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In this article it is taken for granted that the eighteenth century attacks upon the supernatural, the questioning of traditional apologetic methods, and the dissatisfaction of many with deism's remote deity prepared the soil in which immanentist thought could flourish. Dr. Sell shows, by reference to selected thinkers, that whilst there were several varieties of immanentism current in the nineteenth century, there was none which could entirely meet the theologian's requirements. Not indeed that that fact prevented some theologians from nailing their colours to immanentism's mast.

I

We begin with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). It is a testimony at once to his genius and suggestiveness, but also to his inconsistency, that Kant has become not all things to all men, but very different things to very different men. His philosophical pilgrimage is well known. An enthusiastic disciple of Leibniz via Wolff, he never forsook the doctrine of innate ideas; the *a priori* ever weighed heavily with him. But Humean empiricism awoke him, as he said, from his dogmatic slumbers, negatively convincing him that there was no justification for continuing to talk in Leibnizian terms about pre-established harmony and the like. Positively, Hume impelled Kant to seek a more excellent way than that of scepticism: Hume's empiricism could show us how things are, but could never pronounce upon how they must be: "it has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects *a priori*, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our
knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. Here is the essence of what Kant called his Copernican revolution in philosophy. Far from being tabula rasa, as Locke had maintained, the mind is active in creating knowledge out of what is empirically presented to it. This it does by the application of such a priori notions as space and time. Apart from this logically prior, unificatory, work of the reason, no meaningful experience would be possible. Equally, were there no sensory experience such categories as unity, plurality and causality, applying as they do to phenomena only, would be redundant. Professor Casserley has rightly said that for Kant, "The rationalist conception of innate ideas is, more carefully and guardedly stated, a valid one, but rationalist metaphysics are a delusion. The empiricist's distrust of rationalist metaphysics is justified, but natural science provides no clue to the mystery of the objective being of nature." The point may be illustrated by reference to the crucial category of causality.

Hume denied that the law of universal causation could be known a priori to be true, and Kant agreed that the rationalists had been mistaken in maintaining that such supposed necessary truths are directly intuited. The statement "every event has a cause" is not analytic, he argued. He did not agree with Hume, however, that the category of causation, being supplied by the mind, is inapplicable to phenomena. He therefore sought a way of showing that "every event has a cause" must be both synthetic and a priori. Were it not a priori, and thus in some sense necessary, we could have no assured knowledge of the world; were it not synthetic, that is, open to empirical verification, we should be imprisoned within ideas once more. Our knowledge is thus of phenomena only as perceived by our mind. We do not know the things in themselves, for these belong to the noumenal realm. Likewise, although reason prompts us to postulate such ideas as those of God, freedom and immortality we can have, strictly, no knowledge of these, for they are not phenomena. Are we then shut up to a scepticism as extreme as Hume's? Kant does not intend this result, for he considers that having clearly defined and limited the sphere of reason, he has left room for faith. Moreover, such faith is immune both to rationalistic demonstration and destruction. In all of this we have the seeds of an important bifurcation in post-Kantian thought; for on the one hand some came to rest in a Kant-inspired agnosticism, whilst on the other hand, some, grateful for the way in which Kant has made room for faith, launched out upon a sea of transcendentalism, or set off on the quest of experientially-confirmed faith claims.
If the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, second edition 1787) leaves us with an idea of God which, though not intuited is not rationally justifiable, the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) employs the concepts of God, freedom and immortality as postulates — that is, as conditions, and not simply as presuppositions, of thought. Man's will, the practical reason, is subject to a self-imposed moral demand, the categorical imperative; man knows that he cannot refuse to acknowledge this demand; it is directly given in his experience, and is autonomous. As Professor Pringle-Pattison put it, "Man as noumenon, or purely rational being, gives the law; man as phenomenon receives it." Hence, morality does not depend upon religion: if it did morality would be heteronomous — a possibility which Kant shunned as undermining his belief that that is moral which is done for its own sake. However, by way of guaranteeing an eternal order in which the due apportionment of virtue and reward, evil and punishment will be completely achieved, we may, not irrationally, postulate God, freedom and immortality. This last train of thought is more fully elaborated in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). But man remains his own lawgiver; his autonomy is firmly entrenched. Robert Mackintosh, as so often, encapsulates most of the difficulties in Kant in a few sentences:

On one side, the world we know by valid processes of thinking cannot, we are told, be the real world. Or, beginning from the other side; neither the reality which ideal thought reaches after, nor yet the reality which our conscience postulates, is the valid world of orderly thinking. The great critic of scepticism has diverged from idealism toward scepticism again, or has given his idealism a sceptical colour, mitigated — but only mitigated — by faith in the moral consciousness.

Needless to say, this faith is remarkably different from biblical faith in a knowable (truly though not, of course, exhaustively) personal God who has revealed Himself supremely in Christ. Yet not a few later liberal theologians, rejoicing that Kant, by separating reason from faith, had once and for all demolished the old grounds of natural theology, came to believe that "doctrines whose validity thought failed to substantiate might be justified by religious faith." The words of Professor Van Til are scarcely too harsh: "the primacy of the practical reason as over against the theoretical reason...leads to the postulation of the wholly unknown God and of his manifestation through Christ in the world. And this Christ is also both wholly known and wholly unknown. As such it is that He is supposed to help man who has in the first place constructed Him". Lest the last sentence here seem too severe, let us attend to Kant's own...
words: "Though it does indeed sound dangerous, it is in no way reprehensible to say that every man creates a God for himself... For in whatever manner a being has been made known to him... he must first of all compare this representation with his ideal in order to judge whether he is entitled to regard it and to honour it as a divinity".\textsuperscript{9a} Theologically, this overlooks the work of God the Holy Spirit. Philosophically, it places autonomous man above God. Psychologically — did not P.T. Forsyth somewhere say that the religious man does not review God's claims and then admit him when he is satisfied? \textit{Isaiah} vi is more to the point.

