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Idealism Still Speaks:

Some provoking thoughts in the philosophy of C. A. Campbell

Introduction

Since the so-called 'Revolution in Philosophy', many thinkers consider philosophical idealism to be a dead issue. And this attitude is not restricted to the purely philosophical world alone, it has made its impact on the theological scene as well. Yet one wonders, as C. A. Campbell has put it, if it is not true that 'the majority of Idealism’s critics are surely in real danger of throwing away the baby with the bath-water ...' ¹ At any rate, it would seem that Professor Campbell, as an idealist, has some very important things to say, at least to those of us who would grant that metaphysical enquiry has some legitimacy. And it would seem mandatory that the serious theologians listen to what he has to relate. May it be stated at the very outset that it is this author’s contention that aspects of Campbell’s concepts quite well demonstrate that idealism is not to be summarily consigned to the grave. Now if this be true, these issues should be set forth for consideration. This, therefore, shall be the purpose of this paper. Our first consideration shall be:

I. Campbell’s starting point

Professor Campbell is frank to admit that ‘my starting point is Bradley’s epistemology’.² Following Bradlian scepticism, Campbell contends that the ultimate nature of reality is for us ‘beyond knowledge’. Ultimate reality in its final character cannot be grasped by any process of finite experience. Many facets of human experience support this primary thesis. Cognition, moral action, and religious experience all attest to the idea that reality

¹ C. A. Campbell, Scepticism and Construction. (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., p. ix.).

² Ibid., p. v.
is 'supra-rational'. And as these forms of experience are held by Campbell to be basic to one’s being, he feels entitled to say that our very nature obliges us to assert the supra-rational character of ultimate reality. This admitted metaphysical scepticism thus becomes 'the converging point of a variety of independent lines of thought'.

Of course, metaphysical scepticism is not new or novel in idealistic philosophy. For example, Plotinus, Plato (in his most profound passages), Schelling, and F. H. Bradley all speak in this sceptical tone. Also, a vast multitude of religious mystics, the vedic literature, etc., claim the validity of a supra-rational reality. Yet, the concept is in opposition to the completely rational system of Hegelian idealism. It is well known that the Hegelian Absolute was thoroughly rational, i.e., there is no part of reality that cannot in principle, if not in fact, be realized by rational thought. Now it is this doctrine that Campbell rejects in his supra-rationalism. Campbell’s Absolute is 'unknowable', i.e., the rational process of thought cannot, in principle or fact, attain to ultimate reality.

Campbell first argues for a supra-rational reality from the old Bradlian idea that the cognitive judgment implies contradiction. Campbell declares that the judgment, i.e., the essence of all thinking, is the assertion of 'unity in diversity'. Neither 'unity' nor 'diversity' can be eliminated in predication. Unless there is unity, the terms simply 'fall apart'. Again, unless there is genuine diversity, there is no movement of thought at all. Thinking cannot be expressed in the formula "A" is "A'". Therefore, as all thinking must unite differences, the formula "A" is "B'" is proposed as the true form of cognitive activity.

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3 Ibid. p. vi. It may be that there are still some who would outright reject at the very start any type of metaphysical enquiry on the basis of some version of the verifiability principle. But as often pointed out, this principle is built upon a pre-supposition that it cannot itself verify. Metaphysical enquiries seem a legitimate task to this writer and cannot be considered a meaningless endeavour, at least to those whose epistemological pre-suppositions allow for such knowledge.

4 Space precludes Campbell’s arguments for the contention that all thinking is judgment. Suffice it to say that he argues along quite traditional idealistic lines.
Is "A" is "B" any improvement over "A" is "A", however? To some extent, Campbell tells us, but there are still grave difficulties. It seems obvious to him, that strictly speaking, 'B', as long as it is different from 'A', is 'not "A"'. So the formula actually reads "A" is not "A". Now it is evident that this not only asserts. It annuls at the same time.

