

THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

It is impossible with ordinary emotion to open a book written by a man of whom Bishop GORE has said that he is the greatest spiritual writer of our time. That man is Baron Friedrich von HÜGEL. And the book is written upon that subject which gives fullest scope to spiritual gifts, its subject being Eternal Life. Our expectation is accordingly very high, a severe test of any book. The whole title is *Eternal Life: A Study of its Implications and Applications* (T. & T. Clark; 8s. net).

It is a handsome volume of nearly five hundred pages. And that the author has given himself seriously to it is made manifest at once by its elaborate Table of Contents, and not less elaborate Index of Topics. Rarely does an author take the trouble to prepare these aids so carefully, few authors realizing how necessary they are to the earnest reader, and how little in the way of the superficial book-taster. But it is when we enter the book itself that we understand the meaning of the words of the Bishop of Oxford.

The style arrests us first. No ordinary writer would dare to write so accurately. Every thought has its place; every shade of thought has its own peculiar emphasis. The only writer with whom Baron von HÜGEL can be compared is the late Max MÜLLER. Foreigner though he may once have been, there is not a trace of any foreign idiom.

Rather it is that his mastery of English enables him, as with Max MÜLLER, to use the English language with the daring of one who has a great work to do with it, and knows that like a high-bred and well-mastered steed it will serve him best when he has most to do. Balzac complained of the inadequacy of the French language. But when the writer comes, his language always rises to the height of his great argument.

The subject is Eternal Life. How he came to write upon this subject, and how he made at last such a book as this of it, Baron von HÜGEL states with unsuspecting confidence in the Preface. The book is divided into three parts, the first part being a Historical Retrospect, the second a Contemporary Survey, and the third Prospects and Conclusions. As the second part approaches the end, Baron von HÜGEL tells us what is the value of a knowledge of Eternal Life for the enrichment and efficacy of that life which we have now to live in society. 'The complex,' he says—we shall of necessity use his own words for the most part—'the complex of vivid operative convictions connected with Eternal Life, as we have gradually come to understand it in this book, is fundamentally fivefold.'

'There is, first, a keen yet double sense of *Abidingness*—an absolute Abidingness, pure Simul-

taneity, Eternity, in God; and a relative abidingness, a quasi-eternity, Duration, in man (*qua* personality). And the Eternity is always experienced by man only within, together with, and in contrast to, the Duration. And both Eternity and Duration stand out, in man's deepest consciousness with even painful contrast, against all mere Succession, all sheer flux and change.'

In this first conviction, then, there are two parts. There is the sense of complete unchangeable eternity which belongs to God alone. We do not possess that unchangeableness; but the conviction that God does, gives strength and steadfastness to, all our endeavours. It is the conviction of Clough—

It fortifies my soul to know
That, though I perish, Truth is so:
That, howsoe'er I stray and range,
Whate'er I do, Thou dost not change,
I steadier step when I recall
That, if I slip, Thou dost not fall.

What *we* reach is Duration. It is not unchangeable eternity. Its value to us lies in that. For it means progress; it means the possibility of proceeding from grace to grace, of being changed into His image from glory to glory. And it is a very different thing from the impulsive, unregulated, unprogressive flux and change of the mere animal.

'There is, next, the keen sense of *Otherness in Likeness*. We are genuinely like, and we are genuinely unlike, God, the Realized Perfection. Hence there is ever a certain tension, a feeling of limitation or of emptiness, a looking for a centre outside of, or other than, our own selves.'

Again there are two parts. There is likeness to God. And this likeness is the vindication of that reverence for man, that demand for self-realization, which is not untrue though often used in the interests of secularism. For if there is likeness to God the reverence we feel is reverence for God,

the self-realization is realization of the God whom we actually harbour.

But in this likeness there is 'otherness'—Baron von HÜGEL cannot call it unlikeness. And because of this otherness we never lose humility and a thirst for purification. For 'even the deepest and best of ourselves never is, never will be, God.' So, because there is both Likeness and Otherness, we find a continual reason for self-respect, humility, contrition, each aiding and penetrating the other; and for a faith and certainty, which will never be arrogant, and for a diffidence, which will never be sceptical.