Kant appears to think exclusively in terms of a natural religion. The question as to whether or not there is a word from the Lord never seems to occur to him. Indeed he has great respect for the person of Christ, though he really finds in him no more than an exemplar; and for Kant's "Son of God" we may read "moral ideal". For all his criticism of the rationalists, he ends up in a practical deism. Nor is that all. He is religiously unsatisfying because of his tendency to "use" God. Religion's real purpose is as a support for morality, and here God is very useful — but he is a \textit{deus ex machina} no less than the deist's God.\textsuperscript{5b} Read Kant as we may, we find ourselves unable to resist H.R. Mackintosh's conclusion that "God is introduced with deep reverence, yet not for His own sake, but rather as a necessary presupposition of the moral system. He enters to effect a reconciliation between duty and happiness, becoming, in Herder's felicitous phrase, 'a nail to hold together a morality that was falling to pieces'".\textsuperscript{10a}

In view of all this it comes as no surprise to find that the note of the gospel is decidedly muffled by Kant. An inherently unknowable God, who is the projection of autonomous man's reason is not the holy Creator before whom man stands as sinner. Hence the exemplar Christ will suffice; and in the result of the Christian life is not a joyous life of fellowship with the risen Christ and his people, but rather a lonely attempt to attend to one's duties understood as divine commands. We do not say that Kant has no understanding of evil. On the contrary, he speaks of "man's natural propensity" to it, and he opposes the \textit{Ausklarung}'s "easy-going Optimism which is repugnant to the very genius of religion".\textsuperscript{5c} It is on the remedy that he is so weak. Yet, as Emil Brunner pointed out, had Kant moved from the view of evil as the breach of an impersonal law, to an understanding of sin as the wilful spurning of a holy, loving God, he would have forsaken the rational standpoint of the philosopher for that of the believer.\textsuperscript{11} To Kant religion remained the determination to "look upon God as the lawgiver universally to be honoured".\textsuperscript{9b} This is Kant's greatest utterance on the matter; but since the
religious man's experience is not so much "I ought therefore I can", as "I ought but I cannot — who will deliver me?", it is also his most tragic. We do not find in Kant an attenuated gospel. We find law ultimately triumphant over grace, and that is no gospel at all.\(^\text{12}\)

Already we begin to see how difficult it is to being "from below" and arrive at the Christian God. We shall see the same point illustrated as we turn to the father of modern theology, Schleiermacher. Then, when we come to Hegel we shall find that for all his talk about the Absolute, his immanentism leaves him thoroughly earth-bound, so to speak. Professor Aiken brings us sharply face to face with the issue when he writes that "from the time of Kant on...it is the thinking subject himself who establishes the standards of objectivity".\(^\text{13a}\) Can there be any commerce between this view and that which seeks to think God's thoughts after him? Have we, in Kant, and in so much that succeeds him, the old dispute between Jerusalem and Athens settled in favour of Athens?

II

Schleiermacher (1768-1834) appears to us to be both attractive and perverse. He opposed that rationalistic theological aridity which did not take account of pious feeling — to him it was "a badly stitched patchwork of metaphysics and ethics". He opposed those detractors of religion whose attacks upon the "evidences" of religion left true religion intact. As for Kant's God who is "brought back through the back door of ethics", he is no God at all, and the cultured despisers of religion are right to reject him. Unlike some theologians who "outgrow" the generality of the faithful, Schleiermacher maintained pastoral contact with the Church — Kantian individualism was not for him. He sought to combine "both religious interest and scientific spirit in the highest degree and in the best possible balance for theory and practice alike".\(^\text{14}\)

With this objective we are in entire accord, and it is worth underlining in passing that his oft-mentioned romanticism notwithstanding, Schleiermacher stoutly opposed sloppiness of thought wherever he found it. Above all, in face of Christian scholasticism, Catholic and Protestant alike, he set Christ as Redeemer at the heart of his theology, so that we can at least understand why A.M. Fairbairn should have commended him for having saved religion "from friends and enemies alike".\(^\text{15}\) Yet it is hard not to believe that Schleiermacher leaves us with a
reduced Christianity, and that some of theology's subsequent weaknesses originate from him.

In 1799 Schleiermacher published his *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, and on the basis of the understanding of religion there set forth he brought out his *The Christian Faith* in 1821, and a second edition of it ten years later. Central to his understanding of religion, and of Christianity as the highest expression of it, is the pious feeling. Eschewing both innate ideas and sensation, he contends that apart from this feeling there is no real religion. He carefully describes the nature of this feeling. It has nothing to do either with unconscious states, or with those moments of self-reflection in which we contemplatively view ourselves as quasi objects. Though not entirely divorced from knowing and doing, feeling is to be distinguished from them; certainly it is not derived from them — it is immediate. The characteristically religious feeling is one of absolute dependence, and it is designated by the word "God". Thus, "in the first instance God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this feeling, and to which we trace our being in such a state; and any further content of the idea must be evolved out of this fundamental import assigned to it".  

When a person recognises that the feeling of absolute dependence is indeed the consciousness of God, we may properly speak of revelation, though not in the sense in which God is given, or intervenes, from without.

We should grievously misunderstand Schleiermacher were we to suppose that his "feeling" is individualistic. Far from it: his doctrine of the Church, and of the new humanity in Christ entails the collective nature of the experience. It is, moreover, at least in intention, an experience of the historic Christ, apart from whom, in Schleiermacher's view, there would be no Christianity at all. Schleiermacher's centre is ever this Jesus, the proper man, as He is known in the individual's self-consciousness; in union with Him man finds true life. (Schleiermacher never makes it entirely clear why the feeling of absolute dependence requires the historic Christ; perhaps the truth is that Schleiermacher's Lutheranism cannot proceed without Him).

Even from this summary description we see the justice of W.A. Brown's claim that "the original feature in Schleiermacher's definition of Christianity is the combination of the speculative and the historic"; but, to reiterate, he does not deal in the old rationalist speculations. Just as he waged war on the older rationalism, so in turn he has been charged with psychologism. That is, it has been denied that the analysis of one's feelings is informative of anything (least of all, of God) other than one's emotional states. It would not be difficult to find passages in
Schleiermacher's works which would, in isolation, justify this charge. We consider, however, that on balance H.R. Mackintosh has correctly assessed the situation when he concludes that Schleiermacher's over-all intention was to regard feeling as "a mode of objective apprehension, a species of emotional perception or awareness of spiritual things", and to view God "as confronting the soul in His real and infinite causality".10b, 18

This most favourable interpretation does not, as far as we can see, get Schleiermacher out of the wood. To us it seems that his difference with the Enlightenment rationalists and with the deist is still, like Kant's, a family difference only. Whether reason or the pious feeling is to the fore, man remains the key to the system. The starting-point is variously my own reason, my own moral law, or my own feeling of absolute dependence; and we question these starting points, not least because from them flow those modifications or reductions of Christianity which we detect at several points in the work of those who espouse them. Let us then indicate those points in Schleiermacher's position which bear with particular force upon the question of the nature and relations of God and man.