Therefore, it would seem that, formally speaking, the uniting of differences produces constant self-contradiction. And by this the intellect is repulsed. Thus the thought process seeks a mediation or system wherein the differents and the unity of the judgment can be harmonized, i.e., it seeks for a ground to unite the differents of the judgment into a perfect unity which can alone characterize the real. This alone can satisfy the intellect. But it is a futile effort Campbell contends, for

'[... although such a unity is the inherent demand of the intellect, and thus needful for the assurance of apprehending ultimate reality, it is a unity that is not attainable by the intellect. And this failure, it will appear, is a failure not merely in degree. It is a failure in principle. For - and this is the central paradox of human experience - the route which the intellect takes, and must take, in its effort to realize its ideal, is one which never can, by reason of its intrinsic character, lead to the desired goal of mutually implicatory system or unity in differences - which never can, therefore, yield us apprehension of the real.'

So the route that the intellect must travel can never lead to its goal of a perfect, self-implied whole. Thus it is a path that can never lead to ultimate reality. Consequently, reality must be disparate from every thought product. And the term 'disparate' is to be taken in its fullest sense. Thought and reality are strictly incommensurable. Therefore, one must conclude that:

'Reality owns a character which transcends thought - a character for which, since a label is convenient, we may term 'supra-rational', and there is no possibility of measuring the degree in which any particular content of thought manifests the character of reality.'

This is metaphysical scepticism.

6 Campbell argues that it is never evident how the relations are related to the terms. A further ground must be sought and ad infinitum.
7 Campbell, op. cit., p. 20.
Now the problem Campbell must face rests in the fact that
the mind does assign the terms ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ to many of its
concepts. And if reality and thought are incommensurable, how
is this to be accounted for? Here Campbell employs his own
version of the Kantian idea of the ‘Noumenal’ and ‘phenomenal’
worlds. Campbell tells us that Noumenal truth, or truth about
Ultimate reality is unattainable by finite cognition. To attain
to this truth would be to transcend one’s own finitude. Yet we
do live in a practical, phenomenal world, Campbell points out.
There is not only the world of ‘things-in-themselves’, there is
also the objective world as actually cognized by us. And this
world has its own meaning and criterion of truth.\(^8\) It is not
ultimate or noumenal truth, to be sure. Yet it is ‘finally valid
for human experience,’\(^9\) for it is the only kind of truth con­
cretely known. Thus an empirical investigation of our phenomenal
world is well in order. Still, one must always bear in mind

\[\ldots\] the distinction between Ultimate or Noumenal Truth, the kind
of satisfaction which the intellect ideally wants, and what may be
called Phenomenal truth, the kind of satisfaction at which in practice
the intellect can alone significantly aim.\(^{10}\)

Now this is Campbell’s epistemological foundation upon
which he builds his system of thought. It must be admitted that
many serious objections have been raised to this sceptical
principle, but they cannot be presented in this limited space.
Neither can defence of Campbell’s position be undertaken here.
The foregoing is simply presented as the starting point from
which Campbell presents the things that seem to be of real
importance to him today.

\(^8\) In contrast to most idealists, Campbell argues that the correspondence
topry theory of truth is the *meaning* of phenomenal truth. Yet he holds with
idealism that coherence is the *criterion* of truth. This later view grows out
of his insistence upon an ‘ideal intermediary’ in all finite cognition, thus
following Kant.

\(^9\) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

\(^{10}\) *Ibid.*, p. 82. The similarity between Campbell and Kant are quite clear.
This seems to have developed largely because of Campbell’s rejection of
Bradley’s concept of ‘degrees of truth’.
Therefore, with this foundation in mind we move on to discuss Campbell’s projection of:

**II. A Free and Substantial Self**

It is well known that ‘the question of mind and body is a major crux in modern philosophy.’\(^{11}\) It is also clear that the vast majority of contemporary thinkers follow in broad outline the naturalistic approach as perhaps best epitomized in Gilbert Ryle’s *The Concept of the Mind*. But once again Campbell breaks with the consensus of current thought and projects the idea of a substantial self that is at least conceivably separable from the body.

