. One may not always agree with the decisions of the Home Office—I personally do not always do so—but they are taken with the greatest care and sincerity. Moreover we know from various sources, including a questionnaire issued by UFAW to all the biological Fellows of the Royal Society, that this control by the Home Office of experiments on animals has the almost unanimous support of British scientists, among whom a humane tradition has been built up.

Finally, as an illustration of the sort of conclusion that an amateur casuist may come to, I venture to repeat an opinion which I have published elsewhere. In the first place I distinguish between killing and hurting. There is no harm in killing an animal, provided you do it painlessly, whereas in clinical research on human beings you are bound to avoid any procedure which entails a risk of death. Again, in the case of animals permanent disablement, as by hypophysectomy, can be dealt with by killing the animal painlessly at the end of the experiment, but this cannot be done with a human subject. With these reservations I suggest the following rule: The experimenter or inspector must put himself in imagination in the place of the animal. He must leave out of account any risk of death or permanent disablement (which alone can justify him in choosing a victim other than himself) and focus his attention on the individual experience of pain or other stress involved; and

---

he must now ask himself 'Should I myself be willing to endure that
degree of pain or other stress in order to attain the object in view?'
If not, his decision must be negative, and no experimenter has a right
to make an animal suffer what he would not wish to suffer himself, but
for any permanent disablement or risk of death that might be involved,
in order to provide the knowledge sought.

If anybody finds my rule unacceptable I hope he will try to devise a
better one, but if this is to be compatible with Christian ethics it must
satisfy two conditions. First it must conform to humility, as opposed to
the contemptuous arrogance which repudiates moral obligations to­
wards inferiors. Secondly it must conform to charity as opposed to sel­
fishness, whether simple selfishness or that extension of it which would
be grudge beneficence to species other than our own.

In designing an experimental test a scientist tries to simplify the con­
ditions as much as possible by eliminating irrelevant factors that might
affect the phenomena to be observed. For testing the sincerity of a
Christian's profession animals offer just such a simplified situation.
Being devoid of wealth, of prestige, in many species of popularity, and
of various other accidents which may furnish non-altruistic motives
for being beneficent to human beings, they afford material for a
critical test of a Christian's humility and charity.
BOOK REVIEWS


This useful little book consists of three essays by Jacques Maritain, Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, of Princeton University. The author is an eminent scholastic thinker, and writes from a conservative Roman Catholic position.

For many of his readers, the third essay, 'God and Science', will be the most important part of the book. Here Professor Maritain begins by dividing scientists into two categories, and distinguishing the 'Exclusive' from the 'Liberal' scientist. The former believes that the only 'genuine rational knowledge of which man is capable' is scientific, while the latter recognises that knowledge of reality does not consist solely in 'phenomenal knowledge'. For Maritain, the Exclusive position is worthless, as he sees it as self-destructive. On the other hand, the approach of the Liberal scientist is rational as it admits 'two different levels in our approach to reality'. With such a 'principle of complementarity' the scientist is able to recognise that 'notions worked out by philosophy are intelligible in terms of being, not of observation and measurement'. From this point Professor Maritain proceeds to defend the 'five ways' of Aquinas' philosophical approach to God. He claims that they 'stand fast against any criticism'. He rightly points out that too often they have been dismissed, as part of the so-called 'ontological argument' of Descartes, which has been recognised by philosophers since Kant to have been no proof of God's existence at all. In fact Aquinas did not accept Anselm's version of the argument, and the Thomist proof is quite different in that it infers the necessary existence of a First Cause, from facts that are 'quite undeniable' and not from an idea. For many, however, the question will not be whether the mode of proof is valid, but what is its use even if it is valid.