Schleiermacher's work is pervaded, as we have implied, by anti-supernaturalism. The God who intervenes from without; still more, the God who remains without in ultra-deistic fashion, is not God at all. In harmony with this conviction is Schleiermacher's understanding of miracle. He contends that the traditional apologetic had erred in utilising the supposedly evidential properties of miracles conceived as divine breaches of the natural law. In fact piety requires no such miracles. On the contrary, since God is immanent in all things, the distinction between natural and supernatural occurrences no longer holds; "Miracle is simply the religious name for event. Every event, even the most natural and usual, becomes a miracle, as soon as the religious view of it can be the dominant. To me all is miracle".19a In the interests of both science and religion "we should abandon the idea of the absolutely supernatural because no single instance of it can be known by us, and we are nowhere required to recognise it".20a We do not wish here to defend the old understanding of miracle, nor to discuss Schleiermacher's alternative in detail. We simply outline his position as illustrative of his blurring of the creator-creature distinction. For what he says concerning miracles is a function of his general position which called forth G.P. Fisher's adverse, yet just, comment, "In the conception of God at the outset [of Schleiermacher's system] His transcendence is sacrificed and absorbed in His immanence".21
Does this mean that Schleiermacher is a pantheist? Just as it is difficult to make the charge of subjectivism hold against him in an unqualified way, so with the charge of pantheism. We do not believe that Schleiermacher intended to advocate pantheism — for all his admiration for Spinoza, for example, he dissociated himself from the latter's idea that there could be no reciprocity of relations or emotions between the deity and the individual. On the other hand, his way of equating all causation, including human, with divine providence made it difficult if not impossible for him to allow adequate freedom either to God or to man. It is as if he seeks both to dispense with supernaturalism and yet, even whilst asserting immanence, to transcend the temporal.

The mystical impetus in this latter direction is nowhere more clearly indicated than when he says that since "the reason is completely one with the divine Spirit, the divine Spirit can itself be conceived as the highest enhancement of the human reason, so that the difference between the two is made to disappear. But further...whatever opposes the movements of the divine Spirit is the same as what conflicts with human reason; for otherwise there could not exist in man (as there does), before the entry of those divine influences, a consciousness of the need of redemption, which these very influences set at rest".20b

This blurring of the creator-creature distinction has called forth Professor Bloesch's comment, "In mysticism the eternal God calls to the eternal within man. In the Christian faith the eternal becomes man".22 Moreover it results in that anabaptism whereby "revelation" comes to mean "human discovery"(Compare 10c, 19b) and Christian proclamation becomes not the proximate cause of, but rather the way of describing, the emotional disturbance of salvation.23

With a doctrine of God which, despite his best intentions, verges upon pantheism; with God conceived as cause or power, it is not surprising that Schleiermacher does not understand sin as wilful rebellion against a holy, righteous, loving Father. In the wake of Spinoza, who regarded sin as a defect whereby the sensual affections overcome man's reason, Schleiermacher conceives of a war within man between higher and lower states of consciousness. Of this war Adam is the first exemplar, and Christ is redeemer in so far as in him God-consciousness reached its highest expression. Union with him, elevation by him — these are the redemptive steps, and second-century understandings of recapitulation come to mind. Far from being a state of radical alienation from God, "sin in general exists only in so far as there is a consciousness of it"; far from describing broken inter-personal relationships, sin "manifests itself only in connexion with and by means of already existent good, and what it obstructs is future good."20c In Schleiermacher's emphasis
upon man's freedom to will ever more God-consciousness with a view to emulating Jesus, we have a rather more than incipient Pelagianism, and a corresponding weakness on the nature and redemptive necessity of divine grace. Redemption is a process rather than an act once more.

We thus come to the realisation that for all his emphasis upon the historic Christ, Schleiermacher's Jesus is so bound up with the relativities of history that his uniqueness is not established, though it is inconsistently adhered to. We might almost say that Schleiermacher's Christ is an incarnate idea rather than an incarnate person; certainly he by-passes much New Testament teaching concerning Jesus's life, and he will not allow the possibility that Jesus was tempted. Small wonder that Dr. Lovell Cocks said of Schleiermacher's Jesus that he "stimulates our God-consciousness, but is not Himself the Word, being indeed no more than the 'occasion' of the emergence of something that is not a 'Word of God' at all, but the secret treasure of our human reason. Neither in its rationalistic nor its romanticist form has humanism been able to exhibit the Gospel as 'news' and Christ as the unique Mediator of salvation".

Concerning Schleiermacher's system as a whole, H.R. Mackintosh prophesied that "more and more it will impress rather by its contrast than by its likeness to the faith of Prophets and Apostles". Not all have concurred, however, and it cannot be said that the question as to whether in theology we should begin "from below" or "from above" has yet decisively been settled.

III

We turn now to Schleiermacher's colleague Hegel (1770-1831) who, although he started from the rationalistic side of Kant rather than from the psychological interests of Schleiermacher nevertheless promoted an immanentism which was as reductive of the gospel as was Schleiermacher's. Hegel set his face against that Romanticism represented by Schleiermacher, Jacobi and others. To him it seemed to make for conceptual weakness concerning the Absolute; it exalted intuition; and it fostered a truth-obscurring relativism. He was no less opposed to that dualism between thought and the thing-in-itself which Kant had bequeathed to philosophy. Nor was Hegel alone in this; indeed his indebtedness to Fichte (1762-1814) and Schelling (1775-1854), though by no means complete, is clear. Fichte developed a naturalistic pantheism in which the material world is held to be
the construct of man the thinker — man whose thought is yet held to be derived from God's thought; and Schelling, anxious to give the material universe a real life of its own, so to speak, propounded the idea that nature is a never-absolutely-objective organism whose ultimate meaning is gained as it achieves consciousness in the thinking self. They both attempted to correct what they, and Edward Caird after them, took to be Kant's oversight, namely, that the phenomenal and noumenal realms "are essentially relative to each other, so that either, taken apart from the other, becomes an empty abstraction". For his part Hegel suggested that Kant's doctrinal affirmation that we have no knowledge save of phenomena could be turned around against him, for the assertion is presumed to give us knowledge, yet it has nothing to do with phenomena. Hegel would allow no barriers in the quest of knowledge, and more than once rebuked Kant for attempting to learn to swim without entering the water.