Professor Campbell begins his argument by pointing out that a thinking subject is always to some degree aware of itself. Self-consciousness is a presupposed fact in all cognition. As the cognitive judgment invariably assumes some objective reality, by the same token, it also implies a cognizing subject that is subjectively conscious, however inexplicitly, of itself. Further, this thinking subject must somehow be the *same* subject throughout its varying cognitive experience. To substantiate this contention Campbell declares that cognition is never of the nature of an ‘atomic simple’. Any object that is not seen as related to other objects has no significance for the judging mind. Even a ‘this’ is for cognition a ‘this – not that’. ‘This’ only has meaning as it stands opposed to ‘That’.

> ‘What is cognized, then, is never bare A, but always A in some sort of relationship to B (C, D, etc.). But unless the subject to which B (C, D, etc.) is present is the same subject as that to which A is present, no relationship, obviously, could be apprehended between B (C, D, etc.) and A.’\(^ {12}\)

Campbell further feels that cognition implies not only a subject that is identical to itself in all its varying cognitive modes,

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but one that is also conscious of that identity. Consciousness of identity is as vital as the fact of identity, for the apprehension of A and B would still fall into separate worlds of experience if the subject were unaware of his identity in both judgments.

Campbell thus feels that it is safe to say that a cognizing subject is the same subject in all its cognitive modes and is conscious of that identity. Now it is obvious that here an important conclusion can be drawn, for the clear implication of this contention is that the subject self is something "over and above" its particular experience; something that has, rather than is, its experiences, since its experiences are all different, while it remains the same. After all, that which is active in cognition can hardly be the activity itself. In a word, the self must be a 'substance'.

But of what is this identical substantial self an identity? Summarily stated, the self is to be identified with a conscious subject. The subject self thinks, feels, and desires. And these are clearly conscious states of mind. Although there are pressing problems concerning the self's relation to the body, the self as revealed in self-consciousness is at least an identity of mind or spirit. And although it may be discovered that the self is more, Campbell feels one can say that "I" is at least a "spiritual substance". However, the pressing issue of mind-body relationship must be faced. The question here as Campbell puts it, is:

'Is the union of body and mind within the self a merely de facto union, so that their separation is at least conceivable? Or is it an essential union, so that a self which is not an 'embodied mind' is not a thinkable conception at all?'

In seeking an answer to this query, Professor Campbell appeals to common sense. He declares that ordinary thinking

13 Ibid., p. 77.
14 'To deny that the self is reducible to its experiences is by no means to deny that the self manifests its real character (in whole or in part) in and through these experiences'. On Selfhood and Goodhood, p. 82.
15 Ibid., p. 85.
16 Ibid., p. 95.
people believe that the question of whether or not the self can survive the destruction of the body is at least an intelligible enquiry. Yet no one would intelligently ask if the self would survive the destruction of the mind. So in ordinary opinions, at least, a mind is viewed as essential to the self in a manner in which the body is not. Moreover, Campbell feels that in such matters, the ideas of the ordinary intelligent man are not to be discredited just because of his lack of sophistication. In such issues as these, there is a sense in which he 'knows what he is talking about'. Thus, summarily stated, Campbell concludes, along with the common man, that the mind is related to the body in a mere de facto union, not in an essential union.

Still, it must be understood that Campbell views this concept as applying only to the ontological self. It does not apply to the self qua man. Man per se is a biological species as well as a spiritual being. And it is the failure to make the distinction between the ontological self and the self qua man that dispose some to say that common sense believes in the essential union of the mind and body.17

Now the implications of Campbell's concept of the self and his position on the relationship of mind-body have profound significance concerning belief in the idea of 'life after death'. They at least afford an 'abstract possibility' that the self can exist after the death of the body, he tells us. Perhaps an abstract possibility is not as much as some would desire, but at any rate

'... it leaves the way open for discussion on their own merits the various ethical and religious considerations bearing upon the problem of immortality, which, so far as I can see, we should be obliged to rule out of court a priori if it were indeed the case that any self to be a self must be an embodied self.'18

This now paves the way into Campbell's important concepts concerning the freedom of the self. The issue to be faced in this

17 Space again precludes a detailed presentation of Campbell's arguments against the idea of an essential mind-body union. His quite interesting and convincing polemic against Gilbert Ryles' position is found in the Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 3 (1953). Of course, Campbell in no way denies that the mind and body react in a cause-effect relationship.