'There is, thirdly, the keen sense of *Other-Worldliness in contrast with This-Worldliness*. There is here a lively conviction that our spiritual personality, and its full beatitude, can never be attained in this life, but only in the other life, after death; and yet that the other life can be begun in this life, indeed that we are, all of us, more or less solicited, here and now, by that other life, and that we cannot consummate it *there*, unless we begin it *here*. And, in this case, as everywhere, the greater and ultimate has to awake and to grow within us, in and through, and in contrast with, the lesser and (eventually) secondary.'

The two sides are again a deep help in all our trials. We labour energetically at the improvement of man's earthly lot; but without philistinism, without impatience or fanaticism, because we know that the best we can do for a man's earthly life will not satisfy him when once he is fully awake. We thus find perpetual escape from all pedantry or feverishness, and this through the gain of an unconquerable, because sober, optimism.

The fourth conviction is a sense, the keenest sense, of *Reality*. 'Our analyses, theories, hypotheses, our very denials and scepticisms, all presuppose realities which environ and influence us, real beings; realities which, together with us real men, constitute one real world. And throughout,

and within, and over against, all these realities is *the* Reality of realities, the Eternal Spirit, God. Indeed, this Source and Sustenance of the other realities is apprehended by us ever with, and in, and through, and over against, those other, various realities that impinge upon our many-levelled lives. And thus our highest certainties awaken with, and require, our lower and lowest ones.'

Once more, the value of the conviction is in its double-sidedness. The great reality is God. And when we are convinced that God *is*, we know that life is a gift worth having. It also is a reality, and all the opportunities it offers are realities. We are filled with faith, courage, joy. We are unhurt by abstract argument or subjectivist theory.

'And finally, there is the keen sense of *Unity in Multiplicity and of Multiplicity in Unity*—of the Organism. Everywhere we find in the real world only such organisms—systems, families, complexes; nowhere sheer, mere unity or units. God Himself (in the deep rich Christian orthodoxy) is a Trinity of Persons; Christ is a Duality of Natures; the Humanity of Christ and of all men is a Trinity of Powers. Our bodies are wondrous organisms, our minds are still more wonderfully organic; and the two together form an organization of an even more marvellous unity in multiplicity. And yet it is not even such a single man who is the true, fundamental social unit, but the family, in which the father, mother, and child are each *sui generis* and essential, as non-interchangeable parts of this rich organism. Thus from a lichen or seaweed up to God Himself—the unspeakable Richness (because incomprehensibly manifold Unity and complete Organization)—we find ever increasingly rich, organized unities. And the great social complexes of Society and the State, of Economics, Science, Art, are all similarly possessed of specific laws of organization. They are strong and beneficent only as special wholes possessed of special parts, which wholes again have to grow and fructify in contact, contrast, and conflict with other such complexes without, and the ever

more or less disorderly elements within, themselves.'

'Here, again, we find an immense help. For thus we are all taught Reverence for each other's spiritual individuality, and for the characteristics of all the great organisms; since each is necessary for all the others. And we gain in Public Spirit; since we feel keenly that no individual or organization, however essential and sacred, can live fully and fruitfully except by living also with and for other individuals and organizations.'

'And, perhaps above all, the religious passion can thus, at last, more and more require and seek the scientific, and the other noble, passions of mankind. For here man has to grow with and through other men and other things, never simply within and through himself. And thus his very religion here drives him to find checks and obstacles even to his standards and ideals—sure, as he is, that he requires purification even in the best of what he is and has, and that God, Who has ordered all things to co-operate towards the good of those who seek and love Him, will ever help his soul to find His Peace and Eternity in even the severest storms and wreckage of its earthly times.'

Professor Adolf DEISSMANN, of the University of Berlin, has paid two visits to Asia Minor. After returning home from the second visit he delivered eight lectures at the University of Upsala, on St. Paul. He then worked these lectures into a book. The book has been translated into English by Mr. Lionel R. M. STRACHAN, M.A., and published under the title of *St. Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History* (Hodder & Stoughton; 10s. 6d. net).