Christians believe that God revealed Himself to man in the person of Jesus Christ. But, as Paley pointed out, if a man is to avoid being included among those who 'thought it a thing incredible that God should raise the dead', we must first be persuaded that there is a God to do it. The Scriptures teach that 'All that may be known of God by men lies plain before their eyes', and that it is this fact that leaves them without any 'possible defence for their conduct' (Rom. i. 19-20). The inference would therefore appear to be that man has some inherent knowledge of God's existence. The issue here seems to be whether human conviction as to the existence of God can be satisfactorily reached by a Thomist proof. Professor Maritain himself distinguishes metaphysical proof from what he calls a 'pre-philosophical, simply natural knowledge of God's existence'. For many Christians the latter form of knowledge would be quite acceptable while the Thomist proof would automatically remain suspect as a form of 'intellectualised' belief. This is both curious and unfortunate. It is all very well to say that the Scriptures begin with the assumption that 'in the beginning God . . . ', but it is equally incontrovertible that if a man does not believe in God's existence, such a belief must be held before he can approach God in Christ (Heb. xi. 6). If this is so, why should man's reasoning (whether
REVIEWS

Thomist or otherwise) be suspect as a vehicle for spiritual revelation while a 'primordial intuition' is acceptable? No one would suggest that Thomist reasoning will take a person much further than a form of monotheism, but we should be careful before we leave Thomist proofs of the existence of God, on one side as 'starting from the wrong suppositions'.

To have said all this may suggest that this is the only question of importance that this book deals with. This would be a false impression. It is full of wisdom beautifully expressed in lucid writing. Problems, as old as man himself, are illuminated by new insights and fresh turns of expression. In the first essay, there is a good example of this when Professor Maritain deals with Cicero's problem, whether the philosopher should remain in isolation or become a man of politics.

Perhaps the second essay, 'Truth and Human Fellowship', is the most contemporary, as it deals with the problems confronting any Christian considering the question of unity and reunion. The defender of Evangelical Fundamentals cannot help finding himself frequently upon common ground with Professor Maritain. The fact that true toleration can only be found hand in hand with genuine conviction is admirably demonstrated. When speaking of relations between believers of different religious denominations he insists that friendship must not transcend or exist in spite of dogma. 'Such a view is inadmissible for all who believe that the word of God is as absolute as His unity or His transcendence. A mutual love which would be bought at the price of faith, which would base itself on some form of eclecticism, or which, recalling Lessing's parable of the three rings, would say, "I love him who does not have my faith because, after all, I am not sure that my faith is the true faith, and that it bears the device of the true ring", in so saying, would reduce faith to a mere historic inheritance and seal it with the seal of agnosticism and relativity. Such a love, for anyone who believes he has heard the word of God, would amount to putting man above God.' These words, like the book from which they come, are relevant. Every Christian thinker should be considering just such problems as are dealt with in this book.

T. C. F. STUNT


This is the second volume of the Paternoster Church History, of which we have come to expect a high standard both in writing and scholarship. In neither respect are we disappointed by Dr Walker's volume which is a worthy companion to those of Professor Bruce and Dr Skevington Wood.

The subtitle, 'Sketches of Church History from A.D. 600 to A.D. 1350', is an indication of the method that the author has adopted. By basing each chapter on a particular character or movement, he has avoided a consecutive narrative of ecclesiastical politics except where particularly necessary, as for example in the chapter dealing with the Eastern Schism. The result is a happy emphasis on individuals and their beliefs rather than on the growth of dogma and dissent.
This is not to say that Dr Walker neglects such developments, but that he keeps them in their human framework. Such an emphasis avoids the false form of institutionalism that characterised the period about which he is writing.

Traditionally, Protestants have regarded the centuries under discussion as a ‘dark age’ of superstition, ignorance, and error. From this others have reacted, showing that there has always been a remnant of faithful people who have maintained the basic truths of the faith. Dr Walker’s book demonstrates, most strikingly, our inability to generalise with accuracy, if we are concerned with the people of whom the Church consisted rather than the institution that was widely regarded as the Church. Truth and error are found side by side in many different sorts of people. Anselm, a staunch Papalist, took the position, which the reformers later defended with great vigour, that Divine satisfaction with the sacrifice of Christ is the basis of the atonement, rather than Origen’s ‘piscatorial trick’. Bernard of Clairvaux is another example. Going further than any of his predecessors in his claims for the Papacy, he said that the Pope was ‘the high priest, supreme pontiff, prince of bishops, successor of the Apostles, in authority Peter, and in unction Christ’. Similarly, with reference to Mary he taught that ‘it is God’s will that we should have everything through Mary since she is a mediatrix in whom we have no cause to doubt’. On the other hand this accumulation of unscriptural dogma cannot really invalidate the simple faith of the man who wrote: ‘To know Jesus and Him crucified is the sum of my philosophy.’