18 Campbell, op. cit., pp. 102-103.
area of thought is: does the self have genuinely open possibilities in conative action? Of course, absolute idealism is largely a deterministic philosophy in regards to the doctrine of freedom. The only element of freedom it grants to the finite self is that man qua rationally organized being reflects the rationality of the free absolute. But this idea is far removed from the commonsense connotation of the term ‘freedom’. Moreover, there is psychological as well as philosophical determinism. Campbell points out that the behaviouristic psychologists see man as a mere product of heredity and environment. And as the individual has little or no control over these factors, he cannot be said to be free in any real sense. Then there are others who state that the whole issue is a mere pseudo-problem, e.g., Moritz Schluk and Nowell Smith.

Still, in spite of the consensus of many thinkers, the man in the street feels that he has true open possibilities when he makes a decision. And if this be true, ‘the act must be self-caused, (and) self-determined’. But it is clear that in the case of professional thinkers, there is ‘almost universal acquiescence . . . that free will in what is often called the “vulgar” sense is too obviously nonsensical a notion to deserve serious discussion’. However, regardless of this fact, and in the face of onslaughts from both metaphysical and psychological determinists, Campbell frankly confesses that, ‘I myself firmly believe that free will, in something extremely like the “vulgar sense”, is a fact.’

Yet it is vital to see that Campbell places the entire issue of freedom in an ethical and moral setting. He departs in some degree from the ‘vulgar sense’ of freedom and holds that it is in the realm of moral action alone that genuine freedom exists.

There is one experimental situation, and one only, in our view, in which there is any possibility of the act of will not being in accordance with character; viz., the situation in which the course which formed character prescribes is a course in conflict with the agent’s moral ideal; in other words the situation of moral temptation.

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20 Ibid., p. 6.
21 Ibid., p. 6.
22 Ibid., p. 21.
This now leads into a brief discussion of some aspects of Campbell’s ethical views. Campbell considers it vital that the essential freedom of the substantial self be preserved in the moral sphere, for on this hinges the whole validity of moral praise and blame.

Now it is important to see in more detail just what kind of freedom Campbell recognizes as a precondition of moral responsibility. He first points out that freedom must pertain primarily to inner acts. As the nomenclature itself implies, it is a problem of the will. Therefore, it seems obvious that overt acts have no essential relevance to the issue. Secondly, these inner acts are such that the person involved is seen as the sole author. No external determinants eliminate the self-determined nature of the acts. This is vital, for ‘the agent must be not merely a cause but the sole cause of that for which he is deemed morally responsible’.\(^{23}\)

Of course, no one would care to deny the impact made by heredity and environment upon one’s choices. Furthermore, it is generally acknowledged that the acting subject has little or no control over these influences. This is the reason why we make allowances in moral praise and blame for bad heredity and/or environment. Yet we still feel that there is something for which a man is totally responsible; something of which he is the sole author. In the third place, it must be asked whether or not this ‘sole authorship’ suffices to make the act a morally free act. Could it not be that the act is no more than a necessary expression of the agent’s nature? Campbell denies this suggestion, for it seems obvious to him that a condition of moral responsibility is that the agent could have acted otherwise. It is his basic conviction that ‘a man can be morally praised or blamed for an act only if he could have acted otherwise’.\(^{24}\) These are the three conditions of a morally free and responsible act.

Now we must see just how Campbell presents his doctrine of moral decision activity. He tells us that the term ‘moral decision’ is ‘not the decision as to what is our duty, but as to

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 8.

\(^{24}\) Campbell, *On Selfhood and Goodhood*, p. 102. (Italics mine).
whether we shall do our duty'. Such a decision is called for when one is thrust into a conflict between what he clearly believes to be his duty and what he feels as his strongest desire. In other words, moral decision arises in a situation of moral temptation. And not only is the decision in such a situation entirely a moral matter, it is the very core of the moral life.

Clearly, there are difficulties in casting the moral situation in the mode of a conflict between one's sense of duty and one's strongest desire. For example, it has been maintained that one's strongest desire can only be intelligibly grasped after the event of choosing. In such a view, the strongest desire was merely the course followed. But Campbell holds that we often know during the conflict itself what we would do if we were to allow our 'desiring nature' to dictate our choice. And we can surely measure the relative strength of our competing desires.