Schelling's idea of movement, evolution, was vigorously pursued by Hegel. His Absolute was not a static object or substance susceptible to immediate apprehension, but a spirit — God even — which all encompasses phenomena. The phenomena remain real and are not absorbed by the Absolute; rather they are embraced by it in an eternal flux of immanent, evolutionary activity. The plasticity of the system is such that there could not be absorption of subject by object or *vice versa*; nor, as with Spinoza, do subject and object continue as individuals within a static substance; nor again, as with Schelling, is there a convergence upon a common abstract identity of nature and spirit. Above all we do not have in Hegel, contrary to what some have supposed, an aloof Absolute which transcends and is for ever apart from the phenomenal world. So concerned was Hegel with the real world that we may agree that he was "a man...possessed of an eye for the concrete only second to Aristotle's". Hegel's Spirit acts immanently to gather up consciousness and nature within its own complete, yet ever mobile self-consciousness. (The somewhat strange conjunction of adjectives must be pardoned: it has been well said that with Hegel one must first attempt to grasp the system, or see the vision, and only then examine the parts).

From the human side, the hard way of rational thinking, rather than the softer mystic or intuitionist options represented respectively by Boehme and Jacobi, is the way by which man attains the truth; the route takes man through art, religion and philosophy — themselves the thesis, antithesis and synthesis of Absolute Spirit. There is no escaping rationality, for "that which is rational is real, and that which is real is rational". Thought and being, though in mutual contradictory opposition, are one, since there cannot be the one without the other. The
Absolute resolves all antitheses with which our experience confronts us; indeed our own selves are real only as they are caught up by the Absolute. This is not to say that there is no distinction between man and God. The distinction is, however, within man's "unhappy consciousness"; it pains man and God, and its resolution, though assured, is not yet. Meanwhile the dialectic proceeds as antithesis succeeds, yet never cancels or replaces, thesis, and as synthesis is ever more nearly approached. As G.R.G. Mure has it, "The triadic formula writ large is the total manifestation of absolute spirit alienating itself and returning upon itself through (and as) Nature and man". In other words, in the dialectic process contradictions are resolved, not by being swept aside or explained away; nor, as with Fichte, by being regarded as apparent only; but by being caught up into a higher unity. It is not that Hegel deliberately set out to sabotage the law of contradiction as ordinarily understood by perversely maintaining contradictories. Rather, he sought a way of accommodating the real contradictoriness of human experience within a system which properly recognised the world as it is. His theory must both accept the world as it is and at the same time, since the world is rationally grounded, deny that there can be any absolute and final contradictions. As Caird acknowledges,

The thought that there is a unity which lies beneath all opposition, and that, therefore, all opposition is capable of reconciliation, is unfamiliar to our ordinary consciousness for reasons that may easily be explained. That unity is not usually an object of consciousness, just because it is the presupposition of all consciousness...

It is the unity itself which gives its bitter meaning to the difference, while at the same time it contains the pledge that the difference can and even must be reconciled.

It follows that both a proof and a disproof of the principle presuppose the principal itself. Hegel's contradictoriness is not, as with Aristotle, a static matter of logic. It is dynamic; it is as has been said, the fuel of his system.

How does all this bear upon the question of the God-man relation? We first underline the point that Hegel who "lived, apparently, for no other purpose than that of playing secretary to the Absolute" adopts a thoroughly immanentist stance. There is no transcendent Other here. The issue is so clear that it is surprising that it has so frequently been misunderstood, as, for example by J.C. O'Neill who claims that Hegel and Bultmann err in adopting the Enlightenment's God who cannot work visibly on the world. This is the reverse of what Hegel did, and we endorse the verdict of Dr. DeWolf that "Hegel...is, par excellence, the philosopher of continuity, by reason of the fact that he shows so explicitly how thoroughly he means to resolve all the apparently
conflicting elements of experience and being in the one unbroken life of the all-inclusive Process, the Spirit which is the Absolute". The eternal Spirit unfolds itself in the universe — indeed, the universe is that unfolding, and the Absolute is the totality of things. Such a view cannot but do violence to the concept of the personality of God, and nowhere is this more clearly seen than in connection with the Hegelian Trinity, which H.R. Mackintosh concisely stated, and pertinently criticised as follows:

As pure abstract idea God is Father; as going forth eternally into finite being, the element of change and variety, God is Son; as once more sublating or cancelling this distinction, and turning again home enriched by this outgoing in so-called self-manifestation or incarnation, God is Holy Spirit. Such a Trinity, clearly, represents that which is in no sense eternal but only coming to be; it has no meaning, or even existence, apart from the finite world. It is a dialectical triad, not Father, Son and Spirit in any sense in which Christian faith has ever pronounced the three-fold Name.

(We recall that the latter-day idealist F.H. Bradley denied that the Absolute was personal, moral, beautiful or true.)

In Hegel's idea of a God of becoming, who is inseparable from his creation, we have the genesis of that notion, sentimentalised by some later liberal theologians, that God needs us as much as we need him. The tendency of Arminianism thus finds metaphysical justification; and some of Hegel's left wing successors upheld a position which "does away with the self-existence and independent reality of the Deity, identifies God with man's thoughts about Him, and makes the communion of man with God to be nothing but man's communion with himself or with the progressive spirit of the race". In this way, and for all his concern with history, Hegel leaves us with an unhistorically rooted, idealised Christianity in which, not surprisingly, the God-man as an historic person has little place. This despite phrases which appear to tell in an opposite direction: "Christ has appeared; a Man who is God; God who is Man, and thereby peace and reconciliation have accrued to the World". Here is Hegel, the true Lutheran, at his most final. But he was not ever thus, and G.H.R. Mure has well said that "Jesus was in fact for him much less real in Nazareth and Jerusalem than he was in Martin Luther's inner consciousness". Christianity's main role, as far as Hegel is concerned, is to provide a fund of doctrines symbolic of
that relation between the finite and the infinite which it is philosophy's business to delineate.

Anyone who begins from as close and total a kinship between God and man as Hegel posits will almost inevitably be in difficulties over the doctrines of sin, grace and redemption. Hegel does not indeed underestimate sin. He takes it very seriously, though not, we feel with that moral urgency which can flow only from a real grasp of God's holy otherness over against the (genuine) individual. He does not grasp the tragedy of alienation, for his evolutionary theory encourages an optimism which regards sin as a necessary step towards self-determined moral goodness. As a later prominent Hegelian wrote, "there is nothing in evil which cannot be absorbed in good and contributory to it; and it springs from the same source as good and value". It was this kind of remark which prompted Reinhold Niebuhr to speak of the almost unanimous "easy conscience of modern culture" — though as Professor Pingle-Pattison noted, Hegel himself spoke much of the labour of the Spirit, whose ultimate triumph, though a foregone conclusion, is not easily won.

