

1802 zu den Proverbien. The transcription is due to Dr. Otto Hoppmann (Hinrichs; M. 10).

Messrs. Hinrichs are also the publishers of a brochure by Professor Strack, entitled *P'saḥim der Mišnatraktat Passafest* (M. 1.80).

Under the title of *Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu*, Dr. Heinrich Schumacher has published a critical and exegetical study of Mt 11²⁷, 'All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him.' It is one of the most elaborate and exhaustive studies of a Scripture text that we have had for a long time.

An essay by Bertram, Bishop of Norwich, on the origin and meaning of the title 'Son of Man,' has been published by Mr. Murray both in Latin and in English. The title is *De Verbis Filii Hominis* (1s. 6d. net).

To the literature on the historicity of Jesus add *Wissen wir etwas Sicheres über Jesus?* by Johannes Jeremias (Deichert; M. 0.80).

The same publishers issue what is called a 'religio-psychological' study by Lic. Dr. Werner Elert, under the title of *Die Religiosität des Petrus*, (M. 1.50).

They also publish a volume of talks to young theologians on the parables in Mt 13, with the title *Altes und Neues aus dem Schatz eines Hausvaters* (M. 2.40).

Messrs. Williams & Norgate have issued the last portion of the new edition of H. J. Holtzmann's *Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie*, as edited by Jülicher & W. Bauer (1s. 6d.).

The latest issue of Harnack's 'Beiträge' is entitled *Über den privaten Gebrauch der Heiligen Schriften in der Alten Kirche* (Hinrichs; M. 3).

The Doctrine of the Incarnation in the Creeds.

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IV.

(1) THE adequacy of the metaphysical formulæ used in regard to the Person of Christ can only be tested by a minute examination of the terms employed. The most famous term is *ὁμοούσιον*, consubstantial, which is expanded in the phrase *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς*. (i.) It is well known that the term gave great offence to many conservative theologians, for it was suspected as having been used by Sabellianism, in which the three persons (*πρόσωπα*, not *ὑποστάσεις*) are only modes, successive in time, of the *οὐσία* (substantia) of God, who is unity (*μονάς*). These modes are consubstantial, and so *ὁμοούσιον* appeared to threaten a return to this modal monarchianism. (ii.) We must trace the use of the term *οὐσία* further back in order to fix the meaning of Athanasius, and thus to show whether this reproach was justified or not. 'The term *οὐσία* (essence) in Aristotle, signified first a thing in the concrete, which is a subject and cannot be a predicate, an individual object, the supporter of attributes; and secondly, a class, be it a species or a larger class, a genus'

(Fisher's *History of Christian Doctrine*, p. 137). This ambiguity of the term is a serious defect when it is used in precise definition to mark off orthodoxy from heresy. It is certain that Athanasius did not mean that Christ was an individual of a divine species or genus, and the Father another; for that would have been a return to polytheism, and would have made the trinity not a unity, but a society. Popular Christian language, it must be observed, often comes perilously near such tritheism. But, on the other hand, if Athanasius had meant that Father and Son are an individual subject, the supporter of attributes, he would have fallen back into modalism, a denial of the eternal distinction of Father and Son in the unity of the Godhead. His meaning lies between regarding Christ and God as one individual, and as two individuals of one species or genus. While more is meant than a qualitative similarity, not quite as much as a quantitative identity is intended. Neither of the two original senses of the term *οὐσία* can be carried over into

the meaning he assigned to *δμοούσιον*. Certainly the rival term *δμοιούσιον* was not preferable, for it denies both the unity of substance and even the sameness of the class to which Christ and God belong. (iii.) The Creed of Chalcedon, probably unintentionally, takes advantage of the ambiguity of the term to describe Christ as also *δμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα*. This must mean that Christ and we belong to the same species—man, for it is not likely that the fathers assumed an individual entity—mankind, to which individual men hold similar relation as the Father and the Son to the unity of the Godhead. The following clause seems to indicate this *κατὰ πάντα ὁμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*; Christ is not one with us, but like to us as belonging to the same species. This difference in the meaning of the term *οὐσία* may perhaps be made plainer by an illustration in our English speech. It means both the abstract general as mankind, and the concrete general as *the man*. To speak of Christ's divinity or Godhead is not to affirm what Athanasius meant by *δμοούσιον*. He intended to assert that the Son no less and no otherwise than the Father belongs to the one God.