Now if a conflict between the sense of duty and the strongest desire is the essence of the situation in which free moral decision operates, there are two important points to be made. First, the decision is the moral agent's own decision. In other words, it is an instance of self-activity. Secondly, and of vital importance, moral decision 'is experienced as something which, though (as we have seen) issuing from the self, does not issue from the self's character as so far formed'. Now throughout one's life, and at every stage, there is a developing—yet relatively stable—complex of emotive and conative dispositions. This complex we call 'character'.

'The self activity of moral decision, then, as experienced, differs very significantly from the self-activity of ordinary choices in virtue of the fact that while in both cases it is the self that is active in the former case it is not the self merely qua formed character that acts, but the self as somehow transcending its own formed character.'

This concept of the self transcending its own formed character is vital to Campbell's whole idea of morality. For it is only as one makes the will-effort to rise above his formed character and act according to his sense of duty that he is morally praise-worthy. This is the basis of all morality.

25 Ibid., p. 148.
26 Ibid., pp. 149–150.
27 Ibid., p. 150.
Now Campbell admits that his idea of the self transcending its own formed character is rather paradoxical. But this because such an act is a true creative act. And:

‘If an act is creative, then nothing can determine it save the agent’s doing of it. Hence we ought not to expect to understand it in the sense of seeing how it follows from determinate elements of the self-character; for then it would just not be a ‘creative’ act.’

Moreover, such an approach to the concept of a free self lends more credence to the contention that reality in its final character is supra-rational.

Now if the self is a morally free, creative, substantial entity, theism takes on real significance, for, as Campbell points out

‘... whatever may be the precise relationship between ‘self’ and ‘soul’, it is at least certain that, where there are no ‘selves’ in this sense, there can be no ‘souls’ in any sense that interests the theologian.’

And it seems abundantly clear that ‘theology without a soul would seem to amount to something very like a contradiction in terms’.

Therefore, we finally consider:

III. Campbell’s Theistic Views

In approaching this aspect of Professor Campbell’s thought, it is vital to see that Campbell feels that theism must be approached primarily from the religious perspective. A true theism can only be grasped when it is approached from religious experience. Thus he initially sets forth the idea that all genuine religion is essentially belief in a worshipful Being. Now it follows that if the object of worship is deemed to be worshipful, certain attributes must be true of that Being. First, all real worship is directed towards a supernatural Being. All genuine religion has a certain element of *mystery* surrounding the worshipful object, Campbell contends. The worshipful’s ‘mode of being and functioning is not “intelligible” to us in the way in which we

28 Ibid., p. 153.
29 Ibid., p. 6.
30 Ibid., p. 7.
suppose that the familiar processes in things and persons are "intelligible".\textsuperscript{31} In a word, it has something of a supernatural quality. Secondly, a worshipful Being must be one of transcendent value. This follows because worship implies \textit{adoration}. And such an emotion can only be evoked by that which is felt to possess transcendent value.\textsuperscript{32}

Finally, the worshipful must be a Being of transcendent power. Campbell argues for this postulate by pointing out that worship is permeated with a sense of \textit{awe}. And the objective correlate of awe is power, i.e., power that is mysterious and overwhelming. Now the power of the worshipful is not \textit{merely} mysterious. For power to inspire genuine awe, it must also be a transcendent power.

Thus Campbell concludes that the worshipful must be endowed with 'Mystery, power, value – in all essentials, Otto's \textit{mysterium tremendum et fascinans} . . .\textsuperscript{33}

Now with these principles set forth, Campbell summarizes by setting forth a detailed definition of religion.\textsuperscript{34} He tells us that

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... \text{religion may be defined as 'a state of mind comprising belief in the reality of a supernatural Being or beings endowed with transcendent power and worth, together with the complex emotive attitude of worship intrinsically appropriate thereto.'}\textsuperscript{35}
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It must be granted that it may appear \textit{prima facie} that there is a great gulf between the truth of religion and the truth of theism.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 240.