Throughout the period in question we find dissentient voices that reject the accepted dogma of the Papacy. Alcuin ‘teaches something which sounds very like justification by faith’; Guibert the Archdeacon declared that ‘all the sons of the Church are priests, be they laymen or clerks’, and from there rejected the principle of clerical celibacy. Berengarius, following Ratramnus of Corbie, rejected the corporal presence of Christ, at the Lord’s Supper; Abelard maintained that absolution was only declaratory; Occam admitted the authority of ‘only Scripture and the Universal Church’. Marsiglio of Padua asserted that ‘bishops and presbyters are fundamentally the same’.

Dr Walker’s book is well written and eminently readable. It seems a pity that it has no footnotes to go with its Bibliography, and also that the index only refers to the names of people. In both these respects, its predecessor, The Spreading Flame, was better equipped. These, however, are only very minor objections. Here is a vast amount of information lightly and interestingly presented, without presuming too much knowledge on the part of the reader. In addition to all this the author evidently has a keen sense of humour. We found particularly illuminating the comparison of the theological rivalry at the Byzantine Sports with the ‘religious undercurrents present at a Scottish football match between Celtic and Rangers’, though Bernard of Clairvaux’s concern for the ‘carnal’ snoring of his monastic companions is equally instructive.

One is conscious when reading about this period that medieval men did usually believe in God, judgement, Hell, and, indeed, the truth of the Gospel, but that in spite of this they could and often did, like Faust, reject the Gospel, and instead ‘enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season’. In fact Dr Walker quotes the hero of a Provençal novel who indicated his preference not to go to Heaven
but rather to Hell where all the interesting people would be. Today when so many people do not believe in God, let alone the truth of the Gospel, we can very easily fall into the error of assuming that once the Gospel has been fully explained in all its ‘sweet reasonableness’, men will understand and be converted. One of the most interesting chapters in The Growing Storm is entitled ‘The missionary zeal of Raymond Lull’, and it instances just this problem. It is evident that the fault we have referred to is not confined to the present day. The enthusiasm and devotion of Lull were very considerable. He learnt Arabic and wrote in it; he twice went to Africa to preach to the Moslems, and was finally stoned by them. Unfortunately, ‘in argument he lost sight of the fact of revelation, and wasted much of his missionary effort in composing innumerable books of apologetics which converted no one’. The fact that man’s will, as well as his intellect, is in need of alteration is easily forgotten, and the case of Raymond Lull may perhaps come to apologists as a salutary reminder.

T. C. F. STUNT

Christian Attitudes towards War and Peace. ROLAND H. BAINTON. Hodder and Stoughton, 1961. 25s.

This is an objective, fascinating and scholarly book by a well-known Church historian who is a professor at Yale University. The result of more than thirty years of study, it is a mine of information presented in an attractive way—though unfortunately, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, many (including the reviewer) will find the approach is exasperatingly ‘liberal’.

Professor Bainton divides religious attitudes towards war into three types—opposition, the theory of the just war, and the crusade.

The attitude of the crusade is found in the Old Testament and in the wars of the Maccabees, he says. But in the early period of the Christian era participation in war was considered sinful. Passages of the following type are, however, not uncommon in the writings of the early Christian fathers: ‘A soldier in the civil authority must be taught not to kill men and to refuse to do so if he is so commanded’ (Canons of Hippolytus). Instructions of this kind make it clear that many Christians of the day distinguished between a soldier’s duty in war and peace. In the pax Romana a soldier might spend his entire professional life performing duties which, today, would be performed by the police, post office or civil service. Thus soldiers were responsible for the transport of the imperial mails and (in Rome) for the fire service. At the Council of Arles (fourth century) it was decided that if soldiers left their employment in time of peace they committed sin, but that, on the eve of battle, it was their duty as Christians to resign.