Given this understanding of sin the atonement can only be a further testimony to the rhythmic unity of God and man. It is the means whereby God as Absolute Spirit reconciles himself to himself by the death of Christ understood as symbolic of the resurrection of Spirit. Again we see the result of the lack of genuine individuality in either God or man. There is truth in the charge that Hegelianism has no room for Hegel — hence Kierkegaard's protest against it. Nor does there seem to be any room in Hegelianism for God apart from Hegel. Here we have the consummation of that humanistic, rationalistic-immanentist thrust which from the Renaissance onwards had been gathering increasing momentum. It is one thing to regard union with God as a sharing of his nature; it is quite another to regard it as a pantheistic absorption into his being. Many will feel that the latter is too high a price to pay for salvation from deism; and many Christian thinkers may well find themselves in unusual agreement with McTaggart, who opined that as far as Christianity is concerned Hegelianism is "an enemy in disguise — the least evident but the most dangerous". The danger is at its height in the bland disregard in Hegelianism of anything resembling God's regenerating grace.
If one were to write a history of nineteenth century western Christianity under some such title as "The Ramifications of Immanentism", a surprisingly comprehensive account could result. We use the term "Christianity" advisedly, for, whether positively or negatively, immanentism influenced both thought and practice. Thus, to take some random examples: Professor Horton Davies finds a link between immanentism and the preference of most nineteenth-century Free Church theologians and ministers for Zwinglian, memorialist, views of the Lord's Supper, rather than for the High Calvinist doctrine; and again, between immanentism and that embarrassment to certain liturgiologists, the Harvest Festival. For some ecclesiological implications of immanentism we might turn to H.B. Wilson's article on "The National Church" in Essays and Reviews (1860). He suggested that since the old dogmatic standpoints of the Church of England were ripe for supercession, a new Church should be envisaged, built, in undogmatic fashion, upon the moral consciousness of the nation. In the field of scientific advance immanentist theory and investigatory zeal acted as mutual stimuli upon one another. Finally, as he reflected upon the missionary situation at the beginning of the twentieth century, Dr. A.E. Garvie expressed concern lest the concept of God as already immanent in man should undermine the missionary enterprise by reducing the importance of the historic Christ, and by minimising the tragedy of sin and, in consequence, the need of a Saviour.

Returning to more strictly intellectual matters we find that immanentism inspired no one variety of philosophy. We have already seen that the immanentist tendency was shared by men in other ways so different at Schleiermacher and Hegel; but in the nineteenth century the proliferation of immanentism is even more remarkable, and inspires both kindred and diametrically opposed philosophies. Over some of these we need not delay, for they were so clearly out of accord with Christian thought that few theologians, if any, thought of expressing their views in terms of them. Thus, there were positivistic and agnostic varieties of immanentism which, since they ruled out a transcendent object, whilst deeming such an object the sine qua non of religion, had no use for religion at all — except, in some cases, as an emotional crutch for the weak-minded. There was materialism (as equally immanentist as its opposite, absolutism), whose high priest Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72), with quasi-discipular dialectic licence, turned Hegelianism on its head, made actual matter...
rather than mind his fundamental principle, equated God with man's
nature, and resolved theology into anthropology. There was
Auguste Comte (1798-1857), whose positivism, whilst denying the
transcendent, allowed for a religion of humanity wherein inter-
personal relations were accorded divine status. Dr. Elliott-Binns
notes Frederic Harrison, E.S. Beesly and J.H. Bridges as being
among Englishmen who took Comtism seriously. That not all were
thus inclined is evidenced by the wag who alleged that at their
Fetter Lane meetings for the worship of humanity there were three
persons and no God. Professor William A. McKeever of the
University of Kansas was among Americans who exalted man: "Man
is my best expression of Deity", he wrote, "and so I bow reverently
at this shrine". It was left to Professor R.W. Sellars and
others to make the point that man is not fit object of worship,
and therefore that "the very attitude and implications of worship
must be relinquished". The pragmatists, of whom F.C.S. Schiller
(1864-1937) is a prominent British example, tended to agree.

Other varieties of immanentism made a considerably greater
appeal to Christian thinkers, and hence the perils of reductionism
were correspondingly greater. We continue to speak of varieties
of immanentism, for some have written as if monism alone appealed
to theologians. The monistic tendency of all forms of immanentism
cannot be denied, but it is only proper to note how earnestly some
sought to resist it. Of these some were moved by a romanticism
which made for a decidedly immanentist transcendentalism (a paradox
shortly to be resolved); others, making the Incarnation the
foundation of their theology, were at least as indebted to the
Alexandrian theologians as they were to Hegel. It goes without
saying that the continuing Platonist insistence upon the God-man
continuity, though by no means exclusively immanentist, had clear
immanentist features. But, yet again, a cautionary word: to
think too much in terms of groups or schools would suggest a
degree of tidiness, and a series of master-disciple relationships,
which do not always appear. We shall follow the relatively safe
chronological path, making our points as we go.

Dr. Vernon F. Storr listed the following distinctive features
of Romanticism: (1) The belief that man is not simply an
intellectual being, and that reason, far from being merely the
logical faculty, is "a creating and unifying factor". (2) The
awakening of the spirit of wonder. (3) The high place accorded
to the imagination. (4) An emphasis upon the sympathy between
man and the natural order. These, taken all together, made for
a profounder study of man's psychology than had ever before been
undertaken; and made possible a new apologetic which would no
longer rely upon external evidences (which were being
increasingly called into question with the growth of biblical
criticism), but which would appeal to the religious man's spiritual experience.

Such an atmosphere was one in which Coleridge (1772-1834) \(^{51}\) revelled — though never uncritically. Thus, for example, whereas he was at first greatly impressed by Schelling, he later cooled towards him. Again, whilst acknowledging his debt to the Cambridge Platonists, and to More and Smith in particular, he went further than they in understanding the continuity between God and man to be moral and spiritual, and not intellectual only: "God in His wholeness, and therefore chiefly in His holiness, not merely God's mind in man's mind — that was the note; with the necessary consequent, that Christian truth was at the same time an affirmation of this immanence and a means of intensifying it still more". \(^{52}\) To Coleridge man is essentially a spiritual being, but he by no means endorsed monism. On the contrary, from Kant he inherits a transcendentalism, though not one which leads him either to Kant's scepticism or to the deist's absentee deity. In a very important footnote Professor Welch draws his readers' attention to three factors in Coleridge's experience which modified his indebtedness to the Platonists, to Kant and to others. They are "the quality of personal religion, in which prayer and the struggle of sin and redemption were at the center ... Second ... a deep sense of social need and a hope for the revitalization of English society and the church — a cause which he wanted to serve ... Third, Coleridge's religious thinking developed from a position within the historical Christian faith. He had little interest in religiousness in general". \(^{53}\)