\textsuperscript{32} This aspect of the worshipful is important in that it excludes from the ranks of true religion some of the 'cults'. For the end purpose of the apotropaic religions, for example, is merely to mollify the hostility of demons. Thus the objects of such 'worship' can hardly be seen as possessing transcendent worth. Furthermore, many of the so-called 'primitive religions' fare little better under the qualification that the worshipful must possess transcendent worth. So long as these religions seek only to curry the favour of the 'gods', they cannot view these gods as objects of transcendent worth.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 247.

\textsuperscript{34} He points out that he is using the term 'religion' in the 'careful and considered linguistic usage of competent persons and, also that it is religion in its basic form as experience, not religion as the objectification of that experience in historic institutions . . . ' \textit{On Selfhood and Goodhood}, p. 248.

\textsuperscript{35} Campbell, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 248.
Yet Campbell contends that the gulf is not wide at all, nor is it a mere linguistic ineptitude to identify generic religion with theism. The reason is, 'theism is not just one species of religion among others, but rather the proper culmination of the development that is intrinsic to religion as such'. Therefore, the central tenets of theism are the central beliefs of the generic religious attitude when it is fully developed. So the common man is quite justified when he identifies true religion and theism, for they are in essence one and the same.

Yet, religion is not to be equated with a purely rational theism. It is Campbell's feeling that a purely rational theism lacks internal consistency. He reasons on the basis of the extreme difficulty of attributing, in a literal sense, characteristics like good, wise, powerful, etc., to a God who is infinite and self-complete. For a rational, literal meaning cannot be given to such terms if God is perfect and infinite as theism claims him to be. What then is the proper approach to belief in God? Campbell emphatically declares that our choice is 'Either symbolic theology or no theology at all'.

However, is a symbolic theology at all practicable? Is it possible to justify in any way the attributing of qualities to God while at the same time realizing that these very qualities cannot be taken in a literal sense?

It is a difficult procedure, Campbell admits. Still, it seems that the task has been quite successfully accomplished by Rudolf Otto in his classic volume, Das Heilige.

It is Otto's contention that the distinctive character of the worshipful is 'Holiness'. But rational concepts just cannot exhaust the meaning of 'Holy'. There is something more in the apprehension of the Divine than can be expressed rationally. This 'something more' Otto calls the 'numinous'. Now as the numinous cannot be conceptually defined, one must 'direct his mind to a moment of deeply felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness' if he is to grasp fully the significance and meaning of the Holy. And a

36 Ibid., p. 255.
37 Ibid., p. 323.
38 Ibid., p. 329.
careful introspective analysis of our numinous experiences throws light on three basic aspects of one's religious life. Otto describes these aspects in the previously quoted phrase 'mysterium tremendum et fascinans'. The 'mysterium' aspect of the numinous experience indicates that one is in contact with something 'wholly other', i.e., something 'whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb'. The 'tremendum et fascinans' gives content to this mysterium aspect of the experience. The 'tremendum' has three elements, viz. (1) the numen is grasped as awe-inspiring, and (2) as overwhelming in might and majesty, and (3) as superabounding in living energy and 'urgency'. Finally, the 'fascinans' is described as a 'blissful rapture by the mysterious enchantment and allure of the numen ...'. This is the numinous experience.

But we must not give this description of the religious experience a naturalistic meaning. The emotions excited are not like the natural emotions. For, 'the glory of God is something that eye cannot behold, or tongue tell'. Actually, the numinous consciousness is an a priori consciousness, i.e., it '... issues from the deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses, and, though it of course comes into being in and amid the sensory data and empirical material of the natural world and cannot anticipate or dispense with those, yet it does not arise out of them, but only by their means.'

This is the non-rational strand in the idea of the Holy. But how can the religious consciousness, if the Holy transcends rational concepts, attribute conceptual characteristics to the numinous object? Otto finds the answer in what is conveyed by the word 'schematism'. Campbell defines Otto's usage of the term by pointing out that

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39 Ibid., p. 331.
40 Ibid., p. 332.
41 Ibid., p. 333.
43 Otto borrows this term from Kant and has been accused of turning Kant upside down (H. J. Paton, The Modern Predicament). Yet this criticism seems to be greatly over-exaggerated and does not really invalidate Otto's position.
... the emotions which the numinous object evokes in us, though qualitatively unique, have a felt analogy with certain emotions evoked in us by attributes and objects in ordinary experiences of which we can form clear conceptions. It is on the basis of these felt analogies that a 'conceptual translation' or schematism of the pure numinous content becomes possible.\textsuperscript{44}

There is an 'inward necessity of the mind', as Otto puts it, that simply compels us to think of Deity as overwhelmingly possessing value, power, etc.