Professor DEISSMANN went to Asia Minor with an open mind and a humble heart. He was ready to learn; he was determined to see. And when he came back it was evident that what he had seen and learned had set him in opposition to the

opinions which theologians have of St. Paul. He came home convinced that he had been able 'to penetrate through the "Paulinism" of our New Testament theologies to the St. Paul of ancient reality.'

He had penetrated through the 'Paulinism' of our New Testament theologies. He had come to see that while 'the work accomplished by the nineteenth century on St. Paul is both by its thoroughness and the magnitude of its production one of the most imposing achievements in the scientific study of religion,' that work as a whole has had far too much to say about St. Paul the theologian and St. Paul's theology. There has been discussion, 'enormous discussion,' of literary questions, especially the authenticity of St. Paul's letters and the relation of the Acts of the Apostles to those letters; but it is chiefly the so-called 'System of the Pauline theology,' or 'Paulinism,' that three generations have wrestled over.

Through Paulinism Professor DEISSMANN has penetrated to the St. Paul of ancient reality. He has been able to see that the St. Paul of theological reflexion is not the real St. Paul. The real St. Paul is a man and a prophet. He is a prophet with the prophetic force of religious experience; he is a man with the energy of practical piety. This St. Paul he discovered in the East. For there he became convinced that 'the people of Iconium, Thessalonica, Corinth, would all have been overtaken by the fate of Eutyclus of Troas if they had been obliged to listen to the Christological, hamartiological, and eschatological paragraphs of modern "Paulinism."'

Was St. Paul no theologian then? Professor DEISSMANN will not say that he was. He will say no more than that he was the pupil of theologians, and that he employed theological methods. He employed theological methods even in his missionary work. Dr. DEISSMANN admits that. But he refuses on that account to rank 'the tent-maker of Tarsus with Origen, Thomas Aquinas,

and Schleiermacher.' His place is rather with Amos the herdman of Tekoa and with Tersteegen the ribbon-weaver of Mülheim. That is to say, he was a practical man of affairs and a mystic. In so far as St. Paul was a theologian he simply used the rules of Rabbinism he had been brought up to. What is best in him belongs not to theology but to religion. He is a religious genius. And it is because he is a religious genius and not a theologian that his outlook is not backward but always 'forward into a future of universal history.'

Now as a religious genius, whatever that may be, St. Paul had a double experience. He had the experience of Christ after the flesh and he had the experience of Christ after the spirit. Professor DEISSMANN does not take the words in 2 Co 5¹⁶, 'we have known Christ after the flesh' to mean that St. Paul had had personal acquaintance with the earthly Jesus. He says that if that were so, the concluding words, 'now we know him no more,' would be trivial. But there *was* a Christ after the flesh. St. Paul knew that as surely as the rest of the Christians did. There was also a Christ after the spirit. And in the judgment of Professor DEISSMANN these two are so different that it is right to give them different names. It is right to call the first 'Jesus,' He being simply human. The other should be called 'Jesus Christ,' to make it clear once for all that only after His ascension did the disciples recognize the Deity of the Lord and did enter upon 'the Cult of Jesus Christ.'

'The Cult of Jesus Christ'—it is Professor DEISSMANN'S phrase. It is Professor DEISSMANN'S discovery. And he is proud of it. He is aware that men talk freely now of 'Jesus' and of 'Christ,' identifying or distinguishing as their inclination lies. Long before men talked so, he had discovered the difference and had used the two words differently. He had used the word 'Jesus' when he spoke of the Gospel; and he had used the word 'Christ,' or rather 'Jesus Christ,' when he spoke of the Cult. It is the discovery of his life,

and he has written this book for the purpose, above everything else, of showing that St. Paul knew the Gospel of Jesus and also the Cult of Jesus Christ.

Ten years ago no anti-Christian apologetic was so effective as the argument that everything in Christianity had its parallel in other forms of religion. For the originality of Christianity, or rather its singularity, was held then to be its most admirable characteristic.

But ten years of study have altered that. Singularity is now the last thing that is claimed for Christianity. Not only is it admitted that there are parallels to its most cherished beliefs and its most sacramental institutions; it is also acknowledged that the singularity of Christianity would be the surrender of its claim to be the religion of all mankind.