Though, at the confines of the Empire, a few Christians did in fact fight as early as A.D. 170-180 (e.g. the ‘thundering legion’), all the outstanding Christian writers of the East and West were agreed that killing in battle was wrong for Christians. The strong line taken on this subject stands in striking contrast to the Christians’ attitude towards slavery which was never condemned as such.
In the Christian empire the position changed. At times, indeed, only Christians were admitted in the fighting armies. But, even so, Christians who killed in what were deemed to be ‘just wars’ had heavy penance imposed, and the clergy, of course, were always forbidden to shed blood. This pattern remained with little change till the time of the Crusades, when all pretence of a just war was forgotten. The same ruthless spirit was shown both by Roman Catholics and by Protestants in, for example, the opening up of the New World and again, in our own lifetime, towards those in enemy countries.

The story is a sad one—strangely reminiscent of that of the Pharisees up to the time of our Lord. Hand in hand with increasing love for unfortunates, for animals, for prisoners, and for victims of disasters we note an increasing cynicism and callousness in man’s attitude to war. If we had lived in the days of our fathers we would not have sailed to Africa to catch slaves, or mocked at the lazy Irish as they died of hunger, or made sport of the sufferings of animals. But do we, in fact, fill up the measure of the sins of our fathers? It is for the Christian Church to decide. The sheer horror of modern war, thinks Professor Bainton, now makes it easier than formerly to decide if it is right for us as Christians to participate.

If we do not participate, does that involve withdrawal from the world? There have been two schools of thought here as represented by the Quakers and the Mennonites respectively. The Quakers have always held that it is right to urge others to live up to the principles they profess to hold, even though you may not hold them yourself. Professor Bainton gives historical instances to illustrate this point. But the Mennonites accepted the need for complete withdrawal. Again, it is for Christians, if they decide that participation in war is sinful, to decide which path is right.

Whatever decisions they may come to, there is no doubt that Christians of all schools of thought will be indebted to Professor Bainton for many years to come for the meticulous fairness with which he has marshalled the arguments used on both sides of the controversy about which he writes.

R. E. D. CLARK
THE VICTORIA INSTITUTE

or

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN

FOUNDED 1865

PAST PRESIDENTS

1865–1886 The Right Hon. The Earl of Shaftesbury, K.G.
1886–1903 Sir George Gabriel Stokes, Bart., D.C.L., F.R.S.
1903–1921 The Right Hon. The Earl of Halsbury, P.C., F.R.S.
1921–1923 The Very Rev. H. Wace, M.A., D.D., Dean of Canterbury
1927–1941 Sir Ambrose Fleming, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S.
1941–1946 Sir Charles Marston, F.S.A.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

PRESIDENT
Professor F. F. Bruce, M.A., D.D.

VICE-PRESIDENTS
Professor J. N. D. Anderson, O.B.E., M.A., L.L.D.
Professor Malcolm Guthrie, Ph.D., B.Sc., A.R.S.M.

TRUSTEES
Ernest White, M.B., B.S.
Francis F. Stunt, LL.B.

THE COUNCIL
CHAIRMAN
E. G. Ashby, M.A., B.D.
(In order of original election)

Robert E. D. Clark, M.A., Ph.D.
Ernest White, M.B., B.S.
Rev. J. Stafford Wright, M.A.
R. J. C. Harris, A.R.C.S., B.Sc., Ph.D.
Francis F. Stunt, LL.B.

Professor F. F. Bruce, M.A., D.D.
Gordon E. Barnes, M.A.
Professor D. M. MacKay, B.Sc., Ph.D.
Rev. H. L. Ellison, B.D., B.A.
A. H. Boulton, LL.B.

Francis F. Stunt, LL.B., Honorary Treasurer
Mrs B. C. Ellis, Secretary to the Council

EDITORIAL SECRETARY
David J. Ellis, B.D.

AUDITOR
G. Metcalfe Collier, A.C.I.I., Incorporated Accountant