It was, indeed, Coleridge's profound sense of the reality of moral evil, together with his high view of conscience, which proved the greatest bulwark against the pantheistic tendencies in his thought. For him sin could never be anything other than sin, and redemption was required. This conviction coloured his attitude towards the older rationalism which, he thought, did not really get to grips with the whole man at all; and it prompted his quest of a theory of rationality which should both make good this deficiency by permitting genuine apprehensions of divine reality; but which would set its face against simple emotionalism whether pietistic or evangelical. Further, he sought an understanding of reason which appreciated reason's bounds and was not afraid to pause before the ineradicable mystery which lay at the heart of things. He was thus led to distinguish between the understanding and the reason. The former provides us with experimental knowledge via sensation, whilst by means of the latter we intuitively apprehend spiritual truth which is not amenable to empirical verification. \(^{54}\)
Coleridge's distinction was employed by the American transcendentalists from about 1830, though Dr. Buell has made it clear that their definition of reason varied from one to another:

Those who recognised such a faculty sometimes called it by different names, such as 'Spirit', 'Mind', 'Soul', and they also differed in the claims they made for it. For some Transcendentalists it was simply an inner light or conscience; for others it was the voice of God; for still others it was literally God himself immanent in man. Some regarded the informing spirit primarily as an impersonal cosmic force; others continued to think of it in traditional anthropomorphic terms.

As with Coleridge then, their transcendentalism was immanently anchored, so to speak. They opposed pantheism, but were equally averse in spirit to external evidences of religion. Instead, like their fellow-Unitarian, the Englishman Martineau (1805-1900), they made conscience the seat of authority in religion, and were to that extent at one with the immanentist spirit of the times. They had the example of Channing (1780-1842), by whose assertion of the dignity of man they had been much impressed, and with whose criticisms of what was regarded as a degrading Calvinism they were in utter sympathy. Dr. McLachlan informs us that the monument to Channing in Boston bears the legend, "He breathed into theology a humane Spirit and proclaimed a new divinity of man".

Supreme among the transcendentalists was Emerson (1803-82) for whom man was equally in harmony with nature as with God. Theodore Parker (1810-60) evinces that difficulty to which we saw that Hegelianism could tend, namely, he is reluctant to ascribe personality (and, for that matter, impersonality) to God on the ground that to do so "seems to me a vain attempt to fathom the abyss of the Godhead, and report the soundings". Loyal to the Congregationalist family (out of which American Unitarianism had sprung) was Horace Bushnell (1802-76), whose New Theology opposed tritheism and the governmental theory of the atonement; upheld the divinity of man, and sought to show that the fundamental truths of religion are hindered rather than helped by the older apologetic methods of shoring them up.

Meanwhile in Britain the general immanentist tendency was being upheld by Erskine of Linlathen (1788-1870), and by his friend John McLeod Campbell (1800-72), whose book *The Nature of the Atonement* (1856) played down the penal aspects of the
atonement, and whose belief that Christ's saving work had been done for all and not for the elect only caused such heart-searching in conservative Scottish circles. Another Scot, Carlyle (1795-1881) exercised a wide influence upon theological thought, not so much because he erected a persuasive system, which he did not, but because he seemed to strike certain chords which, as many thought, would have to appear in any adequate theological score. Among these were his anti-materialistic immanentism inspired by Goethe, and his strong sense of the moral law - inherited from a Calvinism with which, as with institutional Christianity generally, he was in other respects profoundly disenchanted.

Among those of the Church of England who were most receptive to new ideas we note Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875) - a student of Schleiermacher - and Julius Hare (1795-1855). The latter carried forward the main emphases of Coleridge, utilising the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in relation to such themes as progress and development, which were shortly to become theological talking-points of the first importance. Supreme among the Anglicans influenced by Coleridge, however, was F.D. Maurice (1805-72). Like his mentor, Maurice stood firmly for the trustworthiness of spiritual experience. God does not have to be sought as if he were afar off. He is immanent in man and our seeking of him is itself a response to his prior presence. Against High Calvinism and High Anglicanism alike Maurice maintained the essential divinity of man, urging that the essence of sin is refusal to acknowledge that fact; salvation is the glad recognition of it. For his denial of the eternity of punishment Maurice was deposed from his Chair at King's College London in 1854 - he would lose his position rather than have the God-man continuity disrupted. His immanentist-transcendentalism found its chief expression as he developed his "Greek" Logos theology of the Incarnation. To him the supreme meaning of the Incarnation was that the world, far from being fallen, is already redeemed. Not surprisingly, Maurice's emphasis upon the atonement is relatively slight.

Other more adventurous Anglicans included the contributors to Essays and Reviews. Eschewing external religious evidences, they sought to do some theological ground-clearing and, in the process, to prise open the minds of their readers. Conscience and reason were, for them, the joint touchstones of valid doctrine, and both conscience and reason were helped rather than hindered by the scholarly advances in science and biblical criticism that were being made. A generation later Lux Mundi (1889) was more positively "Greek" and incarnational. Among its illustrious contributors was J.R. Illingworth (1848-1915) who, for all his
indebtedness to the post-Hegelianism of T.H. Green, had no intention of blurring the creator-creature distinction, as may be seen from one of his later works, *Divine Transcendence* (1911). In this he was at one with Charles Gore, the editor of *Lux Mundi*, who was later to criticise the Modern Churchmen's Union in such a way as to draw the following response from one of the Union's distinguished members: "Dr. Gore is correct in affirming that we believe that...the difference between Deity and Humanity is one of degree. The distinction between Creator and creature, upon which Dr. Gore and the older theologians place so much emphasis, seems to us to be a minor distinction". 63

We come full circle to the professional philosophers, and we note Edward Caird (1835-1908) and T.H. Green (1836-92) 64 as being more or less faithful disciples of Hegel. The qualification is important, since whilst, for example, Green endorsed Hegel's criticisms of Kant, he nevertheless felt that Hegel's own system was over-ambitious and on one occasion declared, "It must all be done over again". 65 For Green mind is constitutive of the relations which make up the world; there is no possibility of isolating phenomena and of considering them in abstraction from mind. With all of this Caird agreed and so, in broad terms, did the younger absolutists, F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) and Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). C.C.J. Webb properly observed, however, that these last were even more strongly immanentist than their older contemporaries, and that they did not subscribe to the doctrine of immortality, which inspired the teleology of both Caird and Green. 43a Neither would they, like Caird, have invoked the Incarnation of Christ as signifying the truth of the claim that God was immanent in all men. Both Bradley and Bosanquet denied personality to God and regarded their Absolute as superceding the God of religion altogether. By the time we come to McTaggart (1866-1925) God is entirely redundant.