It is therefore without the least apprehension now that we read a book by Professor Salamon REINACH of Paris. Professor REINACH has made himself known as a diligent worker in the comparative study of religion. He has also made himself notorious as a keen antagonist of Christianity. His knowledge is not unfathomable; but whatever knowledge he possesses he uses in the effort to shake the influence and arrest the progress of the religion of Christ. And there was a time when this effort of his was looked upon with alarm. It was even accepted by the indolent as a sufficient excuse for remaining ignorant of what the comparative study of religion is.

It is not so now. In his most recently translated book, *Cults, Myths and Religions* (Nutt; 7s. 6d. net), Professor REINACH traces the origin of prayers for the dead. And, however dear the practice of praying for the dead may be to us, we can follow his evidence sympathetically, and have not the least concern as to where it may lead us.

It seems to lead us to Egypt. For Professor

REINACH begins by saying that the Greeks and Romans did not pray for their dead. They prayed, not *for* their dead, but *to* them. Their dead were gods. If, at least, they had been great on earth, they took their place after death among the multitude of divinities. Sacrifices were offered to them, and their aid was invoked in prayer.

But after a little Professor REINACH tells us that this was not the only religion of the Greeks and Romans. This was the official religion. There was a popular religion which subsisted side by side with this, and at last supplanted it. In the popular religion the dead were judged according to their conduct in this life. Some were sent incontinent to the Elysian Fields, the abode of the blessed; others were hurled into Tartarus. Now this popular religion of Greece and Rome recognized prayer for the dead. But the practice seems not to be found until Greece and Rome had come into contact with the religion of the Egyptians.

We are accordingly sent to Egypt. And in Egypt the prayers for the dead—if they may be called prayers for the dead—are extremely simple and natural. ‘It is the solemn moment,’ writes Maspero, ‘when the dead man, leaving the town where he had lived, begins his journey to another world. The multitudes assembled on the banks salute him with good wishes: “May you reach in peace the West of Thebes! In peace, in peace to Abydos! Go down in peace to Abydos, toward the Western Sea!”’ Or again, “Serapis, grant him victory over his enemies,”—enemies, that is, whom the dead man might encounter on his journey to the realms of bliss,—“give him good welcome, Lord Serapis.”’ These prayers, we say, are extremely simple and natural, but they seem to be a beginning.

Now the only book of Scripture, in which there has been found an undeniable reference to prayer for the dead is the apocryphal second book of Maccabees. This book relates (12⁴³⁻⁴⁴) that the soldiers of Judas Maccabæus, on stripping the corpses of a few companions of theirs who had

fallen in an engagement with Gorgias, the governor of Idumæa, found a number of amulets under their tunics. As these articles were forbidden by the Jewish Law, Judas 'prayed that this transgression might be blotted out,' and sent 2000 drachms of silver to Jerusalem as a sin-offering. 'Wherein,' comments the author of the book, 'he did very well and honestly in that he was mindful of the resurrection: for if he had not hoped that they that were slain should have risen again, it had been superfluous and vain to pray for the dead.'

Professor REINACH believes that in making this comment the author or editor of the second book of Maccabees fell into a mistake. He believes that Judas Maccabæus had no such idea in his mind when he sent the money to Jerusalem. All that he desired to do was by means of this sin-offering to purify the people who had come under the displeasure of God through the unholy act of their comrades in concealing amulets about their persons. It was the act of a careful commander, anxious that no displeasure of God should imperil his soldiers' success in war. But as for prayers for the dead or a resurrection, Professor REINACH sees no evidence that Judas Maccabæus believed in one or the other.

It was not until the second book of Maccabees was written, and it was because the writer of it had come under Egyptian influence, that the idea or the practice of prayer for the dead was known to the Jews. Even then—the date is about 120 B.C.—it was only a sect of the Jews that recognized it. 'In short,' says Professor REINACH, 'everything tends to prove that the custom of praying for the dead was introduced, in the first century before our era, in certain Jewish communities, particularly in those of Egypt, to one of which the writer of the second book of Maccabees belonged. It had not yet been adopted by the Palestine which listened to the teaching of Jesus—who never speaks of it, although very positive on the subject of a future life and the judgment of souls according to their merits.'