(2) Again, how far does the phrase *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς* carry us? This is the Nicene formula; the Chalcedon Creed reads: *πρὸ αἰῶνον ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα*, and *ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς Παρθένου τῆς Θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα*. The Athanasian statement runs: 'Deus est ex substantia Patris ante saecula genitus: Homo ex substantia Matris in saeculo natus.' Here, again, words are used ambiguously: (i.) The generation out of the substance of the Father expresses in the intention of the Creed distinction but not separation; the generation out of the substance of the mother surely expresses separation. Thus the Nicene formula, if we were to interpret it by the parallelism in the Athanasian, would not necessarily guard the unity of Father and Son in the Godhead, but might mean separation as well as distinction. Two further questions about this language may be asked. (ii.) Does not the term *generation*, even when qualified by the epithet *eternal*, suggest not only the origin of one individual in another, but even the subsequent separation of the one from the other? Again, in the phrase in the Athanasian symbol *ex substantia Matris*, is not the term *substantia* used in a more narrowly physical reference than its proper mean-

ing allows? A physical analogy may illustrate the different senses of the parallel phrases. As the branch may be said to be of the substance of the tree, so is the Son of the Father; as the offspring is of the substance of the parent, so is Christ of Mary. One other consideration must at this point be advanced. It will be observed how carefully the derivation from Mary is guarded by the qualifying phrase *κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα*. Is the description of Mary as *τῆς Θεοτόκου* not illogical, inconsistent? If the being generated from Mary was confined to the manhood, how can the generating be extended to the Godhead? One feels that the title is inserted not because it was necessary, but because the phrase had been accepted as orthodox.

(3) Another term employed, the meaning of which is ambiguous, is *φύσις*. In the phrase *ἐν δύο φύσεσιν*, or *ἐκ δύο φύσεων*, the term seems to be nearly, if not quite, equivalent to *οὐσία*. Popularly nature and substance are used interchangeably; but, strictly defined, the difference is that between manhood and mankind or the man. The substance is the existent entity; the nature is the totality of its attributes or characteristics. 'Different substances might have attributes in common, and so their natures might be similar; but they themselves remained distinct, and in thought at least could be distinguished from their natures; while the natures, too, of different things might have much in common with one another, but yet remained distinct, and could be spoken of almost as if they were real existences in themselves. This, however, was only a loose mode of speech—the reality was always the "substance" to which the nature belonged. The "nature" was not conceived of as being the "substance," nor the "substance" as being the "nature." "It" was not "its nature," nor was "its nature" "it" (Bethune-Baker, p. 48). (i.) Recognizing this distinction, we may urge that what the Creed of Chalcedon did by changing from the term *οὐσία* to the term *φύσις* was to introduce ambiguity in the statement. Whenever we sum up the orthodox Christology in the phrase 'two natures in one person,' we do not mean exactly what the fathers intended. They meant to affirm two substances in the one person, unconfused and unchanged, although they used at this point 'nature' for 'substance.' They meant a divine subject and a human subject distinct the one from the other, in one person (*πρόσωπον, ἰπόστασις*),

as the subsequent disputes about one will or two wills show. (ii.) What most persons using the formula to-day would probably mean (and think themselves, under cover of the ambiguity of language, in close agreement with the creeds), is this, one subject possessing both human and divine attributes in so far as these are consistent. We identify subject and person: it is one and the same self that thinks, feels, wills; and it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to think two subjects or selves, God and man, in the unity of one person. (iii.) The Athanasian Creed confirms an interpretation of the Chalcedonian, for it runs: 'Unus domino, non confusione Substantiae, sed Unitate Personae.' It is two substances, subjects of attributes in the strict sense of the word, and not two natures in the proper use of the term, that the Creed of Chalcedon means to assert as united, unmixed, unchanged, undivided, unseparated, in one person.

(4) These four adverbs deserve closer study as they set the bounds within which the conception of the union of the natures, or more strictly the substances, must be confined. (i.) *ἀσυγχύτως*, 'without confusion,' forbids the thought of any blending into the unity of one subject of subjects so distinguished from, nay, even opposed to, one another as God and man; and the reason is distinctly given in the explanatory declaration of the Council 'by this confusion teaching the monstrous doctrine that the divine nature of the only-begotten is passable.' While the man in Christ suffered, it is, according to this Council, monstrous to believe that the God in Him suffered with the man. This is the pagan notion of the gods 'careless of mankind'; it is certainly not the God and Father revealed in the Son and Saviour. One subject in Christ thus suffered, and the other did not, and could not. How can we conceive any personal unity here? (ii.) *ἀτρέπτως*, 'without conversion,' forbids the thinking any real humiliation of God, or any real exaltation of man in the Incarnation. Paul's declaration in Ph 2⁷ (*ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν*) would be heresy to be condemned. This is the *static* view of God and man, while the Scriptural view, and the view of modern theology is *dynamic*. This too is an inheritance from Greek philosophy which exalted Being above Becoming, which conceived ultimate reality as substance, and not as spirit. And it is surely quite impossible for us with our different outlook to accept this limitation. (iii.) *ἀδιαπέρος* and