Not surprisingly, the tendency of post-Hegelian immanentism to exclude the truly personal identity of both God and man gave rise to some influential thinkers who came to be known as the personal idealists. Of these one of the earliest and greatest was Professor A.S. Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931) whose criticisms of Hegel are to be found in his *Hegelianism and Personality* (1887). One of the best summaries, and most gracious criticisms, of his position is that by his pupil H.R. Mackintosh. 66a Pringle-Pattison's main platform is that "in the conditions of the highest human life we have access, as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of the divine". 67 Mackintosh welcomes this, but questions how far his teacher's identification of God with the Absolute allows for the fatherhood of God. He is also hesitant concerning the
notion of the mutual reciprocity of relations between God and man, for this may lead to the false suggestion that "God needs man for existence just as man needs God".66b

V

How shall we assess the immanentist thrust in nineteenth-century thought? First, immanentists of all kinds are to be applauded for having set their faces so firmly against deism; and immanentists of certain kinds are further to be praised for their staunch opposition to naturalism; for with neither deism nor naturalism can Christian theology happily trade. Secondly, the generosity of spirit and openness of vision which characterises the best of the immanentists is a welcome relief from the more arid patches of earlier rationalism, whether philosophical or theological.

Having allowed all this, we cannot overlook the fact that all types of immanentism really look to man — to his reason, his conscience or his religious experience — as the arbiter of truth. This makes them part of that very broadly rationalistic post-Renaissance humanistic family which includes Descartes, Locke, Schleiermacher and Hegel, all of whose members sat more or less loosely to certain aspects of the Christian message. Having noted this all-embracing tendency, we now note certain difficulties which arise in connection with particular varieties of immanentism.

Professor A.C. McGiffert once questioned whether theology needed the doctrine of immanence at all. He quoted McLeod Campbel as saying that "The one great word of the New Theology is unity — the unity of the individual with the race, and of the race with God", and commented, "Much that the conception of divine immanence conserves is taught by the Christ of the synoptists — the nearness of God, the kinship of man and God, the value of the present life — but all this might be taught also by one whose philosophy was of another sort".68 This is a fair judgement as applying to monism, but not all nineteenth-century immanentists took that line, as we have seen. In particular, the "Greek" incarnational line represented by Maurice and the Lux Mundi group upheld the transcendent, maintained the creator-creature distinction, and met pantheism head on. That the monists should be in greater peril at this point was almost inevitable, and their danger was one inherited, however unconsciously, from Spinoza as much as from Hegel. As A.E. Garvie was to say, "In the new theology the distinction between God and man, which morality and religion alike demand, is confused, if not altogether denied".69
Although Coleridge never minimised sin, many of the monists could not give a due account of it. Hence H.R. Mackintosh's complaint concerning the "sophistical manipulation of moral evil" which characterises all absolutisms: evil, for them, can only be on the way to good. Similarly, Professor L. Hodgson urged against William Temple that "if all creation, including myself, be God fulfilling Himself in His historical self-expression, then I, even the sinful I when engaged in sinning, am in the last analysis a mode of God's self-expression".

Again, the immanentist was frequently in difficulties with the historical. As Strauss said, giving the game away, "It is not the fashion of the Idea to pour its fulness in a single life".

Certainly the general tendency has been for immanentists of the monistic kind to be more than a little embarrassed by the Jesus of history; and those Logos immanentists who made so much of the Incarnation tended to do so on principles which made redemption much more of a symbolic idea than an historically accomplished fact: man was already divine, and hence a relatively radical atonement would suffice.

We are the first to grant that the Christian theologian has no biblical or other warrant for excluding God from any part of his creation. We have more than a suspicion, however, that the immanentist way of avoiding deism's remote deity leaves us with more problems than it solves. May it not be that the way to ensure that both immanence and transcendence are accorded their due weight is via a fresh appraisal of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit? But that is a theme for another time — and for a more strictly theological journal.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

3 We italicise these words in order to make plain the fact that Kant is not a straightforward idealist. In fact, as Professor H.D. Aiken reminds us (Ref. 13, p.33), Kant did not hold that mind is the sole reality, or that the mind creates the world it knows. Further, things-in-themselves are independently real. They are not, however, objects of knowledge, and hence "about them the understanding has properly nothing whatever to say". Thus Dr. Alexander is
near the mark when he interprets Kant has holding that "In
the constitution of knowledge the mind contributes as much
as it receives". See The Shaping Forces of Modern
Thought, Glasgow 1920, p.156. But this assertion must
not be understood in such a way as to overlook Kant's
powerful streak of realism, or to make him a Berkeleian
phenomenalist-idealist who believes that we actually
perceive things-in-themselves. Cf. the following
paragraph.

4 J.V. Langmead Casserley, The Christian in Philosophy, 1949,
p.125.

5 A.S. Pringle-Pattison, The Philosophical Radicals, 1907,
(a) p.224; (b) p.266-7; (c) p.256; (d) 291.


7 George Galloway, "What do religious thinkers owe to Kant?"
The Hibbert Journal 1907, 5, 650.

8 C. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, Philadelphia:

9 I. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans.
T.M. Greene and H.H. Hudson, N.Y., Harper Torchbooks 1960,
(a) p.157n; (b) p.95. Later in the same work, however
(pp.178-9), Kant does allow that the idea of grace,
though wholly transcendent, is one which we are entitled
to assume will effect in us what nature can not, on
condition that we use our powers aright. We here verge
upon a Pelagianising doctrine of works: in fact God's
grace is unconditional, or it is not grace. Again, Kant
says that apart from hope in grace, we have no confidence
that the evil in man will be overcome. Such utilitarianism
seems to make a prop out of grace. Michael Despland
provides a useful discussion of Kant on grace in his Kant
on History and Religion, Montreal & London: McGill-Queen's
U.P. 1973, chap. IX.

10 H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, 1937, (a) p.23;
(b) p.48; (c) p.71n; (d) p.100; (e) p.105.

11 E. Brunner, The Mediator, trans. Olive Wyon, Philadelphia:
Alone, 1943, p.34; and D.M. Mackimmon, "Kant's Philosophy
of Religion", Philosophy 1975, 50, pp.131-144.

12 Though H.J. Paton (The Categorical Imperative, 1947, p.196)
writes: Kant's "Formula of Universal Law, insisting as it
does on the spirit as opposed to the letter of the moral
law, is his version of the Christian doctrine that we are
saved by faith and not by works". Two comments require
to be made here: (i) The formula as here described is
rather a plea for integrity and a denunciation of
hypocrisy. (ii) The Christian doctrine, which as
Professor Paton expresses it might imply that faith
itself is a work, is that we are saved by grace through
faith.
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13 H.D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology, N.Y. Mentor Books 1956, (a) p.15; (b) p.71.