'The Great Doctrine of Justification has not, in general, been occupying a position of special prominence in Christian circles of late years. The reason seems to be that current interpretations scarcely commend themselves. I have a grave suspicion that the general Christian public has a feeling that either the interpreters have somewhere missed the mark or else the doctrine is an antiquated relic fit only for a museum.'

And so, the Rev. E. J. Watson WILLIAMS, who writes these words, offers *A Plea for a Re-consideration of St. Paul's Doctrine of Justification*, in a substantial volume, which has been published at the Century Press (Bennett; 4s.). His plea is a careful study of the use of the word in Scripture and (wisely) in the vernacular Greek of St. Paul's day; and the offer of a wholly new meaning for it.

There are two doctrines of justification. There is 'what is usually styled the "Catholic" doctrine,' and there is 'the so-called Protestant or Evangelical doctrine.' The 'Catholic' interpretation is an attempt, says Mr. WILLIAMS, 'to expound this doctrine in such a way as to make it commendable.' Its weakness is its exegesis. It does not use St. Paul's words in the way that St. Paul understood them. Whatever he meant by the word or words which we translate 'declare righteous,' he certainly did not mean 'make righteous.'

The 'Protestant' doctrine is strong exegetically, but it does not seem to Mr. WILLIAMS to 'ring altogether true.' He gives it in the words of Professor PFLEIDERER (an unexpected choice of an 'evangelical'): 'This "justifying" or "reckoning righteous" is not recognizing righteousness that is there, but ascribing righteousness that is not there to the man who is in fact Godless.' And then he quotes, with much approval, the words of SANDAY and HEADLAM: 'There is something sufficiently startling in this. The Christian life is made to have its beginning in a fiction. No wonder that the fact is questioned, and that another sense is given to the words.'

It is in St. Paul, and only in St. Paul, that the difficulty is found. Mr. WILLIAMS believes that St. Paul used the words in a special and technical sense. He certainly did not coin his meaning, far less the words themselves. The Greek words were freely used, and in that sense, by St. Paul's contemporaries. They obtained their special meaning because they were translations of Hebrew words which had that meaning in the Old Testament.

The Old Testament words are *zedek* and *zēdākah*. They are rendered familiar even to English ears by Murray M'CHEYNE'S hymn—'Jehovah Tsidkenu was nothing to me.' What do these words mean? Because they are translated into Greek by the words *dikaios* and *dikaiosunē*, which in the classical writers mean good or righteous and goodness or righteousness, it has been assumed that the Hebrew words had that meaning. It is the other way, says Mr. WILLIAMS. Instead of interpreting the Hebrew words by the Greek (which may have had a different meaning from the classical by the time of St. Paul), interpret the Greek by the Hebrew.

But how are we to know the meaning of the Hebrew words? We have the Hebrew method of writing in parallels to help us. The employment of this method of writing makes it possible to ascertain the meaning of any Hebrew word, if it is used frequently enough. The Hebrew words before us are used very frequently indeed. No doubt the Hebrew parallel is not exact. It is of the very soul of it that there should be some difference, a direct contrast or at least a little progress in the thought. But that only makes the assurance that the correct meaning is obtained more sure.

Well, what do the Hebrew words mean? Mr. WILLIAMS observes first of all that the word rendered 'righteousness' is often associated with a word rendered 'judgment.' And the association (on the accepted meaning of these words) is some-

times very peculiar. In Ps 33⁵ we read of the Lord that 'He loveth righteousness and judgment.' Does this mean that He loves righteousness in a man? What, then, is the judgment that He also loves? In Ps 103⁶ we read, 'The Lord executeth righteous acts, and judgments for all that are oppressed.' Here 'righteous acts' are literally 'righteousnesses'; and if again these 'righteousnesses' are the righteous acts of any good Israelite, what are the judgments?