ἀχωρίστως, 'without division,' 'never to be separated,' may be taken together as asserting against Nestorius, or rather against what Nestorius was supposed to teach the unity of Christ's person. The doctrine of two substances (*οὐσίαι*), however, makes it difficult, nay, impossible, to understand how the framers of the creed would have us conceive the unity concretely. Their assertion 'the distinction of natures being in no wise done away because of the union, but rather the characteristic property of each nature being preserved, and concurring into one Person and one substance,' becomes intelligible in the measure in which we recognize the affinity of God and man, and God's communicativeness in grace, and man's receptiveness in faith, and depart from the rigid separation of God and man which is throughout the creed assumed. The first two adverbs against Eutyches and Apollinaris are inconsistent with the last two directed against Nestorius. These inconsistencies show how impossible it is by abstract metaphysical formulæ to do justice to concrete historical reality.

(5) The two words used for person, *πρόσωπον* and *ὑπόστασις* next invite our attention. (i.) It is freely admitted even by the defenders of these creeds that the Greek philosophy from which the formulæ were drawn, had no adequate conception of personality, and that it is due to the influence of Christianity in invigorating the moral conscience and vitalizing the religious consciousness that the modern conception of personality is so much clearer and fuller. Ancient Philosophy was objective, it was concerned with the idea in the thing known; modern philosophy is subjective, it inquires about the subject knowing. We must keep this distinction constantly in view, as an inadequate conception of personality alone explains how it was possible for these thinkers to conceive two substances in one person unconfused and unchanged. (ii.) The term *πρόσωπον* means face, countenance, or expression of the face, appearance as regards condition or circumstance. In Sabellianism the term is applied to the three modes through which the divine unity passes. Father, Son, and Spirit are *masks* or *rôles* successively assumed by the one God. Nestorius, as well as the orthodox fathers who condemned him, used the term. 'When Nestorius insisted that he believed our Lord Jesus Christ, in His Godhead and His manhood to be "one *prosopon*," it was not that they

suspected the term *prosopon* of any hidden heretical meaning, but that they did not believe that he really believed what he said that he believed' (Bethune-Baker, p. 52). (iii.) But, it may be asked, why was he then suspected and condemned? It was because his use of the term *ὑπόστασις* was different. He declined to confess our hypostasis or a hypostatic union in Christ; and in his refusal he was justified by the older usage of the term, on which a new meaning had been put.

(a) 'To express the conception "substance" he used either of the two Greek synonyms *ousia* and *hypostasis*, the latter more frequently than the former' (Bethune-Baker, p. 49). 'Ousia is properly Platonic, while hypostasis, a comparatively modern and rare word, is properly Stoic' (Bigg, *The Christian Platonists*, p. 164). In using the term *ὑπόστασις* as = *οὐσία* he was entirely justified by its previous history. It means (1) 'that which settles at the bottom, sediment'; (2) 'anything set under, a support.' From this second meaning two metaphorical uses are derived, 'the groundwork or subject-matter of a thing,' and 'the foundation or ground of hope or confidence, confidence, resolution'; (3) 'subsistence, reality; substance, nature, essence.' From the time of Melito in the East and Tertullian in the West, two substances in the person of Christ had been affirmed. In the Anathemas attached to the Nicene Creed there is the phrase *ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας*, showing that the terms were then regarded as equivalent, and Athanasius in one of his later writings asserts their identical meaning.

(b) In the later decades of the fourth century, however, a new meaning had been imposed on the word *hypostasis* by some of the Greek theologians. They had come to use it as equivalent to *prosopon* for the three 'modes of existence' in the one substance of the Godhead; and this use had found general, but not universal, acceptance. Nestorius himself recognizes it. There is no distinct proof, however, that the term had been used for the person of Christ, as the unity of the Godhead and manhood.

(c) Even Cyril is not consistent in his use of the noun *hypostasis*, and the adjective *hypostatic*; and his translator Marius Mercator renders it sometimes 'substantia,' and sometimes 'subsistentia,' but never by the definite *persona*. Probably it served Cyril's purpose to use the ambiguous term, as his own mind wavered

between a unity of nature and a unity of person, for Eutyches believed himself to be following in the footsteps of Cyril in his monophysitism. Monophysites regarded *φύσις* as equal to *ὑπόστασις*, and so asserted one nature as well as person in Christ: identifying *φύσις* with *ὑπόστασις* in the Godhead, some of them landed in tritheism. 'If we regard this hypostatic union,' says Cyril (*τὴν καθ' ὑποστάσιν ἔνωσιν*), 'either as impossible or unmeet, we fall into the error of making two sons.' To avoid the duality of persons he assumes that the humanity was impersonal. 'Scripture does not say that the Word united to Himself the person (*πρόσωπον*) of a man, but that "he became flesh." But *οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος*—both Nestorius and Monophysites insisted. The Son unchanged 'became partaker of flesh and blood,' 'but even when taking to Himself flesh still remaining what He was.' These sentences would suggest that it was human body the divine Son assumed; but Cyril adds afterwards that 'the holy Body *was* endued with a rational soul' ('The Second Epistle to Nestorius' in *On Faith and the Creed*, pp. 100-101). Our psychology does not allow us, however, to conceive a rational soul that is not personal.