Now it is clear that 'analogy' implies difference as well as identity. And in the case of the numinous experience, the difference is of vital importance. For the numinous experience comes to us in the aura of a supra-natural, supra-human, supra-rational occurrence.

Still, one is always tempted to rationalize the experience. But this is because it is most difficult to maintain the 'white-hot temperature' of the numinous experience. Yet at the same time, a rational strand has its place. For we could not even think of the experience apart from rational cognition. But the rational concepts that grow out of the experience must be understood as analogies only.

Therefore, it seems to Campbell that Otto has clearly shown that incontestably, the only kind of theology possible is a symbolic theology. Thus we are shut up to a supra-rational theism. But the issue to be faced in a supra-rational theism is, in what sense, satisfactory to religion, can the rational concepts that we do assign to God be presumed to be valid symbols of their symbolizandum?

It is clear that any symbol is valid if anyone accepts it as a symbol. But this is a mere subjective validity and will not do for religion. Theism demands that the symbol be objectively true and necessary, i.e., it must be valid not just for some minds, but for mind as such. But Campbell is convinced that the symbols of the supra-rational theist are valid for all. After all, this was the whole point of Otto's argument. Campbell thinks it most clear that

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 337 (Italics mine).
'... certain rational concepts are applied to God through ... an a priori schematism of numinous experience; that, by an inward necessity of the mind, not by the accidental circumstances of particular minds, that the identity (despite the difference) of these concepts with the nature of the supra-rational object of religious experience is affirmed. The basis of this inward necessity ... (is) the felt analogy between the emotions evoked by the numinous object and the emotions evoked by the 'rational' qualities in question.' 45

Therefore, Campbell contends that there is good justification for the claim that the rational concepts attributed to God have objective validity as symbols of the nature of the supra-rational God. For they are necessitated by the very nature of the mind when we try to 'think' God. As Campbell puts it, 'the human mind, qua religious, cannot but think its object in these terms even while it fully recognizes their utter inadequacy as literal representations'. 46

But is there any objective validity to religion or supra-rational theism? If there is none, few would care to embrace the idea of a supra-rational theism. It will be remembered that Campbell has already argued that cognition points to a supra-rational ultimate reality. And if this be true

'... we have something more than the bare elements of a rapprochement between metaphysics and religion, something that promises a genuine, if partial, metaphysical corroboration of the objective validity of the religious consciousness.' 47

Furthermore,

'... as the unity of the ultimate reality of metaphysics is a unity in difference, a unity of which the differences are its self-manifestation, it would appear ... that it is the unity of mind that is by far our best symbol.' 48

And a perfect, ultimate mind or spirit must necessarily be thought of as the highest conceivable in wisdom, goodness, and power. Now as these symbols apply to ultimate reality, it was also found that they apply symbolically to God. And if such be the case, here is strong evidence for the identification of the

46 Ibid., p. 355.
48 Ibid., p. 409 (Italics mine).
God of true religion with the supra-rational absolute of metaphysics, thus giving objective validity to supra-rational theism. It is on this basis that Campbell contends for the objective validity of his supra-rational theism.

Conclusion

Now it is granted that little argumentation is presented to substantiate these three important aspects of Professor Campbell's thought presented here. Moreover, it is conceded that his views have been set forth in barest skeleton form. Yet what he has to say concerning the self, morals, and theism, seems most important to this author, especially in the light of the fact that we live in a day when metaphysics and theology have been widely branded as 'meaningless' by the hardcore empirical mind. Thus his concepts are merely outlined here with the hope that they may stimulate more detailed study and discussion. And in the course of this endeavour it may perhaps appear, as the author has contended, idealism does still speak.