Mr. WILLIAMS answers that the judgments have nothing to do with decisions. The atmosphere of the law courts is far from them. What was the judge in Israel? A lawyer? There is a Book of Judges. Is it a digest of the law of the land? The judges in Israel might be administrators of law, but if they were so it was quite by the way. They were really warriors; and when they ruled they ruled not by the majesty of the law but by the power of the sword. Their judgments were in like manner, not the decisions of a judge in a court of law, but the acts of a general on the battlefield.

'The Lord executeth righteousnesses and judgments for all that are oppressed.' His judgments are the acts by which He delivers them from their oppression; His righteousnesses are the acts which set them on high among their enemies. In short, righteousness is just the opposite of 'confusion of face,' with which it is placed in contrast in Dn 9⁷, 'O Lord, righteousness belongeth unto thee, but unto us confusion of face.'

Now turn to St. Paul. Once upon a time St. Paul's belief had been that a man is 'justified' by the Law. What did he understand by that? Not that the Law was a law court or a lawyer. These things were not in all his thoughts. He understood that by keeping the Law a man was delivered from his foes and from his fears. He has no more 'confusion of face,' or, in our own language, he can hold up his head. He believed that by keeping the Law a man could hold up his head before God and man. He was not righteous, the

idea of morality was not in it ; and not good, there was no sense of sanctity attaching to it. He was—the word is not easily found, we ought to have coined or adapted it long ago. Mr. WILLIAMS suggests 'vindicated,' but that refers rather to the act of the Law—the judgment—than to the state of the man. Whatever word is chosen the meaning is clear. The man stands qualified for whatever honour men can bestow and whatever glory God has to give.

Why did St. Paul give up the idea that a man is so qualified by the Law? Simply because he found that he was not so qualified. The Law was not able to do it. The word did not change its meaning: St. Paul changed his opinion of the Law. What the Law could not do Christ did. And any man could by faith in Christ make his own what Christ did. Christ having executed judgment on all his oppressors, he could hold up his head before God and man.

The Person of Jesus Christ.

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IN attempting, at the request of the Editor, a preliminary notice of the new work by Professor H. R. Mackintosh, on the doctrine of the Person of Christ, I must disclaim all idea of adequately estimating the book. It is far too rich in suggestion, and too thorough in its handling of a great and arduous theme, to make any adequate judgment of it possible without much fuller opportunity of examining and weighing it. I shall therefore confine myself mainly to giving some brief account of its plan and execution, and shall only touch upon its actual contribution to the discussion, and upon some of the thoughts which it suggests.

One may say at once that the book is of exceptional quality and richness, and more than fulfils all the expectations which the earlier writings of the author had led one to expect. There are very few recent theological volumes on the same plane of all-round distinction, for knowledge, for constructive power, and, not least, for admirable lucidity and arrangement. It is nothing less than masterly as a piece of exposition, a quality which comes out alike in the architectonic of the argument and the charm of the style.

It consists of three sections, following the usual modern schema of Exegesis, History, and Reconstruction.

The first of these deals with a survey of the Evangelic and Apostolic Christology. Little need be said here of this or of the following section. Both are throughout excellent. Especially note-

worthy in this first section is the candour with which the writer admits the 'subordinationist' elements in the Apostolic teaching, recognizing in the clearest way that while the highest view of our Lord's Personality is a structural part of New Testament thought, there is another strand of thinking intimately interwoven with it which, to superficial observation, seems to be radically at variance with that higher view. Surely scholarship has, finally, to all intents determined what the New Testament data actually are, and the real controversy has shifted to their historical antecedents, their constructive interpretation, and their religious value.

The second section is equally good. The author's knowledge of the whole vast field is wide and deep. Whether he is dealing with the ancient or the modern field, we get the same sense of adequate knowledge and precision of statement which mark the scholar in theology as in other regions.

The more recent developments as represented by the Ritschlian and post-Ritschlian Schools receive special attention, not only in this, but in the two last sections of the book. I know of no Christological treatise where these are so fully discussed. I should say that the writer's own positions have been determined mainly in view of these later developments. He feels strongly, and I believe rightly, that these latter theories, if carried consistently through, would mean the destruction or