14 Quoted by C. Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Yale UP 1972, p.63.

15 A.M. Fairbairn, Christ in Modern Theology, 6th edn. 1894, p.224.

16 F.D.E. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. and ed. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart, Edinburgh, 1960, p.17. For On Religion we use trans. J. Oman, New York: Harper Torchbooks 1958. It is thus misleading when R.S. Franks ("Trends in Recent Theology", The Congregational Quarterly, 1945, 23, 19-29; p.22) says that "Schleiermacher found a new starting-point for theology by going back to Calvin's idea of religion as the way in which we depend upon God"; for to Calvin the dependence was upon a God supernaturally revealed in his Word; to Schleiermacher the supernatural reference is excluded. As W.P. Paterson says "What Schleiermacher was impressed by in Christian experience was in truth an important fact — it was the same fact which impressed Calvin when he studied the content of the believing mind and heart, and was aware of a joyful feeling of assurance that a divine work of reconciliation and regeneration had been wrought, and that it had been wrought by the instrument of the Word of God. The difference was that while Calvin rightly interpreted the feeling as a finger-post pointing to the mine of revealed truth, the subjective school in its typical representatives has looked upon it as being itself the spiritual mine". The Rule of Faith, 1912, pp.168-9. Compare Van A. Harvey, "A Word in Defense of Schleiermacher's Theological Method", The Journal of Religion, 1962, 42, 151-170 with Franks; and for the alternative view see Kenneth Hamilton, "Schleiermacher and Relational Theology", ibid. 1964, 44, 29-39.


19 Schleiermacher, On Religion, Ref. 16, (a) p.88; (b) p.89.

20 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, Ref. 16, (a) p.183; (b) p.65; (c) p.277; (d) para. 98; (e) para. 100.


23 Thus, "At the Reformation, in the Puritan upheaval, and in the Wesleyan revival, it is much clearer that the preaching of a gospel was a cause of the spiritual convulsion, than that the constituent ideas of this gospel were a description and interpretation of the emotional phenomena". W.P. Paterson, Ref. 16, p.128.


25 See e.g. M.F. Wiles, The Remaking of Christian Doctrine, 1974; and for comments upon it see inter alia Nicholas Lash, "The Remaking of Doctrine: Which way shall we go? Irish Theological Quarterly, 1976, 43, 36-43.


29 G.R.G. Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel, 1965, p.40. Cf. W.H. Walsh, Metaphysics, 1966, p.72 and chap. IX. See also H.N. Findlay, Hegel, A Re-examination, 1958, pp. 19-23 and 348-351; and György Nádor, "Hegel on Empiricism", Ratio 1964, 6, pp.154-160. Nador reminds us (p.159) that whereas the empiricist analyst peels the onion until the onion is no more, Hegel is concerned that we shall end up with an onion. He refers us to Hegel's Encyc. II, para. 220, app.

30 G.R.G. Mure, ref. 29, p.35.

31 See E. Caird, ref. 28, (a) Chap. III; (b) pp.138, 140.

32 J.C. O'Neill, "Bultmann and Hegel", Journal of Theological Studies 1970, 21, 400. O'Neill's earlier point to the effect that Hegel and Bultmann rejected the anti-Enlightenment romanticism which made God accessible to feeling only is well made, p.395.


34 F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 1893, p.533.

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37 G.R.G. Mure, "Hegel, Luther and the Owl of Minerva", *Philosophy* 1966, 41, 132. In this article the question is raised as to whether Hegel really thought that his own position implied its own supercession — and also, since the two were in his view inextricably interwoven, the supercession of Christianity. The suggestion is made that Hegel's Lutheranism prompted his moments of recoil from eternal flux, though such moments were never decisive.


43 For a lucid account of the several varieties of nineteenth-century immanentism, and one to which we are much indebted, see C.C.J. Webb, *A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850*, Oxford, 1933, (a) pp.100, 109-111.

44 For Feuerbach see W.B. Chamberlain, *Heaven wasn't his Destination*, 1941.


50 V.F. Storr, ref. 49, pp.127-30.


53 C. Welch, ref. 49, p.114.


56 Buell, ref. 55, p.5. He further notes that "Almost all reached Transcendentalism by way of Unitarianism before they were thirty years old; more than half were at least trained for the Unitarian ministry; almost all the men attended Harvard. Many were from backgrounds of wealth and gentility..." p.7. Not indeed that all Unitarians were open to new ideas. Some remained epistemologically with Locke, and R.V. Holt, commenting on the reception accorded by his fellow Unitarians to Martineau notes George Armstrong, faithful to Locke, who confessed "to a hatred of the instinctive, transcendental and what—not German school of moral and metaphysical philosophy — the spawn of Kant's misunderstood speculations — the dreams of the half-crazed Coleridge, and the inane fancy of the Hares, Sterlings, Whewells, in loud and varied succession since". See R.V. Holt, *The Unitarian Contribution to Social Progress in England*, 2nd rev. edn. 1952, p.343.

57 John McLachlan, *The Divine Image*, 1972, p.158. He further quotes Martineau (Essays I p.103) as saying that Channing's "sense of the inherent greatness of man" was "a fundamental point of faith".


60 For Carlyle see D.A. Wilson, *Life of Thomas Carlyle*, 6 vols. 1923-34.
61 Thirlwall and Hare are in DNB, as is Maurice, for whom see also, ed. J. Frederick Maurice, The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice, 2 vols. 1884; A.R. Vidler, The Theology of F.D. Maurice, 1948; A.M. Ramsey, F.D. Maurice and the Conflict of Modern Theology, CUP 1951; O.J. Brose, F.D. Maurice, Rebellious Conformist, Ohio, 1971.

62 In addition to the general works listed above see P.O.G. White, "Essays and Reviews", Theology, 1960, 63, 46-53; Ieuan Ellis, "'Essays and Reviews' Reconsidered", ibid., 1971, 74, 396-404.

63 H.D.A. Major in The Modern Churchman, 1921, 11, 357; quoted by A.M. Ramsey, ref. 61, p.73.


65 E. Caird's preface to Essays in Philosophical Criticism, eds. A. Seth and R.B. Haldane, 1883, p.5. Caird explains that by this remark Green meant that 'the first development of idealistic thought in Germany had in some degree anticipated what can be the secure result only of wider knowledge and more complete reflexion'.

66 H.R. Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 1923, (a) Chap. "A Philosopher's Theology"; (b) p.266; (c) p.300; (d) quoted, p.284.