(d) Nestorius' objection to Cyril's view of the hypostatic union was that it involved a change and confusion of the divine and the human substance in Christ. The terms *hypostasis* and *ousia* ('subsistentia' and 'substantia'), originally identical in meaning, in course of time came to be used in the doctrine of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ in different, and even inconsistent, senses. *Ousia* expresses the unity of the Godhead, and *hypostasis* the unity in the person of Christ. *Hypostasis* expresses the trinity in the Godhead, and *ousia* the duality in the person of Christ. In the one case we have three *hypostases* in one *ousia*; in the other two *ousiai* in one *hypostasis*.

(e) This discussion of the terms employed shows not only the injustice of the condemnation of Nestorius due to the ambition and rivalry of Cyril rather than to any real divergence from Christian truth; but even more the inadequacy of the metaphysical ideas and terms with which the Creeds attempt to define the nature of the Godhead and the person of Christ. If we attach exactly the same meaning to the word *ὑποστάσις* or *πρόσωπον*, 'subsistentia' or 'persona,' in the doctrine of the Trinity as in the doctrine of Christ, we deny the divine

unity. If we give exactly the same meaning to *οὐσία* or 'substantia' in the doctrine of Christ as in the doctrine of the Trinity, we deny the unity of His person. The Creeds maintain an unstable equilibrium between the unity and the duality of the person of Christ, Christian thought since has tended either towards Nestorianism in its common acceptance or to Eutychanism; Calvinism inclines

to the former, and Lutheranism to the latter. The Creed of Chalcedon was only an enforced truce; for it is through and through a theological compromise. A durable peace can be hoped for only, if not only the conclusions, but even the assumptions of the creeds are re-examined, and we can reach categories of thought more adequate to the reality to be interpreted.

In the Study.

Virginibus Quærisque.

Ready, aye Ready.

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'I am ready.'—ROM. i. 15.

THIS is the motto of one of our old Scottish families. Long ago one of our Scottish kings, James v., was about to advance against the English. He assembled his nobles at Fala, and none of them were willing to follow the Royal Standard with the single exception of Sir John Scott, who said he was ready to serve his king anywhere. King James was so pleased with the loyalty of Sir John Scott that he gave him the right to add a sheaf of spears to his coat of arms and this motto—a sheaf, a bunch of spears, representing a company of armed men, with this word—'Ready, aye Ready.'

If the Apostle Paul had a motto, I think it might have been something like this. In his letters and speeches you come again and again upon this word—'I am ready.' This was just the kind of man Paul was—a quick little man, swift, prompt, prepared, aye ready.

I want to give the motto to the boys and girls to-day. You have gone back to school: you are looking forward to the work of the session, and much farther forward to life. What a splendid thing if you really make this your motto and always say—'Ready!'

You may begin with it early in the morning. When that knock comes to the door, very aggravating it is on a dark winter morning, is this what you say as you jump up quickly—'I'm ready'; or do you say something else, or say nothing at all?

Then perhaps you will get into the habit of being ready; and it will help you all your life. If you

keep your eyes open, you will see that there are two kinds of boys—the quick boy and the slow boy. The quick boy has the best of it. Best at his lessons, best at his games. The quick eye, the ready hand, the swift foot—these count for something. And he is best too in life and the work of life when he comes to it.

When all the school-days are done, and the student-days, and the apprentice-days—when you come to the work of life, will you say—'I am ready'? School-days are days for getting ready, and it is a terrible thing to be pushed out to your work when you are not ready for it. Think of the medical student who shirked his work. Everybody wondered how he managed to get through his exams., but he did in a kind of way. Then he was sent to take somebody's practice in the country. One day he was called to a serious case miles away, and when he stood at the bedside he did not know what to do. He went home ashamed, to read up about it when it was too late—home like a beaten hound because he knew that if he had done his work as a student he would never have been helpless that day. Terrible it is to come to your work in life and say, 'Not prepared.'

It is God who gives us our work. Isaiah heard God in the Temple, and said, 'Here am I, send me.' Samuel, the little minister, heard God calling, and said, 'Speak, Lord; for thy servant heareth.' Paul at Damascus heard the voice from heaven, and said, 'What wilt thou have me to do?' They all said, 'Ready!' Our life is like that. Whatever our work may be, building houses or baking bread, writing books or printing books or selling books, a doctor's work or a minister's work, every day it is God who calls, and we should say, 'I am ready.'

Sometimes I wonder if there are any of our boys